



**Ukrainian Language Policy: The Status of Russian in English Language Medium
Ukrainian and Russian Newspapers and in the Linguistic Landscape of Four Regions**

Svetlana Anatol' L'nyavskiy-Ekelund

Centre for Languages and Literature
Master's Thesis, 30 hp (SPVR01)
English Language and Linguistics
January 2016
Supervision by Dr. Francis M. Hult

Abstract

Following a long-standing sociolinguistic pursuit to investigate language policy through complex non-linear models that analyze historical, structural, political and social processes that produce, contextualize, circulate and negotiate particular ideologies, beliefs and myths about languages and their values through meaning-making activities, this master's thesis aims to apply an interpretive approach to corpus-assisted discourse analysis and appropriate elements of nexus analysis to an investigation of the status of the Russian in the language policy of Ukraine during the period of 2010 to 2015.

Regarding language policies as a complex social phenomenon, this study of Ukrainian monolingual language policy is focused on investigating nexuses involving policymaking, its interpretation by various political players, and implementation aiming to answer the question of how established and circulating discourses mediate, negotiate and regulate relations between Ukrainian and Russian languages.

Two specialized corpora were created for a synchronic study of language ideological debates (Blommaert, 1999) in Ukraine's and Russia's most popular English-medium editions of online newspapers, designated for a Western audience, regarding the *de jure* status of the Russian language in the period from the onset of Victor Yanukovich's presidency in 2010 until 2015. *De facto* implementations of the language policy regulations and negotiations in the visual environment are studied through linguistic landscape data collected in four diverse regions of Ukraine.

The results of this study support the findings of Hult and Pietikäinen (2014) and Kulyk (2009) that language ideological debates are made salient by political elites during elections or times of crisis; moreover, it shows how the claims of discrimination against the Russian language

and Russian speakers have been used by the Russian government as a pretext for invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, the analysis of debates in media and the comparative study of linguistic landscapes point out the regional differences and linguistic realities ‘on the ground’, demonstrating the need for a flexible language policy that would take those differences into account and, while aiming at development and support of the state language, would recognize the Russian language as a resource necessary for the nation’s unity at this point in time.

Keywords: language policy, corpus-assisted discourse study, Ukraine, Russia, linguistic landscape

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|----|
| 1. Introduction | 6 |
| 1.1. Developing a non-linear model of language policy analysis | 6 |
| 1.2. A language to kill for: Ukrainian language politics as a reason for military conflict | 8 |
| 1.3. Complexity of language issues in Ukraine | 9 |
| 1.3.1. Native language vs. language of everyday use | 10 |
| 1.3.2. A special place for English language | 11 |
| 1.4. Language policy in Ukraine during the nation-state building period | 12 |
| 1.5. The laws governing language use in Ukraine relevant for this study for analysis of media and public space discourses | 14 |
| 1.6. Summary of chapters | 18 |
| 2. Historical – structural analysis of Ukrainian and Russian language relations through the eyes of Ukrainian, Western and Soviet scholars | 21 |
| 2.1. Ukraine and Ukrainian language in the imperial shadows | 22 |
| 2.1.1. A nation at the cross-roads: Ukrainian language and imperial politics | 22 |
| 2.1.2. Language of the Ukrainian nation and imperial Russian politics | 23 |
| 2.2. Ukrainian and Russian languages during the Soviet period | 24 |
| 2.2.1. Soviet program of “korenizatsia” (indigenization): the new ideological state tools of control | 25 |
| 2.2.2. Stalin’s era and the opposite effect of Ukrainization | 26 |
| 2.3. Ukrainian and Russian relations from 1939 till the end of the USSR | 29 |

| | |
|---|----|
| 2.4. Ukrainian and Russian languages during the first 25 years of independence and language policy legislation | 32 |
| 2.4.1. Language management in the post-Soviet space under the rule of the new old Ukrainian elite | 33 |
| 2.4.2. Russian Federation: and out-of-state player influencing Ukrainian language politics | 35 |
| 3. Theoretical and conceptual frameworks for data analysis and methods | 38 |
| 3.1. Discourse analysis and its critical dimension | 38 |
| 3.1.1. Methods of discourse analysis of language policy in media and public space | 39 |
| 3.2. Approaches for the present study | 43 |
| 3.2.1. Corpus-assisted discourse analysis | 44 |
| 3.2.2. Research approaches to the study of linguistic landscape | 45 |
| 3.3. Methodology for data collection and analysis | 47 |
| 3.3.1. Data collection for corpus-assisted discourse analysis | 48 |
| 3.3.2. Linguistic landscape: research methods and data collection | 50 |
| 3.3.3. Linguistic landscape data collection sites | 52 |
| 4. Comparative corpus and linguistic landscape data and analysis | 59 |
| 4.1. Discourse analysis of the English medium articles in Ukrainian and Russian media | 59 |
| 4.2. Corpus-assisted interpretive analysis of language issues in Ukrainian and Russian English medium news from 2010 to October of 2015 | 62 |
| 4.2.1. Exploring collocations of the focus words ‘Russian’ and ‘language’ | 73 |
| 4.2.2. Exploring the most frequent collocations of ‘language’ | 82 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| LANGUAGE POLICY IN UKRAINE | 5 |
| 4.3. Linguistic landscape data analysis: language policy and public space | 91 |
| 4.3.1. The general distribution of languages in Kyiv | 93 |
| 4.3.2. The general distribution of languages in Dnipropetrovsk | 96 |
| 4.3.3. The general distribution of languages in Lviv | 97 |
| 4.3.4. The general distribution of languages in Odesa | 99 |
| 5. Conclusion | 105 |
| 5.1. Ukrainian and Russian language relationships | 105 |
| 5.2. Media coverage of the language issues in Ukraine: finding solutions of a political play? | 107 |
| 5.3. Language policy implementation in linguistic landscape | 109 |
| 5.4. The avenues for future research | 112 |
| <i>List of tables</i> | 113 |
| <i>List of figures</i> | 114 |
| <i>References</i> | 115 |

1. Introduction: Language policy in Ukraine in English Language Ukrainian and Russian Media and in Linguistic Landscape

“National security depends as never before on language and intercultural communications skills” (Brecht, as cited in Scollon & Scollon, 2007, p. 622).

1.1. Developing a Non-linear Model of Language Policy Analysis

This master’s thesis aims to analyze the language policy of Ukraine in the light of language ideological debates (Blommaert, 1999) in the most popular Ukrainian and Russian English-medium editions of online newspapers, designated specially for Western readership, regarding the status of the Russian language in the period from the beginning of Victor Yanukovych’s presidency through the tragic events in Ukraine of the year 2014 and until today. Following the footsteps of Spolsky (2004, 2009) and Shohamy (2006, xvi) in a long-standing sociolinguistic strive of investigating language policy (LP) using a variety of approaches, this thesis is complemented by a comparative study of languages in public space (a.k.a. linguistic landscape analysis) in the four distinctive regions of Ukraine as a mechanism of de facto language policy implementations where language ideological debates turn into social practice (Shohamy, 2006, p. 110). The quantitative analysis of language ideological debates in Ukrainian and Russian media is assisted by corpus linguistics’ techniques and is based on discourse-analytic tools such as quantitative corpus-assisted discourse studies (CADS) (Partington, Alan, Dugid, Tailor, 2013). The qualitative model for analysis is based on understanding language policy as a social construct and a complex social process based on cultural beliefs, attitudes and myths which are produced and mediated by relations of power (Tollefson, 1991; Shiffman, 1996; Spolsky, 2004; McCarty, 2011; Johnson, 2013) within the framework of interpretive approach to Critical Discourse Analysis as developed among many others by Fairclough (1989, 1992), Blommaert

(1999, 2015), and using relevant elements of nexus analysis founded by Scollon and Scollon (2004) and elaborated by Hult and Pietikäinen (2014) and Blommaert (2015) that provides systematic approach to the investigation of complex social issues across chronotopes and scales.

The aim of the project is to unite the study of language policy often criticized for “dichotomizing language policy creating and implementation” (Siiner, 2012, p. 21) by examining not only discursive representations of language ideologies in media, but also by tracing and comparing regional historical language ideologies, policies and practices ‘on the ground’ by comparing the visibility of those processes, such as the emergence of English language in public space (Pietikäinen, Lane, Salo, Laihiala-Kankainen, 2010) of four very distinct regions of Ukraine. The main research questions the project is seeking to answer are found in the framework developed by Hornberger and Hult (2008, p. 285):

- How are circulating and established discourses mediating relationships among different languages reflected in media coverage?
- How is media coverage of language ideological processes intended for Western audience used by political players?
- How do language policy debates in media relate to sociolinguistic circumstances in public spaces ‘on the ground’?

The results of the investigation of circulating and intersecting discourses in the media demonstrate how language ideological debates surrounding the status of Russian language in Ukraine were (re)contextualized and deployed by the Russian government for the justification, destabilization and (eventual) invasion of Ukraine to achieve its geopolitical goals. Moreover, analysis supports the findings in Kulyk (2009, p. 17), Hult and Pietikäinen (2014), that the interpretations of the language policy and language status had been made salient and exploited

by the Ukrainian political elite during election and in times of political crisis, and did not include finding real solutions to the existing problems. Finally, the study of linguistic landscapes (LL) demonstrates the *de facto* power, status and language realities (Shohamy, 2006) in Kiev (north-east), Dnipropetrovsk (east), Lviv (west) and Odesa (south) regions of Ukraine.

1.2. A Language to Kill for: Ukrainian Language Politics as a Reason for Military Conflict

The search tags “Ukraine in turmoil” started to dominate the front pages of the leading news agencies in November of 2013, when after two years of preparations and deliberations president Yanukovich refused to sign the long-awaited association agreement with the European Union. Numerous brutal beatings of students who took to the streets following this decision provoked spontaneous protests that became more and more organized and took over Maidan, the central square of Kiev, which now became a symbol of resistance, revolution and a memorial to those who sacrificed their lives for the new Ukraine. Back in February of 2014, when it seemed as if the tragic events were coming to some kind of resolution, the newly appointed Ukrainian government cancelled the controversial law “On Principles of the State Language Policy”, a step that many consider being pivotal in the conflict, but some go as far as calling it “outrageously stupid” (Dzhygyr, 2014).

Since the commencement of the protests in Kyiv, the Russian propaganda machine has conducted an increasingly aggressive campaign against Ukraine claiming violations of human rights and Russian language speaker’s discrimination by fascists in Kyiv. Thus, a hasty cancellation of the law “On Principles of the State Language Policy” on February 23, 2014 by Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Supreme Council), was promptly presented by the Russian media as an intention to eradicate the Russian language from Ukraine, and to declare that “the Russian population, (usually labeled as Russian “compatriots” (*sootechestvenniki*), as someone still

concerned about the Russian state and language), were under serious threat” (Moser, 2014) and in need of protection. The fact that the abolishment of the so called “Language Law” was immediately annulled for the lack of any other sound regulatory instrument was deliberately ignored in the Russian central press. Formally (because the concentration of Russian troops in regions bordering Ukraine, including unidentified armed troops in Crimea were reported prior to this), it was the ‘signal’ that the Russian administration was waiting for, as on March 1, 2014 Putin asked and received the permission from the upper chamber of Russian parliament (Duma) to use military force on Ukrainian territory “for normalization of societal and political situation in that country” (Ioffe, 2014). Contrary to Russia’s statement that a coup d’état took place in Kiev, it was in Crimea where unprecedented events took place which undermined not only Ukrainian sovereignty but the whole post 1945 and post-Cold War security order: in violation of the Budapest international agreement Russia annexed the territory of a European sovereign state (Wilson, 2014, p. vi-vii). Van Rompuy states that after this affront on post-Cold war rules of international security, “the world will never be the same” (as cited in Wilson, 2014, p.1). Following those events, many Ukrainian intellectuals and researchers began to address the question of how this could get so far and where the support for separatism came. The next sections will establish the background and the role of language politics in attempt to establish underlying reasons for the ongoing war in the Eastern Europe that keeps on claiming lives every day.

1.3. Complexity of Language Issues in Ukraine

It is a known fact that for the last 300 years the Russian empire has conducted a “forced language and cultural assimilation policy towards the non-Russian population” (Masenko, 2006, 2009, p.102; Savojska, 2011; Dzyuba & Davis, 1968), which on Ukrainian territory resulted in a

“co-existence of two languages, Ukrainian and Russian, along with various forms of bilingualism and diglossia” (Masenko, 2009, p. 102). In this way, many researchers start their articles about language issues, attitudes and identity in Ukraine with statements describing Ukraine as a country divided by language, the country divided into an Eastern and a Western part that use predominantly Russian or Ukrainian respectively in everyday life. This kind of polarization was not favored but was justified because of the influence of the USSR national politics that established Russian as lingua franca (later conceptualized it as “native” or “second native” language for *Homo Sovieticus*) when industrialization and mass migration was promoted and often forced by the Soviet state on groups of people from different republics. Ryazanova-Clarke defines the fall of the Soviet Union as the time when borders were moved across people practically overnight, and about 25 million Russophones found themselves living in other countries often as conditional members of different linguistic communities (2014).

The popularity of the USSR national project, with Russian language vested with a mission of interethnic unity, is reflected in the fact that from the first steps of independence the majority of the post-Soviet states chose their own languages as symbolic targets of independence and embarked on de-Russification of state domains followed by the implementation of various normalization tools within language politics that would address asymmetric bilingualism and the status of the language of the former imperial power (Ozolins, 1999; Acustsson, 2011; Olszanski, 2012; Ryazanova-Clarke, 2014).

1.3.1. Native language vs. language of everyday use. Ukraine is a “bi-ethnic, bi-linguistic state” (Kreindler, 1997, p. 96) where ethnic Ukrainians and Russians amount to over 95% and other ethnic groups amount to less than 1% of the population (Index Mundi, 2014). The above mentioned industrialization in the USSR also resulted in populating the majority of the eastern

and southern urbanized industrial regions with Russian speakers, with 80% of those being Russians and the rest using Russian in everyday life (Arel, 1995; Bowring, 2014, p. 59). The study of the linguistic situation in Ukraine from the beginning was complicated by researchers' confusion between the languages that people identified with (or native language, *ridna mova*) and the languages they used. Upon elimination the above mentioned confusion it has been reported that 55% of Ukrainian citizens called Ukrainian their mother tongue while over half of the same population relied on Russian language in every day life (Bowring 2014, p. 59; Masenko 2009, p. 105).

1.3.1. A special place for English language. During the first years of independence, the use of English was intentionally limited by the government in order to promote the state language (Goodman, 2009, p. 33), which initially made the spread of English problematic considering the state's monolingual language policy. However, this initial top-down pressure could not compete with a bottom-up demand for increased English competence due to changing economic conditions and opportunities provided by a newly fashionable and prestigious knowledge of English (Goodman, 2009, p. 33-34). Today, according to Bever (2010, p. 46), as a vehicle of innovation and globalization English continues to shape sociolinguistic situation and linguistic landscapes in Ukraine. Strengthening Ukraine's intention to affiliate with the West, and in order to modernize the state and make it more accessible and attractive for investors, in October of 2015 Ukraine's President proposed to make English a "second working language along with Ukrainian" (Kyiv Post, 2015); moreover, in November 2015, president Poroshenko signed a decree "On Declaring 2016 the Year of English Language in Ukraine" (Unian, 2015).

1.4. Language policy in Ukraine during the nation-state building period

Considering that "Russification" and "Ukrainization" in Ukrainian history came and went

in waves for about 300 years, after the declaration of independence it would have been very tempting to follow the ethnic state restoration model of nation-building as chosen by the Baltic states as a protest against the imperial domination; however, the history of ethnic conflicts that often accompanied nation-building projects (as in Quebec, Estonia, Transdnistria), the existence of bi- and multi-national states that combine nationalizing projects of their ethnic components, and the fact of Ukraine being a multinational country with many languages autochthonous on Ukrainian territory, moved politicians toward adopting the civic all-inclusive nation-building project (Safran 1999; Janmaat 1999; Kuzio 2002; Besters-Dilger 2009; Polese 2011; Olszanski 2013) at least in their best intentions. However, those intentions are complicated by a ‘one state – one language’ policy aimed at the revitalization of Ukrainian (Stepanenko, 2003, p. 109).

During the last two decades, Ukraine has made several attempts to turn the course of its development towards democracy, human rights, stability and integration with the European Union (Besters-Dilger, 2009, p.7). Unfortunately, the relative stability of the first twenty years has been constantly challenged by inconsistent attempts to implement democratic and market reforms, political scandals like “Kuchmagate”, struggles between new pro-Ukrainian, pro-Russian oligarchy and the “nomenklatura” which has ended in the disaster that Ukraine is facing today (Zhurzhenko 2002, 2014).

According to Kulyk, because of the lack of history of statehood prior to the declaration of independence in 1991, Ukrainian identity has been formed primarily within an ethno-cultural paradigm where language traditionally has been a crucial component; consequently, modern Ukrainian society holds radically different views regarding the issues of complex historical relations with Russia, mixed and overlapping identities and language; moreover, this societal

ideological and cultural divide is deepened by “different ethnic compositions, established practices of language use, life trajectories and social memories” (2009, 2013b).

The study of language politics in connection with statehood, nationalism and history reflects the current interests of social scientists investigating the nature and the roles of nation state building models, (re)nationalization, collective memories, myths, and the consolidation of multiple identities and loyalties (Safran, 1999; Besters-Dilger, 2009; Polese, 2011). “When the “titular group” after which the “homeland is called”, writes Arel (1995), feels threatened by unequal distribution of languages, the state begins regulating those discrepancies in language practices with language policies. From the other side, policies are born as regulatory mechanisms within language practices and may not only have exclusionary but also promotional effect for languages in need of protection (Arel, 1995; Johnson, 2013). Tollefson maintains, “In the modern societies, language policy is used to sustain existing power relationships” (1999, p. 11). In Ukraine, the ardent defenders of the status of Ukrainian as the only state language have a very good reason to do so, as they have so called “Belarusian scenario” right next to them. Yielding to the pressure from Russia to stop forced Belarusization and “to remove violence and discrimination from language policy” (as cited in Bekus, 2013) in favor of Belarusian and Russian bilingualism and declaring Russian as the second state language in 1995 (while *de facto* the Russian language has already been used in all spheres of political, social and cultural life), within a year Belarusian has been marginalized again. For example, the number of students instructed in Belarussian decreased from 75% to 38% (Bekus, 2013), and by 2009 the number of people using Belarusian at home was only 11.9% (Charnysh, 2013, p. 6).

The controversy of the relations between the Russian and Ukrainian languages, such as *de facto* unbalanced asymmetrical bilingualism while Ukrainian has been declared as a *de jure*

symbolic identity marker of the Ukrainian state, had to be prioritized, consistently addressed and resolved with financial and institutional help from the state to ensure a stable functioning of the modern multilingual society (Kuzio, 2001; Olszanski, 2012; Zhurzhenko, 2014). Instead, those issues became the objects of political manipulations and were “heightened periodically, usually in times of elections, and (is) all but forgotten in the meanwhile” (Kulyk, 2009, p. 17).

The next section covers the current language management legislation in Ukraine as developed by the state authorities relevant for this study of media discourse and the linguistic landscape.

1.5. The Laws Governing the Language Use in Ukraine Relevant for Analysis of the Discourses in Media and the Public Space

Legislative acts governing language status and use are often presented in Russian media as discriminatory towards the Russian language - a minority language used by the majority of people in Ukraine. Researchers of Ukrainian language policy, however, find the legislation sufficient for the development of linguistic diversity, but most often non-restrictive enough since Russian steadily remains the language of choice in many social spheres (Stepanenko, 2003, p. 115; Moser, 2014, p. 413). The list of relevant laws for the study and a short discussion of their implementation are as follows:

1. The Constitution of Ukraine was adopted in second variant in 1996 and amended in 2004. As stated in the preamble, the constitution is written on behalf of “the Ukrainian people – citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities” who recognize the state of Ukraine as multinational and implies the multilingual nature of Ukrainian society. Article 10 names Ukrainian language as an official language strengthening its position de jure “in all spheres of public life on all territory of Ukraine” and guarantees “free development, use

and defense of Russian, ..., and other languages of national minorities of Ukraine” – here the Russian language is given an ‘honorary primacy’ which is not jurisdictional in recognition of Russian minority size, but listing Russian together with minority languages such as Tatar or Moldovan with guarantees of free use just like the other languages of the land.

2. The law “On the Print Media” from 1993 was followed by the law “On Broadcasting” in 1994. The first one liberally stipulated that “print media in Ukraine shall be edited in the official language and in any other language”, and the second law stated that “TV/radio organizations shall broadcast in the official language” with permission to use the language of prevalent minority in the regions of their compact dwelling. Intended to limit the use of Russian language in national and regional broadcasting, the law on broadcasting prioritized the Ukrainian language and was complemented in 2006 obligating all national and inter-regional channels to broadcast in Ukrainian (Polese, 2014, p. 42; Moser, 2014, p. 27; Bowring, 200). However, parliamentary failure to adopt tax cuts on publications in Ukrainian, which was done by Russia for Russian language books designated for export, reduced the number of Ukrainian language news papers and books from 68% and 90% in 1990 to 35% and 12% in 2000 (Polese, 2011, p. 42). Furthermore, regardless of efforts to control the quotas for national language broadcasting, it was circumvented by sending programs in Russian during the prime hours, because at this point Ukrainian TV channels would lose large shares of audience, especially in the Russophone regions (Polese, 2011, p. 45). Richter (2002, p. 146) notes that Moscow-based broadcasting that is historically popular in Ukraine, was also difficult to control, even if moved to less popular frequencies, Russian Public Television (ORT) remained the

most popular channel in Ukraine. ZenithOptmedia, as stated in Ryabinska (2011, p. 5) estimates that in the region Ukrainian television is in the second place after the Russian one.

3. To strengthen the possibility for euro-integration and to become a member state of the Council of Europe, Ukraine signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) on 2nd of May 1996. For various reasons connected with lack of previous judicial precedent and multiple procedural mistakes including the inadequate translation from Russian instead of the original language, deliberate “misunderstandings” and arbitrary interpretations of ECRML intended application by the pro-Russian language groups (Moser, 2014, p. 71-79), ten years passed until it was ratified and went into effect on January 1st in 2006. This is despite the fact that the Constitution of Ukraine does not define “regional language”, “language group” or “minority language”, but only the “state language” and “languages of national minorities” (Moser, 2014, p.71-73). One could see that a disappearing minority language is very different from the language of minority, which in case of the Russian language in the Ukraine represents the language of the majority. From the onset, the process of ratification of the ECRML proved to be stormy, as the representatives of the Communist Party of Ukraine saw the opportunity for promotion of Russian regardless of the fact that the language failed to meet the “criteria of a regional or minority language as defined by the Charter” (Moser, 2014, p. 71-72). The Constitutional Court of Ukraine found that there were major mistakes during the procedure that did not comply with the Constitution. Following the period of legal vacillations and multiple amendments, a number of regional and city councils in eastern and southern Ukraine proclaimed Russian as a “regional” language on those territories

claiming that it was done in compliance with the charter. In fact, it was a frivolous interpretation of the ECRML as there are no provisions regarding the establishment of “regional and minority languages”; moreover, they violated the Constitution as it does not allow local authorities to make such decisions (Moser, 2014; Kulyk, 2009).

