



LUND UNIVERSITY

# Asylum diversity in the European Union

A case study of residence permit distribution to asylum seekers in  
Sweden and Finland

Hannes Guggenheimer  
Rasmus Bergander

# Abstract

The ongoing refugee crisis has divided the European Union. While some states shelter hundreds of thousands of refugees, others only grant asylum to a handful. This phenomenon is creating a demographic rift inside the union and is also causing internal quarrels over joint responsibility, which possibly could undermine the existence of the organization. In this thesis we search for the potential causes of the intra-organizational discrepancy by examining Sweden and Finland. These two states have approximately the same prerequisites for granting asylums, but vary greatly in number. In order to determine what causes this incongruity the states will be analyzed with two variables. The first variable examines the major political parties' refugee policy, through framing theory. The second variable analyses the Migration Boards through Max Weber's bureaucracy theory and scrutinizes the Director Generals of these organizations. Both variables result in sub-conclusions, which in the end are merged into one. The final conclusion determines that both variables are jointly contributing to the Swedish-Finnish discrepancy with the states having different political foundational frames, varying levels of bureaucracy of the Migration Boards and different approaches towards immigration from the Director Generals of the Migration Boards.

*Keywords:* Residence permits, asylum, Sweden, Finland, Swedish Migration Agency, Finnish Immigration Service, political parties, framing theory, bureaucracy theory.

*Word count:* 7484

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# 1. Introduction

One of the biggest consequences of war and conflicts is refugee crises. In Europe this phenomenon is the most evident result of the conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. Even though the great majority of European states are members of The European Union (EU) the approach and management regarding refugees is very diverse throughout the union. Some countries, such as Sweden and Germany, grant a high number of refugees' residence while other states such as Finland and Estonia do the opposite. This phenomenon is causing demographic discrepancy in the union as well as leading to quarrels over responsibility. In the long run this could undermine the organization, leading to the dissolution of the European Union. Without doubt there are internal differences on state basis in the EU when it comes to economic factors, which partly could explain this diversity. However some states have very similar capabilities and possibilities to handle refugees, but still the numbers of residence permits distributed to asylum seekers<sup>1</sup> vary greatly between them. This phenomenon raises the interesting questions of *why* this is the case and examining this puzzle will be the striving of this thesis. Sweden and Finland are two EU-countries that are similar in a number of ways<sup>2</sup> but when it comes to granting asylums the countries differentiate completely. In 2014 Sweden distributed 23 times as many residence permits to asylum seekers than Finland.<sup>3</sup>

The gap between the countries creates a perfect ground for a comparative case study that hopefully can unravel the core to the question of why the diversity between the states exists. The large difference in residence permits between two states similar to a high extent such as Sweden and Finland raises the question of the origins of this diversity. The importance of the question is furthermore emphasized by the fact that the refugee crisis Europe is facing will shape the union significantly. The radically different number of RPDAS per capita for each state will change the demographic scattering of the union as whole. Since the situation is ongoing, and probably will continue for a foreseeable future, it is of utmost importance that the mechanisms behind the diversity are being unraveled. We mean that a clear result originating from the difference of two states similar to the degree of Sweden and Finland will be applicable on most other cases, in line with John Stuart Mill's *method of difference*.<sup>4</sup> Thus the number of states being examined in this thesis is sufficient in order to fulfil the purpose of finding what regulates whether a state decides to grant a high or low number of asylums. The research question reads as follows:

*What explains the difference in residence permits distributed to asylum seekers in Sweden and Finland between the years 2010 - 2015?*

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<sup>1</sup> The term *residence permits distributed to asylum seekers* is used frequently in this study and will be shortened to RPDAS.

<sup>2</sup> For a further discussion on this matter see chapter *Method and research design* p. 3

<sup>3</sup> Swedish Migration Agency, 2015a; Finnish Immigration Service, 2015a; For a visual comparison of the discrepancy of the state's RPDAS see *Table 2* p. 18

<sup>4</sup> Teorell & Svensson, 2007:221–222; Esaiasson et al, 2012:115–119

## 1.1 Limitations

Our study will focus on analyzing the years between 2010 and 2015, since these years have been the most intense from a RPDAS perspective in modern time. This does not mean that we are excluding the possibility of earlier events having major implications for the course of actions, but rather that we believe the last years to have a larger significance for the study in general. Furthermore this is a period where both countries have had elections, where the economic development between the countries is similar but where the statistics of RPDAS differs a lot which in total makes it a suitable limitation.<sup>5</sup> Although statistics are used to some degree, this thesis foundations are limited to qualitative methods because of the limited space. We will also limit the study to RPDAS in order to exclude temporary students and workers etc. Furthermore we will only examine first-time permits, thus removing renewed and extended permits from the study. Lastly we will have to limit this study to analyzing the Migration Boards<sup>6</sup> of Sweden and Finland, consequently excluding instances such as The Migration Court and The Migration Court of Appeal.<sup>7</sup>

## 1.2 Previous research

The field of study is relatively unexplored, which further increases the relevance of this thesis. Some prominent researchers whose ideas we have used for inspirational matters, however, are Simon McMahan who studied how European states frame and react to intra-European immigration,<sup>8</sup> Shakti Srichandan who discussed effects of migrant workers becoming a more frequent phenomenon in the EU<sup>9</sup> and a Danish research team led by Nikolaj Malchow-Møller that quantitatively examined the variations of attitudes towards immigrations in different European countries.<sup>10</sup> These studies are without doubt related to our but not close enough for us to effectively build on them cumulatively, thus making our study something of a pioneer in the field.

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<sup>5</sup> For a visual comparison of the discrepancy of the state's RPDAS see *Table 2* p. 18

<sup>6</sup> A *Migration Board* is the general term for an organization that manages applications for asylum. It is the term that will be used for discussing the Swedish Migration Agency and the Finnish Immigration Board jointly in this study.

<sup>7</sup> The Migration Court and Migration Court of Appeal are instances that, among other things, reconsider rejected asylum applications deeming it possible to be receive residence permission through these authorities as well.

<sup>8</sup> McMahan, 2015

<sup>9</sup> Srichandan, 2015

<sup>10</sup> Malchow-Møller et al, 2008

## 2. Theoretical framework

### 2.1 Framing Theory

The first theory that will be guiding the work of this thesis is *Framing Theory*. The core idea of this theory is that when an individual or a group of actors jointly recognizes a particular event, the unit tends to employ one or more frameworks or scheme of interpretation. The framework functions to interpret what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful. It enables the person to locate, perceive, identify and label all possible occurrences defined in its circumstances. The term to describe this is *political marketing*<sup>11</sup> which deals with the marketing of political platforms, political candidates and political parties. The framing part of this is political leaders trying to build on a particular setting in order to endow that context with meaning using his/her store of knowledge. The frame then operates as a lens through which the public looks at and examines the situation.<sup>12</sup> Hence the leaders set the agenda and the reference point for the public.

