

# ‘Securitized’ Solidarity?

Explaining Member States’ Motivations for Participation  
and Patterns of Participation in Joint Operations at the  
External EU Borders

Adriana Rodica Ilişescu

# Abstract

Joint Operations at the external borders of the EU are axiomatic for EU's border management policy and constitute forms of collective action involving the efforts of two or more Member States for the purpose of securing the common borders. Nevertheless, participation in joint operations is based on voluntarism and guided by the principle of solidarity, which should act as catalysts encouraging MSs' participation in Joint Operations. Scrutinising the phenomenon from the perspective of collective action theory offered both a theoretical and empirical puzzle, since states, as rational actors, would be expected to 'free-ride'. Yet, despite the voluntary nature and the lack of institutional 'coercion', Member States do participate extensively in joint operations. This raised a bi-dimensional enquiry, related to the question of *motivations* behind MSs' participation, and adjacently to *patterns* of participation in Joint Operations.

Regarding *motivations*, the findings of the paper seem to suggest that participation in joint operations has been predominantly security-driven and connected to the provision of border/internal security (as collective goods), but also, to a certain extent norm-driven, and connected to the provision of refugee/migrant protection (as collective good). A salient finding was that the Member States' security concerns have led to the appropriation of solidarity for security-ends and, as such, to 'securitized' solidarity.

Regarding *patterns*, the findings seem to suggest a positive correlation between the degree of commitment to human rights of Member States and the degree of participation, but almost no correlation between the state's geographic propinquity to the external borders and participation.

*Key words:* collective action, joint operations, external EU borders, motivation for participation, patterns of participation

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*Tell me and I might forget, teach me and I may remember, involve me and I learn.*

(Benjamin Franklin)

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# List of Abbreviations

CoE	Council of Europe
Commission	European Commission
CRATE	Centralised Record of Available Technical Equipment
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EBGTs	European Border Guard Teams
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EPN	European Patrol Network
ER(s)	Evaluation Report(s) for Joint Operations
EU	European Union
Frontex	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders
HMRA	Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis
HR	Human Rights
JO(s)	Joint Operation(s)
MS(s)	Member State(s)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OP(s)	Operational Plan(s) for Joint Operations
PT	Process-Tracing
RABIT(s)	Rapid Border Intervention Team(s)
SAC	Schengen Associated Country
SAR	Search and Rescue
SBC	Schengen Border Code
SCIFA	Strategic Committee for Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum
TEP	Technical Equipment Pool
UK	United Kingdom
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WJP	World Justice Project

# 1 Introduction

The abolishment of the internal borders, the establishment of the Schengen area and the free movement of people's principle, enshrined in the European Union (EU) primary legal basis, have relinquished *de facto* sovereign prerogatives of Member States (MSs) over territorial borders (Sperling, 2013: 203) and led to a "spatial turn" (Wolff, 2008: 254), due to the emergence of new borders and spaces. Currently, the EU's external borders amount to 11.700 km of land, respectively 45.500 km of sea border, of which approximately half represents the Southern maritime border (Frontex, 2014g: 11). The external borders of the EU constitute a matter of co-responsibility, although in practice the 'burden' of securing the borders falls primarily on the 'gate-keepers' of Europe – the external border MSs. As such, the "spatial turn" has created multi-dimensional interdependencies between MSs, and the porous external borders led to increased pan-European concerns about "unconventional', 'asymmetric' and 'transnational' threats" (Bossong and Rhinard, 2013: 130), such as irregular migration and cross-border crime (Rijpma, 2009).

This led to reinforced cooperation of MSs in the field of border management through the set-up of operational cooperation at the external borders, the most eloquent form of which are joint operations (JOs). JOs constitute 'collective actions' that are coordinated by Frontex, hosted by MSs and involve the participation of other MSs and their financial, human and logistic support (Nováky, 2011: 3). Nonetheless, they rely on voluntary participation of the MSs and participation should be guided by the principle of solidarity. Viewed from the perspective of collective action theory and given that participation in JOs is based on voluntarism and no institutional 'coercion' is present, the expectation would be that MSs would 'free-ride' on the efforts of other MSs. Despite there being sporadic occurrences of 'free-riding' behaviour, empirical data show that MSs do participate extensively in JOs. This raised the questions of *motivations* and *patterns*. Given the scale and importance that JOs at the Southern external borders have gained recently, the focus of the inquiry has been on JOs implemented at the Southern external borders.

Hence, the paper set out to enquire *what factor(s) can explain MSs' participation in joint operations at the Southern external borders of the EU?* In addition to this, as a secondary research puzzle, the paper looked into the question of *what patterns of participation can be observed in joint operations at the Southern external borders of the EU?*

In order to shed light on the research questions, the thesis first explained the foundations of operational cooperation at EU level (subchapter 2.1, 2.2) and the pivotal role of JOs

in the framework of EU border management (subchapter 2.3). Thereafter, previous research was delineated to set the basis of the current study (subchapter 2.4). Subsequently, the research puzzle has been defined by using collective action theory (chapter 3) and hypothetical assumptions explaining motivations for MSs' participation and potential patterns of participation were advanced (chapter 4). For the purpose of a sound research enquiry, the methodological approach and limitations were presented in the following (chapter 5). The findings of the in-depth analysis of the two selected cases of JOs, i.e. JO Hermes (Italy) (section 6.1) and JO Poseidon (Greece) (subchapter 6.2) were presented subsequently. For the purpose of clarity, the analysis was presented separately for the question on motivations (subchapters 6.1.1, 6.2.1) and for the question on patterns (subchapters 6.1.2, 6.2.2). A cross-case comparison has followed (subchapter 6.3). Finally, the conclusion sums up the findings and suggests potential avenues for further research (chapter 7).

## 2 Operational Cooperation at the External EU Border

Guided by the premise that understanding “the politics of institutionalisation” (Leonard, 2009: 372) is necessary to understand the intricacies and issues related to a policy, the following section will discuss the institutionalisation of operational cooperation and JOs, and the academic attention offered to this phenomenon.

### 2.1 EU Border Management Policy: the foundation for operational cooperation

30 years ago, in 1985, six European states met in a symbolically important place<sup>2</sup> to sign the Schengen Agreement (1990), which envisaged the gradual abolition of checks at the common borders of the signatory states, and as a “functional spill-over” (Pollack, 2010: 17ff.), the reinforcement of the newly formed external borders in consonance with a set of common rules. The “Schengen laboratory” (Commission, 2002: 2; Jorry, 2007: 3) constituted a first attempt at ensuring common external border control amongst a number of European states (see cf. Rijpma, 2009: 122; Mungianu, 2013: 360ff; Leonard, 2009: 377) and the agreement was subsequently adopted by most EU MSs<sup>3</sup>, including the Schengen Associated Countries (SACs).

Given that the question of border control was and continues to be a topic of “high politics” that directly impinges on state sovereignty (Geddes, 2012: 266), the transfer of national powers to the First Pillar was “both partial and gradual” (Rijpma, 2009: 122), but gained significant legislative momentum with the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. The cautious conferral of powers to the supranational institutions in the area was eloquent of this development. Following the Tampere European Council of 1999, a greater emphasis was set on the need for effective control of the external borders and, in view of this, the Council called for “closer cooperation and mutual

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<sup>2</sup> The Schengen Agreement was signed in Schengen, Luxembourg, near the tri-point where the borders of France, Germany and Luxembourg meet.

<sup>3</sup> The United Kingdom and Ireland have negotiated an opt-out from the Schengen *acquis*. Denmark also secured opt-outs in specific JHA areas but is a member of the Schengen Area. Also, the Schengen Area excludes Romania, Bulgaria and Cyprus and, as of 2013, Croatia. The latter only hold Schengen candidate countries status.



technical assistance between the MSs' border control services, such as exchange programmes and technology transfer, especially on maritime borders, and for the rapid inclusion of the applicant States in this co-operation" (European Council, 1999).

In the context of the 9/11 terrorist attack and an increased influx of irregular migrants<sup>4</sup> coming from the African continent (Carrera, 2007), the question of border control was brought back on the EU agenda by the Laeken European Council of December 2001. The Laeken Council Conclusions reiterated the need for more effective control of the EU's external borders that will "help in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration networks and the traffic in human beings" (European Council, 2001). The European Council "ask[ed] the Council and the Commission to work out arrangements for cooperation between services responsible for external border control and to examine the conditions in which a mechanism or common services to control external borders could be created" (European Council, 2001: 12). The Laeken and Tampere Council were stepping stones towards the foundation of operational cooperation at the external borders of the EU, alluding to this necessity and possibility.

In response to this, in 2002, the Commission issued a Communication "Towards Integrated Management of the External Borders of the Member States of the EU", which delineated five mutually interdependent components to establish a common policy of management of the external borders, namely: "(a) a common corpus of legislation; (b) a common coordination and operational cooperation mechanism; (c) common integrated risk analysis; (d) staff trained in the European dimension and inter-operational equipment; (e) burden-sharing between Member States in the run-up to a European Corps of Border Guards" (Commission, 2002: 12ff.). The Commission extensively emphasised the need for reinforcing operational burden-sharing and pooling financial, technical and human resources for the purpose of securing the external borders (Commission, 2002; Rijpma, 2009: 129).

The subsequent "Action Plan for the Management of the External Borders" of the Council from June 2002 acknowledged the need for further cooperation but also maintained a reticent position related to the establishment of a European Corps of Border Guards and kept a "pragmatic orientation" (Rijpma, 2009: 128) regarding burden-sharing and common legislation (Council of the EU, 2002). Instead, the Council took steps towards the institutionalisation of operational cooperation by setting up a network structure consisting of specialised centres in different border management areas, under the coordination of a Common Unit (SCIFA+). Thus, at the outset, operational cooperation was established as "an expression of intergovernmental governance" and a method to "overcome the weaknesses of national management of the external borders" by acting collectively (Mungianu, 2013: 361).

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<sup>4</sup> An irregular migrant is a "third-country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils, the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in the Member State concerned" (European Parliament, 2015).

However, this pragmatic institutionalisation soon revealed its deficits as the institutional set-up faced “structural limits” (Leonard, 2009: 378) and raised questions related to limitations in terms of membership and agenda, legal basis and effectiveness in operational matters (Commission, 2003; Rijpma, 2009: 131). This led to the replacement of SCIFA+ with the Practitioners’ Common Unit (PUC), composed only of the heads of border control services put in charge of operational issues. Soon after, a more structured approach to operational cooperation for the management of the external borders was advocated during the European Council in Thessaloniki. This offered the Commission a “window of opportunity” for proposing the establishment of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders<sup>5</sup> (Frontex). Despite the fact that, at the beginning, the Commission and the Parliament supported the creation of a European Corps of Border Guards, MSs opposed, which led to a compromise solution, namely the creation of Frontex to “promote burden-sharing, solidarity and mutual trust in the management of external borders” (Jorry, 2007: 2).

## 2.2 The institutionalisation<sup>6</sup> of operational cooperation

A turning point in the development of operational cooperation has been the establishment of Frontex - the EU border management agency (Council Regulation 2007/2004). Since 2005, Frontex became, alongside the MSs, a pivotal actor in border management, being tasked with the central responsibility of, *inter alia*<sup>7</sup>, “coordinat[ing] operational cooperation between Member States in the field of management of external borders” (Regulation 2007/2004, Article 2.1.a) and “fostering the principle of solidarity” in border management among MSs (Jorry, 2007: 1; Lusenti and Watanabe, 2014: 3). However, perhaps not surprisingly given the reluctance of MSs to pool sovereignty in this field, “the responsibility for the control and surveillance of external borders [*still*] lies with the Member States”, while Frontex has only a coordination role (Regulation 2007/2004, Article 1.2).

Hence, operational cooperation is the first of Frontex’s tasks and appears in the formal name of the agency. The most eloquent form of operational cooperation is represented by joint operations<sup>8</sup>. According to the Commission, JOs are “operational activities

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<sup>5</sup> Hereinafter: Frontex.

<sup>6</sup> Institutionalisation can be defined as embedding a set of procedures into one institution.

<sup>7</sup> The other tasks of Frontex, as defined by the legal basis, are: to assist MSs in the training of national border guards and establish common training standards (Article 2.1.b), to carry out risk analyses (Article 2.1.c), to follow up the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders (Article 2.1.d), to assist MSs with technical and operational assistance at the external borders (Article 2.1.e), and to provide MSs with necessary support in organizing joint return operations (Article 2.1.f).

<sup>8</sup> In addition to operational cooperation, the European Border Guard Teams, the RABIT teams and the European Border Fund also constitute forms of operational cooperation (see Mungianu, 2013). Given that

carried out by two or more MSs, and possibly in cooperation with the Agency, with a view to strengthen surveillance and control at a section of the external borders” (Commission, 2003a: 10). The importance of JOs is substantiated also by the fact that more than 50% of the budget of Frontex is spent on such activities with the aim of curbing irregular migration and cross-border crime (Frontex, 2013a: 74; Frontex, 2012a: 65; see also House of Lords, 2008: 3). This is by far the most important operational activity on which Frontex spends its budget and the one that received most scholarly attention. The types of JOs coordinated by Frontex in cooperation with MSs correspond to the three different types of borders that the EU MSs share with third countries, namely sea, land and air (Frontex, 2015b). Prior to the amendment of the Frontex Regulation in 2011, the original Frontex Regulation “contain[ed] no rules on how Frontex operations should be prepared, conducted and evaluated” (Commission, 2010: 2), which raised questions in terms of legitimacy and accountability.

The deployment of JOs was supported by a set of tools that have been developed with the purpose of facilitating operational cooperation. Up until the amendment of the Frontex Regulation in 2011, JOs relied on contributions from the MSs and SACs which were centralized in the Central Record of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE), a database of technical equipment for surveillance. However, contribution and participation to the JOs was entirely voluntary (Commission, 2003; 2010). The amended Regulation 2007/2004 established two other mechanisms to support operational cooperation, namely the European Border Guard Tools (EGBTs) and the Technical Equipment Pool (TEP). Despite the introduction of a more structured approach towards pooling resources for operational cooperation, participation and contribution of MSs are still made voluntarily based on the principle of solidarity and are negotiated on an annual basis with Frontex (Leonard, 2011: 245; Frontex, 2013b: 4).

In addition to JOs, Frontex has also been mandated with the management of the rapid intervention mechanism (RABITs) which is to be activated in circumstances requiring extraordinary technical and operational assistance. In contrast to JOs, where contribution and participation are entirely voluntarily, RABITs are remarkable by the fact that they are founded on the principle of “compulsory solidarity” (Baldaccini, 2010: 235; Leonard, 2011: 245). Thus, EU MSs are required to contribute to the “Rapid Pool” with border guards and deploy them upon request “unless they are faced with an exceptional situation substantially affecting the discharge of national tasks” (Regulation 2007/2004).

While touching upon different aspects of operational cooperation, the main focus of the present thesis will be joint operations and, in particular JOs at the Southern European Border. A motivation for this will follow.

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JOs are developed through the deployment of RABIT or EGBTs, they constitute more likely tools that support operational cooperation and will be discussed as such in the present study.

## 2.3 Joint operations

Due to their contentious nature<sup>9</sup>, scale and the rising death toll in the Mediterranean Sea, JOs at the Southern European border have gained prominence in recent years. Most JOs conducted there are joint sea operations, however, there are some more complex operational concepts that involve both sea and land operations. Nevertheless, joint sea operations are by far the most important operational activities conducted under the coordination of Frontex. Their importance in the context of EU border management is also reinforced by the fact that Frontex spends approximately 80% of the budget allocated for all JOs only on operations at sea (Frontex, 2013: 74; Frontex, 2012: 65; see also House of Lords, 2008: 3).


