State Fragility, Migration, Integration and Terrorism?
A Historic opportunity towards mutual recognition

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Abstract

Jihadism has become a major topic in Western as well as non-western public debate. Many military groups have sprung up in late 20th and early 21st century, claiming legitimacy using jihad for a wide variety of causes ranging from Kashmir, Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Nigeria. This leads to the question whether Islamist fundamentalism has been successful in projecting jihad to mean engagement in a violent 'holy war' against the dominant West, which can then be extended against non-Muslims elsewhere. It has assumed the importance of a major factor of contemporary societal, political and military security and insecurity. This thesis attempts to make a small contribution to better understanding some of these aspects of violent jihadism.

Since the 1979-1989 war in Afghanistan, terrorist groups continue to use jihad as legitimate justification for all the activities they carry out. The past three decades have witnessed several revivals and reproductions in the global jihadi movement under different names and under various leaders. But they all revolve around the idea of formation of the Caliphate – the ideal state. Even though jihad provided the catalyst for the core doctrine of all these groups and organizations, it is one of many other. These organizations came up in the wake of failed states that had undergone armed conflicts and wars, political violence, human rights violations and military coups. The organizations wasted no time in exploiting situations where there was a security, political or military vacuum and rushed in to lay the groundwork in those areas as a first step that would guarantee its subsequent growth so that it may execute its agendas. Hotbeds of conflict seen in the Islamic world today serve as testament of the success of this tactic. Let us look at the disastrous situation in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Afghanistan and other countries, in which these groups operate sowing death and destruction, and leading to displacement of populations.

My focus in this thesis is on analysing the circumstances that support the growth of terrorist groups, and which enable them to continue in a perpetual state of renewal very similar to the rebranding of corporate brands, by trying to answer the following question: **Why do terrorist groups continue to grow anew while they are in a state of permanent renewal?**

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I.   Introduction

Jihadism has become a major topic in Western as well as non-western public debate. Many military groups have sprung up in late 20th and early 21st century, claiming legitimacy using jihad for a wide variety of causes ranging from Kashmir, Somalia, Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Nigeria. This leads to the current debate on the subject whether Islamist fundamentalism has been successful in projecting jihad to mean engagement in a violent 'holy war' against the dominant West, which can then be extended against non-Muslims elsewhere. It has assumed the importance of a major factor of contemporary societal, political and military security and insecurity.

This debate is happening in the backdrop of strategic thinking about security that had moved out of the military sphere in the mid 90s post-Cold War international scenario. The fissure in security studies theory based on the dominant state-centric approach on the one hand and that which sought to unravel the various societal components was sought to be remedied and bridged. The new framework encompasses issues and referent objects in the economic, environmental and societal sectors, as well as the strategic studies that concern the military-political angle. The new unified theory better explains how issues become securitized, and to locate the relevant security dynamics on levels ranging from local, through regional to global. With the end of the bipolar system in the new Millennium, international ties have taken on a more regionalized approach (Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde 1998).

Given the relatively little time that researchers had to comprehend the current rise of violent Islamism not all analysis has been up to scratch with understanding the genealogy as well as current dynamics of the phenomenon. This thesis attempts to make a small contribution to better understanding some of these aspects of violent jihadism.

A lot is being said about the underlying factors that have led to its emergence and relatively rapid spread in the Middle East. Although Islamic State has laid claim to the establishment of a caliphate in late June last year, stretching across territory it held in Iraq and Syria, its origins date back to late 90s in Jordan and Afghanistan. While mutating across time and territory, it has proved to be a much greater menace to that rest of the world in its aim and approach than Al Qaeda. This is so because of its military and fighting capabilities, ability to attract fighters from across the globe and its considerable financial resources. While maintaining control over vast terrain and regions across Iraq and Syria, it has opened up a major confrontation on sectarian scale in the Middle East, and at the same time issued an open call to wage jihad or holy war by Muslims in the West.

From a Western viewpoint, the main dangers stem from the condition of general instability within the Middle East in which jihadi groups have flourished from Iraq, Syria and Yemen. According to Charles Lister, although the coalition of western and Arab forces have targeted Islamic State leadership and units by aerial bombardment, the best way to counter terrorism in the region would be to address the sectarian and socio-political conditions in Iraq and Syria that led to dangerous fissures (Lister 2014).

The savagery displayed by jihadist groups today has become a source of concern for the entire world, foremost being the Arab and Muslim world which is itself being accused of exporting evil and terror. Despite the fact that Europe and the Western world is considered infidel territory by the jihadi groups, it is the Arab and Muslim world which has had to pay a much higher price in terms of human lives and physical destruction in its capitals and cities at the hands of this savagery. It is not hard to fathom why. The political regimes that control Islamic countries are considered in the view of these groups to be apostate regimes which are products of the post-colonial period -- alternative projects created by the 'infidel West' to replace the Dream State of the Islamic Caliphate.

The war in Afghanistan to expel the Soviet forces marked a fundamental turning point in the globalization of jihadi activities. The doctrine of jihad gained momentum during that crucial decade, and I can say that during this period there was not a home in the Arab and Muslim world that did not have cassettes and brochures distributed by the followers of Abdullah Azzam that told the wonderful and miraculous stories of the Mujahedeen in their fight against the Soviet invasion. This was followed by a new growth in the tide of jihad that then reached Chechnya and Bosnia and the wave that accompanied Jihadi activities was renewed. The Chechen-Russian conflict dates back centuries ago. But the most recent conflict was in the 90s after the breakup of the Soviet Union gave the Chechen separatists the opportunity to declare independence in 1991. After two years of fighting from late 1994, the Russian forces withdrew. In 1999, the fighting resumed and ended next year, with Moscow establishing direct control over Chechnya. The nationalistic struggle meanwhile has taken on terrorist and religious colour. Radical Islamists from Chechnya and other North Caucasian republics have set off many terror attacks in Russia.

International commentators have been late in finding links between the Balkan conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovnia during 1992-95 and Al Qaeda's export of terror to the West. Foreign mujahideen from post-Soviet Afghanistan to Lebanese Shia Hezbollah joined the conflict on behalf of the Bosnian Muslim population and its forces, under attack from both Serb as well as Croat forces. Additionally, the UN arms embargo was a major disadvantage for the Bosnian attempt to

defend itself. Iran came in with aid to the besieged Bosniak forces through supply of weapons and advisers. But eventually, under the terms of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the bulk of the foreign mujahideen had to move out. It has been noted that the Bosnian conflict gave the Arab fighters from post-Soviet Afghanistan a war theatre to test their skills in European conditions and also were able to motivate a new generation of pan-Islamic militia groups. From there it is easy to extrapolate the links to the current radicalization of youth in Europe (Kohlmann 2002).

Then there were al-Qaeda's activities in Iraq, which led to a sectarian and bloody war, the sources of which have not dried up until now, with jihadi activity being actively stoked by what is known as the 'Islamic state'. This is a new step in the path of the renewal of jihad across the world -- that of removing borders. The Islamic State joined the cities of Mosul in Iraq and Deir al-Zour in Syria to form the nucleus of a national state with an Islamic flavour aimed at reviving the Islamic Caliphate. Individuals who do not owe allegiance, loyalty and obedience to the new Khalifa Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, were to be considered apostates who must be killed wherever they are to be found.

Every since the 1979-1989 war in Afghanistan, terrorist groups continue to use jihad as legitimate justification for all the activities they carry out. The past three decades have witnessed several revivals and reproductions in the global jihadi movement under different names and under various leaders. But they all revolve around the idea of formation of the Caliphate – the ideal state. Even though jihad provided the catalyst for the core doctrine of all these groups and organizations, it is one of many other. Another significant provided them with a fertile environment for growth. These organizations came up in the wake of failed states that had undergone armed conflicts and wars, political violence, human rights violations and military coups. The organizations wasted no time in exploiting situations where there was a security, political or military vacuum and rushed in to lay the groundwork in those areas as a first step that would guarantee its subsequent growth so that it may execute its agendas. Hotbeds of conflict seen in the Islamic world today serve as testament of the success of this tactic. Let us look at the disastrous situation in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Afghanistan and other countries, in which these groups operate sowing death and destruction, and leading to displacement of populations.

My focus in this thesis is on analysing the circumstances that support the growth of terrorist groups, and which enable them to continue in a perpetual state of renewal very similar to the

rebranding of corporate brands, by trying to answer the following question: **Why do terrorist groups continue to grow anew while they are in a state of permanent renewal?**

Through studying the historical background of the evolution of the concept of jihad and the diversity of jihadist movements and the circumstances in which they were born, I arrived at a hypothesis that will be tested in this thesis in order to answer the question posed above. This hypothesis can be articulated as follows: **The fragility of states in the Middle East and the lack of full integration by Muslim immigrants into Western society are largely responsible for the success of violent jihadi projects.**

I would like to clarify the point that this thesis does not deny the point of view which says that religion is an important and central factor in stimulating these groups to exercise their Jihadi activities. This school of thought, which seeks an explanation of why terrorist groups continue to grow, based on religious text and the Jihadi doctrine is true and no one can deny this rationale. But what I'm trying to do through this thesis is to focus on the role of areas of conflict and fragile states in providing the appropriate environment for the growth of such groups.

The point which I shall rely on to support my point of view is that the doctrine of violent jihad has existed for decades. If we take the example of the jihadist thought of Hassan al-Banna in the concept of the emergence of the Islamic state and its liberation from colonialism and the creation of a military force aimed at reviving jihad, we find that they are ideas that strayed one way or the other due to lack of implementation. At one point, the Muslim Brotherhood did attempt to form a special forces group, but conditions were not conducive to turning these ideas into operations on the ground. This doctrine remained as a mere idea until the appropriate climate was found. By the appropriate climate I mean areas of conflict, war, sectarian and ethnic violence, and situations where states are occupied, especially those with the status of countries in the Muslim world such as Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. This leads us to think in terms of the need to work on minimising these scenarios as a first step in preventing these jihadi groups from accessing areas of conflict. A second step would be to work to find effective solutions to these conflicts and disputes through political and peaceful means based on reconciliation, consultation and mutual understanding. The current scenario calls for a radical solution to mitigate conflict zones and a drying up of the sources nurturing these groups.

During my thesis and preparation process in writing this paper, I was firmly convinced about the role of Muslim communities in terms of moving forward towards political and social integration as a parallel project to counter the phenomenon of the violent jihadist tide towards Europe. But the urgent need to answer an important question before delving into the characteristics of such a project presented itself. Do these communities really believe in the concept of integration as a methodology that can be relied upon to neutralise the religious legitimacy claimed by Islamist groups? Do they really seek to integrate? But I discovered an even more important step in advancing this particular project amidst Muslim communities. Is it possible for these communities to first recognize that the religious justification derived from the interpretations of scholars and preachers is an important factor in legitimizing the work of these Islamist groups, and that we, therefore, urgently need a comprehensive review of all of this content that has been disseminated over centuries based on self-criticism and distancing ourselves from the reverence these scholars seem to command? From here we can begin, by first answering this question. I foresee that the answer will be very difficult and will need many detailed case studies and in-depth research on the viability of Muslim societies in Europe and the Muslim world to engage in self-criticism in order to rid itself of the state of divinity in which they are trapped, and which prevents them from using reason and logic without being dragged towards a state of religious mania whipped up by scholars who see themselves as the light of God on earth and who are worthy of blind obedience in their interpretations. It suffices at this stage in my thesis to try to extend an open call as an experimental step in this project that calls for the Muslim communities in general, both in the Islamic world and in Europe, to look at themselves and to admit with courage that it bears responsibility in one way or another for a large part of that legitimacy claimed by those Islamist groups. It is the ignorance of these communities in matters of religious thought and its obsession with the world of Fatwa as enshrined by some sheikhs, preachers and jurists that prevent individual Muslims to think for themselves. The jihadi groups count on this to perpetuate their grip over the community.

