Variation in the implementation in Swedish Municipalities

Social requirements in public procurement

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Abstract

This thesis has attempted to map and explain the vaiation in implementation of social requirements in public procurement. The objects of study are the municipalities of Sweden from which both policy documents and procurement requirement specifications were collected. The thesis developed two models to explain the variation in two implementation types, the implementation into municipal strategic guidelines, and the usage of requirements in procurements collected from three procurement types. The theisis limited the study to three kinds of social requirements; collective agreements, equal opportunity and optional full time.

The analysis consisted of both bivariate analysis, as well as linear regression. The bivariate analysis showed that there were no provisions, or requirements of, optional full time.Of the strategic guidelines studied, roughly 30% contained provisions for collective agreement and equal opportunity. The social requirements in the requirement specification varied between the three types of procurements.The results of the regressions were inconclusive, but indicated that the number of administrators had a positive correlation with the use of social requirements, and that open-ended provisions had a negative impact. The political explaination for the variation in implementation did not reach confidence levels where we with certainty could use it to explain the variation.

Key words: Implementation, Public procurement, Social requirement, Social responsibility, Social consideration

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Table of contents

List of Tables

1   Social Requirements: a threat to legally secured procurement or the future of administration?

The topic of social requirements in public procurement is a conflictual one. Members from a Swedish law firm argued in a national Swedish newspaper (SvD 2015-07-14) that social requirements in public procurement could not be considered legally secured. They claimed that the uses of social requirements risked undermining the principles on which the entire public procurement legal code is based, those of effective use of official funds and equal treatment of contractors.

Social requirements can be defined as requirements put on companies through the public procurement process to adjust and develop in its contribution to a socially sustainable community. In 2010, the European commission, in their publication *Buying Social,* broached the use of social requirements in public procurement. Among other things, the publication presented ways for promoting perspectives through public procurements, such as social inclusion and employment opportunities (European Commission 2010).

The proponents of social requirements argue that social requirements can be used in accordance with the principles of public procurement (SvD 2015-07-28). Proponents argue that using social requirements enables local governments to overcome societal challenges, such as segregation and social exclusion (Dagens Samhälle 2011-11-01). In Sweden, public procurements approximately accounted for 600 billion SEK (Upphandlingsmyndigheten).Therefore, the extra cost in processes of public procurement which social requirement could entail could be considered an issue of utmost importance. Furthermore, the size of the public procurement practice means that social requirements constitute an effective tool for the development of society, locally as well as nationally and internationally.

Despite the potential of the issue, and the financial magnitude of the public procurement process, no studies of social requirement in public procurement have attempted to map the implementation on the local level. Instead, studies of public procurements in Sweden are often concerned with environmental requirements, and how other great societal challenges could be combatted through public procurement (For example Lundberg, Marklund, Strömbäck and Sundström, D. 2015; Oelreich and Philip 2013).

The European commission opened for an optional implementation in their publication (European Commission 2010), by presenting a way for the public sector to use social requirements, but not making it legislative. Optional implementation, and the study there of, is interesting as it is an implicit measurement of how the municipalities of Sweden uses their prerogative to choose. This thesis' first aim is to investigate how Swedish municipalities has chosen to implement social requirements in public procurement, and by extension, how it varies among the municipalities.

The variation in the implementation of social requirements can likely have many different explanations. As shown earlier, there is a public dispute over the uses of social requirements, which is ideological in nature. However, are ideology and politics the only explanation for the variation? A second aim is to determine what other factors influence the implementation of social requirements.

As stated earlier, social requirements can be defined as requirements put on companies through the public procurement process to adjust and develop in its contribution to a socially sustainable community. This thesis limited the study of social requirements to three types of requirements. The first type is requirements of or relating to collective agreement, which puts demands on the contracting companies to have collective agreement in place between themselves and the labor unions, or equivalent demands. The second type is requirements of optional full time, where the contracting company tries to avoid involuntary part-time appointments of staff. The third type is requirements of or relating to equal opportunity, which includes requirements of anti-discrimination efforts and inclusion of underprivileged groups. The selected types of social requirements are studied due to their conflictual nature. They are at the heart of the Swedish labor traditions. Furthermore, the thesis will focus on two kinds of implementation. The implementation of the concept of social requirements into Swedish municipalities' strategic guidelines for public procurement, and the usage of social requirements when specifying public procurements.

This thesis found that there was a variation in both types of implantation, and that the variations did not fully overlap in the chosen period of study, e.g. 2015. The analysis found that the perfect overlap, where the existence, or lack of social requirements, where the same in both strategic guidelines and in requirement specifications, only accounted for two thirds of the selected cases. In the strategic guidelines for public procurement, provisions for requirements of or relating to collective agreement and provisions for requirements of or relating to equal opportunity where present in 30 % of the guidelines. However, the implementation of the use of social requirements had a discrepancy between the two types of requirements where the tendency between the different business areas was that the collective agreement type of requirement was more common than the equal opportunity type. Furthermore, there were no recorded cases of optional full time either as a provision in the strategic guidelines, nor as a requirement in the requirement specifications. The analysis was unable to fully map which factors influenced the implementation of social requirements, but found indications that municipal cooperations mattered in the formation of the strategic guidelines, and that precise guidelines and the number of administrators mattered in the usage of social requirements in public procurement.