4. The new law “On Principles of the State Language Policy” signed by the president of Ukraine Yanukovich in August of 2012, which allowed predominantly Russian speaking regions to use Russian as an official second language, reflected many shortcomings and manipulations “tested” during ECRML ratification by Kolesnichenko, one of the authors of the law whose political message was “not a “multilingual”, not even “bilingual, but a “Russian-speaking” Ukraine (Moser, 2014, p. 185), and “perceived as endangering the use of Ukrainian and thus contributed to confrontation rather than compromise” (Kulyk, 2013, p. 281). Chernetsky notes that the 2012 language law was “poorly written and ... criticized by many experts at the time”, in addition “no budgetary allocations were made at the time, so passing this law was, in effect, a purely symbolic measure intended to divert the attention of the Ukrainian electorate from corruption and economic problems” (as cited in Palash Ghosh, 2014).

Paragraph 1 (article 26) of the new law, relevant to this research of the Linguistic Landscape, deregulates the use of languages in advertising by removing limitations on language use imposed by the harshly criticized law from 2003, and vesting the decision on which language to use solely to a participant of business activity. According to paragraph 2, trademarks have to be displayed according to the language of the registration document.

Moreover, as a result of political disputes and the most recent developments (the war against Russia and pro-Russian separatists in the Eastern Ukraine), the relation between the state language (Ukrainian) and the Russian language - which is used by over 50% of Ukrainian population for family communication and used by 40.3% vs. 35.3% who prefer Ukrainian in everyday communication (Moser, 2014, p. 49; Pavlenko, 2007, p.62) - is no longer officially challenged, which reflects the ultimate goal of the state in the process of nationalization, but does not reflect the real language situation in modern Ukraine - a multinational, multilingual and multicultural society. Furthermore, it must be noted that on June 7, 2014, the new president of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko made an announcement that the “Ukrainian language will remain the only official language”, and the other languages of the land would be treated according to the Article 10 of the Constitution, “which guarantees free development of the Russian and other languages” (Poroshenko, 2014). Finally, there hasn’t been any further developments regarding the new or amended “Law on Languages”, so the 2012 version is still in force. Kulyk (2008) concludes that none of the main political camps in Ukraine are interested in finding a solution or a compromise for the language issue, as it is lost in the middle of power and economic disputes. The Ukrainian language policy, Shohamy (2006) writes:

... falls in the midst of these manipulations and battles,
between language ideology and practice. It is through a variety of overt and covert *mechanisms*, used mostly (but not exclusively) by those in authority, that languages are being manipulated and controlled so as to affect, create and perpetuate “de facto” language policies, i.e., language practices. (p. XVI).

1.6. Summary of Chapters

Chapter 2 is a historical-structural analysis (Tollefson, 2015) of the complex and dynamic relations between Ukrainian and Russian languages as seen through the eyes of Ukrainian, Western, Soviet and Russian scholars. Starting with the imperial times, this chapter focuses on the trajectory of Ukrainian language using an historical perspective outlining the political mechanisms used to sustain Russian language domination politics in the Russian Empire and the USSR. The structural part of the analysis focuses on institutional forms and practices used by the Ukrainian state to maintain relations of power during the nation-building process (Tollefson, 2015, p. 142) of “imagined community” complicated by “objective reality” (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1991).

Chapter 3 introduces the theoretical foundations of the study, locating interpretive and nexus approaches to discourse analysis of semiotic systems within hermeneutics, critical hermeneutics theories, discourse and critical discourse methods of investigation of social phenomena within historical and social contexts. A special discussion is devoted to the role of media which plays crucial role in discursive propagation of nationalist ideologies, “fusing nation and state” (Horner, 2011, p. 495). The methodology section presents Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS) as a way to merge Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Corpus Linguistics (CL) for studies of political discourse and approaches for research in the area of the linguistic landscape, followed by data collection sites and techniques used in data collection for both aspects of language policy in the media and in public space.

Chapter 4 is devoted to findings and analysis of two major data collection sets in cyber space and in the Ukraine, connecting discourses of language ideological debates in media with the actual implementation of those ideologies and language policies in place (Pietikäinen et al,

2011, p. 278). Two small specialized corpora especially designed for this study are analyzed using descriptive statistics and the AntConc concordance tool. The photographic data numbering about 700 pictures for each of the 4 regions are investigated for language distribution and relations among official (top-down) and personal (bottom-up) claims to public spaces in which English language is now playing a very significant role.

Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the analysis by discussing the findings and the implications of this research, outlining the possibilities for using current and additional data that would benefit this type of multidimensional analysis.

2. Historical - Structural Analysis of Ukrainian and Russian Language Relations through the Works of Ukrainian, Western and Soviet Scholars

Following the recent developments in language policy research, this chapter is focused on the investigation of historical and structural aspects of language ideological debates (Blommaert, 1999), as seen through the eyes of Ukrainian, Western and Russian scholars, from the position of “power, inequality, and the impact of coercive politics on language learning and language use” (Tollefson 2015, p. 140). According to Tollefson (2015), historical factors help to shed light on the group experiences, linking specific language issues with the history of language politics of the former colonizing states, without which it would be impossible to understand current ‘language ideological debates’ as “slowly unfolding processes of discursive exchange” (Blommaert, 1999, p. 11) which unfold at various scales and within various scales in “time space” (“chronotope”) continuum, often over centuries, in various sociopolitical contexts, circulating and intersecting at nexus points, encouraging a researcher to step away from *longue durée* linear explanations in order to situate and analyze those processes within the whole nexus of practice (Scollon, 2005; Hult & Pietikäinen, 2014; Hult, 2015; Blommaert, 2015). Structural factors, as suggested by Tollefson (2015, p. 142), are conceptualized through various legislative and institutional language-planning organizations, agents and practices that serve the interests of dominant political and economic groups, shaping and regulating language behavior.

This chapter begins with analysis of historical relations between the Ukrainian and Russian languages, analyzes the factors (re)contextualized in the official narratives by the Russian Federation, and places emphasis on the historical factors influencing current language legislations and its implementations in the Ukraine.

2.1. Ukraine and Ukrainian language in the Imperial shadows

Kasianov (2009, p.7) defines this period as stage one of the Ukrainian history of nationalization that commenced in the middle of 19th century and was characterized, according to the author, by “invention of tradition” and culminated in “the creation of a grand narrative” such as *History of Ukraine-Rus* by Mykhailo Hrushevsky; consequently, the period ended after WWII with authoritarian efforts of the Soviet state to reincorporate Ukrainian history back into imperial narrative.

2.1.1. A nation at the cross-roads: Ukrainian language and Imperial politics.

Being one of the youngest national states of eastern Europe, for many centuries the territory of modern Ukraine was part of a larger state structure, a cultural buffer zone between Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam, and a home to many groups of people united by their religious affiliation, social status, geographical location, and by the constellation of related Slavic languages, which until 1991 did not have a state of its own. (Yekelchik, 2007; Magocsi, 1996; Kasianov & Ther, 2009). Ukraine was divided and ruled by the Russian Empire, Poland and the Habsburgs, therefore a concept of cultural and linguistic unity was one of the most important factors in the development of a “modern nation” rooted in the French revolution and German romanticism (Yekelchik, 2007, p. 21; Magocsi, 1996; Zhurzhenko, 2001). This absence of prior statehood, the influence of the former imperial powers in political, administrative, economical and language spheres, and the whole Ukrainian national idea being developed by the national quest for independence and self-identification made it possible for some historians to doubt not only Ukrainian distinctiveness, but also the existence of the Ukrainian language. Those historical and structural factors, which in reality had never been put aside, were brought to surface and (re)conceptualized by the former colonizing state; moreover, they became especially noticeable

after the establishment of the “Russian World Foundation” by president Vladimir Putin in 2007, when the old imperial name of Ukrainian territories “Little Russia” was used again to bring Ukraine back into the sphere of Russian interests. Emphasizing the brotherly relationship from the side of “Great Russia” Putin stated that “no one should be allowed to interfere in relations between us; they have always been the business of Russia itself” (as cited in Moser, 2014, p. 140). In 2008, during a meeting with George Bush, Putin simply explained to the president of the USA that Ukraine was not even a state and hinted that in case of Ukrainian affiliation with NATO, that country would simple cease to exist (Pravda, 2008).

2.1.2 Language of the Ukrainian nation and imperial Russian politics. Here, the ‘nation’ is understood in the context of Ukrainian language where a nation is defined as an ethnic community united by common origin, language and culture not necessarily belonging to the same state, which defined the Ukrainian nation during the pre-state period of formation (Yekelchyk, 2007, p.21). Though influenced by many surrounding states and historical linguistic diversity, the most problematic linguistic relations Ukraine ever had were with Russia (Zhurzhenko, 2001). In the beginning of the period of Russian “nationalization” early in the 19th century, the Russian language was called “Great-Russian” and was regarded as a common standard language, while Ukrainian was considered to be Malorossian (“Little-Russian”), the language of peasants spoken outside the main cities of Malorossia (“Little Russia”) inhabited mostly by Russian speakers. In 1863 and 1876, Russian linguistic imperialism manifested itself first with an imperial ban on language cultivation and use (Spolsky, 2009, p. 146) that prohibited publishing of educational and religious literature and then with a ban to publish anything at all in Ukrainian, to import Ukrainian literature from abroad and even use of Ukrainian in theatrical plays; many Ukrainian activists lost their jobs and were even sent to exile (Yekelchyk, 2007, p.

68; Moser, 2014, p. 21; Magocsi, 1996, p. 440). It all happened after the tsar was persuaded by those opposing the Ukrainian national movement that it was all Austrian intrigue against Russia; this situation strongly resembles current fears and disbeliefs of president Putin of the existence of Ukrainian civil activism and civil society which was strong enough to rise on its own, without help of the CIA or American Department of State (Yekelchuk, 2007, p. 68; Moser, 2014, p. 21; Snyder, 2014).

Generally speaking, national and language politics of Imperial Russia could be qualified as the politics of assimilation and linguistic imperialism (Tollefson, 2015; Spolsky, 2009, ch.9); moreover, besides describing Ukrainian as a mere dialect of Russian, the documents from the Tsarist period explain that Ukrainian as an independent language does not exist (Grenoble, 2003, p. 83). The fall of the empires dividing Ukraine after the WWI started a new era when Ukraine came to be known as a geopolitical and cultural entity.

2.2. Ukrainian and Russian Languages During the Soviet Period

This period is particularly important for the understanding of the imprint left on Ukrainian national movement, culture, identity and language.

At the beginning of the tumultuous European revolutionary era of 1917 - 1919, the attempts of forming the autonomous Ukrainian state took place within the boundaries of emerging Soviet Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania (Yekelchuk, 2007, p. 107; Magocsi, 1996, p. 470). The struggle for Ukrainian territory from various sides continued well into the 1920s; however, in December of 1919 Moscow agreed to formal Ukrainian independence and officially recognized Ukrainian language in the light of Lenin's conclusion that the fighting continued due to Bolshevik's inattention to the "national question" (Yekelchuk, 2007, p.123-125), thus agreeing to share not only the state but also some of the ideological power.

From 1920, all important decisions were delegated and decided by Moscow; however, for the first time the borders of the state closely corresponded to the area inhabited by the speakers of Ukrainian language; moreover, the memories of Ukrainian uprisings ensured that initially the state was supporting national languages and culture following the idealistic Lenin's plan of absolute linguistic equality for all members of the Federation (Magocsi, 1996, p. 526; Yekelchuk, 2007, p. 129; Kuzio, 1998, p.4, Wright, 2000, p.1).

2.2.1. Soviet program of “korenizatsia” (indigenization): the new ideological state tools of control. From 1922, free seceding from the Union was not possible. The rooting of communist ideology, terminology, standardization and codification through national languages took place extensively during the first decade of Soviet rule by allowing the member states to keep their languages and cultural traditions (Magocsi, 1997, p. 530-531; Wright, 2000, p.1). By 1927, the effects of “indigenization” became visible and included the following:

- 70% of state documentation was produced in Ukrainian (compared to 20% in 1925);
- the number of ethnic Ukrainian state government workers exceeded 50%, though many historians note that it was true only at the lower levels of administrative apparatus;
- the urban centers experienced a surge of Ukrainians from the countryside;
- 97% of Ukrainian children and 81% of schools for adults had access to and used Ukrainian in education;
- 88% of periodic editions were also published in the national language;
- some members of the Ukrainian intellectual elite returned from the exile;
- increased academic activity and standardization of Ukrainian language resulted in

using Ukrainian as a medium for scientific publications (Yekelchuk, 2007, p. 139-141; Magocsi, 1996, p. 540-542).

2.2.3. Stalin's era and the reversal of Ukrainization. By the end of the 1930s, as noted by many Ukrainian scholars, the progress of Ukrainization was visible but not as sweeping as it is thought by the Western historians. Yekelchuk (2007, p.140) maintains that by the end of "indigenization" period, the urban centers were bilingual rather than Ukrainian speaking and the Russian culture was already dominating the scene. Regardless of those facts, by 1926 the upper echelons of the Soviet power were already expressing their concern about the formation of local elites and, as Stalin expressed it, forced Ukrainization and the assimilation of Ukrainian proletariat (Dzyuba & Davis, 1968, p. 53; Yekelchuk, 2007, p. 140). The end of this initial permissive policy and the destruction of the achievements in the "full development of the socialist Ukrainian nation" are considered by Dzyuba "one of the greatest tragedies of the Ukrainian people in its entire history" (1968, p.53).

Usurpation of power by Stalin in 1928, changes in official ideology and forced "collectivization" resulted in:

- the removal of 62,000 of peasant households to Siberia, Far East and Central Asia by 1930;
- numerous political proceedings that excluded over 24,000 people from Ukrainian Communist Party (CPU);
- repressions, arrests, suicides and mass executions among Ukrainian political and intellectual elite that started in Ukraine in 1930s (about 7 years earlier than in the rest of the USSR);
- the famine (known as "Holodomor") that took the lives between 3 and 3,5 million

only in Ukraine alone (Magocsi, 1997, p. 560-565; Yekelchuk, 2007, p. 165-171; Dzyuba, 1968, p. 53).

The language politics of the Soviet administration only progressed after that dark period of Soviet history. Many Ukrainian philologists conceptualize it as a “linguicide” because since the end of 1920s the ideological battles about languages and people’s identity became the battles within the language; citing the works of Sheveljov, Masenko writes that besides the classic mass deportations of Ukrainians to the other territories and the population of Ukrainian lands with carriers of the titular language, considerable efforts were made into controlling and changing the structure of Ukrainian by forbidding certain words (for example translation of special terminology into Ukrainian) and syntactic constructions, changing grammatical forms and orthography, transplanting constructions from Russian or making them resemble the ones in the Russian (translated from Ukrainian, 2006, p. 7-11). Masenko and Hvylyja point out that those tactics were used by the Soviet ideologists for the “removal of the artificial barrier between Ukrainian and Russian languages” (Hvylyja, 1933, as cited in Masenko, 2006, p.8). In 1933, a Communist party document classified Ukrainian language as “fraternal” and unique Ukrainian lexical constructions as “stolen from Polish”. Russian language was determined to have positively influenced Ukrainian and people’s efforts to “crush the devious and hostile plots of bourgeois nationalists aimed at the destruction of friendship and unity of fraternal peoples of the USSR by cleansing the language from nationalistic aberrations” (Sherekh (1998), as cited in Masenko, 2006, p. 12-14). This signified the intrusion of the state on a micro-level into the very heart of language cultivation and use (Tollefson 2015, p. 142; Spolsky, 2007, p.146), which was a “logical” progression from first redefining nationalism as a “nationalist deviation” equating it with treason, then branding Ukrainian philology as the science of “Ukrainian fascism” - it

became clear that Ukrainization and the possibility to make Ukraine into something more than “administrative-geographical term” at this point was gone (Masenko, 2006, p.16; Dzyuba & Davis, 1968, p. 53).

The legacy of Stalin’s era, which is extremely important for understanding of many societal processes in modern Ukraine, could be summarized as follows:

- witch-hunts, terror, purges and the enforcement of Soviet-Russian nationalist patriotic ideology, which did not tolerate any kind of expression of other national sentiment if it threatened the cult of “Russian big brother” and Stalin himself;
- replacement of the ideals of “proletarian internationalism” by old imperial assimilation politics with propaganda of the Russian language as the language workers, communist future and international communication of the USSR;
- the famine and repressions resulted in mass migrations, which destroyed the traditional agricultural society and virtually eliminated the national intelligentsia, the two social groups that always were at the base of national movements;
- Ukrainian language cultivation was declared as an attempt to alienate Ukrainian language from Russian in order to sabotage transformation of Soviet Ukraine into integral part of the Soviet Union (Magocsi, 1997; Hvylyja, 2002; Yekelchuk, 2007; Savojska, 2011).

The worst effects of this devastating period were best summarized and connected to the imperial past by Dzyuba in 1968,

Besides everything else, this Stalinist policy was calculated to knock out of the Ukrainian people any trace of national sentiment and national consciousness. A taboo was weighed upon them for some thirty-five years, so it is not at all surprising that they are so little

developed among a considerable mass of the Ukrainian population, to the point that some Ukrainians, just as in pre-revolutionary days, know nothing of their national membership... Just as in pre-revolutionary days, a good number of Ukrainians are ashamed of their nationality and their language, and consider it rustic, 'uncultured', and third-rate. (p.53)

2.3. Ukrainian and Russian Language Relations from 1939 till the end of the USSR

According to the well-known today scenario, Hitler, in 1939, assured by non-intervention of the Soviet Union (Stalin-Hitler pact), defeated Poland while Soviet troops advanced from the east and took over western Ukrainian lands from Poland. The Baltic states had no choice but also agree to be 'protected' by the USSR. The new regime's real face and intentions became clear from the very first days of occupation:

- Soviet administrative institutions were immediately established and there was nothing left of western Ukrainian economic independence;
- By the end of 1940, about 1,25 million people (320 000 families of Polish and Ukrainian ethnicity) were deported to Siberia, Far North and Middle Asia, the others escaped to the zones occupied by the Germans (Yekelchuk, 2007; Moser, 2014; Magocsi, 1997).

So it was only natural that in this state of terror, chaos and confusion many western Ukrainians joined the radical Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) led by Stepan Bandera and later in 1942 the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) which to a certain degree cooperated with the German Army in hopes that now the days of bloody Soviet regime in their country were counted; consequently, the expression "Banderites" later became a derogatory name for western Ukrainians (Magocsi, 1997, p. 624-627; Snyder, 2010), which again appeared during the latest anti-Ukrainian campaign. .

In the immediate postwar period, under the strict control of Moscow and the pressure of Russian-speaking newcomers, more and more Ukrainians spoke Russian. However, that was the least of the worries for many people who were recovering after the decades of hardship enjoying developing economy, free education and medical care, moving into cities and occupying new state-owned apartments (Yekelchuk, 2007, p. 224-228). Ukrainian history at this period was rewritten in the context of deep desire of Ukrainian ethnos to unite with Russia as the greatest moving force of the key historical events. In this spirit of grand narrative reconstructions, in commemoration of the 300 years since Pereyaslav agreement (when the Cossack Hetmanate signed a military union with Russia which was (re)contextualized as desire of overlordship); moreover, as the sign of indestructible friendship Crimea was transferred to Ukraine in 1954 (Yekelchuk, 2007; Moser, 2014). The period of de-Stalinization somewhat resembled a “thaw”; while integration of Ukraine into the USSR continued until the power in Ukraine was taken over by Shcherbytskyi, a political rival of Shelest, who replaced Khrushchev also after an intricate plot within the party.

The most important changes of this period could be summarized as follows:

- The overall tendency could be classified as a continued Russification for creation of a new homogenous ethnos of “Soviet people” (Magocsi, 1997, p. 653-658; Yekelchuk, 2007, p. 235-242).
- Russian language kept gaining grounds as a language of prestige and social mobility, creating a situation of “asymmetrical bilingualism” (Ozolins, 2000, p. 8).
- Russification continued through education: in 1958 Ukrainian language stopped being compulsory for schooling; later in 1965, the order of Ukrainization of higher education was abolished shortly after it went into force (Yekelchuk, 2007,

p. 237; Zhurzhenko, 2001). Russian was more and more often chosen by parents as a language of teaching for their children; by 1987, 72% of schools in Ukraine instructed in Russian (Zhurzhenko, 2001; Moser, 2014, p. 22-23);

- The use of Ukrainian language became restricted, yet again, just as during the imperial times, to intellectual and scientific spheres, and those who tried to use it in daily life were stigmatized and called “nationalists” or “country bumpkins” (Moser, 2014, p. 23);
- There was no official “Russification” policy, Zhurzhenko writes, but state control over all areas of Ukrainian language functions and use provided Soviet authorities with monitoring vehicles over “national consolidation” tendencies, especially in western Ukraine (2001);

The majority of Ukraine’s residents accepted the fact of Russian language domination in higher cultural and educational spheres, as Magocsi notes, which consequently made it possible to identify yourself as Ukrainian and a Soviet citizen; moreover, those multiple hierarchical loyalties were possible with the acceptance of the marginalization of Ukrainian culture and language and dominating Russian (1997, p. 663).

The end of Shcherbytsky’s time, which coincided with the period of the USSR disintegration is classified by Masenko as the apogee of the Communist Party’s assimilation politics in implementation of post-war directive sounded out by Khrushchev in 1961 who declared that Russian language was voluntarily studied by non-Russian peoples because it was practically their second native language; furthermore, she cites Shcherbytskyi’s passage from 1974 where he states that “today, in the process of cultural development, as never before the role and significance of the Russian language is elevated, which rightfully became the second native

language in our republic and became commonly accepted as the method of international communication of all nations of the USSR” (2006, p. 25). In the comments Masenko wonders, according to whose rights (2006, p. 25)?