At the Southern border level, Frontex coordinates a set of operational concepts (also called joint operations), which act as ‘umbrella’ operations that are activated in phases and in different years, most of which are joint sea operations. Thus, from 2006, Frontex coordinated *inter alia* the different phases of a number of overarching JO concepts in cooperation with the three main ‘gate-keepers’ of the EU’s borders, namely: Hera, Indalo, Minerva (hosted by Spain), Nautilus (hosted by Italy and Malta), Hermes, Aeneas, Triton (hosted by Italy), Poseidon Sea and Land (hosted by Greece). All were deployed in operational areas along the shores of the Mediterranean Sea or at the land external borders, with the exception of Hera, which took place in the Atlantic Ocean (Frontex, 2010a; Frontex, 2015b).

The JOs’ are strategically deployed to cover the main migration corridors on sea namely: from Turkey to Greece, migration occurring both by sea and land (the Eastern Mediterranean route), from Tunisia and Libya to Italy and Malta (the Central Mediterranean route), and from Morocco to Spain by sea, as well as to the Spanish enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla (both by land and sea) (the Western Mediterranean route) (Frontex, 2015a). As illustrated in Figure 1, these are the main “hotspots” where detections of illegal border-crossings occurred, which in recent years have been put under pressure due to higher levels of migratory flows. However, contrary to popular belief, migration by sea constitutes only a small fraction of the overall phenomenon of migration. In fact, the majority of irregular immigrants arrive legally in the EU (mainly by air) but then they overstay their visa (Frontex, 2015b, Wolff, 2008).

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<sup>9</sup> See Baldaccini (2010) for a discussion on extraterritorial border control through Frontex sea operations.

**Figure 1: Detections of illegal border-crossing by migratory corridor (2009-2015)**



Source: Author’s design based on data from Frontex Annual Risk Analysis (2015a: 16)<sup>10</sup>

Frontex-coordinated JOs are thoroughly planned and “intelligence-driven” (Frontex, 2015b) and the *modus operandi* of JOs follows a pre-defined operational cycle. In the initial phase, an operational plan (which is not publically available) is drafted for each JO in agreement principally with the “host state”<sup>11</sup> and with the cooperation of the participating MSs. Each JO is normally managed from an International Coordination Centre (ICC) located in the ‘host state’, where representatives of Frontex and of the MSs involved in the JO with human or operational resources are located (House of Lords, 2008: 32). Once the operation commences, actions undertaken with the equipment and experts belonging to another state must be agreed upon with a representative of the state to which they belong. Since the establishment of Frontex in 2005, the number of JOs coordinated by the agency has increased considerably. Furthermore, interestingly enough, more and more MSs are participating in JOs despite the voluntary nature of participation (see Frontex, 2011b: 13, Marin, 2011).

From a legal point of view, JOs may involve all MSs, with the exception of the UK and Ireland, which have negotiated an opt-out from the implementation of the Schengen rules. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the UK is not associated in the Schengen/Dublin system, it has been participating in JOs conducted by Frontex (House of Lords, 2008). In addition to these, SACs that have decided to sign association agreements to the Schengen/Dublin System may also take part in the operational activities. Furthermore, increased operational cooperation has extended also beyond the

<sup>10</sup> Data prior to 2009 was not available. The figures presented in the graph show an incomplete picture as they do not include those that eluded the border controls and entered the EU.

<sup>11</sup> A ‘host state’ is defined as a MS in which a joint operation, a pilot project or a rapid intervention takes place or from which it is launched (Regulation 2007/2004). A ‘home state’ is the state seconding border guards and providing assets for a joint operation.

EU, as it involved at times the participation of third countries in JOs coordinated by Frontex. This has led to prolonged debates in the academia over the ‘extraterritorialisation’ of border control (see Baldaccini, 2010, Andrade, 2010, Marin, 2011). Despite this being an intriguing phenomenon, the extent of this study precludes a more thorough discussion.

Furthermore, in recent years, with the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a legally binding document, but also due to violations of human rights (HR), such as allegations of *refoulement*<sup>12</sup> (i.e. ‘push-backs’), inhumane living conditions in the reception and detention centres, as well as the death of thousands of immigrants at the “door-steps” of the EU (Baldaccini, 2010), JOs have also been tightly interlinked with respect for HR and have received a “humanitarian” dimension due to the development of search and rescue (SAR) actions during joint sea operations. Additionally, in respect to HR, in 2011, Frontex adopted a Fundamental Rights Strategy, which has the aim of embedding respect for HR in all its activities including JOs. JOs, and in particular joint sea operations have recently become a focal point of discussion in the EU and the need for their reinforcement (in particular of JO Triton and JO Poseidon) has been proposed in the 10 Point Action Plan, recently endorsed by the European Council in an Extraordinary Meeting on Migration (European Council, 2015).

## 2.4 Previous research related to operational cooperation

Despite the great political and media attention that operational cooperation and, in particular JOs, have attracted and their importance at EU level, little academic attention has been given to the topic. Furthermore, the academic literature on the topic written thus far has focused on offering mostly descriptive empirical accounts of the development of operational cooperation and JOs and focused primarily on the role of Frontex (see e.g. Mungianu, 2013; Jorry, 2007; Pollak and Slominski, 2009; Wolff, 2008; Andrade, 2010; Baldacchini, 2010; Leonard, 2011; Marin, 2011; Bolanin and Bellais, 2014).

A common line of argumentation that is recurrent in the literature is connected to the question of effective and efficient contribution of MSs to the development of JOs, which was signalled in various academic articles (Mungianu 2013; Jorry, 2007; Pollak and Slominski, 2009; Haake, 2012; Wolff, 2008; Bolanin and Bellais, 2014; Haake et al., 2012). However, past the empirical accounts, the phenomenon of JOs has not been discussed as yet from a theoretically grounded point of view. Thus, this study aims to fill this gap in knowledge and analyse participation in JOs from a theoretically grounded point of view, and thereby also complementing the scarce empirical knowledge existent in the literature on JOs.

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<sup>12</sup> *Refoulement* entails the forced return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they are liable to be subjected to ill-treatment or persecution.

### 3 Collective action through operational cooperation

Collective action normally occurs when the action of two or more actors is necessary to accomplish an outcome (Udehn, 1993: 240; Sandler, 1992: 1). Thus, by definition operational cooperation and JOs are forms of collective action that are deployed with the purpose *prima facie* of sharing the burden of border management of the external EU borders. Furthermore, due to their specific nature, similar to CSDP operations (but on a much smaller scale), JOs are ‘collective actions’ which require political, economic, logistic and human resources, and, as such, represent a ‘burden’ that has to be shared by the participating states (Nováky, 2011: 3).

The theory of collective action has its roots in the reasoning of Mancur Olson (1970) who refuted the traditional assumption that “groups of individuals with common interests are expected to act on behalf of their common interests much as single individuals act on behalf of their personal interests” (Olson, 1970: 1). Instead, he purported that “members of a large group [...] will *not* act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or [...] some separate incentives” (Olson, 1970: 2). This is in stark contrast to previous research that assumed that collectives having similar goals will be inclined to act collectively for the attainment of those goals. Sandler (1992: 3) concisely grasps the pivotal argument of Olson, namely that “individual rationality is not sufficient for collective rationality”. However, individual rationality also entails that actors will take the most rational course of action, especially if not coerced, and ‘free-ride’ (i.e. they will enjoy the benefits of the collective goods without contributing to the actual costs for providing that good) (Olson, 1970; Sandler 1992). Space limitations preclude the author from ‘doing justice’ to the 50 years of research regarding collective action. However, for the purpose of this study, this is assessed as not being necessary, given that collective action theory will be used as a ‘heuristic device’ in setting the basis of the research puzzle and not as an ‘explanatory law’ (Udehn, 1993: 240). This follows the reasoning lines of Bossong and Rhinard (2012: 133) who argued that “part of the beauty of the public goods approach is that it can be used productively at various levels of sophistication”.

Going back to the assumptions afore-delineated raises an initial question: what kind of ‘outcome’ are MSs collectively acting for through JOs as means of border management?

### 3.1 Security: as a “Janus-faced” collective good

*Coastguards have a crucial role of both saving lives and securing maritime borders.*  
(Commission, 2015: 11)

In the literature, collective action is connected with the provision of ‘collective goods’. According to the theory, ‘collective goods’ are produced in the common interest of a group through the aggregation of individual contributions (Thielemann and Armstrong, 2013: 155). This raises the question, what type of interest do MSs’ share which gives rise to JOs and what is/are the collective good(s) sought and generated through border management via JOs?

Traditionally, security was the main *raison d’être* of a state and was tightly interlinked with the concept of borders. The borders constituted the virtual boundary between the inside and the outside and were the “mark of sovereignty” (Bolanin and Bellais, 2014: 232ff.). The abolition of internal borders and the establishment of free movement within the EU made the remaining ‘virtual’ borders porous. This, coupled with the intensification of transnational threats gave rise to an ever-expanding discourse on the ‘securitization’ of migration and its perception as a ‘threat’ to the internal stability and integrity of a state. Consequently, border management tools (*inter alia* JOs) have been put in place with the primary goal of mitigating this ‘threat’ and ensuring security (Ceccorulli, 2009; Marin, 2012; Leonard, 2011). Following this reasoning, it becomes apparent that, *prima facie*, security is the main ‘collective good’ sought and (arguably) generated through JOs. However, different types of security can be connected to JOs at the external borders, i.e. at ‘intermediate’ level - border security, and at ‘finite’ level - internal security, which essentially relies on border security. Given that border security and internal security have similar implications, they can both be defined by using a broader definition of security. Leonard (2011: 238) interprets security as involving a ‘continuum from normalcy to worrisome/troublesome to risk and to existential threat’.

According to the public goods theory, collective goods are considered to have two essential characteristics, namely: *non-excludability*, i.e. non-contributors cannot be precluded from benefiting from the produced good, and respectively *non-rivalry*, i.e. one actor’s use of the good does not affect the benefits available to the others (Sandler, 1992: 6; Bossong and Rhinard, 2013: 134). Previous research shows that both border security and internal security can be substantiated as ‘collective goods’ (see Bolanin and Bellais, 2014; Bossong and Rhinard, 2013). Thus, benefits from border security provided through the efforts of one MS or a group of MSs necessarily extend to the other MSs of the Schengen system (i.e. they are non-excludable), and benefits enjoyed by any one of the MSs do not decrease the level of benefits available to the other MSs (i.e. they are non-rival). Furthermore, the provision of internal security in the EU by ensuring control over the borders can be equally enjoyed by all states, and the benefits drawn by one MS from internal security do not diminish the benefits of the others.



In the context of increased attention given to HR in connection to JOs, a question that arises is whether other types of ‘collective goods’ are generated indirectly. In a study regarding burden-sharing in refugee protection Suhrke (1998) (see Thielemann, 2010) argued that refugee protection has important ‘collective good’ characteristics as all countries profit if some countries provide refuge to displaced persons. Suhrke argues that the protection of refugees reduces the risk of conflict and ensures security for all states, which makes it in principle a non-excludable and non-rival collective good (see also Thielemann, 2010). Similarly, given that a significant part of migrants attempting to cross the borders are refugees and asylum seekers, it can be argued that refugee protection (‘human security’) is provided via JOs (especially joint sea operations, which many times turn into SAR actions), which can have collective good characteristics. Nonetheless, critics would contradict this view by arguing that collective action via JOs has been actually generating insecurity for the migrants due to ‘push-back’ practices (Carrera and Den Hertog, 2015). This essentially leads us to the question ‘security for whom?’ (Baldwin, 1977) and makes security in connection to JOs a ‘Janus-faced’ and elusive collective good.

### 3.2 Collective action problem: Free-riding problem...or not?

Departing from the theoretical assumption that “members of a large group [...] will *not* act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or [...] some separate incentives” (Olson, 1970: 2) and taking into consideration that participation of MSs in JOs is entirely voluntary, ‘free-riding’ behaviour should be the norm (hypothetically speaking). ‘Free-riding’ behaviour has been loosely defined in the literature; however, the ‘free-rider’ problem has been generally used to refer to a situation in which an actor benefits from the consumption of a collective good (e.g. border security and internal security), while they “free-ride” (i.e. not participate) (Sandler, 1992: 17). Thus, despite the fact that MSs share a collective interest in the provision of border security and internal security, the absence of coercion and the nature of the goods provided could potentially lead some MSs to free-ride on the efforts of the others to secure the borders and not take part in JOs.

Traditional public goods approaches put an emphasis on the fact that individual contributions to the production of some collective goods are normally both costly and often “only trivially important in achieving a group goal, especially in large groups” (Shepsle, 2005: 8). Given that “non-contribution is a dominant strategy in the collective action game”, it may be assumed that MSs will be tempted to ‘free-ride’ (Shepsle, 2005: 8; Udhen, 1993: 239). Furthermore, due to their non-excludable and non-rival nature, collective goods are assumed to ‘encourage free-riding’ (Bolanin and Bellais, 2014: 234).

However, despite there being occurrences which could be perceived as ‘free-riding’ behaviour, an overall empirical analysis of MSs’ participation in JOs points out that ‘free-riding’ is not that common and that MSs do participate in JOs (see Frontex, 2011b) despite there being no ‘institutional coercion’ (understood as legally binding provisions). This argument is also reinforced by looking more generally at contributions of MSs to the main operational resources for Frontex-coordinated JOs, currently the European Border Guard Teams (EGBTs) and the Technical Equipment Pool (TEP). Since their establishment in 2011, Frontex compiled annual reports regarding the commitments made by MSs to the EGBTs pool. According to the Frontex reports, the number of EGBTs committed increased from 1.875 at the end of 2013 (Frontex, 2013b: 7) to 2.500 at the end of 2014 (Frontex, 2014b: 9). Furthermore, the reports also show an increase in the number of contributions to the TEP. To give just a few examples, for instance, the number of offshore patrol vessels increased from 17 in 2013 to 26 in 2014, whereas the number of coast patrol boats increased from 137 to 196 (see Frontex 2013b, 2014b). It must be emphasised that contributions to both the EGBTs and the TEPs are done based on “Calls for contributions” and “Calls for secondment”, and as such depend on MSs’ willingness (see Frontex 2013b, 2014b).

This raises both a theoretical and empirical puzzle if perceived from the perspective of collective action theory, which assumes that, despite having a common interest, members of a large group will not contribute unless coerced or unless some “separate incentives” exist. As afore-delineated, the overall institutional set-up for JOs does not imply the existence of ‘institutional coercion’, which may account for MSs’ participation in JOs. This raises at least two questions, can there be other types of ‘coercion’, ‘constraints’ or ‘selective incentives’ in connection to participation in JOs that may account for MSs’ participation? What types of ‘incentives’ or ‘constraints’ are present that could potentially impact the decision of MSs to participate? These two questions will be tackled in Chapter 4, which will propose two hypothetical assumptions and argue why they have the potential to explain participation. Furthermore, in parallel, the paper will attempt to gain an insight of potential patterns of participation, but this will constitute a secondary research question as highlighted in the following subchapter.

### 3.3 Problem definition and aim of the study

Public policy tools, and implicitly JOs, are formulated and implemented in multi-actor networks (Hermans et al., 2014: 10). In this sense, Noll (2003: 237) purported that, in asylum policy, burden-sharing (participation) in collective action efforts can be seen as a “multi-actor, multi-level game bringing together states, sub-state entities and protection seekers”. However, the network approach is hampered by a truly “Babylonian conceptual chaos” (Borzal in Sabatier, 2007: 129) as it involves a myriad of actors having converging and/or diverging interests.

Along these lines of thinking, EU JOs as forms of collective action have been developed in multi-actor settings with the purpose of securing the ‘collective goods’ of border security and, ultimately, internal security. However, despite sharing (a) common goal(s), according to the collective action theory, and as afore-explained, MSs are expected to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others. Given that no real ‘institutional coercion’ exists in this equation and participation is based on voluntarism, the expectation that states will ‘free-ride’ is even higher. Nevertheless, empirical data shows that MSs do participate in JOs. This raises the question of *motivations* or rationales for the participation of MSs. Given the scope of the present paper, the focus has been placed mainly on JOs developed at the Southern external borders which led to the question:

*What factor(s) can explain MSs’ participation<sup>13</sup> in joint operations at the Southern external borders of the European Union?*

Despite the inherent flaws in arguing that MSs’ preferences are “homogenous and interchangeable” (Udehn, 1993: 243), for the purpose of simplification, the present paper assumed that MSs share common preferences, although adjacently a more nuanced inquiry has been sought where the data permitted it. Moreover, the ‘puzzle’ also raised the question of *patterns* (understood as trends): *what type of patterns of participation in joint operations can be observed?* However, this was explored only as a secondary question and at an aggregate level and provided an indication of general trends, but the paper has not delved deeper into the rationales behind these trends and patterns.

