

Lund University  
Graduate School  
Master of Science in Global Studies  
Department of Political Science

SIMV07 (30 ECTS)  
Supervisor : Erik Ringmar  
Term : Spring 2015



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## **Securitization of Transit Forced Migrants**

*An Analysis of the Changing Representations of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in  
Indonesian Major Print Media*

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## Abstract

This thesis aims to explain how and why the representations of transit forced migrants in Indonesian major print media were vastly different within two time spans: (1) during the arrivals of the Indochinese refugees in 1975-1996 and (2) in the period of the new generations of refugees from Middle Eastern and South Asian countries in 1997-2013. Employing media content analysis of 216 news articles from three major print media in Indonesia, this study found out that the Indochinese refugees were portrayed with positive labels and thus, mainly discussed in connection with the non-security theme. In contrast, the new generations of forced migrants were portrayed with negative labels such as ‘illegal immigrants’ and were framed as security threats. Grounded within Securitization Theory, this thesis thus argues that the changing representations were caused by the securitizing move made by specialized agencies in Indonesia. Additionally, this study took one further step by questioning: why were the Indochinese refugees not securitized? And why were the new generations of refugees securitized? To provide answers for these questions, this thesis employs theoretical thematic analysis concentrating on subconscious drivers and cost-benefit calculations that lead to the actors’ decision to securitize or not to securitize the forced migrants.

**Keywords:** *transit forced migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, media representations, Securitization Theory, Indonesia.*

Words: 20,116

## **Acknowledgement**

This thesis has been produced during my scholarship period at Lund University, thanks to a Swedish Institute scholarship. I express my sincere gratitude to Erik Ringmar, my supervisor, for his insightful inputs during the process of this thesis writing. I also thank Kristina Jönsson, my examiner, for her encouraging and constructive comments. In addition, I would like to thank the board of editors of Kompas Daily who granted me a sabbatical leave to study at Lund University – in particular to my editors who stood up for supporting my study leave’s application: Mas Banu, Mas Sutta, and Mas Imam. I also thank the Manager of Education and Training Division of Kompas Daily, Mbak Poppie. Nevertheless, I should also thank Pusat Informasi Kompas – especially Mas Ari – and Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo for assisting me while searching for news archives. I thank my family – especially my mother, my wife, Yenni Astriaty Saleh, and my lovely boy, Altair Ivander Lee, my colleagues who kindly gave valuable comments on this thesis: Aydin Baran Gürpınar, Shane Isler, Andrew Garnett, and Benni Yusriza. Last but not least, I also express my gratitude to Ladaea Rylander from Lund University’s Academic Support Center.

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## **Abbreviations**

AFP	: Australian Federal Police
DGI	: Directorate-General of Immigration
IDPs	: Internally Displaced Persons
IDR	: Indonesian Rupiah
INP	: Indonesian National Police
IOM	: International Organization for Migration
UNHCR	: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US	: United States
USA	: United States of America
USD	: United States Dollar

“If ASEAN countries refuse to provide protection for **refugees** then the third countries will use it as an excuse for not receiving the **refugees**.”<sup>1</sup>

*(Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs on Kompas newspaper, 14 July 1979)*

“They are **illegal immigrants**. Should we let them come in, even when our law does not allow it?”<sup>2</sup>

*(Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs on Tempo magazine, 9 September 2001)*

## 1. Introduction

These statements commenting on transit forced migrants by two different Indonesian Foreign Affairs Ministers from two different periods of time provide an excellent illustration of the changes in the way the Indonesian government labels asylum seekers and refugees in media. During 1975-1996, Indonesia hosted hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees. After this period, Indonesia has been receiving much smaller, but steadily increasing, numbers of Middle Eastern and South Asian forced migrants. The first statement used ‘refugees’ to represent people who flee their home country due to political instability and conflict. In line with this label, the government also discussed the issue of protection. The second quotation shows how recent forced migrants are labeled as ‘illegal immigrants’. Thus, their attempt to anchor their boats in Indonesian soil should be prohibited.

These news extracts imply that the representations of forced migrants in the Indonesian major print media have changed. How immigrants are perceived in receiving or transit countries has become a central issue in the academic world as well as in the realm of immigration policy. Categorizing immigrants contributes to differential treatments among them as the different terms have social and political implications for people who are labeled within those categorizations (Brun 2010: 337). Moreover, ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers’ have different

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<sup>1</sup> The original text is in Indonesian language. The text was translated as accurate as possible.

<sup>2</sup> The original text is in Indonesian language. The text was translated as accurate as possible.

meanings compared to ‘illegal migrants,’ with the last term usually having a criminal connotation (Koser 2006: 44).

Previous studies about how refugees and asylum seekers are perceived negatively by hosting countries have been mainly conducted in relation to Western countries. Those studies predominantly discuss how media and the government represent refugees and asylum seekers negatively – as a security threat (Esse et al. 2013; Gilbert 2013). Khosravinik (2009) shows that the representations of refugees and asylum seekers can change in different socio-historical settings, though he does not aim to explain the crucial question of why representations of forced migrants changed. Studying the changes can contribute to knowledge on the possible socio-political drivers behind the changes, thus providing a more comprehensive picture on the nexus between media representations and transit forced migrants.

This thesis will try to fill this gap by not only analyzing how the representations have changed, but also by seeking explanations on the causes of these changes. Additionally, this thesis will also fill out another research gap, which is the representation of forced migrants in a transit state – since issues of border controls, asylum seekers management, and immigration policies’ transfers from Australia to Indonesia have otherwise been dominating studies about refugees and asylum seekers in Indonesia (e.g. Missbach 2013; Kneebone 2014; Nethery and Gordyn 2013).

### **1.1. Purpose and Research Questions**

The aim of this thesis is to explain how and why the portrayals of transit forced migrants in Indonesian major print media changed after the end of the Indochinese refugees’ arrivals. This study’s aim was generated based upon an initial pilot testing of the materials that show the changes (*see 4.2*). In order to achieve this aim, the research questions are:

- How did the representations of transit forced migrants in Indonesian major print media differ from the time of the Indochinese refugees’ arrival in 1975-1996 to the time of the new generation of refugees in 1997-2013?
- Why were the representations of transit forced migrants in those two time spans different?

## 1.2. Terminologies

This section provides brief explanations on some key terms that will regularly appear in this thesis. *Forced migrants* could be perceived as persons who leave their places of origin due to involuntary reasons, such as to escape persecution, torture or armed conflicts. They differ from *voluntary migrants* who often have economic motivations to migrate (Castles and Miller 2009: 188). However, it is important to bear in mind that the strict division between economic motivation and humanitarian motivation is very difficult to be demarcated since in many cases migrants' motivations are mixed.

Included within forced migrants are *internally displaced persons* (IDPs), refugees, and asylum seekers. IDPs are people who move because of involuntary reasons, yet remain within their country's borders (Castles and Miller 2009). *Refugees* are defined as people who escape from their home country due to "well-founded fear of being persecuted" (UNHCR 2009: 4). This definition was taken by UNHCR from the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees. *Asylum seekers* refer to people who seek protection from persecution by fleeing their home country, but their refugees' applications are not yet finalized. In this thesis, the term of forced migrants is used interchangeably with refugees and asylum seekers when it discusses the migrants in the context of 'involuntary' migrations. In addition, this thesis only discuss international forced migrants, therefore the term of forced migrants used in this thesis excludes IDPs.

When refugees are already granted permits to move to countries that provide long-term protection, this process is called *resettlement* (Castles and Miller 2009: 189). In contrast, if refugees' applications are denied they will be *repatriated*, which means that they will be sent back to their country of origins. Refugees and asylum seekers might also be called *boat people* in relation to the form of transportation they use in seeking entry into a transit or destination country's territory.

By definition, *transit state* refers to a state that is located in between the sending countries and the receiving countries or "at the crossroad of the first and third world" (Kimball 2007 cited in Sahin-Mencutek 2012: 142). The transit forced migrants in this thesis context means that the migrants did not actually intend to stay in Indonesia, but rather used Indonesia as a stepping stone while awaiting their resettlement in a developed country, such as Australia.

Additionally, up until the time of this thesis writing, Indonesia still has not ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees, which means the Indonesian government will not grant refugee status for foreign applicants and also will not offer permanent settlements for refugees in Indonesia. However, the Indonesian government allows United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to open an office in Indonesia and take care of refugees' applications.

### **1.3. Previous Studies**

Studies related to this thesis can be divided into three specific themes. First, the representation of transit forced migrants within mass media in hosting countries. Second, the securitization of forced migrants, and lastly, the studies of transit forced migrants in Indonesia.

#### **1.3.1. Forced Migrants' Representations**

Based on the characteristics of the forced migrants' spatial movements, some scholars have researched IDPs (e.g. Duncan, 2005; Brun 2010). Other scholars are more interested in shedding some light on the concept of international refugees and their relations to the hosting communities (e.g. Codjoe et al. 2013; Agblorti 2011). In the context of the latter, themes of hostilities within hosting countries towards international forced migrants have gained scholars' attention in the past decade. These studies show that it is not unusual that the receiving countries portrayed asylum seekers as 'illegal immigrants'.

During the last decade, according to Esse et al. (2013), Western countries have had a tendency to see refugees and immigrants from a negative point of view – a tendency largely influenced by the media. Media in Western countries “focus on the threat that refugees and immigrants pose to the members of the host societies” (Esse et al. 2013: 520). Drawing upon a Canadian case, they bring up some themes that are usually used to portray forced migrants negatively, such as “spreading infectious disease”, “bogus claims”, and “terrorists may gain entry to Western countries” (Esse et al. 2013). Gilbert (2013) also confirms similar representations of Mexican refugees within local media in Canada.

Mass media, according to Kushner (2003: 259), might not always produce antipathy toward asylum seekers, but most likely it has a significant contribution to “reinforce” the antipathy. In line with Kushner's view, Bleiker et al. (2013:

399) argue that representations in media “are crucial because all knowledge of political issues is unavoidably and inherently mediated”. In other words, this view underlines the importance of media in the study of forced migration.

In the Australian context, Klocker and Dunn (2003) highlight that negative media representations of asylum seekers are in line with the negative ‘themes’ produced by the government officials, such as the uses of words of ‘threat’, ‘other’, ‘illegal’, and ‘burden’ when discussing refugees. Innes (2010: 457), in addition, understands categorizations of ‘genuine asylum seekers’, ‘economic migrants’, ‘bogus asylum seekers’, and ‘illegal immigrants’ as an effort to construct asylum seekers who are, in reality vulnerable, as a threat to the hosting states. She furthermore emphasizes that the dominant narrations of threats attached to the asylum seekers in Britain’s case are: (1) traditional physical threat, (2) economic threat, and (3) societal threat (Innes 2010).

Other studies have concluded that the representations of asylum seekers are not static, but change according to particular social-political settings. Khosravini, for example, conducted a critical discourse analysis of newspaper articles in the UK from 1996 to 2006 that contained two significant incidents, namely (1) the Balkan conflict in 1999 and (2) the British general election in 2005. The findings demonstrated that during the Balkan conflict, the general representations of refugees in British newspapers were allegedly positive. The forced migrants were portrayed as “victims”, “powerless”, and “helpless” (Khosravini 2009: 484). However, those positive representations of forced migrants contrast strongly with the period around the British general election in 2005. During that time, asylum seekers and immigrants were portrayed as participating in “asocial” or “negative actions” (Khosravini 2009: 488).

McKay, Thomas, and Blood (2011) also touch upon different representations of refugees and asylum seekers in Australia during three different time spans: the wave of Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s, the arrival of Cambodian refugees in the late 1980s, and the third waves of refugees after the 1990s. The last group was mainly labeled as “queue jumpers”, “illegal asylum seekers”, and “illegal immigrants” (McKay et al. 2011: 609). However, McKay et al.’s work did not focus on the changing patterns in how the refugees and asylum seekers were represented. Instead, they only focused on the representations of asylum seekers in one time span during an incident of a boat

transporting refugees that exploded in north coast of Australia in 2008. Therefore, McKay et al.'s and Khosravinik's findings are unable to illuminate why the shift in refugee representations occurred. This thesis will fill this gap by analyzing the factors that can explain the changes in refugees' representation in Indonesian.

In addition, the vast majority of research on negative representations of refugees and asylum seekers has been conducted in relation to Western countries, which are destination countries for refugees and asylum seekers. Fewer studies take place in transit countries, such as in Turkey (Sahin-Mencutek 2012) and Jordan (Chaterlard 2002). Those studies mainly focus on the government's policies on transit forced migrants. As an exception, a study about Iraqi refugees in Jordan also touched upon how some parts of local communities despise the presence of transit forced migrants – yet they still use the terminology of 'guests' instead of 'refugees', or other negatively nuanced labels (Nanes 2007). This thesis thus contributes to this 'niche', since forced migrants in transit countries are understudied compared to the research conducted in Western settings.

### **1.3.2. Securitization of Forced Migrants**

The issues of forced migration or irregular migration have also attracted scholars in the field of security studies. The arrival of undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers in the late 1980s in Western countries resulted in migration being framed as a security issue (Castles and Miller, 2009: 209). Nyberg-Sorensen (2012) argues that migration is often framed as a security risk that is connected to "global mafias, organized crime [...] Islamic radicalism, terrorism, urban violence, and or other ills" (2012: 66). This migration-security nexus was furthermore triggered by the series of terrorist attacks: the 9/11 attacks in the USA followed by other incidents in Spain in 2004 and the UK in 2005 (Isotalo, 2009 cited in Nyberg-Sorensen, 2012: 66).

In the study of the migration-security nexus, Securitization Theory – mainly connected to the Copenhagen School's scholars – has been widely used to explain how undocumented migration has been framed as a security threat (e.g. Watson 2009; Hammerstad 2012; Hammerstad 2014). This theory views security threats as socially constructed and consequently, rejects the realist understanding of objective threats, furthering the possibility of widening the security concept.

Securitization Theory is useful to illustrate how a once non-politicized or politicized issue can then become securitized (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-24).

Hammerstad (2012) criticizes the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory that highlights political elites or the government to be the most important securitizing actors. Drawing upon a case of a South African policy towards Zimbabwean migrants, Hammerstad explores "securitization from below", which emphasizes members of grassroots movements as relevant actors in securitizing migrants.

Watson (2009) conducted media research in order to show how humanitarian migration has been securitized in Canada and Australia. Hass (2010) goes one step further and argues that media's role could be significant in securitization. Hass did not focus on the securitization of migrants but used the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study. The media, according to Hass, can play three roles: (1) media can act as a platform for 'speech acts'; (2) media can made itself perform 'speech acts'; and (3) media can act as watchdog when securitizing moves are accelerated (Hass, 2010: 84).

In developing countries, securitization of migration has not yet gained wide attention. Arifianto (2009: 614) argues that, "fewer studies exist on the securitization of migration in developing countries." His research focuses on how Malaysian elites securitized migrants who came from Indonesia and how the Indonesian government reacted to those securitizing moves.

### **1.3.3. Forced Migrants in Indonesia**

Indonesia has also received attention from scholars who are interested in explaining the problem of transit forced migrants. However, these studies mainly explain how the Australian government was able to influence Indonesian government policies so that Indonesia could 'filter' refugees and asylum seekers through tougher immigration policies. Kneebone (2014) underlines the success of the Australian government in securitizing forced migration issues within the Asia-Pacific region through the Bali Process that was initiated by the Indonesian government and the Australian government a decade ago.

Besides the influence on the regional level, there were also efforts from the Australian government to influence Indonesia's immigration policies through aid and diplomacy (Nethery et al. 2012). Nethery and Gordyn (2013) utilize the

concept of “incentivized policy transfer” to explain how the Indonesian government adopted Australia’s policies in (1) detention centers and (2) through connecting the issue of forced migrants with people smuggling. In addition, Taylor and Raffety-Brown (2010) underline the impact of Australia’s policy transfer to Indonesia in regards to the refugee assessment process.

Antje Missbach focuses her research on Indonesia’s border control and asylum seekers nexus (Missbach and Sinanu 2011; Missbach 2013; Missbach 2014). Similar to aforementioned research, Missbach also underlines the changes in Indonesia’s immigration policies towards transit asylum seekers. Missbach’s article “Waiting on the Island of ‘Stuckedness’: Managing Asylum Seekers in Island Detention Camps in Indonesia from the Late 1970s to the Early 2000s” provides insightful analysis on Indonesian government policies during those two different time spans; the time of Vietnamese forced migrants in 1970s and the Middle East forced migrants in early 2000.

However, instead of focusing on the differences, Missbach approaches the issue from the similarity in managing asylum seekers through the use of “island detention centers”. She mentions briefly the reasons for a more reluctant stance of the Indonesian government to handle forced migrants during the post-Vietnamese refugee arrivals, which are due to the lack of political will and also lack of funding (Missbach 2013: 297). However, those two reasons somehow simplify the changes. Immediate questions revolving around those arguments surfaced – for example, why the political will of the Indonesian government changed after the end of Vietnamese forced migrants’ arrivals. In that sense, the arguments need further investigation.

This thesis could contribute to filling in research gaps within the studies of forced migration and security in two ways. First, it provides a chance to employ Securitization Theory in a non-Western setting. Second, it can also illuminate the shifts of representations of forced migrants in different socio-political settings and further explain the factors that motivate the changes.