Two achieve these two aims, to map the variation in implementation and investigate which factors influence that implementation, the thesis will be structured as follows. Firstly, the following chapter will narrow the two broad aims discussed above into two concrete research question on the implementation of social requirements in public procurement. Following the two concrete research questions will be a chapter (three) on the previous research regarding implementation, how implementation studies as a field has developed since Pressman and Wildavsky first released their book *Implementation* in 1973. The chapter will also discuss how this study hopes to add to the literature on implementation by studying optional implementation. Chapter four will use the previous literature on implementation to identify and develop measurements for possible factors that influences the optional implementation of social requirements, both into Swedish municipalities' strategic guidelines and in the usage of

social requirement in public procurement. Chapter five will be dedicated to the methodological considerations of the selection of Swedish municipalities to study optional implementation, and how the collection of data for study has been made. Chapter six will test the variables and data described in chapters four and five through both regressions and bivariate analysis.

2   Aim and Research questions

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the body of literature on EU implementation by looking at the municipal level implementation rather than the domestic implementation. Furthermore, this thesis intends to investigate whether the discretion left in implementation, as suggested by Treib (2008), is used by the municipalities in Sweden in regards to social requirements specified in public procurement. The optional implementation will be studied in two different aspects. Firstly, the implementation into the municipals local strategic documents, and secondly the usage of social requirements in public procurements.

1. How does the implementation of social requirements in municipal strategic guidelines of public procurement vary? Moreover, is there a variation in the implementation of social requirement in public procurements procurement specifications?
2. Which of the probable explanations of variation in implementation holds explanatory power? Can any of the probable explanations be disproved?

3   What has been said in previous literature on implementation and compliance?

This chapter will start with a short review of how the research field of implementation can be grouped into different sub-categories, before reviewing the theoretical development. Chapter four will use the theoretical lessons presented below to create models for explaining the variations in implementation. The topic of this thesis, namely the municipal prerogative to implement social requirements in public procurements, relates to the literature on implementation. Implementation can be defined, as the process between policy expectation and policy results (DeLeon 1999:314). In the implementation literature a 'gap' or a failure in implementation is often identified and studied and explained in different ways. In the studies of implementation in the EU, it can be said that generally the focus is rather on a compliance aspect of implementation, and very few have studied the 'street-level' implementation. Furthermore, no study seems to have investigated the municipality's role in EU implementation even though previous publications have indicated that the EU has a high impact on the municipalities in Sweden (SKL 2010).

According to Treib (2008), the studies of compliance and implementation are similar in nature, where implementation studies study the process of translating policy into action, and compliance in the same manner observe a countries compliance with international agreements. One of the main differences being that compliance studies often are somewhat less concerned with the process than on outcome of implementation.

EU implementation studies stem from the traditional fields of study of domestic implementation which mainly focused on the federal systems of USA (examples of this is Derthick 1972; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Bardach 1977) and Germany (Mayntz 1979; Scharpf 1978) as cases. The field of domestic implementation has since then mainly had a case-study design trend. The case-studies have been revolving around a divide in theoretical approach; namely that of top-down (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Bardach 1977; van Meter and van Horn 1975; Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983) vs bottom-up (Lipsky 1980; Hjern and Porter 1981; Elmore 1980; Barrett and Fudge 1981) divide (Hill and Hupe 2002:43; Treib 2008:6). The scholars of the top-down approach conceived implementation as a "hierarchical execution of centrally defined policy intentions" (Treib 2008:6) while the scholars of the bottom-up approach argued that the policies were shaped by the problem solving strategies of the actors inside the policy implementation process (Treib 2008:6). Lately, there has developed a third group of scholars who has attempted to develop the field through the development of theory of implementation (Hill and Hupe 2002).

The theoretical development can be categorized through the identified independent variables that influence the implementation (Hill and Hupe 2002). The following groups of independent variables will be presented below according to the terminology used by previous researched,

and improved in the subsequent chapter (four). The first such category of independent variables is *policy characteristics* and stems from the work of Lowi (1972) on policy types (Hill and Hupe 2002). Within implementation the taxonomy on policy types spawned a school of thought which has developed since (e.g. see Ripley and Franklin 1982; Matland 1995; Parsons 1995; Rothstein 1998). The school of thought focuses on the theorization on 'which types of policy' has 'which types of implementation issues'. In this thesis however, the study will only focus on one type of policy, which Lowi (1972) would describe as redistributive, therefore the policy types hold no real explanatory power for the variation in implementation of social requirements in public procurement, as the policy type does not vary.