There are different types of frames such as *thematic*, *evaluative* and *threat frames*.<sup>13</sup> These three have been selected out of their relevancy for the thesis and because of being three of the most prominent frames in the field.<sup>14</sup>

1. The *thematic framing* introduces a content dimension or an organizing theme to the perception, interpretation and assessment of the situation. The frame then operates as a prism or lens that illuminates the creator's specific vision and displays it to the public forum, thus producing an environmental context for the particular issue.<sup>15</sup>
2. The *evaluative framing* illustrates frames that serve as benchmarks to which the external environment is compared. A certain frame can thereby make the public perceive the reality brighter or darker than is actually justified by a specific situation or event.<sup>16</sup>
3. If a political leader or party is more direct in their framing they can use *threat framing*. It includes tinting someone or something with a certain degree of fear and pointing it out as a threat.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010:149; Winther Nielsen, 2015:340-343

<sup>12</sup> Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010:151-153

<sup>13</sup> Graham et al, 2013:423-427

<sup>14</sup> Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010:150-153; Mintz & Redd, 2003:195-198

<sup>15</sup> Gross, 2008:171-174; Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010:151-152

<sup>16</sup> Mintz & Redd, 2003:195-198

<sup>17</sup> Mintz & De Rouen Jr, 2010:149-154

All three includes the overall power of framing carrying the possibility to change the public perception of a problem, without even distorting or suppressing information, merely by the framing of outcomes and contingencies.<sup>18</sup> The political programs of the parliamentary represented political parties of Sweden and Finland embody the ideologies, positions and substantial questions that they want to shed light on by creating a frame. The stated stand points written there reflects the core opinion of the party as whole. Hence the political programs can be the source of the framing tactics that the political parties in each country manifest. We hope to find *what* the essence of the party's foundational principles are and also *how* the different arguments are put forward - how they are framed. The analysis can unravel potential relationships between Sweden and Finland's different approach to granting asylums. With the discussion above in mind the first variable of this study is:

### 2.1.1 First independent variable

The *standpoint of political parties* in the question of RPDAS of both countries represented by the political parties in each country's parliament, and manifested by the parties' political platforms. Since the political platforms is the foundation of the party's standpoint we believe that a distinct trend discovered herein would be crucial for the number of granted asylums. The concrete aspect that will be examined is: "What essential trends can we identify regarding the political parties, positive or negative attitude towards immigration and how is it manifested?" To emphasize the variable's reliability<sup>19</sup> we will use two measuring points, 2010 and 2015, in order to determine whether the party has been having a similar standpoint for the past five years thus affecting the process for RPDAS through their political actions.

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<sup>18</sup> *ibid*

<sup>19</sup> Esaiasson et al, 2012:57



## 2.2 Bureaucracy Theory

The second theory that we will apply is Max Weber's *bureaucracy theory*.<sup>20</sup> Weber meant that an organization<sup>21</sup> under optimal conditions, given suitable employees and approving environment, eventually would flourish into complete bureaucracy.<sup>22</sup> The fundamental state of bureaucracy is achieved when the institution goes from being a dependent, replaceable and ineffective unit to a state of almost living organism, that works independently – thus practically impossible to dissolve. The bureaucracy almost receives a soul of its own and can come to alter the power relationship with the hand that once created it, consequently achieving a degree of autonomy which was not originally intended.

In order for an institution to achieve the state of Weberian bureaucracy six characteristics must be fulfilled:

1. First of all the employees of the bureaucracy must act within a legally regulated mandate, which causes employees at the bottom of the hierarchical ladder to have a narrow mandate connected to a small area of expertise.<sup>23</sup>
2. Secondly the hierarchy needs to be solid and its order of conduct not to be questioned. There is no such thing as a personal opinion with the exception of the executive leadership.<sup>24</sup> The leadership can on the other hand form the bureaucracy as they prefer since the organization, like a vehicle, is conductible to anyone who has the keys to its engine and know how to conduct it.<sup>25</sup>
3. The hierarchal relationship should be stated in the bureaucracy's internal doctrine, thus preventing rapid change of the institutions foundation.<sup>26</sup> The bureaucracy should not, however, be restrained by a higher authority such as a government or laws to a high extent, since it must be internally maneuverable in order to maintain its efficiency.<sup>27</sup>
4. To further increase the bureaucracy's formality all employees are obligated to have a specialized education tilted towards the narrow area he/she will be working in. The employee should be connected to the work to such a degree that disobeying or transferring between departments should be almost impossible.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Weber, 1991:196-203; Lachmann, 1971:49-56

<sup>21</sup> By organization Weber means a formal unit such as a department or an enterprise, not a family or a group of friends; Dronberger, 1971:296-299

<sup>22</sup> Weiss, 1983:42-47

<sup>23</sup> Weber, 1991:196-199; Dronberger, 1971:293-297

<sup>24</sup> Mintzberg, 1983:9-15

<sup>25</sup> Lachmann, 1971:62-67

<sup>26</sup> Dronberger, 1971:311-314

<sup>27</sup> *ibid*

<sup>28</sup> Bendix, 1960:294-298

5. The position of the employee inside the bureaucracy should be his/her only work, resulting in the organization being a significant part of his/her life and minimizing external influences that could backfire on the bureaucracy.<sup>29</sup> With no input from the employees the course of action decided by the executive leadership will sustain without questions or objections from the staff making the bureaucratic machinery extremely efficient.<sup>30</sup>
6. Finally Weber emphasizes the importance of the bureaucracy sharing a common vision. Even though the bureaucracy is gradually dehumanizing the staff they should still have goals, which of course are defined by the executive leadership.<sup>31</sup> By stating clear and achievable visions the bureaucratic machinery automatically works in this direction.<sup>32</sup>

By fulfilling these six characteristics of bureaucracy Weber claims that any organization will be extremely efficient which is being manifested in a famous quote about the perfect organization: "Precision, speed, consistency, availability of record, continuity, possibility of secrecy, unity, rigorous coordination, and minimization of friction and of expense for materials and personnel are achieved in a strictly bureaucratized [...] administration conducted by trained officials [...]".<sup>33</sup>

Both the Swedish Migration Agency and the Finnish Immigration Service fall under the Weberian organizational criteria,<sup>34</sup> but we have reason to believe that the level of *bureaucracy* is varying between the two institutions. If the discrepancy in terms of degrees of bureaucracy would be significant, it would (combined with an executive leadership working in a straight direction) affect the outcome of RPDAS in each state, since the Migration Office then would be able to choose a path of its own. To clarify this statement we would like to return to Weber's second characteristic for the ultimate bureaucracy where the leadership could conduct the machinery as they prefer, thus enabling a highly efficient bureaucracy to grant and execute a high number of RPDAS. The same bureaucracy could also work in the opposite direction and actively prevent asylums. One example of an autonomous action being taken by the Swedish Migration Agency is the decision to let every Syrian refugee receive permanent residence permit in September 2013.<sup>35</sup> The decisions of the leadership of the Swedish and Finnish migration office will therefore be studied thoroughly in this thesis. An ineffective organization would not be able to grant asylums at the level of a perfect bureaucracy even if provided with an asylum benevolent leadership. Therefore it is of utmost importance to also study

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<sup>29</sup> Weber, 1991:202

<sup>30</sup> Dronberger, 1971:301–304

<sup>31</sup> Bendix, 1960:294–298

<sup>32</sup> Weiss, 1983:244–247; Bendix, 1960:289–293

<sup>33</sup> Weber cited in Dronberger, 1971:303

<sup>34</sup> Weber, 1991:196–203

<sup>35</sup> Swedish Migration Agency, 2015b

the level of bureaucracy of the Swedish Migration Agency and the Finnish Migration Service from Weber's six characteristics with the following variable:

### 2.2.1 Second independent variable

*The degree of bureaucracy* in the Swedish and Finnish Migration Offices measured from Max Weber's six characteristics of bureaucracy. In addition this variable will examine the *standpoint in terms of distributing residence permits to asylum seekers of the executive leadership* of the Swedish and Finish Migration Boards.