The analysis was hypothetico-deductive and drew on existent literature to propose a set of premises formulated theoretically. This is due to the scope of the study, which precluded a more thorough analysis of this puzzle. The overall purpose of the study is explanatory (Yin, 2009: 7, 40), seeking to scrutinise motivations for MSs’ participation in JOs and to explore the question of patterns.

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<sup>13</sup> Other than host states for the JOs.

## 4 Opening ‘Pandora’s box’: Premises regarding motivations and patterns of MSs’ participation

*There is a human proclivity to draw stark distinctions and to represent complex reality with a simple characterisation (Sandler, 2004: 11).*

When asking what might motivate the EU MSs to participate in collective action through JOs in a voluntary manner, some might immediately utter the word ‘solidarity’. Solidarity is a guiding EU principle encapsulated in the EU primary law through the ‘Solidarity clause’ (see Article 222 TFEU). In connection to border management and migration policies of the EU, ‘solidarity’ is portrayed as a ‘beam of light’ that should guide the actions of MSs, given that “[t]he policies of the Union in border management, asylum and immigration and their implementation should be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between the Member States pursuant to Article 80<sup>14</sup> of the TFEU” (Regulation 656/2014, Recital 2). The term ‘solidarity’ is an ambiguous and “thick concept” (Coppedge, 1999) and a precise definition is hard to find. However, EU solidarity has been mostly associated with the principle of universalization, i.e. acting as one wishes the others to act (Thielemann, 2003) and defined as ‘loyal cooperation’ (Mitsilegas, 2014: 187). Despite the importance of solidarity in the EU set-up, this paper seeks to look “beyond the much-vaunted solidarity” (Nascimbene and Di Pascale, 2011: 355) in order to find other rationales that might motivate MSs to participate, while acknowledging that solidarity may play an important role.

In the literature, two paradigms for explaining state action have been substantiated. March and Olsen (1989) argued that two logics are at the foundation of individual (state) action, namely: a logic of consequence and a logic of appropriateness. While the logic of consequence is informed by rational-choice assumptions and cost-benefit calculations, the logic of appropriateness is informed by notions of identity, norms and rules (March & Olsen, 1989: 949ff; see cf. Goldmann, 2005; Thielemann, 2003; Opp, 2012).

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<sup>14</sup> Article 80 TFEU states that: “The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States”. The policies of the Union under the chapter are: policies on border checks, asylum and immigration (Chapter 2 TFEU).

From a broad perspective, previous attempts to explain state participation and patterns of participation in different forms of collective action or in burden-sharing schemes have been made by scholars, mainly in connection to asylum and refugee policy (Thielemann, 2003; Thielemann and Armstrong, 2013; Thielemann and El-Enany, 2010; Thielemann and Dewan, 2006) or common security and defence policy (Nováky, 2011). However, given the paucity of information related to Frontex-coordinated JOs, no attempt has been made to investigate the intricacies of state participation in them.

Relying on these theoretical concepts and literature, the following sections will attempt to provide two potential premises for participation and two potential hypotheses of participation patterns of states in JOs. However, when trying to explore these aspects one must take into account the *sui generis* nature of JOs and, in particular, the nature of joint sea operations. In this sense, Leonard (2011: 240ff.) highlights the particular nature of joint sea operations by calling them “extraordinary in the broadest sense of the word, i.e. out of the ordinary”, due to the involvement of “semi-militarised” actors in them<sup>15</sup> and their security-oriented character (Marin, 2011; Lutterbeck, 2006). This is also valid to a certain extent for joint land operations.

Taking these aspects into consideration, as well as the afore-delineated assumptions about MSs’ interests, the following sections will argue that participation in JOs can be seen both from the perspective of the logic of consequence and of the logic of appropriateness. The afore-mentioned research questions can be approached from numerous perspectives and a vast spectrum of explanatory factors can be taken into consideration, which “will function as an unlimited reservoir, of potential, or ad hoc explanations” (Udhen, 1993: 248) and provide “an extremely inelegant ‘saturated’ model that explains each outcome perfectly” (Coppedge, 1999: 467). While trading saturation for parsimony, the following explanations will gravitate around a small set of potential explanatory factors.

## 4.1 Logic of anticipated consequences

The logic of consequence assumes that actors are rational (in the present case, states) and perceives action as “driven by the logic of rational and strategic behaviour that anticipates consequences and is based on given preferences” (Thielemann, 2003: 255; see also March and Olsen, 1989: 9; Pollack, 2010: 24-25; Gillinson, 2004). This is in line with the rational choice approach which explains both “individual and collective (social) outcomes in terms of individual goal-seeking under constraints” (Pollack, 2007: 32; Snidal, 2013: 87). The rational choice approach assumes the existence of three elements: (a) methodological individualism, (b) goal-seeking or utility maximization, and (c) the existence of institutional or strategic constraints on individual choice. In this

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<sup>15</sup> For example, the joint sea operations are coordinated by the Guardia Civil in Spain, respectively Guardia di Finanza, both having semi-military status (Lutterbeck, 2006).

context, individuals (states) are assumed to act according to preferences which are “fixed, transitive and exogenously given” (Pollack, 2007: 32ff.). This essentially means that actors’ preferences and actions are constrained and the constraints may arise either from the existence of institutions or from actors’ interdependencies (Snidal, 2013: 87).

At its core, the Schengen area is built upon interdependencies, as control of the external borders has become a matter of co-responsibility. This means that a MS’s control of its section of the external border is done on behalf of the whole EU and a border MS “acts in the interest of the other MSs” (European Commission, 2011b). This naturally implies security interdependencies between actors (Sandler, 1992: 1), as the states with weak control systems will not only attract migrants themselves, but also be used as transit routes towards other regions. Ultimately, this entails that “the system is only as strong as its weakest link, with a single weakness in any part of it having potential serious implications for all other parts” (Ceccorulli, 2009: 4). Ever since the 1990’s, migration has been perceived in the EU as presenting inherent vulnerabilities, given that migratory flows of labour migrants, irregular migrants and asylum-seekers were associated with various ‘threats’, such as terrorism, cross-border crime or social unrest (Leonard, 2011). Thus, a discourse on the ‘securitisation’ of migration and its perception as a ‘threat’ to internal stability and security flourished (Ceccorulli, 2009). Consequently, border management through JOs became, *inter alia*, one of the primary tools for mitigating this ‘threat’ for the purpose of safeguarding the ‘collective goods’ (i.e. border and internal security). Hence, security interdependencies and the “securitisation” of migration led to policy coordination, which essentially altered actors’ preferences and interests.

Nonetheless, the presence of the risk can be perceived as pervasive due to the existence of an area with no internal borders between Schengen States, which means that clandestine migration bound for certain Southern states is an issue of common concern for all the EU (Andrade, 2010: 313). As Ceccorulli (2009: 15) notes, “while differing over detail, all MSs have a common interest in a strong external border”. This is due to the fact that the free-movement of people principle facilitates the movement of both *bona fide* travellers but also of irregular migrants and potential criminals. Furthermore, numerous scholars show that most migrants travel to other European countries once entered in the EU (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012: 40, 45; Brian and Laczo, 2014: 86). Thus, while it is evident that border countries are the most exposed to the risk of irregular migration and the vulnerabilities it brings for internal security, and as such are interested in securing the borders by participating in JOs, it may be assumed that the other MSs have an equal interest in securing the borders and participating.

This line of reasoning allows us to assume that migration acted homogeneously as a form of ‘exogenous constraint’ over the preferences of MSs in participating in collective action at the external EU borders. From this perspective, and given that “rational choice has explained change in terms of changing constraints” (Snidal, 2013: 100), it may be assumed that an increase or decrease in participation in JOs could be correlated with an increase or decrease in the perception of the migration ‘threat’ at a certain point in time.

In a similar vein, when attempting to explain participation in burden-sharing schemes for asylum, Thielemann (2003: 255-256) argued that participation can be perceived as a measure taken for “insurance against the occurrence of a particular external shock”. This essentially provides us with a premise for a potential *motivation* for participation, namely that, provided the ‘securitisation’ of migration and its perception as a ‘threat’ at the EU level, *the presence of a security ‘threat’ (i.e. high irregular migration flow) has the potential to affect MS’s willingness to participate in JOs* (security-driven motivation) as they will feel a direct concern over their own internal security.

However, this line of argumentation is not sensitive to the fact that MSs do not share the same exposure to the migration ‘threat’. MSs face different situations due to their geographical location and patterns of travel flows and migratory routes (Commission, 2011c) and provided that “threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones” (Ceccorulli, 2009: 4), this would make the states in the immediate vicinity of the external borders and their neighbours more vulnerable to migratory flows. Furthermore, although there are inherent differences between defence threats and migration ‘threats’, some scholars argue that there are also some similarities (Marin, 2011; Lutterbeck, 2006). From the theoretical standpoint of burden-sharing and participation in military operations, a country’s willingness to assume the burden associated with collective security is directly proportional to its perception of threat (Nováky, 2011). Thus, a more realistic line of argumentation is that the ‘threat’ exposure is not equally shared by MSs and that one can speak about a “variable ‘threat’ exposure” (Bossong and Rhinard, 2013). Following these lines of reasoning, we can formulate a premise for *patterns* of participation as it may be assumed that *countries closer to the Southern external borders, for which the perception of the ‘threat’ is (supposedly) higher, will be more likely to participate.*

## 4.2 Logic of appropriateness

The assumption that political action is solely governed by a logic of consequences has been contested by numerous scholars (March and Olsen, 1998; Udehn, 1993; Thielemann, 2003; Opp, 2012) who argued that such a view does not consider the role of ‘non-material’ incentives (Opp, 2012: 77). Thus, scholars argued that alternative catalysts for action can be viewed from the perspective of the logic of appropriateness. Rational choice critics, in particular, emphasised the complexity of individual choice and the “inevitability of deliberation, of moral conflict, and moral purpose” (Hurrell and Macdonald, 2012: 71). Thus, the logic of appropriateness purports that actors seek to fulfil obligations which are embedded in a set of norms to which they adhere or which are subject to a collective identity (March and Olsen, 2009). As such, actors are seen as “acting in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed and publicly known, anticipated and accepted” (March and Olsen, 1989: 949-952). On the other hand, more balanced approaches argued that the logic of consequence is interlinked

with that of appropriateness, as self-interest can be defined to include altruism, commitment to norms, feelings of solidarity (see Udhen, 1993; Opp, 2012).

In this approach, actors are expected to act in accordance with a set of norms which constrain and guide their behaviour. Norms are understood as “internalised Kantian imperatives (“blind, compulsive, mechanical or even unconscious”)” which carry a sense of obligation and constrain individual behaviour (Hurrell and Macdonald, 2013: 71). As such, the constraint is generated endogenously and spurs from non-utilitarian factors such as obligations, habits and practices. However, Väyrynen (1999: 36ff.) argued that norm commitment can be enforced both endogenously and exogenously. Endogenous enforcement of commitment to a norm entails the fact constraints arise from a normative perspective due to the internalisation of norms and values by the actor. On the other hand, exogenous enforcement of commitment to a norm arises when the constraint is externally imposed on the actor, through coercive or non-coercive measures.

Analysing more broadly the literature on migration and asylum policy, as well as the one on operational cooperation, one ‘norm’ appears prominently, i.e. respect for human rights (Thielemann, 2003; Thielemann and Dewan, 2006). Departing from the assumptions that “good explanations are made lean and minimize the assumptions made” (Snidal, 2013: 89), the paper will focus on the importance of HR in the context of JOs. This is due to the relevance that HR have gained regarding JOs over time.

The norm of upholding human rights has been considered as one of the constitutive norms of the EU (Manners, 2006: 70ff.). The axiomatic importance of HR is also embedded in the legal basis of the EU, as the Treaty of Lisbon states that “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for HR, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States [...]” (Article 2 TFEU). Although embedded in the operational activities from the beginning, the importance of HR has caught momentum in more recent years, due to the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2009) as a legally binding document, but also due to violations of HR, such as allegations of *refoulement* (i.e. ‘push-backs’), inhumane living conditions in the reception and detention centres, as well as the death of thousands of migrants at the ‘door-steps’ of the EU (Baldaccini, 2010).

The recent declaration of the High Representative Federica Mogherini, in relation to the incidents in the Mediterranean highlights the importance of HR in the context of European action: “The Mediterranean is our sea, one of our seas, and we have to act together as Europeans. It is not only an issue of *moral duty*: the numbers of people that are dying at sea, not only the day before yesterday but over the last months and years, tell us we cannot repeat again “never again” if we don't act consistently and coherently afterwards. It is also our interest, our credibility. The European Union was built and is built around the protection of human rights, human dignity and the life of human people. We need to be consistent in that; this is also our *specific interest*” [emphasis



added] (Mogherini, 2015). However, viewed from the theoretical framework of Väyrynen (1999), this statement points to an ambivalent position as it connects commitment to safeguarding human rights both to a “moral duty” and to “specific interests”.

This line of argumentation leads us to one broad assumption regarding *motivations* to participate, as it can be assumed that *the occurrence of human rights violations may act as a factor determining MSs to participate in JOs* (norm-driven motivation). This is provided the fact that JOs do protect HR. However, viewed in the framework of Väyrynen (1999) concern over the occurrence of violations of HR may be motivated either by endogenous enforced commitment to the norm of HR (“moral duty” to act imposed by the actors upon themselves), or can be exogenous constrained commitment to the norm of HR (“interest to act” imposed by external actors). Given the difficulty in making a clear-cut differentiation or finding actual significant data that may support the idea that commitment to a norm was constrained either endogenously or exogenously, the paper will primarily seek a causal connection between the occurrence of HR violations and participation in JOs and will only minimally look into whether this comes from exogenous/endogenous enforced norm commitment.

When assessing *patterns* of participation from a norm-based perspective, it can be noted that MSs differ widely in their adherence to EU values and norms and in particular to commitment to HR (WJP, 2015). While some states are “front-runners” in promoting commitment and respect for HR, others can be considered “laggards”. Given that problems related to the respect for HR appear to be pervasive when it comes to JOs, and under the premise that MSs’ degree of commitment to HR varies widely, it can be assumed that *countries that are more committed to human rights are more likely to participate in JOs*.

## 5 Methodological considerations

The following sections will present the research design and the core methodological tools utilised. Given that any research design and method is fallible, this section will also highlight the strengths and limitations of the methodological choices made.

### 5.1 “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants”<sup>16</sup>: Combining insights from multiple theories

The present paper departed from the theory of collective action, which constituted a key basis for problematizing the research inquiry. As observed by various scholars, the strengths of the collective action lie not only in its ‘hard’ mathematical uses, but also in the fact that they can provide structure and rigour to the assessment of complex policy phenomena and pinpoint analytical puzzles (Sperling, 2012: 203ff; see also Pecorino, 2014; Hermans et al. 2014: 10ff). As such, the present paper used collective action theory only as a “heuristic device” and not an “explanatory law” (Udehn, 1993: 240). In order to advance premises for motivations and patterns of participation, the study departed from the two logics of action developed by March and Olsen, but complemented them with literature explaining state action and participation in burden-sharing. Using a “complementary approach” to theory and combining insights from multiple theories can help uncover new perspectives and “prompt us to seek evidence that we would not otherwise uncover” (Cairney, 2013: 8). Moreover, “[...] explicit or implicit ‘conceptual lenses’ and the promotion of multiple lenses should allow us to become more aware of the assumptions that underpin each lens [...]” (Cairney, 2013: 8). Thus, the present paper did not seek an *ad litteram* application of the theory, as theory was used to formulate potential explanations and hypotheses for the research inquiry.