The second group of independent variables of note are *policy formation* (Hill and Hupe 2002) and consists of studies trying to identify which form policy should take to make implementation smother (Hill and Hupe 2002:125). These studies have traditionally been carried out through qualitative methods as the feedback between implementation and policy development is key (e.g. Meier and McFarlane 1995; May 1993, 1994, 1995; May and Burby 1996; Castellani 1992; Clark 1997). However, Hill and Hupe (2002) point out that a quantitative study with time-series data could possibly account for the occurrences of feedback.

The third category of independent variables, common in the studies of implementation, are what Hill and Hupe (2002) calls *vertical public administration*. The core of the issue is the impact of vertical links from the policy formation to the street level, and has been studied ever since Pressman ad Wildavsky (1973) attempted to model the links mathematically (Hill and Hupe 2002:126). According to Hill and Hupe (2002:127) the empirical studies of vertical links avoid studying too many links at once by limiting attention to the relationship between two levels in the policy making process. Of importance to this thesis endeavors the studies that focus on the local implementation and power in a federal system (e.g. Scholz et al. 1991; Cimitile et al. 1997). There are no such studies applied to the EU system.

The fourth group independent variables applied in implementation studies is *influences on implementation agency responses* (Hill and Hupe 2002). This category can in turn be further divided into two traditions of literature, namely the literature on general agency characteristics and dispositions (e.g. van Meter and van Horn 1975; Durant 1993; Krause 1996; Hickenson et al. 1971; Di Maggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1995) and the behavior of street-level staff (e.g. Lipsky 1980; Satyamurti 1981; Bowe et al. 1992; O'Toole 1997; Chan et al. 1995; Kelly 1994; Chaney and Saltzstein 1998; Provan and Milward 1991; Erthridge and Percy 1993) (Hill and Hupe 2002:123).

Hill and Hupe (2002:133) argue that a fifth category of independent variables is *horizontal inter-organizational relationships*. The category consists of studies which focuses on horizontal organizations cooperation success or failures as factors in successful implementation. According to Hill and Hupe (2002:134) however, the studies done within this model of explanation (e.g. Pettigrew et al. 1992; Wistow et al. 1994; Flynn et al. 1996; Hudson et al. 1997; Powell et al. 2001) has not stemmed from traditional implementation theory, but stems from a tradition of British literature focusing on the relationship of street-level workers for collaborative initiatives imposed from a higher level in the policy chain.

The sixth group of independent variables of note is *the impact of responses from those effected by the policy* (Hill and Hupe 2002). Within this category, the production of policy is seen as co-production, involving negotiation and bargaining. Studies have been made both

investigating powerful actors, mainly big corporations, who effect the policy which affect them (e.g. Richardson et al. 1982, Hawkins 1984; Blowers 1983,1984; Chan et al.1995; O'Toole 1997; Ellison 1998) as well as the impact of less powerful actors, namely individuals (e.g. Ethridge and Percy 1993; Meyers et al. 1998; Stoker and Wilson 1998; Hupe 1993a; Campbell 2001).

The last independent variable in the literature, identified by Hill and Hupe (2002) is *the environment or policy context*. This body of literature focuses on the impact of external forces on the policy that the policymakers have little or no influence over. Examples of these types of studies are Hollifield (1990) who studied the impact of migration pressure on immigration policy and Meier et al. (1995) who studied the change in agricultural markets and its impact on the creation of agricultural policy (Hill and Hupe 2002:136).

In terms of EU implementation studies, Treib (2008) identifies three waves of literature. The first wave dealt with institutional efficiency, and the outcome of the implementation processes of transposition, application and enforcement was explained by clearly stated policy objectives and a well-organized state apparatus (Treib 2008:7). The second wave of EU implementation investigated the level of misfit between EU legislation which was to be implemented and the existing institutional and regulatory traditions to explain differences in implementation (Treib 2008:8). As a third wave Treib (2008:10) described a theoretical and methodological diversification as a development to supplement the rather limited scope of the first two waves, and to give a fuller picture.

In terms of empirical material few scholars have studied the sub-national level within the field of EU implementation. In addition, while the EU implementation studies stem from the traditional studies of implementation in federal systems, Hill and Hupe (2002:127) argue that what most EU implementation scholars actually study is policy formation. There are theoretical lessons from the domestic implementation studies for the EU implementation process. The next chapter will use the groups of independent variables that previous scholars have identified as influencing the implementation process and develop them into complete models for variation.

4   What are social requirements, and why do their implementation vary?

As shown in the previous chapter, the implementation research has previously focused on a failure or 'gap' in implementation as a focus of their study, requiring a new approach to the explanations for variation in implementation when studying optional implementation. This thesis will rather try to explain variation within what might be called successful implementation by the authors discussed in the previous chapter. As the usage of social requirements is optional for the municipalities to implement, all of them have succeeded with the implementation. As claimed in the introduction, the study of optional implementation is interesting as it is an implicit measurement of how the municipalities of Sweden uses their prerogative to decide.