### 3. Method and research design

The research question of this thesis emphasizes the causal mechanism that explains *why* Sweden distributed more residence permits to asylum seekers than Finland, during a specific period of time. In order to provide an answer adjusted to this fact we focus on said *explanation*, rather than the *understanding* of the issue.<sup>36</sup> To achieve a deeper understanding of the phenomenon a more widespread study also including an analysis of discourses and a more thorough historical survey would be needed, which is beyond the limits of this study. Instead this thesis aims not only to clarify the origins of the diversity of RPDAS in Sweden and Finland, but to reveal a general pattern of under which conditions residence permits are distributed to asylum seekers. In order to prove such causality we will use the methodological framework of Mill called *method of difference* which claims that if two similar units face the same conditions and receive different results, other units will follow the same pattern.<sup>37</sup>

Since Sweden and Finland are located in the same geographic region, share a common history to a large extent, are members of the European Union and have equal levels of internal EU trading<sup>38</sup> they are without doubt to be classified as very similar states, thus Mill's method of difference will be applicable.

It is reasonable to believe that the political parties represented in the Swedish and Finnish parliament affect the number of RPDAS, just as the same parties decide most matters in the two states. This is also the reason to why the first variable about political stand-points is included in the study and why the party platforms are used as the foundational source. Political platforms, programs and official statements are the main messages communicated outwards by the parties and therefore a relevant object to analyze. We are aware of the fact that parties not always stick to their political platforms, but in order to maintain a high level of electoral support and legitimacy the agenda must be followed to a high extent. A party that repeatedly acts contrary to its political platform will act against the voters that elected it and eventually lose support and their seats in the parliament. By only examining parties being represented in the parliament (with higher emphasis on the five largest of each state) we therefore ensure that the political programs are representative for the actions being taken by the party, thus making the variable a relevant unit of measurement. A party communicating a hostile view towards migration and RPDAS will most likely do its utmost to limit this phenomenon and vice versa.

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<sup>36</sup> Hollis, 1994:18–19 & 248–250

<sup>37</sup> Teorell & Svensson, 2007:225–226; Esaiason et al, 2012:154–157

<sup>38</sup> Eurostat, 2014b

The reasoning above leads us towards our second variable - the mandate, capability and the will of the executive leadership of the Swedish Migration Agency and The Finnish Migration Service. For this variable we will study the two organizations thoroughly in order to determine the level of bureaucracy from the Weberian characteristics. We will also examine the stand-points of the executive leadership in both Migration Boards in order to determine their view on the issue of RPDAS.

The variables are separated and connected to different theories, but we believe that there is a degree of linkage between them. The first variable is directly affecting the second since it is reasonable to believe that a state with a political forum flourishing with support for migration would allocate a significant portion of the state budget to their Migration Board and increase its mandate. Obviously it could work the other way around too, with the political parties creating a restraining environment for that Migration Board.

## 4. Analysis

### 4.1 Analysis of first variable

#### 4.1.1 The refugee policy of political parties in Sweden and Finland

In the following chapter we will foremost examine the most visible and characterizing standpoints & approaches towards refugee policy<sup>39</sup> in the five largest<sup>40</sup> political parties in Sweden and Finland. We use the programs and manifests that are available, but also look into their websites where they often mention RP as one of their political subjects. The relevant standpoints will be connected with framing theory since the particular way a frame is created effects how a certain issue can be thought about and accordingly affects the possibilities for different actions.<sup>41</sup> An analysis that conclude *what* and *how* the political parties are framing their RP and what effects this has on each state's national attitude. During the research we have observed tendencies in the thematic framing of the RP on state basis. The national Swedish thematic frame on the issue is displaying an overall open view and considers immigration as an enriching possibility of growth.<sup>42</sup> The Finnish national thematic frame reveals a more indifferent view with little light being shed on the issue. The actual attention given, however, is generally endorsing a restrained and controlled vision.<sup>43</sup>

##### 4.1.1.1 Analysis of the refugee policies of the Swedish parties

The five largest political parties according to mandates is the Swedish Social Democratic Party (S), Moderate Party (M), Green Party (MP), Centre party (C) and the Sweden Democrats (SD) (SCB, 2015)

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<sup>39</sup> The term *refugee policy* is used frequently in this study and will be shortened to RP.

<sup>40</sup> By largest we mean the percentage of seats held in the parliament between 2010 and 2015. The decision to mainly concentrate the analysis to the larger parties is motivated with the fact that substantial political power is needed to significantly affect the outcome of the nation's migration politics. The smaller parties are not, however, excluded from the study. For further information and discussion of them see chapter 4.1.1.3 *Conclusion of first variable* p. 16 and *Table 1* of figures included therein.

<sup>41</sup> Björnehed, 2012:38

<sup>42</sup> Moderate Party, 2010; Swedish Social Democrats, 2010; Green Party, 2010, Centre Party, 2010

<sup>43</sup> Finns Party, 2010; Centre Party of Finland, 2006

#### 4.1.1.1.1 The Moderate Party

We initiate by analyzing the Moderate Party (107 mandates - 2010, 84 -2014). Their manifest, *An active policy for immigrant's establishment*, was created slightly prior to the elections of 2010. They describe Sweden as an open society that has been enriched culturally & economically by immigration and that Sweden should serve as a sanctuary for people that flee from persecution and oppression.<sup>44</sup> They give the reader a picture (a prism) of Sweden as “open” and as a “sanctuary”, thus contributing to the *national Swedish thematic frame*.<sup>45</sup> Hence this perception becomes the reference point set by the politicians of the Moderate Party and become a benchmark for their course of action.<sup>46</sup> In their present manifest they have chosen a more restrictive path which is manifested in the following quote: “Our new politics regarding migration and integration implies a third way between the Green Party’s wishes of a free immigration and the Sweden Democrat’s closed borders”<sup>47</sup> [our translation]. They refer to the present situation as “unsustainable” and claims that Sweden must reduce the amount of RPDAS temporarily.<sup>48</sup> In addition they request a change in the legislation enforcing the Dublin convention<sup>49</sup> and temporary resident permits, which are both controversial propositions that express a totally new approach towards refugees.<sup>50</sup> This sudden linguistic change in M from “open” & “enriched” to “unsustainable” is a typical example of a strategic change. The universal knowledge of how cognitive mechanisms influence party strategists to re-navigate strategy is, however, quite limited.<sup>51</sup> Theoretically the move could be in line with Anthony Downs’s theory of *vote maximization*<sup>52</sup> or it could be a way for the Moderate Party to, without organization gain in mind, handle what is perceived as a serious threat. What is certain, however, is that the radical alteration of the RP from a party holding a significant number of the parliamentary seats will affect both the thematic frame of Swedish immigration and the actual upcoming immigration situation.

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<sup>44</sup> Moderate Party, 2010

<sup>45</sup> Mintz & De Rouen, 2010:151–152; Guggenheimer, 2015:13-14; For a further discussion on the matter of the Swedish National thematic frame see chapter 4.1.1 *The refugee policy (RP) of political parties in Sweden and Finland* p. 10

<sup>46</sup> Mintz & De Rouen JR, 2010:150

<sup>47</sup> Moderate Party, 2015

<sup>48</sup> *ibid*

<sup>49</sup> The essence of the Dublin convention is that a refugee seeking asylum in Europe should be applying for this in the first country of arrival. He/she should therefore be denied the right to apply for asylum in any other country and being referred to the primary.

<sup>50</sup> Moderate Party, 2015

<sup>51</sup> Winther Nielsen, 2015:340

<sup>52</sup> Downs, 1957:135-141; Håkansson, 2010:69; The core of Down’s theory is that parties change strategies in order to fill a political vacuum i.e. a burning issue that few or no other parties pay attention to.