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<sup>16</sup> Cairney, 2013: 1.

## 5.2 Methodological approach

For the purpose of explaining the research questions, the case study method and the method of structured-focused comparison were utilised. Additionally, the study combined qualitative and quantitative methods.

### 5.2.1 Case study method and Structured-focused comparison

For the purpose of shedding light on the research questions, the present study employed the method of case study which entails “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (George and Bennett, 2005: 5; cf. also Gerring, 2004: 141; Crasnow, 2011: 28). Although being criticised for lacking “scientific consciousness” (George and Bennett, 2005: 68), the case study method has the advantage of “allow(*ing*) one to peer into the box of causality to locate the intermediate factors lying between some structural cause and its purported effect” (Gerring, 2007: 45). Thus, in-depth analysis of JOs shed light on the potential rationales for participation and pinpointed potential patterns. Additionally, case studies have the advantage of being able to serve heuristic purposes and inductively identify other important causal mechanisms, as such setting the basis for future research (George and Bennett, 2005: 45). Given that this is a first attempt at explaining participation in JOs, while following a structured approach to the analysis of the cases, the researcher has taken into consideration other potential explanatory factors.

As presented in the following, the study has analysed two cases. For the purpose of providing an answer to the first research question, qualitative within-case analysis through process-tracing has been employed. This has not only provided an answer to the research question but also fed into the analysis of the second research question, which has been explored primarily quantitatively. In order to compare the cases, the method of structured-focused comparison (George and Bennett, 2005: 67ff) has been used. In this sense, the formulation of the explanatory premises both for the question on motivations, as well as the one on patterns, gravitate around a small set of premises which give structure and focus to the case analysis. This has also ensured that cross-case analysis could be effectively performed as the same types of underlying factors have been investigated in both cases.

### 5.2.2 Case selection

A “case” is construed by George and Bennett (2005: 17) as “an instance of a class of events”. The concept of “class of events” is defined by scholars as a “phenomenon of scientific interest” (George and Bennett, 2005: 17). The research questions identified for a study guide the research and facilitate the identification and definition of the “unit of

analysis (i.e. “case(s)”)” (Yin, 2009: 30). In the present case, the research question circumscribes the ambit of the “class of events” to JOs at the external Southern borders of the EU. While data availability was axiomatic in selecting the cases, methodological criteria and reasoning have been applied to avoid selection bias (King et al., 1994: 128ff.), but also to ensure the comparability of the cases by selecting “comparable cases” on “key variables” (Lijphart, 1971: 687ff.). As the paper utilises both qualitative and quantitative methods, but the qualitative method is predominant, the study has utilised purposive sampling for the selection of the cases. However, the selection of cases when using mixed methods can lead to what is called a “representativeness/saturation trade-off”, which entails the fact that emphasis is set either on the saturation of the qualitative sample or more emphasis is placed on the representativeness of the quantitative sample (Teddlie and Yu, 2007: 83-87). Nevertheless, given that the qualitative analysis part of the study is more prominent, priority has been given to saturation over representativeness.

Thus, the cases were selected via purposive sampling from the JOs implemented at the external Southern border of the EU. Given that each JO is deployed in an individual Southern Mediterranean MS<sup>17</sup>, the selection was made also in order to ensure more contextual coverage by selecting JOs that were developed in different MSs. This ensured a higher external validity of results as they can be applicable to more contexts. Furthermore, since the study aimed at analysing participation in JOs over time, the time dimension was also important and only JOs deployed over the period 2007-2014 were considered. This scoped down the number of cases to JOs developed in Spain, Italy and Greece due to the fact that none of the rest of the MSs had JOs hosted on their territory which extended over the period of interest. George and Bennett (2005: 17) argued that when choosing cases for the analysis, they do not only have to be just “relevant” but they also have to provide the “kind of control and variation required by the research problem”. Thus, guided by the hypothetico-deductive premises set out for the two research questions, cases have been selected with the purpose of ensuring control and variance on the variables of interest (participation, security ‘threat’, HR) while avoiding extreme cases. Given that the JOs developed in Spain did not show significant variance on the factors of interest (migratory flows remained low over the years and HR issues were assessed as being minor when compared with other cases), the cases selected were JOs deployed in Italy (JO Hermes) and Greece (JO Poseidon). Both JOs showed variance on the factors of interest, as both were disposed on migratory corridors with high levels of irregular migration and both were strongly criticised for being connected to problems related to HR.

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<sup>17</sup> The states considered to be Southern Mediterranean Border States were: Spain, Italy, Greece, France, Malta, Cyprus, and Portugal.

### 5.2.3 Data collection and analysis

Departing from the aphorism stating that “the truth lies at the confluence of independent streams of evidence” (Deutsch in Coppedge, 1990: 467), the present paper sought to combine multiple streams of evidence in order to provide a solid response to the research question. The data was collected mainly from primary sources and in particular the Operational Plans (OPs) and the Evaluation Reports (ERs) of the JOs. JOs are guided by OPs and are finalised with an ER, which are agreed upon and drafted by the MSs together with Frontex. It was assumed that given that the OPs and ERs include participating MSs in the drafting process, they could contain information related to the core motivations for the development of the JO and for participation of MSs in the JO. Nevertheless, neither OPs nor ERs are publically available. Thus, a request for access to the documents for the JOs under study under Regulation 1049/2001 was made by the author of this paper to Frontex and partial access was granted<sup>18</sup>. Given that only partial access was obtained, the data was complemented with official reports, declarations, legislation, as well as secondary literature, in order to perform a contextual analysis that may uncover motivations for participation.

#### 5.2.3.1. Mixed methods: process-tracing and statistical analysis

Given that the research explores the question of motivations and, secondarily, the question of patterns, mixed methods (Bryman, 2006: 98) have been employed to explore the four premises afore-delineated. Due to the nature of the *motivations* premises, qualitative research has been employed by theory-testing process-tracing which relied on documentary analysis and context analysis. Due to the limitations of document analysis, the research focused also on analysing the political context in which the JOs developed. This was assumed to shed light on the potential motivations of MSs to participate and corroborate findings of the document analysis.

On the other hand, the assumptions related to *patterns* have been explored both quantitatively through statistical analysis and qualitatively. Notwithstanding this, the two streams of information should not be perceived as independent of each other as they fed into one another and were brought on ‘common ground’ in the analysis.

Given that the present paper used mixed methods, operationalization of the core concepts has been done both for qualitative and quantitative purposes. The operationalization of variables entails funnelling in from a broad background concept to a more systematised concept (conceptualisation) and operationalising the systematised concept in indicators based on which the researcher produces clear definitions (in the

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<sup>18</sup> Partial access was obtained for the Evaluation Reports of JO Hermes 2008-2014, as well as for the Evaluation Reports of JO Poseidon Sea 2010-2014, and JO Poseidon Land 2010-2014. Additionally, Operational Plans for JO Hermes 2009-2014 were retrieved online from a platform created to facilitate access to restricted documents of the EU [<http://www.asktheeu.org/>].

case of qualitative analysis), respectively scores (quantitative analysis) (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 530ff). This ensures rigorous research, as the enquiry relies on well-defined concepts (for qualitative) and reliable and valid<sup>19</sup> indicators (for quantitative). Additionally, concepts are sensitive to changes in their meaning over time (Coppedge, 1999: 468, Adcock and Collier, 2001) and are sensitive to ‘contextual specificity’ (Adcock and Collier 2001: 534). These aspects were also considered in the operationalization of the variables. Particular attention has been paid to problems that affect measurement, namely reliability (in order to avoid random error) and validity (to avoid systematic error) (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 531).

The following sections present the methods that were employed in order to answer each of the two research questions and the operationalization of the core concepts.

### 5.2.3.2. Process-tracing

In order to seek an answer to the first research question related to motivations, theory-testing process-tracing (PT) was utilised and the analysis was performed over the period 2007-2014<sup>20</sup>. Theory-testing PT is a within-case analysis method and “a powerful method of inference” (George and Bennett, 2005: 30) through which a theory (hypothesis) is deduced from existing literature and evidence is sought whether the hypothesised causal mechanism is present in the case studies (Beach and Pedersen, 2011: 7ff.) Thus, theory-testing PT “traces the links between possible causes and observed outcomes” where the causes are hypothesised based on literature (George and Bennett, 2005: 6; see also Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Gerring, 2007). Unlike experimental design, PT is more Y-centred than X-centred, which means that the focus is on finding out “the causes of a specific outcome (Y) and not on the effects of a specific cause (X)” (Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 80). Conceptualisation in theory-testing PT is deductive and relies on logical reasoning to identify a causal mechanism, whereby X produces Y (Beach and Pedersen, 2011: 7ff.). The groundings for conceptualisation and the hypothesised causal mechanisms of interest for this paper have been set in Chapter 4. Theory-testing PT relies heavily on empirical evidence gathered within-cases to make case-specific empirical inferences of the presence or absence of the hypothesised causal mechanism in each case. In the present study, descriptive empirical inference constituted a first step in the analysis of the cases, which formed the basis for inferring causal connections between the factors of interest and the outcome. By tracing the context of the development of the case through documentary analysis, the research generated a set of observations that allowed ascertaining the existence of causal connections between participation and the two factors of interest (presence of the threat, violations of HR).

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<sup>19</sup> Measurement validity is concerned mainly with whether the scores accurately reflect the concept that the researcher is trying to measure (Adcock and Collier, 2001).

<sup>20</sup> From the beginning of the implementation of JOs until presently.

### *Operationalization of key concepts*

*Participation* - has constituted the core dependent variable in the present study and is considered to be a “thick concept”, meaning that it can have multiple dimensions (Coppedge, 1999). For the purpose of both the qualitative and quantitative analysis, participation has been defined as the actual presence of a MSs in a particular JO. Although operationalizing participation as contribution (i.e. equipment and experts provided) would have allowed for a more nuanced analysis, the scarcity of information, as well as the sensitive character of such information precluded such operationalization. For the purpose of the quantitative analysis, the dataset has been composed by aggregating each MSs’ participation over time in the period analysed (see Appendix).

*Presence of a security ‘threat’* - given that security is no longer associated with military force, researchers argued for the existence of new types of ‘threats’ which can affect a state’s stability. Ceccorulli (2009: 2) interpreted “security in a broader manner as consisting of “unwanted foreign intrusion: defence of physical and psychological security, of economic interests of language and cultures”. This coupled with the definition of security provided above based on which security was seen as “continuum of normalcy” (Leonard, 2011: 238) allowed the formulation of a definition of the “threat”. For the purpose of this paper, ‘threat’ was interpreted as a disruption of the ‘continuum of normalcy’ determined by an influx of irregular migrants. The increase or decrease in the presence of the ‘threat’ was assessed against participation in JOs and coupled with documentary analysis and analysis of the context of developments in order to determine whether a change in the presence of the ‘threat’ can be correlated with participation.

*Human rights violations* – The analysis focused on major human rights violations in connection to JOs (e.g. incidents related to drowning, ‘push-backs’) and in parallel ascertained whether there was a change in the MSs’ attitude or interest in participation following such events.

The analysis for both explanatory factors (i.e. threat and HR violations) focused first on gathering observations in parallel over the specified time-period 2007-2014 comprised in the OPs and ERs, as well as Frontex Reports related to potential motivations for participation. In addition to this, context analysis was performed in order to formulate descriptive inferences to determine whether a causal connection between the factors of interest and participation was present. Particular attention has been given to the sequence of observable evidence and the implications it had for the hypothesised explanation (Beach and Pedersen, 2011: 7ff). Additionally, consideration has been given to a potential ‘lag effect’, as certain events connected to the hypothesised factor of interest may have not produced an immediate impact of the outcome of interest. Hence, the presence or absence of a causal connection between the factors of interest and participation was assessed. However, it is important to note that the study only explored causal connections, and not causal effects, and the causal mechanism was, to a certain

extent ‘black-boxed’ (Beach and Pedersen, 2011: 9), which constitutes one of the limitations of the present study.

### 5.2.3.3. Statistical analysis

In order to answer the question of patterns, hierarchical multiple regression analysis (HMRA) has been utilised. Given the hypothesised, HMRA was assessed as being the adequate approach (although presenting some limitations) and was performed in order to explore the relationship between the explanatory factors and the dependent variable, while controlling for other explanatory factors (Pallant, 2010: 102ff; Agresti and Finlay, 2014). Prior to conducting the analysis, preliminary analysis was conducted to ensure that the assumptions of normality, linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity were not violated (see Appendix).

#### *Operationalization of variables*

As can be observed from the assumptions made related to patterns/trends of participations, participation is viewed as being influenced by: (a) *proximity to the border*, (b) or with the degree of *commitment to human rights*. *Proximity to the border* has been operationalised by measuring the actual geographical distance between the host country of the JO (i.e. Greece, Italy) and the different MSs.<sup>21</sup> For the purpose of operationalising *commitment to human rights* of different MSs, the World Justice (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2015 was utilised.<sup>22</sup> The WJP Rule of Law Index compiles indicators for a number of factors and, *inter alia*, HR. The human rights indicator has been utilised.

A great advantage of quantitative analysis is the ability to *control for alternative explanations* while testing the explanatory power of the factors of interest. However, alternative explanations must be based on valid theoretical assumptions. Given the ‘rule of thumb’ for the size of the sample that requires a significant number of observations for each predictive factor, the number of variables that was possible to be included was limited also by the number of existent observations (in this case by the number of MSs participating). Nevertheless, two *control variables* have been identified in the literature and included in the analysis. The literature on collective action and participation in burden-sharing schemes provides substantial evidence to show that the size of a state affects its participation in collective action initiatives. Size of a country has been assumed to skew the distribution of participation towards large MSs (Olson, 1970: 3; Thielemann, 2003: 236). Additionally, the strength of the connections that a MS has to another has been hypothesised to affect the degree of support that it is willing to provide to another state under pressure. MSs with closer connections will be more willing to

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<sup>21</sup> For the operationalisation of proximity to the border, the following tool has been used: [http://www.mapdevelopers.com/distance\\_finder.php](http://www.mapdevelopers.com/distance_finder.php)

<sup>22</sup> For the WJP Rule of Law Index see: <http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/>



help one another in situations of pressure (Thielemann, 2003). This was understood as cooperation affinity of a MSs towards the host MSs.

*Size* has been operationalised based on the work of Crowards (2002) which identified four clusters of EU states based on size, namely ‘micro’, ‘small’, ‘medium-sized’, ‘large’.<sup>23</sup> Strength of connections between MSs or *cooperation affinity* has been operationalised by using the bi-dimensional cooperation map developed by Naurin and Lindhal (2010) in connection to patterns of cooperation between MSs in the Council Working Groups. The closest connection on the map (i.e. Italy-Spain) has been used as the smallest unit of measurement for the ties between different MSs and the host state of the JO (see Appendix).

### 5.3 Limitations to the research design

All methods are fallible and “contain gaping methodological holes” (Coppedge, 1999: 465), however, acknowledging the limitations of a research design is an important step in mitigating or reducing their effects. The following section will present a series of limitations of the research design chosen to provide an answer to the two research questions. Despite being formulated as two independent research questions using different methods, the research process has been complex and interlinked and the streams of information gathered for providing an answer to the each question fed into one another. Thus, although presented independently for the purpose of clarity, the two research questions are interlinked and aim at shedding light upon the same phenomenon. In analysing the question of motivations, two premises have been formulated, which rely on a limited set of explanatory factors. However, political processes are complex phenomena that imply equifinality (i.e. multiple causality) (George and Bennett, 2005: 157). While acknowledging the limitations of the research design, the present paper chose to focus on a limited number of factors for the purpose of this research enquiry.