Summing up, after a short period of linguistic freedom mandated in the resolution from 1919, which guaranteed the “free development of the Ukrainian language and culture and included instructions that employees of all state institutions should be conversant in Ukrainian” (Grenoble, 2003, p. 83), the Communist government “swung back to the previous imperial practices of Russification which it tried to disguise behind the slogans about the equal rights of all the national languages and ‘harmonic nature’ of the native-and-Russian bilingualism” (Masenko, 2009, p. 102). According to Grenoble, this not so “well-conceived” policy, which was often contradictory and illogical, “represented a conscious effort on the part of the communist leadership to shape both ethnic identity and national consciousness through language” (2003, p. vii). The decades of totalitarian regime that lasted until the mid-80s facilitated the implementation of the Russification policy even “on a much bigger scale than in the Tsarist Russia” (Masenko, 2009, p. 102).

2.4. Ukrainian and Russian Languages During the First 25 Years of Independence and Language Policy Legislation

The next round of prominent language problem discussions in 1988, during the era of *Perestroika*, followed the Communist party’s directive “to strengthen the role of the Russian language as means of international communication” (as cited in Masenko, 2009, p. 103) reflected in the study of the department of Culture of the Russian Language on “Ukrainian-Russian bilingualism”, where the obvious inequalities in usage of the Ukrainian and Russian languages in favor of the Russian language were described as “adversary allegations of foreign bourgeois-

nationalist falsifiers of the linguistic reality in the Soviet Union” (as cited in Masenko, 2009, p. 103). Thus, to the time of declaration of its independence in 1991, Ukraine were in the midst of “national and linguistic conflicts” (Masenko, 2009, p. 104) that marked the movement of separation of the former Soviet Republics from the USSR. Considering the new social and political contexts, new ways of dealing with language problems, language policy, and laws were needed. As discussed by Bowring, the 1989 “Law on Languages”, which gave Ukrainian the status of the only official language of the state, was deemed as an essential condition for the survival of Ukraine as a nation by the leading law experts, and viewed by the others as ambiguous with “highly contradictory ideological messages” (Kulyk, 2009, p. 79). What complicates matters further is the conclusion made by the International Association for the promotion of cooperation with scientists from the New Independent states of the former Soviet Union (INTAS) experts that in Ukraine “ethnic or “national” groups do not speak one language; there is, however, a strong view held by many political actors that they ought to” (Bowring, 2009, p. 59).

With the dissolution of the Soviet state in December 1991, the second stage of Ukrainian national project, which according to Kasianov started in the late 80s (2009, p. 7), was unfolding during the new era of globalization, modernization, within new geographic and fading cultural boundaries, carrying ideological and political baggage from the past, and under pressure and manipulation from the former colonizing power who refused to recognize Ukraine as a sovereign state and nation (Wilson, 2014; Kapeller, 2014). The attractiveness of the old Soviet project was so great that about 92% of the whole country and over 80% of the eastern industrial regions voted for independence, including Crimea, which supported the move with provisions of sovereignty within Ukraine (Wilson, 2014; Magocsi, 1997).

2.4.1. Language management in the post-Soviet space under the rule of the ‘new’ old Ukrainian elite. Trying to establish its new status quo as an independent and sovereign state for Ukraine meant severing almost century-old economic and political ties from Russia. Ruling the country without Kremlin’s directive was an attractive idea for both the opposition and the old communist elite, which resulted in new seats of the government being taken by yesterday Kremlin-loyal bureaucrats who quickly adapted their political platforms to the new conditions; furthermore, at the first stages of nation building, Leonid Kravchuk’s government was preoccupied with political struggles leaving economical development in the hands of the same ‘red directors’, former bureaucrats and “shadow” dealers who accumulated enormous wealth selling state property and reselling cheap Russian oil and gas to Europe; consequently, before long, it was understood that the country was headed towards political oligarchy controlled by capitalistic clans (Yekelchyk, 2007; Wilson, 2014). Political struggles and dysfunctional economic politics resulted in the fact that in the beginning of 1990s three-quarters of Ukrainian population lived below the poverty level (Yekelchyk, 2007). Dissatisfaction with non-existent democratic changes within various political movements, as explained by Yekelchyk, such as pro-communist anti-reform and pro-Russian one in the east, brought about the first attempts to subvert the national unity through resurrection of the Communist party in Donetsk in 1993, demands to change the status of the Russian language with hopes of restoration of the USSR (2007); moreover, in 1994 about 90% of voters in the industrial provinces of Donbas participated in an illegal referendum to elevate the status of Russian to the second state language (Arel, 1995, p. 596).

The next president, Leonid Kuchma, understood that the language question could powerfully affect his political career. He came to power in 1994 thanks to his promises to protect

the Russian language and restore connections with Russia, but instead he went into Ukrainian political history as someone who learned Ukrainian during his election campaign and kept using it, held a political course independent from Russia that legitimized the formation of a new Ukrainian political elite, and reinforced the status of Ukrainian as the only state language in the constitution of 1996 (Kuzio, 2002; Yekelchuk, 2007; Polese, 2011).

Having discussed the situation at the beginning of the period of Ukrainian independence, and the array of historical and structural factors that shaped the initial period of Ukrainian nation-state building, it is extremely important to discuss the continuous actions of Russian Federation that resulted in the situation the world has been witnessing since 2013.

2.4.2. Russian Federation: an out-of-state player influencing Ukrainian language politics. After the annexation of Crimea there has been a surge of publications that sought to analyze and understand the motives of Russian Federation (RF) in Ukraine. Leading political scientists agree that Ukrainian independence was perceived by the RF elite as a challenge and humiliation from the very beginning; moreover, as Putin's regime became more and more authoritarian, it sought to regain control over former Soviet territories, and since 2004 it did not look upon Ukraine other than as an internal political factor. Wilson (2014) describes the RF's so called 'neighborhood policy' as follows:

- Setting up pro-Russian front parties (also discussed in Yekelchuk, 2007), framing the language question as the problem of human, civil and political rights, and constantly politicalizing the language situation only in favor of the Russian language (Moser, 2014);
- Bribing local politicians, ranging from investing 500 billion dollars in Victor Yanukovich presidential campaign in 2004 and in 2010 with demands of

federalization and making Russian the second state language (Moser, 2014) and subverting election results when he did not win (Yekelchuk, 2007; Wilson, 2014), for example, to giving Yanukovich 15 billion in one installment in December of 2013 in attempt to prevent the signing of an agreement with the EU;

- Funding pro-Russian Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) with the intent of supporting “compatriots” in Ukraine (Moser, 2014; Wilson, 2014);
- Spending billions every year on propaganda and public relations;
- Working through shadowy front companies like RosUkrEnergo in Ukraine;
- Promotion of the “Russkij Mir” (*Russian World*) foundation, a continuation of RF soft-power political tools aimed at the resurrection of vast arrays of Russian “historical myths”, (re)creation of false historical memories, and promoting the concept of the world of Russian language and speakers as a common good beyond state borders (Khmelnitskiy, 2007; Acustsson, 2011; Moser, 2014);
- Information war, political technologies which extend way past competitive presentations of ideas and information and involve ‘latent information management of the opponent’s internal, economic and cultural processes’ and ‘information-psychological aggression based on economic, political and diplomatic pressure’ (Maliukevicius, as cited in Wilson, 2014, p. 36).

Moser (2014) provides exhaustive factual data verifying the above list of pressure methods, and the information on connections with and support of Ukrainian key political figures by Russian Federation authorities, mostly from the Party of Regions and eastern Ukraine, usually with limited or no command of the state language and a very pronounced pro-Russian stance and open demands for elevated status for the Russian language and regional privileges for Russian-

speaking regions. Considering this relentless pressure throughout the years, the link between language politics and state security has been raised in Western and Ukrainian scholarship in fear of separatism in the areas with a high share of Russian-speakers formed the language and citizenship policies (Feldman, 2005; Kymlicka & Grin, 2003, p. 15). Brubaker (1998) has described the nation-building policies of a number of other post-communist states as “nationalizing”, where the degree of nationalization and perception of the intergroup stability depends on to what extent the core nation senses its position as being (extremely) stable or vulnerable and continuously in need of protection (Verkuyten & Reijerse, 2008). Unlike in the Baltics, Ukraine never introduced normalization tools for the Russian speakers living in the so-called geopolitically amorphous ‘contact zones’ (Zhurzhenko, 2015); however, neither Baltic nor Ukrainian scholars directly connected the matters of national security nor clearly defined the shortcomings of language politics regarding those zones prior to the annexation of Crimea.

After laying down the theoretical foundations for this study in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 will be devoted to the analysis of how the relations between Ukrainian and Russian languages are covered in media and reflected in regional linguistic landscapes.

3. Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks for Data Analysis and Methods

This chapter locates a multidimensional approach to language policy studies within methods of discourse analysis that require making “connections across large and small scales of human activity” (Hult, 2015, p. 217). Among a variety of roles that languages play in society, language policy (LP) and linguistic landscape (LL) can be seen as the mechanisms of language manipulation that determine language choices, regulate language use, allocate the space for specific languages, and deliver ideological messages (Shohamy, 2006, p. 123). Both, LP and LL are social phenomena that are expressed through language, but viewed as a social activity they cannot be separated from their social context (Fairclough, 1989, p. 23). Discursive approach, as a meaning making and organizing system of power and knowledge that creates and limits the possibilities (Gee, as cited in Scollon & Scollon, 2004, p. 4) applied to the study of LL and LP, focuses on reproduction of power relations, the ways of mediation of ideological and sociopolitical issues, and connects texts and society.

3.1 Discourse Analysis and its Critical Dimension

In this thesis, discourse is understood through the art of interpretation first located in the scholarship and practice of hermeneutics and critical hermeneutics that placed the methodology of discourse interpretation beyond the text into fundamental dimensions of understanding of human experience and the social world (Gadamer, 1976, 1989, 1990 a, b; Thompson, 1984; Bakhtin, 1986; Hall & Gieben, 1992).

According to Kinsella, a hermeneutic approach, which aims at understanding rather than explaining, emphasizes the role of situatedness of discursive interpretation in history as nothing is created *ex nihilo*, acknowledges the dialogical nature of the inquiry addressed in Bakhtin’s (2006) heteroglossia, and recognizes the ambiguous nature of textual analysis interpretation. This

synthetic and systematic approach to discourse as a production process and ways of organization of knowledge through language located in social practice at a particular historical moment has been formulated in works of Foucault (1954-1984), Fairclough (1989), and Gee (1999) among many others.

The addition of a critical dimension to the hermeneutic approach came in response to critiques that Gadamer's traditional vision "ignores the crucial dimensions of power, and the specifically ideological deformation of language use" (Kinsella, 2006), which Gadamer, in his polemics with Chomsky and Dottori, saw as a limitation of freedom of personal expression imposed by the "social factors of behavioral roles, which its knowledge puts at the disposal of the social engineer" (2003, p. 86). However, a discursive approach to the exploration of power between social groups in society (a.k.a. critical discourse analysis (CDA)) is widely used for studies of political discourse, ideology, racism, economics, media, advertising, institutional discourse and education by Gee, Kress, Pennicook, Wodak, Chilton, van Leeuwen, among others (Blommaert 2005, p. 26). Discourse analysis utilizes textual data for understanding particular phenomena, according to Scollon & Scollon, "texts themselves are among the most powerful tools for the production of social power relations" (2003, p. 7). One of the main goals of this thesis is the investigation of language ideological debates regarding the status of Russian language in Ukrainian language politics in search of "the complex nexus between how people think about, label and evaluate linguistic practices in various sociopolitical contexts" (Milani 2007, p. 113).

3.1.1. Methods of discourse analysis of language ideological debates in media and public space. Grounded in North American linguistic anthropology, and aiming to investigate social processes surrounding language politics, the studies of language ideologies has been

gaining the interest of researchers for the last two decades (Johnson & Milani, 2009, p. 3-4). Language ideologies, according to Spolsky, are historically situated discursive constructs, embedded in daily language practices, and carrying articulations and beliefs about the nature, value, and function of languages (Spolsky 2009), for which media and public space open up discursive spaces where different social actors compete in making their voice and claims heard. These values and beliefs are not just expressed by those who gain access to the discursive space but are negotiated through the gate-keeping capabilities of national press and public spaces regulations (Blommaert, 1999; Johnson & Milani, 2010; Pietikäinen et al, 2010). The modern electronic versions of newspapers have become the most frequently used places for data collection used in research of language ideological debates (Ajsic & McGroarty, 2015, p. 187); while the linguistic landscape may reflect the results of those debates in public space. Moreover, produced synchronically as the debates unfolds, media texts provide an immediate account of discourses in place; at the same time, they become the diachronic *de facto* registry of circulating discourses in time and space allowing researchers to analyze their various relations and representations (Milani, 2007; Hult & Pietikäinen, 2014). By the same token, according to Pietikäinen et al. linguistic landscape data delivers the same synchronic aspect of language distribution, hierarchies and ideologies governing public space at the particular moment, while at the same time tracing and reflecting “different (historical, political, economic, legal and social) processes in these landscapes” (2011, p. 278).

The study of language ideologies as a process that unfolds in time and space highlights the interrelationships between discourses and their networked characteristics in connection with broader historical, social, economic, and policymaking practices in and outside the society that surrounds the debates (Hult and Pietikäinen, 2014). Language ideological debates are thus

“slowly unfolding processes of discursive exchange” (Blommaert, 1999, p. 11); it could be suggested that the same debates take place in public space, for example, during my research trip to Ukraine in the spring of 2015 I took pictures of the central street in Dnipropetrovsk in eastern Ukraine, since then 256 streets in this city had their names changed according to the process of ‘de-Sovietization’ that was a subject of heated debates while I was still there. Developing this theory further and suggesting that in order to give realistic accounts of objects bound to remain unstable, Blommaert, Johnson and Milani write about an increasing need for complex non-linear models that explain the social processes (re)producing, (re)contextualizing, (re)circulating or negotiating particular ideas or beliefs about languages through meaning-making activities, the changes that societal developments cause for languages and language values (Johnson & Milani, 2010; Blommaert, 2005, 2015). The search for tools that would help demonstrate the complex connections across the time and space, multiple domains and contexts surrounding language politics is further assisted by the concept of *intertextuality*, coined by Kristeva in 1966 and inspired by Bakhtin’s notions of *dialogism* and *ambivalence* that proposes the interconnectivity of texts with other texts and also “implies the insertion of history (society) into a text and of this text into history” (Kristeva, as cited in Johnson 2014, p. 167).

Ideological debates may become salient at particular moments of political crisis; however, as noted above, neither the debates nor the ideologies themselves emerge *ex nihilo* as they may have been unfolding over centuries (see Chapter 2), became entrenched, or as Hult and Pietikäinen express it, became “sedimented” through previous occurrences of debate (2014). In other words, they become contemporary instantiations and (re)contextualizations of historically situated discourses that mediate present debates in media and public space (Blommaert, 1999, 2015; Pietikäinen et al, 2011; Hult & Pietikäinen, 2014). Those historically situated discourses

that influence the indexical order of discourse are defined by Blommaert as “chronotopes” (2015, p. 1-2). In Bakhtin’s understanding of the inseparability of time and space, chronotopes are “chunks of history that are invoked to organize the indexical order of discourses” mediated by scales, “the scope(s) of actual understandability of specific bits of discourse” (Blommaert, 2015, p. 2)), i.e. have their parameters expanded or limited which, in turn, will have an effect on how those discourses will be foregrounded and deployed in subsequent debates (Hult and Pietikäinen, 2014; Blommaert, 2015). Inspired by Bakhtin’s key notion of heteroglossia, Blommaert explains how introduction of those “intrinsic blending(s) of space and time” enables a historical-sociological analysis of different “voices” within the social stratigraphy of language of that moment (Blommaert, 2015; Siiner & L’nyavskiy, 2015 in press). Participants in shared collaborative activities like debates, “bring along” different voices that might not be totally shareable and what they consequentially “take along” after the activity is also not totally aligned and can even be conflicting, challenging the linear models of meaning making. Understanding history is evaluating it – from one’s own specific position in the sociolinguistic system (Blommaert, 2015). Communicability or availability of chronotopes depends thus not only on the context but also on the historical bodies of the participants or the different sociocultural materials in our discourses (Blommaert, 2015; Scollon & Scollon, 2004). Investigating a social phenomenon in its complexity across time and scales is greatly facilitated and systematized in nexus analysis method (Scollon & Scollon, 2004; Scollon, 2005; Hult, 2010a).

Mapping discourses by asking specific questions about them, finding their points of intersections, or a “nexus of practice”, and going from individual action, a “nexus point”, in particular scale at the particular moment in order to trace the next points of engagement and its effect on social practice for understanding of how the whole emerges by understanding the

relationships among its parts, a classic hermeneutic circle, lies in the foundation of nexus analysis (Scollon & Scollon, 2004; Hult, 2015). As a corollary to what is discussed above, the discursive spaces opened by the various social actors, from national to institutional and personal scales to the voices of other social actors are also shaped and constrained by particular political, cultural and economic conditions.

3.2. Approaches for the Present Study.

Using the line of thinking inspired by Hornberger and Hult (2008, p.285) of considering the language policy as a whole, and attempting to take into account multiple actions unfolding in time and space, identifying the social actors engaged in changing the course of particular historical moment, the following aforementioned questions are investigated in this paper:

1. How are circulating and established discourses mediating relationships among different languages reflected in media coverage?
2. How is media coverage of language ideological processes intended for Western audience used by political players?
3. How do language policy debates in media relate to sociolinguistic circumstances in ‘on the ground’ in the public space?

There are many methods for doing CDA. In this thesis, the corpus-assisted techniques are complimented by the interpretive approach to textual analysis developed by Fairclough (1989, 1992) and defined by Heracleous as “a communicative action that is constructive of social and organizational realities” (2006, p.2), which is located in social theory and could be performed by using inductive and deductive methods of various linguistic samples complimented by multimodal, ethnographic and linguistic data.

3.2.1. Corpus assisted discourse analysis. Corpus linguistics (CL) inspired Corpus

Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS, Partington et al, 2013) are becoming increasingly popular in the analysis of presentations of certain issues in media (Taylor, 2014), as it makes it possible to supply qualitative in-depth analysis together with quantitative and statistical analysis of language use in large corpuses of electronically stored linguistic examples, mostly in textual form. Some argue that due to the fact that corpus analysis is a computer-assisted method of analyzing naturally occurring examples of language use, it offers the researcher a reasonably high degree of objectivity. However, the subjective researcher input cannot be avoided when building up the corpus and deciding which computer-detected linguistic patterns have to be analyzed and how (Siiner & L'nyavskiy, in press). There is therefore big variety in CL methodologies (Baker, Gabrielatos, Khosravini, Krzyzanowski, McEnery & Wodak, 2008, p. 277) depending on what is analyzed and what kinds of corpora are assembled.

Many researches have suggested that merging CDA and CL methodologies can be especially useful in the studies of political discourse, i.e. how power, ideological bias etc. is enacted through discourse in news reports (Baker, 2005, 2006; Baker et al, 2008; Partington, 2003, 2010; Adel, 2010, 592). Since CL examines frequencies and quantifications into the study of discourse based on the view that repetitive use of structures and word combinations produce “conventional ways of talking about things, which in turn affect attitudes and opinions (Stubbs & Baker, as cited in Koteyko, 2014, p. 19); moreover, in case of specialized corpora with known topic of the corpus texts, the “examination of the strongest key words and clusters, provide(s) helpful indications of the respective stance”(Baker et al., 2008, p. 278); finally, unlike the method of CDA that reveals the patterns belonging to a particular discourse but does not use the feature of frequency detecting if those patterns have undergone entrenchment, CADS can detect central agents and topics in texts in terms of who is mentioned most often, how much space an

issue gets etc., CL makes it possible to determine the *keyness* of a text or corpus, i.e. the statistically significantly higher frequency of particular words or nodes in the corpus under analysis in comparison with another comparable specialized corpus, where *keyness* points towards the “aboutness” of a text or corpus compared to another comparable corpus (Adel, 2010; Barker et al, 2008), making it possible to analyze changes in two, diachronic corpora (Partington, 2014). CL approach is mostly lexical and for the purpose of discourse analysis, its findings need to be interpreted including the broader, extra-linguistic context (Wodak, 2007). This is usually done by “hands-on” analysis of the concordance lines – i.e. lines in source texts where the focus words, or key words appear.

3.2.2. Research approaches to the study of linguistic landscape. The second part of language policy research in Ukraine presented in this thesis investigates Linguistic Landscapes (LL) in four distinct regions of this largest European country - the sociolinguistic circumstances literary “on the ground”, i.e. the *de facto* effects of policy-making in public space. United by a common objective of studying relationships between different languages within specific landscapes, LL analysis emerged through understanding of the material world being symbolically constructed through visual display of linguistic and multimodal signs (Hult, 2014, p. 509-510). According to Chandler, the meaning of the sign makes no sense in isolation; its meaning depends on the code within which it is situated producing a framework within which the sign could be interpreted (2007, p. 147).

Based on this theory, linguistic landscape (LL), as deliberately constructed visual display of multimodal signs, could be conceptualized as a system, which requires codification in order to be related to each other and understood. As Chandler states, “codes organize signs into meaningful systems which correlate signifiers and signifieds through the structural forms of

syntagms and paradigms” (2007, p. 147). In the case of LL, which among other things investigates relations between languages, applying structuralism’s ‘principle of parsimony’ (Chandler, 2007, p.148) may lead to seeing the individual signs in public space as syntagmatic units that form a system of codes within LL paradigm. LL could reflect “the most pervasive code in any society, [which is] its dominant natural language” expressed in written form (Chandler, 2007, p. 148). I say ‘could’ because LL does not necessarily do so, since the linguistic situation in the community may not correspond to official policy, which this research is going to demonstrate.

One can think of LL as texts located in public space, where besides communicational denotational literary function, in which they inform the addressee of the referent, the store, the service or the café behind the doors, they acquire socio-cultural connotational ideologically charged meanings. For example, in the capital of Ukraine Kyiv, where over 60% of people prefer using Russian in everyday communication, the signage of the central street codes different reality – only 10% of the signs are in Russian on the main street, as the results below demonstrate.

Modern research of LL also views relationships between languages as a result of deliberate organization regulated by policy choice (top-down) from one side and by beliefs of individuals making their choices of signage for the intended audience (bottom-up) that deliver messages about power, importance, beliefs, salience or absence of certain languages; moreover, there is an effect of globalization that inserts non-local languages into the scene, as could be seen in the LL of Ukraine; finally, what is most relevant for this research, LL functions as spatial representation of relative power and status of linguistic or ethnic groups in a given territory (Spolsky, 2009; Shohamy, 2009; Gorter, 2006; Hult, 2014, 2014a; Muth, 2015). Defined in those terms, studies on LL are well suited within the paradigm of critical discourse analysis which could be

approached more systematically by applying nexus analysis reasoning in identifying the social practice influencing the display of signs in public space, interaction order that looks at the distribution of languages in public space identifying the underlying discourses related to language politics (Scollon & Scollon, 2004, p. 9; Hult, 2014a, p. 511-512, 2015).