II. **Disposition:**

In this thesis paper, I have tried to offer an analysis and evaluation of the circumstances that support the growth of terrorist groups by studying the historical background of the evolution of the concept of jihad and the diversity of jihadist movements. Here are brief overviews of my thesis as seen from the perspective of each section of this paper.

In the Historical Background section, I have examined the doctrine of jihad from the view point of ideas revived in the early twentieth century by Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, and how this doctrine assumed the form of organised operations in military style. In the paper, I have highlighted the key role of Services Office in inspiring fighters heading to Afghanistan and in expanding the scope of their operations to include Islamic jihad to other parts of the world. In this section, I have presented the main points of the doctrine of 'jihad' and the link between the doctrine of jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the emergence of the "Islamic State" as a formidable force.

In a series of literature review, I have looked at the role played by fragile or failed states in formulating the brand of transnational terror unleashed by Osama Bin Laden. I have also brought to fore the issues of integration of Muslim immigrants in Europe, and how they are pitted against the values and the prejudices of the host societies. The debate about Islam's compatibility with Western values, and the claim of an ideological war between Islam and the West are interesting aspect of literary observations. Through the reviews, I have examined whether there are any prospects of a reconciliation of Islam and the West and what implications, if at all, are there for possible Muslim integration.

In the Theoretical framework highlighted the role of fragile states in the scheme of things, I have presented through this paper the emergence of the main dilemmas that are of significant consequence in the integration of immigrant communities in Europe and of Muslim communities in particular. My effort has been to point to the fact that the communities in the fragile states have tried to escape harsh reality of their countries to search for countries that can guarantee them a decent living, security and peace. In this thesis paper, I have explained how the waves of migration have contributed to making the fragile states more fragile and prone to a situation of complete collapse.

In methodology, I have utilised the Fragile States Index, an annual ranking of 178 states based on their levels of stability and the amount of pressure they face, to study the patterns of trans-border terrorism and the spread of Islamic jihad in recent years. This thesis paper has also made use of the Global Terrorism Index of 2014 as a means of pin-pointing the core issues related to jihadist movements. I have also attempted in this thesis to present opinion pieces, thesis and studies which revolve around the subject, by referring to global events related to terrorism, as well as the Hijab debate in France, the prohibition of minarets in Switzerland, and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris.

In key findings of this thesis paper, I have identified that there is a strategy according to which violent jihadi groups reinvent themselves and thereby renew the call for the emergence of an Islamic state. I have also expressed the view that it is the grim reality that these groups have reached a point of no return, as reflected in the emergence of a "real state" carrying the name of the 'Islamic Caliphate' in the border region between Iraq and Syria.

In this thesis paper, I have identified the reasons driving many Muslim and non-Muslim communities to migrate to developed countries. I have pointed out that the issue of the integration of immigrants in the European community is paramount due to the wide gaps between the religions, cultural beliefs and societal behaviours. I have also pointed out in this thesis paper the opportunity offered by History towards mutual recognition of Muslim and Western societies. In this endeavour, it has been my effort to highlight the mistakes made by some members of European communities in taking a generalized view of the situation and holding all members of Muslim communities primarily responsible for the death and violence by some terrorist groups.

III. Historical Background

Catalyst Element: The 'Jihad'

Since the arrival of fighters in Afghanistan in 1980 to participate in the war against the Soviet Union or "the Holy War" as it was known, the doctrine of 'jihad' began to acquire systematic features. Consequently, from being just a set of ideas revived in the early twentieth century by Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, this doctrine assumed the form of organised operations, carried out in perfect military style.

Such groups regarded 'jihad' as a deep religious concept that could be used to defeat the Great Powers. The ouster of the Soviets from Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union were seen by some as actual proof of the effectiveness of this jihadist approach in the "liberation of peoples". This was good enough reason to convince all the fighters arriving in Afghanistan from several regions of the Islamic world, and especially from the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East, to embrace this principle. More importantly, in Afghanistan, these were the first signs of a surge of fighters who believed in 'jihad' as a transnational approach. This trend was represented by the organization of al-Qaeda, which was founded by Osama Bin Laden, a young man from Saudi Arabia.

What is known as Services Office (Maktab Al Khidmat MAK) played an important role in feeding the fighters heading to Afghanistan to fight there, since it worked as a sort of guesthouse for the fighters who were subsequently called "the Afghan Arabs". This office worked in the Pakistani city of Peshawar, bordering Afghanistan, as a military camp to recruit soldiers for the Afghan war front. This office, which was founded by the spiritual father of the fighters in Afghanistan, Abdullah Azzam, worked for the establishment of a network of recruitment offices all over the world, including the United States.(Roth, Greenburg, and Wille, n.d.)

Although many leaders of these groups agreed that 'jihad' as a doctrine represented the only way to rescue the community, the nature of this relationship was threatened by tension between the pioneers of this systematic set of ideas. With the end of the Soviet military mission in Afghanistan, some jihadists expanded the scope of their operations to include the extension of the Islamic jihad to other parts of the world, such as Israel and Kashmir. To achieve these ambitions several overlapping and interrelated organizations were formed, including al-Qaeda, which was formed by Osama Bin Laden in the initial meeting that was held on 11 August 1988. Bin Laden wished to carry out non-military operations in other regions of the world. On the contrary, Abdullah Azzam

wanted to continue focusing on military campaigns. After the assassination of Azzam in 1989, the Services Office was closed and many joined Bin Laden's organization.

The differences between Abdullah Azzam and Osama Bin Laden were clear indications of the sharp and irreversible differences between these two poles. This separation was one cause, among others, of the crucial rift that would have affected the militant groups in Afghanistan.

Abdullah Azzam adopted a concept of 'jihad' based on its fundamentalist and traditional interpretation, calling for the restoration of lands that were once under Muslim rule such as Palestine or areas under Soviet rule, and even southern Spain, which was under Islamic rule five centuries ago. In sharp contrast to this approach, Bin Laden believed it was necessary to overthrow all the governments in the Islamic world that he dubbed as "Apostate Governments". This concept was, however, rejected by Azzam and his followers because they thought that this could cause strife among Muslims.

Main points of the doctrine of 'jihad':

'Jihad' worked as a catalyst to attract Muslim youth to join these groups, which aimed to promote and revitalize themselves with an emphasis on the importance of the liberation of the Islamic community. During the twentieth century these Islamic groups played an important role in the formation of the jihadist extremist ideology, and these personalities played a vital role in the promotion of the concept of the 'jihad' as a systematic operation, starting from the revival and the promotion of this trend by the leader and the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, Hasan al-Banna, eventually culminating in fatwas issued by Abdullah Azzam to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Abdullah Azzam: known as the spiritual father of this modern trend of global 'jihad', acquired his education in Islamic law and philosophy in the universities of Amman and Damascus and in the Egyptian University of Al-Azhar, one of the oldest universities in the world and the most famous in the Islamic world. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Azzam was one of the first Arabs to reach Pakistan to help the jihadists. Azzam issued a fatwa calling for 'jihad' against the Soviets, declaring that it was the individual duty of every Muslim who could afford it because it was a defensive 'jihad' against the invaders.(Bruce Riedel 2011)

Azzam travelled all over the world, including America, urging Muslims to join "the caravan of jihad" in Afghanistan. He developed the idea that Muslims had to engage truthfully in a global

'jihad' against their enemies, especially Russia and then America. Azzam wrote dozens of articles and books to glorify the need for a global battle against the enemies of Islam. His works also glorify the suicide bombings and martyrdoms, and the basic elements of the tactics of al-Qaeda. These included a list of the disciples of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of the organization of al-Qaeda in Iraq (Bruce Riedel 2011) . They specifically had a significant role in the establishment of a second generation of jihadist currents. In the subsequent sections, the effects of these two figures in the growth of the extremist jihadist groups will be reviewed.

Abdullah Azzam had a very charismatic personality that attracted many admirers around the Arab and Muslim world, and his books gained much popularity among the enthusiastic young Muslims engaged in 'jihad'. Abdullah Azzam laid the foundations of the al-Qaeda movement and the war in Afghanistan, and served as a spiritual mentor of Osama Bin Laden. In late November and early December 1989, al-Qaeda was founded on the basis of the idea ("Solid base") developed by Azzam and mentioned for the first time in an article he wrote and published in the monthly "al-Jihad" (April 1988). Later, Osama Bin Laden declared in Peshawar that this organization (Maliach, n.d.) was founded and that Azzam, the ideological founder of the organization of al-Qaeda, was assassinated in a car bombing whose blast was detonated by a remote control in Peshawar. It is not certain who killed him (Aryn Baker 2009).

Osama Bin Laden: Azzam met Bin Laden in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in 1980, when Azzam was studying in a Saudi university, where their relationship started (Bruce Riedel 2011). Bin Laden travelled to Afghanistan in 1984, in response to the calls for 'jihad' issued by his spiritual mentor Abdullah Azzam, to participate in the Islamic holy war against the Soviet occupation forces. Bin Laden came from a Saudi family that had large fortunes and financed the war in Afghanistan and provided leadership for more than 20,000 fighters recruited from all over the world (Telegraph 2012). Bin Laden developed his political belief during study at King Abdulaziz University in late 1970, and became a follower of Abdullah Azzam, the spiritual leader that believed that it was an obligation for all Muslims to engage in 'jihad' to found a single Islamic State. This idea had significant impact on young Muslims like Bin Laden, who was always critical of what he saw as the growing Western influence on life in the Middle East. With the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces, Azzam and Bin Laden travelled to Peshawar in Pakistan to join the battle. They did not become fighters by themselves, but they employed their prayers and their extensive contacts in the Middle East to gain financial and moral support for the jihadists. They also encouraged young people to migrate from all over the Middle East region to take part in the Afghan

Jihad, and together they founded the organization's Services Office which served as the headquarters of the global jihadists(Staff 2009).

Ayman al-Zawahiri: Al-Zawahiri was engaged in the activities of political Islam movements since an early age when he was still in school, and the foundations of his radical ideas were formed by his admiration for al-Sayyid Qutb. He was arrested at the age of fifteen for having joined the banned Muslim Brotherhood. The political activities of al-Zawahiri did not prevent him from studying medicine at Cairo University, from which he graduated in 1974 and earned a Master's Degree in Surgery after four years. Later, he founded a medical clinic in a suburb of Cairo but he soon started to gravitate toward radical Islamic groups that were calling for the overthrow of the Egyptian government. He joined the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group since its foundation in 1973. In 1981 he was arrested for being one of the suspects who assassinated the Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat. Despite his acquittal in the case of the assassination of Sadat, he was convicted for the possession of illegal weapons and was sentenced to a term of three years. Following his release in 1985, he left for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Shortly thereafter, he went to Peshawar in Pakistan and, at a later date, to neighbouring Afghanistan, where he established a faction of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Movement (Jayshree Bajoria 2011).