An additional limitation of the study was imposed by the availability of data. Given that only limited research has been conducted on JOs and that most of the relevant documents are not publicly available or are restricted, this constituted an important challenge. A primary concern interlinked to the availability of data when it comes to social science research is the reliability of the findings (i.e. their accuracy) (Adcock & Collier 2001: 531). In order to ensure a high reliability of the findings, the present paper employed complementarity<sup>24</sup> and triangulation (Bryman, 2006:105). Triangulation has

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<sup>23</sup> ‘Micro’: *Malta, Luxembourg*; ‘Small’: *Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia*; ‘Medium-sized’: *Austria, Ireland, Belgium, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Norway, Czech Republic, Portugal, Denmark, Romania, Finland, Slovakia, Greece, Switzerland, Hungary, Sweden*; ‘Large’: *France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, UK*

<sup>24</sup> Entails: elaborating, enhancing and illustrating the results from one method with those of the other.

been employed at two levels in order to corroborate the findings namely: methodological triangulation<sup>25</sup> and data triangulation<sup>26</sup> (Cox and Hassard, 2010: 945).

In terms of methods utilised, the theory-testing PT has as core limitation the fact that the causal mechanism was to a certain extent ‘black-boxed’ (Beach and Pedersen, 2011: 9) which limited the ability to make clear-cut causal inferences. However, the present paper only sought to test causal connections. Moreover, one of the potential limitations of using statistical analysis is astutely caught in the maxim “correlation does not imply causation” (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014) which implies that the “demonstration of causality is a logical and experimental, rather than statistical problem” (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2014: 158). Due to this, the conclusions and inferences from both methods will be drawn cautiously.

Last but not least, a primary concern has been the external validity of the findings (i.e. the capacity to generalise the findings) (King et al. 1994). Due to the relatively narrow scope of the study only prudent generalisations can be made to other cases. However, given the fact that the aim of the study was to scrutinise the validity of a set of hypotheses to well defined cases, generalisations of the findings can be made to cases presenting similar ‘contextual specificity’.

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<sup>25</sup> Entails: use of multiple data collection methods.

<sup>26</sup> Entails: use of multiple sources.

## 6 Analysis of the cases

*We are a community of eccentrics who share the delusion that politics is simpler than it appears (Coppedge, 1999: 467).*

The following chapter presents the empirical findings and analysis of the two cases. In an initial step, the answer to the question of motivations has been sought via process-tracing, document and context analysis. In a second step, the secondary question of patterns and trends has been investigated by mainly quantitative analysis. This has been done for both cases. Thereafter, a cross-case comparison has been developed.

### 6.1 Joint Operation Hermes and Italy

Due to its geographical propinquity to the African continent, Italy has been one of the major destination countries for irregular migration coming from North Africa, in particular since the mid-2000's, due to a displacement of flows from Spain (Andrade, 2010). The Central Mediterranean route represents one of the main 'arteries' of irregular migration to the EU. To a lesser extent, migrants and smugglers also utilise the sea route from Egypt or Turkey to Apulia and Calabria (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012: 41; Frontex, 2015b). Migratory flows towards Italy are typically mixed comprising migrants from North-African, Sub-Saharan, and Asian countries that are headed regularly towards Lampedusa or Sicily as main destinations.

As a response to the volatile situation in North Africa and the increased pressures on the Southern Mediterranean border of Italy, Frontex, in cooperation with Italy, as host country, and a set of MSs initiated JO Hermes. At its peak in 2013 and 2014, the JO Hermes clustered the efforts of approximately 20 MSs and SACs (Frontex, 2013a, 2014a). Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the JO Hermes 2011 gathered the efforts of 13 MSs and SACs and a budget of over 14 million euro and was one of the most important operational activities developed by Frontex (see Frontex, 2011a). The following section will present a qualitative empirical analysis of MSs' *motivations* for participation over time in JO Hermes (2007-2014). An overview of MSs' participation per year is presented in Table 1.

**Table 1: Participation in JO Hermes per year and MS**

JO Hermes	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Austria					X	X	X	X
Belgium					X		X	X
Denmark							X	X
Finland						X	X	
France	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Germany	X		X		X		X	X
Greece	X				X		X	X
Hungary					X		X	
Italy	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Latvia				X				
Lithuania						X		X
Luxembourg				X			X	
Malta							X	
Netherlands					X		X	X
Poland					X	X	X	X
Portugal	X		X		X	X	X	X
Romania	X				X	X	X	X
Slovakia			X	X				
Slovenia								X
Spain	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sweden							X	
UK	X					X	X	X
Norway			X				X	X
Iceland						X	X	X
Switzerland					X	X	X	X
<b>Total MS/year</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>18</b>

\*Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia did not participate in the JO

\*Participation is marked with [X]. Host country [Italy] is marked in Yellow

Source: Author's compilation based on Frontex Annual Reports (2007-2014); Operational Plans JO Hermes, (2009-2014); Evaluation Reports JO Hermes (2008-2014)

### 6.1.1 What are the motivations for MSs' participation in JO Hermes?

#### The context of JO Hermes and MSs' Participation

##### *The calm before the storm (2007-2010)*

The JO Hermes was initiated in 2007 and re-activated in 2008 with the purpose of “coordinat[ing] operational cooperation between MSs [...] through organising joint patrols [...] in order to *tackle illegal immigration* across the external maritime borders” [emphasis added] as a response to the increasing migratory movements (Frontex, 2007b; 2008b), which was a consequence of the displacement effect from Spain<sup>27</sup>. In this

<sup>27</sup> Prior to 2007, Spain was the main focal point for irregular migrants and human smugglers. The ‘Canary Crisis’ occurred in 2006 when an unexpected increase of irregular sea crossings took place from Western

context, the number of irregular migrants detected at the external borders of Italy grew exponentially throughout 2007 and 2008 (Frontex, 2007a: 14). In 2008, the number of detections at the Italian borders constituted 41% of the total sea border crossings towards the EU (Frontex, 2008: 12ff.). Although the upward trend constituted a reason of concern for the EU MSs, participation in the action in Italy was relatively modest both in 2007 and 2008, with only 7<sup>28</sup>, respectively 2 MSs participating in the JO, notably MSs in the immediate vicinity of Italy (e.g. France, Germany) or MSs that were confronting themselves with similar migratory issues (Spain, Greece, Portugal) (Frontex, 2007b, 2008b).

The low participation rate may be a consequence of the fact that the JOs Hermes 2007 and 2008 were among the first JOs and the MSs were still reluctant to participate in such initiatives. This was also signalled by the Evaluation Report (ER) of the 2008 JO, which highlighted an inflexibility of participating MSs to allow the National Officials to change the patrolling schedules as needed (Frontex, 2008b. 3). However, the analysis shows that participation was mostly security driven, given that the participating states were mostly states having a strategic interest in securing the borders (i.e. MSs in the immediate vicinity or confronting themselves with similar problems). Nevertheless, the JOs were also supported by the UK, for whom the situation was different. Given that the UK is not a Schengen state, its participation in JOs at the Southern border is quite surprising. A report realised by the UK in connection to Frontex-coordinated JOs shed light on potential motivations for participation. Firstly, the security-rationale was strongly embedded in the report which even went to highlight that “we [UK] can protect our borders better than the Schengen states control their own external borders” (House of Lords, 2008: 21). Furthermore, in addition to the security-driven rationale, a capability-driven motivation surfaced, given that the report stated that the UK wanted to “make use of its great experience in the efficient policing of borders to assist the other MSs” (House of Lords, 2008: 7).

The security-driven approach towards migration was also reflected by the position adopted by the host state, Italy towards migration which, the analysis revealed, was only minimally contested by MS’s but strongly criticised by humanitarian organisations. Beginning with 2009, Berlusconi’s government put even more emphasis on ‘combating’ irregular migration and ensuring the security of the external sea borders became of paramount importance both to Italy and the other MSs. Hence, Italy concluded the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation with Libya, which ensured an increased patrol of the seas surrounding the Italian border. Italy secured Libya’s cooperation in exchange for financial aid, which led the Minister of the Interior, Roberto Maroni, to declare that “Italy was investing to secure Europe’s borders and the

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Africa to the Canary Islands (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). At EU tier, the efforts were reinforced through the establishment of the JO Hera, initiated after the diplomatic *tour d’Europe* of the Spanish authorities who framed the crisis as an “unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the whole Europe” which required an “urgent European solution” (Carrera, 2007; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012: 35ff.).

<sup>28</sup> Note that the figures exclude the host MS.

EU should take note” (in Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, 2013: 607). This, coupled with the unilateral returns of migrants from Italy, led to a decrease in the numbers of migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea throughout 2009 and 2010 (Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, 2013: 607; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012: 41ff). In this context, JO Hermes 2009 was deployed with a duration of 6 months, gathering the efforts of only 6 MSs and had a modest contribution to ensuring border management, although being considered a success (Frontex, 2009a: 45; Frontex, 2009b). In a similar manner as the 2007 and 2008 phases of the JO, the JO Hermes 2009 had the aim to “tackle identified *threats and risks*” [emphasis added] (Frontex, 2009c) by performing border surveillance, which once again confirms the perception of irregular migration as a “threat” and the need of MSs to act out of a logic of anticipated consequences in order to mitigate the ‘threat’. Perceived in the broader political context, given the unilateral actions of the Italian government and the support from Libya, the risk of irregular migration was significantly reduced, which may offer a potential explanation as to why the number of states participating in JO Hermes 2009 was reduced.

*A ‘race against solidarity’<sup>29</sup> for the prize of security (2011-2012)*

Following the political turmoil in Tunisia in January 2011, a sharp increase in the number of migrants coming from North Africa was registered, with as much as 5.160 irregular migrants arriving in Lampedusa only in the period 1 January to 21 February 2011 (Frontex, 2011d). The reception facilities and capacity of Lampedusa to face such an influx were overwhelmed, given that the island has a population of approximately 5.000 people. By the end of August, more than 47.000 irregular migrants had arrived in Italy from Tunisia and Libya. Italian officials described the situation as a “biblical exodus” or a “human tsunami” (Spiegel, 2011), declared ‘state of emergency’ and urged the EU and Frontex to intervene. As a result, the JO Hermes 2011 was initiated in February 2011, 5 months earlier than initially planned and extended until March 2012 (Frontex, 2011e; 2011c). The stated aim of the JO as presented in the OP was to “increase situational awareness, response, interoperability and performance to tackle identified *threats and risks* affecting the EU external borders” [emphasis added] (Frontex, 2011d: 3). Thus, the main goal of the operation was security and emergency-driven and gathered the efforts of 12 MSs and SACs, which constituted a two-fold sharp increase in the number of participating states in comparison with previous years.

Confirming the sense of urgency of the situation and concerns over border and internal security, Malta and Switzerland participated for the first time in JO Hermes due to their strategic interest in protecting their ‘own’ borders (Nascimbene and Di Pascale, 2011). However, Malta postponed the decision of participation (Times of Malta, 2011) mainly due to a protracted disagreement with Italy over the clauses for disembarkation of persons. In 2010, the Council Decision on SAR and disembarkation in Frontex sea operations, which stipulated that in the event in which disembarkation in a third country

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<sup>29</sup> Carrera et al., 2011.

would lead to a violation of the principle of *non-refoulement*, then disembarkation should be realised in the country hosting the JO. This led to the unilateral withdrawal of Malta from participation in JOs, despite its strategic interest (Carrera, 2015: 9ff.). However, Malta's involvement in JO Hermes 2011 can be seen through the lenses of the declaration made in the context of their participation in the ongoing JO Triton, in which context, Malta declared that they would be involved "in very exceptional cases, if security factors require it" (see Carrera, 2015: 9).

The rationales behind such a reinforcement of the borders and the high participation of MSs were clarified by the Council Conclusions of March 2011. Although acknowledging the humanitarian emergency in Tunisia and Libya, the Council expressed its concern over the migratory movements and stressed the axiomatic importance of MSs' participation in JO Hermes 2011, in order to "[...] improve the control and management of borders and [take] measures to facilitate the return of migrants to their countries of origin" (European Council, 2011: 4). Furthermore, the Council invited the JHA Council to meet without delay and draft a plan for developing capacity to manage migration and refugee flows. The subsequent JHA Council endorsed the Council Conclusions by urging MSs "to provide further human and technical resources to support the Agency's operations, and in particular JOs Hermes, Poseidon Land and Sea and the possible deployment of a RABIT operation in Malta" (Council of the EU, 2011). This reinforces the idea that participation was driven mainly out of necessity and interest in securing not only the external borders but also each MSs 'national' borders.

Interestingly, the migratory crisis at the coastline of Italy did not only lead to lack of solidarity with the refugees involved in the crossing of the Mediterranean, but also created internal dis-unity leading to the questioning a fundamental principle of the EU – i.e. the free right of movement. In April 2011, Italy granted a number of 30.000 migrants from Tunisia temporary residence permits for humanitarian protection, which gave the undocumented migrants the right to move freely in the Schengen area and legally enter other MSs (Carrera et al., 2011; Lusenti and Watanabe, 2014: 2ff.). In response to this, the French authorities took the decision of reintroducing border checks and stopping trains coming from Italy towards France at the border. Furthermore, similar measures were considered by states such as Germany (Deutsche Welle, 2011), Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands (Carrera et al., 2011). The measure taken by Italy subsequently led to a discussion over the provisions of the SBC in order to enable the re-introduction of internal border controls in situations in which significant numbers of third-country nationals cross the external border, or when Schengen states persistently fail to protect external borders (Lusenti and Watanabe, 2014: 2ff). The "Franco-Italian affair" (Carrera et al., 2011) was a clear portrayal of the "weakest link technology", meaning that "the smallest amount of the good provided by an individual actor determines the absolute amount of the public good available to all" (Ceccorulli, 2009). In the case of the French-Italian row, this entailed that the amount of border security ensured by Italy directly reflected on the French internal security, which

increased the need for France to act by participating in measures that mitigate the vulnerability – such as in JO Hermes.

Furthermore, this also led to a “race against solidarity” (Carrera et al., 2011; see also Den Hertog, 2011) and gave rise to tensions and lack of trust between MSs (Nascimbene and Di Pascale, 2011: 355). It can be inferred that France, as well as the rest of the MSs that reacted to the crisis were driven by the logic of anticipated consequences and cost-benefit calculations in their attempt to ‘close’ their national borders and protect their security. In the case of France, the cost of upholding the principle free movement of persons appeared to be only secondary to protection of internal security by preventing ‘unwanted’ migrants from entering the state. Moreover, solidarity with Italy, the state under pressure, was ‘securitised’. By extrapolation, it may be assumed that MSs’ interest in participating in this period was primarily security-driven and spurring from an interest to protect themselves against an external ‘threat’, while the MSs at the periphery were ‘used’ as a ‘buffer zone’ protecting the ‘core countries’ of the EU.

2011 was a crucial year also due to the fact that “precisely in the year the Mediterranean region was subject to the most surveillance, the largest amount of deaths or disappearances were recorded” (ECRE, 2011). Despite the fact that Frontex reported that JO Hermes “saved over 20.000 migrants at sea during search and rescue operations” (Frontex, 2012d), UNHCR (2012) reported that 1.500 persons lost their lives attempting to cross the Mediterranean in 2011. However, one incident in particular caught the attention of the international community, namely a “boat-left-to-die” in the Mediterranean despite there being a high military and police presence at sea (ECRE, 2011). The investigation by the Council of Europe (CoE) concluded that the incident had happened due to a “catalogue of failures” at sea (Council of Europe, 2012) by SAR teams and NATO vessels present at sea (Den Hertog, 2012). The reaction of the EU MSs was modest, which could also be due to the fact that the collective responsibility for the tragedy in the Mediterranean was shifted on the shoulders of NATO and individual MSs that had sea presence during that period and it was considered to be a ‘collective failure’(Council of Europe, 2012). Furthermore, in spite of such events, Italy continued the pursuit of border security through the bilateral repatriation agreement concluded with North African states (Carrera et al., 2012: 3ff.), which led to a decrease in migratory flows during 2012 (Frontex, 2011d), ensuring security for both Italy and the other MSs at the cost of protection of refugees.