#### **1.4. Arguments**

The literature review, a pilot study (*see 4.2*), and the theoretical framework (*see 3.3*) have guided this thesis into an initial understanding of how to answer the research questions. This writing contains three interconnected contentions. First,

the way refugees and asylum seekers are portrayed in the major print media has become more hostile after the end of the Indochinese forced migrants' arrivals. Second, the changes arguably occurred due to the securitizing move made by Indonesian government officials. In this case, media reports can serve as an indication to see the actors' moves. Third, the motivation of actors to securitize or not to securitize transit forced migrants can be explained through the notions of subconscious drivers and cost-benefit calculations (Karyotis 2012).

### **1.5. Structure of Thesis**

This thesis is structured into eleven chapters. The first chapter provides introduction. The second chapter gives a background on international transit forced migrants in Indonesia. The third chapter explains the theoretical framework that guides this thesis. The fourth chapter presents the methods that will be used, while the fifth chapter illustrates the media analysis of the representations of refugees and asylum seekers in Indonesia's media in two different time spans: the period of Indochinese refugees' arrivals (1975-1996) and the period of new generations of forced migrants (1997-2013). This chapter also provides analysis behind the meaning of the changing representations. Chapters six and seven will present analysis on the factors that can explain the shifts of representations. Chapter eight provides brief arguments to connect chapters six and seven. Chapter nine will provide a conclusion of the study while chapter ten will summarize the bibliography of this thesis. Chapter eleven consists of appendices.

## **2. International Forced Migrants in Indonesia**

This chapter consists of background information on the international forced migrants that came to Indonesia within the two different time spans. The first section concerns the Indochinese forced migrants within the time period of 1975-1996, while the second section concerns the new generation of forced migrants that came to Indonesia in the period of 1997-2013.

### **2.1. Indochinese Forced Migrants**

The end of Vietnam War in 1975 was marked by the victory of the communist regime that caused massive outflows of Vietnamese-Chinese descendants who resisted the communist ideology. Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia were three countries in Southeast Asia that received the biggest number of Vietnamese refugees (see *Table 1*). Those countries were considered a transit location for the refugees who intended to stay in developed countries.

According to an Indonesian historian, Asvi Marwan Adam, the inflows of Indochinese refugees to Indonesia can be divided into three periods (Swastiwi et al. 2012: 10). First, the 1975-1978 period, which was dominated by the use of refugee camps on several Indonesian islands. Second, the period of 1979-1989 was marked by the establishment of a refugee camp on Galang Island. Additionally, this period was also characterized by the relaxed terms in allocating refugee status. Lastly followed the period of 1989-1996, where forced migrants had to face stricter screening processes. Missbach (2013: 292) notes that after June 1989, refugee status, while initially granted to all of the Indochinese forced migrants, started to become assessed on an individual basis. In this sense, each asylum seeker had to provide evidence of his/her claim. A person who failed to provide substantial evidence would face repatriation.

The first group of Indochinese forced migrants that transited through Indonesia was recorded on 19th May 1975, which consisted of 92 people who continued their journey to Singapore (Fandik 2013: 166). On 22nd May 1975, a boat that carried 25 refugees anchored at North Natuna Island, Indonesia (Ismayawati 2013). In the first quarter of 1979, the arrival of refugees to Indonesia rocketed to about 40,000 people. In comparison, however, the number

of Indochinese refugees in Indonesia was a mere 2,800 people in 1978 (Ismayawati 2013: 14).

**Table 1**  
**Indochinese Refugees' Arrivals by Boat in Countries of First Asylum**  
**1975-1995**

Countries	1975-1979	1980-1984	1985-1989	1990-1995	Accumulation
<b>Malaysia</b>	124,103	76,205	52,860	1,327	254,495
<b>Hong Kong</b>	79,906	28,975	59,518	27,434	195,833
<b>Indonesia</b>	51,156	36,208	19,070	15,274	121,708
<b>Thailand*</b>	25,723	52,468	29,850	9,280	117,321
<b>Others</b>	30,538	48,139	25,200	3,076	106,953
<b>Total</b>	<b>311,426</b>	<b>241,995</b>	<b>186,498</b>	<b>56,391</b>	<b>796,310</b>

*Source:* UNHCR (2000: 98)

*\*Thailand received higher overland Indochinese refugees that reached 640,246 people in total from 1975-1995*

Within the same year, the Indonesian government also offered Galang Island as a refugee processing camp. The idea was warmly welcomed by those states in the international community who ended up donating money for the establishment and operational costs of the processing camp. This movement resulted in the international community applauding the 'humanistic' approach of the Indonesian government towards the transit forced migrants (Kompas, 19/06/1996). Initially, Galang Island Refugees' Camp was proposed to only last for 2-3 years from the first time it was established in 1979 (Kompas, 24/07/1981). However, it took 17 years before the Indonesian government closed the camp in August 1996. From the 121,708 refugees that transited in Indonesia, 111,876 of them were resettled in third countries – with the vast majority of the refugees being resettled in the USA (Ismayawati 2013: 190). A few months before the closing of the refugee camp, the Indonesian government established a humanitarian military operation to repatriate asylum seekers who did not pass the selection process. During the operation from June 1996 to September 1996, the military sent 4,570 asylum seekers back to Vietnam. The UNHCR praised the operation for using persuasive approaches (Pusat Sejarah TNI 2007: 4).

## 2.2. The New Waves of Forced Migrants

Not too long after having dealt with the influx episode of the Indochinese forced migrants, Indonesia started to receive new generations of forced migrants who mainly came from Middle Eastern, Central Asian, and South Asian countries, such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Sri Lanka. The first inflow of forced migrants from Afghanistan and Iran that arrived in Indonesia was recorded in 1996, of which, all 12 forced migrants used air flight (Missbach 2013). The number of asylum seekers arriving in Indonesia began to increase between late 2000 and 2002, where after it began to decrease between 2003 and 2008 (UNHCR 2015). Since 2009, however, the numbers of asylum seekers and refugees have steadily increased once more (see Table 2).

Unlike the Indochinese refugees who gained widespread public attention within Indonesia due to their significant volume in 1979, the new waves of forced migrants only began receiving attention after the MV Tampa incident at the end of August 2001. The Australian conservative government rejected a request by MV Tampa – a Norwegian ship – to dock in Australia. This was due to the ship having rescued 438 forced migrants that sought to claim asylum in Australia. These migrants were initially travelling via an Indonesian ship that had sunk in the sea (McKay et al. 2011). This incident created diplomatic tension between Australia and Indonesia because both countries refused to receive the forced migrants.

**Table 2**  
**Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Indonesia**  
**2006-2013**

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Refugees	301	315	369	798	811	1,006	1,819	3,206
Asylum Seekers	265	211	353	1,769	2,071	3,233	6,126	7,110
Returned Refugees	0	0	1	311	0	0	35	0
Others	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
People on Concern	566	526	726	2,878	2,882	4,239	7,980	10,316

*Source:* UNHCR (2007-2014)

In contrast to the Indochinese refugees who were centralized on Galang Island, the ‘new generations’ of forced migrants live in several cities in Indonesia. Some of them have to stay in immigration detention centers while others can stay in cheap hotels or rent rooms or houses from local residents. The majority of

forced migrants that are allowed to live in open detention centers stay in Bogor, West Java, in Riau, Sumatera Island, or in Makassar, Sulawesi Island. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) provides funding for food for refugees and asylum seekers who are detained in immigration detention centers at a cost of 15,000-25,000 IDR (1.5 to 2.5 USD) per person per day (Nethery et al. 2012: 102).

Forced migrants living outside the immigration detention center also get a monthly living allowance from the IOM or from other international organizations. Refugees and asylum seekers have to sign a certificate declaring their compliance before they are allowed to live outside immigration detention centers. The declaration consists of five points, including: “the refugees should stay within specific area designated by the Directorate General of Immigration; refugees are not allowed to be at the airport or seaport unless accompanied by an immigration officer, [...] and refugees should report to Immigration every two weeks for purposes of registering their presence” (Peraturan Direktur Jenderal Imigrasi Nomor IMI-1489.UM.08.05).

Evidently, the Indonesian government responds to this new wave of forced migrants differently from the previous generations of forced migrants. No one specific institution was appointed to coordinate the management of forced migrants, unlike during the inflow of the Indochinese refugees previously. However, for the new waves, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Law, and Security Affairs establishes an ad-hoc team on a yearly basis to handle migrant issues. The team consists of several institutions under the umbrella of “People Smuggling, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers Task Force” (Keputusan Menkopolkam Kep-10/Menko/Polhukan/2013).

### **3. Theoretical Framework**

This theoretical framework discusses the nexus between media representations and securitization of transit forced migrants. Establishing the link between those issues is critical in order to provide a theoretical foundation to answer the research questions of: how and why the portrayal of forced migrants in the Indonesian major print media changed between two different time spans. However, it is important to bear in mind that this thesis employs Securitization Theory to illuminate the portrayal of forced migrants, and not the other way around. This chapter is divided into three connected sections. The first section explains a media representation theory that provides a foundation to understanding what media representation means and how this, in turn, affects the forced migrants' changing portrayal in media. The second part discusses Securitization Theory: key concepts, some critiques, and also how this theory can be useful in this study. The last part talks about actors' motivations to securitize or not to securitize an issue.

#### **3.1. Media Representations**

Media has been an important part of human communication for centuries. It provides people with information, whether in the forms of texts, moving images or still images. The way media portrays social groups, whether in connection with their sexes, races, religions or origins, is the primary concern of media representation theory (Levisen and Wien 2011). According to Chavez (2001), media representation is closely connected to the construction of meaning. Utilizing Hall's notion of representation, he underlines that people "use symbols to communicate, or represent what we want to say about our feelings, beliefs, concept, plans, etc" (Chavez 2001: 34). In this sense, text of news articles do not merely consist of passive or neutral symbols or words; rather, they actively produce and convey 'messages'. How media represents forced migrants has implications for the public perception of the reality of who forced migrants are and thus, how to treat them.

On one hand, public "discourse" influences media; on the other hand, media, in turn, influences the public through its role in reconstructing and developing "discourse" (Pettersson 2006: 41). The former argument is in line with Geraghty's (2000: 368) point of view on the importance of the media's role in

making “realistic representations”. Geraghty furthermore argues that the representations will only work when they confirm with the audience’s understanding of the object being represented. In a very extreme example, when the media represents a pigeon as a dangerous and life threatening animal, the audience might refuse to accept those representations if society, in general, perceives the pigeon as a friendly and adorable animal. However, when the audience, hypothetically speaking, already believes in the possibility of the pigeon as a vector of Avian Influenza – a deadly virus – they might accept the representations of the pigeon as dangerous.

Media representations of a particular social group, for example, are not equal to the “true nature” of the group being portrayed, since media representations are inevitably social construction. Moreover, Edgar and Sedgwick (2002) argue that representations have nothing to do with the interests of the represented groups or how the groups expect to be portrayed. A group, according to these scholars, "can be represented in a manner that might be conceived as stereotyping them" (Edgar and Sedgwick 2002: 339). This argument fits well into the context of transit forced migrants. It is not in the interests of forced migrants to be represented as ‘outsiders’ or ‘illegal immigrants’. Instead, those representations pose as stereotypes that might jeopardize migrants’ interests. Therefore, what triggers media to represent something as they represent it? Does it reflect society’s understanding of certain realities?

Krzyzanowski and Wodak (2009) cited in Busch and Krzyzanowski (2012: 279) argue that several studies have shown the connection between media representations and political agenda on the issue of migration and asylum seekers. The argument is based upon the understanding of a “chain of recontextualizations” in which the media and politics have dual directional relations. First, political discourses are taken by media through politicians’ statements or speeches. Second, discourses in the media are used by politicians (Bernstein 1990; Wodak 2000 cited in Busch and Krzyzanowski 2012: 279).

In connection to this thesis, I will argue that the media representations of transit forced migrants were influenced by the political agendas of elites. Elites in this context are a group of governmental institutions. The argument is based upon the fact that in this particular topic, the government’s voice within the media is dominant. Thus, it played an important role in constructing the image of refugees

and asylum seekers – whether to frame it in the context of humanitarian policy or in the context of security strategy. In order to establish this argument, this thesis will need help from Securitization Theory.

### **3.2. Securitization Theory**

The previous section in this chapter has led to two understandings: what is represented in the media is the construction of reality, and that media representations can arguably be influenced by political agendas which can construct an issue as a security problem. In that regard, Securitization Theory is helpful for this study in two ways: (1) it enables one to situate the issue of transit forced migrants in either the realm of security or non-security, and (2) it allows one to identify when an issue has or has not been securitized.

Securitization has become one of the prominent theories of security studies in the last few decades. This theory is closely associated with a group of scholars referred to as the ‘Copenhagen School’, which consists of Buzan, Waever, and several others (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 75). The theory provides the possibility of widening the concept of security. This is possible because Securitization Theory does not subscribe to the objectivist understanding of security that assumes the existence of “objective” or “real” threats outside their social construction. For several decades, the realist-traditionalist understanding of security has dominated security studies. This view presupposes the state as the most important aspect of security and thus situates the military sector as the main response to security concerns (Sheehan 2005).

In contrast, Securitization Theory – grounded in a constructivist paradigm – challenges the objectivist understanding of security by arguing that security is socially constructed. However, the Copenhagen School does not offer a subjective construction of security that lies upon personal perspectives of threats because this might result in a radical relativist way of understanding security. Instead, the Copenhagen School proposes a middle ground between objective-positivist and subjective-relativist. They highlight an “intersubjective process” of the construction of security (Buzan et al. 1998: 30). According to Hansen (2000: 288), the “intersubjective” understanding paves the way to the widening of the security concept, but is also able to hinder “unlimited expansion” that could make the security concept become meaningless.

Before further discussing the key concepts of Securitization Theory, I would like to highlight a crucial concept from the Copenhagen School that is central to this thesis, which is “the spectrum of public issues”. According to Buzan et al. (1998), public issues can be understood from a spectrum consisting of non-politicized, politicized, and securitized. The first point refers to an issue that is not debated publicly and therefore, the state has no involvement in the issue. When the issue is politicized, the state will have a role in it and the issue will receive public attention, which will then lead it to being debated. Securitized means that an issue is perceived as an existential threat to a particular object. Thus, an extraordinary response is employed (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-24). The definition of a non-politicized issue is clear, but the line between a politicized issue and a securitized issue is unclear and still requires more explanation. Buzan et al. (1998: 29) highlight that the aim of politicization is to handle the issue transparently; “a matter of choice, something that is decided upon and that therefore entails responsibility”. In contrast, securitization is marked by “the breaking of procedure or rules he or she would not otherwise be bound by” (Buzan et al. 1998: 25). Breaking the procedure in a politicized issue, in this case, is not treated as a free choice, but rather as a last resort, when it is necessary or unavoidable in order to handle a threatening issue.

The spectrum of public issues can be a useful guidance for this thesis. This study needs to identify where on the spectrum the issue of transit forced migrants was located during the time of the Indochinese refugees’ arrivals and where on the spectrum the issue was during the time of the new influx of forced migrants. Understanding the location of the issue within the spectrum is important in order to be able to build up an argument that revolves around the representation of transit forced migrants changing from a non-security issue into a security problem (see *Chapter 1*).

In regard to the process of how an issue becomes a security concern, Ole Wæver (1995: 55) argues that “security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real: the utterance itself is the act”. His claim is based on understanding that security could be regarded as speech acts, where declaring something as a security issue is the act. It means that an issue or social groups can be securitized if actors enunciate to certain audiences that the intended issue poses an existential threat to one or more particular referent objects and that therefore,

in order to handle the issue, extraordinary measures need to be executed immediately (Waever 1995: 55; Buzan et al. 1998: 21).

It is the dynamics of those components: actors, existential threats, referent objects, extraordinary measure, and audiences that are central to Securitization Theory. An existential threat generates a sense of urgency and therefore locates an issue on the top of the priority list that needs to be handled immediately, often by unusual measures. The securitization can only work if the object that is presented is being threatened or is considered as something fundamentally important (Buzan et al. 1998).

However, ‘speech acts’ – the epistemology of Securitization Theory – has mainly become the object of critiques from other scholars working with the widening of the security concept. Balzacq (2005: 181) claims speech acts focus too much on the “internal” nature of threats, but negate “external threats” that have nothing to do with the discursive strategy of speech acts. In contrast, he argues that language influences people’s perception of reality, but language does not construct it. In other words, language matters in the construction of meaning, but it is not the only thing that matters. His epistemological stance allegedly differs from the Copenhagen School, which Buzan et al. (1998: 204) claim as “radically constructivist”. Drawing upon the case of securitization of migration in Greece, Karyotis (2012) underlines a relatively similar problem on the inability of the ‘speech acts’ approach to illuminate the non-discursive process of the securitization of migration. As the consequence, he argues that speech acts fail “to capture the full dynamic of the complex process through which issues are raised on the security agenda” (Karyotis 2012: 392).

Huysmans (2000) provides a suitable alternative understanding that can illuminate the “complex process” of the securitization of migration to this thesis’ case. Huysmans highlights that ‘speech acts’ can impose securitization, but it is not the only possible way. Securitization can also be imposed through “restrictive policy and policing” (Huysmans 2000: 751). The latter argument is developed to tackle the “weak” point of the discursive approach – that speech acts that only focus on political speeches in the public domain inevitably belittle the less visible, but still influential, works of “security experts”, such as the police (Huysmans 2006: 8).