As stated above, implementation as a concept will be measured in two ways. Both if the municipalities chose to regulate the social requirements in their own strategic guidelines, and if social requirements are applied to specific instances of public procurement. In this chapter the concepts, correlations and possible implications will be discussed. Firstly, the concept of social requirements will be reviewed, and specific types of requirements will be selected for study. The following sections will present two models, aiming to explain the variation implementation, in regulation and usage of social requirements, developed from the concepts used by previous scholars.

4.1   What are social requirements?

As a basis for what counts as social requirements this thesis will take departure in the 2010 publication by the European Commission *Buying Social – A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public Procurement.* The Commission determines that social requirements, or Social Responsible Public Procurement as they title it, is about influencing the market place. The important limitations of the social requirements are that they have to be proportional and cannot constitute an excluding measure towards companies from other member states.

This thesis will measure the occurrence of social requirement in public procurement, both in the application and in strategic guidelines in the Swedish municipalities. As a limitation, three types of social requirements was selected. Namely requirements of or relating to:
- collective agreement,
- requirements of optional full time,
- requirements of equal opportunity.

None of the three types are directly or completely regulated by any conventions and relates mainly to the contracting companies own operations. Furthermore, all of the requirement

types are labor centered in nature. Therefore, as stated in the the beginning of the thesis, they are conflictual in the Swedish context. Three types of requirements will be further developed and operationalized below.

4.1.1   Requirements related to collective agreements

Collective agreements are a central part of the Swedish labor model and have a particular role in Swedish labor legislation as they have the authority to circumvent parts of the labor legislation (Lagen om Anställningsskydd). Collective agreements in Sweden are usually an agreement between the worker's union and either industry organizations or individual companies.

The measurement of occurrences of collective agreement requirements or related requirements in public procurement will assume that two different phrasing are used. Firstly, the milder phrasing which requires conditions equivalent to those of collective agreements for employees of the contracting company, which can take explicit and implicit forms. Furthermore, the requirement for equivalent conditions to that of collective agreements will be limited to conditions of Swedish collective agreements, rather than for collective agreements generally. The second type is expected to be a harder phrased requirement for the company to have collective agreement.

4.1.2   Requirements related to optional full time

Optional full time is a regulation on worktime, which is reverse to the traditional regulation. In terms of requirements in strategic guidelines for public procurement or in the public procurement process, this category will represent all demands for an option of increased worktime for the contracting companies' employees. In the strategic guidelines, this is expected to take the form of a clear-cut provision opening for the requirement of optional full time. In the requirement specification, this is expected to be included under the section on employer responsibility.

4.1.3   Requirements related to equal opportunities

The requirements related to employment opportunities aim to look for requirements that aim to give employment opportunities to disadvantaged groups, such as immigrants or people with immigration background, young individuals lacking work experience, individuals with disabilities, or other individuals similarly apart from the regular labor market. Proponents of equal opportunity kinds of requirements would argue that they are highly intertwined with social sustainability, an inclusive community, and integration of immigrants. The measurement of this requirement will include any requirements that relates to work training, internships and the like.

4.2   What explains variation in implementation?

This segment will discuss the different explanations of implementation variation, both for the regulation of social requirements in the strategic guidelines for public procurement, as well as the usage of social requirements in public procurement by municipalities in Sweden. The variation in both of the two categories is to be understood as variations in implementation as implementation constitute both the codifying of rules into the legal code and the actual application of that legal code. Below the two categories of variables, *possible explanations of variation in strategic guidelines* and *possible explanation of variation in requirement usage in public procurement*, will be presented and discussed. The models for explaination are developments of the independent variables identified in the previous literature. Furthermore, the following sections will operationalize the variables, determining how the influence of each explanation will be measured and coded.

4.2.1   Possible explanations of variation in strategic guidelines

The following sections will focus on the explanatory factors that explain the variation of implementation of social requirements into the local strategic guidelines. These factors include the political leadership in the municipalities, the municipal cooperations, and the economic and demographic factors.

Political leadership
The political leadership is going to measure the composition of the municipality assembly and is believed to have a high correlation with the content of the strategic guidelines for public procurement. The variable is a development of the findings of scholars such as Choi (1999) who determined in his study of privatization of local government services that the local political leadership had an impact on the policy output of local governments. In this thesis, there are similarities that makes it likely that political leadership will play a role.

Choi (1999:118) found that the composition of a local council affected whether a local government was enthusiastic or not about the privatization of Compulsory Competitive Tendering. Similarly, this thesis will work on the premises that political leadership in the municipalities impact the implementation through motivation and strategies in relation to the adding of social requirements to the strategic guidelines for public procurement. It is likely that a variation in political leadership also implies a variation in the motivation of the political leadership to add social requirements to the strategic guidelines. Furthermore, the strategies for solving social issues in the municipality will likely vary due to the political leadership, with different coalitions being more likely to use social requirements in public procurements than others are.