#### *Ambivalent answers to new storms (2013-2014)*

However, in 2013 and 2014, an upward migratory trend was registered with over 170.000 irregular migrants making the crossing of the Mediterranean only in 2014 (Frontex, 2014a). This was coupled with an increasing death toll due to accidents related to overloaded boats, which peaked in 2013 with the incident near Lampedusa when a boat carrying hundreds of migrants capsized. As a consequence of this, and due to a slow reaction on behalf of the EU, from October 2013 to October 2014, the Italian



Navy Operation *Mare Nostrum* was deployed – primarily a unilateral<sup>30</sup> and military action (Carrera and Den Hertog, 2015: 4). In parallel to the Italian operation, JO Hermes 2013 was initiated by Frontex and gathered the participation of 20 MSs. This is in the context in which previously, even in the unfolding of the “biblical exodus” of 2011, the participation of MSs was approximately half of the participation in 2013, i.e. 12 MSs participated in 2011. A comparison of the original OP and the ER of JO Hermes 2013 points out that initially only 13 MSs committed their participation, which means that the rest of the MSs’ joined the operation during the course of its development. Rationales for this can only be assumed, but in the context of the tragedy unfolding at the “door-steps” of the EU, and the pervasive criticism for the lack of a reaction, this could have constituted an impulse for more MSs’ participation (Frontex 2013c, 2013d).

The EU leaders’ response to the crisis in Lampedusa came through the voice of the European Council in October 2011, who called for the “reinforcement of Frontex activities in the Mediterranean and along the South-Eastern borders of the EU” (European Council, 2013a, 2013b) and requested the development of Eurosur, which was envisaged to “detect vessels and illegal entries, contributing to protecting and saving lives at the EU’s external borders” (European Council, 2013a, 2013b). Critics argued that “in response to the arrival of migrants in Lampedusa, the EU sought to expand its securitisation concept to include new measures and tools of identifying irregular migrants, preventing entry (European External Border Surveillance System – Eurosur) and ensuring forced return” (Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, 2013: 599), which essentially indicates a security-driven motivation of MSs to act through participation in JOs. On the other hand, it is interesting to note the emphasis put by the Council on safeguarding human life. This happened in the context in which previously it turned a ‘blind eye’ on similar smaller scale tragedies and on the customary ‘push-backs’ performed by Italy and Syria, which essentially went against the principle of *non-refoulement* of the EU.

Due to the termination of *Mare Nostrum*, and the pervasive calls for a commensurate response on behalf of the EU, JO Hermes 2014 (Frontex, 2014d, 2014e) was upgraded to the new JO Triton<sup>31</sup> which has the aim of better controlling irregular migration *and* contributing to SAR in the Mediterranean (Frontex, 2014c; Commission, 2014). Hence, a shift can be noted from a primarily security-oriented functionality of the JOs to *also* SAR functionality. Although not in the scope of the present study, it is impossible not to touch briefly upon the events that unfolded in 2014-2015 in the context of JO Triton. Despite the fact that the OPs and Evaluation Plans of JO Triton are not publically available, Frontex announced that 26 MSs are currently taking part in JO Triton 2015 (Frontex, 2015c). This is notable, especially given that such a high participation was only noted in 2013 and 2014 in the aftermath of the Lampedusa tragedy. In connection with such a high mobilization, Frontex stated that “[w]e have dramatically increased the

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<sup>30</sup> Italy was supported by Slovenia.


<sup>31</sup> JO EPN Hermes and JO Aeneas, which was active only from 2011, were merged into the new JO EPN Triton concept (see Frontex, 2014c).

deployment levels in the Central Mediterranean to support the Italian authorities in *controlling its sea borders and in saving lives*, too many of which have already been tragically lost this year” [emphasis added] (Frontex, 2015c). Moreover, at the Extraordinary Council meeting on migration of 2015, one of the 10 points on the future strategy for management of migration was constituted by the reinforcement of JO Triton and Poseidon. This is connected in the Council statement primarily with “prevent[ing] further loss of life at sea” and secondly with tackling irregular migration (European Council, 2015). Thus, a shift in the purpose of JOs can be noted - from primarily ‘combating’ irregular migration to primarily ‘saving lives at sea’, thereby safeguarding HR. Nevertheless, military measures were integrated in parallel in the migration agenda. In June 2015, within the scope of EU’s Comprehensive Approach to migration, a military operation was launched in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED), with the aim of systematically identifying and capturing vessels that are suspected of being used by migrant smugglers (EEAS, 2015). It is notable that this is “the first time after 10 years” that migration was put on the Foreign Ministers Agenda (Mogherini, 2015).

Interestingly, this shift is reflected also in the statements of EU leaders which previously were primarily concerned with securing the external borders against the migration ‘threat’. In this sense, the Italian foreign minister underlined that the ‘duty of saving lives’ lies not only on the Italy but also on the other EU MSs and asked for MSs reinforcement in operations in the Mediterranean (The Guardian, 2015a). As a reaction to the pressures from Italy but also from humanitarian organisations, the leaders of Germany, France and the UK pledged assistance in the SAR operations (The Guardian, 2015b). The case of the UK is highly relevant as it had previously criticised and opposed JOs considering them an “undesirable ‘taxi service’” and a ‘pull factor’ for migrants (Carrera and Den Hertog, 2015: 5). Shifting their position, the UK has currently pledged support to the SAR operations through JO Triton. Nevertheless, the UK took safeguards in order to secure a deal that would not imply taking the responsibility for the saved migrants at sea (The Guardian, 2015b).

As an overall preliminary conclusion, the evidence gathered through process-tracing supports the idea that, at an aggregate level participation of the MSs was mainly security-driven and constrained by the presence and level of the irregular migration ‘threat’. This has been evidenced both by the document and context analysis. However, generalizations must be made with caution, given the multiplicity of potential rationales for participation and the diversity of MSs. Nonetheless, apart from the security-driven participation, the ‘securitisation’ of solidarity among MSs also came as an additional argument to reinforce the fact that the preferences of MSs are mainly security driven. In more recent years, the EU MSs preferences are blurred and ambivalent as they continue to be tightly connected with the security-driven motivation, constrained by the persistent presence of the ‘threat’ and a logic of consequence, but also connected to normative-motivations, constrained *prima facie* by exogenous pressures to act.

**Figure 2: Detections of irregular migrants on Central Mediterranean route**



Source: Author's compilation based on Frontex (2015a)

### 6.1.2 What patterns of participation in JO Hermes can be perceived?

The present paper also set out to test two hypotheses that were drawn based on theoretical underpinnings and literature on the topic in connection to *patterns*, namely that *countries closer to the border, for which the presence of the 'threat' is allegedly higher will participate more*, respectively that *provided that violations of HR are pervasive, countries which are more committed to human rights will participate more*. For this purpose, the ability of proximity to the border and commitment to HR to predict levels of participation was assessed using HMRA. In the first step the influence of country size and cooperation affinity was controlled for. The control variables were found to explain 42% of variance in participation. In the second step, after entering the two variables of interest (i.e. proximity to the border and commitment to HR), 47% of variance in participation was explained with a high statistical significance (99%). In this context, the factors of interest together explained an additional 8% of the variance in participation, as demonstrated by the  $R^2$  change of 0.82 (significant at 95%). In the final model<sup>32</sup>, commitment to HR appeared to also make a strong contribution to explaining the dependent variable (standardised Beta=.340) at a significance level of 95%. However, proximity to the border does not appear to have a significant explanatory power.

Thus, based on this, the results seem to suggest that, on an aggregate scale, participation can be explained to a great extent by commitment to HR. This supports, to a significant extent, the hypothesis that MSs that are more committed to HR participate more in JOs than those with a lower level of commitment, which is relevant and interesting in the context of the afore-delineated increase in concern for human right. On the other hand, surprisingly proximity to the border appeared not to have a significant explanatory

<sup>32</sup> In the final model, both size (standardised Beta=.451), followed by cooperation affinity (standardised Beta=-.419) showed statistical significance levels above 99% and appeared to have a strong contribution to explaining the dependent variable.

potential. This refutes the null hypothesis that the countries closer to the focal point of entry into the EU are more willing to participate. An explanation for this could come from the fact that the perception of the ‘threat’ may be more homogeneously perceived among MSs, which is why most of them participate at one time or another. This is also reinforced by the qualitative analysis which shows that concerns about security are pervasive among MSs as the core purpose for participating in JOs is to ‘tackle irregular migration’.

## 6.2 Joint Operation Poseidon and Greece

Although prior to the 1990’s, Greece was one of the net outward migration states, due to its accession to the EU and to the Schengen Area (2000), it became one of the new immigration states being strongly affected by migration from Asia and North Africa. The external border management situation in Greece is even more complex than in Italy, given that there are multiple points of irregular entry both by sea and by land. Since 2007 in particular, the main entry point in Greece was through the maritime border with Turkey. However, due to increased sea surveillance, migration was displaced predominantly to the land border in the period 2010-2012. Starting with 2013 and continuing at present, the situation at the maritime border of Greece became dire, from both a border management perspective and a humanitarian perspective, as migration was concentrated at the Aegean Sea (Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, 2013: 612).

Greece does not constitute only a destination, but also a very important transit country for irregular migrants into the other EU MSs. By the end of 2010, approximately 90% of the people detected irregularly in the EU had entered through Greece (McDonough, 2012: 2) In this context, the concept JO Poseidon was developed in response to the increasing pressure on the Greek borders and represents one of the most complex operational concepts developed under the coordination of Frontex, involving both sea and land<sup>33</sup> operations and being active in multiple operational areas. As presented in the following, both the JO Poseidon Sea and Land gathered the support of a significant number of MSs in almost all phases of the development (see Table 2). Being interlinked and given that at the beginning the two operations were combined into one, JO Poseidon Sea and Poseidon Land will be discussed together in the following. While following a systematic year-by-year approach to the analysis, the subsequent section focuses only on the crucial findings for each of the JOs relevant for the assumptions afore-delineated. The paucity of the information in connection to JO Poseidon, which is also highlighted by scholars (see Marin, 2011: 476), limited the scope of the analysis and made the task at hand more challenging.

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<sup>33</sup> Most of the land border between Greece and Turkey is actually constituted by the river Evros, which is also considered to be a highly dangerous and difficult crossing point for irregular migrants.

**Table 2: Participation in JO Poseidon Sea and Land per year and MS**

JO Poseidon Sea/Land	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Austria	≈	Δ	X	X	X	X	X	X
Belgium		Δ	X	X	X	X	Δ	X
Bulgaria	X		X	X	Δ	Δ	X	X
Croatia			Δ		≈		X	X
Czech Republic			Δ	Δ	Δ	Δ		
Cyprus	≈	Δ	Δ	X	Δ	Δ		
Denmark		X	≈	X	X	X	X	X
Estonia		Δ	X	X	X	Δ	X	X
Finland		Δ	X	X	X	Δ	X	X
France	≈	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Germany	≈	Δ	X	Δ	X	X	X	X
Greece	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Hungary			Δ	X	X	Δ		
Italy	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Latvia	≈	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Lithuania		≈	X	X	X	Δ	Δ	
Luxembourg		≈	X	≈	Δ	X		
Malta	≈	≈	≈	X	Δ	X	X	X
Netherlands	≈	≈	X	X	X	X	X	X
Poland			≈	X	X	X	X	X
Portugal	≈	X		X	X	X	X	X
Romania	≈	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Slovakia		Δ	X	X	X	Δ	X	X
Slovenia			≈	X	X	Δ	Δ	
Spain	≈	X		Δ		≈	Δ	X
Sweden	≈	X	≈	≈	≈	≈	X	X
UK	≈	X	X	X	X	X	X	≈
Norway		Δ		X	≈	X	X	X
Switzerland					Δ	Δ	Δ	Δ
Iceland				≈	≈	≈	≈	X
<b>Total MS/year</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>24</b>

\*Participation is marked with ≈ / JO Poseidon Sea; Δ / JO Poseidon Land; X / Both JOs Poseidon

\*Host country [Greece] is marked in Yellow

Source: Author's compilation based on Frontex Annual Reports 2007-2014; Evaluation Reports JO Poseidon Land and JO Poseidon Sea 2010-2014

## 6.2.1 What are the motivations for MSs' participation in JO Poseidon? The context of JO Poseidon and MSs' participation

### *'Securitized' land and sea border (2007-2009)*

Similarly to Italy, Greece began registering an increasing number of irregular border crossings at its sea and land borders with Turkey beginning with the mid-2000. Only in 2007, Greece reported an increase of 170% in irregular border crossings in comparison to the previous years, which were mainly concentrated around the maritime borders but also around the land border with Albania (Frontex, 2007a). This trend persistently continued throughout 2007 and 2008 but the largest share of irregular border crossings were on the border with Albania (Frontex, 2008a: 12). As a response to the increased pressure, JO Poseidon Sea 2007 and JO Poseidon Sea 2008 were deployed and were supported with assets and experts by 14, respectively 13 MSs. In parallel, JO Poseidon Land was deployed at the land border but gathered the support of only 2 MSs (2007) (i.e. Bulgaria and Italy), respectively 17 MSs (2008).

The OPs and ERs for JO Poseidon Land and Sea could not be analysed for these years given the fact that access to them was not granted. However, it may be inferred by analysing the context and other reports, that the relatively low participation rate in the case of Poseidon Land could be accounted for by the fact that Albanians constituted a large share of the migrants attempting to enter Greece, which were crossing the border mainly for economic reasons with most migrants taking seasonal jobs in Greece and necessarily not moving further in the EU (Frontex, 2015b). Thus, the perception of the 'threat' in this period by the rest of the MSs could be considered as relatively low and mostly connected to irregular border crossing across the maritime borders. Furthermore, in this period the Greek coast guard was reportedly systematically *refouling* irregular migrants and refugees by pushing small boats out of the national waters (see Baldaccini, 2010: 241ff.), which essentially prevented them from entering Greece or moving to other EU countries. The practices of Greece of *refouling* refugees were met with criticism from humanitarian organisations, and the EU MSs were also criticised for not acting upon their commitments. ProAsyl noted that the practices of MSs in Greece "illustrat[ed] the decreasing commitment of EU Member States to guarantee even basic human rights standards" (ProAsyl, 2007: 5), which suggests the presence of normative exogenous pressures on the EU MSs to act.

### *The 'other' Greek crisis*<sup>34</sup> (2009-2011)

Beginning with 2009, due to the effects of the concluded agreements of Italy with Libya, respectively of Spain with Senegal and Mauritania, a displacement effect of the migratory flows from North Africa took place and the Turkish-Greek land border became a major "hotspot" for irregular migration, which peaked in 2010. The sudden shift of the migratory flow towards the land border was due to a cumulus of factors including, *inter alia*, the de-mining of the Evros region at the land border with Turkey

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<sup>34</sup> McDonough and Tsourdi, 2012.

(Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi, 2013: 612). Initially, the JO Poseidon Land 2010 was deployed with the purpose of controlling the border. The ER stressed the “high level of solidarity to Greece” shown by 24 MSs and SACs which participated in the JO. However, the ER also stressed that the efforts were not sufficient in the context of the pressures on the border, as the number of daily detections amounted to 245 (Frontex, 2010h: 5). Due to this increase, on 24 October 2010, the Greek Government requested immediate assistance at the external border to tackle an “exceptional mass inflow of immigrants”, much as in the case of Italy in 2011. The following day, Frontex and the other MSs announced that they intended to support Greece in solving the “serious situation” by increasing “the control and surveillance levels at Greece’s external border with Turkey” (Frontex, 2010e) via the deployment of the RABITs. This was the first time the mechanism had been used and no other use was made until now. Given the “compulsory solidarity”, i.e. obliged participation, of the RABITs, the actual participation in this exercise does not offer a valuable insight into rationales for participation. However, the purpose of the RABIT exercise, i.e. “tackling the current exceptional and urgent situation of irregular migration towards Greece with a desired deterrence effect, and to demonstrate well-coordinated operational solidarity of the EU MSs to render effective border security at the EU external borders” (Frontex, 2010g: 4), which replaced JO Poseidon 2010 that was already in place, shows that the action was mainly emergency and security-driven. Scholars contested the proportionality of the measure and argued that the activation of the RABITs, although presented at EU level as a sign of “European solidarity”, was mostly an illustration of EU MSs priorities: “more security (Frontex) and not going at the heart of the issue, which is that of human protection of refugees and undocumented migrants” (Carrera and Guild, 2010: 15).