In that context, I find the concept of “security continuum” that Huysmans developed from Didier Bigo to be useful for this thesis. Security continuum is “an institutionalized mode of policymaking that allows for the transfer of the security connotations of terrorism, drug trafficking and money-laundering to the area of migration,” (Huysmans 2000: 760, Huysmans 2006: 71). Huysmans further explains that the transfer of security concern to the migration issue will work in the way that it would change people’s perception on the initial meaning of migration issue or refugees’ issue.

Hammerstad (2014: 268-269) also shares a similar idea to Huysmans by arguing that in many cases, refugees and asylum seekers are not directly referred to as “threats or enemies”, but “they were lumped together with other more traditional scary trends such as international crime”. In this thesis’ case, I include other types of crimes that, according to previous studies, are regularly connected to migrants, such as people smuggling, arms smuggling, human trafficking, global mafias, arms smuggling (Nyberg-Sorensen 2012; Curley 2008).

In a nutshell, the theory is useful for guidance in two ways. First, almost all public issues can be securitized, thus the way the media represents refugees and asylum seekers can contribute to securitization or it can also be a tool to analyze whether an issue is securitized or is not securitized. Second, securitization can take the form of directly referring to migrants as existential threats (Buzan et al. 1998). It can also take the form of lumping the migration issue together with frightening crimes (Hammerstad 2014). Up to now, what is not yet outlined by this thesis is a tool to analyze the actors’ motivation for securitizing migration. The same tool can arguably be used to analyze why migration is not securitized.

### **3.3. Actors’ Motivations**

The Copenhagen School argues that Securitization Theory has to deal with various questions of security, ranging from what are considered as threats, when an issue should be securitized, how it is securitized, who securitizes the issue, why an issue is securitized, and under what conditions an issue is securitized successfully (Wæver 1995: 58; Buzan et al. 1998: 32). Even if the Copenhagen School is clear in providing the operationalization framework on the process of securitization, they are not clear enough to offer a tool to analyze why an issue is securitized.

In understanding that not all problematic issues are securitized, Buzan et al. (1998: 32) argue that to securitize or not to securitize an issue is a matter of choice, “it is a politics”. Therefore, how then do we proceed to investigate the choice behind the decision to securitize transit forced migrants? Waever (1995) briefly touches upon the issue of why an issue is securitized when he illustrates the securitization of the environmental issue. He furthermore argues that the reason is obvious, which is the combination of “the possible magnitude of the threat posed” and “the need to mobilize urgent and unprecedented response” (Waever 1995: 63). However, assessing the magnitude of the problem to understand motivation to securitize an issue will not work within this study’s case. That is because the number of transit forced migrants in Indonesia was much higher during the time of Indochinese refugees’ arrival compared to the current condition, and while the issue was not securitized during the arrival of the Indochinese refugees, the new generation of forced migrants has been securitized (see *Chapter 2* for the data).

In order to answer the question on the reason behind the changes in the portrayal of forced migrants in Indonesia, this thesis borrows Georgios Karyotis’ (2012) framework to analyze the elites’ motives to securitize the migration issue. In “Securitization of Migration in Greece: Process, Motives, and Implications”, Karyotis employs two layers of analysis: the subconscious drivers of elites and cost-benefit calculations (Karyotis 2012: 399). The subconscious drivers are deeply-rooted in the mind of the elites and condition their beliefs about who they are and what their roles are, and are thus not easily changed. It could be something that serves as “a core belief” (Karyotis 2012: 399). Cost-benefit calculations assume that the elites are rational actors that ground their choices in something with less cost that gives more benefits (Karyotis 2012: 340).

However, for Karyotis’ framework to function well in the Indonesian context, it is necessary to take into account the regional influence. The importance of discussing regional influence is connected to the cost-benefit calculations motivation. In this layer of analysis, Karyotis puts too much emphasis on the domestic politics and neglects regional influences. Curley (2008: 20) argues that combining domestic politics and regional security dynamics could explain why “some cases of undocumented migration are securitized while similar cases are not”. The regional security dynamic could put pressure on elites’ decisions to

securitize or not to securitize, but it could also serve as a way to control challenges towards state legitimacy, as well as opening the opportunity of “resources sharing” (Emmers et al. 2008: 63).

To conclude this section, the framework to analyze the motivation behind actors’ decision to securitize the migration issue will be a combination of the above-mentioned concepts. It will look into the subconscious drivers of actors as well as be accompanied by the calculations of cost and benefit that are based on the domestic condition and the regional security dynamic. Moreover, the same framework will also be used to analyze why the actors decide not to securitize forced migration issues.

## **4. Methodology**

### **4.1 A Pluralist Methodology**

This thesis understands that an issue can be constructed as a security threat, but it does not mean that external realities do not exist outside the process of the enunciation of an issue as a security threat. As such, this work accommodates the critical realist's perspective. This thesis takes into account both observable variables and also non-observable variables that might contribute to the observable outcomes (Brante 2001). Accommodating critical realism's perspective in this study also opens a possibility of combining both quantitative and qualitative methods through a pluralist methodology (Klintman 2014). In the context of Securitization Theory, Balzacq (2011: 52) also endorses a pluralist approach. According to him, scholars working with the Securitization Theory can use various methods such as discourse analysis, content analysis, process tracing, and ethnographic methods. It is also not unusual for those methods to be combined in some way.

On that basis, this study employs two methods, namely media content analysis and thematic analysis. The reason for combining the methods is to maximize each method's strength by compensating each other's weaknesses. Media content analysis is beneficial to provide the patterns of forced migrants' representations, but this method has a limitation in answering 'why' questions (Bryman 2012: 304). According to Bryman, by solely depending upon this method, researchers might be able to argue for some answers, but it will only be speculative. In this regard, he suggests that to answer a 'why' question – which is one of the focuses of this thesis – researchers need to conduct an “additional data exercise” that can also be qualitative analysis (Bryman 2012: 307).

Moreover, a combination of methods is something that is not unusual in research. In reference to Sulaiman-Hill et al. (2011) in a longitudinal comparative research about media portrayal in Australia and New Zealand, mix methods are also utilized through content analysis and thematic analysis. The positive side of combining two different methods is to be able to provide suitable answers to various questions. In this study, content analysis is used to analyze media articles for comparisons in how the refugees and asylum seekers were portrayed in two different time spans. In addition, it is also used to analyze how securitization

happens and who securitized the issue. The thematic analysis serves to explain the actors' motives to securitize or not to securitize transit forced migrants. In brief, the data analyses are conducted in two stages. The first stage is conducted through media content analysis, and the second stage is through theoretical thematic analysis.

#### **4.2. Pilot Study**

Before I designed my thesis research, I first conducted a pilot test with small samples. This pilot test was intended to see whether this study is worth being done in the first place. The samples were Kompas newspaper articles with the distribution of 54 articles representing the period of the Indochinese refugees' arrivals, and 63 articles representing the period of the new generations of forced migrants. The samples were coded openly. This initial study gave some insight that served as an overall preliminary argument for this study. First, the label that dominated was initially 'refugees', and then that changed to 'illegal immigrants'. Second, the frame of the news that initially contained a humanitarian approach and problem-solving issues became dominated by law enforcement. Third, the actors that made statements in the media also changed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense/Military to the Indonesian National Police (INP) and the Directorate-General of Immigration (DGI).

#### **4.3. Media Content Analysis**

In brief, media content analysis is a "message-centered methodology" (Neuendorf 2002: 9 cited in Macnamara 2005: 1) that is useful to analyze a broad range of texts from the contents of newspapers or newsmagazines to the content of films and television programs (Macnamara 2005: 1). Hansen et al. (1998: 95) argues that this method is "by definition a quantitative method" due to its emphasis in identifying and counting topics or communication symbols in texts under scrutiny.

This method is chosen for this study because it is suitable to provide patterns of media portrayal over time about particular issues in large corpuses (Berelson 1952; Gunter 2000 cited in Levinsen and Wien 2011: 842). In this sense, content analysis is useful to establish patterns of the transit forced migrants' representations in the Indonesian major print media over a period of 38 years. In utilizing content analysis, this thesis subscribes to the procedure of

Hansen et al. (1998: 98-99); (1) formulating research questions, (2) choosing samples, (3) constructing categories, (4) developing coding schedule, (5) test the coding schedule in small scale and readjust it, and (6) conduct the full coding and thus analyze the data. All of the steps are performed in sequential order. The categories and the coding schedule are developed in parallel to one another by consulting to the pilot study, the literature review and also to the theoretical framework.

This thesis does not intend to measure the usefulness of a text through quantitative means, but rather to seek the underlying message of the manuscripts. In other words, the analysis excludes the measurement of texts' lengths, frequencies of the appearances of certain words, or direct or indirect sentences. Instead, this study only focuses on developing simple categories, such as basic information of the text concerning what labels are used to represent refugees, what are the main topics of discussion in the news concerning refugees, and who are the actors making statements in the news. Furthermore, for research purposes, each category is further divided into sub-categories.

These categories and sub-categories are translated into a coding schedule that – more or less – serves as a simple questionnaire. In order to avoid mistakes during the coding process, a codebook that serves as a coding manual is also created as an aid. According to Bryman (2012: 299), a coding manual is “a statement of instruction to code that also includes all of the possible categories for each dimension being coded”. In other words, the coding manual should be detailed, as it is important to guarantee the reliability of the study. In this study, inter-coder reliability is not an issue because the coding process is only conducted by one person. However, it is important to make sure the code book is clear enough to ensure that one coder can code different texts in a consistent way.

In this study, firstly the codebook is developed in line with the literature, as well as from the pilot study. In total, the codebook only consists of eight pages, consisting of detailed explanations of categories and sub-categories. For example, the categories for labels are ‘illegal immigrants’, ‘illegal asylum seekers’, ‘refugees’, and ‘asylum seekers’, while for the themes; the categories are ‘non-security’ that incorporates both ‘non-politicized’ and ‘politicized’, and ‘security’. Thus for each theme, there are also sub-themes. In the ‘security’ theme, lies the sub-themes ‘traditional physical threats’, ‘economic threats’, and ‘societal threats’

(for details see *Appendix 1*). When the codebook and coding schedule were ready, a trial test was conducted with a few texts. The results from this test allowed me to reformulate the approach if needed, and to also add some new sub-categories to the codebook. The full coding has been conducted manually and analyzed using Microsoft Excel.

#### **4.4. Theoretical Thematic Analysis**

As previously mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, thematic analysis is employed to provide answers to a ‘why’ question – which the media content analysis method is unable to do. In the context of this study, the ‘why’ question is: why did the representation of transit forced migrants in the Indonesian print media change? Since this question is answered by utilizing Securitization Theory, the ‘why’ question is then reformulated into: why were the transit forced migrants securitized/not securitized?

Thematic analysis is commonly misunderstood with similar methods. Bryman (2012: 578) argues, “it is not an identifiable approach”. He thus gives an example of a “framework approach” as a strategy to conduct thematic analysis, by providing a matrix of a framework consisting of themes and sub-themes. However, Bryman’s argument is in contrast to Smith and Firth (2011) that argue a framework approach differs from thematic analysis, even if both methods have something in common, such as, identifying themes. They argue that a framework approach is different in a sense that this approach is more “complex” and “transparent” than thematic analysis (Smith and Firth 2011: 54-55).

Braun and Clarke (2006) provide a clearer definition and a ‘know-how’ explanation about thematic analysis. They highlight thematic analysis as being epistemologically and theoretically “neutral”, which allows it to be operationalized either inductively or deductively. For this study, I decided to do a deductive “theoretical thematic analysis” (Braun and Clarke 2006: 84). This means that the themes shall be driven by previous research or theories. This approach might reduce the richness of the data, but it will instead give an opportunity to provide “detailed analysis of some aspect of the data” (Braun and Clarke 2006: 84).

In regards to this thesis, it is important to bear in mind that for the thematic analysis the materials are not only media reports from Kompas

newspaper, Tempo magazine, and Tempo newspaper. It also incorporates government reports from Indonesia and other related countries (USA and Australia), on national law and government regulations. The time spans of the additional materials are the same as for the media report samples. I generate two grand themes – based upon consultation to previous research – which are subconscious drivers and cost-benefit calculations. Thus, the samples are read and then coded carefully. Afterward, I organize the codes into two bigger groups in connection with my theoretical grand themes. In order to generate sub-themes under the two grand themes, the scattered codes are thus rearranged. In each of sub-theme, I also provide excerpts of texts that serve as evidence, as well as to strengthen arguments in each sub-theme (Braun and Clarke 2006: 93).

#### **4.5. Sample Design**

The news samples were taken from three prominent and influential media houses in Indonesia. Two of them are newspapers, namely Kompas and Tempo, while the other one is a newsmagazine named Tempo. Newspapers and magazines are still the most popular in terms of its circulation in print media. In 2013, newspapers' circulation reached 9.5 million while magazines were sold for 7.8 million copies per edition. In total, within the same year, the circulation of print media in Indonesia was about 22.3 million copies (Serikat Perusahaan Pers, 2014: 54-55). The market penetration of print media in Indonesia was about 25 percent of the population (Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika 2013).

There are three reasons as to why these three print media sources were chosen. First, two out of the three media sources were established before the arrivals of Indochinese refugees in 1975. Kompas newspaper was founded in 1965 while Tempo Magazine was established in 1971. Tempo newspaper was established in 2001, but since it is under similar editorial management, it can be argued that the reports of Tempo magazine during Indochinese refugees' arrivals could be a source of comparison to the news articles of Tempo newspaper. This enables this thesis to access continuous reports about refugees from different time spans. This continuity is vital because this study focuses on the patterns of forced migrants' representations over a long time period. The reason of not adding other media houses will be discussed under the 'limitations' section of this chapter.

Second, these three media sources are also the highest ranked among Indonesian media in regards to their circulation. In 2010, Serikat Perusahaan Pers (The Union of Press Companies) recorded that Kompas newspaper's circulation was an average of about 600,000 copies per edition – putting Kompas forward as the most circulated newspaper in Indonesia. Tempo newspaper was in third position with 200,000 copies, while Tempo news magazine's circulation was 120,000 copies per edition (Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika 2013). Additionally, those media also have an expansive national distribution, as well as nation-wide news coverage.


Third, these media houses have high reputations for their quality in Indonesia. Kompas is a leading reputable newspaper in Indonesia with a strong value of “to console the poor, to remind the established” (Manzella 2000: 315), while Tempo magazine, in Janet Steele's (2003: 127) words, is acknowledged as the most important weekly news magazine in Indonesia, which provides “a picture of events that is highly influential”.

When the selection of media sources and time periods were completed, the next step was to select news samples in accordance to “relevant content” (Hansen et al. 1998: 104). The samples were chosen through relevant sampling design, through the use of certain keywords. Internal search engines from Kompas and Tempo were used since Indonesia does not have an integrated media archive. Searching for articles on Vietnamese refugees, the keyword combination used were those of *pengungsi* (refugees), *Vietnam*, *imigran gelap* (illegal immigrants), *Indocina* (Indochinese). For the recent waves of refugees, the keywords were *imigran gelap* (illegal immigrants), *transit*, *Indonesia*, *pengungsi* (refugees), *suaka* (asylum).

The sample selection includes straight news, feature stories, editorials, interviews, and opinion columns. The results of the data selection through relevant keywords reached 256 entries for the time span of Indochinese refugees and 298 entries for the time span of after the Indochinese refugees' arrival. In order to find samples that serve the purpose of this research, all of those articles were read and reselected. In the case of the articles that only mentioned Indonesia, but no Indonesian sources were mentioned, the items were abandoned. In total,

there were 216 relevant samples<sup>3</sup> that were coded for this study, with distributions of 129 articles from Kompas newspaper, 37 articles from Tempo magazine, and 50 articles from Tempo newspaper. In regards to the articles distribution based upon the time span, 123 articles were published in time span of new waves of forced migrants (1997-2013), while 93 articles were published during the Indochinese forced migrants' arrival (1975-1996). In regards to the sample distribution per year, please see *Graph 1*.

**Graph 1**  
**Sample Distribution**



The content media analysis that is conducted in the first stage is also helpful in selecting relevant news articles for the theoretical thematic analysis. Only articles that contain statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Military are reused in order to find the answer for the reason behind non-security approach in the handling of the Indochinese refugees' arrivals. In addition, only news articles containing comments from the DGI and INP are reused for the thematic analysis in finding an answer to the reason behind decision to securitize the migrants. All of the samples of this thesis were written in Indonesian. Therefore, the news extracts that I provide in the upcoming chapters are my own translation<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> Other studies that used media content analysis had various numbers of samples, ranging from 203 articles (Nolan et al. 2011) to 1,174 articles (Levinsen and Wien 2011).

<sup>4</sup> My native language is Indonesian. I did not find any difficulties to understand the news samples of this study.

#### **4.6. Limitations**

As a case study of representations of refugees and asylum seekers in media and government documents in Indonesia, this thesis has a limitation in the generalization of the results of the study. However, this thesis compensates the limitation with a possibility to present a more nuanced investigation by analyzing the changes in two different time settings. The samples of this study were only limited to 216 news articles from three print media. The problem was due to the bad archival system in the majority of print media houses in Indonesia. Only two media houses are well known for having a proper archive management, which are the Kompas and Tempo groups. An effort to add one more media house, Media Indonesia has not been a success because of an incomplete archival system. Media Indonesia only has access to news reports published from the end of 1996 and above, even though the newspaper was established back in 1970 ([www.mediaindonesia.com/aboutus](http://www.mediaindonesia.com/aboutus)).