#### 4.1.1.1.2 The Centre Party

The Centre Party (23 mandates 2010, 22 – 2014) has a positive but lowly prioritized view of immigration in 2010 and solely states that: [...] “Sweden should be an open and attractive country for immigrants”<sup>53</sup> [our translation]. In 2015 migration politics is a core issue and the party states: “War and persecution forces millions to flee. Some come to Sweden. It is our duty to give them shelter, both as a state and as human beings”<sup>54</sup> [our translation].

Consequently C contributes to Swedish thematic migration frame<sup>55</sup> by explicitly stating that Sweden should be open and more welcoming towards refugees.<sup>56</sup>

#### 4.1.1.1.3 The Social Democratic Party

In The Swedish Social Democratic Party’s (112 mandates 2010, 113 – 2014) program from 2010 they state that “Sweden is a clear example proving that the knowledge, labor and diversity that are caused by refugees have had significant importance for Swedish growth and development” [our translation].<sup>57</sup> Regarding their RP they write; “We want Sweden and the EU to have a common, legally secure, humane, solidary and effective asylum policy” [our translation].<sup>58</sup> They stick to their vision in their 2015-program which is being manifested as: “We Social democrats stand up for the right to seek asylum as a part of the human rights”<sup>59</sup> [our translation]. A slight difference from earlier writings is the increased emphasis of shared responsibility in the European Union: “In the EU the responsibility for refugees must be carried more solidary”<sup>60</sup> [our translation]. One can also observe signs of the reaction to the refugee crisis: “To uphold the right of asylum, clear rules of conduct are required. In times of crisis this is even more vital”<sup>61</sup> [our translation]. S mediates a very positive view using the typical “social democratic” words; humanitarian & solidary which could serve as both thematic and evaluative frames. An example of the thematic use is the connection to the party ideology and setting of environment where the RP is placed,<sup>62</sup> which in the Social Democrat’s

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<sup>53</sup> Centre Party, 2010

<sup>54</sup> Centre Party, 2015

<sup>55</sup> Mintz & De Rouen Jr, 2010:149; For a further discussion on the matter of the Swedish National thematic frame see chapter 4.1.1 *The refugee policy (RP) of political parties in Sweden and Finland* p. 10

<sup>56</sup> Centre Party, 2015

<sup>57</sup> Swedish Social Democratic Party, 2010

<sup>58</sup> *ibid*

<sup>59</sup> Swedish Social Democratic Party, 2015

<sup>60</sup> *ibid*

<sup>61</sup> *ibid*

<sup>62</sup> Entman, 2004:21-29



case is characterized by words such as “humane” and “welcoming” - thus contributing to the national Swedish thematic frame.<sup>63</sup>

#### 4.1.1.1.4 The Green Party

The Green Party (25 mandates 2010 & 2014) states in their manifest from 2010 that the RP must have respect for human rights and declares that Sweden must create more legal ways to get into the country.<sup>64</sup> In their 2015-program they call for a transformation towards more benevolent migration politics in Sweden and the establishment of “A world without borders where everyone has the right to move, but no one has to flee”.<sup>65</sup> An ambitious writing indeed, which exceeds the already positive thematic Swedish migration frame.<sup>66</sup>

#### 4.1.1.1.5 The Sweden Democrats

In their 2010-program The Sweden Democrats (20 mandates 2010, 49 – 2014) names a section *A responsible immigration policy*.<sup>67</sup> The program states: “In today’s Sweden we have irresponsible immigration and integration politics. Our country has received too much immigrants in too little time, and only some of them have been refugees under UN’s Geneva convention. This has created broad economic, social, and cultural problems at the same time as we have decreased our space for supporting those people that really are suffering around the world.”<sup>68</sup> [our translation]. SD is using *threat framing* by implying that immigrants by existence are threatening the Swedish society and its cultural values.<sup>69</sup> For their 2015-program they chose the name *A responsible RP*<sup>70</sup> and clarifies that they are not per se objecting immigration as a phenomenon, but objects the Swedish thematic migration frame for being too benign.<sup>71</sup> The threat frame is less obvious in the later program but still expresses skepticism towards exceeding foreign influence.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Swedish Social Democratic Party, 2015; Entman, 2004:21-29

<sup>64</sup> Green Party, 2010

<sup>65</sup> Green Party, 2015a; Green Party, 2015b

<sup>66</sup> For a further discussion on the matter of the Swedish National thematic frame see chapter 4.1.1 *The refugee policy (RP) of political parties in Sweden and Finland* p. 10

<sup>67</sup> Sweden Democrats 2010

<sup>68</sup> *ibid*

<sup>69</sup> Mintz & De Rouen Jr, 2010:150-152

<sup>70</sup> Sweden Democrats, 2015

<sup>71</sup> *ibid*

<sup>72</sup> *ibid*

#### 4.1.1.2 Analysis of the refugee policies of the Finnish parties

The five largest parties in Finland are Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP), National Coalition Party (NCP), Centre Party Finland (CPF), Finns Party (Perus) and Left Alliance (LA).<sup>73</sup>

##### 4.1.1.2.1 The Social Democratic Party of Finland

The RP of SDP (42 mandates 2011, 36 – 2015) is not displayed in their general manifests and one has to look into a separate, partially hidden, program from 2010 to encounter it.<sup>74</sup> The program states that the eagerness to receive refugees and the management of refugees is connected to international solidarity and rooted into Finnish culture. In order to fulfil its responsibilities Finland needs to accelerate its management of asylum applications by expanding the Immigration Service.<sup>75</sup> This line of thought is consistent in SDP's 2015-version, with the exception of a higher emphasis on EU-responsibility rather than a global ditto in the later version.<sup>76</sup> Alike their Swedish social democratic counterparts SDP focuses on terms such as “solidarity” and “openness”, creating a thematic frame.<sup>77</sup> SDP obviously tries to improve their own image in the matter by creating an evaluative frame where it equals itself to its Swedish system.<sup>78</sup>

##### 4.1.1.2.2 The National Coalition Party

In 2010 the National Coalition Party (44 mandates 2011, 37-2015) only mentions immigration briefly and centers the discussion to labor immigration, thus excluding the asylum issue completely.<sup>79</sup> In 2015 they adapt a more confronting perspective and wishes to empower “A child-friendly society and planned immigration policy”<sup>80</sup> [our translation]. They explicitly states that: ”The Finnish RP should be humane but regulated”<sup>81</sup> [our translation], which to a

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<sup>73</sup> Statistics Finland, 2015

<sup>74</sup> SDP, 2010

<sup>75</sup> *ibid*

<sup>76</sup> SDP, 2015

<sup>77</sup> Swedish Social Democrats, 2015; SDP, 2015; Mintz & De Rouen, 2010:150-152

<sup>78</sup> Swedish Migration Agency, 2015a; Finnish Immigration Service 2015a; Gross, 2008:171-174; Mintz & Redd, 2003:195-198

<sup>79</sup> National Coalition Party, 2007:9-10

<sup>80</sup> National Coalition Party, 2015

<sup>81</sup> *ibid*

relatively high degree is a positive view of the phenomenon - incoherent with the Finnish national thematic frame of immigration.<sup>82</sup>

#### 4.1.1.2.3 The Centre Party of Finland

The Centre Party's (35 mandates 2011, 49 – 2015) program for 2010 is not mentioning RP at all.<sup>83</sup> This indifference towards the immigration issue has altered, similarly to NCP, during the last decade resulting in an extensive RP-declaration in the Centre Party's 2015-program.<sup>84</sup>