In this research, the linguistic landscape study is limited, due to the limitations of the project, to physical linguistic items, such as official and commercial signs, street names, posters and personal messages visible in streets. Spolsky (2009), Shohamy (2006) and Hult (2014) consider linguistic landscape (LL) a sub-domain of language policy sharing the same principles of language management, which connects it with language ideologies, myths, propaganda and coercion, and contributes to construction of social reality.

If language policy reflects choices made by the political elites, then the distribution of linguistic items in public's view could be seen as a manifestation of an official policy in one of contested spaces (besides media, education etc.), where people respond and renegotiate the official the nation-building project (Polese, 2009, 2011; Rubdy, 2015). Shohamy outlines the following lines of inquiry that could guide researchers in their journey through public spaces, for example: one could ask what kind of reality does LP create and shape in linguistic landscape, what message does LL send to people living and coming to the area, and how the languages heard differ from the languages seen (Shohamy & Gorter, 2009, p. 2).

3.3. Methodology for Data Collection and Analysis

In this study, the qualitative interpretive analysis of language ideological discourses in Ukrainian and Russian English-language medium news is supported by corpus linguistics inspired methods, lately developed as Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS, Partington et al, 2013). The first part of this section describes the construction of the corpora and the second

part is dedicated to the methods of analysis including the justification for the multimodal approach, consisting of supplementary quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. Corpus-assisted qualitative and statistical analysis of the number and 'aboutness' of media texts on language issues, which Koteyko refers to as "a valuable 'quantitative ally' for inherently qualitative studies" (2014, p.4), are complemented by the linguistic landscape language distribution data; together, they help to outline and explain how "concurrent and conflicting language ideologies are historically situated discursive constructs" that include "(re)construction and negotiation of language, national, ethnic identities unfolding in time" (Hult and Pietikäinen 2014).

3.3.1. Data collection for corpus-assisted discourse analysis. Using the framework of Corpus Linguistics (CL) suggested by Ädel for the study of political discourse (2010), the following approaches for gathering the material were taken:

1. An extended definitional scope of political discourse, where "the political topic" together with the "underlying political issue" are the main criteria as the ways to investigate the topic, underlying issues, "power and control ... enacted through discourse" (Adel, 2010, p. 591- 592);
2. Genres under investigation produced by "the most powerful and visible agents in political discourse" (Adel, 2010, p. 592) included all texts devoted to the issues under investigation, specifically because unlike Ukrainian news that often reported directly from the sites, Russian portals often did not concentrate on the 'timeliness' or 'novelty' of the event but preferred to employ 'prominence' of long expert analysis for maximizing the significance, or 'impact' and 'superlativeness' (Bednareck & Caple, 2012 a,b) of the language issues meant for the English-speaking audience .

3. The “agents” of political discourse are the government, the political institutions, the politicians, the journalists, and the online media.
4. Manual investigation of the texts with most frequent content words in both corpora, keyness, and the most frequent collocations of the focus words ‘Russian’ and ‘language’ was conducted in order to identify the most frequently occurring discourses. Some of the passages were selected for demonstration of those tendencies, such as their sociopolitical, historical, intertextual and theoretical connections, organization of the articles through discursive perspective (Blommaert, 1999; Bednarek & Caple, 2012, p. 104).

Two specialized corpora based on predetermined content focus words (Fitzsimmons-Doolan, 2015) have been created through the archival research of online publications from 2010 till October 2015 in the leading Ukrainian (*Kyiv Post*, *Interfax*, *Unian* and *Ukrinform*) and Russian (*RIA*, *Sputnik*, *RT*, *Pravda*, *Kommersant*) electronic news depositories which have English-medium version: Ukrainian (453 articles) and Russian (203 articles) which amounted to 152 320 tokens in Ukrainian corpus and 153 602 tokens in Russian respectively, which indicates that both corpora are compatible in their size, both sufficiently representative for the study and large enough to justify a corpus-assisted approach. The collected corpora can thus be characterized as a small, specialized corpus (Barker et al, 2008) that can be processed by computer corpus software in a preliminary way, and the evidence of which can be examined manually and individually, while important features of the context of production of the texts may become lost in a large corpus (Clark, 2007).

The reason for such difference in the number of articles which, however, resulted in comparable corpora is explained by the differences in approaches to the language related news in Russian and Ukrainian media. Ukrainian news covered all related events for the Western readers

from different angles by tightly following the actions in place and the reactions they caused, while Russian media published significantly longer articles, expert testimonies and opinions that mostly repeated the same official narratives about the discrimination against the Russian language and Russian-speakers in Ukraine. All archival searches and crosschecks were based on the following phrases: ‘status of the Russian language in Ukraine’, ‘Russian language in Ukraine’ and ‘status of the Russian (Ukrainian) language’; consequently, all the articles had to discuss the issue or mention it in various contexts. Thus it is known that all the selected articles mention ‘Russian language’ and/or ‘Ukrainian language’ and discuss the status of the languages at least on one occasion. To ensure the purity of data, all textual material was converted into .txt files stripping the article of formatting and other electronic tags that create a lot of clutter and reduce the effectiveness of researcher’s work.

For statistical analysis of the data, AntConc concordance tool for Mac OS, (available from <http://www.laurenceanthony.net/>), was used for creating a word list for the most frequent content words in the chosen (parts of) corpora. The word lists were sorted by frequency, as descriptive statistics of CL techniques can certainly “point towards the ‘aboutness’ of a text or homogeneous corpus (Scott, 1999), that is, its topic and the central elements of its content” (Baker et al., 2008, p. 278). Furthermore, “two theoretical notions, and their attendant analytical tools, were central in the analysis: keyness and collocation”, where “keyness is defined as statistically significantly higher frequency of particular words or clusters in the corpus under analysis in comparison with another corpus” (Baker, Gabrielatos, Khosravini, Krzyzanowski, McEnery & Wodak, 2008, p. 277). Moreover, “as the topic of the corpus texts (are) known, the examination of the strongest key words [and clusters] (focus words, collocations and the most frequent topic words here, SL), provided helpful indications of “the respective stance” (Baker et al, 2008, p.

278) toward the language issues in Ukrainian and Russian corpora. In this case, the most frequent focus words directly related to the issue of the language policy examined in this paper are ‘language’ and ‘Russian’.

3.3.2. Linguistic Landscape: research methods and data collection. There are a number of methods to investigate the language policies in place; moreover, the growing body of Linguistic Landscape (LL) research shows that “confluence of (trans)national, cultural and economic discourses mediates language choices on signs, ..., reproducing national language ideologies” (Hult, 2014a, p. 507). Pavlenko studied LL in Kiev from a diachronic point of view, approaching the LL as a dynamic process of the present day’s arrangements with a deep consideration of the past with a data collection span over 10 years (in Shohamy, 2010, p. 133). Marten’s group of researchers included the interview with the shop owners in a form of spontaneous conversations as a way of complementing qualitative, attitudinal part of LL research in Latvia, where some owners were hostile (in Shohamy, 2010, p. 115). Sloboda investigated ideological indexicality of LL on the longest bridge over Vltava in Prague, as a single example of state ideology (in Shohamy, 2009, p. 173).

While working on research options for a multimodal analysis of language policy in Ukraine together with my professor, Francis Hult, we decided that researching the implementation of language policy *de facto* would complement the data collected from the cyber sources. However, for a researcher going to Ukraine alone for a rather limited time, the methods of interviews and sociological questionnaires are out of reach due to the volume of work required to produce diverse and statistically representative samples. At the same time, I was very interested in doing a comparative study on language policy implementations in the diverse regions of Ukraine.

The next question was about the actual unit of analysis within the space occupied by signs (Gorter, 2006, p.3-4). While the general coding scheme was decided upon, the question remained whether to analyze the whole store front as a unit, for example, or to break it up into individual signs. The decision was made to photograph individual signs in their environment, which has proven to be the right way for qualitative part of analysis and provided the data needed for the analysis of multilayered discourses in place.

With generous support from the Birgit Rausing Language Program, the capital of Ukraine and three other cities described in the next section were chosen for the study.

3.3.3. Linguistic Landscape data collection sites.




Figure 3.1. ⁱEthno-linguistic map of Ukraine and linguistic landscape data collection sites visited in March, April and May of 2015. Map source Wikimedia Commons (2011).

1. Dnipropetrovsk is a major regional industrial center and the 3rd largest city of eastern Ukraine with 1.3 million residents, a home to the giant missile factory from Soviet times because of which the whole region used to be closed to foreigners, where according to various surveys about 80% of the population uses Russian language in everyday communication (Arel & Khmelko, 1996; Fournier, 2010). Another trademark of ‘Dnipro’ is its intense political life: traditionally linked to Communist working class ideology, it has become a place whose livelihood depended on state subsidies, and where many ‘red directors’/politicians benefited from privatization of state enterprises, state funds and connections with oligarchs, ‘clans’ and ‘families’ from other regions (Yekelchuk, 2007; Goodman, 2012; Wilson, 2014). LL data was collected on the central Karl Marx street which hosts many local administrative buildings, commercial centers. It runs through the central Square of Independence and is often blocked for traffic during various festivities.

ⁱ The creator of the map, Yerevanci, grants permission to copy, distribute, adapt and transmit the work: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethnolinguistic_map_of_ukraine.png#file



Figure 3.2. Dnipropetrovsk, eastern Ukraine, a part of data collection site on Karl Marx street.

2. Kyiv, the capital and a largest city of Ukraine with a population of 3,14 million where, according to Masenko (2002), 52% of the population prefers using Russian in most of daily situations, 32% use Russian and Ukrainian, and 14,8% speak mostly Ukrainian. LL data was collected on the central street of Khreschatyk, which is also blocked for traffic over weekends and holidays providing ample space for festivals and various entertainments.



Figure 3.3. Kyiv, capital of Ukraine, data collection site on Khreschatyk street.

3. Lviv, the center of historical region of Galicia, is one of the main cultural centers of western Ukraine, where the 64% of the population prefer communicating in Ukrainian and about 2-3% prefer Russian (Masenko, 2009; Charnysh, 2013, p.4). LL data was gathered at Svoboda (*Freedom*) street in the heart of Lviv's downtown. Just like in the other cities, Svoboda Prospect is often blocked for traffic for holidays.



Figure 3.4. Lviv, western Ukraine, a part of data collection site on Svoboda Prospect

4. Odesa - a city of about 1 million on the Black Sea costal line and a bustling sea port which in the very beginning of the 19th century became an administrative center of Novorossiya (New Russia) after colonization of the nearby territories by the Russian Empire. Among the four cities under investigation, Odesa has the weakest ties to Ukraine: in 1926 only 7% of the population identified themselves as Ukrainians in comparison with about 48% in 1989 (Popova, 1993; Yekelchuk, 2007, p. 33). According to Skvirskaja (2009) and Popova (1993), it hosts representatives of 127 ethnic groups, of which 7% prefer to communicate in Ukrainian and 77% in Russian. LL data was collected on Deribasovskaya Street, Odesa's 'signature' location, which is open for traffic only in about 1/3 of its length with the other 2/4 being allocated only for

pedestrians.



Figure 3.5. Odesa, south-western Ukraine, a part of data collection site on Deribasovskaya Street

The best times to photograph the signage, especially taking the *establishing shots* (whole arrangements on building fronts), followed by closer *cut-in* shots focusing on details, depended on the lighting. Many objects were best photographed before the central streets were filled with people, and the guards in jewelry stores and banks did not feel obligated to come out and question my intentions. This being said, I have not encountered a single hostile reception as the reasons for taking my time in front of the shops with a camera were honestly explained; in the contrary, if my presence was noticed I engaged the shop guards and the owners in conversations, and they usually were willing to share their fascinating insights about the perils of Ukrainian, their lives, businesses and language use. It was also necessary to come back during daytime when free-standing ads were put out by business owners giving the extended third dimension to their store fronts.

The material collected consisted of approximately 700 photographs from each city with the names of the streets, public signs, names of shops, advertisements, billboards set on the sidewalks by the shop entrances or pointing to the shops inside the court-yards, personal advertisements and graffiti accompanied by verbal signs. The following framework, criteria for quantitative and qualitative analysis, and the way of reasoning while collecting and analyzing material were used:

1. Linguistic landscape was investigated from the qualitative “language ecology” point of view: in that case “the presence (or absence) of language displays in the public space communicates a message, intentional or not, conscious or not, that affects, manipulates or imposes ‘de facto’ language policy and practice” (Shohamy, 2006, p. 110).
2. Aiming at the usability of data for the possible future qualitative analysis of the “presence (or absence) of specific language items, displayed in specific languages, in a specific manner, sending direct and indirect messages with regard to the centrality versus marginality of certain languages in society (Shohamy, 2006, p. 110), images of the signs were collected ‘in context’. In other words, the photos of the signs were collected in the way that the whole design of the store would be visible, not only the parts taken out of their surroundings.
3. “Official signage” (the signs placed by authorities), “commercial signage” (the signs set up by commercial enterprises), private signage (graffiti, posters etc.)(Pavlenko, 2010, p. 134) are quantitatively analyzed from the “top-down” (representing items issued by the state) vs. “bottom-up” (items issued by “autonomous social actors, selected by individuals and representing a number of domains”) points of view, as those mechanisms are viewed as affecting ‘de facto’ language policy (Shohamy, 2006, p. 115).

In order to ensure the consistency and comparability of the data acquired from four different cities, pictures were taken on central streets of Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Lviv and Odesa, in the centers of major commercial and tourist activity of the cities mentioned above. This type of analysis was done by Cenoz and Gorter in the Basque Country, where the aim of the research was not to investigate the linguistic composition of the whole city but to create a careful inventory of all texts for the case exploration (Gorter, 2006, p.3).

4. Comparative Corpus and Linguistic Landscape Data and Analysis

The previous chapter has established the theoretical background and introduced the data collection sites assembled in the course of this study. This chapter begins with a comparative study of language ideological debates with the assistance of corpus linguistic tools together with the interpretive discourse and relevant aspects of nexus analysis are applied to the study of circulating and intersecting discourses in media. In the following sections, the analysis progresses to interpret linguistic landscape data, investigating discourses in place and the interaction order of discourses in linguistic landscapes.

4.1. Discourse analysis of the English medium articles in Ukrainian and Russian media

Language ideological debates do become salient at the times of election or political crisis. The language issue was a well established discourse in modern Ukrainian politics long before independence. It has been noted by Arel and Khmelko (1996), Barrington (1997), Kubicek (2000), Wolczuk (2001), Kulyk (2009), Hult and Pietikäinen (2014) and many others that radically different views on history, foreign relations and language are concentrated around relations with Russia and have been exploited by regional political forces to deepen the divide and manipulate the electorate especially at the time of election or political crisis. Savojska states that turning language into the object of political manipulations causes linguistic-political separatism which in turn becomes the reason for linguistic conflicts (2011, p. 155), and as the latest events show, may turn into military confrontation. Table 4.1. compares the number of articles on language issues from 2010 to 2015 and is accompanied by the chart (Figure 4.1.) confirming the above statements.


Table 4.1.

Number of language policy related articles in Ukrainian and Russian media from 2010 till 2015

| Years | Ukrainian | Russian | |
|-------|-----------|---------|----------------------|
| 2010 | 41 | 31 | Election campaign |
| 2011 | 16 | 4 | |
| 2012 | 296 | 24 | Language law |
| 2013 | 30 | 7 | |
| 2014 | 67 | 128 | Annexation of Crimea |
| 2015 | 5 | 16 | |
| Total | 455 | 203 | |

Figure 4.1.

Comparative chart of articles in Ukrainian and Russian media from 2010 to 2015



As one can see, the language issue became salient around the election campaign of Victor Yanukovich in 2010, when Ukrainian English-medium papers released 41 articles and Russian

ones discussed the issue at least 31 times. The next surge of texts in media appeared from July to November, 296 in Ukrainian (a 19 times increase in comparison with 2011) and 24 in Russian (a 6 times increase from 2011), as in August of 2012, with multiple violations of parliamentary procedures, the new language law was passed prompting violent protests in western and central Ukraine right on the heels of parliamentary elections in October during which Yanukovich was trying to prepare favorable conditions for the next presidential campaign of 2015 by previously changing the rules in local elections, using ‘political technology’ to run all sorts of schemes for boosting failing popularity of his government (Wilson, 2014; Moser, 2014). By the summer of 2013, being threatened by the intensification of the EU negotiations with Ukraine, Russia virtually ceased all exports especially targeting heavy industries of Donbas and by November, just a week before Vilnius Summit, Yanukovich’s administration pulled out of the EU association talks pocketing 15 billion offered by Putin and choosing “bribery as a substitute for foreign policy” (Wilson, 2014, p. 65).

The force and spontaneity of the protests that resulted in Yanukovich’s escape to Russia were immediately contextualized in Russian media as an extreme nationalists’ fascist coup that threatened the well-being of Russian-speakers in several Ukrainian oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv), which were also reduced in Russian media to the geo-historical imperial concept of Novorossiya (New Russia) signaling its belonging to Russia and reinforcing the notion of that “other Ukraine” (Wilson, 2014; Zhurzhenko, 2014). As could be seen, by the time of the annexation of Crimea, the western audience was barraged by 128 articles mentioning language issues, 55 of which were produced in March. Ukrainian press was basically monitoring language ideological debates unleashed by Russia by reporting news from Crimea and reflecting rising tensions in eastern Ukraine which

resulted in half the articles related to language issues (67, with 21 articles from March 2014) as at that time the country was facing a war. However, it is not the fact that certain issues become salient at the time of certain political activities of crisis, but how those issues are (re)contextualized by various political forces.

4.2. Corpus-assisted Interpretive Analysis of Language Issues in Ukrainian and Russian English Medium News from 2010 to October of 2015

Table 4.2.

The most frequent content words among the first one hundred content words in 455 Ukrainian and 203 Russian English medium articles

| <u>Ukrainian</u> | <u>Frequency</u> | <u>Russian</u> | <u>Frequency</u> |
|------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------|
| language(s) | 3158 | Ukraine | 1762 |
| Ukraine | 2154 | Russian | 1654 |
| Ukrainian | 1641 | Russia | 1101 |
| Russian | 1399 | Ukrainian | 1077 |
| law | 1070 | language(s) | 833 |
| regional | 525 | Crimea(an) | 658 |
| bill | 495 | Kyiv | 635 |
| policy | 492 | people | 496 |
| president | 476 | country | 462 |
| regions | 414 | president | 420 |
| Kyiv | 403 | government | 405 |
| people | 398 | protest (ers) | 360 |
| parliament | 397 | state | 331 |
| party | 389 | region | 319 |
| Russia | 377 | status | 315 |
| Rada | 344 | parliament | 314 |

| | | | |
|------------|-----|-------------|-----|
| Yanukovych | 334 | law | 304 |
| status | 331 | Crimean | 258 |
| council | 311 | Donetsk | 251 |
| principals | 288 | eastern | 247 |
| national | 271 | referendum | 242 |
| country | 266 | military | 241 |
| Lytvyn | 248 | official | 238 |
| political | 222 | against | 254 |
| government | 212 | authorities | 215 |
| against | 197 | political | 199 |
| issue | 187 | forces | 198 |
| minority | 181 | regional | 196 |
| opposition | 181 | foreign | 193 |
| rights | 159 | western | 193 |
| Ukrainians | 157 | bill | 186 |
| Crimea | 156 | rights | 166 |

As could be observed, Ukrainian articles mention ‘language’ or ‘languages’ about 4 times more often (3158 tokens in Ukrainian corpus, vs. 833 tokens in Russian). This kind of phenomena could be explained by stepping away from corpus techniques and looking at the use of ‘language’ in the superstructures of the news discourse, the headlines, which according to Van Dijk plays crucial role in news production, organization, comprehension and reproduction of the text by the media user (1988, p. 14) A simple count showed that only 34 (15%) of 203 articles in Russian corpus had language issue in their headlines. In Ukrainian corpus only 45 articles or 10% out of 455 did not have the language issue in their headlines. To understand why in the

articles regarding the status of the Russian language the focus is not on the issue, we can examine the following.

On the list from Russian corpus the sixth position is taken by ‘Crimea(an)’ with 658 tokens in 203 articles. Upon a closer examination of a number of articles with ‘Crimea(an)’ in the headline, such as *Crimean Self-Defense Squads in Stand off with Ukrainian Soldiers at Belbek Airport* (RT, 2014d), it appears that the article’s most important information is located in the first paragraph, according to the general principle of communicative functions (Van Dijk, 1988, p. 16) and has not much to do with the status of Russian language in Ukraine. In the very last paragraph the language issue is weaved into the information about the stand off in Crimea to explain to the reader why there is such tension in the region. The same tactics are used in the majority of the articles reporting on the situation in Crimea, for example, the last paragraph in the article from the RT news *Ukrainian troops dispatched in Crimea switch to region’s side*, explains to the reader:

Crimeans began protesting after the new self-imposed government in Kiev introduced a law abolishing the use of other languages for official documents in Ukraine. More than half the Crimean population are Russian and use only this language for their communication. The residents have announced they are going to hold a referendum on March 30 to determine the fate of the Ukrainian autonomous region. (RT, 2014)

It could be seen that “the ideological construct of a unified, homogeneous nation with a national language linked to a specific territory” (as cited in Hult, 2014, p. 3) is being used to describe the Russian-speaking majority in Crimea. The group, whose language rights are violated according to the article, is categorized and assigned the dominant status by the mentioning of its size (“over

half”) and presumed homogeneous ethnicity (Van Dijk, 1988, p. 26). Besides the final paragraph totally devoted to the source of the unrest in Crimea, right after the first paragraph foregrounding the most important information, there is a highlighted link directing the reader to the article *Facts you need to know about Crimea and why it is in turmoil* (RT, 2014, likely to catch attention of those who may not read the article to the end. It appears to be a good example of an “installment –type”, a discontinuous way to organize the news macrostructures by inserting the link to the ideological debates right after the lead and devoting the “less prominent schematic categories (e.g., History or Comments)” (Van Dijk, 1988, p.15) to the ideological issue that would be continuously used as justification for the annexation of the territory of the sovereign state of Ukraine.