The measure must also be interpreted in the broader context of the asylum policy. Given the deficiencies of the Greek asylum system, some MSs (Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands, UK) were constrained to stop ‘sending back’ asylum seekers to Greece despite having first entered through Greece.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the emergency-driven response can also be viewed as a measure to counter such situations in which, due to humanitarian reasons and constrained by the deficient asylum and border management systems of border states as Greece, the other MSs would be in the position of having to process the asylum applications and tackle the ‘burden’ of ‘unwanted’ migrants. Similarly, Carrera and Guild (2010: 1) observed that the deployment of the RABITs also signalled the “limits of the principle of solidarity and fair-sharing of responsibility and the failure of the EU Dublin System”, where solidarity is to be understood both between MSs and with the refugees attempting to reach the EU. They argue that the “deployment is merely of an emergency, temporary and (in)security (police)-driven nature, and the strengthening of the common EU external land border between Greece and Turkey may further increase the tensions by enlarging the distance between the external border

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<sup>35</sup> In 2010, under the ‘Dublin system’ the principle of ‘first safe country’ was applicable. This essentially entailed that the first country through which a migrant claiming asylum entered was the one processing the asylum application.

control practices and Europe's commitment to the rights and freedoms of asylum-seekers and refugees" (Carrera and Guild, 2010).

In the context of the activation of the RABITs, JO Poseidon Land 2010 was suspended for a period of two months and reactivated at a later stage. In parallel to the JO Poseidon Land, JO Poseidon Sea 2010 gathered the support of 24 MS and, for the first time, they included two SACs, Norway and Iceland. From the perspective of violations of HR, the RABIT intervention was criticised at EU level due to the inhumane and degrading treatment of migrants. The Human Rights Watch (2011) noted that "ECtHR categorically ruled that the transfer of migrants to detention in Greece would expose them to prohibited abuse, an executive agency of the EU and border guards from EU member states knowingly facilitate such transfers". It should be duly noted that border guards of other MSs need to be authorised by their home state in order to perform such activities. To a great extent, this refutes the assumption that MSs participate due to HR violations and reinforces the argument for the security-driven motivation.

As a follow up to the RABIT exercise, the JO Poseidon Land 2011 was established gathering the participation of 24 MSs. The 2011 ER for Poseidon Land sheds light upon potential rationales for participation in the JO as it noted that the JO had "coordinate[d] the EU MSs operational solidarity to render border security at the EU external borders" (Frontex, 2011h). Furthermore, it highlighted the fact that "having entered Greece successfully, a large portion of these migrants intend to travel to other EU countries, as their final destination is Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden and France" (Frontex, 2011h: 5). It may be inferred that 'operational solidarity' at the external borders and participation of the MSs in JOs has the main purpose of safeguarding the individual preferences of MSs and their 'own' internal and border security.

#### *The cost of security (2012-2013)*

The porous borders of Greece have also attracted criticism by the other EU ministers. In a similar manner as in the case of Italy, the 'migration crisis' generated a 'solidarity crisis' between MSs. In 2012, seven EU ministers questioned the principle of free movement due to the lax border controls at the Greek borders, alluding to the possibility of reinstating border checks if the migratory situation was not controlled. In this sense, the German Minister Hans Peter Friederich noted "the question still remains what happens when a country is not capable of securing its borders, as we see in Greece. [...] Is it possible to reinstate border controls? [...] I want to clarify that as part of our discussion". In addition to this, they emphasised the need to strengthen Frontex's operational activities at the Greek-Turkish border (Euractiv, 2012). This signals not only a "Schengen crisis" (Brady, 2012) or a 'solidarity crisis' with the MSs under pressure, but indirectly also indicates the underlying rationales for MSs participation in Frontex-coordinated JOs at the external borders of Greece, i.e. to safeguard their own national interests of security even at the cost of one of the fundamental principles that unites the EU – the free movement of persons.



The displacement of the migratory flows to the maritime borders starting with 2012 (see Frontex, 2012a: 9) was coupled with a commensurate response as the JO Poseidon Sea 2012 was supported by 22 MSs including Norway and Iceland. The JO ER emphasised ever since the beginning that Greece represented a concern as “it is mainly a transit region for irregular migrants heading to the EU” (Frontex, 2012e: 1) and that “migrants detected in the East Ionian Sea were apprehended while trying to reach Italy” (Frontex, 2012e: 4). Interestingly, in 2012, the operational area of Poseidon was extended to cover the border between Greece and Italy. Thus, the sea patrols deployed by the MSs were utilised not only to control the influx of migration from the ‘outside’ towards Greece, but also from Greece towards other MSs, which reinforces the migration-‘security-threat’ nexus and uncovers the interests of MSs. An analysis of the OPs for 2012 and 2013 has been performed in a report from 2012 by a Human Rights organisation. While acknowledging potential bias in interpretation, given that the OPs have been interpreted from the point of view of a human rights agency, it can be observed that the report mentions that the aim of the JO, as stated in the OP was “to identify the arrival of an embarkation as quickly and as far from the border as possible (early detection) and to ‘control secondary migration flows’” (secondary migratory flows meaning movements from Greece towards other MSs) (FIDH et al., 2013: 34). Notably, the ER of the JO Poseidon 2012 is also the first one<sup>36</sup> that mentioned that “besides surveillance and security, it is important to highlight the humanitarian aspects” (Frontex, 2012e: 4), and went ahead to underline that 33 SAR interventions were performed during the JO Poseidon Sea, which saved the lives of 966 migrants.

*A “humanitarian crisis within the economic crisis”<sup>37</sup>(2013-2014)*

Although the overall amount of detections on the Eastern Mediterranean corridor decreased towards the end of 2012 and in 2013, an increasing trend in migration across the maritime border was registered throughout 2013, and the migratory flow was composed by a large share of Syrian nationals seeking asylum (Frontex, 2012a: 54). In parallel, a decrease in the number of detections at the land border was mainly due to the deployment of the Greek operation Aspida (“Shield”) but also due to the reinforcement of JO Poseidon Land. At the maritime border, JO Poseidon Sea 2013 was supported by experts and equipment provided by 20 MSs including Iceland and Norway. However, apart from emphasizing the importance of border surveillance in connection to the reinforcement of the maritime border in Greece, the Frontex 2013 Report (2013a: 16) also emphasised the contribution that JO Poseidon Sea had to SAR actions by emphasising that “rescuing people in distress at sea was one of the key elements highlighted during 2013 maritime joint operations” (Frontex, 2013a: 64).

From the beginning of 2014, the maritime borders of Greece were increasingly under pressure with over 50.000 migrants arriving only in one year. The OP of JO Poseidon Sea 2014 stated that the operation enabled MSs to “tackle identified *threats* and *risks*

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
<sup>36</sup> From the ones analysed by the author in the period 2009-2014 for which only limited access was available.

<sup>37</sup> Alexis Tsipras (Reuters, 2015).

affecting maritime borders” (Frontex, 2014f: 11) and that “the deployment of human resources has been adequate to the level of the *threat* regarding irregular migration [emphasis added] (Frontex, 2014f: 12). However due to the humanitarian crisis unfolding in the Mediterranean, increased attention to HR could be observed in the JO Poseidon Sea 2014 ER which highlighted that UNHCR was involved in operational briefings regarding HR. JO Poseidon Sea 2014 was initially planned for the period May-September, however, due to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, deployment was extended. As in the case of JO Hermes, JO Poseidon Sea was set at the centre of the EU’s migration agenda of the Extraordinary Council on Migration from 2015 and is currently the second largest and most important JO deployed in the Mediterranean (European Council, 2015). Moreover, an increasing concern over the “humanitarian crisis” unfolding even currently, has led to pressure on the EU to act by reinforcing its sea presence. In this sense, the UNHCR as well as the Prime-Minister of Greece called the situation “shameful” and called upon the EU to act (Reuters, 2015). The reaction of the EU MSs to this external pressure appears to be ambivalent, just as in the case of Italy, and the overall response was pooling resources under the JO Poseidon Sea operation in order to decrease the humanitarian crisis but also to secure the borders. Moreover, even SAC states, such as Norway signalled their concern by sending rescue vessels to “sail to Greek waters to assist in the ongoing humanitarian disaster that is now unfolding in the Mediterranean” (Royal Norwegian Embassy in Athens, n.d).

To sum up, evidence pointed out that, as in the case of JO Hermes, participation in JO Poseidon was initially security-motivated and driven by the exogenous constraints spurring from the presence of the migration ‘threat’ and the vulnerabilities imposed by the Schengen system and the free movement principle. Nonetheless, to a certain extent a shift in priorities occurred in connection to the JO Poseidon, starting roughly with 2012/2013, as the JOs Poseidon and, more precisely, Poseidon Sea were increasingly connected to SAR necessities and the ‘duty’ to react to the humanitarian crisis.

**Figure 3: Detections of irregular migrants on Eastern Mediterranean route (sea, land and total)**



Source: Author’s compilation based on Frontex (2015a)

## 6.2.2 What patterns of participation can be perceived?

Similar to the case of JO Hermes, a HMRA was performed in order to test the two hypotheses of interest. This shed light on the ability of the two interest factors to predict participation, while controlling for the effect of size and cooperation affinity. In the case of JO Poseidon, the statistical results are rather puzzling. In the first step, the control variables appeared not to explain variance in participation. In the second step, the addition of the factors of interest did not show an increase in the explanatory power of the model either. The final model including all 4 variables was not statistically significant. However, despite not being statistically relevant, HR and size showed the largest standardised Beta coefficient (standardised Beta=.307; respectively Beta=.274). This disproves both initially formulated null hypotheses, refuting the idea that countries closer to the border or countries more committed to HR participated more. One rationale for this may be the fact that there was insignificant variance on the dependent variable and, as a consequence of that trends and effects may have been blurred.

When analysing the standardised Beta coefficients in the final model, there is some indication that HR and size make a contribution to explaining variance in participation, however, the results are not statistically significant. Moreover, the Pearson correlation coefficient between participation and size of the country shows a positive correlation between the two, which means that larger countries participated more over the period (size:  $r=.312$ ;  $p=.050$ ). Thus, the results of statistical analysis seem to suggest that on an aggregated scale and in this particular case, participation was not explained by the factor of interest variables or by the control model.

## 6.3 Discussion: Cross-case comparison

The following sections will discuss the findings of the two cases and provide an answer to the research questions. Firstly, the question related to motivations for participation will be tackled through a cross-case comparison of the findings and, thereafter, a discussion related to the findings for the second research question, regarding patterns, will be provided.

### 6.3.1 Motivations for participation: between endogenous and exogenous 'constraints'

The afore-delineated empirical analysis (sections 6.1.1 and 6.2.1) focused on JO Hermes, respectively Poseidon Land and Sea, and analysed the context in which the JOs developed in the period 2007-2014. The initial research question concerned motivations for MSs' participation and set out to identify what other types of 'incentives' or

‘constraints’ could explain participation in JOs. The paper provided two potential explanatory premises for *motivations* for participation from the perspective of the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness, namely: (a) the presence of a security ‘threat’, which was correlated to *exogenous ‘constraints’* encourage MSs action (*security-driven motivation*); (b) the occurrence of violations of HR, in which case participation was related to either *endogenous ‘constraints’* (acting out of a ‘moral duty’), or to *exogenous ‘constraints’*, spurring from external pressure put by external actors on the MSs to act in order to safeguard the ‘normative’ image of the EU (*norm-driven motivation*). The analysis was guided by theoretically grounded hypotheses and performed for both cases. A set of cross-case conclusions can be drawn from the analysis.

Firstly, in both the case of Italy and Greece, an increase in irregular migration was registered from the beginning of the mid-2000 as a result of a displacement effect of migratory flows from Spain. In this context, the JO Hermes, respectively JO Poseidon<sup>38</sup> were deployed. The OPs and ERs appear to suggest that the initiative had a security-driven underlying motivation and participation of MSs was linked to the interest in controlling the migration ‘threat’. Although overall higher in the case of JO Poseidon than in the case of JO Hermes, participation has shown an upward increase over the period under analysis. The higher degree of participation in JO Poseidon may be connected with the more limited capacity of Greece to control the borders, the porous nature of its borders, and the fact that by 2010, approximately 90% of the total of irregular persons detected in the EU MSs had entered through Greece (McDonough, 2012: 2).

The analysis showed that both in the case of JO Hermes and of JO Poseidon, exogenous ‘constraints’ and the presence of the irregular migration ‘threat’ (as stated in the Operational Plans and Evaluation Reports of the JOs) appeared to be a strong catalyst for participation. Yearly increases of the migration ‘threat’ were followed by increases in participation, which may suggest a causal connection between the two. A cumulus of evidence suggested this causal connection. Firstly, in both cases, the analysed documents appeared to indicate a strong concern of MSs over the provision of the ‘collective goods’ – border security and internal security – but principally at ‘national’ level, and thereafter at EU level, and in numerous cases migration was referred to as a ‘threat’ to the stability of MSs. Although stronger evidence could be gathered in the case of JO Poseidon, an overarching concern presented in the reports was related to the fact that both Greece, respectively Italy acted as transit states for irregular migrants attempting to reach other EU countries. This may be an additional catalyst for participation in order to safeguard national interests.

Secondly, the analysis of the context of migration in both Greece and Italy uncovered two sets of events that not only showed the ‘securitized’ nature of “European solidarity” both with the MSs under pressure and with refugees/migrants, but also revealed the

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<sup>38</sup> From here onwards JO Poseidon will be used to denote both JO Poseidon Sea and JO Poseidon Land.

underlying interests and preferences of MSs – securing their own ‘national’ borders and providing ‘national’ internal security. In both cases analysed, the ‘migratory crisis’ generated a ‘Schengen crisis’ and a ‘solidarity crisis’, although in the case of Italy the crisis was more pronounced and led to the re-introduction of effective border controls at the border with Italy. Thus, as a consequence of the increased number of irregular migrants entering through Greece and Italy and the ‘risk’ of movement to other EU states, some EU states including, *inter alia*, France (most notably), Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, went as far as questioning one of the fundamental principles of the Union – the principle of free movement. In Italy’s case, this happened in 2011, being triggered by the Italian government’s decision to issue temporary residence permits to undocumented migrants, which angered the other EU MSs. Similarly, in Greece’s case, this occurred in 2012, when due to the high secondary migratory movements from Greece to other EU states, the EU MSs reacted by threatening with the re-introduction of border controls. As afore-argued, this seems to suggest that the MSs actions were constrained by ‘exogenous’ pressures (the presence of the ‘threat’) and it may be inferred that MSs participated in JOs mainly due to security concerns which were concealed under the façade of ‘solidarity’. Mitsilegas (2014) argued in the context of asylum policy that solidarity can be seen as interconnected with interest and necessity and arising from a “crisis mentality” (Mitsilegas, 2014: 187). Moreover, he argued that solidarity can be securitised and can be seen as “emergency management” (Mitsilegas, 2014: 187). Similarly, the high participation of the MSs in both migratory ‘crises’ but also the adjacent measures taken by individual countries lead to the conclusion that their actions were driven by security motivations and spurred from a logic of consequences.