Another potential pitfall is the exclusion of online media that have played a significant role in the Indonesian media industry. It is also evident that more articles about transit forced migrants have been published in online news portals. However, this study did not include this platform because it contained no news about Indochinese refugees. However, it might be beneficial to include this news platform for future research about the representation of refugees in recent time.

Moreover, thematic analysis of texts still has a limitation in investigating the motive behind the actors' decision in securitizing transit forced migrants. Interviews might be a good choice for digging up information about the motives to securitize the new generations of forced migrants, however, they might not be suitable for collecting data about the motives for not securitizing the Indochinese refugees.

## 5. Changing Representations: A Sign of Securitization?

This chapter contains the results of a content analysis of 216 news reports about refugees and asylum seekers who have transited through Indonesia during two different time periods: the Indochinese refugees' arrivals (1975-1996) and post-Indochinese refugees' arrivals (1997-2013). The results show that the way that transit forced immigrants were labeled and were discussed evidently changed between the periods. In addition, the dominant actors who made statements within the media also changed. This chapter thus also discusses the meaning of the changes.

### 5.1. Changing Labels

The content analysis of the labels was conducted at the level of the entire article. Each article was only coded once. During the period of arrival of the Indochinese refugees, the vast majority of the sample used positive labels. The label of 'refugees' appeared in 72 percent of the news samples. In total, the combination of positive representations such as 'refugees', 'mix-positive' and 'boat people' reached 89 percent. Mix-positive contains a combination of two or more of the positively connoted labels, such as 'refugees', 'boat people',<sup>5</sup> and 'asylum seekers'. The use of negative terms, such as 'illegal immigrants' was very low. There was no single article that solely used 'illegal immigrants' to represent the migrants. Instead 'illegal immigrants' was always used together with a positive label like 'refugees' (for detail see *Table 3*).

In contrast, the uses of labels were dramatically different in the second time span; negative labels dominated the major print media's representation of the transit forced migrants. The 'illegal immigrants' label appeared in 60 percent of all news samples, while the combination of positive labels – 'refugees', 'asylum

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<sup>5</sup>In this study, I categorized "boat people" as a positive label. I was aware that it might be problematic to categorize "boat people" as a positive label since in developed countries, it has negative connotation. However, for Indonesians, "boat people" shows the plight of the forced migrants that had to leave their country on an unsafe vessel and with limited resources. Therefore, it evoked local people's sympathy.

seekers’, and ‘mix positive’ – appeared only in 5 percent of the samples (see *Table 3*).

**Table 3**  
**Representations of Transit Forced Migrants in Indonesian Print Media**

Labels	Indochinese (1975-1996)		Post-Indochinese (1997-2013)	
	Frequency	(%)	Frequency	(%)
Refugees	67	72	2	2
Mix positive	14	15	3	2
Mix positive-negative	8	9	40	33
Fugitive	2	2	0	0
Boat people	2	2	0	0
Illegal Immigrants	0	0	74	60
Immigrants	0	0	2	2
Mix negative	0	0	1	1
Asylum seekers	0	0	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>100</b>

*N* = 216

## 5.2. Changing Themes

The content analysis also scrutinizes the way transit forced migrants were discussed in the media reports. In this study, the unit of analysis was at the level of an actor’s statement. Each actor’s statement in a report was only coded once. In total, there were 209 statements coded from 93 articles in the period of Indochinese refugees, and 278 statements coded from 123 articles in the second period. The number of statements is proportional to the number of actors making the statement.

*Table 4* shows that the themes of the statements in the two time spans were very different. In the period of Indochinese refugees, the non-security theme was dominant, contributing to 89 percent from 209 statements. This theme incorporates discussion on the plight of refugees, living conditions, and solutions. In contrast, in the time span of the new generation of forced migrants, the security issue dominated the statements, with the frequency of 64 percent from 278 statements. The non-security theme dropped to 15 percent.

**Table 4**  
**Themes of Transit Forced Migrants Discussion**

Themes	Indochinese		Post-Indochinese	
	Frequency	(%)	Frequency	(%)
<b>Non-Security</b>	186	89	41	15
<b>Security</b>	22	11	179	64
<b>Non-conclusive</b>	1	0	58	21
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>100</b>

### 5.3. Changing Actors

Regarding the actors who made the statements, the Indonesian government officials appeared most frequently within both time spans. In the period of the Indochinese refugees' arrivals, the government officials' statements contributed to 48.3 percent from 209 statements. Various international actors appeared at 28.7 percent. The category of 'refugees' statements' was in the third place with 11 percent (see *Table 5*). The domination of the government officials increased significantly in the second time span. In the period of the new waves of forced migrants, the Indonesian government officials contributed to 70 percent from the overall statements (see *Table 6*). In this time span, the presence of international actors reduced to third place, with the forced migrants' voices increased to the second place.

Although the statements by the Indonesian government were dominant in both time spans, there were some shifts of sub-categories within the Indonesian government category. In the time of Indochinese refugees' arrival, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense/military were the two most dominant institutions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed to 20.6 percent of the overall statements, while the Ministry of Defense contributed to 13.6 percent. These compositions changed dramatically in the second time span. Those two institutions dropped to third and fourth place respectively in the time of the new waves of forced migrants. Their roles were replaced by DGI and INP instead. The DGI voices in the media reached 27.3 percent, while the INP contributed to 26.3 percent from the overall 278 statements.

**Table 5**  
**Actors in the Period of**  
**Indochinese Refugees Influx**

<b>Actors</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>(%)</b>
<b>Indonesian government</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>48.3</b>
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	43	20.6
Ministry of Defense/Military	29	13.9
Local governments	6	2.9
Police	4	1.9
President	3	1.4
Member of parliament	8	3.8
Ministry of Information	3	1.4
Other government officials	1	0.5
Immigration	2	1.0
Ministry of Social Affairs	1	0.5
Port authority	1	0.5
<b>Refugees</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>11.0</b>
<b>Local people</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>7.2</b>
<b>International actors</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>28.7</b>
UNHCR	15	7.2
Vietnam	11	5.3
Australia	10	4.8
The USA	8	3.8
Others	7	3.3
ASEAN (collective)	2	1.0
Malaysia	6	2.9
IOM	1	0.5
<b>Media</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3.8</b>
<b>Others</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1.0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>100.0</b>

In addition, changes in the compositions also occurred within the international actors' category. During the Indochinese refugees' arrival, UNHCR, Vietnam, Australia, and the USA gave active voices regarding the care of Indochinese refugees. In the period of the new waves of forced migrants, the USA's voices disappeared. In contrast, Australia's voices became dominant. The strong presence of Australia will be discussed in Chapter 7, regarding the motivation behind securitizing moves made by DGI and the INP. In addition, the presence of the USA's voice will be discussed in Chapter 6.

**Table 6**  
**Actors the Period of post-Indochinese Refugees**

<b>Actors</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>(%)</b>
<b>Indonesian government</b>	<b>195</b>	<b>70.1</b>
Immigration	76	27.3
Police	73	26.3
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	17	6.1
Ministry of Defense/Military	17	6.1
Local government	4	1.4
Members of parliament	2	0.7
Others government officials	2	0.7
Port Authority	2	0.7
President	1	0.4
Ministry of Social Affairs	1	0.4
<b>Refugees</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>11.9</b>
<b>International actors</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>9.0</b>
Australia	11	4.0
UNHCR	7	2.5
IOM	5	1.8
Others international actors	2	0.7
<b>Local people</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>Media</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2.5</b>
<b>Academician/experts</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2.2</b>
<b>Others</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1.4</b>
<b>Smugglers</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0.4</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>100.0</b>

#### **5.4. From a Politicized Issue to a Securitized Issue**

Employing media content analysis, this study has shown different representations of the transit forced migrants in Indonesia within two different time spans. They were labeled differently and the themes of the discussions also changed. Those changes led to one major question: why were the Indochinese refugees portrayed with positive labels and were discussed in non-security theme, while the newer generations of forced migrants were represented with negative labels and thus framed as security threats? The theoretical framework chapter has provided tools for answering the question. Borrowing Buzan et al.'s (1998) spectrum of public issues, this thesis can argue that the different representations were because of the issues being situated at different points of the spectrum.

During the Indochinese refugees' arrival, transit forced migrants allegedly was situated in the zone of a politicized issue. In contrast, the issue of the new

generation of forced migrants was in the process of moving from the politicized zone to the securitized zone. This section will further establish empirical evidence to support these arguments. The issue of the Indochinese refugees was discussed widely in the print media, and thus, the government regulated the migrants (Buzan et al. 1998). In 1979, the Indonesian government established a refugee processing camp in Galang Island. Within the same year, the Indonesian President Suharto issued a Presidential Decree Number 38/1979 on the Coordination for Solving the Vietnamese Refugees Problem in Indonesia (Keputusan Presiden RI 38/1979). The decree becomes the only presidential decree to regulate international refugees transiting in Indonesia (Taylor and Rafferty-Brown 2010: 144).

The content analysis in the previous sections has shown that in the period of the Indochinese forced migrants, almost 90 percent of the samples show the use of positive labels towards the migrants. In addition, about 89 percent of 209 statements made by the actors in the samples of news articles can be grouped into the category of non-security issues. It means that even though the issue was debated in the public sphere, the migrants were not securitized. *Graph 2* shows in detail that almost 60 percent out of 186 statements with the non-security theme in the period of Indochinese forced migrants' arrivals discussed refugees in connection to an effort to solve the problem. This theme includes the establishment of a refugee processing camp, their resettlement, repatriation, and international cooperation in handling refugees. The second most common theme was the humanity theme incorporating the living condition of the forced migrants, the refugees' plight while in the journey to Indonesia, the refugees' basic needs, and their waiting time in Indonesia. The opportunistic behavior of refugees<sup>6</sup> was in third place.


The newer generations of forced migrants that came from Middle Eastern countries and South Asian countries were labeled mainly with negative terms, such as 'illegal immigrants'. Labeling transit forced migrants as 'illegal migrants' cannot be separated from states' efforts to govern migration as it is not only a

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<sup>6</sup> This theme of opportunistic behavior was not categorized under 'security issues' because it was mainly statements from the Vietnamese authority saying that the refugees fled their country due to their failure to adapt with the communism' style of life. It was not considered a threat for Indonesians who also refused the communist ideology.

matter of categorizations (Scheel and Squire 2014) – it represents an underlying way of the states’ thinking that inevitably contributes to why the refugees and asylum seekers are handled through tougher measures. Furthermore, the previous section shows that 64 percent of 278 statements in the period of post-Indochinese refugees’ arrivals discussed refugees along with security concerns.

**Graph 2**  
**Details in Non-security issue,**  
**Indochinese Refugees’ Arrivals**




In arguing that these changes serve as signs that the issue has been securitized, it is necessary to answer the following questions (Buzan et al. 1998; Waever 1995): What existential threats were associated with the transit forced migrants? Who were the actors? What extraordinary measures were offered to handle the threats? In regards to threats and extraordinary measures this study, as mentioned in the theoretical chapter, also takes into account the argument that forced migrants do not need to be directly referred to as threats, but it can also take form of putting them together with traditional or transnational crimes (Huysmans 2000: Hammerstad 2014).

*Graph 3* provides empirical evidence for the argument above. About 57 percent out of 179 statements – categorized as security theme – discussed the migrants along with a transnational crime theme. The crimes include people smuggling, human trafficking, and drugs trafficking. The second security issue associated with forced migrants was the illegal status of their presence in Indonesia. About 25.7 percent of the statements contributed to this discussion. In

total, those two threats contribute to 148 out of 179 statements. In general, the transnational crimes and the illegal statuses of migrants can be categorized under traditional physical threats (Innes 2010).

**Graph 3**  
**Threats Associated to Transit Forced Migrants**



However, the societal and economic threats that appeared quite frequently in developed countries' settings (Innes 2010) evidently did not appear in the Indonesian case. It can be due to the fact that Indonesia is a very diverse nation consisting of hundreds of ethnicities, languages, and cultures. All of those ethnicities were united by the political ideology of *Pancasila*<sup>7</sup> – the five principles – that also contains the idea of multiculturalism. In a sense, there is no homogenous identity of 'being Indonesian' that might be harmed by the presence of these forced migrants in transit. Furthermore, the economic threat also did not appear significantly because of two reasons. First, the forced migrants' basic needs are handled by international organizations such as IOM and UNHCR – not by the Indonesian government. Second, while waiting in Indonesia, the refugees and asylum seekers are not allowed to work, which means they pose no

<sup>7</sup> *Pancasila* is the Indonesian national ideology consisting of five principles, respectively: (1) belief in one God, (2) just and civilized humanity, (3) Indonesian unity, (4) democracy under the wise guidance of representative consultations (5) social justice for all the peoples of Indonesia. I borrowed a translation of the five principles from *Encyclopedia Britannica* <http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/440932/Pancasila>

competition to the local job market (Peraturan Direktur Jenderal Imigrasi IMI-1489.UM.08.05).

Regarding the actors who made the securitizing move, Huysmans (2000: 758) argues that in the European Union context, the securitization of migration includes “multiple actors such as national governments, grass roots, European transnational police network, and the media”. I, too, agree that securitization is a complex process. Therefore, it might be problematic to refer the actors of the securitization of migration to particular persons or institutions. However, the empirical materials of this study provide evidence that INP and DGI<sup>8</sup> were the two dominant securitizing actors, making the most frequent statements in the media (see *Table 6*). Moreover, *Table 7* shows those two actors were mainly giving statements concerning the illegality of transit forced migrants’ statuses and other statements that linked transit forced migrants with transnational crimes. In total, those two institutions contributed to 104 statements of the overall 148 statements referring to transnational crimes and illegal statuses of the migrants.

**Table 7**  
**Actors and the Security Framing of Transit Forced Migrants**

Actors	Total	Percentage
<b>Police</b>	58	55.8%
Transnational crimes	48	46.2%
Illegality status	10	9.6%
<b>Immigration</b>	46	44.2%
Transnational crimes	19	18.3%
Illegality status	27	26.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>104</b>	100.0%


Police and Immigration officials gain legitimacy in securitizing the issue due to their nature of being “specialized agencies” (Watson 2009) or “security professional” (Huysmans 2000). According to Watson, their main audiences – who need to be convinced on the nature of the threats and the solutions that need to be taken – are “the governing elites” (Watson 2009: 20). In that sense, their

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<sup>8</sup>INP and DGI consist of various individual actors from national, provincial, and district levels. The reason for lumping them together as actors at the institutional level was due to the chain of command nature of those two institutions. It is unlikely for police officials to show dissenting opinion about transit forced migrants against their institutional policy.

statements in the media shall be understood as not to get public approval of the securitizing move, but rather, they will be seen as part of “symbolic measures” (Bigo 1998: 158) in order to establish an image that they have done something to handle the refugees’ issue, while meaning that they have not necessarily solved the problem. In other words, the aim was to gain “moral support” from the public, while they achieved “formal support” from elites (Balzacq 2005: 184).

**Graph 4**  
**Solutions Offered to Handle the Migrants’ Threats**



The arguments are thus also connected to the extraordinary measures they offered. In *Graph 4*, from 179 statements on threats associated with transit forced migrants, the vast majority came without concrete solutions. In addition, 22.9 percent suggested severe law enforcement as a solution to the threats. This includes investigation on the smuggling cases and also the idea to increase punishment for people who were involved in the smuggling process. The idea of severe punishment has been implemented after the Indonesian government issued a revision of the Immigration Law in 2011. People who are involved in the smuggling process, whether ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ can be convicted to 5 to 15 years jail time (Undang-Undang Nomor 6 tahun 2011, Article 120). The law brings huge consequences for refugees and asylum seekers in transit in Indonesia. With the new regulation, any kind of assistance connected to an alleged people smuggling network can lead to imprisonment.

## **6. Why Were the Indochinese Forced Migrants Not Securitized?**

This chapter discusses the internal and external factors that contribute to the actors' motivation not to securitize transit forced migrants at the time of Indochinese refugees' arrivals. The actors – as revealed by the media content analysis – are the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Ministry of Defense/the military. Grounded in the theoretical framework, the investigation is conducted in two sub-chapters, namely the subconscious drivers and cost-benefit calculations.

### **6.1. Subconscious Drivers**

It was more or less a decade after the failed coup – for which the Indonesian Communist Party was blamed – when the first group of Indochinese refugees came to Indonesia in 1975. As a consequence of the failed coup the first President of Indonesia, Sukarno, was forced to resign, and was subsequently replaced by Suharto, a military general. Suharto's new regime constructed hatred towards communism portraying communists as 'evil'. In the early years of the New Order regime, about half a million people were killed (Elson 2001: 125) – mainly those who were associated with the Indonesian Communist Party.

When the brutal reaction towards communism had become internalized in the minds of the Indonesian people, it arguably served as subconscious driver for the Indonesian elites to not securitize the forced migrants, who were seen as 'poor' beings fleeing their country due to the cruel communist government. Therefore, it was a noble action to take care of them. News reports in the mid of 1979 – the time when inflows of refugees soared – mainly blamed the Vietnamese government. Some of the articles containing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regularly put pressure on the Vietnamese government to also take some responsibility in handling the refugees' issue.