The fifth position in Ukrainian corpus is taken by ‘law’. The ‘law’ issue (1070 tokens) has been used by various fractions and players in the Ukrainian government, by “the groups and individuals who want to control and manipulate ... in order to promote political social, economic and personal ideologies” (Shohamy, 2006, p. XIV). In an article from 2010 reprinted in Kyiv Post in July of 2012 in the anticipation of the new language law debates, *Yuschenko calls new language law ‘strategy for de-Ukrainization’*, the readers were reminded the following:

Third Ukrainian President Viktor Yuschenko (2005-2010) has said he believes that the adoption of the language law indicates that the country is being offered a strategy for de-Ukrainization.

"We are being offered ...a plan of Russification, in which the national language is not needed. Finally, we are being offered a strategy for de-Ukrainization," he said at a forum of patriotic forces in Kyiv on Saturday.

He described the adoption of the law on principles of state language policy as "mockery and cynicism." "If you want to preserve Ukraine, first of all, preserve its language," Yuschenko said, "If you give up the European course, you will get Moscow's policy, dependence on Moscow, from which our humiliation and the loss of our independence always comes." Yuschenko said that all Ukrainian values in Ukraine were "subject to anathema." (Kyiv Post, 2012)

Kulyk's research on the attitudes toward the language law change back in 2005-06 shown that the popular attitudes have been rather ambivalent, which created the opportunities for many political actors to manipulate their constituents by creating the sense of urgency for the language law or to declare that there was none (2009, p.49). This kind of ideological message from the pro-Ukrainian block (headed by Yuschenko) in 2004 led the winners of Orange revolution to power, which in turn deepened the polarization of the political elites opening the space for the pro-Russian Party of Regions to strengthen their stance on official status of Russian for its Southern and Eastern constituencies (Kulyk, 2009, p. 49).

In Russian media 'law' is mentioned 304 times. In the article also from 2012, *Tymoshenko slams Russian-Ukrainian equal language status proposal*, the Russian side chose the imprisoned former Ukrainian Prime Minister Tymoshenko to deliver a very similar message about the new language bill, "It is not just election games, it is a crime against Ukraine," she said. "I will not let it happen! Hear? Am here behind bars but I won't let you abuse Ukraine!" In the following paragraphs of the same article, the intense metaphoric message of a criminalized political figure is offset by the factual report of a broken promise of language equality and a fear of increased hostilities because of that:

Before he was elected in 2010, President Viktor Yanukovich promised to make Russian the other official language but then did not achieve the required majority in parliament to get the bill through... The opposition has argued the bill would only aggravate relationship between Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking citizens.” (Sputnik 2012)

The reaction from Russian Prime Minister Medvedev to the uprising in Ukraine and the new troubles with Kivalov-Kolesnichenko language law (Tyshchenko, 2012), which was met with such hostility in 2012 and temporarily repealed in 2014, states the reason why the discussions of the language law in the neighboring state are so important for Russia:

Medvedev commented, “*We do not understand what is going on there, there is a real threat to our interests and to the lives and health of our citizens,*” he noted. Medvedev also added that currently Ukraine lacked legitimate representatives of authority, and expressed surprise over Western politicians holding opposite opinions. (RT, 2014e)

The example of the discussion in Ukrainian media shows the fear of a compromise solution to the language issue, where even a suggestion of codifying the status of Russian in Ukraine as a regional language is perceived as a threat to the national identity (Hult & Pietikainen, 2014, p.14) and independence. The quoted Medvedev’s statement sheds light on the mechanisms used by the Russian authorities to weave the language issue into the much wider realm of their political interests in Ukraine, where the language, as “an instrumental symbol, [which] can easily be put to serve some of the political purposes” (as cited in Bowring, 2006, p. 58) and even used to make demands (on behalf of Russian-speaking population, SL) in the fight to retain their privileged status (Shohamy, 2006, p. 46).

4.2.1. Exploring keyness of Ukrainian and Russian corpora

In the process of the examination of the most frequent word lists, it became apparent that there were a number of the most frequent words in the Russian corpus, which were almost absent among the first hundred most frequent words in Ukrainian corpus. So, the keyness feature (McEnery, Xiao, Tono, 2006) of AntConc concordance tool was used to identify significantly frequent (positive key words) that are present in target corpus (Russian) and absent or with insignificant infrequency in the reference corpus (Ukrainian). According to Partington (2014, p. 130) keyness can also be defined as the measure of both relative presence and absence of items in one dataset compared to another and the absence can be both relative (lesser use of previously dominating words) and absolute (new words appear and old disappear). Applying this comparative measure to both corpora revealed that the words referred to conflict discourse various geo-political entities, including military and social actions.

Table 4.3.

Presence of the political and conflict words in Russian and Ukrainian Corpora sorted by keyness

| Political & conflict words | Russian | Ukrainian |
|----------------------------|---------|-----------|
| Crimea(an) | 916 | 300 |
| military | 241 | 36 |
| coup | 132 | 3 |
| referendum | 242 | 72 |
| forces | 198 | 49 |
| NATO | 111 | 16 |
| troops | 215 | 21 |
| Western/West | 344 | 124 |
| against | 254 | 197 |
| proclaimed | 61 | 3 |
| war | 134 | 44 |

defense

111

32

This table demonstrates significant difference among the most frequently used words in Russian corpus in the quantity of geo-political ('Crimea(an)' (three times more frequent than in Ukrainian articles), 'NATO' (7 times more frequent) and "West(ern) almost 3 times more frequent (Russia's perceived political and military opposition against ongoing Russia-supported armed conflict), and conflict lexical devices ('military', 'coup', 'protest', 'against', 'war', 'defense') used to talk about the issues surrounding the status of the Russian language. Knowing that only 10% of the articles in Russian corpus are directly related to the language status, one can see that the use of above mentioned linguistic devices is designed to activate particular attitudes, by bringing in authorities and political actions, (re)framing the established discourses and (re)contextualizing them by the use of scripts associated with military and violence (Van Dijk, 1988, p.16; Bednarek & Caple, 2012, p. 105). Van Dijk describes the presence of those fixed semantic categories as parts of a gradually constructed particular model; in this case, what we know about the social unrests and military conflicts adds new referential points to our knowledge (our model) of language ideological debates (1988, p. 22).

A comprehensive diachronic analysis of ideological debates regarding the status of the Russian language in Ukraine from the time of its independence is beyond the scope of this paper as it is limited to the latest developments from 2010, but the results presented in the Table 2 and the overall picture would benefit from yet another step back into the history of the issue with a closer look at three articles, one from 2004 *40% of Ukrainians come out for official status of Russian language* (Sputnik, 2004) published by Russian media two years before the official ratification of the EC. The language issue is stated overtly in the headline and repeated in the first paragraph with the reference to the scientific data collected by the reputable Kiev

International Sociology Institute. The neutral tone of the article presents statistical data and outlines the ongoing state of the Russian language status discussions, though shortly mentioning the existing hostility towards the presence of Russian for official communication in Ukraine. The second article from 2006, however, shows the increase in the number of Ukrainians who not only want to see Russian as the official or state language, but would also prefer to “live back in the Soviet Union” (Sputnik, 2006). The third article from 2014 (RT, 2014) holds the language dispute as a cause for the alleged uprising of the Russian majority in Crimea, which would result in annexation and a military conflict in just a few weeks. The latest contextualization of the language issue in Ukraine and Russian-speaking compatriots could be examined by looking at a few positions in the ‘keyness’ results that did not make the first 30 on the list, but they are very prominent and pounded on a daily basis in discourse on Ukraine in Russian-medium outlets, especially Russian TV. Those words are ‘national(s)’ (123 tokens), ‘fascist(s)’ (45 tokens in Russian corpus), ‘junta’ (36 tokens), and ‘Bandera’ (23 tokens). The article *The truth instead of lies* in the newspaper *Pravda* (*The Truth*), 2015) informs the Western reader of the following:

Western media outlets have been spreading outright lies in recent days, ... when Fascist forces seized power in an illegal coup, ousting the democratically elected President against all legal norms for impeachment and placing a Putsch in control.

... many Western citizens are unaware that Fascist massacres took place across south-eastern Ukraine after illegal Putsch. ... 50 people were burnt alive ... in Odesa when Fascists attacked Russian-speaking Protesters. Those who escaped were hacked to death... crowd jeered and chanted “Death to Russians”. Mariupol, fascists mowed down unarmed civilians, ... 46 police shot by Fascist national guard forces... Fascist forces attacked Slavyansk and murdered many civilians, including, children, women and elderly.

Link to crimes committed by Kiev Junta forces... Prime Minister Yatsenyuk, whose own homophobic positions are well reported, labeled as “subhumans” the citizens of Donbas... The list in the article goes on and on exploiting *superlativeness* with multiple repetition of ‘fascists/’junta;/’coup’ etc., *prominence* by bringing and insulting in members of Ukrainian government, *impact* with cause-effect relations, *consonance* by using evaluative language and referencing the monsters of the past like ‘fascists’ and assigning the same roles to the Ukrainian side (Bednarek & Caple, 2012 a,b); moreover, Russian-speakers, individuals, as elderly, women and children are juxtaposed to the mass of the Ukrainian junta, the fascist forces and so on. In case the reader has any doubts about this account, the credentials of the author who contributed this piece to *Pravda*, which emphasize the human agency (Hult, 2015, p. 223), occupy about 1/3 of the article’s *The truth instead of lies* length:

Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey has worked as a correspondent, journalist, deputy editor, editor, chief editor, director, project manager, executive director, partner and owner of printed and online daily, weekly, monthly and yearly publications, TV stations and media groups printed, aired and distributed in Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Portugal, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe Isles; the Russian Foreign Ministry publication Dialog and the Cuban Foreign Ministry Official Publications. He has spent the last two decades in humanitarian projects, connecting communities, working to document and catalog disappearing languages, cultures, traditions, working to network with the LGBT communities helping to set up shelters for abused or frightened victims and as Media Partner with UN Women, working to foster the UN Women project to fight against gender violence and to strive for an end to sexism, racism and homophobia. He is also a Media Partner of Humane Society International, fighting for animal rights. (Pravda, 2015)

If one tries to find the information about this foreign expert, the agent of influence chosen by *Pravda* to inform the western readership, the internet brings up a couple of references to Timothy Bancroft-Hinchey, a ‘literature major’ from Leeds and a failed song writer with some journalist classes.

Thinking of ideological debates as “slowly unfolding processes of discursive exchange” (as cited in Hult & Pietikäinen, 2014, p. 5), one could observe how over the course of 10 years the Russian language status discourses were (re)contextualized, “reconfigured and deployed in real time as a debate unfolds” (p. 5). We can see how the status of Russian language has become one of the “established discourses” that is nested inside the next cycle of debates, which in turn “may become salient at particular moments of political crisis” (Hult & Pietikäinen, 2014, p.5). Here one could also identify a chronotope (Bakhtin 1986, Blommaert 2015) that enabled Bakhtin to address the co-occurrence of events from different times and places by bringing chunks of history to the interactional here-and-now as relevant context, for example, defining the 2013-14 uprising in Kiev as a ‘fascist coup’ successfully invoked the Great Patriotic War (WWII) chronotope, which in the minds of Soviet and European post-war generations equals the enemy where violence, war, nationalism and Hitlerism attributes defined the event and its participants and primed the audience for a relentless propaganda campaign (Siiner & L’nyavskiy, 2015, in press). Analyzing the transformation described above, one could note how over time the discourse of language status and highly politicized language debates, especially on the side of Russian media regarding the inclusion of the language of the former colonial power into the identity of the modern Ukrainian society, acquired more and more complex “layered simultaneity” (Blommaert, 2005, p. 126-131; Scollon, 2008, p. 65; Hult, 2015, p. 223) of discourses, which were used to escalate “tensions surrounding the (re)territorialization”(as cited in Hult &

Pietikäinen, 2014, p. 15) of the language and later progress to “opening discursive space” (Hult & Pietikäinen, 2014, p.8) for destabilization of the new model of Ukraine as a westernized “single language” nation (Zaliznyak, 2009, p. 140).

4.2.1. Exploring collocations of the focus words ‘Russian’ and ‘language’. Another difference in the attitudes regarding the status of Russian language could be revealed by examining the number of the focus word ‘Russian’, which occupies second position in Russian and takes fourth place in Ukrainian word list, by running the data through the AntConc collocation tool. The idea for the organization of the next table was to compare the numbers of common collocations of ‘Russian’ found in both corpora among the first 30 most frequent positions; however, it yielded only two common collocations (‘status’ and ‘official’), besides ‘language’. Thus, the following table was created.

Table 4.4.

Comparison of the most frequent collocations with content words of the focus word ‘Russian’

| Russian corpus | Collocation | Ukrainian corpus | Collocation |
|----------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|
| language(s) | 230 | language(s) | 503 |
| speak(ing/ers) | 158 | speak(ing/ers) | 291 |
| pro-(Russian) | 113 | Ukraine(ian) | 146 |
| federation | 73 | status | 149 |
| foreign | 72 | official | 69 |
| population | 57 | regional | 68 |
| Ukrainian | 54 | state | 46 |
| ministry | 47 | pro-(Russian) | 32 |
| flags | 37 | official | 32 |
| official | 36 | federation | 24 |

| | |
|------------|----|
| protesters | 35 |
| Ukraine | 32 |
| status | 32 |

Besides the same words that were found in the tables 4.1. and 4.2., there are three new positions from the Russian corpus ‘flag(s)’, ‘foreign’ and ‘pro-Russian’ found within two positions from ‘Russian’. ‘Flags’ (37 tokens) appear in 17 the articles of the Russian corpus where the various protests are described, and the loyalty to the state of Russia and pro-Russian groups (bearing flags of Russia) is displayed:

Thousands also gathered for a rally in the Black Sea coastal city of Odesa on Sunday, protesting against the coup-imposed government in Kiev. They carried Ukrainian, Russian, and Crimean flags and chanted slogans such as “*Ukraine and Russia are together*” and “*Odesa is against Nazis and tycoons,*” as well as “Referendum! (RT, 2014a)

Examination of the collocations of ‘Russian’ sorted by frequency with ‘foreign’ shows that all 58 collocations refer to the ‘Russian Foreign Ministry’. The reason for the presence of such prominent government entity in the language debates is the concern for the well-being of Russian-speaking ethnic minority, for example, the article by RT (‘Russia Today’, the former RIA Novosti) from February, 2014, *Cancelled language law in Ukraine sparks concern among Russian and EU diplomats* gives the following account of the events:

A much stronger reaction earlier came from Konstantin Dolgov, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s commissioner for human rights. “*Attack on the Russian language in Ukraine is a brutal violation of ethnic minority rights,*” he tweeted in a comment on the abolition of the regional languages law.

... The resolution, proposed by six political groups in the European Parliament, urges Ukraine to ensure that its new legislation complies with the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (RT, 2014b).

Furthermore, collocations of ‘foreign’ point out at another important side of Russian interest in Ukraine: in the article *EU, US ‘ideological sowing’ behind current Ukrainian crisis – Russian official*, the Russian authorities issue the following statement:

The Russian parliament has repeatedly blasted the involvement of foreign officials and politicians into internal affairs of Ukraine. When the events took a violent turn in the beginning of this year, both the lower and upper houses passed addresses to foreign colleagues asking them not to interfere in the crisis and warning of dire consequences for the Ukrainian state and its people (RT, 2014c).

Uniting Russian people against the ‘external enemy’, usually a Western enemy, is a known tactic employed by the government of the Russian Federation at the times of internal crisis situation; however, as could be seen, the language ideological debates in Ukraine are amplified and circulated in the Russian news for the legitimization and justification of the totally different intentions. The ‘dire consequences’ of the alleged Western interference in Ukraine now occupy the prime spots in the news. As the forces demanding the union with Europe in Ukraine grew stronger and started to win, Russian government, which all this time kept behaving as a representative of Russian-speakers in Ukraine (following the ‘Russian World’ doctrine) demanding on the surface, “to follow the rules of pluralist democratic societies, including advocating that all citizens should have the opportunity to learn a variety of languages” (Shohamy, 2006, p. 46), used the ‘language card’ and brought in its troops.

Following the thread from conflict discourses in Table 2, ‘troops’ are present 10 times (215 tokens) more frequently in Russian corpus (vs. 25 tokens) collocates 20 times with ‘Russian’ in Russian corpus mostly to deny any presence of RF military in Crimea or Ukraine. The article *Putin: Russian citizens, troops threatened in Ukraine, need armed forces’ protection* from March 1 of 2014, gives the following justification for the involvement of Russia in the conflict:

Russian President Vladimir Putin has requested the use of Russian military forces in Ukraine to settle the situation there. The Russian population and the Crimea-based Black Sea Fleet are threatened by the situation in the country, he said. (1a)

Putin’s request was filed after the Chairman of the Federation Council, Valentina Matvienko, said that in order to “*protect the people*” Russia could theoretically send troops to Ukraine. She particularly referred to the crisis in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, where Russians make the majority of the population.

Putin stressed that in the case of further spread of violence in the eastern regions of Ukraine and Crimea, Russia reserves the right to protect their interests and the Russian-speaking population (RT, 2014).

This article is organized the same way, as are many others not directly connected to the language policy discussion. After the first paragraph (1a) there is a link to the full site of information about Crimea with reference to the language issue. ‘Russian population’, ‘Russian citizens’, ‘Russian speaking population’, ‘people’ (in need of protection) are used interchangeably through out the article which appears to be, as Bourdieu expressed it, a political exploitation of language boundaries, or a “phenomenon of the performative character typical for ethno-political entrepreneurs, who may live ‘off’ as well as ‘for’ ethnicity (as cited in Bowring, 2009, p. 58).

Further Bourdieu adds, “by invoking groups, they seek to evoke them, summon them, call them into being”; however, it often “bear little or no relation to the lived reality of the people they claim to represent.” (as cited in Bowring, 2009, p.58)

The absence of a highly prominent political and military discourse in the Ukrainian corpus does not diminish the political tension around the language policy in the country. All the top positions in the Ukrainian most frequent word list are taken by the words one would probably expect to find in the discussion about the language policy of the new nation state, such as ‘law’, ‘state’, ‘regional’, ‘bill’, ‘languages’, ‘policy’ and so on. A more detailed discussion about those positions in the Ukrainian corpus will be done later in this paper.

Reflecting on ‘vertical intertextuality’ for capturing the historical connections to previous texts (Johnson 2015, p. 167), the following path from the past could be followed giving us a helping hand in understanding two different points of departure regarding the language policy in Ukraine. The article *Another language issue* (Yuschenko presidency) in Ukrainian *Kyiv Post* (2005) states the following:

We're big supporters of the Ukrainian language, but President Yuschenko's order to Interior Minister officials that they speak it is heavy-handed and politically dumb etsk as much as in Lviv. A nation is entitled to its national tongue; and given the vicious state violence that was used to suppress Ukrainian under both Tsarist and Soviet imperial rule, strengthening Ukrainian's presence here would help balance the scales, partially redressing a tremendous historical wrong... More pertinently, the fact is that whether you like it or not, Russian is the language spoken by a majority of people in this country.

... Happily, government schooling in Ukraine today goes on in Ukrainian. That means that in a generation's time, Ukraine will be far more Ukrainian-speaking than it is today.

... Furthermore, sleazy efforts are currently underway in Donetsk and other parts of Ukraine to tar Yushchenko as an anti-Russian fanatic who will make reading Pushkin illegal and Russophones into second-class citizens of the sort Ukrainian-speakers were during the successive incarnations of the Russian empire. ... An “orange” Ukraine, unburdened of undue Russian influence, oriented toward the West, and salubriously back in touch with its best traditions, will inevitably drift toward its ancestral language. It will do so organically, naturally and in the absence of state pressure – the way it should. Stop the nonsense. (Kyiv Post, 2005)

This article is informative in a sense that it outlines a few circulating discourses around the language policy in Ukraine, as well as points out “the social actions and social actors which [are] crucial in the production” of the discourse (Scollon & Scollon 2004, p. 155), and shows how discourses are construed around the focus word ‘Russian’. The “inventory of relevant discourses” (Hult & Pietikäinen, 2004, p. 8) could be outlined as follows:

1. We need to distance ourselves from the heritage left by Russian imperial domination;
2. Ukraine should become “one nation – one language” country;
3. Russian has deep roots in our country, it already dominates many areas of everyday use, it is not endangered, and there are no bases for its special status;
4. Education in Ukrainian is a way for a smooth transition to “one nation – one language” model.

The disagreements in the methods among the social actors on how to proceed with a transition towards desired linguistic unity of the country and the presence of “heavy-handed” orders of the president to all officials to speak Ukrainian may be explained by what scholars have defined as

“the deficient nature of Ukrainian democracy” which combines some democratic elements with electoral and competitive authoritarianism and only formally “meets the requirements of democracy” (as cited in Kulyk, 2009, p. 15). Referring back to the Table 4.2., it is noticeable that the issue of language rights does not appear among the top priorities in Ukrainian discourse, which becomes obvious from the article mentioned above, where the Ukrainian nation is the one entitled to the national tongue; however, it is prominently present in Russian (166 tokens in 203 articles vs. 159 in 455 Ukrainian), adding power to the buildup of the conflict perception in Russian media. The last paragraph of the example (Kyiv Post, 2005) covertly states the ways of relieving the coming generations of Ukraine from having to choose which language to speak, as it will be “organically, naturally and in the absence of state pressure” eliminated. This kind of rhetoric seem to reflect the ultimate goal of ‘one nation – one language’ policy, which is counterproductive at this point in time as well as contradictive to the constitution of Ukraine, where the Article 10 guarantees the rights for “free development, use, and protection of Russian and other languages” (Constitution, 2004).

The next example from the Russian corpus assembled prior making the choice to right about the period from 2010 till presence, is dated by 2004 with the headline *Expert: Ukraine’s intellectual potential suffers over lacking official status for Russian language* illustrates the point used by Russian media in circles, over and over again, to problematize the status of Russian in Ukraine specifically intended for the English-speaking reader:

Vyacheslav Igrunov, director of the international institute for humanitarian and political studies, champions granting an official status to the Russian language in Ukraine.

... at a press-conference in RIA Novosti, he said that half of the population in Ukraine speaks Russian as their native tongue and therefore making Russian an official language in the republic is quite natural from the humanitarian point of view.

In the opinion of the expert, the language the Ukrainians speak today is a colloquial one (1a) while the lacking official status for the Russian language leads to an ever lower intellectual potential of Ukraine.

Russian has been recently ousted from higher educational establishments and from professional endeavor, claimed Igrunov. At the same time, seventy percent of the republic's book market are Russian-language literature. (1b) "A qualified teaching of Russian at schools is obviously required," concluded Igrunov (Sputnik, 2004a).