The program problematizes the phenomenon of immigration, claiming it correlates with an increased crime rate and causes societal segregation.<sup>85</sup> CPF believes that the only sustainable solution to the refugee problem is to restore peace in areas of crisis: "Refugees must be helped as close to their homes as possible"<sup>86</sup> [our translation]. CPF frames immigration as a passive threat towards the national security of Finland, claiming that the only actual solution to refugee crises is bilateral aid and disaster relief support. By this statement the Centre Party depicts immigration per se as malign for Finland, feeding the existent skeptical thematic frame currently residing in the country.<sup>87</sup>

#### 4.1.1.2.4 The Finns Party

The Finns Party (39 mandates 2011, 38 - 2015) is the only Finnish party that explicitly state that RP is their major political issue.<sup>88</sup> In 2010 their program is characterized by nationalistic strains with the refugee issue being linked to the famous quote "when in Rome, do as the Romans do"<sup>89</sup> combined with rejection of a "burden sharing" regarding refugees.<sup>90</sup> In their 2015-program one of the most representative and conspicuous statements read: "Immigration creates an irreversible change in countries domestic population structures, it destroys the internal societal cohesion, it burdens the public services and the state's economy to an unacceptable degree, leads to the growing of ghettos, favors religious radicalism and consequences originating from this and breeds ethnical conflicts"<sup>91</sup> [our translation]. "The

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<sup>82</sup> Guggenheimer, 2015:14-15; For a further discussion on the matter of the Finnish National thematic frame see chapter 4.1.1 *The refugee policy (RP) of political parties in Sweden and Finland* p. 10

<sup>83</sup> The Centre Party Finland, 2006

<sup>84</sup> The Centre Party Finland, 2015

<sup>85</sup> *ibid*

<sup>86</sup> *ibid*

<sup>87</sup> Mintz & Redd, 2003:195-196; Entman, 2004:33-39

<sup>88</sup> Finn Party, 2010

<sup>89</sup> *ibid*

<sup>90</sup> *ibid*

<sup>91</sup> *ibid*

annual net immigration has during a decade increased to almost 20 000 without any political reaction. If the immigration continue at this rate, Finland will clearly have no possibility whatsoever to successfully integrate immigrants in the future whilst sustaining our social peace”<sup>92</sup> [our translation]. This example of threat framing shows the Finns Party’s explicit picturing of refugees as a hostile element and claims that the consequences of exceeding immigration levels will be irreversible for the nation.<sup>93</sup> The threat tactic becomes even more evident when one scrutinizes the 20 000 immigrants the Finn Party claim Finland receives annually. The total sum of residence permits distributed in 2014 was 17 995 but most of them were temporary permits for workers and students<sup>94</sup> with only 1346 being approved asylum applications.<sup>95</sup> The linkage of an annual residence permit distribution to asylum seekers of 1346 with an impossible integration situation, is an evaluative frame serving the purpose of planting the idea of a much more overwhelming refugee situation to the Finnish people.<sup>96</sup>

#### 4.1.1.2.5 The Left Alliance

The Left alliance (14 mandates 2011, 12 – 2015) has consistent manifest reaching from 2010 – 2015 where they declare a desire for increased rights for immigrants and plans for improved societal integration.<sup>97</sup> LA wishes to see Finland alter its joint national RP towards a more humane one characterized by a radically increased RPDAS.<sup>98</sup> Except for some vague statements in the matter from the Social Democrats, LA is the only Finish party that explicitly requests a raised immigration level to Finland.<sup>99</sup> They thereby substantially oppose the nation’s restrictive thematic immigration frame. They build their argument on using the word “humane” which is in line with their ideology and works as an own thematic frame for their RP.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Finns Party, 2015

<sup>93</sup> Mintz & De Rouen Jr, 2010:151-152

<sup>94</sup> Finnish Immigration Service, 2015b

<sup>95</sup> Finnish Immigration Service, 2015a

<sup>96</sup> Mintz & Redd, 2003:195-198

<sup>97</sup> The Left Alliance, 2015

<sup>98</sup> *ibid*

<sup>99</sup> *ibid*

<sup>100</sup> Mintz & De Rouen Jr, 2010:150

### 4.1.1.3 Conclusion of the first variable

To summarize the national thematic RP-frames are being upheld by several parties in both countries. The Swedish national frame, characterized by openness and the view of the phenomenon of immigration as enriching for the nation, has been maintained by the Social Democrats, the Moderate Party, the Centre Party and the Green Party until recently.<sup>101</sup> This persistent support from a broad political spectrum in the question creates a foundational national support for the phenomenon as such, consequently creating a basis for extensive RPDAS. The smaller political parties in Sweden such as the Left Party, the Liberals and the Christian Democrats are generally contributing to the positive nation frame, with some contemporary statements from CD opposing the view.<sup>102</sup> The recent policy change of the Moderate party along with increased support for the threat framing Sweden Democrats might alter this national frame. This will have implications for the upcoming immigration situation and the RPDAS.

The Finnish restrictive national frame, additionally characterized by indifference towards the phenomenon, is mainly being upheld by the Finns Party and the Centre Party. Only the Left Alliance and the Social Democrats (to some degree) actively fight the battle for an alteration of the frame towards a Swedish model. With the smaller parties (the Green Party, Swedish People's Party of Finland and Christian Democrats) sharing the indifference towards the question and two parties maintaining the negative view in governmental position,<sup>103</sup> Finland is actively minimizing its RPDAS and will most likely continue this restrictive RP for a foreseeable future.

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<sup>101</sup> The Moderate Party recently changed

<sup>102</sup> For additional information of the frames and stand-points of the smaller parties see *Table 1* p. 17

<sup>103</sup> For a further discussion on the matter see the 4.1.1.2.3 *The Centre Party Finland* p. 15 and 4.1.1.2.4 *The Finns Party* p. 15

Party name	Percentage of parliamentary seats 2010/2015(1) <sup>104</sup>	General view on immigration 2010(2) <sup>105</sup>	General view on immigration 2015(2)	Consistency 2010-2015	Type of framing(3) <sup>106</sup>	Immigration as possibility or threat(4) <sup>107</sup>	Explicit focus on RP as subject(5) <sup>108</sup>
<b>Social D. Moderate</b>	32%	Positive	Positive	Yes	T	Possibility	Yes
<b>Sweden D.</b>	27%	Positive	Negative	No	T, E, TH	Possibility	Yes
<b>Green P.</b>	10%	Negative	Negative	Yes	TH	Threat	Yes
<b>Centre P.</b>	7%	Positive	Positive	Yes	T	Possibility	Yes
<b>Liberals</b>	6.4%	Positive	Positive	Yes	T	Possibility	Yes
<b>Left P.</b>	6.1%	Positive	Positive	Yes	T	Possibility	Yes
<b>Christian</b>	5.7%	Positive	Positive	Yes	T	Possibility	Yes
<b>CPF</b>	5.0%	Positive	Neutral	No	T	Possibility	Yes
<b>NCP</b>	21%	Neutral	Negative	No	T, TH	Threat	Yes
<b>SDP</b>	20.3%	Neutral	Positive	Yes	T	Possibility	No
<b>Perus</b>	19%	Positive	Positive	Yes	T, E	Possibility	No
<b>Left A.</b>	18.8%	Negative	Negative	Yes	TH	Threat	Yes
<b>Green P.</b>	6.5%	Positive	Positive	Yes	T	Possibility	Yes
<b>SFP</b>	6.3%	Positive	Positive	Yes	T	Possibility	No
<b>CDF</b>	4.5%	Positive	Positive	Yes	T	Possibility	No
	2.8%	Negative	Negative	Yes	TH	Threat	Yes

Table 1: Summary of mandate, frames and refugee polic(ies) of parties represented in the Swedish and Finnish parliament.