In an official report about the care and security arrangements in Galang Island Refugees' Processing Center, the writer of the report, Lieutenant Colonel (Police) Kunarto, mentions Vietnamese officials had a policy of "throwing waste" (Kunarto 1980: 10). The description of analogizing refugees with 'waste' was evidently used to construct a bad image of the Vietnamese government as not willing to take care of their citizens. In contrast, the refugees were portrayed

differently. Still in the same report, Kunarto (1980: 110) describes refugees as follow:

*“Refugees are like ‘stripped’ persons, even if they were rich or highly educated [...] Mostly they had experiences of being extorted and threatened by the Vietnamese rulers. They were robbed, raped, and threatened by pirates. Their ships were directed back to the sea. With their own eyes, they witnessed the pledge of their friends and families who drowned in the sea.”*

Another indication was the use of *Pancasila* – the five principles – as a foundation of justifying the government’s policy to take care the refugees. A government source in Kompas (19/10/1978) argued that the refugees’ arrivals had caused problems for Indonesians. However, they had to be accepted due to humanitarian value, which is included in *Pancasila*. He mentioned the decision to be a “consequence of *Pancasila*”. In another news extract, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mochtar Kusumaatmadja said, “*So what should we do? Should we let them die or drown in the sea? Where is our Pancasila then?*” (Tempo magazine 21/04/1979).

Karyotis (2012) argues that subconscious drivers in policy-making might be based on certain values. In the Indonesian context, *Pancasila* served as these values. Nevertheless, the hatred of communism that led to sympathy toward the Indochinese refugees should not be understood as the sole driver of the actors to keep the issue of transit refugees away from the realm of being securitized. The next section provides other perspectives to understand the complexity of the issue of transit forced migrants in the Indonesian setting.

## **6.2. Cost-Benefit Calculations**

The thematic analysis has generated three important themes within cost-benefit calculations. First, the Indonesian government’s non-security approach in handling Indochinese refugees was intended to neutralize the negative portrayals of Indonesia deriving from the Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor. Additionally, the non-security approach fitted the regional and global ‘atmospheres’ that made it able to attract resources. Lastly, it was also aimed at maintaining state legitimacy by showing that the government was controlling the

inflows and outflows of forced migrants. It also showed the government's active role on the regional and global level.

It is also important to bear in mind that initially, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Indonesian military had contesting perspectives on the handling of refugees. The idea to establish a refugee processing center at Galang Island came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, possibly from the Minister himself, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja (Pane 2015: 351). The Ministry of Defense initially opposed the idea. Tempo magazine (22/09/1979) in "Doors in Pejambon" quotes a source from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioning that *"it is not a secret that there was 'misunderstanding' between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and another ministry in regards to the issue of handling the refugees"*. Tempo did not openly mention the name of the ministry, but it was apparently referring to the Ministry of Defense. Before President Suharto made the final decision to issue a presidential decree on the handling of refugees, there were statements from the military officials that tried to contest to the idea of establishing a refugee processing center. It can be found in these extracts:

*"Regional Army Commander Brigadier General Sularso worries that the establishment of refugees processing center will trigger the increase of refugees' arrivals"* (Kompas 12/06/1979).

Additionally, the Minister of Defense General M Jusuf argued:

*"The arrivals of refugees have created many problems that can trigger local people restlessness. The increasing of goods' prices, refugees' brawl..."* (Tempo magazine, 17/03/1979).

Suharto appointed the Ministry of Defense as the coordinating ministry in handling the refugees' issue through the Presidential Decree Number 38/1979, in a bid to show his effort to calm the military. It was necessary because Suharto used the military to secure his power. He had been in full control of the Army since 1969 (Elson 2001: 182). The Presidential Decree consolidated all of the refugees' security and care arrangement into the hands of the Ministry of Defense. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for diplomacy and cooperation with international organizations (Keputusan Presiden RI 38/1979).

### 6.2.1. Good Public Relations

Under the New Order regime, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had an interest in developing an image of Indonesia as a country that respected human rights. By providing a refugee processing center and taking active role in solving the refugees' issues in Southeast Asia region, the Indonesian government could legitimize the claim. The news materials confirm this argument. The vast majority of the Indonesian government officials, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted the humanitarian aspect of the Indochinese refugees' issue.

Arguably, it had something to do with the Indonesian government's military intervention in East Timor in 1976: ever since the invasion, Indonesia had been seen by the international community as an abuser of human rights. Under the atmosphere of the Cold War, Western countries, including the USA, did not oppose Suharto's decision to integrate East Timor as part of Indonesia. The US government though asked Suharto to conduct a public relations campaign so that the US did not face opposition back home for their support of Indonesia.

On 10th May 1978, US Vice President Walter Mondale met Suharto in Jakarta. A declassified document consisting of a summary of the meeting, includes a statement where Mondale says that the Carter administration "*does not question the incorporation of East Timor to Indonesia [...] There are problems on how to deal with our mutual concern regarding East Timor and how to handle public relations aspect of the problem*" (United States Departement of State 1978: 36-37). The focus of the discussion within the meeting was a US suggestion that the Indonesian government open East Timor to some visitations from non-governmental organizations in order to show that East Timor was not a closed zone.

Less than a year after the meeting, the Indonesian government decided to offer an island as a refugee processing center. The policy was considered 'soft' compared to Indonesia's neighboring countries – such as Singapore, which rejected the Indochinese refugees. In 1979, when the refugees' arrivals increased significantly, Thailand and Malaysia also refused refugees, and thus sent boats carrying refugees back to the sea. The Indonesian government's decision to reduce the number of new refugees through tougher border control was in response to the actions of Malaysia and Thailand (Osborne 1980). The Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed in June 1979 said, "refugees in

Malaysia would be expelled, and those seeking to enter in the future would be shot if they ignored warning to go away” (Osborne 1980: 50).

The Foreign Affairs Ministry, the military, and Suharto did not openly provide any link between helping refugees and the military action in East Timor. However, the way the Indonesian elites repeatedly highlighted Indonesia’s humanistic approach in helping Indochinese refugees evidently provided the red thread. Even when the military made a firm statement on refusing entry to new refugees, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs neutralized it by arguing that Indonesia still employed a humanistic approach. One of the extracts shows an anonymous Indonesian official mentioning that, *“offering an island can elevate Indonesia’s position because it was a humanitarian offer”* (Tempo magazine 31/03/1979).

Suharto in his speech at the People’s Consultative Assembly on the 16th August 1979 also highlighted the same point. He mentioned that the Indonesian government would not offer permanent resettlement because Indonesia could not afford to do so. The government still needed to increase the well-being of the Indonesian citizens. However, he kept underlining the humanistic approach in tackling refugees, as follow:

*“We truthfully had lent our hand to help tens of thousands of refugees consisting of the elder, men and women, youngsters, children, and even infants. For the sake of helping human being and in the name of humanity we truly had done what we could do according to our ability”*  
(Sekretariat Negara RI 1979: 340).

In his speech, Suharto used ‘refugees’ to represent the forced migrants – not a single time employing the ‘illegal immigrants’ label. He also linked the issue with a humanitarian problem and how to solve it. There was no mention about people smuggling or transnational crimes. The way he perpetrates the ‘truthfulness’ of the Indonesian government policy in helping refugees in the name of humanity can also be understood as a way to convince the public that the motivation to help refugees was pure; there was no ulterior motive. However, was that true? Alexander Betts (2006: 38) argues that the Galang Island Refugee Camp was politically exploited by the Suharto regime. Suharto used the camp as an example of how Indonesia respects human rights, which evidently gained international media’s attention.

A retired military officer who was involved in the Galang Refugee Camp, Admiral Kunto Wibisono made a similar observation. In a semi-biographical book about Galang Island Refugee Camp, he argues that Suharto personally made four directives in regard to the Galang Island Refugees Camp. The last point was that the refugees should be treated humanely in accordance with the second principle of *Pancasila* – just and civilized humanity. It was assumed that the last point of the directive was intended to neutralize the negative opinion towards Indonesia originating from the East Timor problem (Ismayawati 2013: 10-11).

### **6.2.2. Attracting Resources**

The empirical materials suggest that attracting resources from the international community was one of the motivations to not securitizing the Indochinese refugees. Attracting financial support was very salient in the Indonesian government's narrative. The other kinds of resources were to increase the third countries' resettlements quota and to endorse neighboring countries not to conduct unilateral refoulement. The increase of resettlement quota from developed countries was crucial in order to make sure that all of the refugees would leave Indonesia as soon as possible. In addition, hindering unilateral refoulement policy from the neighbor countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand served as a preventive measure to avoid massive arrivals of refugees who were expelled by those countries.

Intention to attract financial support can be found in the way the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the international community to provide joint funding towards establishing a refugee processing center on Galang Island. Not only for the development of the camp, but also for the operational costs. In the news report, the Indonesian officials proposed 18.5 million USD for the initial establishment of the refugee processing center in 1979. The representative of 24 countries – including the USA, Japan, and Australia – accepted the proposal (Tempo magazine 20/05/1979; Kompas newspaper 16/05/1979). Besides the direct financial needs of caring for refugees, the financial support was also channeled into the development of areas surrounding the refugee processing camp. The circulation of money in the area also triggered the local economy. In addition, the military was most likely benefiting from the presence of the processing center as well. For example, the Indonesian Navy's

business unit became the supplier of the refugees' food (Tempo magazine 01/03/1980).

It was clear that if the government decided to securitize the forced migrants, only harm would be done. On one hand, they might not be able to gain financial support from those members of the international community that were willing to help the refugees. On the other hand, the Indonesian government would not be able to refuse all of the refugees since they would continuously come forth. One of the Indonesian officials mentioned, *"If they were treated like ordinary immigrants, they would fully become the responsibility of Indonesian Immigration"* (Tempo magazine 31/03/1979). To deter the refugees according to the same narrative as Malaysia – to be shot if they would not obey warning – would only diminish Indonesia's reputation even further within the international community, considering the blowback from the East Timor problem. To let it become 'business as usual' would show the incompetence of the Indonesian government in handling the issue, thereby delegitimizing the government.

The materials also suggest that Indonesia's soft approach to the Indochinese refugees was also intended to force the developed countries to accept more refugees through resettlement programs. Not only to increase the quota, but also to make the resettlement process faster. It can be seen from these extracts: *"One of the preconditions of the provision of the Island was that the Western countries agreed to accept these fugitives. So, there will be no residual problem for ASEAN"* (Tempo magazine 24/02/1979). In addition; *"[...] urge developed countries to continue their effort in making the refugee issue as international responsibility"* (Kompas 09/08/1983). In that logic, the more – and the quicker the third countries accepted refugees, fewer refugees would stay in Indonesia. Yet, it did not work that way since the quicker resettlement process through the Galang Island's Refugee Processing Center attracted more Indochinese refugees to come to Indonesia.

### **6.2.3. Maintaining Legitimacy**

Not securitizing the forced migrants can also be linked to the motivation of maintaining legitimacy. First, by not securitizing the forced migrants, the government was able to attract resources providing the possibility for the government to establish a refugee camp that minimized contact between the

forced migrants and the local community. The camp was helpful in the way that it gave the government full control of the forced migrants' movement because they were concentrated on one island. The refugees were allowed to visit the main island temporarily, but they still had to return to camp eventually.

The need to monitor the forced migrants was mainly because the vast majority of the refugees were Chinese descendants. During that time, Indonesia had an issue with tens of thousands of Chinese descendants who were labeled as 'illegal immigrants'. They were suspected to be loyal to China instead of Indonesia. That was considered as security issue because the military believed that the Chinese government supported the failed coup in 1965. Soon after, Suharto solidified his hold on power and Indonesia suspended diplomatic ties with China in October 1967 (Suryadinata 1990: 684) – which lasted until 1990.

In addition, showing the public that the government employed a friendly approach by letting the refugees to come to Galang Island meant that the Indonesian government was in full control of the refugees' arrivals. In other words, the massive arrival of refugees was not a reflection of a failed attempt of the Indonesian military in containing the issue, but on the contrary, this showed that they were effectively handling the issue. This logic of reasoning can be found in the way the Indonesian government highlighted that the issue of refugees' arrivals was not easy to be handle, but it was still under the government control. The Minister of Foreign Affairs argued, "*since the Bangkok meeting, the number of refugees is still increasing. However, do we panic? Shall we fight each other? Do we run? No! [...] No other people can guard our home better than ourselves*" (Tempo magazine 07/07/1979).

## **7. Why Were the New Generations of Forced Migrants Securitized?**

This chapter discusses factors that led the actors' decision to securitize the transit forced migrant issue within the period of the post-Indochinese refugees' arrivals. The actors in this time span are specialized agencies, namely the INP and DGI. Corresponding to the theoretical framework, discussion in this chapter consists of two sections, which are subconscious drivers and cost-benefit calculations.

### **7.1. Subconscious Drivers**

During the Indochinese refugees' arrival, the issue of communism could have arguably served as a subconscious motivation that influenced the actors' decision to not securitize the refugees. Considering the fact that the Cold War has since ended, this was not the case in the context of the new generations of refugees. Even after the fall of Suharto's regime in 1998, the public's hatred of communism had reduced although it did not entirely disappear. The subconscious driver that led actors to securitize the new generations of forced migrants was not so salient. One possible explanation is to dig into the elites' understanding of nationalism.

That is nicely illustrated by a lead paragraph of a feature story about forced migrants in Tempo magazine (04/11/2001) that was written as follows: *“the rains of stones in other people's countries, the rains of illegal immigrants in our country. What else could we say? That is a fate that Indonesia should accept in the midst of the unfinished crisis.”* The first sentence of the lead paragraph was a modified version of a well-known Indonesian proverb meaning, “the rains of gold in other people countries, the rains of stones in our country. Still, it is better to stay in our country”.

The proverb has an implicit message of nationalism that one should stay and be loyal to their homeland, even at the time when the country is in trouble and neighboring countries seemingly offer better wealth. In this sense, besides describing Indonesia as suffering the consequences from conflicts in other countries, the paragraph also criticizes forced migrants who have shown 'disloyalty' to their home countries by leaving it during times of hardship to pursue 'the rains of gold' or wealth in other countries. Thus, it also connects to the

general perception of the honesty of the forced migrants' claims. In recent years, the asylum seekers globally are more seen as driven by economic reason.

## **7.2. Cost-Benefit Calculations**

Thematic analysis of news reports have shown two factors that motivated the two institutions to securitize transit forced migrants. This part will argue that the external motivations of the INP and DGI were to attract resources and maintain the institution's legitimacy.

### **7.2.1. Attracting Resources**

The motivation to securitize the transit forced migrants in order to attract resources remains somewhat latent in the news report samples. Neither the statements made by officials from the INP nor the DGI in the media directly asked for a budget increase in order to tackle the 'threat' of transit forced migrants. Instead, both institutions show relatively similar narrations through the dichotomy between the complexity of the problem and the lack of resources to handle it. However, the message is obvious: in order to tackle the complicated problem, the problem of a lack of resources should first be solved.

The thematic analysis also shows that the narratives from the two institutions were not identical since they each showed different stressing points. When representing the complexity of the problem, DGI officials tend to focus on issues – such as how forced migrants could be very demanding in the matter of their basic needs or in regards to how they want a faster process in finding permanent resettlement. The issue of how forced migrants escape from detention centers has appeared many times to be the most problematic for the immigration officials.

In contrast, INP underlined the sophistication of people smuggling networks that assist forced migrants going to Australia from the Indonesian coastal border. Their narratives were centered on issues surrounding the smuggling networks that involve international actors, local people, several state apparatuses, namely police officers and soldiers. The highly organized recruitment process was also discussed, showing the disconnected chains of the recruitment, the transportation of smuggled forced migrants, the changing routes and modes of operation, and finally the high financial and equipment supports.

However, both the INP and DGI officials have something in common: they argue that the geographical condition of Indonesia provides so many ‘ratlines’ ready to be used by the smuggling networks.

The motivation of the Immigration officials to attract resources is evident in their statements that centered on three points, which are the lack of detention centers both in terms of quantity and quality, the lack of funding for taking care of forced migrants, and finally, the lack of personnel. Most commonly, the statements on the lack of detention centers appeared within the Kompas newspaper, Tempo newspaper, and Tempo magazine, such as “*detention center should only accommodate 80 people, but now there are 129 people here. We even had accommodated 200 people,*” (Tempo magazine, 05/09/2010) or “*immigration has 13 detention centers, which according to the Director of Immigration Investigation and Prosecution R Muchdor, some of them are too small to function, do not have sufficient means, and the capacities to housing people are below needs*” (Kompas, 30/04/2010).

The lack of detention centers forces immigration officials to use the immigration office’s hall and police station’s jail for accommodating migrants. In some cases, this problem is blamed as the cause of migrants escaping. In regards to funding, the immigration officials refer to the basic needs of migrants as well as additional incentives for officials to work overtime. Meanwhile, in the context of limited personnel, it connects to two functions. First, the lack of manpower to guard the migrants, which is highlighted in this extract: “*the Immigration Detention Center in Kupang only has eight guards that are divided into two groups. They are mainly only contracted workers while the migrants are reckless people*” (Tempo magazine 05/09/2010). Besides, the lack of personnel also connects to the inability to control the inflows and outflows of migrants at the Indonesian borders as described in the following extract: “*Indonesia has 129 immigration checking points and 79 border crossing posts with only 5,327 immigration officers conducting services in Indonesia and abroad*” (Kompas 30/04/2010).