Strong correlations between the strategic guidelines and the political variables would indicate a strong political influence on the process, which in turn would mean that ideological reasoning is at the core of the issue. Furthermore, it would suggest that local democracy is one

of the main explanations for the variations in the regulation and use of social requirements in public procurement, as the result of local elections will influence the strategic guidelines implicitly.

In regards to the impact on the strategic guidelines, the Political leadership variable will measure the composition of the municipality council. This thesis will operate from the assumption that the traditional left-right divide on labor issues holds true within this particular case as well. However, in some of the Swedish municipalities there are other parties that are not a part of the traditional left-right divide; most notably of these are the Sweden Democrats. While the Sweden Democrats are considered a party of the extreme right wing, they also harbor some labor policy ideas that would place them in the political left. The placement of the Sweden Democrats is made more problematic as the different instances of social requirements would have very different reactions from the party, as opposed to the other seven established parties that could be expected to follow the left-right divide. Therefore, this thesis will forgo the inclusion of the Sweden Democrats in the political index tied to the political leadership. Furthermore, other parties that do not have any seats in the Swedish parliament are likewise left out of the coding as they have a risk of lacking cohesion and adapting to local factors rather than an ideological idea.

In regards to specific operationalization, as the municipality council tends to be varied in size, each municipality will be assigned a value between -1 and 1 with the following formula:

$$PL_1 = (M_1 + M_2 + M_3 \ldots + M_N)/N_M$$

M_x being members of the municipality council, which are assigned either -1 or 1 as value depending on if they are traditional right wing parties (Moderates, Center, Liberals or Christian democrats are assigned 1 as value), left wing parties (Social democrats, Left party, or the Swedish green party are assigned -1 as value). Sweden democrats and other parties are left out of the compilation of the value. The sum of the value of the left or right members in the municipality council is then divided by the number of members of the parties included in the compilation (N_M).

The composition of the municipal council will be measured during the election term 2010-2014. The motivation for this is that the commission released their publication about social requirements in public procurement in 2010. Therefore, the political term 2010-2014 is likely to be the most influential in terms of the impact on the strategic guidelines. If the traditional political divide on labor issues holds true, a value close to -1 should mean it is more likely for a municipality to have elements of social requirements in their strategic guidelines than municipalities with a value closer to 1.

Municipal cooperation
The municipal cooperation measures the influence of cross-municipal cooperation. While all Swedish municipalities cooperate through the national cooperation Sveriges kommuner och landsting (SKL), which nullifies the effects of cooperation, there is additional cooperation on sub-national levels. Municipal cooperation will be used to measure the impact of cooperation and debate across municipal boundaries, in municipal cooperation (kommunförbund).

The municipal cooperation as an influencing factor stems from the previous research done on horizontal inter organizational relationships' impact on implementation. In the case of Swedish municipalities and their strategic guidelines the municipal cooperation are more

likely to have an impact due to their sharing of norms (as suggested by Provan and Milward 1991:399) rather than the traditional explanation of pooling and sharing resources.

Political cooperation between municipalities could influence the strategic guidelines through the transference of norms of how public procurement should be used. Ideas of what problems the municipalities face, which options they are available, and which tools can be used to address which issues are likely some of the possible ways in which municipal cooperation influences the political decision making, and therefore the formation of the strategic guidelines.

Among municipal cooperations the impact on the implementation of social requirements in public procurement is expected to differ. Cooperations have different degrees of organization and different focuses (Bergh and Lindahl 2007:26), and therefore the degree of influence is expected to differ. The expected relations between the cooperation and the social requirements are not expected to be linear as different cooperation is expected to have different effect on the strategic guidelines, and therefore it will not be included in the regression analysis. Instead, particularly interesting cooperation will be identified to investigate the impact of each to get a combined image of the impact of municipal cooperation.

Economic and demographic factors

The economic and demographic factors taken into consideration are the ones that can be related to the specific social requirements that are measured, as indicated by previous scholars such as Hollifield (1990). Hollifield (1990) argued that external factors that were tied into the policy area affected the implementation, by changing the needs that the policy fulfills as well as the ideas of what the policy should do. For example, the immigration flows into a country impact the implementation of asylum policies.

One type which relates to the requirement on optional full time, will be a GINI-coefficient of income division in the municipality. While data on the degree of part time work would be a better variable, there is an absence of such data on the municipal workforce. Instead, the coefficient on income division will represent the degree of part time work. Furthermore, the variation in demographic composition and labor force between the municipalities is expected to have some explanatory value. The expectation being that a municipality with a large immigration and/or a high youth unemployment rate is more likely to use social tools to integrate its immigrant population and curb the unemployment than one with a homogenous and employed population.

4.2.2 Possible explanations of variation in requirement usage in public procurement

The variation in the usage of social requirements in public procurements is the second way to measure implementation. As will be detailed below the variation in the application of social requirements have multiple possible explanatory variables.