State	RPDAS in 2010	RPDAS in 2011	RPDAS in 2012	RPDAS in 2013	RPDAS in 2014	RPDAS in 2015	Total*
<b>Sweden</b>	8732	9088	12 576	24 498	31 220	32 631	<b>118 745</b>
<b>Finland</b>	1784	1271	1601	1827	1346	1532**	<b>7534</b>
<b>Difference</b>	6948	7817	10 975	22 671	29 874	31 099	<b>111 211</b>

Table 2: Display of the number of residence permits distributed to asylum seekers between 2010 – 2015 in Sweden and Finland.

\* All the data is collected from the official statistical archives of the Migration Boards.

<http://www.migrationsverket.se/English/About-the-Migration-Agency/Facts-and-statistics-/Statistics.html> and

[http://www.migri.fi/about\\_us/statistics/statistics\\_on\\_asylum\\_and\\_refugees](http://www.migri.fi/about_us/statistics/statistics_on_asylum_and_refugees)

\*\* The data from 2015 is only covering the first 11 months

<sup>104</sup> 1. The percentage of parliamentary seats for the last five years. Sum of parliamentary mandates in the last two elections, divided with the total amount of mandates of these elections.

<sup>105</sup> 2. Interpretation of respective party's general view on immigration and RP (Positive, Negative, Neutral).

<sup>106</sup> 3. Distinguishing of each party's evident frames (T), Evaluative (E) or Threat (TH).

<sup>107</sup> 4. Interpretation of the party's general views on immigration as possibility or threat.

<sup>108</sup> 5. Analysis of whether the party give/how they give RP attention in their public writings.

## 4.2 Analysis of second variable

### 4.2.1 Examination of the levels of bureaucracy in the Swedish Migration Agency and the Finnish Immigration Service

#### 4.2.1.1 Prevalence of Weber's first characteristic in the Migration Boards

Weber's first feature of bureaucracy is the narrowness of the employees' mandate, which should be as limited as possible.<sup>109</sup> The Swedish Migration Agency is divided into several departments,<sup>110</sup> separated both hierarchically<sup>111</sup> and geographically to a very high extent.<sup>112</sup> Furthermore the Swedish agency is conducted with the *LEAN-philosophy*<sup>113</sup> with high emphasis on the importance of standardized tasks and tools for the employees,<sup>114</sup> which greatly increases the efficiency of the procedure - but also reduces each employee's mandate.<sup>115</sup> The Finnish Immigration Service, on the other hand, is a more coherent organization with fewer employees and more diverse mandate.<sup>116</sup> Their organizational structure has not been optimized and standardized like the Swedish case, thus creating a less regulated working environment in terms of mandates.<sup>117</sup>

#### 4.2.1.2 Prevalence of Weber's second characteristic in the Migration Boards

Weber's second characteristic concerns the internal hierarchy of the organization and the leadership's ability to conduct it in an external environment.<sup>118</sup> In other words, can the Director General of the Migration Board maneuver the organization as he/she desire or will the organization and/or any other elements impede it? The Swedish Migration Agency has been a hierarchical organization for quite some time, but the authority of the leadership has expanded significantly during the last decade.<sup>119</sup> In 2004 the Swedish Agency for Public Management analyzed the Migration Agency and criticized it for being too diversified, with a deficiency of power and responsibility connected to the Director General.<sup>120</sup> It claimed that the geographic distribution of the regional offices could result in a divided organization if constant and evident connection to the executive leadership was not maintained. The SAPM

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<sup>109</sup> Weber, 2001:196–199; Dronberger, 1971:293–297

<sup>110</sup> For visual information on the Swedish Migration Agency see *Appendix 1* p. 34

<sup>111</sup> For a further discussion on the hierarchy of the organizations see chapter 4.2.1.2 *Prevalence of Weber's second characteristic in the Migration Boards* p. 19

<sup>112</sup> Swedish Migration Agency, 2016a; Swedish Migration Agency, 2016b

<sup>113</sup> Eliasson, 2011:16–17; The philosophy of LEAN is that efficiency and customer value are two symbiotic phenomena. Accordingly a company or organization create tools to supply both. Practically speaking this is being implemented through standardization and the creation of routines, mandates and processes.

<sup>114</sup> Pahlsson, 2011:75 & 81-82

<sup>115</sup> Eliasson, 2011:25

<sup>116</sup> Swedish Migration Agency, 2015c; For visual information on the Finnish Immigration Board see *Appendix 2* p. 34

<sup>117</sup> The Finnish Immigration Service, 2013:2-7

<sup>118</sup> Mintzberg, 1983:9-15; Lachmann, 1971:62-67

<sup>119</sup> Swedish Migration Agency, 2015c

<sup>120</sup> The Swedish Agency of Public Management, 2004:21-22

therefore encouraged a more centralized authority and also recommended the development of a system visualizing the responsibility and mandates more noticeably.<sup>121</sup> Two years later, when reforms were already initiated in order with SAPM's recommendations, the Migration Agency received similar critique from the Swedish National Audit Office.<sup>122</sup> The SNAO claimed that the leadership of the Migration Agency needed further insight into the organizations continuous work, thus encouraging it to supervise working papers and documents of its employees; not only when presented to the leadership but also occasionally during the working process.<sup>123</sup> The essence of this critique was to homogenize the organizations task and make sure that every asylum seeker got treated equally, but in addition the review also increased the power of the leadership.<sup>124</sup> Reforms originating from reports such as SAPM's and SNAO's have resulted in the Swedish Migration Agency today being very top-down in its character and indeed fulfils Weber's second characteristic.<sup>125</sup> The Finnish Migration Service lack the same geographic diversification and is more centralized to its headquarters. The responsibility for the organization is ultimately tied to the Director General, but the executive power is more divided. Whilst the Swedish Director General was encouraged to supervise the departments thoroughly the rest of the Finnish leadership are operating their departments more autonomously, thus creating a less hierarchical situation.

#### 4.2.1.3 Prevalence of Weber's third characteristic in the Migration Boards

The third Weberian characteristic is connected to the institutionalization of laws and organizational mandates for the Migration Agencies. That is, whether there are internal or external barriers for what the leadership may or may not do and what the organizations are entitled to accomplish. The Swedish Migration Agency has during the last decade almost monopolized the area of refugee management and also has the legal authority for this.<sup>126</sup> The definitions of refugees and who should be granted asylum is of course regulated by laws,<sup>127</sup> but the operative work and the ultimate decisions are being taken almost solely by the Migration Agency.<sup>128</sup> Until 2007 the question of integration was handled by the separated Integration Agency, which was merged into the Migration Agency thus uplifting the previous organizations core issues into the later.<sup>129</sup> The Finnish Migration Service is regulated by laws to a higher degree than its Swedish counterpart.<sup>130</sup> Finland also has a government department working solely with migration and asylum issues, whilst the Swedish counterpart (the Ministry of Justice) is working with all legal matters.<sup>131</sup> The Finnish Migration Department is supreme to the Migration Service and have the authority to decide over core matters such as closure of asylum centers. The Finnish Migration Service consequently becomes a solely operative organ rather than a semi-political entity, such as

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<sup>121</sup> *ibid*

<sup>122</sup> Swedish National Audit Office, 2006:49-50

<sup>123</sup> *ibid*

<sup>124</sup> *ibid*

<sup>125</sup> Lachmann, 1971, s. 64-66

<sup>126</sup> Ministry of Justice Law on Foreigners chapter 4 §6, chapter 5 §20 & chapter 8 §17

<sup>127</sup> *ibid*, chapter 1 §3, chapter 5 §1b-1c & chapter 13 §1

<sup>128</sup> Swedish Migration Agency, 2014:8-11

<sup>129</sup> Swedish Integraton Agency, 2007; Persson, 1997:98-103

<sup>130</sup> Law of the Immigration Agency, 1995

<sup>131</sup> Migration Department, 2016; Ministry of Justice, 2016



the Swedish counterpart, in addition to its operative activities.<sup>132</sup> The Swedish Migration Agency is in legal terms inferior to the Ministry of Justice just like the Finnish equivalent is subordinated to the Migration Department, but has been provided with significantly more resources and is autonomous to a completely different degree.