Those limited capacities of the Indonesian DGI give reason to attract resources from outside the country. Australia is evidently one of the most generous parties that support the DGI. However, unlike financial and equipment aid for the INP that is given directly, Australia pours the money into the IOM,

which afterwards, assists the Indonesian Immigration. The strategy for avoiding public unhappiness with the immigration function closely connects to the sovereignty of a state, in particular, through how it regulates who is allowed and who is not allowed to enter or leave the country (Hollifield 2000: 141). Indonesians could perceive direct financial assistances to the Indonesian Immigration as a form of Australian intervention to their country’s sovereignty. In several extracts, the immigration officials mention the IOM repeatedly, referring to the organization as helping in the financing and caring of transit forced migrants.

The supports were based on a tripartite agreement between IOM, the Indonesian government, and the Australian government in 2001 (Mcnevin 2014: 644). Every year, the IOM provides a special budget for the transit forced migrants in Indonesia under the program of “care and voluntary return of migrants in an irregular situation in Indonesia” (see Table 5). An explanation of the program in IOM’s budget says that the organization is supporting the financial needs of the Indonesian government in caring for the forced migrants – from their basic needs to the transportation cost of the migrants. Additionally, the funding is also used for the purpose of “strengthening regional cooperation and providing technical support to Indonesia’s migration management systems....” (IOM 2006: 81). *Table 8* shows that the immigration was able to attract significant resources.

**Table 8**  
**IOM Annual Budgets**  
**“Care and Voluntary Return of Migrants in an Irregular Situation in Indonesia”**

<b>Year</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>
<b>USD (millions)</b>	1.206	2.729	3.709	2.966	2.459	2.119	2.981	3.103

Source: IOM (2001-2008)

The INP meanwhile, used a different narrative to gain financial supports. Unlike the immigration that highlighted the lack of resources, the INP allegedly showed the advance systems and mode of operation of people smuggling in order to attract resources. This narrative mainly describes their effort in arresting migrants and in halting smuggling networks, thus arguing that the smugglers’ ways of working are very organized in both the inter-provincial and international

arena. Therefore, it is only logical that the way to handle this is by improving the equipment and capabilities of the INP.

Within the aspect of domestic funding, the securitization of transit forced migrants is considered an ‘emergency’, and thus, should be a ‘priority’ above any other issue (Buzan et al. 1998). The sense of priority will pave the way to get more resources. According to data from the Indonesian House of Representatives, in between 2005-2010 INP’s budget was increased by 138 percent, from 11.6 trillion IDR to 27.6 trillion IDR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat RI 2010: 1). The report also mentioned that one of the outcomes of the budget increases for INP was an increase in solving conventional and transnational crime cases, rising from 76,000 cases in 2005 to 79,000 cases in 2010 (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat RI 2010: 1).

In regards to resources from outside the country, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) is one of the active supporters of INP. The INP spokesperson Inspector General Didi Widayadi in Tempo newspaper (05/09/2001), admit that five regional police forces regularly received money from AFP, which could be seen as follows;

*“Only 125 million IDR for five regional police [...] the cooperation is directly between Australian Federal Police and Indonesian National Police, not between the two governments. The regional police that quarterly receive funding are Metro Jaya (Jakarta), West Java, Bali, East Nusa Tenggara and West Nusa Tenggara. In assumption asylum seekers regularly transit in those regions.”*

In a report, AFP also admits the funding is given to five INP special intelligence units that are charged with gathering intelligence information towards “the arrest and prosecution of Indonesian-based people smugglers and their networks” (AFP 2002: 11). Other assistances from AFP to INP can be read in AFP Annual Reports 2002-2003, mentioning that AFP granted five small boats worth 1.5 million AUD to the INP (AFP 2003). Some regional police also received equipment supports directly from AFP. Bali Regional Police received computers, motorcycles, camera recorders, and GPS from AFP. On the media, the representative of AFP says, “Bali has been a transit point for illegal immigrants planning to go to Australia. We hope that equipment will be beneficial for Bali

*Regional Police, specifically in handling the case of people smuggling” (Kompas, 06/11/2010).*

The motivation of attracting resources as one of the drivers of the Indonesian elites to securitize transit forced migrants might be problematic. Some scholars might argue that Indonesia’s specialized agencies can still attract resources without securitizing transit migrants. Mainly, it is connected to the belief that the Australian government needs help from Indonesian officials in making sure that the transit forced migrants stay in Indonesia rather than escape to Australia. However, it is important to bear in mind that the specialized agencies focus on protecting Indonesia’s public support, since the Australian aid could easily being framed as a form of intervention to national sovereignty. The calculations of resources and legitimacy will be further discussed in the chapter of connecting the dots.

### **7.2.2. Maintaining Legitimacy**

Securitizing transit forced migrants as a way to maintain legitimacy works in two ways. First, through performative actions; it shows that the state apparatuses, the INP, and also the DGI, have tackled the issues. Those two institutions regularly report to the public – through mass media – on how they tried to handle the issue of the ‘uninvited guests’. Second, the way the INP and DGI label the transit forced migrants as ‘illegal immigrants’ could arguably become a strategy to show the public that the government has done something to handle the inflows of transit forced migrants, but the migrants always try to find way out to tackle the government efforts. It is mainly due to the way those institutions link forced migrants to people smuggling networks.

Indonesian immigration officials and the INP officers work together when doing raids in areas with a high concentration of transit forced migrants – mostly in open detention centers provided by the IOM and other international organizations. Transit forced migrants that are unable to show attestation letters from UNHCR or get an attestation letter from a UNHCR office outside Indonesia were sent to immigration detention centers. In the case that the nearest detention center is full, some migrants are then transferred to police stations.

The raid is intended to show the Indonesian public that the DGI has done what it can in order to stop the ‘illegal’ people from entering Indonesian borders.

The threats, according to the DGI officials can be very negative to Indonesia in the long run, which is illustrated from this extract: *“immigration officials presume a new mode of operation in human trafficking. Indonesia has become transit country, but can also become target country”* (Kompas newspaper, 10/06/2006).

In contrast, the INP continuously constructs public trust of their legitimacy by repeatedly guaranteeing that they can establish public order and prevent ‘unauthorized’ movement of forced migrants in and out of Indonesia through non-regular channels. The rhetoric took form in quantity and quality statements. In regards to quantity as an example, INP’s Chief Detective Commissaries-General Sutarman says, *“in 2009, INP holds in custody 996 illegal immigrants, in 2010 about 2,352 immigrants, in 2011 it reached 2,470 immigrants”* (Kompas 10/02/2012).

The INP also continuously publicizes the quality of their work, for example, when they tackled a people smuggling network even when it was an international syndicate. It is clear in this extract, *“The Head of West Java Regional Police Inspector-General Suhardi Alius says, his officers is hunting an Indian citizen who is suspected to be the mastermind behind people smuggling. Boat carrying immigrants sink in South Cianjur Coastal, West Java”* (Tempo newspaper, 30/06/2013).

The performative nature of the raid and custody of the transit forced migrants somehow did not solve the problem. After the security approach used by the aforementioned state apparatuses, the results did not show a positive correlation with the decrease of transit forced migrants coming to Indonesia. In several cases, the migrants tried once more to leave Indonesia for Australia through non-regular channels such as use the smugglers services. The following extracts show it;

*“Those migrants were arrested when the bus they used passed by Singosari Street. They afterward were brought to the Malang City Police Station. However, for the sake of immigration document investigation, the migrants were handed over to Malang Immigration officials. The interrogation revealed that among those illegal immigrants, four people once run away from Bangil Immigration Detention Center”* (Tempo newspaper, 12/07/2012).

Even though the raid and the arrest of the people smugglers did not contribute to the decrease of the inflows of undocumented transit migrants in Indonesia, it was still useful in maintaining public trust within specialized agencies, as well as the government's legitimacy. Karyotis (2012) argues, in order to secure their legitimacy the government needs to show to their constituents that they have the willingness to control the situation. Sometimes it can take the form of "symbolic reassurances" (Edelman 1964: 153 cited in Karyotis 2012: 401). The symbolic reassurances by the INP and also DGI are likely reactive when some incidents happen. When the media reported that many people died in the Indonesian sea due to the sinking of the boat carrying smuggled refugees to Australia, both the DGI and the Police conducted raids.

It is important to bear in mind that the people smugglers work in a clandestine manner; when their works are successful, no one knows. However, when they fail – for example, in the case of the Australian Navy intercepting the ship carrying forced migrants thus creating diplomatic tension with Indonesia – the Indonesian public will know. A 'parade' of small or medium size successes in tackling people smuggling that are propagated in the media, can neutralize the negative critiques of the inability of the state apparatuses to instill public order. This is more so in a case where a lot of people have been affected, and then INP has the responsibility to bring the perpetrator to the court.

Additionally, labeling transit forced migrants as 'illegal immigrants', insinuating that they are involved in people smuggling, could to some extent, excuse the Indonesian state apparatuses from their failure. This is because 'refugees' or 'asylum seekers' fall under understanding of being passive, whereas being a 'refugee' means that the person fled their country under a situation which is not within his or her control. In other words, a person that is labeled as 'refugee' is closely connected to a condition of "restricted agency" (Scheel and Squire 2014: 188). On the other hand, an illegal immigrant shows a more active agency. Being an 'illegal immigrant' means that a person firstly conducted something illegitimate, which means that the person associated with the term 'illegal immigrant' performed "less-restrictive agency" than forced migrants as such refugees (Scheel and Squire 2014).

## 8. Connecting the Dots

Chapters 6 and 7 have provided explanations of motivations for and against securitizing transit forced migrants. Within the discussion of cost-benefit calculations, the themes of maintaining legitimacy and attracting resources have emerged. However, arguing that these two themes explain the motivations for both securitizing and not securitizing transit forced migrants in two time spans might be perceived problematic – this is, in particular, related to the theme of attracting resources. One might argue that there was a possibility that the specialized agencies could receive funding from Australia even if they did not securitize transit forced migrants. Therefore, this chapter will highlight three arguments to tackle this issue that were implicitly mentioned in Chapters 6 and 7.

Firstly, if the issue was not securitized, the public would question the necessity of those agencies to receive financial support from Australia. In an ‘emergency’ situation where the specialized agencies argue that transit forced migrants pose a threat to Indonesia while there is simultaneously a shortage of resources to deal with this situation, the ‘extraordinary’ step of receiving aid from Australia will be strongly justifiable and legitimate. Otherwise, implementing a soft policy and receiving resources from Australia might construct an image of those institutions as being a lackey of the Australian government, thus delegitimize them.

Secondly, in general, the Indonesian government cannot afford to show a friendlier approach as during the Indochinese refugees’ arrivals. That is due to the possibly protracted nature of the transit forced migrants in the current reality of global reluctance in accepting forced migrants. According to Crisp (2003: 78), after the end of Cold War the developed countries have become less interested in financing assistance to forced migrants, while the developing countries that once generously accepted those migrants feel “their generosity was too easily and quickly forgotten by the international community”.

Handling the Indochinese refugees has been acknowledged as an undesirable experience for Indonesian government officials. It was due to the protracted condition of the Galang Island Refugee Processing Center. The camp was only designed to last for about 3-5 years from the time it was first established

in 1979. However, the facts show that the inflow of Indochinese forced migrants did not stop until the 1990s, even after the stricter process of giving refugees statuses began at the end of the 1980s. On one hand, Indonesia faced continuous inflows of refugees, but on the other hand, the number of resettlements offered by the developed countries had steadily decreased since the end of 1980s. According to the data from UNHCR, during 2001-2011, there were only 1,916 refugees who resettled in third countries or in average, about 190 people per year (Kompas, 15/05/2012). The figures were almost nothing compared to the resettlement given to Indochinese refugees. During 1975-1996, there were 111,876 refugees who transited in Indonesia and resettled in third countries – which means about 5,327 refugees were resettled per year (Ismayawati 2013: 190).

Moreover, it was not easy to repatriate the forced migrants that were not accepted by the third countries. These experiences evidently made the Indonesian government think twice when deciding what to do with the newly coming transit forced migrants. A friendly policy and reception towards forced migrants might be sending a message to other forced migrants to come to Indonesia while waiting for their refugee statuses to be processed. The negative portrayal of the refugee processing center was reflected in a statement made by the Indonesian Director-General of Immigration Iman Santoso suggesting that the Indonesian government needed to show a stronger stance in order not to let the ‘illegal immigrants’ stay for a lengthy time in Indonesia. The consequence of the protracted presence of forced migrants might lead to the emergence of “the Second Galang Island”, which the DGI officer emphasized should be hindered (Tempo magazine 04/11/2001).

Thirdly, the public resentment to the migrants is higher compared to the sentiment towards Indochinese refugees, in which the media might arguably play role in it. It is also evident that the general reception of refugees and asylum seekers from local societies has also changed compared to the time of the Indochinese refugees. From analysis of the news reports, the local communities’ comments were relatively positive. They mainly perceived forced migrants as poor people that needed to be helped. The majority of news during this time span that quoted local people discussed the emergency help they conducted. Comments from local people about forced migrants after the early of 2000s were mainly negative. Crisp (2003) highlights that the resentment might be due to the forced

migrants received facilities: free food, healthcare – while the local people do not enjoy the same facilities.

During the Indochinese refugees' arrivals, the refugees were concentrated on one island and therefore contact with other local people was limited. Additionally, under the Suharto regime, the government could easily control the media's portrayal of forced migrants in order to maintain a positive public perception of forced migrants. The military evidently conducted surveillance toward mainstream media's report on refugees and the refugees' processing camp. Police Lieutenant Colonel Kunarto in his report as Security Commander of Galang Refugees' Processing Center, had a special section in describing his evaluation toward the 'framing' and the 'tone' of national print media, and compared this with international media. Kompas newspaper and Tempo magazine were also on the monitoring list. Kunarto mentioned that national media had the tendency of reporting forced migrants negatively unlike the international media, which praised the Indonesian government (Kunarto 1980: 138).

The same control over media reports could also be found in an internal classified radiogram from the Deputy Commander of ABRI (Indonesian Military) 18th July 1979, which underlined that all activities regarding the processing of refugees and hindering new entrances of refugees were not allowed to be published for any publication. Besides, only the highest rank generals were allowed to give statements regarding those issues. Lastly, any visitation to the refugees processing center was only possible if one had a permit issued by the Ministry of Defense and Security in Jakarta (Radiogram Menteri Pertahanan T/545/1979). However, this is something that is not going to happen this time around.

## 9. Conclusion

Drawing upon the Indonesian case, the thesis shows how the representations of transit forced migrants at the time of Indochinese refugees in 1975-1996 were remarkably different compared to the new generations of refugees from Middle Eastern and South Asian countries that came to Indonesia in 1997-2013. The former were portrayed with positive labels and discussed with a non-security approach, whereas the latter, by contrast were framed as a security threat. I showed the different portrayals of forced migrants by employing media content analysis on 216 articles from Indonesian major print media.

I thus situated the different media portrayals within the spectrum of the public issue from the Copenhagen School. This thesis established the argument that the Indochinese refugees were situated as a politicized issue, but it was not securitized. Therefore, the portrayals of refugees in that time were still positive. Even if they were referred as a humanitarian burden, they were not framed as threats. In contrast, the new generations of forced migrants were shown as being lumped together with transnational crimes. They were also often labeled as 'illegal immigrants'. In this sense, I argued that the issue had been securitized.

Based on the media content analysis I found out that the dominant actors during the different time spans were also different. During the Indochinese refugees' arrival, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military were the actors that served to keep the issue of migration in the realm of the politicized. In the second time span the specialized agencies of the INP and the DGI were arguably the dominant actors who thus securitized the migrants.

This study took one further step by questioning: why were the Indochinese refugees not securitized? Additionally, why were the new generations of forced migrants securitized? I thus conducted the second step of the analysis by employing a theoretical thematic analysis on the selected materials to seek subconscious and conscious drivers that could explain the actors' decisions within the two-time spans. The materials suggested that the decision not to securitize the Indochinese forced migrants was to provide a good portrayal of Indonesia in the international community after the Indonesian military invasion of East Timor in 1976. In addition, it was also to attract resources and maintain legitimacy, which

was possible because it corresponded to the global perception of the forced migrants. The subconscious driver was allegedly due to the hatred of communism and the refugees were seen as the victims of the communist regime in Vietnam.

The next generations of forced migrants had no connection to communist regimes. Thus, it corresponded not only to the global perception of the new forced migrants, but also to the nationalistic understanding of the Indonesian elites. In addition, the experiences of handling the Indochinese refugees contributed to the understanding that following a ‘soft’ approach might cost too much while securitizing the migrants could instead attract more resources. Again, this was in line with global or regional perceptions on the issue of forced migration. Additionally, it can also serve to maintain legitimacy by showing to the public that the government conducted harsh policies to deal with the forced migrants.

Even though this thesis has tried to answer not only ‘how’ the issue was portrayed differently and thus answer ‘why’ it was portrayed differently, further research is still necessary. The study was not able to dig deeper on the implications of moving the issue from the realm of a politicized issue into the realm of a securitized issue. Did it actually solve the problem – or was the securitization of forced migration only a ‘symbolic’ gesture? Only through further research can we gain more knowledge by answering this question.

In addition, this thesis only divided the period of over 30 years into two-time spans simplifying the complex nature of media representations. However, in each time span there were also different dynamics, which cannot simply be explained through the spectrum of the public issue. For example, in general the label that was used in the period of 1975-1996 was consistent, with almost no mention of ‘illegal immigrants’. However, in the 1990’s the way it was discussed was a little different, with more emphasis on repatriation efforts. Lastly, this thesis conveys the problem through a macro perspective, but it might also be interesting to see a micro study about this issue by investigating how local media in a city with many transit forced migrants represents the refugees and how it influences the perceptions of local people on the refugees, and vice versa.