Here the reported opinion of a known expert about the potential damage to the intellectual capacity of the whole country is given based on the way the “social value and social stratification of languages” (Hult & Pietikäinen, 2014, p.15) in Ukraine as perceived by the Russian elite. The use of negativity (‘suffers’, ‘lacking’, ‘lower intellectual potential’, ‘ousted’), prominence (‘expert’, ‘director’) and personalization (division of the Ukraine in halves, students of higher education, professionals) (Bednarek & Caple, 2012, p.104) offer insight into the ways Russian government wants to negotiate and maintain its presence and participation in Ukrainian politics. “Native’ refers directly back to the Soviet discourse on the intended status of Russian language. The ambiguity of the phrase (1a) states the deficiency of the language that Ukrainians speak and is not just a glitch in translation, but a deliberate stance, given that Sputnik (a.k.a. RIA, RT) is the biggest and the oldest state-owned agency in Russia with exponentially growing budget. The phrase (1b) may be interpreted as suggesting that Ukrainian literature is not rich enough to satisfy the needs of the market. In this study there were no plans to compare the materials offered

to the Western reader and to the readers in Russia, but the bluntness of the statements in the English version made me look further. The transcript of Igrunov's interview for Sputnik in Russian states that it is the quality of Russian language spoken in Ukraine that suffers from limitations of use and becoming the "kitchen language", and the reason for having such high percentage of literature in Russian is because it is more economically feasible (Igrunov, 2004).

As it turns out, the extracts from the interview in Russian were taken out of context (majority the Western readers would not match this text with original); however, Russian politologist states the importance of the 'officiality' and language quality in "an effort to affect actual language practices in accordance with these ideological standards" (Shohamy, 2006, p. xvi). What the article in the English edition does not report is that Igrunov's interview is mostly devoted to the different reasons why Ukrainian advancement towards Europe should happen under Russian control; one of the reasons is that if Ukraine would solely depend on Russia, just like before, it would not need American handouts. In this context, the Russian political scientist talks about the diminishing intellectual potential, since Ukrainian unfavorable language policy makes the Russian speakers leave the country, depleting Ukraine of the Russian intellectuals, or most likely of the number of subjects that would be easier to control.

This kind of discourse surrounding the language issues in Ukraine and Russia shows how they could be (re)defined, indexed and placed in closed categories with a consequential transfer of the new stereotypes to the identities of the group members (Shohamy, 2006, p. 9-14; Hult & Pietikäinen, 2014, p.13). While in Ukraine one could see the tendencies described by Shohamy as belonging to the new nation-states for which "language continues to play a major role in the midst of battles between authoritative groups seeking to sustain homogeneity, hegemony and monolingualism for the sake of national identity" (Shohamy, 2006, p. xvii). At the same time,

Russian interest in Ukrainian language policy is mostly tied to the preservation of the Russian control by its continuous presence and meddling into affairs of the neighboring sovereign state, including the language policy.

4.2.2. Exploring the most frequent collocations of ‘language’. The next table investigates the most frequent collocations of ‘language’ found in both corpora in the first 30 positions, which provides the insight into priorities in the discussions about the language issues in Ukraine.

Table 4.5.

Comparison of collocations of the focus word ‘language’ sorted by frequencies

| Collocation | Frequency in Russian corpus | Frequency in Ukrainian corpus |
|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Russian | 230 | 409 |
| official | 86 | 192 |
| state | 83 | 522 |
| second | 62 | 87 |
| law/bill | 59 | 397 |
| Ukrainian | 51 | 357 |
| regional | 31 | 166 |
| status | 29 | 25 |
| native | 17 | 77 |
| policy | 9 | 387 |

As could be observed, both countries are concerned with the discussions about Russian more than Ukrainian. For every 5 tokens referring to the Russian language there is about 1 referring to the Ukrainian in the Russian corpus. The results from the Russian corpus also show that ‘official’, ‘state’ (86 and 83 tokens respectively) and ‘second’ language status of Russian (62 tokens), as well as the battle for recognition of Russian at least as a ‘regional’ language (31 tokens) take the top positions in the discourse considering the great symbolic power held by the state, official or second or regional languages of the modern state, “often likened to a flag-waving symbol” (Grenoble, 2003, p. 26-27). Ukrainian media debates are also “dominated by the issue of the status of the Russian language; whether it should be ‘state’ (concordance plot showed the presence of this discussion in 266 articles) or ‘official’ “(Bowring, 2009, p.60), 409 tokens of ‘Russian’ language vs. 357 tokens of ‘Ukrainian’, often at the expense of the other languages that need protection, such as Crimean Tatar language (it will not be discussed here since it is de facto no longer under Ukrainian jurisdiction). The history of the presence of those language status variations in discourse could be explained firstly by a closer look at the essence of the new language law on the fundamentals of the state language policy, which came into effect on July 10, 2012, and secondly referring to the textual evidence from the history of the Russian language on the territory of modern Ukraine. The base positions of the new language law are stated in the article from UKRINFORM agency *Languages law takes effect*:

The national language policy in Ukraine is based on the recognition and comprehensive development of the Ukrainian language as the official one, and the guarantees for free development of regional or minority languages, other languages, as well as the right to linguistic identity and language preferences of each person.

Ukrainian as the official language shall be used on the entire territory of Ukraine in the exercise of powers of the legislative, executive and judicial power bodies, in international treaties, in teaching process at educational establishments within the limits and under the order defined by this law. The state promotes the use of the state language in the mass media, science, culture and other spheres of public life.

In general, the law applies to 18 regional languages: Russian, Belarusian, Bulgarian, Armenian, Gagauz, Yiddish, Crimean Tatar, Moldovan, German, Modern Greek, Polish, Romani, Romanian, Slovak, Hungarian, Ruthenian, Karaite and Krymchak.

The official use of regional or minority languages in a particular area is allowed, provided that the number of its speakers is 10% or more of the local population. (Ukrinform, 2012)

Here the Russian is included in the list of regional languages, where “regional” is defined by the EC as “languages spoken in a limited part of the territory, within which, . . . , they may be spoken by the majority of the citizens”, which, according to Bowring, is perfectly applicable since “Russian is a regional language in some regions of Ukraine. And Russian is a minority language in Ukraine as a whole (and of course is not the State Language)” (2009, p. 71). ‘Minority’ status is present in direct collocation with ‘language’ in Russian and Ukrainian corpora below the first 30 positions, 22 and 13 tokens respectively. The conflict with “regard to the relationship between Ukrainian nation-building and the continued presence of the Russian language in so many spheres of life” (as cited in Bowring, 2009, p.79) needs to be referred to historical-structural analysis section perspective.

The status of Russian as a dominant language has been established on the territory of Ukraine for a few centuries. In the USSR, even though the language policy goals were “far from transparent, . . . , a deliberate policy of promoting Russian existed beyond question, and the active

promotion of Russian accelerated over time”(Grenoble, 2003, p.26), which in turn resulted in creation of “an atmosphere of hostility toward Russian in some places and towards Ukrainian in others” (Grenoble, 2003, p.82), especially since the policy of Russification in the Soviet republics assured that “ethnic Russians held a disproportionate number of high-ranking positions in the government” for which there is ample historical evidence (Grenoble, 2003, p.26).

Zhurzhenko (2002) adds a number of historical decisive factors to the reasons for such polarized perception of Ukrainian and Russian languages, one of which is in difference of experience of the WWII when the West of Ukraine fought with Nazis and Soviet army (the fact so cherished in Russian propaganda), and the East fought against the Nazis together with Russians; moreover, the East, inhabited the Soviet migrants, did not have the same direct experience with Stalin’s terror as the West; consequently, for many reasons discussed in this paper Eastern Ukrainians still ask themselves if the Soviet regime was that bad, and Russian media would like to keep recycling this discourse of domination and importance of the Russian language in the minds of its readers. Another reason, according to Grenoble, though never explicitly stated, is possibly the history of “Russian ‘chauvinism’”, motivated by suspicion or prejudice against the non-Russian population”, which manifested itself in violent suppressions of “any nascent nationalist movements by firmly establishing the authority of the Russian language” (2003, p. 26). Thus, one of the first steps toward building a new nation-state taken by Ukraine upon declaring its independence was the 1992 Law “On National Minorities”, which “treated Russians as an ordinary minority and did not provide any privileged status for the Russian language” (Bowring, 2009, p. 84); however, as Skvirskaja notes, if there is any correspondence between language and (ethnic) identity, Russian cannot be reduced to the language of an ethnic minority, as this is a kind of identity that Russians have never developed (2009, p. 179). This point is illustrated in the

Russian RIA(Sputnik) article from 2010 *Top Ukrainian MP warns Russian could takeover as national language*, in the first two paragraphs there are the following statements:

The Russian language is stronger than Ukrainian and would become the country's main language if it was given official status, Ukrainian parliament Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn said on Saturday.

The question of Ukraine giving official status to the Russian language has become a matter for heated debate since Viktor Yanukovich was elected president in February on the back of strong support in the mainly Russian-speaking east of the country (Sputnik, 2010).

And the last paragraph reads:

Yanukovich's election victory showed a clear split between the pro-Russian east of the country and the more nationalist west, where his opponent, Yulia Tymoshenko, won most votes. A similar divide was seen five years earlier, when Viktor Yushenko was elected president at the expense of Yanukovich (Sputnik, 2010).

Here the Russian language is seen as a force that can undermine the efforts of the Ukrainian state to have Ukrainian as a language of “national consolidation” that could unite “all ethnicities into a single Ukrainian people” (Skvirskaja, 2009, p.178). There doesn't seem to be a way for the group, which is described in Russian media as occupying the whole east of the country, to accept, perceived as a degrading, status of a national minority provided by the European Charter. The impression of the power of the Russian language in Ukraine and the conflict discourse regarding “a clear split” between the righteous pro-Russian east are enforced by the negative image of a “more nationalist west” (a topic that deserves special attention in Russian and Ukrainian political discourse, but is beyond the scope of this paper) and the pro-nationalist

Yushchenko who won “at the expense” of pro-Russian Yanukovych. Again, following the progression in Russian discourse from 2010 to April of 2014, in the article *EU should recognize Crimea as part of Russia – Czech president*, Russian state news agency not only reminds the readers of the history of a former Russian region, but strengthens his point with the opinion of the Western leader regarding the abilities of the Ukrainian law makers by citing his insults:

Zeman described Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to give Crimea to the Ukraine in 1954 as “stupid” in a radio interview. He also blasted the law of the Ukraine’s state language which deprives the Russian-speaking population of the right to use its language at the state level. He called this situation “idiotic” (RT, 2014f).

The same attitude in a stronger form and different interpretation of the Russian language status than provided by the law of Ukraine could be found in UK Telegraph on the page managed by *Rossiskaja Gazeta* (‘Russian newspaper’ (rus)) in April of 2014, right after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, the article *Ukrainian crisis: unity lost in translation* with a subtitle *Divisions over language in troubled Ukraine are not clear-cut but Russian speakers, especially in the east of the country, feel threatened* informs of the following:

Benjamin Franklin once wrote: “Tongue double brings trouble”. That might have resonated with the members of Ukraine’s parliament whose first decision after President Viktor Yanukovych departed in February was to repeal a 2012 law that gave individual regions of Ukraine the right to have Russian recognized as a second state language alongside Ukrainian, permitting its use in official documents, in dealings with local officials, and in areas such as courts and schools. (Kudinova, 2014)

The 2012 Law “On the principles of the state language policy” (a.k.a. law of Kivalov-Kolesnichenko), which is described by both sides as ‘controversial’ granted the Russian

language a regional status that has not been legalized before; however, this article assigns the Russian language a status of the state language, which has never been offered, as it is contradictory to the constitution of Ukraine. Granting the Russian language, a status of the second state language has been a long standing wish of Russian government and the pro-Russian forces in Ukraine. Discussions on the ‘regional’ status of Russian language are present on average in about one third of the articles in both corpora (50 tokens in Russian and 60 in Ukrainian). The firm stance of Ukrainian law makers on one and only official state language while giving de jure the local authorities permission to use Russian and other languages of national minorities along with the state language (as cited in Bowring, 2009, p. 89) was never acceptable for those who wanted to see the status of Russian elevated to the level they thought it deserved, thus they saw the opportunity with the ratification of the EC to correct the situation. From the way the situation is described by the Russian news, it becomes clearer how the tension between languages is created by the policy favoring Ukrainian language; their symbolic values with Ukrainian emerging as a language of prestige and social mobility keep stirring language relations in Ukraine (Hult & Pietikäinen, 2014, p.3). At the same time, the threat to the former status of the Russian language on Ukrainian territory keeps producing the whole regions that “refuse to accept the ideology and hegemony of the state in which they reside” and “refuse to submit to regulate their (language) behavior ...no matter how stringent the attempts to do so” (Shohamy, 2006, p. 38). By 2010, the situation in Ukraine was described in the following terms in the April English language digest of the Russian newspapers by RIA Novosti:

Yanukovych can afford to ignore the hysterical reaction of the nationalist opposition because the idea of building a mono-cultural nation-state in Ukraine has failed completely.

Yanukovych should not be guided by any partly fetishistic expectations of granting second state-language status to the Russian language. The recognition of the Russian language's official status at regional level, the elimination of anti-Russian discrimination in education, television and film distribution and the end of history-distorting anti-Russian sentiment match the interests of both Ukraine and its president.

Yanukovych, Azarov and their Party of Regions (a pro-Russian party, SL) could acquire stable political dominance in Ukraine and become Moscow's constructive partners if they are able to control their appetites during the re-division of property. Previous years ought to have taught the Kremlin to appreciate such a partner in Kiev, the analyst writes in conclusion. (RIA, 2010)

Based on hands-on examination of the most frequent collocations of the focus words in the texts, the “inventory of relevant discourses” (Hult & Pietikäinen, 2004, p. 8) on the Russian side could be listed as follows:

1. The discourse of the inadequate status, violation of human rights and discrimination of the Russian language in Ukraine contextualized as “language-as-right” (Ruiz, as cited in Horner, 2011, p. 492) that is appealing to the Western readers;
2. The discourse of forced Ukrainization and the Ukrainian nationalism that poses a threat to the Russian-speaking population (the aggressiveness of articles rises closer to the time of the military attack on Ukraine);
3. A semi-covert discourse about Russian geopolitical interests in Ukraine. All those discourses may be seen as nested Russian matryoshka dolls, situated in their places in time and space, established in Russian media and deployed at the times of need (Hult & Pietikäinen, 2014, p. 5-7).

It appears that by the 2010 the “application of the political strategy of “divide and rule” (Hult & Pietikäinen, 2014, p. 4), which has been used on Ukrainian territory a few times before, has created a satisfactory balance in the eyes of the Russian politicians and economists that the calls of Ukrainian opposition could be ignored (Wilson, 2014). The pro-Russian block in the Ukrainian parliament and the pro-Russian president were on the right course of cooperation with Russia, while “re-dividing” the power and property in their own country. The language issue at this point was discussed by various committees with attempts “not to be brought to the problems of the two languages – Russian and Ukrainian” (23), until the new surge of debates started in 2012, after the new language law of Kivalov-Kolesnichenko was introduced and passed by the Rada (Ukrainian parliament). During this time, the process of Ukrainization in cultural sphere, education and media, or the “drift” described in the example above was taking place around the country. On many occasions it was followed by the sudden tightening of the “Ukrainization” screws later flowing into the periods of *laissez-faire*, when lack of uniform strategy and sound enforcement measures, poor planning and lack of funds, reflected on by many researches, often played a decisive role (Polese, 2011; Zhurzhenko, 2001; personal communication, A.G.). Moreover, the absence of an organized unifying strategy not only for resisting but also providing a viable alternative to Russia’s aggressive creation of a hostile environment in the eastern parts of Ukraine, RF’s increasing support of pro-Russian groups, media games with such geo-political concepts as *Novorossiya* that resulted in construction of a ‘new reality’, in the face of self-proclaimed republics on the territory of eastern Ukraine accompanied by their continuous denial of the Ukrainian statehood, the uniqueness of language and identity in Russian media – all of those factors contributed to the possibility of violent separatist protests against the government and the armed conflict (Zhurzhenko, 2014; Wilson, 2014; Yekelchuk, 2015). From the RF’s side,

in Russian media under the slogan of rights for the native language, political technologists continued to carry over and through the discourses of discrimination against the Russophone population of Ukraine resurrecting and rewriting imperial history, which resonated well in Western society and manipulated the audience in the ‘right’ direction; moreover, the export of “Russian World” together with enormous amounts spent on anti-Ukrainian propaganda, which suffered a fatal blow on Maidan square, had to be upgraded to an endangerment of the lives of the Russian speakers in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and resulted in so called ‘hybrid’ war that is raging on Ukrainian territory today. Finally, as could be seen from the dynamics of media coverage, the language issue and ‘protection’ of the compatriots in Ukraine was so important to begin with that is almost forgotten in the Russian news today.

The next section connects the ideologies uncovered in media debates and analyses their representation in a material world of signs in public space.

4.3. Linguistic landscape data analysis: language policy in the public space

The approach to data analysis in this section of Ukrainian language policy regarding the status of languages ‘on the ground’ is based on recognition that presence, prominence or domination of languages in public space symbolizes the status of each language, which also reflects relative power and status of language groups (Bourhis, 1992; Landry & Bourhis, 1997); thus, data were analyzed quantitatively in order to determine languages distribution on the signs. Knowing that Ukrainian language policy assumes the promotion of ethnic and national status of Ukrainian language, the first table 4.6. was composed with a focus on a large scale to show the interaction order of language distribution on all commercially produced signs (official and commercial) and excludes private hand-written, home-printed announcements and graffiti. For table 4.6. multilingual signs were counted first as monolingual according the dominating

language based on its visibility; moreover, for table 4.7. signs were coded according to the production type as official vs. non-official (top-down vs. down up) categorized according to the dominating language; finally, for table 4.8. signs were counted as bilingual and multilingual and coded based on dominating language and overall language presence in case of multilingual displays.

Table 4.6.

Total number of commercially produced signs on the central streets divided by the dominating languages on the signs.

| | Ukrainian | | Russian | | English | | Other languages | | Total | |
|--------|-----------|-----|---------|------|---------|-----|-----------------|------|-------|------|
| Kyiv | 282 | 63% | 46 | 10% | 103 | 23% | 17 | 4% | 448 | 100% |
| Dnipro | 352 | 50% | 229 | 32% | 116 | 16% | 12 | 2% | 709 | 100% |
| Lviv | 446 | 78% | 1 | 0.2% | 115 | 20% | 10 | 1.8% | 572 | 100% |
| Odesa | 253 | 38% | 250 | 37% | 156 | 23% | 14 | 2% | 673 | 100% |

Table 4.7.

Comparative table of top-down and bottom-up signs in the public space on the central streets.

| | Kyiv | | | Dnipro | | | Lviv | | | Odesa | | |
|-----------|------|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-------|-----|-----|
| Languages | Ukr | Rus | Eng | Ukr | Rus | Eng | Ukr | Rus | Eng | Ukr | Rus | Eng |
| Top down | 56 | 2 | 2 | 38 | 4 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 15 | 0 |
| % | 94% | 3% | 3% | 91% | 9% | - | 100% | - | - | 55% | 45% | - |
| Down up | 41 | 39 | 5 | 2 | 75 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 45 | 0 |
| % | 48% | 46% | 6% | 5% | 95% | 0 | 85% | | 15% | 2% | 98% | - |

Table 4.8.*Languages distribution in bilingual signs including non-commercially produced announcements*

| | Ukrainian | | | Russian | | | English | | | Other | | |
|--------|-----------|-----|-----|---------|-----|------|---------|-----|----|-------|------|---|
| | U+E | U+R | U+ | R+U | R+E | R+ | E+U | E+R | E+ | +U | +R | + |
| KYIV | 50 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 22 | 0 | 40 | 7 | | 11 | 0 | 0 |
| | 85% | 8% | 7% | 8% | 92% | | 85% | 15% | | 100% | | |
| DNIPRO | 37 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 38 | 5 | 4 It | 1 Fr | 0 |
| | 100% | | | 100% | | | 28% | 63% | 9% | 80% | 20% | |
| LVIV | 64 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 45 | 0 | 0 | 1 It | | |
| | 100% | | | | | | 100% | | | | | |
| ODESA | 28 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 32 | 1 Tr | 18 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | 88% | | 12% | | 97% | 3% | 66% | 33% | | | | |

U+E – Ukrainian is a dominating language with English in second place

U+R – Ukrainian is a dominating language with Russian in second place

U+ - Ukrainian language is followed by Italian, French, German or other language

4.3.1 The general distribution of languages in Kyiv. The officially produced LL reflects the state ideology which is almost non-contested on the capital's central street with 63% of official and commercial signage being dominated by Ukrainian; almost a quarter of space (23%) is taken by English, the language of power, prestige, globalization and affiliation with the Western world officially promoted through various institutions (Zaliznyak & Masenko, 2001; Bilanyuk & Melnik, 2008; Besters-Dilger, 2009; Pavlenko, 2008, 2010; Goodman 2012), and 4% by the other languages, like Italian or French, usually adorning fancy boutiques or restaurants; only 10% of signs are occupied by Russian contrary to the situation of its preferred use by about half of Kyiv residents. All official state signs in Ukrainian (such as the names of official establishments, street names etc.) are dubbed in English, not a single one is replicated in Russian.

Considering this hierarchy, it could be deduced that the policy of Ukrainization has been gradually adding significant visibility to the titular language and encouraging the competition from English in efforts to replace the imperial lingua franca under the slogan “Україна це Європа” (*Ukraine is Europe*) that is heard and seen from multiple media outlets all over Ukraine. It must be noted that due to linguistic proximity of Ukrainian and Russian some signs were difficult to attribute to either pure Ukrainian or Russian space, the judgment had to be made based on the organization of the whole ‘display’, as could be seen on the door to the Ukrainian chain of canteens “Two Geese” (*Два Гуся*) where the name of the establishment is the same in both languages, but the rest of the signage on the door and above is in Ukrainian and English for the coffee shop in the same location.



Figure. 4.2. The front door of the canteen chain ‘Two Geese’ on Khreschatyk street, Kyiv.

Quite different picture appears after the count of non-officially produced signs, as private

Russian and 7% by other languages. Those very few Russian bilingual signs are enforced by English in 93% of samples, indicating that capitalism in Ukraine speaks not only Russian, like it used to be (Zhurzhenko, 2002, p. 5).