#### 4.2.1.4 Prevalence of Weber's fourth characteristic in the Migration Boards

Weber's fourth criteria considers the specialization of the employees in terms of education and tasks. The more niched the employees are, the harder they are to transfer between positions and departments, hence creating a stable organization.<sup>133</sup> Both the Swedish and Finnish Migration Boards fulfil this criteria to a relatively high degree by demanding a high level of education for their central positions.<sup>134</sup> Intra-organizational rotation is of course taking place,<sup>135</sup> but not to a degree that is considerably adventuring the Weberian criteria.<sup>136</sup> The difference between the Migration Boards is in this matter insignificant and does not alter the discrepancy substantially.

#### 4.2.1.5 Prevalence of Weber's fifth characteristic in the Migration Boards

The fifth characteristic concerns employees trying to implement external ideas into the organization and is partly connected to the fourth criteria. In order to maintain a stable organization the employees should not work for other organizations and/or companies whilst they are employed by the Migration Boards. The employees are not explicitly forbidden to do so but most positions at the Boards are full time and few external consulting staff is involved, thus limiting external input significantly in both countries.<sup>137</sup>

#### 4.2.1.6 Prevalence of Weber's sixth characteristic in the Migration Boards

Weber's last feature is the common vision of the bureaucracy that should be the core issue for all employees.<sup>138</sup> Weber emphasizes the importance of creating a vision that the whole organization can contribute to, consequently motivating the bureaucracy to work as one.<sup>139</sup> The Swedish Migration Agency fulfills this criteria to its full extent by stating a clear vision: "The vision of Migration Agency 'Sweden – a nation open for the possibilities of global migration.'" <sup>140</sup> In order to manifest this goal the organization created a brochure stating its vision<sup>141</sup> and how employees in different departments of the organization could contribute to this goal;<sup>142</sup> mostly connected to the LEAN-philosophy with emphasis on teamwork, standardized processes and constantly keeping the mission in mind.<sup>143</sup> The Finnish Migration Agency also has stipulated an organizational vision that reads: "From immigration

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<sup>132</sup> Law of the Immigration Agency, 1995; Swedish Migration Agency, 2015b

<sup>133</sup> Bendix, 1960:294–298

<sup>134</sup> Åberg 2011:155–160; Migrationsverket, 2016c

<sup>135</sup> Bäcklund, 2011:38–44;

<sup>136</sup> Weber, 2001:202

<sup>137</sup> Finnish Immigration Service, 2013:4-8; Swedish Migration Agency, 2016d

<sup>138</sup> Bendix, 1960:294-298

<sup>139</sup> Weiss, 1983:244-247; Bendix, 1960:289-293

<sup>140</sup> Swedish Migration Agency, 2016e

<sup>141</sup> Swedish Migration Agency, 2012:12–18

<sup>142</sup> Bäcklund, 2011:33–38

<sup>143</sup> Wallin, 2011:125–129; Pålsson, 2011:77–82; Lidström, 2011:91–94

to citizenship – the leading specialist, partner and service provider.”<sup>144</sup> The practical execution of this vision is, however, more diffuse and the mandates stipulated for the employees more vague.<sup>145</sup>

## 4.2.2 Conclusion of first section of the second variable

Summarizing the outcome of Weber’s six characteristics of bureaucracy it is evident that the Swedish Migration Board exceeds its Finnish counterpart significantly. Although some criteria (such as the fourth and the fifth) are both in line with the Weberian utopia, the Swedish agency with its LEAN-philosophy and less governmental regulation has a considerably wider mandate. The outcome of this discrepancy is that the Swedish agency resembles a vehicle conducted by the Director General to a much higher degree, than its Finnish counterpart. This phenomenon results in a situation where the Director General of the Swedish Migration Agency can affect the amount of RPDAS greatly if he/she desires, whilst the Finnish counterpart is pinioned and regulated by the Migration Department. The Finnish Director General could therefore not alter the amount of RPDAS prominently even if he/she desired.

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<sup>144</sup> Finnish Immigration Service, 2016

<sup>145</sup> Finnish Immigration Service, 2013:5-8

## 4.2.3 Examination of the Director Generals at the Migration Boards between 2010 - 2015

### 4.2.3.1 Jorma Vuorio

Jorma Vuorio was Director General for the Finnish Immigration Service for about a decade, ending in the middle of 2013.<sup>146</sup> He then became leader of the Migration Department, thus supervising and regulating Jaana Vuorio,<sup>147</sup> his successor at the Migration Service.<sup>148</sup> During his position at the Immigration Service Jorma Vuorio wished to see immigration as a regulated phenomenon and sought to keep the amount of RPDAS at a constant level; even during periods of international crisis.<sup>149</sup> He favored the idea of citizenships being subject to empirical and linguistic knowledge of Finland & the Finnish language<sup>150</sup> and openly expressed his concern with the Somali immigration.<sup>151</sup> In sum he used his (quite limited) power as Director General to maintain the low level of RPDAS.<sup>152</sup>

### 4.2.3.2 Jaana Vuorio

His successor, Jaana Vuorio, was appointed in July 2013 and has also expresses a desire for strictly regulated migration.<sup>153</sup> She initiated a two week asylum stop for Iraqi and Somali asylum seekers and exhorted an investigation of the security situation in these two states, in order to reduce the amount of RPDAS of these areas.<sup>154</sup> Consequently Jaana, like her predecessor, uses her (quite limited) power to keep the level of RPDAS limited.<sup>155</sup>

### 4.2.3.3 Dan Eliasson

Dan Eliasson was Director General for the Swedish Migration Agency between May of 2007 and September of 2011.<sup>156</sup> His main contribution to the organization was the implementation of the LEAN-philosophy, which resulted in the achievement of a much higher efficiency in the handling of asylum applications,<sup>157</sup> without jeopardizing the legal certainty of the asylum examinations.<sup>158</sup> Eliasson expressed a benevolent view of immigration and is grateful over the fact that people want to come to Sweden.<sup>159</sup> He has also stated that he felt the urge to vomit when watching Sweden Democrat leader Jimmie Åkesson debate.<sup>160</sup> In contrast to the

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<sup>146</sup> Finnish Immigration Service, 2015c

<sup>147</sup> Although the similarity of the Director Generals names' they are not related.