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**APPENDIX 1**  
**CONTENT ANALYSIS' CODING MANUAL**  
**PRINT MEDIA'S REPRESENTATIONS OF TRANSIT FORCED**  
**MIGRANTS IN INDONESIA**

This codebook was generated with consultation to pilot study, literature review, and the theoretical framework sections. Some categories were generated from the result of reading the texts from both periods of time.

**Q1 Source**

1. Kompas newspaper
2. Tempo magazine
3. Tempo newspaper

**Q2 Date**

YYYY/MM/DD

**Q3 Title**

It is necessary to for the cross checking of codes.

**Q4 what type of story is it?**

1. Straight News

It consists a news report that consists of 5W (what, when, where, who, why) of an event being reported. Interview materials usually dominated this type of article. Often, the lead paragraph contains a time line, referring to the 'where' aspect of the news.

2. Feature stories

This article is longer than news stories, with more in-depth information on particular issue being reported. It can be in the form of human-interest stories or feature analysis. The way the story is delivered is sometimes not direct as direct straight news that only deliver hard facts.

3. Editorial

It is usually a reflection the media's point of view in a particular issue. Written without the author's name, thus it can be claimed as non-news reporting.

4. Opinion

An article about certain issues, consisting opinions from people not affiliated to the media house. It clearly expresses a standpoint of the author, which is usually public figures, academicians, political leaders, and experts.

5. Column

It is written by a special journalist or editor of the print media. It is written in an analytical way, thus also offering a personal view in particular issues.

6. Interview

It contains questions and answers with a particular source.

7. Others

**For Q5 please bear in mind that the unit of analysis is the corpus of the text. It means each article can only be coded once.**

**Q5 What labels are used to portray refugees?**

(This could be varied from one time attribution to more dominant attribution)

1. Refugees (*pengungsi*)
2. Illegal immigrants (*imigran gelap, imigran ilegal*)
3. Asylum seekers (*pencari suaka*)
4. Fugitive (*pelarian*)
5. Illegal refugees
6. Boat people (*manusia perahu*)

7. Immigrants (*imigran*)
8. Mix positive (combination of refugees, asylum seekers, boat people)
9. Mix negative (illegal immigrants, fugitive)
10. Mix both positive and negative (contains both positive and negative labels, and also illegal refugees).

**For Q6, Q7, the coding is conducted in the level of statements. In that sense, firstly investigate the actors in the articles. Code only one main theme of the statements!!**

**Q6 Who is the actor that made the statement?**

**Please only code two digits. No need to code details until the lowest unit.**

1. Government
  - 1.1. President
  - 1.2. Foreign Affair Ministry
    - 1.2.1. Minister
    - 1.2.2. Director
    - 1.2.3. Source in the ministry
    - 1.2.4. Director general
  - 1.3. Military
    - 1.3.1. Minister of Defense
    - 1.3.2. Army officers
    - 1.3.3. Navy officers
    - 1.3.4. Galang Island Camp Committees
  - 1.4. Police
    - 1.4.1. National Police Officials (ranging from Chief of police, Special unit chief, every police officer that serve at national level)
    - 1.4.2. Local Police (ranging from provincial level to municipal level)
  - 1.5. Immigration
    - 1.5.1 Minister
    - 1.5.2. National level immigration official
    - 1.5.3. Provincial level immigration official
    - 1.5.4. Local level immigration official

- 1.6. Ministry of Social Affairs
  - 1.7. Ministry of Information
  - 1.8. Port Authority
  - 1.9. Minister of Health
  - 1.10. Advisor to Minister
  - 1.11. Local government (municipal and provincial)
  - 1.12. Member of parliament (national level and local level)
  - 1.13. Other government officials
2. Refugees  
(Both asylum seekers and refugees, or those who are referred as illegal immigrants in some newspaper even though they already have a recognition paper from UNHCR)
3. Local people (ordinary people in the news, usually appear without any attributions and age is given instead as a substitution)
4. International actors (news source non-Indonesian)
- 4.1. US (President, Special envoy, ambassador)
  - 4.2. Australia (PM, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Immigration, Ambassador)
  - 4.3. Malaysia (PM, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Immigration, Ambassador)
  - 4.4. Vietnam (PM, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Immigration, Ambassador)
  - 4.5. UNHCR (commissioner, regional representative, consultants)
  - 4.6. IOM (worldwide, regional representative, consultants)
  - 4.7. ASEAN (when the source refers the statement in the name of ASEAN)
  - 4.8. Others
5. Media
- 5.1. Media voice (a report without any source in it as well as the editorial of the media)

- 5.2. Journalist special report (with the name of journalist)
6. Academicians (experts/practitioners)
7. Smugglers (actor that in the media mentioned as perpetrators, or smugglers).
8. Others (actors that is not mentioned in any of above categories).

**Q7: In which themes, can the statements of actors be categorized?**

**These categories emerged from Buzan et al.'s (1998) spectrum of public issues, while the subcategories emerged from literature reviews and theories as well as pilot study.**

1. Non-Security

This theme contains non-politicized and politicized issue. It means the discussion ranging from no debates, debates with the presence of the government in regulating the migrants.

- 1.1. Humanity (news with this topic mainly discuss human interest stories, about the plight of refugees on their way to Indonesia, their waiting time in Indonesia, their daily life, their basic needs, education, living condition, and living expense. It also includes the relations between the local people and the refugees, but not in the context of bad behavior. Bad behavior shall be coded within social problems, not here.

- 1.2. Solution oriented (This topic includes various themes mainly concerning how the issue of transit forced migrants should be tackled, or how to deal with refugees, or how to treat them. It includes keywords such as repatriation, resettlement, processing center, multilateral approach. **(However, security oriented solution shall not be categorize in this part)**

- 1.3. Opportunistic nature of migrants

This part contains statements when migrants are mentioned by the Vietnamese government as having opportunistic behaviors – they do not want to work hard in accordance to the communist life style.

#### 1.4. Others

## 2. Security

In this issue, migrants are discussed as direct threats to security or connected to security issues. This category contains the issue of social problems, criminality, and border-control.

### 2.1. Border control

It contains issues of border patrol, refusing refugees, genuine versus non-genuine refugees, policing, and also direct associations with military threats.

### 2.2. Social economic problem

It connects migrants with prostitution, brawl, bad habit of refugees, as well as economic threats in the context of funding – though the need to support the basic needs of the migrants.

### 2.3. Transnational crime

Directly mentions people smuggling, criminal networks, transnational criminal groups, human trafficking, drugs smuggling. It can also be in the form of raids and arrests of refugees on the way to Australia from Indonesia. In the case that the statement can be both coded with transnational crime and the illegality status of the migrants, code it with transnational crime.

### 2.4. Breaking immigration law

Fraud documents, no-visa, undocumented, actions stemming from the immigration law, detention centers (as consequences of breaking immigration law). It can also include the refusal to provide protection for the refugees or when refugees run away from the detention centers.

### 2.5. Terrorism

Direct or indirect connection to terrorism.

### 2.6. Significant number

When it highlights the high number of refugees or when the volume of the refugees is mentioned to have increased significantly

#### 2.7. Sinking boat

The statement talks about the ship carrying refugees that sunk in the sea.

#### 3. Non-conclusive

When the statement only provides data or chronology. In addition, when in doubt about the statement, code as non-conclusive.

**In case the answer for Q7 is 2 (securitized) please proceed to Q8 and Q9!!!**

### **Q8 What threats do refugees brings?**

This part was developed in connection to Innes' (2010) research in British Media, but with some changes in economic and societal context due to Indonesia serving as a transit country, thus having no economic benefit from the state provided to the refugees. Additional themes are supplemented from other research in transit state settings, as well as from first reading of articles and the pilot study.

However, in consultation with the Huysmans (2000), the threats do not have to be directly pointed to refugees, but when they are "lumped" together with scary crimes; it is a sign of securitization (Hammerstad 2014).

1. Traditional Physical threat
  - 1.1. Territory and Sovereignty
  - 1.2. Transnational crimes (drugs, smuggling, trafficking)
  - 1.3. Fraud documents
  - 1.4. Illegality
  - 1.5. Possible criminal
  - 1.6. Terrorism
2. Economic threat
  - 2.1. Burden to welfare system
  - 2.2. Costing money to taking care of them
  - 2.3. Inflation
  - 2.4. Better off than local
  - 2.5. Residual problem therefore causing money

3. Societal threat
  - 3.1. identity
  - 3.2. religion
  - 3.3. social problems connected to religion
  - 3.4. bad rapport with local community
4. Non-conclusive

**Q9. What solution is offered?**

1. Detention for refugees
2. Deportation
3. Increase resources (ranging from financial, manpower, and creating special body or task force)
4. Increase surveillances
5. Raid
6. Border control (including visa regime)
7. Severe punishment for people helping people smuggling
8. Establishing processing center
9. People provide information to government
10. International cooperation
11. Non conclusive  
(if there is no one, or no mentioned at all about the solution)

**APPENDIX 2**  
**CODING SHEDULE**

**Content Analysis Coding Schedule**  
**Print Media's Representations of Transit Forced Migrants in**  
**Indonesia**

**Identifier:**

Case Number

Q1. Source

Q2. Date     -   -

Q3. Title

**Questions:**

Q4. What is the type of the article?

Q5. What label is used to portray refugees?

**Please be aware, questions Q6, Q7, Q8, Q9 are connected. Please fill in the boxes to correspond with the placement of the previous answer, in example boxes 1-7. Please only code two digits.**

Q6. Who are the actors made statements?

Q7. In which themes, the statement can be categorized?

**In case of the answer for Q7 is security issue, please proceed to the next questions Q8 and Q9.**

Q8. What threat is associated with transit forced migrants?

Q9. What solution is provided?

**APPENDIX 3**  
**NEWS SAMPLES: INDOCHINESE REFUGEES**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Titles</b>
1	Tempo magazine	1976-09-04	<i>Orang Vietnam di Natuna</i>
2	Tempo magazine	1977-08-20	<i>Di Jakarta Berapa Lama?</i>
3	Tempo magazine	1979-01-06	<i>Tentang Beban Kemanusiaan Itu</i>
4	Tempo magazine	1979-01-13	<i>Kali Ini Perlente</i>
5	Tempo magazine	1979-02-24	<i>Pulau Pengungsi</i>
6	Tempo magazine	1979-03-17	<i>Mereka Bikin Pusing</i>
7	Tempo magazine	1979-03-31	<i>Kita Bukan Tukang Tampung</i>
8	Tempo magazine	1979-04-21	<i>Mereka Akan Dipulaukan</i>
9	Tempo magazine	1979-05-19	<i>Penggalangan di Pulau Galang</i>
10	Tempo magazine	1979-05-26	<i>Bagaimana Membuka dan Menutup Kran</i>
11	Tempo magazine	1979-09-01	<i>Jangan Sampai Jadi Kere</i>
12	Tempo magazine	1979-09-01	<i>Lebih Senang Ketimbang Vietnam</i>
13	Tempo magazine	1979-09-22	<i>Pintu-Pintu di Pejambon</i>
14	Tempo magazine	1980-03-01	<i>Tanda Mata di Galang</i>
15	Tempo magazine	1981-08-01	<i>Green dan Orang Kapal</i>
16	Tempo magazine	1990-05-05	<i>Gelombang Rombeng Vietnam</i>
17	Tempo magazine	1990-05-19	<i>Mengapa Mereka Mengadu Nyawa?</i>
18	Tempo magazine	1990-05-19	<i>Galang Dalam Kenangan</i>
19	Tempo magazine	1990-05-19	<i>Kisah Tinh Xu di Pulau Galang</i>
20	Tempo magazine	1990-06-23	<i>Pulau Galang Nyaris Meledak</i>
21	Tempo magazine	1990-05-19	<i>Apa yang Terjadi Kalau Mereka Terus Berdatangan?</i>
22	Tempo magazine	1994-05-14	<i>Keresahan di Pulau Pengungsi</i>
23	Tempo magazine	1993-06-26	<i>Pulanglah dari Galang</i>
24	Tempo magazine	1993-12-04	<i>Malu Pulang, Susah di Galang</i>
25	Tempo magazine	1993-12-04	<i>Susahnya ke Negara Ketiga</i>
26	Tempo magazine	1979-07-07	<i>Unjuk Gigi Saja, Tak Usah Omong Perang</i>
27	Tempo magazine	1979-07-07	<i>Bantulah Kami untuk Membantu Anda</i>
28	Tempo magazine	1979-06-23	<i>Cahaya 'Jangan Datang' di Laut Indonesia</i>
29	Tempo magazine	1979-06-23	<i>Mungkin Sesuatu Sedang Terjadi di Hanoi</i>
30	Kompas newspaper	1979-10-01	<i>Dubes Kanada Diterima Presiden</i>
31	Kompas newspaper	1979-03-03	<i>Mereka Imigran Gelap</i>
32	Kompas newspaper	1979-03-03	<i>Patroli TNI AL di Laut Cina Selatan Ditingkatkan</i>
33	Kompas newspaper	1979-06-28	<i>Memang Ada Ketidaksepakatan dengan Vietnam</i>
34	Kompas newspaper	1979-07-03	<i>Timbul Perang atau Tidak RI Sudah Siap</i>
35	Kompas newspaper	1979-07-03	<i>Jepang Tidak Segan Lagi Berperan</i>

			<i>di Asia Tenggara dan Timur</i>
36	Kompas newspaper	1979-03-05	<i>Indonesia Tetap Akan Sediakan Pulau</i>
37	Kompas newspaper	1979-08-04	<i>Swedia Ambil 600 Pengungsi Vietnam di Indonesia</i>
38	Kompas newspaper	1979-07-06	<i>Kerjasama di Laut Mencegah Masuknya Pengungsi Vietnam</i>
39	Kompas newspaper	1978-12-07	<i>Indonesia Ikut Konferensi PBB Soal Pengungsi Vietnam</i>
40	Kompas newspaper	1978-12-05	<i>Masih 2002 Pengungsi Vietnam di Indonesia</i>
41	Kompas newspaper	1979-10-08	<i>265 Pengungsi Vietnam Menuju Jerman</i>
42	Kompas newspaper	1979-09-10	<i>Presiden ke Pulau Galang Sebelum Kunjungi Singapura</i>
43	Kompas newspaper	1979-05-11	<i>Australia Sedia Terima 1,000 Pengungsi Vietnam dari Indonesia</i>
44	Kompas newspaper	1979-07-11	<i>Tanggung Jawab Timbal-Balik Indonesia-Malaysia</i>
45	Kompas newspaper	1979-07-13	<i>Kapal RS Perancis Akan Beroperasi di Jemaja</i>
46	Kompas newspaper	1979-06-12	<i>Pengungsi Vietnam Ditolak Masuk Wilayah RI</i>
47	Kompas newspaper	1979-02-14	<i>Sebuah Pulau di Indonesia Dipertimbangkan</i>
48	Kompas newspaper	1979-05-14	<i>Negara-Negara Indocina Jangan Lupakan Tanggungjawabnya</i>
49	Kompas newspaper	1979-07-14	<i>Indonesia Tidak Setuju Pengungsi Dihalau ke Laut</i>
50	Kompas newspaper	1979-05-16	<i>Indonesia Perkirakan Dana P Galang 18.56 Juta Dolar</i>
51	Kompas newspaper	1979-07-17	<i>Melautkan Para Pengungsi Secara Sepihak dan Tanpa Koordinasi</i>
52	Kompas newspaper	1979-06-18	<i>Tak Perlu Kata-Kata Diplomasi Lagi</i>
53	Kompas newspaper	1979-07-18	<i>Harus Diselesaikan dengan Mengikutsertakan Vietnam</i>
54	Kompas newspaper	1979-09-24	<i>Sebuah RS Dibangun di P Galang</i>
55	Kompas newspaper	1979-07-13	<i>DPR RI Parlemen Australia Bicarakan Pengungsi</i>
56	Kompas newspaper	1979-06-27	<i>Perundingan Vietnam-Indonesia Tanpa Hasil Jelas</i>
57	Kompas newspaper	1978-10-20	<i>Penampungan yang Baik dan Hidup yang Santai</i>
58	Kompas newspaper	1978-10-19	<i>Pemerintah RI Minta Bantuan PBB untuk Menangani 1,000 Pengungsi Vietnam</i>
59	Kompas newspaper	1976-10-08	<i>Pengungsi dari Vietnam ke Pulau Christmas</i>
60	Kompas newspaper	1975-06-18	<i>Pojok Kompas</i>