4.3.2 The general distribution of languages in Dnipropetrovsk. In the industrial center of eastern Ukraine Dnipropetrovsk, the economic situation is much worse and one hardly ever hears Ukrainian on the streets, 50% of signs are dominated by Ukrainian, 32% by Russian, and 16% by English, leaving 2% to other global languages of fashion and prestige. It is difficult to estimate the dynamic of language shift in public space before and after the new law on languages which allowed the shop owners to decide themselves which language they want to use for communication with their customers, but it was observed that Ukrainian dominates the signs on the state establishments, telephone booths and banks, concert announcements, which are numerous on the central street, but Russian is strongly present below the shop names, on the sidewalk ads, menus on restaurant windows and other signs in smaller fonts. On Figure 7 there is an example of such arrangement with the name of the commercial establishment and matching working hour plaques in Ukrainian and the enlarged window displays of the newspaper front pages in Russian, creating, as Polese expressed it, the “façade of ‘Ukrainianess’” (2011, p. 42) and leaving the content to linguistic negotiation.



Figure 4.4. Entry to the Information center 'Nika' in Dnipropetrovsk.

The signs on global chain shops, such as GAP, United Colors of Benetton, are mostly monolingual signaling Europeanization and affiliation with global market, which was announced by the mayor of Dnipropetrovsk in 2010 (Goodman, 2010, p. 63). The count of signs top-down and bottom-up mirror each other with 91% of official signs being in Ukrainian and 95% posted by private citizens in Russian, reflecting acceptance of the “official narrative of the state” and offsetting it with “local needs” for communication (Polese, 2011, p.44). Another sign of compliance with the official ideology could be seen in bilingual signs, where 100% of Russian dominated signs are translated into Ukrainian, while Ukrainian bilingual signs do not pay with the same token, all 100% of bilingual Ukrainian signs are complemented by information in English. However, English dominated signs place Ukrainian in second position in about $\frac{1}{4}$ cases, while the other $\frac{3}{4}$ are supported by Russian, which may reflect the intention of the regional authorities to establish themselves closer to the prosperous Western trade partners, which does

not necessarily entail a complete change of power or direct disobedience (Spolsky, 2009, p. 76). Overall division of LL in Dnipropetrovsk described through the lens of nexus analysis reflects more balanced bilingualism, which is shaped by local language discourses of the current language use situation, where language diversity in bottom-up signs “realistically reflects the multilingual nature of a particular territory” (Landry & Bourhis, 1998, p. 27), which many describe as very bilingual Ukrainianess with Russian for every day and functional Ukrainian for official and educational needs (field notes, personal communication, March 9-28, 2015).

4.3.3. The general distribution of languages in Lviv. For the ardent defenders of Ukrainian language vitality the LL on the central street of Lviv would seem like a dream with 78% of public signs in Ukrainian, 20 % in English, 2% in other languages and less than 1% (just one unit on the central street) in Russian, seen in the intelligible signs such as the one in Figure 8 where the word ‘battery’ is written in the same way in Ukrainian and Russian with part of the word in Roman script which Bhatia (2000) calls ‘glocalization’.



Figure 4.5. An example of a ‘glocalization’ sign in Lviv.

In Lviv, the prevalence of Ukrainian in public space may be seen in its communicative function, also indicating the cultural and service expectations of the community (Landry & Bourhis, 1997,

p. 26), but considering that Ukraine is a multilingual and a multicultural state, and language issues are always and closely linked to power and ideologies (Fairclough 2001, p.2), it is also visible that only Ukrainian is welcome on the street that would closely reflect the official mood and ideology. In top-down category 100% of signs in English are translated to Ukrainian (see Figure9), and there is not a single personal flyer (bottom-up) in Russian – the public space of the central street doesn't seem to leave any room for negotiation of identity or any other discourses on societal Ukrainian –Russian bilingualism, while common on the central streets in the other regions, it is absolutely excluded from the most central public space (Pavlenko, 2008, p. 292) in Lviv.




Figure 4.6. Bilingual commercial center directory display, Lviv, Svoboda prospect, with English

as a dominating language supported by Ukrainian.

LL phenomenon in Lviv central street may be characterized in terms of Baker's subtractive and additive bilingualism (Baker, 2011, p. 72), where Russian is being replaced by the language of higher status, English, which echoes historical beliefs, values and goals of sign producers (Hult, 2009, 2011; Scollon & Scollon, 2004, p. 12-14) very homogenous in all levels of analysis.

4.3.4. The general Distribution of languages in Odesa. A prosperous commercial center of Novorossija (*New Russia*), the city was left to the Imperial Russia by Turkey in 1792 and rebuilt into a fort, commercial port and a naval base. Historically cosmopolitan city attracted the migrants of all denominations from all over Europe which by mid-19th century even resulted in a special urban dialect was based on Russian and mixed Ukrainian, Yiddish, Polish, Greek, Italian, French, German and other languages (Skvirskaja, 2009, p. 176-177). Ethnically diverse (127 ethnic groups), multilingual and dynamic, where in 2001 52% of urban Ukrainian population named Russian their mother tongue, his resort town on Black sea had a lot of trouble adjusting to the new state ideology that was served to them during the wave of Ukrainization of 2007 (the time of pro-Ukrainian president Viktor Yuschenko) conceptualized in a slogan "Think in Ukrainian!" (Skvirskaja, 2009, p. 177- 179). The response of the pro-Russian opposition was organized into a political action "I speak Russian!". This specific sociolinguistic context, produced by a specific situation (Cenoz and Gorter, 2006, p. 67) is reflected in Odesa LL in full complexity of historically situated discourses reflected in the interactional order and supported by historical body of sign producers (Scollon & Scollon 2004; Hult 2009, 2015). Official signage space of the city center is equally distributed between Ukrainian and Russian (38 and 37 percent consequently). English as a dominating language on the signs has the same presence as in Kyiv,

23%, almost a quarter of all public space on a rather limited territory. Considering that the site of data collection on Deribasovskaya street hosts a number of ministries, the distribution of top-down signage is tipped 55% vs. 45% towards Ukrainian, but bottom-up announcements clearly show whose linguistic preferences are taken in account as 98% of them were in Russian and 2% (only 1) are in Ukrainian. In bilingual signage 88% of Ukrainian and 97% of Russian signs were accompanied by English, 12% of Ukrainian signs, mostly banks, had support of other languages of international trade. The situation with English in dominant positions reflects the official ideology of institutional regulations and in 66% is supported by Ukrainian translation, 33% of signs in English are complemented by Russian and the heading of the signs are not necessarily translated, see Figure 10, the street display of the menu for the Turkish restaurant where the only the names of the dishes are partially translated and transliterated into Russian.



Figure 4.7. Turkish restaurant menu with a heading in English and a menu in Cyrillic font with Italian menu items partially translated to Russian, Deribasovskaya street, Odesa.

Among the four cities, Odesa is the one where the space occupied by official language is strongly contested by the preferred language of everyday use. Obligatory for official use and official places in the process of state formation (Bourdieu & Thompson, p. 45), Ukrainian is still a norm only in theory in Odesa LL.

As Skvirskaja notes, the people who she interviewed on the streets of Odesa for INTAS project in 2007 were not opposed to cultural and linguistic Ukrainization per se, but to its top-down, institutionalized “ideological overload” and anti-Russian stance. (Skvirskaja, 2009, p. 189; Zhurzhenko, 2002). The same complaints were heard during my visit to Ukraine in Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv in March-April-May of 2015, where people felt threatened by the force of nationalist propaganda while their living conditions were getting worse and worse, and corrupt state institutions were deteriorating and could not guarantee even a basic standard of living. In Odesa, I was during the time when people lived in fear of an attack from Russia. Almost every week there were reports of explosions in the offices of volunteers supporting military operation against Russian troops in eastern Ukraine. The sentiment on the streets, where only Russian was heard, was very mixed; a number of people were planning to move to Russia and adored a “strong president”, some were tired of this insecurity and desperate to see some decisive steps from the government in organizing city defense and dealing with separatists (see Figure 4.8.), others were ready to fight.



Figure. 4.8. Anti-separatism poster in Russian with two icons in English on Deribasovskaya street, Odesa.

On Figure 11 there is a frightening ‘sign of time’, a flyer found on the fence of a construction site on Deribasovskaya street in Odesa which explains how to recognize and report on “domestic separatism” in Russian with two icons in English with the hot-line numbers.

Three points on the list of 10 possible criminally prosecuted offences state that the one who forces upon others the concept of ‘Russian World’, dishonors the values of Ukrainian people, doubts the existence of Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian language, spreads the rumors about non-existent threat to the Russian language and Russian-speaking population on the territory of Ukraine should be recognized as a separatist and reported. Odesa was the only place where those posters were seen, in Dnipropetrovsk there were only instruction plaques on what to do if the city is under attack.

The comparison of LL data collected in four cities of Ukraine primarily points out the

regional differences and the effects of language policy reflected in the interaction order (Hult 2009, 2014, 2015; Scollon & Scollon, 2004, p. 13-14). In the historically Russian-speaking cities of eastern and southern Ukraine the official signage on the state buildings followed the monolingual internationally oriented state policy with translation of the signs in Ukrainian only into English. The official commercial signs in Russian in Dnipropetrovsk took the second place but compensated and actually even surpassed the number of signs in Ukrainian not in rank but in quantity by cohabiting bilingual Ukrainian signs and being almost twice as common on bilingual English advertising displays. So, the real presence and use of Russian is thus reproduced in LL. In Odesa, where on the streets Ukrainian is considered as somewhat a nuisance, the state policy has also brought up the status of titular language in official signage almost to the same level as historically entrenched Russian, but in bottom-up distribution the situation is just like it was during the Soviet times, with all personal communication on the walls in Russian. Lviv's monolingual center, where Russian is not just marginalized but invisible, fosters the symbolic dominance of Ukrainian language as the only language of the country followed by English, also setting up new cultural stereotypes, prestige and symbolic value often elevating English to the first place on displays (Spolsky, 2009, p. 73). This interaction order certainly does not support the feeling of inclusion in bi- or multilingual community, but as Laundry and Bourhis state "it is likely to salient in settings where language has emerged as the most important dimension of ethnic identity" (1997, p. 28). In Kyiv, the situation with relative marginalization of Russian is much closer to Lviv than to Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk, as the capital city center is obligated to model what the politics preach. Those 10% of top-down signs in Russian are distributed among the secondary free-standing commercially produced ads on sidewalks which are taken away over night. There is only one shop with the name that is read the

same in Russian and Ukrainian which was spelled with Roman letters as “Webbuket” and the rest was written in Russian. When asked about the reason for such ‘deviation’ from the overall ‘paysage linguistique’, the two smiling shop assistants answered that they never noticed that the ad on the shop was in Russian.

In all, the disjunction between the language use and its reflection in Ukrainian LL marks the efforts of the state to consolidate the country during the nation-building period, where the agency of local administrations and private sign producers find ways to renegotiate the use of public space and make resemble the real situation of language use without challenging too much the interactional order imposed by the state language policy.

5. Conclusion

5.1. Ukrainian and Russian language relationships.

As stated by Kulyk (2009, 2013b), due to the fact that until the independence in 1991, the Ukrainian national project was formed with language as a crucial component of the national identity, that is exactly one of the aspects of Ukrainian statehood that has been challenged by the Russian Federation from the first day one of Ukrainian statehood. The evidence of this struggle keeps unfolding right in front of our eyes, in media discourse and in reality. The the success of the Ukrainian revolution by the end of January 2014 signified a possible end of Russian Federation involvement into internal and international affairs of the neighboring sovereign state, an involvement that also included language politics. The meddling in Ukrainian affairs was further demonstrated by the annexation of Ukrainian territories and a planned rebellion in the eastern part of Ukraine supported by the Russian military forces.

A historical – structural analysis of Ukrainian – Russian relations shows how the project of imperial linguistic hegemony carried on through the Soviet times, marginalizing Ukrainian language into a scientific discipline and taking it out of almost all societal functions under the slogans of Soviet unity. The works of Ukrainian, Western and Soviet Ukrainian scholars describe various Soviet assimilation tactics that touched all spheres of life in Ukraine, from altering the very structure of Ukrainian language, limiting or forbidding publishing in Ukrainian, removing Ukrainian from the educational system, openly stigmatizing the language as a ‘low variety’ of Russian, declaring Russian as a native language to all Soviet people, to the waves of oppressions and persecutions of the national cadre. Discursive tactics used by the Russian Federation today were recycled from the past and replicate every form of linguistic oppression known in the history of Ukrainian language during the last two centuries of imperial and Soviet rule.

From the very beginning of its independence, Ukraine established a monolingual nation-state oriented language policy with generous legislative guarantees of support and free development for all minority languages, especially Russian; however, as noted by many, the process of Ukrainization was slow, not enforced, and often ignored by the elite and non-elite agents that were supposed to implement the decisions from “above” (Polese, 2011, p. 47). Polese considers this “softness” as a reason for the absence of ethnic clashes in Ukraine (2011, p. 47), but it was before the events that took place in 2013. Considering the nature of the western nation-building model aimed at promoting the particular ethno-cultural titular nation in a multicultural state (Kaiser & Nikiforova, 2006), it is not surprising that the matching ethnocentric language policy was met with overt and covert resistance in eastern and southern Ukraine whose mixed loyalties, values and identities, partially stuck in memory of the Soviet Union, gradually created those eastern ‘others’ that challenged and were passively considered as a threat to the security of the nation-state (Zhurzhenko, 2002, 2014; Acustsson, 2011; Kulyk, 2009). The data presented in this paper supports the view that instead of national unity, Ukrainian language politics contributed to societal fragmentation (Kulyk, 2011, p. 627), or rather was used for gaining electoral support of regional voters in the manner that deepened linguistic-political separatism and resulted in the tragic events of 2014, when their loyalty was put to test (Savojska, 2011; Kulyk, 2011; Zhurzhenko, 2014).

The results of media research also trace discourses about the major legal documents that guide Ukrainian language policy to this day, such as the European Charter and the infamous Law on Principles of State Language Policy that, according to the experts, benefited and promoted only Russian under the new slogan of ‘human rights’ and the old Soviet slogan of ‘native Russian language’ protection (Moser, 2014; Kulyk, 2013), even though as the language of the

minority is spoken more widely than the state language, and therefore is in no need of protection (Charnysh, 2013, p. 6). Moreover, research from February 2015 (Goynash, 2015) shows that Ukrainian-speakers do not mind but also accept the widespread use of Russian, but would like to see Ukrainian as the only state language in all symbolically important political and social practices. However, it contrasts with the intentions of the promoters of the ‘elevated status for Russian’, which have already demonstrated how to use every legislative loophole in order to remain unilingual themselves, and kept claiming violations of human rights receiving extensive help from the Russian side (Kulyk, 2013, p. 280).

5.2. Media Coverage of the Language Issues in Ukraine: Finding Solutions or a Political Play?

Interpretive corpus-assisted discourse and linguistic landscape analysis strengthened by the relevant elements of the nexus method uses descriptive statistics to demonstrate the main tendencies in Ukrainian and Russian corpora and analyses the examples of the articles underlining the main difference in media coverage in Ukrainian and Russian media. While Ukrainian media rather openly informs the Western reader on the multitude of issues related to the views on language regulations, political strategies, and the political struggles surrounding those issues – the Russian media is setting up the scene for the legitimization of their plans for Ukraine by personalizing their campaign to the English-speaking audience, addressing the familiar issues and demanding a higher status for the Russian language on the basis of human rights violations, discrimination and threats to the well-being of Russian-speakers. The presence of conflict discourse in the Russian corpus strengthens the claim of how the languages issue in Ukraine is conceptualized and invoked particular attitudes by the Russian media to justify military invasion.

As the military intervention of Russia progressed it became evident by performing a simple count of the articles referring to the language situation in Ukraine that the issue of the Russian language status has simply died out. The very area that had the equality of Russian language on its agenda since the very first years of independence was now paying a deadly toll of civilian and military lives during multiple violations of Minsk agreements from the Russia-supported separatist forces. In English-medium Ukrainian and Russian news, in 2015, there were 4 articles from Ukrainian side and 15 published by Russian media concerning the language issue. This was due to the fact that Russian authorities had to keep legitimizing their presence in Ukraine, at least for a period of time, trying to convince Western readers that fascists from Kyiv had no mercy for Russian speakers in the East. How the language issues were used by the Russian Federation for simple justification of its relentless involvement into Ukrainian affairs at the beginning of the period under investigation from 2010 when the pro-Russian government in Ukraine secured its control over Ukrainian politics and economy, is clearly seen through the statements of Russian politicians and a gradual build up of a campaign of some kind of mythical threat to Russian and its users that was traced in comparative study of keyness in Ukrainian and Russian corpora. This campaign was orchestrated by Russian and Ukrainian political technologists and started as a way to win electoral votes by the politicians from the pro-Russian eastern part of the country. It further progressed through 2012 when Viktor Yanukovich and his party managed to secure yet another tool for promotion of Russian, that is already dominating the country. This was in the form of a new law on languages that elevated the status of Russian at least on a regional level. From the side of the Ukrainian political elite, instead of receiving continuous financial, institutional and legislative support, language policy was used as a voter manipulation tool benefiting political players, while the measures that would stabilize, develop

and make the language-based national project attractive for all Ukrainian residents were left hanging, providing an attractive niche to be found and filled by the agents of Russian government. In this light, the shortcomings of the implementations of the laws “On the Print Media” and “On Broadcasting”, discussed in the introduction, demonstrate the nearsightedness of Ukrainian politicians that let the vacuum in Ukrainian media, one of the most important areas for nation building, to be filled by the media products produced in Russia. This kind of dependency on Russian players in Ukrainian media market flows together with the country’s economic and political ties to the former colonial power, which left in Ukraine not only a poorly functioning centralized economy but also left a bureaucratic apparatus in place that preferred using every opportunity for personal gains instead of the development of a democratic state.

5.3. Language Policy Implementations in Linguistic Landscapes

Linguistic Landscape data collected in the urban environment in four distinct regions of Ukraine bears the signs of nationalizing state exclusionary language policy that succeeded in three cases out of four in top-down distribution of linguistic signs. However, contrary to claims of Russian authorities about discrimination of the minority language used by more than half of Ukrainians for everyday activities, linguistic landscape data shows a high presence of Russian language in public space in Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa, historically Russian-speaking regions where the use of this language is supposedly oppressed or even forbidden. Not being a dominating language in the LL interaction order, Russian continues, however, to have a high prominence and continues renegotiating its share of visibility and communicative function (Landry & Bourhis, 1997, p. 29), being regulated by the ‘one state language’ policy in top-down and by the actual language use in bottom-up categories. All cities show the signs of commodification of their public space placing a high priority of the presence of English as a

language of globalization, prestige, common understanding, business and tourist attractiveness. The presence of foreign languages is dominated by English, which, according to Kelly-Holmes (a cited in Spolsky, 2009, p. 79), does not have to be understood as long as they recall cultural stereotypes of the country associated with a language; from this perspective, the absence of Russian could be very much justified especially considering that the main street Khreschatyk in Kyiv runs through Maidan square, where the revolutionary events of 2013-2014 took place. Linguistic landscape of the capital city Kyiv draws a much clearer demarcation line of where the state envisions the presence of Russian language, and that is in tertiary position, after Ukrainian and English, and mostly on the removable signs. Going further west, in Lviv, where Russian language has never gained the same prominence during the Soviet times, the same trend is continued and in the city center Russian is not visible even in bottom-up category, while English enjoys almost as much space as in the international sea port of Odesa. While it may be difficult to see the continuity between the ideological debates in media and languages distribution in the public space, one can think of the multidimensional expression of discourses on languages in the virtual and physical spaces, where in one place the politics and policies are made and in the other they are implemented and challenged by ethnic-regional, ideological and economic realities.

In closing, the data presented in this study supports the view that instead of national unity, Ukrainian language politics contributed to societal fragmentation (Kulyk, 2011, p. 627), or rather was used for gaining electoral support of regional voters in the manner that deepened linguistic-political separatism and resulted in the tragic events of 2014 when their loyalty was put to test (Savojska, 2011; Kulyk, 2011; Zhurzhenko, 2014). The results show, that discrepancy “between language identity and practice”(Kulyk, 2011, p. 628) in itself turned out to be an important ‘point of victimization’ used by Russian political technologists to extend the umbrella of the boundary-

defying ‘Russian World’ over all Russian speakers and (re)contextualize them as a “significant population of ethnic Russians living in the ‘near-abroad’ in need of defending, due to their post-Soviet status of oppressed minority” (Acustsson, 2011, p. 30) using Ukraine’s very own legal instruments. The Ukrainian textual data show that there was no linguistic conflict in sight. The circulating and intersecting discourses examined within different scales traced discursive connections back and forth to different political actors, interpreting language policy depending on their current political goals; secondly, Ukrainian language policy was constantly framed as a conflict by the out-of-state player, whose agents inside Ukraine kept pursuing their goals at every turn, not only through language legislation, but through elections, bribery etc. Finally, as Sovik reiterates, “language related conflicts are in general about nonlinguistic goals with political, economical, social, cultural or religious considerations underneath” (2007, p. 49), but in the case of Ukraine one could use the reverse version of this definition, as it is a war that Russian Federation waged on Ukraine that was *framed* as a language conflict, not from the inside, but from the outside. However, the shortcomings of the national language politics on regional, economic, and social levels created favorable conditions for pro-Russian mobilization and separatism that turned former borderlands into bloodlands (Zhurzhenko, 2014).

5.4. Avenues for Future Research.

As the work on this project was coming to an end, in the city of Dnipropetrovsk over 200 streets underwent name changes following the de-Sovetization project conducted by the new Ukrainian government. The nation-state of Ukraine is young, and will be undergoing many dynamic and significant changes that should be monitored and recorded for future studies. Considering the multidimensional approach to the study of language policy with the emphasis on social actions that become social practices, the investigation of the complex language issues in

Ukraine would benefit from systematic synchronic and diachronic studies that could record explicit and implicit changes in *de facto* and *de jure* language policies and practices.