Political leadership

In the usage of social requirements in public procurement the political leadership will be measured at the time of the procurement, namely in 2015 in the same way as with the political leadership in relation to strategic guidelines were measured in 2010-2014. The political

leadership is expected to influence the usage of social requirements through their role as leaders of the bureaucracy, and through what Choi (1999) would referred to as context, namely the authority of the bureaucrats to use or not use social requirements. Concretely this means that the political leadership is expected to influence the implementation in a shorter-term way through its role as the 'bosses' of the bureaucracy. As stated above the left-right divide is expected to play a role in the political leadership variable that means that municipalities with a value close to 1 will be expected to be less likely to use social requirements in public procurement than ones with a value closer to -1.

Political culture

The Political culture variable measures the impact of the political context on the variation in the usage of social requirements on public procurement trough the impact the context can have on the bureaucracy. Scholz et al. (1991) created the variable for the federal system in the USA. Scholz et al (1991) argues in their study of federal bureaucracy at a local level is influenced by local, state and federal politics that the impact of politics are greater than that of the policy process through its impact on street level bureaucrats. Scholz et al. (1991) identifies three reasons why politicians outside the directly relevant policy process matters, namely (1) the home-style leadership influence on enforcement, (2) the electoral coalition influences on enforcement, and (3) political cultures influence on enforcement. In this study, the variable for political culture is a measurement of the political context of the municipality, measuring the politicians of the regional and national politician elected from the municipality's geographical area.

In terms of specific operationalization, the political culture variable will measure the expected presence of regional and national politicians elected in election districts within or containing the municipality. Similarly to the measurement of political leadership, the political culture will use the -1/1 value system of the right-left divide. Instead of using the elected officials this thesis will use number of votes on each party, divided by the number of votes on the seven measured parties in total. However, as the pressure on the bureaucrats, or the non-existence of that pressure, is the assumed mechanics which influence the use of social requirements the variable will always be positive[1]. The variable will measure the distance from the political balance in the municipal political culture, which represents the autonomy of the bureacrats.

The political context of the municipality is important, as it has been shown that bureaucrats can be influenced by politics not directly tied to the creation or enforcement of a policy. The expected correlation will be between the political culture and the actual usage of social requirements in public procurements, through the freedom afforded by the bureaucrats. Scholz et al (1991) identifies three explanations for the mechanics of political influences on bureaucrats:

1. Home-style activities

According to Scholz et al (1991:834), the elected officials can be seen as both ombudsman and leaders of the local community. In their role as ombudsman for the local community the elected official can act as a go-between for community complaints and opinion, which are dependent on their party specific networks. This means that if one party holds a bigger portion

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[1] $\sqrt{(\text{Value of test}^2)}$

of all the elected positions from the geographical area of the municipality certain types of complaints are more common.

As leaders in the local communities the elected officials can affect the beliefs and loyalties of the bureaucrats. Officials may affect bureaucrats through a broad set of activities such as speaking engagements and participation in local meetings (Scholz et al 1991:835). A shift in beliefs and loyalties of bureaucrats might play a significant role on the behavior of the same individual bureaucrats, and therefore on the implementing bureaucracy, and is more likely to happen if the political influence is one-sided.

2. Coalition influence

According to Sholz et al (1991) the second reason why elected officials might be a good marker for influence on bureaucracy is the possibility that the coalitions in the local community which elected the officials have an influence on the individual bureaucrat. While Sholz et al (1991) argues that it is almost impossible to separate the influence of the coalition from the influence of the elected official's home-style activities, due to the fact that they work through the same mechanics, they argue that the distinction becomes unimportant through the fact that the beliefs and values which influences the bureaucrats are the same for the officials and the coalitions which elected the officials.

3. Political culture

The final way in which Sholz et al (1991) argues the elected officials and the bureaucracy relates is the possibility of an existing, relatively homogeneous, political culture within the local community that influences both the elected officials and the bureaucrats. Sholz et al (1991) could not find any statistical significance indicating the existence of a homogeneous political culture. However, this thesis will be open to the possibility of the correlation between the political officials and bureaucrat's behaviors being based in political culture, but will not separate the different explanations.

Municipal cooperations affect the usage of social requirements

Similarly, to the municipal cooperations explanation for variation in the strategic guidelines, the municipal cooperations are believed to influence the implementation in term of the use of social requirements in procurement. While the municipal cooperations variable will have the same data in both the studies of impact, in the case of the usage of social requirements in public procurements the effect is expected to come through the cooperation of the bureaucracies rather than through political cooperation. As stated above, while all Swedish municipalities cooperate through the national cooperation Sveriges kommuner och landsting (SKL), which nullifies the effects of cooperation, there is additional cooperation on sub-national levels. As suggested by Provan and Milward (1991:399) norms of the professional role, and which measures are open for the bureaucrats.