The cooperation between al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden began in 1980 in the city of Peshawar, where al-Zawahiri was working for the Red Crescent Association (Jayshree Bajoria 2011). In 1998 al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden announced the formation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. Al-Zawahiri officially merged his movement, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, with the network of al-Qaeda of Bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri was accused, along with Osama Bin Laden, by the United States of the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. He was sentenced to death in absentia, by the Egyptian Court, for an alleged plot to blow up the US embassy in Albania("Ayman Al-Zawahiri Fast Facts - CNN.com" 2015). With Bin Laden getting killed by US forces in Pakistan in early May 2011, al-Qaeda announced that it would continue to fight the "holy war" against the United States and Israel under the directions of the new leader al-Zawahiri "until all invading armies would leave the land of Islam" (BBC Report 2014).

The doctrine of Jihad for the Muslim Brotherhood:
In 1936, Sheikh Hassan al-Banna sent a letter to King Farouk and to Mustafa al-Nahhas, the Egyptian Prime Minister, inviting them to take the path of Islam, its foundations, its rules and its civilization, and to stay away from the West, its way of life, its systems and curricula. According to

the view of Sheikh Hasan al-Banna, this letter was a plan to "save the general situation of Egypt and the rest of the Islamic world" as part of efforts to consecrate the principle of rule according to Islam.

The action plan submitted by the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood can be divided into three levels. The first level included political, judicial and administrative aspects, since this level contained 10 goals to achieve reform. In this regard, Sheikh Hasan al-Banna saw the need to cancel all political parties and to redirect all efforts to form a united front that would help to achieve the Renaissance of Egypt, strengthen the armed forces, increase the number of young people and inspire their enthusiasm, spreading among them the foundations of the Islamic Jihad. Second level includes aspects of social life and daily practices, that were identified as 30 steps to help improving the overall social status and progress of society, an example of this: people should respect public morals: this ought to be the object of special attention; to strongly condemns attacks on public mores and morality. In addition to censor theatre production and films; to be severe in approving films and combat foreign customs (in the realm of vocabulary, customs , dress, nursing) and to Egyptianize all of these (on finds these customs among the will-to-do members of society); Third level includes the economic and development side by subtracting 10 goals contribute to the improving of the economic situation of the country. (Mitchell 1993).

The viewpoint of Sheikh Hassan al-Banna can be summarized in the concept of liberation of the Islamic nation from all foreign authorities, and the establishment of a free Islamic state in this free nation. Al-Banna believed that the Islamic world had the full right to govern itself in accordance with its religious principles, whose legitimacy was based on the Quran and the Sunnah. Therefore, he believed it was necessary to get rid of any Western influence in all the aspects of the public life of Muslims, including the political, economic and intellectual fields. Al-Banna devoted his life to strengthening his point of view through many books and letters to ensure the continuity of these thoughts regarding the Islamic nation. Among them there are "twenty principles to understand Islam", in which he showed that Islam is a comprehensive system dealing with several aspects and based on the concepts of strength, mercy and justice. He viewed Islam as a culture, and a law or the science of jurists, and 'jihad' as an idea based on the doctrine of honesty and true worship.

Discourse establishing an advanced stage of 'jihad':
Al-Banna's letter represents the infrastructure upon which the Muslim Brotherhood consecrated the idea of liberating the nation from Western domination and colonial control. These main points were also the reference upon which Abdullah Azzam based the fatwa that he issued to

call for the 'jihad' against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and that was followed by Osama Bin Laden, al-Zarqawi and al-Zawahiri.

When dealing with the doctrine of 'jihad' in the view of the Muslim Brotherhood, one must not only keep in mind that this association laid the foundations of the principle of 'jihad' which was subsequently inherited by the jihadist extremist groups, but also that the important leaders of the organizations that were previously mentioned were indeed members of the group of the Muslim Brothers, such as Abdullah Azzam in Palestine, al-Zawahiri in Egypt, and before them al-SayyidQutb, who strongly influenced al-Zawahiri in the formation of his ideas and beliefs.

The doctrine of 'jihad' for the Muslim Brothers can be summarized by the slogan adopted by the group in the beginning of its activities, that is "Prepare yourselves", meaning that the Muslims had to be as ready, organized and prepared as possible. But the question remained: prepared for what, when, where and how?

As a matter of fact, the Muslim Brotherhood believes in the inevitability of the days of confrontation between Islam and the Muslims on the one hand and the infidels, Jews and the Crusaders, as they are usually called by the leaders of the extremist organizations, on the other. Consequently, they rely on this slogan to spread enthusiasm and courage among their following ranks in order to prepare them for the days of the expected big battle.

This intellectual reference makes it easier for many of those involved in the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood to integrate themselves easily into the ranks of extremist groups under the label of 'jihad', which is considered the only possible way for the liberation of society and men's soul on the basis that they will gain the Paradise and the virgins as a result of such actions. Thus, these extremist groups train and prepare secretly and wait for the moment in which there will be a security or power vacuum and they will exploit the chance to emerge.

These groups thrive on crisis to implement their plans, as this is what happened in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Libya and Egypt. Syria is the best proof of the practical application of the principle "Prepare yourselves". I will provide in the following chapter a detailed explanation of the role played by crisis in providing suitable environment for the emergence of these groups. As for the emergence of radical movements in other countries that do not suffer from crisis, they won't

hesitate a moment in the event of disruption, state of imbalance or security vacuum to tighten their grip on power, and if necessary also by force.

Al-Zarqawi and the first attempt to establish a state:

Al-Zarqawi has been described by CNN as a "lone wolf" who carried out his activities independently from the network of the organization of al-Qaeda.(Michel Chossudovsky 2015). The experts, who conducted interviews with his comrades in prison and with some of his previous acquaintances, reported that he spent his time in prison focusing on religious thought. Shortly after his release, he went looking for jihadist groups in Jordan. In early 1989, al-Zarqawi moved to Afghanistan, hoping to join the fight against the Soviet occupation. He spent most of the time in Peshawar, where he adopted the Salafi extremist approach, and the experts said this represented a fuel for his hostility towards the Shiite Islamic governments and moderate Muslims. Al-Zarqawi's first steps intersected with Osama Bin Laden, and they worked together on the foundation of the jihadist groups to initiate the global "holy war". Experts say that al-Zarqawi repeatedly refused to join the al-Qaeda organization of Bin Laden. Apparently, al-Zarqawi might not have met or responded to the insistence of Bin Laden on targeting the "far enemy" and the United States. Instead, al-Zarqawi directed his hostility towards Israel and the Jews in general, and towards Jordan because of his imprisonment in the mid-1990s. Al-Zarqawi formed a group called "Unity and Jihad" or "Al Tawheed wa Al Jihad". "Unity and Jihad" group was financed in the beginning by the Afghan Taliban government, and focused its efforts on the training of suicide bombers in a number of camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan(Lee Hudson Teslik 2006).

Osama Bin Laden had a great influence and a strong effect on those who attended the training camps "Afghan Arabs" in the country under the control of the Taliban, as he derived his legitimacy and prestige from the money he possessed, being one of the wealthiest Arab families in Afghanistan. Conversely, al-Zarqawi was seeking to establish a special training camp in the Afghan city of Herat with his followers, who were released with amnesty from the Jordanian prison at an earlier time. Bin Laden gave his support with small amounts of money, which lasted until 9/11. Al-Zarqawi was based on the other side of Afghanistan, and his operations were very different, and sometimes interfered with the agenda of the organization of al-Qaeda. Bin Laden tried to make al-Zarqawi join the organization through a request of allegiance (oath of religious loyalty), but this offer was repeatedly rejected by al-Zarqawi (Y.Zelin 2003)

The emergence of the "Islamic State" by al-Zarqawi:

After the invasion of Iraq, al-Zarqawi became a household name due to a spate of beheadings and suicide bombings against Shiite religious targets and Sunni civilians, and other operations. As a result of this reputation, many fighters expressed the desire to join him. There was a real need in the group to have a greater access to the resources to continue and expand the scope of their operations. Moreover, the strong desire of Bin Laden to annex the jihadist group in Iraq, all these dynamics made al-Zarqawi succumb to the desire of Bin Laden, and after eight months of negotiations al-Zarqawi declared in the magazine, Al-Battar Training Camp[1] "MuaskarTadrib al-Batar" in October 2014 "his pledge of allegiance and loyalty to Osama Bin Laden", and renamed his group as 'Organization of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia' or as the organization of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and al-Zarqawi won the title of "Prince of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia"..

In 2005, al-Zawahiri sent a letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in which he planned to present his proposal to take control of Iraq after the evacuation of the US forces(Brian Whitaker 2005). In this letter, Ayman al-Zawahiri presented his four-stage plan starting with the control of Iraq, indicating that 'jihad' in Iraq required several additional goals summed up in four steps(al-Zawahiri 2005).

According to al-Zawahiri, the first step was to expel the Americans from Iraq. The second step was the establishment of an Islamic Emirate, developing it to the level of a caliphate to fill the vacuum that could have resulted from the expulsion of Americans and the missed opportunity by non-Muslims to seize power in Iraq. According to al-Zarqawi, there was no doubt that such an Emirate would enter into a fierce conflict with the foreign forces and with those supporting the occupying forces. It would have put them in a state of constant preoccupation making it impossible to establish a stable state and creating the chance to announce the Caliphate, keeping the Jihadist group in a permanent state of war, until the occupying forces are eliminated. As for the third step, this was the extension of the wave of 'jihad' to those secular states near Iraq. The fourth step was a conflict with Israel, as Israel was the last obstacle to the formation of a new Islamic entity.

The letter of al-Zawahiri and the another one of Sheikh Atiyyah Al Libi – one of the most important theorists of the organization of al-Qaeda – reflect the frustration that started to grow in al-Qaeda because of the continuing abuses of al-Zarqawi, as Sheikh Atiyyah Al Libi advised the necessity of mitigating violence and abuse in the enforcement of the law, because this was detrimental to the long-term goals of the global jihadist project. Nevertheless al-Zarqawi ignored

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[1]A Magazine Published by the Military Committee of the Mujahideen in the Arabian Peninsula.

both the suggestions. In 2006, al-Zarqawi held alliances with many other jihadist factions in Iraq and founded what was known as "The Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC)", which gained much clout after the assassination of al-Zarqawi on 7 June 2006.

Several months after the killing of al-Zarqawi, the Council issued a declaration called "Declaration for the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq", in which Abu Hamza al-Muhajir – who took over the leadership of the organization of al-Qaeda in Iraq after the killing of Abu al Zarqawi – pledged his allegiance to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, who had by then come to be known as the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq. Later, after the killing of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the leadership of the Islamic State in Iraq was taken over by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the head of ISIS/ ISIL. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi took charge, refusing to pledge allegiance to the organization of al-Qaeda(Y.Zelin 2003).

IV. Literature Review

The Core of Crisis: The Iraqi and Syrian crises have created hotbeds of conflicts that have become fertile ground for the growth of terrorist groups. This widening arc of terror from war-ravaged Iraq to Syria could potentially pose real threats to the region and the rest of the world.

The problem regions and countries where terrorism runs deep are not hard to find nor is it difficult to understand the reasons behind the growth of such insurgencies. The Global Terrorism Index 2014: 'Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism', which covers the 14 years from 2000 till 2013, reveals that over 80 per cent of the lives lost to terrorist activity in 2013 occurred in only five countries -- Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. The majority of deaths were the result of terrorist attacks, as much as 66 per cent in 2013, by four terrorist organizations -- Islamic State, Boko Haram, the Taliban and Al Qaida and its affiliates. The Index's findings point to the fact that religious ideology is a key motivation for terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa, the MENA region and South Asia. In the rest of the world, the raison d'être for terror is more likely to be driven by political or nationalistic and separatist movements.