Nonetheless, in both cases, due to the increasing death toll in the Mediterranean and persistent violations of HR, at both the Italian and Greek borders, and due to the increased criticism and exogenous pressures on MSs to respect HR (in particular the right for life and human dignity of undocumented migrants), a steady shift in the scope and nature of JOs could be perceived from a JO – border/internal security nexus to a JO – search and rescue nexus. Additionally, the empirical data suggested ambivalent MSs’ preferences, given that on the one hand, the security-driven motivations for participation appear to be maintained constant, while on the other hand, an increasingly norm-driven motivation for participation could be noted. Nevertheless, in both cases, it is unclear whether the norm-driven motivation for participation and concern for HR were ultimately constrained by exogenous pressures from external actors (e.g. humanitarian organisations) or whether they were imposed endogenously, due to the internalisation of norms by the MSs.

However, one must be cautious about stating that a clear shift has taken place, in particular due to the fact that the security and ‘threat’ driven discourse was observed to continue in parallel to the discourse regarding the ‘moral duty’ to save lives and the calls for ‘solidarity’ with the migrants/refugees risking their lives. Additionally, the increased concern over HR especially noted in the analysed documents (OPs and ERs)

could have also been the consequence of a structural shift in the approach towards JOs due to the adoption of the Frontex Fundamental Rights Strategy in 2011.

Thus, while prudent conclusions can be drawn from the analysis concerning this aspect, one must not overlook the political dynamics that occurred recently in the event of tragedies in the Mediterranean. The shift in some state's view, from declining interest in participation in JOs Hermes and Poseidon, to high participation and commitments to 'saving lives' in the Mediterranean (e.g. the case of the UK participation), is an eloquent example of this shift. Moreover, references to the normative duty of the EU to 'save lives' reverberate the MSs' discourse, as well as that of EU leaders. Recently, Juncker (2015) highlighted in connection to JOs and the situation in the Mediterranean "The core priority [*of the MSs*] is to save human lives. This is urgent and we will strengthen the means to save lives".<sup>39</sup>

Overall, the analysis suggested that a synergy of factors appear to account for participation and that the line between acting from a logic of consequence or a logic of appropriateness is increasingly blurred. Moreover, on a general level a shift could be perceived from acting collectively through JOs to generate border and internal security (in particular for individual MSs), as collective goods, to *also* acting collectively to generate protection of refugees and undocumented migrants at sea, which was also presented as having characteristics of collective good at the beginning.

### 6.3.2 Patterns of participation in Joint Operations

The secondary research question was related to *patterns* of participation in JOs. In this sense, for both JO Hermes and JO Poseidon a HMRA was performed with the purpose of testing the two hypotheses of interest, i.e. that *countries closer to the border, for which the presence of the 'threat' is allegedly higher will participate more*, respectively that provided that violations of HR are pervasive, *countries which are more committed to human rights will participate more*. The two hypotheses, formulated based on theoretical underpinnings set out potential patterns of participation. The results were highly different for the two cases, and in the case of JO Poseidon they were not statistically significant. Despite the fact that further tests could have been conducted to test the two hypotheses, the scope of the present study precluded it. Thus, although a comparison between the two cases is limited, a set of conclusions can be drawn.

In both cases, the findings from the cases show that the effect of proximity to the border is negligible and has no statistical significance. Thus, the results refute the hypothesis presented initially, challenging the idea that MSs should participate according to the distance from the focal point of entry of irregular migrants in the EU, which essentially

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<sup>39</sup> Author's translation; Original quote: "La toute première priorité consiste à sauver des vies humaines. L'urgence est immédiate et il faudra que nous renforçons les moyens pour sauver les vies" (Juncker, 2015).

relied on the assumption that “threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones” (Ceccorulli, 2009: 4). However, at the same time, this might also appear to suggest the idea that the perception of ‘risk’ associated with the porous borders and irregular migration moving inward to the EU is rather homogenous at EU level due to the fact that the free movement principle allows both irregular migrants, as well as *bona fide* travellers to move from one MS to another once entered in the EU (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012: 40, 45; Brian and Laczó, 2014: 86). Thereby, all MSs have an equal interest in securing the external borders and participating in JOs.

On the other hand, commitment to HR showed a statistically significant effect on participation only in the case of JO Hermes. However, in the case of JO Poseidon despite the fact that HR showed the most effect on participation in the model, the result was not statistically significant. As presented in the qualitative analysis, the presence of HR violations was pervasive both in the case of JO Hermes and JO Poseidon, as such, it was initially hypothesised that MSs with a higher commitment to HR will be more likely to participate, given the fact that JOs coordinated by Frontex also present HR safeguards. While this hypothesis appeared to be supported in JO Hermes, as states with higher commitment to HR appeared to participate more over the period analysed, this was not the case for JO Poseidon. As afore-mentioned, given the more uniformly distributed and high level of participation in JO Poseidon, the statistical effects might have been blurred. Put in the perspective of the qualitative analysis, which showed that over time, HR became increasingly important in connection to JOs, this comes to reinforce (to some extent) the conclusions drawn from the qualitative analysis.

**Figure 4: Hierarchical regression analysis results**

	Hermes			Poseidon		
	Adjusted R2	R2 Change	Stand. Beta	Adjusted R2	R2 Change	Stand. Beta
<b>Model 1</b>	<b>,426***</b>			<b>,034</b>		
Size			,486**			,302
Cooperation affinity			-,350*			-,077
<b>Model 2</b>	<b>,473***</b>	<b>,082*</b>		<b>,002</b>	<b>,041</b>	
Size			,451**			,274
Cooperation affinity			-,419*			-,156
Human rights			,339*			,307
Proximity to the border			-,100			-,187

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001

Source: Author’s results

## 7 Conclusion

Joint Operations have an axiomatic importance in the border management policy of the EU, constituting a form of operational cooperation at the external border and being coordinated by Frontex and implemented by MSs. Departing from the theoretical underpinnings of collective action, this paper argued that JOs constitute forms of collective action, as they imply the participation of two or more MSs in view of achieving a commonly sought collective good. In the case of JOs, it has been argued that the commonly sought collective good is represented by security, both at an ‘intermediate’ level – border security – as well as at a ‘finite’ level – internal security, but that there are also other indirectly generated collective goods – i.e. protection of refugees/migrants).

Despite sharing a collective interest in the provision of the collective good(s), the theory of collective action purports that “members of a large group [...] will *not* act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or [...] some separate incentives” (Olson, 1970: 2). In the case of JOs, it has been ascertained that participation in JOs is voluntary and that institutional ‘coercion’ (legally binding provisions) is not present. Based on the collective action theory, the voluntary nature of participation and the lack of ‘coercion’ have been perceived as conditions conducive to free-riding behaviour. Nevertheless, empirical data shows that, in fact, participation of MSs in JOs is significant. This led to a theoretical and empirical ‘puzzle’ regarding the question of *motivations* for participation and as a secondary enquiry related to the question of *patterns* for participation. Guided by the theoretical underpinnings of the logic of anticipated consequences and the logic of appropriateness and literature on participation/burden-sharing in migration and asylum policies, the present paper advanced two premises related to potential motivations of MSs’ participation, respectively two hypotheses related to potential patterns.

At the core of the EU border management policy and the development of JOs lies the principle of solidarity which, it has been argued, might have a potential influence upon the willingness of MSs to participate. Nonetheless, moving past the elusive concept of ‘solidarity’, the paper has suggested two potential *motivations* for participation in JOs, namely: (a) the presence of a security ‘threat’, which was correlated to exogenous ‘constraints’ that might determine MSs to act (*security-driven motivation*); (b) the occurrence of violations of HR, in which case participation was related to endogenous ‘constraints’ (acting out of a ‘moral duty’), or to exogenous ‘constraints’- participation being constrained by external pressure on the MSs to act in order to safeguard the ‘normative’ image of the EU (*norm-driven motivation*).



The findings of both the case of JO Hermes (Italy) and the case of JO Poseidon (Greece) appear to suggest that MSs mainly participated in the JOs being guided by security-driven motivations due to exogenous ‘constraints’ generated by the presence of the migration ‘threat’ (logic of consequence). One of the most salient findings of the thesis was that, in the event of high internal security ‘threats’ generated by high irregular migration, the national security interests took centre stage overshadowing even the core principles and values of the EU – the principle of free movement and the principle of solidarity. In contrast to what has been assumed at the beginning, namely that solidarity is a guiding principle for the actions of MSs, the analysis seemed to suggest that solidarity is “state-centred, in that it places emphasis on the interests of the state [...] securitized [and] exclusionary” (Mitsilegas, 2014: 187) not only towards the irregular migrants/refugees, but also in-between MSs themselves. This seems to go in line with the argument made by some scholars that “the political power of security can attempt to appropriate solidarity for its own ends” (Ross in Mitsilegas, 2014: 187) and reinforces the security-driven motivation for participation.

Concurrently, due to an increased gravity of HR issues connected to JOs, a more ambivalent position of MSs’ preferences in connection to participation in JOs could be perceived. In particular beginning with 2011, both security-driven motivations and norm-driven motivations appeared to be connected to MSs’ participation. In this sense, evidence has been collected in the process of the present enquiry which seems to suggest an increasingly important link between JOs and the ‘moral duty’ of the EU to protect lives. By extrapolating, the paper has argued that participation in JOs can be seen as spurring from a ‘normative duty’ to protect HR. Nonetheless, it has not been possible to infer whether the constraint to act in order to protect HR was generated endogenously, due to the internalisation of norms and values by the MSs, or exogenously, i.e. due to external pressures on the EU to act to safeguard the core values. The collected evidence did seem to suggest a continuous exogenous pressure on EU leaders to act to safeguard lives, which may have acted as a catalyst for increased participation in JOs. Overall, a steady shift from a main concern of the MSs with the provision of border security and internal security (in particular at national level), as collective goods, to *also* a concern over the provision of protection of refugees and undocumented migrants, which has been argued to have collective good attributes, could be noted.

Similar to the question on motivations for participation, two hypotheses for *patterns* of participation were tested primarily through quantitative analysis, i.e. *countries closer to the border, for which the presence of the ‘threat’ is allegedly higher will participate more in JOs*, respectively that provided that violations of HR are pervasive, *countries which are more committed to human rights will participate more*. The analysis provided evidence to support the argument that countries more committed to HR participate more in JOs, which is interesting in the context in which the qualitative analysis appeared to show an increasing causal connection between respect for HR and participation over the analysed period.

Potential avenues for further research are plentiful, especially given that JOs have been the object of only a handful of studies. On one hand, for those passionate about qualitative analysis, a potential idea could be assessing the salient issue that was only touched upon in the present study – i.e. explaining why a soaring death toll was registered in which the presence of the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean was high. Such a study can look into the question of ‘collective failure’ and international coordination. On the other hand, for those passionate about quantitative studies, the increasing trend in participation in JOs from the inception until presently could offer an interesting puzzle.

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## 9 Appendix

a. Maps

b. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis assumptions

c. Dataset


*Explanations to dataset:*

Participation – aggregated participation of each MSs over the period 2007-2014. In the case of JO Poseidon, participation was aggregated for both JO Poseidon Land and Sea. Each individual participation (either in the JO Poseidon Sea or JO Poseidon Land) of a MSs was scored with 1 point. If a MSs participated in both Sea and Land, they were scored with 2 points.

Human rights and close ties – the data marked with (\*) was missing, the data gaps were filled by using average scores for similar countries.


a. Maps

Figure 5: Migratory routes



Source: Frontex Operational data

Figure 6: Irregular migration city hubs and routes



Source: European Council (2015)

b. Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis Assumptions:

(a) Multicollinearity (relationship between independent variables): As can be seen from the figures below this assumption has not been violated in any of the cases. Multicollinearity appears when the independent variables are highly correlated. The absence of multicollinearity has been corroborated also by checking the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF).

**Table 3: JO Hermes**

		Participation Hermes	Size of the country	Cooperation affinity	Human Rights	Proximity to the border
Pearson Correlation	Participation Hermes	1,000	,597	-,504	,167	-,111
	Size of the country	,597	1,000	-,317	,000	-,127
	Cooperation affinity	-,504	-,317	1,000	,275	,348
	Human Rights	,167	,000	,275	1,000	,569
	Proximity to the border	-,111	-,127	,348	,569	1,000
Sig. (1-tailed)	Participation Hermes		,000	,003	,193	,284
	Size of the country	,000		,047	,499	,256
	Cooperation affinity	,003	,047		,074	,032
	Human Rights	,193	,499	,074		,001
	Proximity to the border	,284	,256	,032	,001	

Source: Author's compilation


**Table 4: JO Poseidon**

		Poseidon Participation	Size of the country	Cooperation affinity	Human Rights	Proximity to the border
Pearson Correlation	Poseidon Participation	1,000	,312	-,117	,103	-,050
	Size of the country	,312	1,000	-,132	,000	-,093
	Cooperation affinity	-,117	-,132	1,000	,459	,351
	Human Rights	,103	,000	,459	1,000	,709
	Proximity to the border	-,050	-,093	,351	,709	1,000
Sig. (1-tailed)	Poseidon Participation		,050	,273	,297	,399
	Size of the country	,050		,247	,499	,316
	Cooperation affinity	,273	,247		,006	,031
	Human Rights	,297	,499	,006		,000
	Proximity to the border	,399	,316	,031	,000	

Source: Author's compilation

(b) Normality, linearity, homoscedasticity – has been checked by looking at the Normal Probability Plot. The distribution was assessed as being normal and linear and there was no indication of heteroscedasticity.


**Figure 7: Normal probability plots**



Source: Author's compilation

(c) Outliers - can be detected by looking at the scatterplot. Outliers are characterised by a standardised residual level of more than 3.3 or less than -3.3. As can be seen below, this was not the case.

**Figure 8: Scatterplots**



Source: Author's compilation

c. Dataset

ID	Hermes Participation	Poseidon Participation	Proximity Hermes IT	Proximity Poseidon EL	Fundamental Rights	Size	Cooperation affinity Hermes IT	Cooperation affinity Poseidon EL
<b>Austria</b>	4	14	1047	1201	0,87	2	45	59
<b>Belgium</b>	3	12	1506	1949	0,84	2	22	27
<b>Bulgaria</b>	0	12	936	236	0,67	2	17*	8*
<b>Croatia</b>	0	6	909	702	0,67	2	17*	8*
<b>Cyprus</b>	0	7	1695	835	0,65*	1	18	3
<b>Czech Republic</b>	0	4	1270	1311	0,8	2	41	53
<b>Denmark</b>	2	13	1982	2166	0,91	2	31	45
<b>Estonia</b>	0	12	2452	2192	0,81	1	54	68
<b>Finland</b>	2	12	2605	2438	0,91	2	44	58
<b>France</b>	8	15	1004	1575	0,78	3	6	19
<b>Germany</b>	5	13	1162	1375	0,87	3	20	35
<b>Greece</b>	4	n/a	662	n/a	0,65	2	14	n/a
<b>Hungary</b>	2	6	1087	972	0,65	2	47	60
<b>Iceland</b>	3	6	3804	4165	0,9*	1	35*	50*
<b>Italy</b>	n/a	16	n/a	502	0,74	3	n/a	14
<b>Latvia</b>	1	15	2275	1990	0,8*	1	51	66
<b>Lithuania</b>	2	9	2033	1785	0,79*	1	46	61
<b>Luxembourg</b>	2	7	1486	1886	0,85*	0	29	33
<b>Malta</b>	1	12	168	846	0,74*	0	19	12
<b>Netherlands</b>	3	14	1625	2000	0,85	2	23	37
<b>Norway</b>	3	10	2529	2610	0,9	2	35*	50*
<b>Poland</b>	4	11	1455	1296	0,77	3	36	49
<b>Portugal</b>	6	13	1805	2640	0,8	2	6	13
<b>Romania</b>	5	15	1130	650	0,73	2	20*	30*
<b>Slovakia</b>	2	12	999	1167	0,72*	2	45	57
<b>Slovenia</b>	1	7	974	1099	0,77	1	36	47
<b>Spain</b>	8	8	1185	2049	0,78	3	1	15
<b>Sweden</b>	1	11	2040	2120	0,9	2	30	46
<b>Switzerland</b>	4	4	1024	1451	0,87*	2	45*	59*
<b>United Kingdom</b>	4	14	1918	2389	0,79	3	22	37