List of tables

| | |
|--|----|
| Table 4.1. Number of language policy related article in Ukrainian and Russian media from 2010 till 2015 | 59 |
| Table 4.2. The most frequent content words among the first one hundred content words in 455 Ukrainian and 203 Russian English medium articles | 61 |
| Table 4.3. Presence of political and conflict words in Russian and Ukrainian corpora sorted by keyness | 67 |
| Table 4.4. Comparison of the most frequent collocations with content words of the focus Word ‘Russian’ | 72 |
| Table 4.5. Comparison of collocations of the focus word ‘language’ | 81 |
| Table 4.6. Total number of commercially produced signs on the central streets divided by the dominating languages on the signs. | 91 |
| Table 4.7. Comparative table of top-down and bottom-up signs in the public space on central streets | 91 |
| Table 4.8. Language distribution in bilingual signs including non-commercially produced Announcements | 92 |

List of figures

| | |
|---|-----|
| Figure 3.1. Ethno-linguistic map of Ukraine and linguistic landscape data collection sites visited in March, April and May of 2015 | 52 |
| Figure 3.2. Dnipropetrovsk, eastern Ukraine, a part of data collection site on Karl Marx str. | 53 |
| Figure 3.3. Kyiv, capital of Ukraine, data collection site on Khreschatik street. | 54 |
| Figure 3.4. Lviv, western Ukraine, a part of data collection site on Svoboda Prospect | 54 |
| Figure 3.5. Odesa, south-western Ukraine, a part of data collection site on Deribasovskaya Street | 55 |
| Figure 4.1. Comparative chart of articles in Ukrainian and Russian media from 2010 to 2015 | 59 |
| Figure 4.2. The front door of the canteen chain ‘Two Geese’ on Khreschatyk street, Kyiv | 93 |
| Figure 4.3. A part of memorial messages on Maidan square in Ukrainian/English, Ukrainian and Russian languages | 94 |
| Figure 4.4. Entry to the Information center 'Nika' in Dnipropetrovsk. | 96 |
| Figure 4.5. An example of a ‘glocalization’ sign in Lviv | 97 |
| Figure 4.6. Bilingual commercial center directory display, Lviv, Svoboda prospect, with English as a dominating language supported by Ukrainian. | 98 |
| Figure 4.7. Turkish restaurant menu with heading in English and menu in Cyrillic font partially translated to Russian, Deribasovskaya street, Odesa. | 100 |
| Figure 4.8. Anti-separatism poster in Russian with two icons in English on Deribasovskaya street, Odesa. | 102 |

References

- Acustsson, A. (2011). Framed peoples: The discourse of minority elites and the language question in Ukraine. *Slovo*, 23(2), 80-94.
- Arel, D. (1995). Language politics in independent Ukraine: Towards one or two state languages? *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 23(3), 597-622.
- Atlantic Council Report. (2015). Retrieved from <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/hiding-in-plain-sight-putin-s-war-in-ukraine-and-boris-nemtsov-s-putin-war>
- Baker, P., Gabrielatos, C., Khosravini, M., M. Kryzanowski, McEnery, T., & Wodak, R., (2008). A useful methodological synergy? Combining critical discourse analysis and corpus linguistics to examine discourses of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK press. *Discourse Society*, 19, 273 – 305.
- Baker, C. (2011). *Foundations of bilingual education and bilingualism*. Multilingual matters: UK.
- Bakhtin, M. (1986). *Speech genres and other late essays*. (V.W. McGee, Trans.) C. Emerson, & M. Holquist (Eds.). Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Bednarek, M. & Caple, H. (2012a). *News discourse*. Condon/New York: Bloomsbury.
- Bednarek, M., Caple, H. (2012b). Value added: language, image and news values. *Discourse, Context, Media*, 1, (pp. 103 – 113).
- Bekus, N. (2013). Belarusian Language policy in the Context of Linguistic Human Rights. Retrieved from <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~postcomm/papers/2012-2013/>
- Besters-Dilger, J. (2009). Language policy and language situation in Ukraine:

- Analysis and recommendations. In J. Besters-Dilger (Ed.) *Language policy and language situation in Ukraine* (pp. 7 – 15). Frankfurt am Main: Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften.
- Bever, O. (2010). Linguistic landscapes of post-Soviet Ukraine: Multilingualism and language Policy in outdoor media and advertising. Retrieved from <http://arizona.openrepository.com/arizona/handle/10150/194464>
- Bhatia, T. (2000) Advertising in Rural India: Language, Marketing Communication and Consumerism. *ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa Monograph series, 36*. Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo, Japan.
- Bilaniuk, L., & Melnyk, S. (2008). A tense and shifting balance: Bilingualism and education in Ukraine. *The International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 11*(3-4), 340-372.
- Blommaert, J., Verschueren, J. (1991). The pragmatics of minority politics in Belgium. *Language and Society, 20*(4), 503-531.
- Blommaert, J. (1999). The debate is open. In J. Blommaert (Ed.) *Language Ideological Debates*, 1-38. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Blommaert, J. (2005). *Discourse: A critical introduction*. Cambridge University Press: NY.
- Bourdieu, P., Thompson, J. (1991) *Language and symbolic power*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge.
- Charnysh, V. (2013). Analysis of current events: Identity mobilization in hybrid regimes: Language in Ukrainian politics. *The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 41*(1), 1-14.
- Constitution, (2004). Constitution of Ukraine. Retrieved from <http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/16258/preview>

- Dzhygyr, Y. (2014). What is the “Law on Languages” and why it is a problem? Retrieved from <http://euromaidanpr.wordpress.com/2014/03/08/what-is-the-law-on-languages-and-why-it-is-a-problem-briefing-for-english-speaking-friends/> .
- Foucault, M. (1967) *Madness and civilization: A history of insanity in the age of reason*. London: Tavistock Publications.
- Foucault, M. (1980) *Power/Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977*. (C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham, K. Soper, Trans.). C. Gordon (Ed.). NY: Pantheon Books.
- Gadamer, H. G. (1976). *Philosophical hermeneutics*. D. E. Linge, (Ed. & Trans.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Gadamer, H. G. (1989). Reply to Jacques Derrida. In D. P. Michelfelder & R. E. Palmer (Eds.), *Dialogue and deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida encounter* (pp. 55-57). New York: State University of New York Press.
- Gadamer, H. G. (1990). The hermeneutical problem. In G. Ormiston & A. Schrift (Eds.), *The hermeneutic tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur* (pp. 273-297). New York: State University of New York Press.
- Gadamer, H.G. (2006) *A century of philosophy Hans-Georg Gadamer in conversation with Riccardo Dottori*. NY: The Continuum International Publishing.
- Goodman, B. (2009). The ecology of language in Ukraine. *Working papers in Educational Linguistics*, 24(2), 19-39.
- Goodman, B. (2013). *Towards a multilingual future: the ecology of a language at the university in Eastern Ukraine*. Retrieved from <http://repository.upenn.edu/dissertations/AAI3566442/>

- Gorter, D. (2006). The study of linguistic landscape as a new approach to multilingualism. In D. Gorter (Ed.), *Linguistic Landscape: New approach to multilingualism* (pp. 1-7). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters Ltd.
- Ghosh, Palash. (2014, March 03). Watch your tongue. *IB Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.ibtimes.com/watch-your-tongue-language-controversy-one-fundamental-conflicts-ukraine-1559069>
- Goynash, H. (2015). Bad news for Moscow on the language front. *KHPG*. Retrieved from: <http://khpg.org/index.php?id=1428709214>
- Grenoble, L. (2003) *Language policy in the Soviet Union*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Hall, S. (1992). The west and the rest. In S. Hall & B. Gieben (Eds.) *Formation of modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Horner, K. (2011). Media representations of multilingual Luxembourg: Constructing language as a resource, problem, right and duty. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 10(4), 491-510.
- Hult, F.M. (2010). Analysis of language policy discourses across the scales of space and time. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 202, 7-24.
- Hult, F.M. (2014). Shaping discourse of multilingualism through a language ideological debate: The case of Swedish in Finland. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 13(1), 1-20.
- Hult, F.M. (2014a). Drive-thru linguistic landscaping: Constructing a linguistically dominant place in a bilingual space. *International Journal of Bilingualism*, 18, 507-523.
- Hult, F.M. (2015). Making policy connections across scales using nexus analysis. In F.M. Hult & D.C. Johnson (Eds.), *Research methods in language policy and planning: A practical guide* (pp. 217-231). Wiley-Blackwell.

Hvylja, A. (2002). Root out, wipe out nationalistic roots on language front. In L. Masenko, (Ed.), *Language situation in Kyiv*. Kyiv: Urok Ukrainskoj.

Index Mundi, (2014). Ukraine demographics profile. Retrieved from http://www.indexmundi.com/ukraine/demographics_profile.html

Igrunov, V. (2004, January 23). *Perspectives of Russian – Ukrainian relations: Tandem Russia – Ukraine could be the most important concern for Russian in the nearest perspective*. (Trans.) Retrieved from: http://www.igrunov.ru/ukr/vchk-ukr-articles/interview/russ_year-fin.html

Ioffe, J. (2014). Putin’s war in Crimea could soon spread to eastern Ukraine. *New Republic*. Retrieved from <https://newrepublic.com/article/116810/putin-declares-war-ukraine-and-us-or-nato-wont-do-much>.

Johnson, S., Milani, T. (2010) Critical intersections: Language ideologies and media Discourse. In S. Johnson & T. Milani (Eds.), *Language Ideologies and Media Discourse, Texts, Practices, Politics*, 3-17, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group.

Johnson, D., (2015). Intertextuality and Language Policy. Hult, F., Johnson, D. (Eds.) *Research Methods in Language Policy and Planning. A practical guide*. UK: Wiley Blackwell.

Kudinova, Y. (2014). Ukraine crisis: unity is lost in translation. *Telegraph RBTH*. Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/rbth/politics/10796696/ukraine-language-lost-translation.html>

Kaiser, K., Nikiforova, K. (2006) Borderland spaces of identification and dislocation, multiscalar narratives and enactments of seto identity in the Estonian-Russian borderlands. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 29, 928-938.

- Kappeler, A. (2014) Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the imperial past and competing memories. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 5, 107-115.
- Kasianov, G., (2009). "Nationalized" history: past continuous, present. In G. Kasianov, & P. Ther (Eds.), *A laboratory of transnational history: Ukraine and recent Ukrainian historiography*. NY: Central European University Press.
- Kinsella, E. (2006). Hermeneutics and critical hermeneutics: exploring possibilities within the art of interpretation. *Qualitative Social Research*, 7(3), 19. Retrieved from <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/145/319> .
- Koteyko, N. (2014). *Language and politics in post-Soviet Russia: A corpus assisted approach*. UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kreindler, I. (1997). Multilingualism in the successor states of the Soviet Union. *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics*, 17, 91-112.
- Kulyk, V. (2009). Language policies and language attitudes in post-orange Ukraine. In J. Besters-Dilger (Ed.), *Language policy and language situation in Ukraine: Analysis and recommendations*, 15 – 56. Frankfurt am Main: Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften.
- Kulyk, V. (2011). Language identity, linguistic diversity and political cleavages: Evidence from Ukraine. *Nations and Nationalism*, 17 (3), 627-648.
- Kulyk, V. (2013a). Language policy in Ukraine: What people want the state to do. *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures*, 27 (2), 280-307.
- Kulyk, V. (2013b) Language and identity in post-Soviet Ukraine: Transformation of an unbroken Bond. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies*, 5 (2), 14 – 23.

Kuzio, T. (1998). *Ukraine: State and Nation-building*. London: Routledge.

Kyiv Post, (2005, July 2005). Another language issue. Retrieved

from <https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/editorial/another-language-issue-22963.html>

Kyiv Post, (2012, July 7). Yuschenko calls new language law ‘strategy for de-

Ukrainization’. Retrieved from <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/yuschenko-calls-new-language-law-strategy-for-de-u-309549.html>

Kyiv Post, (2015). Poroshenko offers to make English second language in Ukraine.

Retrieved from : <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/poroshenko-suggests-making-english-second-working-language-in-ukraine-taking-the-cue-from-kyiv-mohyla-academy-400152.html>

Landry, R., Bourhis, R. (1997), Linguistic landscape and ethnolinguistic vitality,

an empirical study. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 16(1), 23-49.

Laurence, A. (2015). AntConc [computer software]. Retrieved from

<http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc/>

Masenko, L. (2006). *Language policy in UkrSSR: The history of linguocide, in*

Ukrainian language in XX century. Masenko, L. (Ed.), Kyiv: Kyiv Mohyla Academy.

Masenko, L. (2009). Language Situation in Ukraine: Sociolinguistic Analysis.

In J. Besters-Dilger (Ed.), *Language policy and language situation in Ukraine:*

Analysis and recommendations, (pp. 56-100). Frankfurt am Main: Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften.

McEnery, T., Xiao, R., Tono, Y. (2006). *Corpus-based language studies an*

advanced resource book. London: Routledge.

Moser, M. (2014). The Languages of Ukraine and the War for Russian “Compatriots”.

- Institute for Human Sciences*. Retrieved from <http://www.iwm.at/read-listen-watch/transit-online/the-languages-of-ukraine/>
- Moser, M. The Languages of Ukraine and the War for Russian “Compatriots”. Retrieved from <http://www.iwm.at/read-listen-watch/transit-online/the-languages-of-ukraine/>
- Mutz, D. (1992). Mass media and the depoliticization of personal experience. *American Journal of Political Science*, 36 (2), 483-508.
- Nahaylo, B. (1999). *The Ukrainian resurgence*. London: Hurst & Co.
- Olszanski, T. (2012). *The Language issue in Ukraine an attempt at a new perspective*. Warsaw: Ostrodek Studiow.
- Osolins, U. (2000). Between Russian and European hegemony: Current language policy in the Baltics. In S. Wright (Ed.), *Language policy and language issues in the successor states of the former USSR*, (pp. 6-47). GB: Short Run Press.
- Partington, A., Dugid, A., Taylor, C. (2013). *Patterns and meanings in discourse: theory and practice in corpus-assisted discourse studies*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Pavlenko, A. (2007). *Russian in Post-Soviet countries*. Springer Science Business Media B.V.
- Pietikäinen, S., Lane, P., Salo, H., Laihiala-Kankainen, S. (2010) Frozen actions in the Arctic Linguistic landscape: a nexus analysis of language process in visual space. *International Journal of Multilingualism*, 8(4), 277-298.
- Polese, A. (2011) Language and Identity in Ukraine: Was it Really Nation-Building? *Studies of Transition States and Societies*, 3(3), 36 – 50.
- Popova, I. (1993) *Language situation as a factor of political self-identification and cultural development (based on data from Odesa and Odesa region)*(Trans.). Retrieved from <http://puls.od.ua/index.php/publikacii/nauch-publik.html>

Pravda Russia (2015, January 26). The Truth Instead of Lies. Retrieved

from: http://www.pravdareport.com/world/europe/26-01-2015/129604-ukraine_truth-0/

Pravda Ukraine (2008, April 7). Putin to Bush: “Ukraine is not a state”.

Retrieved from <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2008/04/7/4437118/>

RIA, (2010). Russian newspapers digest. *Kommersant*. Available from S. L’nyavskiy, the online depository from RIA is no longer available.

RT, (2014, March 2). Ukrainian troops dispatched in Crimea switch to region’s side –

sources. Retrieved from <https://www.rt.com/news/ukraine-military-russia-resign-437/>

RT, (2014a, March 23). Massive anti-Maidan rallies grip eastern Ukraine as residents demand referendum.

Retrieved from <https://www.rt.com/news/east-ukraine-rallies-referendum-701/>

RT, (2014b, February 27). Cancelled language law in Ukraine sparks concern among

Russian and EU diplomats. Retrieved from <https://www.rt.com/news/minority-language-law-ukraine-035/>

RT, (2014c, March 13). EU, US ‘ideological sowing’ behind current Ukrainian crisis –

Russian official. Retrieved from <https://www.rt.com/politics/ukraine-russia-us-ideology-510/>

RT, (2014d, March 4). Crimean self-defence squads in stand off with Ukrainian soldiers at

Belbek airport. Retrieved from <https://www.rt.com/news/self-defense-belbek-crimea-795/>

RT, (2014e, February 24). Nationalists promote granting citizenship to ethnic Russians

from Ukraine. Retrieved from <https://www.rt.com/politics/russia-ukraine-citizenship-bill-474/>

RT, (2014f, April 7). EU should recognize Crimea as part of Russia – Czech president. Retrieved

- from <https://www.rt.com/news/czech-president-crimea-eu-881/>
- Richter, A. (2002). The partial transition: Ukraine's post-communist media. In E. Monroe, B. Rozumilowicz, S. Verhulst (Eds.). *Media reform: Democratizing the media, democratizing the State*. London: Routledge.
- Rubdy, R. (2015) Conflict and Exclusion: the linguistic Landscape as an Arena of Contestation. In R. Rubdy, R. & S. Ben Said, *Conflict, exclusion and dissent in the linguistic landscape*, 1- 27. NY; Palgrave MacMillan.
- Ryabinska, N. (2011). The Media Market and Media Ownership in Post-Communist Ukraine, Impact on Media Independence and Pluralism. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 58(6), 3-20.
- Ryazanova-Clarke, L. (2014a). Introduction: The Russian Language, Challenged by Globalization, in Lara Ryazanova-Clarke (Ed.) *The Russian Language Outside the Nation*, 1-32. EUP.
- Ryazanova-Clarke, L. (2014b). Russian with an Accent: Globalization and the Post-Soviet Imaginary. In L. Ryazanova-Clarke (Ed.) *The Russian Language Outside the Nation*, 249-280. EUP.
- Safran, W. (1999). Nationalism. In J. Fishman (Ed.) *Handbook of Language and identity*, 77 – 93, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Savojska, S. (2011). *Linguistic-political separatism as a factor of destabilization of national unity of Ukrainian society during post-Soviet transformation (Trans.)*. Kyiv: Prosvita.
- Scollon R., Scollon, S. (2003). *Discourses in place: language in the material world*. NY: Routledge.
- Scollon R., & S. Scollon. (2004). *Nexus Analysis: Discourse and the emerging Internet*.

- London: Routledge.
- Shevcova, L. (2014, November 17). Three main goals of Putin in Ukraine. *New Time* (Trans). Retrieved from <http://nv.ua/opinion/shevcova/tri-glavnyh-celi-putina-v-ukraine-20803.html> .
- Shohamy, E. (2006). *Language policy: Hidden agendas and new approaches*. Routledge, NY.
- Shohamy, E., & Gorter, D. (Eds.) (2009). *Linguistic landscape: Expanding the scenery*. London, UK: Routledge
- Shohamy, E., Ben-Rafael, E., & Barni, M. (Eds.) (2010). *Linguistic landscape in the city*. Bristol, UK: Multilingual Matters.
- Siiner, M. (2012). *Towards a more flexible language policy: a comparative analysis of language policy design in Denmark and Estonia*. Tartu: University of Tartu Press.
- Siiner, M., L'nyavskiy, S. (2015, in press). From dialogue to alienation: Priming language political issues as issues of state security. A corpus-assisted discourse analysis of language ideological debates in Estonian media before and after Ukrainian crisis. *Language Policy Series*, Springer.
- Skvirskaja, V. (2009). Language is a Political Weapon. In J. Besters-Dilger (Ed.), *Language policy and language situation in Ukraine: Analysis and recommendations* 175 – 200. Frankfurt am Main: Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften.
- Snyder, T. (2010) A fascist hero in democratic Kiev. *The New York review of books*.
Retrieved from <http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2010/02/24/a-fascist-hero-in-democratic-kiev/>
- Snyder, T. (Online lecture). (2014). *Ukraine: From Propaganda to Reality* (Online lecture).

Retrieved from Chicago Humanities Festival Web site:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eKF0bB6_naw

Spolsky, B. (2009). *Language management*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sputnik, (2004, September 14). 40% of Ukrainians come out for official status of

Russian language. Retrieved from

<http://sputniknews.com/onlinenews/20040914/39769100.html> .

Sputnik, (2004a, January 23). Expert: Ukraine's intellectual potential suffers over lacking official status for Russian language. Retrieved from

<http://sputniknews.com/onlinenews/20040123/39905841.html>

Sputnik, (2006, February 27). About 50% of Ukrainians nostalgic for Soviet times – poll. Retrieved from <http://sputniknews.com/world/20060227/43809340.html>

Sputnik, (2010, March 13). Top Ukrainian MP warns Russian could takeover as national language. Retrieved from

<http://sputniknews.com/world/20100313/158185390.html>

Sputnik, (2012, May 24). Tymoshenko slams Russian-Ukrainian equal language status proposal.

Retrieved from <http://sputniknews.com/society/20120524/173646271.html>

Steele, J. (1994) *Eternal Russia: Yeltsin, Gorbachev, and the mirage of*

democracy. Harvard University Press

Stepanenko, V. (2003). Identities and Language Politics in Ukraine: The Challenges of

Nation-State Building. In F. Daftary & F. Grin (Eds.), *Nation-building, ethnicity and language politics in transition countries*, (pp. 107 – 136). Budapest: Open Society Institute.

Taylor, C. (2014). Investigating the representations of migrants in the UK and Italian press.

A cross-linguistic corpus assisted discourse analysis. *International journal of corpus linguistics* 19(3), 368-400.

Thompson, J. (1984). *Critical hermeneutics: A study in the thought of Paul Ricoer and Jurgen Habermas*. NY: Cambridge University Press.

Toleffson, J. (1999). *Planning language, planning inequality. Language policy in the community*. NY: Longman.

Toleffson, J. (2015). Historical-Structural Analysis. In F.M. Hult, D. Johnson, D. (Eds.), *Research methods in language policy and planning: a practical guide*, (pp. 140-151). Wiley & Sons.

Tyshchenko, Y. (2012, June 19). Assessment of the draft bill on Principles of State Language Policy. Retrieved from <http://www.khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1340051180>

Ukrinform, (2012). Language law takes effect. Retrieved from http://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-politics/1384400-languages_law_takes_effect_287006.html

Wright, S. (Ed.) *Language policy and Language issues in the Successor States of the former USSR*, pp. 6-47. Short Run Press: Great Britain.

Zaliznyak, G., Masenko, L. (2002). *Language situation in Kyiv*. Urok Ukrainskoj: Kyiv.

Zaliznyak, H. (2009) Language orientations and the civilization choice for Ukrainians. In J. Besters-Dilger (Ed.), *Language policy and language situation in Ukraine: Analysis and recommendations* (pp. 139 - 174). Frankfurt am Main: Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften.

Zhurzhenko, T. 2001. Language and nation building. Dilemmas of language politics

in contemporary Ukraine. <http://www.iwm.at/read-listen-watch/transit-online/language-and-nation-building-dilemmas-of-language-politics-in-contemporary-ukraine1/>

Zhurzhenko, T. (2002) The myth of two Ukraines. Retrieved from [www. Eurozine.com](http://www.eurozine.com).

Zhurzhenko, T. (2014). From Borderlands to Bloodlands.

<http://www.iwm.at/transit/heft-45-die-unerwartete-revolution/>

Unian, (2015). Poroshenko declares 2016 year of English Language. Retrieved from:

<http://www.unian.info/society/1185773-poroshenko-declares-2016-year-of-english-language.html>

Wilson, A. (2014). *Ukraine crisis what it means for the West*. Totton, Hampshire:

Yale University Publication.

Ädel, A. (2010). Corpus linguistics and political discourse.

In O’Keeffe & M. McCarthy (Eds.), *The Routledge handbook of corpus linguistics* (pp. 591-604). New York, NY: Routledge.