Fragile states

The problem is compounded as many Arab and Muslim countries affected by violent jihad and terrorist activity are also characterized as failed states. Ever since the September 11 attacks in the US and the rise of Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan, the link between transnational terror networks and the role of failed states in facilitating global acts of terror is being studied. It should be noted that these countries have not collapsed completely, in spite of the nomenclature, but have lost control over large swathes of territory. They therefore cannot provide security to citizens, are internally divided by sectarian tensions and attrition, and at the same time exert authoritarian control over its citizens.

Definition of state fragility: Some experts tend to use the term 'fragile states' instead of 'failed states'. This approach ensures that instead of focusing on the nomenclature, the effort would be to address the root of the problem, taking steps to mitigate the causes.

Alexandra Lewis, while analyzing criminal violence in Yemen, had listed some main manifestations that underpin state fragility – lack of territorial control, poor legitimacy, authority-based weaknesses, and a lack of service delivery, particularly in relation to law enforcement and security delivery(Alexandra Lewis 2013).

Graziella Bertocchi and Andrea Guerzoni associated state fragility with various combinations of the following dysfunctions: inability to provide basic services and meet vital needs, unstable and weak governance, persistent and extreme poverty, lack of territorial control, and high propensity to conflict and civil war.(Bertocchi and Guerzoni 2010).

Fragile State Index: When discussing state fragility, the concept has been largely framed with a focus on the debate centred around economic development. For the purposes of studying the patterns of transnational terror, and the spread of Islamic jihad in recent times, it would be more useful to examine the last available international classification on the subject. The Fragile States Index is an annual ranking of 178 nations based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face.

As per the Fragile States Index 2014 (earlier called Failed States Index), the following Arab and Muslim countries affected by violent jihad occupied the top end of the list: Somalia, Sudan were at the Very High Alert category with scores of 112.6 and 110.1 respectively out of 120. In the High Alert category were: Afghanistan (106.5), Yemen (105.4), Pakistan (103.0), Iraq (102.2) and Syria (101.6). Failed or fragile states posed a danger to international security because they produce conditions under which transnational terrorist groups could thrive. These states could be used to plan, execute, support and finance terrorist organizations.

The 2014 Fragile States Index, the tenth edition of the annual Index, comprised data collected between January 1, 2013, and December 31, 2013. The lower the score in the Fragile States Index (FSI), the better. Therefore, a reduced score indicated an improvement, just as a higher score indicates greater instability. FSI methodology distilled millions of pieces of information about the existing social, economic and political pressures faced by each country that it analyzed into a form that was relevant, easily digestible and informative, using its proprietary Conflict Assessment Software Tool (CAST) analytical platform. Data from three primary sources were triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI. Applying highly specialized search parameters, scores were apportioned for every country based on the following 12 indicators of 2 category: First, political and military, Second social and economic indicators (which in turn include over 100 sub-indicators):

Social and Economic Indicators -- Demographic pressures, Refugees and IDPs, Uneven economic development, Group grievance, Human flight and brain drain, and Poverty and economic decline.

Political and military indicators -- State legitimacy, Public services, Human rights and the rule of law, Security apparatus, Factionalised elites and External intervention (Haken et al. 2014).

When studying the Islamic jihad and the brand of transnational terror unleashed by Osama Bin Laden, one can perceive the role played by fragile or failed states in formulating and facilitating his strategy.

Sudan for instance, the country in the Very High Alert category with scores of 112.6 on the Fragile States Index 2014, was the first place Bin Laden traveled to in 1991 after the war with Soviet forces. He spent the crucial five years in Sudan along with his foreign fighters of the Afghan war, until he was expelled in 1996 for his involvement in the east Africa embassy bombings(Astill 2001).

The existing literature on failed states or fragile states provide enough clues to what is happening in terms of terrorist violence and its propagation across borders, sectarian strife and frightening human toll at present in large parts of the Middle East from Iraq to Syria and now Yemen.

Dominic Lisanti examined the subject of failed states and their propensity to breed terrorists. He had focused on terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1996 and 2007, and used both a quantitative and a fuzzy set of qualitative approach and compared the results. In both models, repression by the state and militarized conflict proved to be crucial predictors of terrorism.(Lisanti 2010).

On the other hand, the ties between state failure or democracy and terrorism remained ambiguous. A rise in probability of terrorist acts was linked to a rise in state-sponsored abuse of its citizens. Along with this, countries that were engaged in military dispute were likely to face an increase in terrorism.

While terrorism and political violence could not be equated, and were not the same, they were linked to conflict. Figures examined showed a strong link between state repression and terrorism. There was also a significant link between military conflicts and terrorism, but not as significant as that between state repression and terrorism.

In all cases, lack of conflict was a causal condition leading to low terrorism. High repression combined with militarized conflicts provided the baseline conditions for a variety of different paths

to high terrorism. Addressing the main question of state failure and rise in terrorism, the study, when restricted in time and space, did not substantiate such a link. The answer, according to the study, was yes and no. Yes, in some sense that in the fuzzy set qualitative approach, all the instances of state failure were accompanied by high rates of terrorism, but all the instances of state failure were also accompanied by conflict and repression. No, from the statistical models and a close examination of the cases because we know that at certain times, failed states do not have higher rates of terrorism. To the extent that state failure was accompanied by other potentially negative conditions it was related to high terrorism, but it was not sufficient in-and-of itself (Lisanti 2010).

According to James A. Piazza, states plagued by chronic state failures are more likely to host terrorist groups that commit trans-national attacks, have their nationals commit transnational attacks, and are potentially targeted by transnational terrorists themselves. The relationship between state failure and transnational terrorism was scrutinized. Failed and failing states are characterized by the lack of ability to project power internally. These countries provide the wherewithal for terror groups to organize, train, generate revenue and set up logistics and communications. Terrorist groups are able to develop their own capabilities with little governmental control or scrutiny – a phenomenon termed as the exploitation of 'stateless areas'. Groups which plan to launch transnational attacks tend to use the autonomous space in failed or failing states to organize their logistical and training activity without having to evade the law. Another advantage for terrorist groups is that in such circumstances they can draw on a large pool of potential recruits from within such failed states. On the other hand, it has been argued by others that failed states made for a poor location for foreign terrorists planning clandestine operations. The chaotic conditions inside such countries could adversely affect terrorists themselves(Piazza 2008).

Using the 2006 Failed States Index, the study found that countries categorized as the highest-at-risk for state failure ("Alert") were on average most frequently the location of terrorist attacks; most frequently the source of transnational attacks abroad. States experiencing intense state failures are statistically more likely to be the targets of attacks and are more likely to have their nationals commit attacks overseas. The results of the study showed the linear relationship between intensity and pervasiveness of state failure and transnational terrorism.

In the study, all types of state failures are linked to transnational attacks. All types of state failures are found to be positively associated with transnational attacks. The study supports the argument that states experiencing governability challenges are more prone to terrorism. Established,

homogenous regimes governing small populations while not being engaged in international war are less likely to be the source or target of transnational terrorism. The focus of the war on terror should be to address the problem of failed and failing states.

Piazza in an earlier study had advocated that "social cleavage theory" was better equipped to explain terrorism than were theories that link terrorism to poor economic development. He found that contrary to popular opinion, no significant relationship between any of the measures of economic development and terrorism could be determined. The direction of anti-terrorism policy should take into consideration the danger posed by poor and more developed divided societies posed to international security(Piazza 2006).

Muslims in EU

While the whole world has been focused on the turmoil in the Middle East and the new threat posed by the extreme violence touted by ISIS, the ideological battle of violent jihad is seeping in as well as being ostensibly sown effectively in Western Europe for more than a decade now. The increasingly daring attacks by Islamist jihadists and their followers and sympathizers in Western European cities in recent years and ever since the September 11 attacks in the US, have brought to the fore the condition of the rising population of Muslim immigrants and issues of integration in their adopted homeland, and pitted them ostensibly against the values and the prejudices of host societies, much to the chagrin of analysts and policymakers. The danger signs very well point to the fact that another much larger front to what is happening in the Middle East is being opened up by those masterminding the philosophy of Islamist terror and global dominance.

Luring much larger forces into a long-drawn war designed to bleed them dry was the core strategy pursued by Osama Bin Laden and his cohorts. The alienated, disenchanted and disgruntled elements in the large Muslim immigrant communities in European cities could very well be the stand-bearers of this new battlefront if the drift in Europe is allowed to continue.

But in the existing literature about the situation in the West, especially in Western Europe, whether it is in media analysis, in-depth comparative studies or surveys, a much more clearer and optimistic picture emerges with practical solutions laid out. Some of it presents new hope in ways unimaginable in the midst of the negative messages in the popular narrative.

Between Destination and Origins

To what extent do migrants carry their culture with them, and to what extent do they acquire the culture of their new home? Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris explored the answers to these questions as it would help us know to what extent cultural values endure and whether they are individual traits or derived from society(Norris and Inglehart 2012).

The research design and the empirical evidence used in this study, drew upon the World Values Survey/European Values Study (WVS/EVS) dataset, from 1981-2007. The study compared two types of societies: ORIGINS (Islamic Countries of Origin for Muslim migrants, comprising 20 nations with plurality Muslim populations) and DESTINATIONS (Western Countries of Destination for Muslim migrants, comparing 22 OECD member states with Protestant or Roman Catholic majority populations).

Alternate arguments of cultural integration and divergence in the backdrop about the experience of migration and cultural change and its potential consequences were examined. Inglehart and Norris focus on four important indicators, analyzing attitudes towards Gender equality, sexual liberalization, and comparing religious values and democratic attitudes. The analysis showed that the basic values of Muslims in the West were more or less mid-way between the dominant values prevailing within their countries of destination and origin. The result pointed to the fact that migrants in Europe are in the process of adapting to the host cultures, while continuing to hold on to values from their original countries of origin. The study also shows that living within an Islamic or Western society had a major impact on values than individual-level religious identities, irrespective of an individual's education, age, gender and income, lending support to the integration theory.

Inglehart and Norris agree that cultural cleavages exit, but they are not monolithic. Evidence from the WVS/EVS (1999-2001) indicate that while religious traditions have historically shaped national cultures, today their impact is transmitted mainly through nation-wide institutions, to the population as a whole. This suggests that Muslims are not exceptionally resistant in levels of integration, as some studies show. Inglehart and Norris point out that cultural differences are a potential fault line that demagogues can exploit to inflame hatred between groups. But there is nothing inevitable about cultural conflict(Norris and Inglehart 2012).

The Rooted Tension

Toni Johnson focused on the heightened tension between Western European nations and their Muslim populations as a result of several happenings in the last few years, namely the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London attacks, the 2004 head scarf ban and the 2011 ban of the 'burqa' in France, 2005 Paris attacks, the 2006 Dutch cartoon protests and several prominent killings. Johnson noted that the Muslim population has been growing, and after the 9/11 attacks in the US, the community and religion have been at the centre of debate on subjects such as immigration policy, cultural identity and security. The July 2001 massacre in Norway by Breivik in protest against 'Islamization' and multiculturalism served only to highlight this tension in Europe(Johnson 2011).

Johnson cited other analysts to illustrate that Western Europe's Muslims are generally not well integrated into the society and are often at odds with European values as exemplified by the closed ethnic areas, high crime rates, calls for sharia law and wearing of the veil. Fears about a looming population shift towards Islam and issues of Muslim assimilation serve to focus on the further split between the Muslim citizens and the states in Europe. It was during the rebuilding following World War II that immigration in Western Europe swelled and more immigrants came in to meet the needs of growth, for reunification with family or as asylum seekers. Issues of race and ethnicity came up following this influx. By 2009, European Union had 18.5 million non-EU nationals and 8 million illegal immigrants. In 2008, France had the largest number of Muslims at 8 per cent of the population, followed by the Netherlands at 6 per cent, Germany at 4 per cent and the UK at 3 per cent. In some EU cities, Muslims crossed 20 per cent of the population.