Furthermore, among the municipal cooperations the impact on the implementation of social requirements in public procurement is expected to differ. Different cooperations have different degrees of organization and different focuses (Bergh and Lindahl 2007:26). In terms of specific operationalization, the variable of municipal cooperations, which is the same for both the strategic guidelines and the usage of social requirements in public procurements, will be compiled of multiple sub-variables, one for each municipal cooperation, where each municipality gets assigned either the value 1 if they are a member of the specific cooperation, and the value 0 if not. When combined these 145 sub-variables will be the basis for a bivariate

analysis on the impact of cooperation. As stated above for the impact on strategic guidelines, different cooperation is expected to have different effect on the strategic guidelines, and therefore it will not be included in the regression analysis. Instead, particularly interesting cooperation will be identified to investigate the impact of each to get a combined image of the impact of municipal cooperation.

Municipal policies affect the usage of social requirements
The policy variables will attempt to measure the correlation between the two independent variables. Namely to investigate to what extent the strategic guidelines actually influences the usage of social requirements in public procurements. Previous research has shown that a clearly formulated policy is a key factor for a successful implementation (May 1993). While the transposition of the public procurement into national Swedish legislation is the same for all the municipalities the strategic guidelines of each municipality is unique. This thesis will investigate to which extent the strategic guidelines correlate with actual procurements in the municipality. More specifically the existence of a specific purpose, specified provisions and open-ended requirement relating to social requirements in the municipal strategic guidelines for public procurement.

Specific purpose will measure the overarching purpose of the strategic guidelines. Previous research has suggested that the overall goal of a policy decision have an impact on the successful implementation (Van Meter and Van Horn 1975). A clear and specific purpose has an impact on the bureaucrats' ability to implement in line with the preference of the legislature. In terms of the strategic guidelines for public procurement in the municipalities, the specific purpose variable will be coded as 1 if there is a specific purpose that can be considered in line with the social requirements. This could be purposes, which contains elements of sustainability, fairness, development of the local community, or any kind of class perspective. If none of these elements are present in the specific purpose, or if there is no clear purpose of the strategic guideline what so ever, the variable will be coded as 0.

The specific provisions variables will measure the occurrence of specific social requirements regulated trough the strategic guidelines. The specific social requirements will be those presented in the beginning of this chapter and the occurrence of one will be coded as 1 and the absence will be coded as 0 for each of the three types of social requirement, namely Collective agreement, equal opportunity and optional full time. The Specific provisions stems from Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:464) idea that policy standards and objectives importance for implementation. A specific regulation of social requirements will likely influence bureaucrats who are responsible for public procurement, opening for the usage of social requirements in public procurement while also implying an expectation of usage.

The open-ended variable will measure the existence of open-ended provisions in the strategic guidelines that enables the municipality to use social requirements. The limitation being there is an open-ended provision, which is later specified, it does not count as open-ended. Furthermore, the open-ended has to be written in a way to allow for one or more of the specific social requirements, namely collective agreement, equal opportunity and optional full time.

Administrative resources role in the implementation of social requirements
The administrative resources variable is a variable that indicates how extensive the usage of social requirements in public procurements is influenced by the means to achieve it. The measurement will implicitly measure the acting space of the bureaucrats in terms of resources as extra requirements are expected to demand more for the bureaucracy in terms of time spent on each public procurement process.

The only pure administrative variable is the administrative resources that will measure the number of inhabitants in the municipality per individuals employed for purchase and procurement in the municipality. The need for resources to implement something is argued by previous literature of implementation, such as Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:465) who argued that: "Policies furnish more than the standards and objectives against which to judge implementation: they also make available resources which facilitate their administration". Van Meter and Van Horn argues further that there is a positive relationship between the implementation of a policy and the resources tied to it due to the incentives of implementation of a lucrative policy and the resources for increased enforcement. The idea behind using the number of inhabitants in the municipality as an adjustment for the measurement is that a bigger municipality has more public procurement to perform. A bigger population means more schools, more building and more food that needs transporting, which also means a corresponding increase in public procurement.

External feedback's role in the use of social requirements
The most likely external variables which is likely to impact the usage of social requirement in public procurements is the responses of those affected by the policy, in this case it is likely to be the companies which deliver services to municipalities through public procurement. Richardson and Burrows (1982) concluded that local companies which had been established in the local area for an extended period where more likely to get away with non-compliance from the implementing local government, and could be described as passive influence. This is likely a relationship that holds true for active influence as well as passive. Therefore, this thesis will work from the assumption that the number of local companies in a municipality correlates with the amount of influence business have on the local bureaucrats. A municipality without any companies are therefore unlikely to experience any real influence while a municipality with a flourishing business sphere will be more likely to be influenced.

To measure this and control for size of the municipality, the measurement will be the share of the workforce that are entrepreneurs. The correlation between this variable and in the variation of the usage of social requirements is expected to be low as the connection between the measurement of local entrepreneurs and the actual impact of business on bureaucrats is a loose one. However, the hope is that the variable will indicate a part of the explanation.

5   What has been studied

As mentioned previously, the thesis has studied the implementation of social requirements in public procurement in Swedish municipalities. Moreover, both the legislative type of implementation and the street-level implementation has been studied in each municipality. This chapter will further discuss how this will be done in terms of the cases and data collected. Furthermore, relevant consequences of the selection will be discussed.