61	Kompas newspaper	1976-07-27	<i>15 Pengungsi Vietnam Masih Dikarantina</i>
62	Kompas newspaper	1978-11-16	<i>Indonesia Tak Bersedia Tampung Pengungsi Vietnam</i>
63	Kompas newspaper	1981-07-24	<i>Green Pahami dan Hargai Sikap RI</i>
64	Kompas newspaper	1981-07-23	<i>Presiden Beri Penjelasan Kepada Green</i>
65	Kompas newspaper	1981-01-14	<i>Diselamatkan Nelayan Indonesia</i>
66	Kompas newspaper	1982-07-23	<i>56 Pengungsi Vietnam Mendarat di Natuna</i>
67	Kompas newspaper	1983-08-09	<i>Australia Sedia Tampung 50 Persen Pengungsi Vietnam di Asteng</i>
68	Kompas newspaper	1984-07-09	<i>RI Tak Mungkin Deportasi Pengungsi ke Negeri Asalnya</i>
69	Kompas newspaper	1985-02-03	<i>Di Pulau Galang Terdapat 10,000 Pengungsi Vietnam</i>
70	Kompas newspaper	1986-05-20	<i>Hubungan Australia Indonesia Lewat Pendekatan Lebih Pragmatis</i>
71	Kompas newspaper	1986-01-03	<i>Vietnam Bersedia Memikirkan Masalah Pengungsi di RI</i>
72	Kompas newspaper	1990-05-03	<i>Pengungsi Vietnam Tidak akan Diusir</i>
73	Kompas newspaper	1990-07-05	<i>Vietnam Akan Berusaha Mencegah Pengungsi Ilegal</i>
74	Kompas newspaper	1990-07-30	<i>AS Harapkan Pemrosesan Pengungsi Dipercepat</i>
75	Kompas newspaper	1991-11-23	<i>Tak Cuma Soal Repatriasi</i>
76	Kompas newspaper	1993-03-02	<i>Masalah Repatriasi Pengungsi dan Kebijakan Vietnam</i>
77	Kompas newspaper	1993-03-02	<i>Repatriasi dan Hak Pulang ke Tanah Air</i>
78	Kompas newspaper	1993-06-12	<i>Indonesia Minta Proses Repatriasi Dipercepat</i>
79	Kompas newspaper	1993-09-05	<i>Indonesia Tak Pernah Berusaha Campuri Urusan Negara Lain</i>
80	Kompas newspaper	1993-09-21	<i>Pengungsi Vietnam Siap Direpatriasi</i>
81	Kompas newspaper	1993-10-26	<i>Bantuan Bagi Pengungsi Vietnam Terlalu Banyak</i>
82	Kompas newspaper	1994-04-27	<i>Kunjungan Presiden Le Duc Anh dan Prospek Hubungan RI-Vietnam</i>
83	Kompas newspaper	1994-04-28	<i>Vietnam Berniat Kosongkan Pulau Galang</i>
84	Kompas newspaper	1994-04-30	<i>Pengungsi Vietnam Tewas Bakar Diri di Pulau Galang</i>
85	Kompas newspaper	1994-05-02	<i>Pemulangan Pengungsi Vietnam Tidak Dengan Jalan Memaksa</i>
86	Kompas newspaper	1994-05-27	<i>Repatriasi Pengungsi Vietnam Baru Rampung Agustus 1995</i>
87	Kompas newspaper	1994-07-02	<i>Manusia Perahu Vietnam Terdampar</i>

			<i>di Pulau Sabu</i>
88	Kompas newspaper	1996-04-03	<i>Babak Terakhir Manusia Perahu</i>
89	Kompas newspaper	1996-05-31	<i>Seluruh Manusia Perahu Akan Dipulangkan Selama Juni</i>
90	Kompas newspaper	1996-06-17	<i>Manusia Perahu di Pulau Galang</i>
91	Kompas newspaper	1996-06-18	<i>Memetik Apel di Rumah Nenek</i>
92	Kompas newspaper	1996-06-19	<i>UNHCR: Tidak Ada Paksaan dari ABRI untuk Memulangkan Manusia Perahu</i>
93	Kompas newspaper	1996-09-10	<i>Ditutup, Kamp Pengungsi di Pulau Galang</i>

**APPENDIX 4**  
**NEWS SAMPLES: NEW WAVES OF REFUGEES**

<b>Case Number</b>	<b>Source</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Titles</b>
94	Tempo magazine	2001-09-09	<i>Terjepit Dua Karang</i>
95	Tempo magazine	2001-11-04	<i>Jangan Ada Galang Kedua</i>
96	Tempo magazine	2001-11-04	<i>Karamnya Sebuah Harapan</i>
97	Tempo magazine	2001-11-08	<i>Jerat Hukum Penyelundup</i>
98	Tempo magazine	2001-12-16	<i>Siap Menyelundup Jika Nasib Meredup</i>
99	Tempo magazine	2010-09-05	<i>Kandas di Suaka Penantian</i>
100	Tempo magazine	2010-09-05	<i>Dibujuk Calo Asal Indonesia</i>
101	Tempo magazine	2012-01-01	<i>Kapal Imigran Karam</i>
102	Kompas newspaper	1998-03-25	<i>Disinyalir Ada Jaringan Imigran Gelap</i>
103	Kompas newspaper	1998-07-22	<i>Indonesia Jadi Tempat Transit Imigran Gelap</i>
104	Kompas newspaper	2001-03-07	<i>Indonesia Menjadi Tujuan Imigran Gelap</i>
105	Kompas newspaper	2001-05-19	<i>Imigran Gelap Ditangani Tim IOM</i>
106	Kompas newspaper	2001-08-29	<i>Apa yang Sebaiknya Dilakukan Kepada Imigran Gelap dan Pengungsi?</i>
107	Kompas newspaper	2001-09-05	<i>Trip Ilegal ke Pulau Pasir</i>
108	Kompas newspaper	2001-09-07	<i>Indonesia Perlu Bangun Pusat Penahanan</i>
109	Kompas newspaper	2001-09-07	<i>Hukuman Berat Bagi yang Memfasilitasi Imigran</i>
110	Kompas newspaper	2001-09-25	<i>Indonesia Perlu Ratifikasi Konvensi Tentang Pengungsi</i>
111	Kompas newspaper	2001-10-26	<i>Jusuf Kalla Soal Imigran Gelap</i>
112	Kompas newspaper	2001-10-27	<i>Dua Anggota Polisi Terlibat Jaringan Penyelundup Imigran</i>
113	Kompas newspaper	2001-11-23	<i>61 Imigran Gelap Asal Pakistan Masuk Jatim</i>
114	Kompas newspaper	2001-11-30	<i>Dunia Kecam PM Howard Soal Imigrasi</i>
115	Kompas newspaper	2002-02-06	<i>Makna Kunjungan PM Australia John Howard Masih Sulit Diukur</i>
116	Kompas newspaper	2002-02-28	<i>Perlu Kerjasama Global Menghentikan Fenomena Penyelundupan Manusia</i>
117	Kompas newspaper	2004-09-30	<i>Polisi Australia Minta Lima Imigran Gelap di Semarang Dideportasi</i>
118	Kompas newspaper	2006-06-10	<i>107 migran Gelap Asal Srilanka Ditangkap di Vila</i>
119	Kompas newspaper	2006-11-28	<i>Ditjen Imigrasi Tangkap 31 WNA Ilegal</i>

120	Kompas newspaper	2009-03-28	<i>Polisi Tanah 24 Imigran Gelap</i>
121	Kompas newspaper	2009-03-29	<i>Imigran Gelap Afghanistan Masuk Wilayah RI Setelah Mampir di Malaysia</i>
122	Kompas newspaper	2009-04-12	<i>40 WNA Dikirim Lewat Kepulauan Seribu</i>
123	Kompas newspaper	2009-04-18	<i>Dari Negeri Konflik Mencari Damai</i>
124	Kompas newspaper	2009-04-19	<i>Warga Jadi Terlunta-Lunta</i>
125	Kompas newspaper	2009-04-22	<i>Penyalur Kabur dari Kejaran Polisi</i>
126	Kompas newspaper	2009-04-23	<i>70 Warga Afganistan Direlokasi</i>
127	Kompas newspaper	2009-05-13	<i>1031 Imigran Masuk Lewat Jalur Tikus</i>
128	Kompas newspaper	2009-05-15	<i>Imigran Afganistan Kabur dari Tahanan</i>
129	Kompas newspaper	2009-05-20	<i>10 Imigran Afganistan Kabur</i>
130	Kompas newspaper	2009-05-22	<i>Aceh Tunggu Deplu</i>
131	Kompas newspaper	2009-06-19	<i>Ribuan Imigran Gelap Masuki RI</i>
132	Kompas newspaper	2009-06-20	<i>Ribuan Imigran Masuki RI</i>
133	Kompas newspaper	2009-06-25	<i>Aru Jadi Jalur Baru Penyelundup</i>
134	Kompas newspaper	2009-06-27	<i>WNI Bantu Perjalanan Imigran Gelap</i>
135	Kompas newspaper	2009-10-22	<i>Deplu Verifikasi Imigran Srilanka</i>
136	Kompas newspaper	2009-10-27	<i>Imigran Gelap Dibahas</i>
137	Kompas newspaper	2009-11-03	<i>Indonesia Jangan Mau Jadi Pengaman Bagi Australia</i>
138	Kompas newspaper	2009-11-03	<i>RI Minta Kedubes Srilanka Ikut Terlibat</i>
139	Kompas newspaper	2009-12-29	<i>Imigran Gelap Mengaku Ingin Berwisata</i>
140	Kompas newspaper	2009-12-30	<i>Imigran Gelap Ditampung Sementara</i>
141	Kompas newspaper	2010-03-27	<i>17 Imigran Ditangkap</i>
142	Kompas newspaper	2010-04-30	<i>Terlunta-Lunta Dalam Tarikan Kepentingan</i>
143	Kompas newspaper	2010-04-30	<i>Jejak-Jejak Ketidakpastian</i>
144	Kompas newspaper	2010-04-30	<i>Menegakkan Kedaulatan</i>
145	Kompas newspaper	2010-06-21	<i>Pengungsi Bukan Imigran Gelap</i>
146	Kompas newspaper	2010-07-12	<i>Empat Imigran Gelap Kabur</i>
147	Kompas newspaper	2010-09-19	<i>Repotnya Mengurusi Warga Negara Lain</i>
148	Kompas newspaper	2010-10-13	<i>Sebanyak 52 Tahanan Imigrasi Kabur</i>
149	Kompas newspaper	2010-10-18	<i>85 WNA Ditangkap di Gunungkidul</i>
150	Kompas newspaper	2010-11-06	<i>Australia Bantu Polda Bali</i>
151	Kompas newspaper	2011-03-14	<i>Simalakama Menindak Imigran Gelap</i>
152	Kompas newspaper	2011-11-02	<i>7 Imigran Tewas Tenggelam</i>
153	Kompas newspaper	2011-12-21	<i>Pengungsi Korban Konflik</i>
154	Kompas newspaper	2011-10-23	<i>Jenazah Imigran Terus Bertambah</i>
155	Kompas newspaper	2011-12-23	<i>Dilema Imigran Gelap</i>

156	Kompas newspaper	2011-12-24	<i>Imigran Gelap</i>
157	Kompas newspaper	2012-02-10	<i>Penyelundupan Manusia Meningkat</i>
158	Kompas newspaper	2012-03-08	<i>TNI AL Tangkap Imigran di Batam</i>
159	Kompas newspaper	2012-05-15	<i>Antara Kemanusiaan dan Ancaman Narkoba</i>
160	Kompas newspaper	2012-06-04	<i>Kerjasama untuk Cegah Jatuh Korban</i>
161	Kompas newspaper	2012-09-05	<i>Indonesia-Australia Bahas Kode Etik SAR</i>
162	Kompas newspaper	2013-06-28	<i>Duri "Abadi" Hubungan Indonesia-Australia</i>
163	Kompas newspaper	2013-08-22	<i>Pembatalan Tak Akan Mempersulit</i>
164	Kompas newspaper	2013-08-28	<i>Polisi Tangkap Sindikat Penyelundup Imigran</i>
165	Kompas newspaper	2013-10-12	<i>Pemkot Malang Mendata Warga Negara Asing</i>
166	Kompas newspaper	2013-10-23	<i>WNI Banyak Terlibat</i>
167	Tempo newspaper	2012-07-07	<i>Imigran Gelap ke Indonesia Cenderung Meningkat</i>
168	Tempo newspaper	2013-09-13	<i>Sulawesi Selatan Jadi Jalur Transit Imigran Gelap</i>
169	Tempo newspaper	2012-09-04	<i>Anggota TNI Penyelundup Imigran Gelap Ditangkap</i>
170	Tempo newspaper	2012-04-12	<i>Empat Orang Jadi Tersangka Kasus Imigran Gelap</i>
171	Tempo newspaper	2012-07-12	<i>Polda Jawa Timur Tangkap 25 Imigran Gelap</i>
172	Tempo newspaper	2013-09-26	<i>Imigran Gelap Pakai Puluhan Jalur Tikur di Riau</i>
173	Tempo newspaper	2013-07-27	<i>Empat Orang Jadi Tersangka Tenggelamnya Kapal Imigran Gelap</i>
174	Tempo newspaper	2012-10-10	<i>Lima Oknum TNI Penyelundup Imigran Gelap</i>
175	Tempo newspaper	2011-10-24	<i>46 Imigran Gelap Tertangkap di Karanganyar</i>
176	Tempo newspaper	2012-11-12	<i>Kepulauan Seribu Kewalahan Hadapi Imigran Gelap</i>
177	Tempo newspaper	2013-11-19	<i>Tiga Oknum TNI AL Diduga Selundupkan Imigran</i>
178	Tempo newspaper	2011-10-20	<i>17 Imigran Gelap Ditangkap di Pantai Kukup</i>
179	Tempo newspaper	2013-11-20	<i>Biaya Imigran ke Australia Rp 15 Juta</i>
180	Tempo newspaper	2013-07-30	<i>Warga Negara India Diduga Jadi Otak Penyelundup Imigran</i>
181	Tempo newspaper	2013-07-03	<i>Imigran Gelap Timur Tengah Berulah</i>
182	Tempo newspaper	2012-11-16	<i>Polisi Cokok 35 Imigran Asal Irak</i>
183	Tempo newspaper	2012-09-12	<i>Penyelundup Imigran Dituntut 8</i>

			<i>Tahun Penjara</i>
184	Tempo newspaper	2012-09-28	<i>38 Imigran Ditangkap Saat Sewa Perahu</i>
185	Tempo newspaper	2013-04-15	<i>4 Orang Terlibat Penyelundup Imigran</i>
186	Tempo newspaper	2013-06-08	<i>100 Imigran Timur Tengah Dievakuasi ke Cilacap</i>
187	Tempo newspaper	2013-11-08	<i>Imigran Mabuk Acak-Acak Masjid</i>
188	Tempo newspaper	2013-09-09	<i>Imigran Kembali Tangkap 106 Pengungsi</i>
189	Tempo newspaper	2009-04-17	<i>Imigran Gelap</i>
190	Tempo newspaper	2012-08-31	<i>Kapal Pengangkut 150 Imigran Tenggelam</i>
191	Tempo newspaper	2013-04-18	<i>Polisi Tangkap Lagi 9 Imigran Rohingya</i>
192	Tempo newspaper	2011-10-22	<i>Imigran Asal Afghanistan Diduga Tak Lari Jauh</i>
193	Tempo newspaper	2013-05-13	<i>95 Pencari Suaka Australia Ditangkap di Bali</i>
194	Tempo newspaper	2004-01-11	<i>Imigran Afganistan Protes Jahit Mulut</i>
195	Tempo newspaper	2010-07-26	<i>Polisi Kembali Tangkap 21 Imigran Afganistan</i>
196	Tempo newspaper	2004-10-05	<i>Imigran Asal Afganistan Dihajar Warga</i>
197	Tempo newspaper	2010-10-04	<i>Kemungkinan Adanya Sindikat Imigran Diselidiki</i>
198	Tempo newspaper	2010-10-19	<i>Pantai Gunungkidul Jadi Lokasi Penyeberangan Imigran Gelap</i>
199	Tempo newspaper	2011-12-22	<i>Diduga Terlibat Menyelundupkan Imigran</i>
200	Tempo newspaper	2009-05-22	<i>Bobol Teralis, 10 Imigran Afganistan Kabur</i>
201	Tempo newspaper	2010-04-07	<i>37 Imigran Afganistan Ditangkap</i>
202	Tempo newspaper	2010-03-24	<i>Imigrasi Kupang Kesulitan Deportasi Imigran</i>
203	Tempo newspaper	2009-10-16	<i>Imigran Srilanka Sakit</i>
204	Tempo newspaper	2009-12-31	<i>Asal Afganistan Bertambah</i>
205	Tempo newspaper	2010-11-23	<i>Dua Imigran Gelap Afganistan Ditangkap</i>
206	Tempo newspaper	2009-10-14	<i>Puluhan Imigran Srilanka Sakit</i>
207	Tempo newspaper	2012-08-14	<i>Sembunyikan Ratusan Imigran, Dua Rumah di Sentul Digrebeg</i>
208	Tempo newspaper	2013-06-22	<i>Pelanggaran Hak Anak Pencari Suaka</i>
209	Tempo newspaper	2011-10-31	<i>Petugas IOM Periksa Imigran Gelap di Surakarta</i>
210	Tempo newspaper	2013-09-29	<i>Imigran Diduga Mengemudikan Kapal Sendiri</i>

211	Tempo newspaper	2013-03-19	<i>Imigran Ilegal di Kawasan Asia-Pasifik Meningkatkan Tajam</i>
212	Tempo newspaper	2013-06-24	<i>Imigran Gelap Mengelabui Aparat Dengan Naik Truk</i>
213	Tempo newspaper	2009-02-08	<i>Indonesia Kirim Tim Klarifikasi</i>
214	Tempo newspaper	2009-10-23	<i>78 Imigran Diamankan</i>
215	Tempo newspaper	2010-04-08	<i>205 Imigran Gelap Direlokasi</i>
216	Tempo newspaper	2001-09-05	<i>Polri Akui Terima Dana Australia</i>