According to Johnson, integration and assimilation posed many problems for Muslims. Muslim populations in Europe are relatively poor and are segregated in crime-hit neighbourhoods. Rising crimes and welfare dependency adds to the European perception about the community. One of the reasons for tensions recently was the lack of economic opportunity and high joblessness. Experts are of the opinion that middle class Muslims are more likely to opt for assimilation but are also more likely to identify with their religion than their nationality.

Interestingly, there is no monolith version of Islam in Europe because of the diversity in that region and there is hope for a strong Euro–Islam identity emerging in the future. But the presence of Muslims poses a strong test to the cultural and democratic values in Europe. A case in point was the 2004 murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh for his film critical of Islam's attitudes towards women.

Muslims also face discrimination as most of the immigrants are ethnically different and non-white, which add to the problems of integration.

With regard to fears of radicalism, the dangers from alienated Muslim youth could be met by the increased diversity among the Muslim community. Johnson alluded to the policy implications going forward regarding the issue of integrating Muslims into Europe and cited analysts and scholars on the best way forward. The consensus seemed to be to emphasis socio-economic issues rather than cultural differences, and toning down the political and media rhetoric on terror and Muslims as a group (Johnson, 2011).

According to Uriya Shavit, the fight over the veil in Europe was used by some experts to explore the topic of Muslim integration in the West, and the division created by two types of nationality and two sources of legitimacy. While Muslim jurists in earlier times had mostly opposed Muslims from residing in non-Muslim societies arguing that it weakens their faith and practice, there was no absolute ban. It was only after World War II that Muslim migration from Islamic countries began increasing. And for the last three decades Muslim jurists had been re-examining the issue of identity and duties of emigrants. They took a common approach of not opposing migration to the West. Instead, they focused on creating a legal religious framework to maintain the emigrant' Muslim identity, and use the diaspora to help serve Islam.(Shavit 2007).

Shavit attributed the newfound religiosity among Muslims in the West to the rise of political Islam at a time when pan-Arabism waned. Fears about Western culture trying to undermine Muslim societies led to the thinking among clerics in the Arab world to use Muslim immigrants as a weapon to undermine Western societies. Contemporary Middle East politics had seen authoritarian regimes in the Middle East suppressing Islamists at home while aiding them in exporting their ideology. Many Muslims who had migrated after World War II, are now permanent European citizens, financially secure with rising levels of political awareness. The prospect of being surrounded by a large community of non-Muslims led to introspection about their identity, which coincided with Western advocacy of multiculturalism. As the second generation of migrants grew up, Western liberalism proved a challenge to the conservative values of Islam. The response from parents was to reaffirm the religious identity of their families. Meanwhile, the Islamic jurists retroactively developed a legal structure to legitimize migration, provided that Muslims in the West held steadfast to their religion. The change in viewpoint by jurists were for a variety of reasons – benefits of proselytizing, strengthening Muslim unity, opportunity to advance the divine plan for the world,

and establishing a new frontier in defense of Islam. While these jurists insisted that Muslim immigrants must avoid assimilation, they also held forth about obeying the law of the host countries and urged them not to harm the security of those states. They viewed Western states as mere social mechanisms where Muslims can practice Islam fully. Besides, with the moral and spiritual void in the Western civilization prompted these jurists to believe that ultimately Westerners may move towards Islam.

According to Shavit, not all Muslims accepted such a view. Some of them were of the opinion that Muslim immigrants' role was to improve the image of Islam in the West. Many European Muslims do not follow or reject the position put forth by jurists. Even while advocating a conservative dress code for Muslim women, they sought integration into European society. These pro-assimilation views were drowned out by the jurists operating from the Arab world, but the clash between Western interpretations of personal freedom and Islamists' stand on Muslim rights and duties could not be avoided. The challenge from Arab Muslim jurists was that they viewed the Muslim nation as encompassing the boundaries of all nation-states. Liberal nation-states in the West would have to deal with this existential conundrum by focusing more on the individuals and the ideas motivating them and moving away from superficial issues like the veil and the dress code (Shavit 2007).

Charlie Hebdo

Gawdat Bahgat argued, in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo massacre, for an all-encompassing political strategy in the long run, instead of focusing only on law-enforcement measures. While the right wing political parties in France and Germany had responded using anti-immigration electoral platforms to gain ground in the European Parliament, European leaders like French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel had countered this by reaching out to Muslims in their countries.(Bahgat 2015).

Bahgat highlighted two important propositions that need to be highlighted about the debate about Islam's compatibility with Western values, as some claimed that there was an ideological war between Islam and the West. First, for more than half a century millions of immigrants from North Africa (and elsewhere) had arrived in Europe attracted by work and welfare prospects and the hope of getting to live in a haven away from wars and political instability. Most of them had contributed to Europe's economic prosperity. On the other hand, efforts at assimilation into European societies

achieved very modest success, and marginalized Muslim communities providing fertile ground for extremism. At the same time, the number of Muslims in Europe was large and growing.

Second, this notion of ideological war assumed that Islam or militant Islam was monolithic. Muslims, like followers of other religions, had different interpretations of their religion. Stereotyping and generalizations could help to mobilize angry crowds but undermined efforts to understand Muslim communities in Europe. Instead, a better approach at countering terror than promoting ideas of an ideological war between the two sides would be to examine and address the socio-economic and political issues. Underdevelopment and political instability in South and East Mediterranean States were major forces behind terrorist attacks in Europe(Bahgat 2015).

James M. Dorsey compared the attack on the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris to Al Qaeda's 9/11 attacks in the US. In Dorsey's view, the attacks would have long-term repercussions on the policy of multiculturalism, the hallmark of the European response to immigration in their societies. Post 9/11, there were hurried moves to integrate foreign migrants but those policies did not go as far to counter the economic and social marginalization of those immigrant groups, resulting in more alienation as well as radicalization by youths who sympathized with Islamic countries and societal groups ravaged by war and sectarian strife.(Dorsey 2015)

Dorsey contended that this, in a way, aided Al Qaeda's cause. Like 9/11, the Paris attacks aimed not only on Western freedoms and on society, but also to intensify the divisions in French society between the majority population and immigrants. The jihadist plan was to force Muslim communities in the West who reject violence as a policy and seek to integrate in their adopted societies to feel that they were no longer welcome, by masterminding the majority sentiment against Muslims and foreigners.

Dorsey likened the 9/11 attack a watershed in triggering intolerance and suspicion about immigrants and identifying Muslims on the side of the enemy in the war on terror. Al Qaeda triggered the policies in the West that only served to feed on the long-festering anger and frustration among the marginalized minority. This had resulted in the swelling of foreign fighters who join the Islamic State, the jihadist group operating in Iraq and Syria. This polarization strategy had also fuelled the sectarian confrontation between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East.

Right wing parties in Europe (France, UK and Germany) had been quick to exploit this sentiment for electoral gains. The reaction of many Western leaders and authorities to any act of terror mirrors what followed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, putting the Muslim community

that has nothing to do with violence on the defensive. The result, as Dorsey predicts, was polarization that engendered radicalization. But the civil society in Europe had resisted this Islamophobia. Dorsey pointed out that the response of Norway to Breivik's deadly attack should serve as a model elsewhere. Norway held on to its democratic values, treated the perpetrator as a criminal, and resisted from declaring war on terror (Dorsey, 2015).

Peter Bergen discussed the Paris attacks and whether it had links to Islam and asserted that one could not wish away the connection, even though Muslims who rejected fanatical beliefs did not have any responsibility for what happened. The three terrorists involved in the attacks believed they were holy warriors defending Islam. In the 'martyrdom' video of one of the terrorists, he pledged his allegiance to the ISIS leader and addressed him as the caliph. Osama Bin Laden also had quoted a Quranic verse before his declaration of war against "the Jews and the Crusaders" in 1998. In the Middle East, Sunni and Shiite fundamentalists were locked in a vicious religious civil war covering Iran, Syria and Yemen, killing hundreds of thousands. The Salafism prevalent in Saudi Arabia fuelled intolerance against Shia Islam, as well as other religions, and at the same time restricted women to a role largely confined to the domestic sphere. The Salafism of the terrorists behind the Paris attacks was a highly political version what Bin Laden propagated. The ideology of 'Bin Ladenism' centres around the belief that the world would finally be made perfect by the restoration of a Taliban-style caliphate. Supporters of Bin Ladenism consider as evil the people and countries that they perceive as standing in the way of the goal(Peter Bergen 2015).

Minorities, Majorities

In Tahir Abbas' view, the rift between minorities and majorities is increasing on issues of social cohesion and identity politics. In this regard, Americans generally have managed better. European culture is at present inward looking, with politicians moving to the right. The French ban on the veil and the Swiss ban on minarets revealed a lack of ideas. Abbas notes that when the US opened up to immigration in the mid-60s, it attracted highly educated immigrants, including Muslims from Asia and the Middle East.(Tahir Abbas 2015).

Muslim migrants in Europe on the other hand found themselves at the bottom of the job market. Many of those migrant Muslim communities have become trapped in poor localities, similar to white-majority working class communities. In the case of Muslim minorities, they were identified by their faith, rather than race. Most French Muslims live in poor housing, have low-pay jobs, and low education levels. Matters are getting worse for Muslims in Europe on the political,

social and cultural fronts. Islamophobia also prevents dialogue within the Muslim community, besides dividing and driving extremism on all sides. This has also negated the positive cultural contributions by European-born Muslims in fashion, music, food, dance, literature and film. Abbas concedes that both the US and Europe have exhibited major Islamophobia problems. But it is at the local level that the conflicts exist and where the greater challenges lie. While many minorities and majorities are moving away from each other, Abbas suggests a grassroots level building up of opportunities and a top down delivery of effective policy by politicians (Tahir Abbas 2015).

Toward a Reconciliation of Islam and the West

Jocelyne Cesari described the contrasting images of Islam on the two sides of the Atlantic, showing up the more conflictual and hostile attitudes in Europe. Cesari contended that the common factor was the influence of global politics on the domestic situation of minority Muslims and the tendency to conflate Islam as an international political force with ordinary Muslims living in minority populations in the West(Cesari 2007).

Long before September 11 attacks in the US, there was the fear of political Islam alongside the one-sided view of Islam, which encouraged stereotypical connections between the religion, violence and fanaticism and obscuring all other aspects of the Muslim world. The past two decades had however thrown up many indelible images of the militant version of Islam and Islamic revivalism was considered a synonym for global terrorism by the general public. Cesari explained that it was in this climate that scholars were delving into issues of Muslim integration and whether it was comparable to the process other immigrants had undergone. Cesari notes that the process of victimization among European Muslims was already in motion long before the September 11 attacks. Academic research about the Muslim community and the religion had already been affected. Anti-Islamic discourse had failed to note the fluid and contradictory reality of Islam's integration into western societies. Cesari viewed Muslim immigration to Europe and North America as the foundational moment of a new transcultural space that needs analysis in the light of globalization and urged that instead of trying to discover what constitutes the essential quality of Islam, one should examine the social and historical contexts within which Muslims create their discourse.