<sup>148</sup> Finnish Immigration Service, 2015c

<sup>149</sup> Backman, 2010

<sup>150</sup> Fredriksson, 2010

<sup>151</sup> Backman, 2010

<sup>152</sup> For further information about the number of RPDAS during the mandate of Joma Vuorio see *Table 2* p.18

<sup>153</sup> Abdulkarim & Saarikoski, 2015

<sup>154</sup> von Kramer, 2015

<sup>155</sup> Savonius, 2015

<sup>156</sup> Eliasson, 2011:11–15

<sup>157</sup> *ibid*:18-23

<sup>158</sup> Ribbenvik, 2011:175-179

<sup>159</sup> Eliasson, 2011:24-29

<sup>160</sup> SVT, 2014; The incident occurred when Eliasson was appointed Director General of the Social Insurance Agency

Finnish Director General Eliasson undoubtedly increased the RPDAS through his benign view of immigration, the implementation of the LEAN-philosophy and the decision to grant permanent residence permits to Syrian refugees in 2013.<sup>161</sup>

#### 4.2.3.4 Anders Danielsson

Anders Danielsson succeeded Eliasson in October 2013 and is the current Director General of the agency. Danielsson has compared to his Finnish counterparts an incredibly wide mandate, but he wishes to extend it further: “I should have an extremely wide freedom of action. One could equate it with an American admiral on a carrier. A whole armada of ships. He just stands there: pointing out the target, navigates, decides the velocity”<sup>162</sup> [our translation]. When asked what he would do if the Sweden Democrats would achieve governmental position and implement their immigration politics he answered: “Then I would have to leave. I am not going to point out a specific party but if we theoretically would receive immigration politics that is incompatible with my values, I only have one choice and that is to quit my job”<sup>163</sup> [our translation]. Danielsson is also distancing himself from the idea of proclaiming “safe countries” in the way Jaana Vuorio tried to declare Somalia and Iraq.<sup>164</sup> In sum Danielsson is extensively affecting the amount of RPDAS through his broad (and potentially widening) mandate as Director General and his very positive view of the effects of immigration and cultural diversity.<sup>165</sup>

#### 4.2.4 Conclusion of the second variable

The discrepancy between the Swedish and Finnish Director Generals is remarkable. Both Jorma Vuorio and Jaana Vuorio are reactionary leaders striving for a strictly regulated RPDAS. The Swedish Migration Agency, on the other hand, emphasizes the positive effects of immigration at a societal level and wishes to maintain (if not increase) the already high Swedish figure. Jorma Vuorio and Jaana Vuorio have quite limited power to affect the actual numbers in any direction,<sup>166</sup> but evidently tries to reduce the RPDAS additionally. Dan Eliasson and Anders Danielsson have both explicitly stated that their beliefs and modus operandi is incongruent with restriction policies and party’s waging such values.<sup>167</sup> They are both to be classified as benign to RPDAS and, with the assistance of the extremely bureaucratic<sup>168</sup> Migration Agency, they are almost to be considered sovereign rulers of the organization. Accordingly, the high number of RPDAS is without doubt related to Dan Eliasson’s and Anders Danielsson’s view of high immigration as a beneficial phenomenon for the Swedish society.

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<sup>161</sup> Eliasson, 2011:12-17; Swedish Migration Agency, 2015b

<sup>162</sup> af Kleen, 2015

<sup>163</sup> ibid

<sup>164</sup> Abdulkarim & Saarikoski, 2015; af Kleen, 2015

<sup>165</sup> ibid

<sup>166</sup> For a further discussion on the Finnish Director General’s power see chapter 4.2.2 *Conclusion of first section of the second variable* p. 22

<sup>167</sup> af Kleen, 2015; SVT, 2014

<sup>168</sup> Weber, 2001:196-199; The term *bureaucratic* in Weber’s eyes is, as a reminder, almost synonymous with the term *effective*.

## 5. Conclusion

As declared in the variable's sub-conclusions there is a correlation between each variable and the amount of RPDAS. We still claim that the variables are contributing jointly to the Swedish-Finnish asylum-discrepancy, in the sense that the first variable is directly affecting the second by creating boundaries for the freedom of action of the Migration Boards. To clarify this statement we assert that the national thematic frames created by the leading political parties establish a framework for the respective Migration Board, limiting its width of possible actions. The efficiency of the Migration Boards is ultimately depending on their level of bureaucracy, according to Weber's theory of the phenomenon. A completely developed bureaucracy is also fully conductible by the organizations leadership, in this case the Director General. Ultimately it is therefore the intention and conviction of the Director General that will decide the course of action of an ideal bureaucracy.

The Swedish Migration Agency is to be considered such a bureaucracy. With both the current and previous Director General being positive towards high levels of immigration, the outcome of their terms of office is a large number of RPDAS. The Finnish Immigration Service lacks most of the bureaucratic characteristics inherited by its Swedish counterpart, thus making it less conductible by its Director General. In addition both the current and previous Director General of this organization are reactionary and wishes to see strictly regulated RPDAS. Even if the Finnish Director General would like to increase Finland's RPDAS, the ineffectiveness of the Finnish Immigration Service would halt the procedure significantly. In addition the national Finnish thematic frame contributes to this restriction since the majority of the political parties are being indifferent towards immigration as a phenomenon. Out of the parties that, however, places strong emphasis on the issue most expresses a desire for strict regulations of RPDAS; sometimes even projecting immigration as a threat. In Sweden the immigration issue is frequently debated with most parties having a benign image of the phenomenon. Consequently a reversed scenario is taking place there, with the Swedish Migration Agency receiving an extremely wide mandate in terms of RPDAS.

With the reasoning above in mind, we conclude that the characteristics of the national thematic frame towards immigration - along with the level of bureaucracy - and the mindset of the Director General jointly affects the amount of distributed residence permits to asylum seekers significantly.

## 5.1 Concluding remarks

The conclusion above claims that there is a clear correlation between our independent variables and the distribution of residence permits to asylum seekers. By proving such a correlation analyzing the two overall similar states Sweden and Finland, we believe that our results are applicable to other cases as well. Our contribution to the field could therefore be summarized as: *If a state has been characterized by a positive national thematic frame towards immigration for at least five consecutive years and currently has a bureaucratic Migration Board with an immigration-benevolent Director General, it will distribute a large number of residence permits to asylum seekers.* If a completely reversed scenario exists, the state will distribute an extremely low number of residence permits to asylum seekers. If a state is characterized by a positive thematic frame towards the phenomenon, but has a non-efficient Migration Board and/or a Director General opposing immigration to some degree, the state will distribute an average number of residence permits to asylum seekers.

What one should bear in mind is that the study is limited to *explaining* this phenomenon, not to establish a thorough *understanding* of, for instance, how national thematic frames towards immigration are created in detail. One should also take notice that this thesis fully excludes the normative dimension of the question.

A normative analysis of the issue and/or a study creating a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms of our independent variables are our recommendations for further research to anyone who wishes to, in the name of cumulatively, expand this relatively uncharted research field.

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
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# Appendixes

Swedish Migration Agency



Appendix 1: Organizational chart of the Swedish Migration Agency

2015-03-02

<b>Director General</b> <b>Jaana Vuorio</b>	
Management Support	
<b>Immigration</b> Tiina Suominen Director	<b>Customer Relations and Communications</b> Hanna Koskinen Director
<b>Asylum</b> Esko Repo Director	<b>Administration and Development Services</b> Jouko Salonen Director
<b>Reception</b> Jorma Kuuluvainen Director	<b>Legal Service and Country Information</b> Hanna Helinko Director
<b>Nationality</b> Heikki Taskinen Director	<b>Unit for Electronic Services</b> Petri Kujala Director of Information Management

Appendix 2: Organizational chart of the Finnish Immigration Service