Cesari examined dimensions of Muslim life in the West that held significance to identity and religious practice – the Meta narrative on Islam, political and cultural differences, and ethnicity versus religion, and global Islam. Western Muslims had always been seen as the enemy, more so

after the September 11 attacks. In such a scenario, Muslims adopted three modes of integration, acceptance, avoidance or resistance. Resistance could be taking an opposing stance to dominant narrative, by using Islamic symbols, clothing or behavior. It could also take a radical form by way of allegiance to militant movements.

Cesari noted that of the common things both European and American Muslims shared was the importance of the local community in Muslim identity-formation. The visibility and legitimacy of the new generation of Islamic leadership now coming into its own was nearly always grounded in local and community-based activities. The disputes that occurred at the local level fed into the national debate on Islam and this, in turn, influenced the debate on Islam and its politics.

In both Europe and the US, Islam was inseparable from ethnic identities, especially for first generation immigrants. But since the 1990s, 'trans-ethnic' forms of Islam have emerged. A similar process was taking place in the US, with the search for 'true Islam' which would fit in better within American society. While Global Islam was in crisis, Muslims in Europe and the United States served as a sort of lightning rod. Their position crystallized the debates and controversies that were currently shaking the entire Muslim world: the question of democracy, Muslim relationship to others, the status of women, the lure of fundamentalism.

Cesari, however, pointed out that there are hints of a renaissance in Islam. Islamic practices are being revamped and secularized, and Islamic thought is at a peak of activity. Islamic reformers by virtue of their role in shaping trans-national Islamic thought are introducing a new narrative of reconciliation between Islam and the West. But even so, many are still trapped in the mode of reaction and defensiveness when faced with Western anti-Islamic sentiment. The real challenge ahead is the current tension inside western Muslim communities -- one reformist and the other radical. But much would depend on western government policies – domestic as well as foreign -- that are often seen as hostile to Islam(Cesari 2007).

Implications for Muslim integration

Claire Adida, David Laitin and Marie-Anne Valfort (2015) while discussing the Paris attacks say they fear the worst for Muslim integration in France. They point to the systematic discrimination against Muslims. Muslim immigrants stand out culturally in French society in ways that threaten republican ideals. This gets exacerbated into a 'vicious circle of discrimination'. The

recent violence will only add to this state of affairs. There is a false equivalency between 'Muslim' and 'jihadist' in France.(Claire Adida 2015).

The authors hold the view that the alienation of Muslims in France will make them opt for the viral cults that are propagated on internet and in mosques. A solution will depend on effecting changes from both sides. Reforms in employment and educational sector could be an effective way to end discrimination against French Muslims. Moderate Islam should also weigh in on solutions to this impasse. One of the ways would be to train the imams in France – currently, under 10 per cent of France's 1,800 imams are trained in the country. Recognizing the 'discriminatory equilibrium' between the French and its recently arrived Muslim immigrants offers a more positive prospect for their integration into French society(Claire Adida 2015).

While the various formulations by experts have laid bare the historical and contemporary conditions of Muslim migration to the US and Western Europe, and some of the approaches to problem solving and issues of integration, the time has come for both sides to forge a realistic, workable, long-lasting solution. Policies of multiculturalism promoted in the West after the large-scale post-World War II immigration has failed in addressing the issues following the Millennium. Instead of the 'rooted' and the 'migrant' distinctions, there has to be an understanding that the only prospect in the days ahead is going to be a shared future and a commitment to universal values.

V.   Theoretical framework:

This thesis focuses on fragile states that we previously mentioned, in order to test the hypothesis about this concept as a key perpetuating factor in the emergence of two main dilemmas each of which leads to increased resonance on the subject of integration of immigrant communities in Europe and of Muslim communities in particular. The first dilemma is the increasing armed conflicts based on religious and sectarian grounds, and the second is the lack of the basic elements that guarantee a decent standard of living, quality education, health care, and security-related repression and the suppression of freedoms and other basic rights in these countries.

These dilemmas push the communities in those countries to escape the harsh reality in which they live in order to search for countries that can guarantee them a decent living, security and peace. This leads to the waves of immigration by many communities and at their forefront, Muslim communities, to developed countries such as those in Europe. These waves of migration increase as the countries of origin become more fragile and prone to collapse. This equation ensures that the dialogue on integration continues to exist, but it is intensified when it comes to talk about the Muslim communities and their being affected by terrorist acts committed in the name of religion, especially if one of the members of these communities is directly involved in these groups and subsequently carries out any violent act in European countries.

When examining state failure and rise in transnational terror it has been observed time and again that when compounded by state repression along with armed military conflict, the linkage with terror becomes more strong (Lisanti 2010).

Abdelkerim Ousman has described in detail the ideas and methods in which radical elements from outside are exploiting the conditions of fragility in sub-Saharan Africa such as Sudan, Nigeria and Chad, and destabilising and delegitimizing the existing systems in play, and also encouraging the formation of groups which act against the state (either violently or subversively). These processes, the study points out, exacerbate existing fragility and increase conflicts among

communities in countries that already suffer from poor social cohesion and integration (Ousman 2012).

German sociologists Max Weber in his 1919 lecture 'Politics as a Vocation' defines his subject by focusing on the 'State'. He asks what is a 'political' association from the sociological point of view? Sociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends. Weber contends that ultimately, that the modern state can be defined "sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of physical force. "The monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, or the monopoly on violence, is the defining conception of the state. (Tickamyer 1981)

Force, Weber goes on, is a "means specific to the State." Conceptually, according to Weber, "the modern state is a compulsory association which organizes domination. It has been successful in seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a territory." The state can enforce its authority in its territory through force without losing its legitimate authority. In the 20th Century, this definition of the state has gained prominence in law and in political philosophy. Thus, use of force is acceptable, in the jurisdiction specified by the state's lands. Such a monopoly over violence, according to Weber, must occur via a process of legitimation.

Weber notes that the connection between the state and the use of physical force has not always been so close. He cites the examples of feudalism, where private warfare was permitted under certain conditions, and of religious courts, which had sole jurisdiction over some types of offenses like heresy and sex crimes ("bawdy courts"). Regardless, the state exists wherever a single authority can legitimately authorize violence. The state's main instruments of legitimate violence need not be necessarily the police and military. Private force can also be used, too, with its legitimacy flowing from the state. The "monopoly" means that the state is the only source of legitimacy for all physical coercion or adjudication of coercion.

The right of self-defense by which civilians acting on their own behalf may engage in violence for the sake of defending one's own life or the lives of others, is a private form of legitimate violence that is recognized by the state. Weber also categorises social authority into disparate forms, terming them as charismatic, traditional, and rational-legal. The bureaucracies associated with modern state institutions are increasingly based on rational-legal authority.

The assumption, which stems from Weber's thought, is that when this monopoly of the legitimate use of force is broken, the state turns into a failed or fragile state. Fragile states cannot achieve that and therefore they cannot exercise enough sovereignty on a variety of areas such as education, housing, welfare etc. Fragile states generally cannot assure basic security, maintain rule of law and justice, or provide services and economic opportunities for citizens.

VI.   Methodology:

The goals of the thesis project are to answer the question: why do terrorist groups continue to grow and are in a state of permanent renewal? It is also to test the hypothesis that the fragility of states in the Middle East and the lack of integration with the West are largely responsible for the success of violent jihadi projects. I have adopted this thesis using primarily secondary sources to obtain information, such as jihadist websites that could be accessed, as well as articles, documents and research available online in order to provide a better understanding of the roots and complicated history of the evolution of violent jihadist ideology and its current form, as well as the effects resulting from it today. This methodology has been clearly used in the section on the historical background of the doctrine of jihad being pursued by jihadist groups today. An example of this is the letter sent by the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Hassan al-Banna to King Farouk and which presents the most important features of his vision for the progress of Islamic states in accordance with the rule of Islamic law, at their forefront being Egypt, and which contains a reference for the formation of a military force in support of the principle of Islamic Jihad in the liberation of Islamic states. It is a very useful letter that establishes the general atmosphere of the subject of the doctrine of jihad and its development.

In the section dedicated to previous research related to discussing the subject of fragile states, the Fragile States Index, which is an annual ranking of 178 states based on their levels of stability and the amount of pressure they face, was relied upon, for the purpose of studying the patterns of trans-border terrorism and the spread of Islamic jihad in recent years. It will be much more interesting to study the latest international classification available on this subject, in order to provide a clear perception on the most important criteria used in analysing the degree of fragility of states within the economic and social situation indicators on one hand, and the political and military situation on the other (Haken et al. 2014). The Global Terrorism Index of 2014 was also used. Measuring and understanding the effects of terrorism, the report pointed out that 80% of those killed as a result of terrorist activities during 2013, were located in only five countries – Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria – and that the majority of those killed by terrorist attacks in 2013 (66%), occurred due to four terrorist organizations namely – Islamic State, Boko Haram,

Taliban and Al-Qaeda and its branches. All of these organizations are active in the countries referred to by the Fragile States Index of 2014 as those that have the highest levels of fragility. I also relied on various academic research linking fragile states to the subject of terrorism, and which describe those states as incubators that support the emergence of terrorism as a result of the security vacuum in which they exist, for example(The Institute for Economics and Peace IEP 2014).

With respect to linking the concept of jihad belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood and terrorist organizations, the thesis relied upon the relationship between the texts and ideas that emanated from the Muslim Brotherhood as a first step, and on the development of the concept of Jihad and the establishing of an Islamic state as espoused by later leaders known to have belonged to this international organization such as Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri. The historical introduction contains a detailed explanation of this point as it relates to the evolution of jihadist rhetoric, and the ease of entry and integration of those belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood among jihadist and terrorist groups if they wished to do so.

With regards to the section concerning the subject of integration of Muslim communities, I attempted in this thesis to submit views and opinions such as opinion pieces, research and studies which revolve around the subject, by referring to global events related to terrorism and the resulting Islamophobia, as well as the Hijab debate in France, the prohibition of minarets in Switzerland, and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris which resulted in bringing to the fore the debate on integration and the role of Muslim communities in rejecting / encouraging terrorist activities. The state of conflict or loss felt by immigrant communities in Europe, be it through effects felt from their countries of origin or countries of destination and the reconciliation between the two, is also looked at.

The aim of relying on these sources is to try to draw a comprehensive framework of overlapping topics on the issue of integration, in order to be able to shed light on areas that have remained somewhat neglected for one reason or another, among them being the sensitivity surrounding this subject among Muslim communities due to it providing a painful wake-up call for recognizing points of imbalance and weakness for which Muslim communities themselves are responsible, and which stand as an obstacle to the achievement of integration. These include being misled by Muslim scholars and the subject of following Fatwa without thinking about matters intellectually and logically -- in other words, distancing themselves from the sanctification of ignorance, and textual explanations provided by the elders and preachers.

VII.   Limitations:

It is worth noting here the difficulty in obtaining more sources related to the topics on jihadists and the Muslim Brotherhood due to the banning of all the sites related to these groups by the security authorities in the United Arab Emirates, and I therefore avoided direct wading in trying to provide a deeper analysis of the jihadist rhetoric which is so rampant right now, and have sufficed myself with some published sources such as the letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi which contain some initial signs of the emergence of the so-called Islamic State. This has been discussed in detail in the historical background. I also relied upon a document titled 'Management of Savagery' in analysing the methodology followed by terrorist groups in the process of constant renewal, and in implementing their global jihadist agenda, according to a set of plans that are described in detail in the results and analysis chapter therein. This is a document (in Arabic, which is my mother tongue, and its English translation published by some websites) which I obtained from a friend.

VIII.   Findings and Analysis

Before going into the discussion of the most important conclusions and analyses related to the subject of the thesis, I would like to refer to the methodology which I will follow in providing my analysis, based on several studies of the many overlapping issues of relevance. This methodology is represented by two main points upon which I built my thesis: namely, an attempt to explain and analyse the strategy followed by these terrorist groups when reviving themselves from time to time, and the other point is the discussion of the impact of terrorist activity around the world on Muslim communities in Europe specifically, and how they are affected and react, and where the flaw lies in their handling of the distancing of their religion from terrorist acts by one of its members. I then go on to a case of constructive self-criticism of these communities due to their failure in creating a state of openness and self-criticism, and recognition of their own flaws, which I then attempt to offer a remedy.

There are many questions that revolve in the minds of people, whether they are Muslims or otherwise, about the reason for the renewed phenomenon of terrorism and the emergence of violent extremist groups one after the other. We are witnessing a process of emergence of these groups, similar to the re-branding processes which occur every ten years or so in the realm of business, from the emergence of the Taliban to what is today known as the Islamic State under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. It is of course a question of reiteration, as everyone knows that the aim of these extremist and violent organizations, is to seek to establish the concept of the Islamic caliphate so that it becomes a reality. They waste no opportunity to revive this goal again and again. During this thesis I attempted to address an area that is a bit absent from the questions people ask, and I sought to discuss and test it in order to try to add another dimension that may help in understanding the mentality that motivates these groups. After having reviewed the research works which I referred to in the previous section, I found that there is a strategy according to which these violent jihadi groups reinvent themselves and thereby renew the call for the emergence of an Islamic state. Today we face a reality in which these groups have gotten to the point which I see as a point of no return, where the emergence of a real state carrying the name of the 'Islamic caliphate' has started

to appear in the border region between Iraq and Syria, in a scenario where both countries are in deep crises. Some might say that it is a hasty conclusion to make in considering that this state has become a reality, but in view of the activities carried out by this terrorist group between the Syrian and Iraqi border, I am of the view that that they only lack the recognition of some states to give them a kind of international legitimacy. This group exercises activities that suggest to everyone that they are a quasi-state which exists and is recognized. These activities include the imposition of taxes, educational curricula changes, setting up of internal policing departments as well as courts, and the sale of oil among others which are considered normal for any state in the world.

In order to explore the hypothesis I set ahead to: **Why do terrorist groups continue to grow anew while they are in a state of permanent renewal?** Moreover, more importantly, how do they manage to renew themselves (as I have pointed out previously in several examples)? This remains, I believe, subject to our understanding of the references upon which these groups depend on when renewing and reinventing themselves, and when supporting its real presence and strength at the same time. Observers of the growth time-frame of these groups will note this point with certainty, that they are in a permanent renewal process. But what is interesting is that their re-emergence is linked to specific periods of time, and during specific events in the past few decades. Questioning the goal behind these groups and their renewal is a waste of time and effort, because everyone is aware that these groups are engaged in a global standoff through which they aim to establish the Caliphate state. This is their aim and nobody disagrees on this.

In order to try to understand the reasons behind the emergence of jihadist movements and the continued advance and innovation made in achieving military progress or to carry out terrorist operations on the ground, we find that this thesis which has been addressed in the earlier chapter, has mostly revolved around the idea that these groups essentially benefit from areas of tension and conflict. Moreover, these groups organise themselves and consolidate their presence and bases, especially in those areas that are related to the countries of the Islamic world. The thesis also attributes the reason to the fragility of these states, resulting from several factors, which include conflicts of all kinds and wars whereby these groups always benefit in two important ways -- in luring the youth to joining their jihadi operations, and to carry out terrorist attacks wherever they find the opportunity to do so.

What is meant by areas of tension and conflict in this thesis are those countries that suffer from various crises, and these include: occupation by one state by another, uprisings, popular revolutions,

and military coups. Most of these scenarios have occurred in the Islamic world, for example the occupation of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan which eventually led to the formation of Al Qaeda under the leadership of Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri and the ensuing global war on terror, the military coup in Sudan, where Bin Laden took refuge after Afghanistan, the American occupation of Afghanistan in 2001, the American occupation of Iraq in 2003, the sectarian war in Iraq triggered by al-Zarqawi, and the civil war in Syria, Libya and Yemen after the Arab Spring uprisings.

All the examples given above lead us to a general factor applicable in all of these situations, namely the chaos that accompanies a large security and military vacuum as a result of the dispersion of the efforts of the regular armed forces of these countries and the weakness of its control over its borders and ports, which in turn assists the Mujahideen in their cross-border operations to these areas and their quick establishment of organizations and groups to carry out specific tasks according to a pre-determined strategy, just as it happened in Syria when control of the border by the Assad regime was weakened. This enabled a large numbers of jihadists from various backgrounds to enter Syria. According to the combat doctrine pursued by terrorist groups, the state of chaos that we have mentioned previously, is followed by savagery, brutality and then its management strategy..

The Management of Savagery

If we are to find a solution to stop the **scenario of renewal** by these extremist groups, we must understand the strategy that they are working to implement, and this is **the management of savagery**, which is the practical guide presented by Abu Bakr Naji [1] to the Jihadi groups as a road map toward the establishment of the dream of the Caliphate State. 'The Management of Savagery' as a methodology or strategy was summarized as a document written by Naji in Arabic, predominantly a religious discourse in accordance with the method of preaching and guidance. A translated version is available in English.(Naji 2006)

In the introduction to his book or document titled 'The Management of Savagery', Naji classifies Islamist movements that have developed written programs to get the Islamic nation through the phase of humiliation and weakness - as he puts it − and to return it to a state where it leads the world, into five streams: Salafist Jihadism, Awakening Salafism as represented by Sheikh Salman al-Awda, the Muslim Brotherhood as represented by the original movement in Egypt and the international organizations that follow it, the Muslim Brotherhood followed by Hassan al-Turabi in Sudan, and the Popular Jihad represented by Hamas. Naji describes the phase of management of

savagery as the most dangerous phase that the Islamic nation is yet to go through, and he regards that success in the management of this stage will inevitably lead to the revival of the Islamic State after the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate. Naji describes savagery as that which occurs when large and small states collapse, be they Islamic or non-Islamic, and whereby no neighbouring state or powers close to the state that has fallen is able to control the collapsed territory. Naji uses the example of the fall of the Ottoman Empire after the Sykes-Picot Treaty, which he sees as having divided the Caliphate and turned it into small states, as being the crucial stage that stood in the face of the expansion of the Caliphate.

Naji mentions in his document on the modern revival of the doctrine of Jihad among Muslims in general to the high level of fighting displayed by the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and other regions such as Chechnya and Tajikistan, and he constantly provides examples of the ability of these groups to manage savagery by providing many stories about Abdullah Azzam and Syed Qutub and their respective analyses that predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union. He holds the view that the management of savagery has been very successful in these areas in the establishment of projects for the Caliphate, despite them being later dropped. The experience gained by the jihadi movement over thirty years in fighting enabled the 'Contemporary Renewal Movement' to carry out specialist operations that began with Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in order to achieve several goals, the most important being inspiring confidence in the hearts of Muslims by breaking part of the prestige of the United States and removing the aura surrounding it as an invincible state superpower. The other goal was to compensate for the human losses suffered by the revival movement due to the fighting over thirty years by attracting new recruits through military operations against the United States that dazzle them, and by using the anger caused by American intervention in the Islamic world.

In the Management of Savagery document, Naji continuously refers to the situation in Afghanistan when it was at war with the Soviet Union. He describes the stage that preceded the Taliban control of the area as being subject to the law of the jungle, where people were looking for someone, whether good or bad, to manage the savagery. Charles Lister has assessed Islamic State's considerable organisational strengths in terms of commanding revenue sources and fund governance provide administrative and social services to the civilians in the areas it controls. It also has the leadership capability – from the command level to regional and local levels -- to redeploy men and resources to new areas it seeks to occupy.

According to Naji's view of the management of savagery, the organization that works on this administrative task should take care of some basic things such as the deployment of internal security, food and healthcare, securing the areas of savagery from enemy raids, the establishment of Shariah judiciary, raising the combat efficiency by creating a combat-ready society in all of its categories, working to achieve scalability and the ability to wage war against enemies, and establish alliances.

These tasks referred to are all practised today to the letter by the 'Islamic State' organization under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. What is striking about the subject of the management of savagery is that it converges at multiple points with the letter addressed by Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi – which I referred to in the historical background – especially with respect to the second step among the four steps proposed by al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, which is the establishment of the Islamic Emirate and developing it until it reaches the level of the Caliphate. This would fill the void that may exist when the Americans leave Iraq. This is the essence of the management of savagery according to Naji, the phase he describes as the law of the jungle, such as what occurred after the collapse and withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. There is a debate within Islamic circles about this, with ideas, information, knowledge exchanged, discussed such as what took place between al- Zawahiri and al-Zarqawi.

The scenario of renewal followed by these groups is moving in accordance to what has been described in the Management of Savagery document as "**the Path to Empowerment**" – a comprehensive concept made up of three stages for the emergence of the Caliphate State. The first stage: Hitting and exhausting the enemy; the second stage: The management of savagery; and the third stage: the strength of empowerment [2.] He also offers within these three stages a range of candidate countries that one should focus on towards implementing this strategy. Naji is of the view that these countries (or regions) – he prefers to call them regions seeing as he does not recognize the borders drawn up by the Sykes-Picot Treaty – are to be viewed as initial nominees and that at a later stage, focus will be placed on two or three countries in order to ensure the viability of the population of these countries to move towards Jihad.

In reviewing the countries Naji sees as candidates for these three stages we find that they include: Jordan; the Arab Maghreb: Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco; Nigeria; the land of the Two Holy Mosques: Saudi Arabia and Yemen, taking into account that he does not recognise the borders of any state according to the concepts of the United Nations, whereby he confirmed that he uses the

term 'region' and not 'state', and therefore the region of Yemen will include the countries that surround it. These candidate countries, in his view, share several common features among them that provide some of the ingredients of empowerment -- geographical depth, terrain that allows for the establishment of zones that can be administered under the management of savagery system, weakness of the ruling regime in controlling border areas of its state and even densely populated areas, and the existence of an Islamic Jihadist tendency in these areas. If we take Nigeria for example and if we want to test the validity of this nomination, we find that it is a real and effective candidate based on the activities of the Boko Haram group that declared allegiance to ISIS.

In short, the objectives of the strike and exhaust stage is based on two main pillars: First, the exhaustion of the 'enemy' forces and scattering their efforts through the execution of small-scale and impact operations, and to repeat these types of operations to have a long-term impact with a focus on Muslim communities around the world to undertake striking operations that would serve to distract the ability of 'the enemy'. Second, building the foundations for the Jihadi waves coming from outside the border and attract the youth in order to undertake quality Jihadi operations. So as the picture becomes even clearer with regards to the strike and exhaust step, we may note here the acts of terrorism that took place in many European capitals such as in Paris and the Charlie Hebdo magazine incident[5], Copenhagen[6],and the recent cartoon art gallery incident in Texas[7] in the US. Also noteworthy is the number of Jihadis coming from Europe to join the ranks of ISIS[8].

Renewed conflict hotspots

After having given a full detailed explanation of the methodology used by the terrorist groups that are moving as we have mentioned according the management of savagery methodology, and comparing the most important steps of this methodology with real life examples experienced in armed conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq, we must take a look at the tragedies suffered by these countries as a result of the factors of conflict on the one hand, and as a result of the control exercised by these terrorist organizations on the other. The number of Syrian refugees alone is enough to prove the gravity of the catastrophic situation that has arisen from killings, displacement, torture, exploitation and sectarian fighting. The same applies to Iraq. Since the invasion of Iraq by US forces in April 2003, local and international organizations have registered a rise in the number of orphans and widows because of the aggravated security situation in the country, and which has seen no stability throughout the last 10 years. This has started to reflect on society.

According to Unicef, 2014 has been one of the most devastating year for children. As many as 15 million children are caught up in violent conflicts in the Central African Republic, Iraq, South Sudan, the State of Palestine, Syria and Ukraine – including those internally displaced or living as refugees.(Press centre | UNICEF 2014). The situation of more than 5.6 million children inside Syria remains the most desperate, according to the latest Unicef report. Of these, up to 2 million children are living in areas of the country largely cut off from humanitarian aid. Some 2.6 million Syrian children are still out of school. Almost 2 million Syrian children are living as refugees in Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and other countries. This is in addition to the 3.6 million children from vulnerable communities hosting refugees, who themselves are suffering due to the strain on services like education and health. Meanwhile, the crisis gripping Iraq has forced more than 2.8 million children from their homes, and left many trapped in areas controlled by armed groups (UNICEF | Press centre 2015).

These horrifying facts lead us to think of ways in which we can prevent the radicalization of these orphans and their integration within the terrorist groups that use the tragedy that befell their families to push them on the frontlines against the whole world. They are told how the international community stood as spectators while their country was being destroyed by US forces over a period of 10 years. This point alone is capable of mobilizing the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi youth who are psychologically devastated, physically exhausted and emotionally deprived towards an act of revenge in order to retrieve their rights from an international community which has caused according to that which has been implanted in their minds by the advocates of murder and terrorism the loss of their future and the future of their nation, religion and Islamic Caliphate, not to mention the financial support offered by these groups to those involved in its ranks who come from a state of extreme poverty and neglect.

This catastrophe is being repeated again today. We are witnessing a Syrian tragedy in the true sense of the word. Hundreds of thousands of orphans, millions of displaced people, thousands of young Syrians have lost the opportunity for education and living in peace and have joined the ranks of groups that mould them according to their sectarian, religious and ethnic whims. These groups have fed the spirit of revenge, murder and criminality to these youths, followed by the fatwas of extremist scholars who have made these young people the cannon fodder for their sectarian war against other groups. Because of these scattered conflicts, the youth have been deprived of the ideas of justice, tolerance, understanding and love of the other, and these have been replaced with the logic of murder and crime in the shadow of countries that follow the law of the

jungle, where the strong prevails over the weak. How can we speak of the existence of a state where this terrorism is being combated while we are still suffering its effects everywhere in the world and we can clearly see the factors affecting the formation, composition and consolidation of this terrorism? State failure and fragility is the primary source of terrorism, extremism and violence of all kinds.

Failed or fragile states and the disastrous results arising from cross-border terrorism and violence has prompted millions of people to migrate in order to search for better living opportunities that guarantee them security, peace and dignity. The terrorism emanating from failed or fragile states has severely diminished the chance for a decent social life and this is reflected in poor health, educational, social and even psychological conditions in these societies. These factors have contributed to the emergence of a generation of young drifters searching for an identity that distinguishes them in the middle of the chaos prevailing in their countries. In Somalia and Iraq, 70% of the population is under the age of 30, while the percentage of this age group is more than 53% in Nigeria and 48% in Mali (Gaub 2015). The majority of these youth suffer from the aforementioned social conditions. This brings us to an important topic which requires in-depth study to help us understand the bigger picture about one of the ramifications of terrorism and violence that occurs as a result of these conflicts, and this is the psychological factor and its role in creating a state of intellectual dispersion among generations of Muslim youth in particular. How do these conflicts affect the mental state of these people and how does it work on the formation of being a source of justification for all types of violent behavior?

Failure of state machinery and the sectarian and social divide has given the Islamic State the perfect staging post for their savagery to be unleashed and showcased through clever use of social media. The brutality is designed to frighten military and other opposition forces as well as the public, and to wean away jihadi fighters from other groups. In fact, under Al Zarqawi's leadership, the Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) had also pursued the same strategy, which was opposed by Al Qaeda and led to the breakup of their relationship. Al Zarqawi's goal too, before the Islamic State came into existence, was the establishment of a caliphate. In the management of savagery during the transition to caliphate, the limited strategy entails securing the territory seized and controlling its frontiers. The second stage is to aim for financial security, which the Islamic State has achieved by taking control of oilfields, arms and industrial infrastructure.

At the other end of the spectrum, as an inevitable result of the presence of conflicts and the low level of basic services in fragile states, many Muslim families have migrated from their countries to Europe in search of security, peace and a better life. These families have migrated with their entire legacy of sectarian warfare, and the mental, social, political and economic effects thereof. It is very natural that out of these families there would be individuals who hold extremist ideas and the circumstances of marginalization and conflict have contributed to the formation of their extremist ideas charged with sectarian hatred resulting from years of war. Herein lies the point of confrontation between this heavy legacy of excessive negativity that came out of these communities, and between the openness, democracy and peace found in Europe. This combination is neither intellectually, mentally, psychologically, or above all, religiously homogenized. Some members of these communities do not find that their presence in these countries necessarily entails the need for integration into the prevailing societal values, because simply put, they do not believe that it has anything to do with the teachings of Islam. In other words, the roots of tension between the Muslim and European communities were clear from the beginning. From here, we must argue the need to talk about projects that enhance the process of integration, which have been dealt with by many researchers in which they discussed many of the aspects that have been reviewed in the previous chapter of this thesis.

All findings of the previous studies and research on the issue of the integration of Muslim communities within Western societies, whether true or false, remain attempts to understand this decades-long tense relationship, and I am not going to dedicate this thesis to having a Byzantine debate over their correctness or the correctness of the examples they contain. This dialogue consumed us for many years, and is renewed every time with the same formula when there is renewed terrorism and there is an advent of new terrorist groups practising cross-border terrorist activities, whether in Europe or the countries of the Islamic world.

I have said through this thesis that it is inevitable that conflict zones lead to the emergence of extremist and violent groups. But, if we want to test this point specifically as being the cause of violence in Europe, it will certainly fail, as there is no conflict zones and wars and instances of security, political and military vacuums, so how do we view the cause of this extremism being located there? Here, the role of politicized religious discourse, and a compliance rooted in holy ignorance and insecurity, generally entrenched among Muslim communities in Europe, comes to the fore. Why Europe? Because these communities are in a state of psychological and intellectual conflict between religious inheritance and a cultural state of isolation and introversion that comes

with migration, and between the cultural, social and religious reality in Europe where freedom of belief and openness are thus faced with two choices. First option to abandon all these traditions and embrace the new society to which you have moved to, and this collides with one's continuous religious discourse, which regards the adoption of any new values of these communities as being tantamount to reneging on the religious foundations of Islam thus entering the circle of disbelief. The second option is a life of separation and isolation from the new society in which you live in fear of not falling within the circle of disbelief. Therefore, the dilemma of integration or no integration is flourishing again.

This thesis is an open invitation for frank self-criticism from Muslim communities by introducing a set of clear and explicit questions: Do we really want to create a state of intellectual and moral integration and convergence with the communities in which we live? How long will we continue to be consumed by for wars and sectarian differences and schools of thought within Islamic law? When will we follow reason and logic in dealing with matters that have to do with Islam and in facing criticism laid against us, free from emotional reaction? Are we really interested in coexistence and harmony within European societies or are what concerns us only the social and economic services provided by these countries' welfare systems? Until when will our minds remain hostage to the sanctification of religious ignorance and superstition practiced by a group of preachers across TV channels and social media? Do we respect the rule of law due to our faith in it or due to our fear of law? Finally, is it possible to admit to mistakes exercised by some of our own people while representing Islamic law?

On the other hand, isn't there a middle way? Is integration only dependent on Muslims? There certainly needs to be a cooling down of rhetoric from the political leadership as well as media directed against the 'other' and move the debate away from security and civilizational 'end of history' theories towards a political and societal level that is more accommodating the concerns of the minorities and reflective of the current European inter-cultural space that offers hope and breakthroughs at various levels in the immediate future. The situation calls for a cooling down of rhetoric now predominantly ranged against the 'other' that seems to triggers minority anxiety in Europe.

I believe that the answer to these questions will form the keys to recognizing certain flaws and weaknesses, which will certainly strengthen the desire for integration, co-existence and harmony among Muslim communities in Europe. It will go a long way to control the exploitation of

Muslim communities in Europe by terror groups to carry out the first step of empowerment of which I have mentioned previously s and which is to strike and exhaust.

IX.   Conclusion

If we posit the issue of conflict and violence found in fragile states as fertile ground for the growth of terrorist groups, we continue to have important indicators which links to the issue of integration with Western societies, especially if we look at the level of basic services provided in these fragile states and which range from a severe lack of developed educational systems, tlow level of health care, and lack of infrastructure services. These are reasons driving many Muslim and non-Muslim communities to migrate to developed countries; so the fragility of these countries have yet another dimension which is unrelated to the outcome of wars, disasters and conflicts. If we restrict ourselves to the topic of the fallout from these indicators only, the issue of the integration of immigrants in the European community becomes paramount due to the wide gaps between the religions, cultural beliefs and societal behaviours.

What the Arab and Muslim people are going through today is very necessary, and it is an opportunity given to us by History towards mutual recognition as Muslim and Western societies. Recognition that the inaction and conflicts of interest between actors on the international arena are impediments in finding effective solutions to eliminate conflict and violence and provide the raison d'etre that grants these extremist organizations with the ingredients that they have been waiting for a long time to re-produce. On a secondary level, we must recognize that the younger generations who have no prospects for the future, avenues for education, nor societal recognition based on mutual respect and harmony, will remain the cannon fodder for these extremist groups, and they will continue to explore a variety of ways to implement their ambitions. What is happening today is very important so that the Muslim communities' centuries-old holy ignorance that enforced upon us by many preachers and scholars in the name of Islam is not perpetuated. It is an ignorance based on reverence for explanations from some scholars, more than for the religion itself. An ignorance rejects all intellectual and cultural diversity, science, philosophy, art, research and thinking. We must find solutions to the problems of this era without courtyard solutions, live our lives according to the foundations of halal or haram and without dependence on the greed of some of the clergy.

In contrast, the mistakes made by some members of European communities in generalisation and holding all members of Muslim communities primarily responsible for the death and violence by some terrorist groups, serve as a fertile environment for preachers and extremist scholars to exploit these accusations by promoting the idea that Western societies hate Muslims, and that Muslims are superior in their faith and belief than the rest of the communities. This state of exploitation has reached the level of describing the social justice and decent life offered by Europe to their communities as non-permanent niceties, and that eternity, and bliss is in paradise.

This is in short what the advocates of radical religious extremism depend on when brainwashing the young minds among Muslim immigrants in Europe. As a result, these young people grow up in a state of religious mania associated with death or martyrdom related to hastening one's own death in order to obtain eternal paradise. They also exploit the emotional and psychological instincts as well as religious sentiment by citing shortcuts towards this by mentioning the virgins of paradise and other promises.

We are facing a decisive moment in the rejection of the atrocities committed by these terrorist groups by really uniting in accordance with real human values far from the religious extremist ideologies, and ethnic and sectarian tendencies. We are facing a historic opportunity to break with the past filled with hatred, ignorance and the classification of people according to religious and sectarian beliefs.

X.   Bibliography

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