5.1   What case has been studied

The analysis of municipal implementation of social requirements in public procurement on a municipal level was conducted on all the municipalities in Sweden. The case of Sweden, and its municipal system, is particularly interesting as the municipal governments have many rights, which could be considered unusual in a centralized system, such as the right to tax its citizens. Because of Sweden being neither a federation of states nor a true centralized governing system the municipalities have the right to implement many of the national legislation with autonomy, while lacking the power to ignore national legislation as in the case of some federal legislation (Hill and Hupe 2002:127). Therefore, the underlying assumption is that the municipalities of Sweden follow the Swedish national legislation while they retain the prerogative to implement social requirements in public procurement.

Secondly, by selecting all of the municipalities the analysis avoids the risk of selection biases. However, as will be discussed in the following section, while the ambition of the thesis was to select data from all municipalities the ambition was not fully realized. The missing data gives rise to some concern of a bias created by the responsiveness of the municipalities, where the municipalities that did not respond are of a certain group of cases.

5.2   Which data was used?

This thesis has conducted the study of implementation in two different ways, as two sets of dependent variables. Firstly, the implementation of social requirements into the strategic guidelines for the regulation of public procurement, and secondly the actual usage of social requirements in public procurements.

The collection of strategic guidelines has had an adaptive approach as municipalities regulate their public procurements in different ways. Meaning that the selection has been adapted to how the municipalities has chosen to regulate, and multiple documents has been included in some cases. However, the collection has been centered on documents commonly named

Upphandlingspolicys, Upphandlingsreglemente, and Upphandlingsriktlinjer[2]. In some cases, when these documents have actively referenced other documents they have been included. These documents include, but are not limited to, Etiska regler för upphandling and Hållbar upphandling. For a comprehensive list of the documents see appendix 22.

The collection of documents was firstly conducted through the municipality's websites, if available. If the municipality did not have the documents on their websites, they were emailed and asked to submit the documents for 2015. This has resulted in a collection and coding of 283 documents from 235 municipalities. Furthermore, nine municipalities have communicated that they did not have any strategic guidelines in 2015, and 26 did not reply at all, both were coded as missing value for the variable. If a municipality had multiple documents they have been combined into one data string with an "if any" strategy, for example that if one document contains provisions for demanding collective agreements in their public procurements the entire municipality will be coded as having provision for the demand of collective agreement.

The second type of data collected, for the actual usage of social requirements in public procurement. The collection has been limited to three different types of labor-intensive public procurement sectors where the same national legal code applies[3]. The three types are: construction, cleaning services and transportations services. The tree types are under the jurisdiction of different labor unions. The documents collected were the requirement specification for one public procurement of each of the three types.

The collection of requirement specifications was done in two steps. Firstly, each municipality's head of public procurement was contacted and asked to hand out all of the requirements done during 2015 in the three categories, which resulted in roughly 100 specifications. To compliment the data Visma Tendsign, one of the three major online platforms[4] for public procurements in Sweden, was used due to its function of having a backlog for previous public procurements to identify further public procurements within the three categories. The municipalities where contacted again with requests with specific case numbers for each procurement request. The final tally for the collection of requirement specification that 214 specifications from 146 municipalities. The rather limited result of the collection is both due to the fact that many municipalities had not conducted any public procurements within one or more of the categories, along with the limited response from the initial request for specifications and the absence of a backlog for two of the major online platforms.

The data collection for the independent variables presented in the previous chapter has been very different depending on the variables, but there have been three distinct types; the political variables, the administrative variables, and the official statistics variables. The following sections will present the collection and coding of the data for the three variables. The political variables consist of three variables. The political leadership in the municipality between 2010 and 2014, the political leadership in the municipality in 2015, and the political culture of 2015. The data for the two variables dealing with political leadership was collected

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[2] Furthermore documents whith names such as *styrdocument för upphandling, upphandlingsföreskrifter, upphandlingsbestämmelser, program för upphandling* and *upphandlingsstrategi* has been deemed as equivalent.
[3] Lagen om offentlig upphandling (2007:1091)
[4] Namely: Visma tendsign, e-avrop and Kommers annons.

from the Swedish election committee's website, more specifically the composition of the municipal council. As described in the previous chapter each council member from the left parties[5] where given a value of (-1) while the right wing parties[6] where assigned a value of 1. The values where then divided by the number of members of the seven parties combined to give a mean[7]. As stated in the previous chapter other parties, including the Swedish democrats, was not included as there is uncertainty which role they will generally play. This gave a span of between -0.8 and 0.778 for political leadership between 2010 and 2014, and between –0.739 and 0.727 for the political leadership in 2015.

The political culture variable was also constructed from data collected from the Swedish election committee's website. The data collected was the voting statistics from each municipality in the election for regional council and the parliament. Each vote on the left parties was assigned a (-1) value and each vote on the right wing parties was assigned a 1 value. After which the value was divided by the number of votes for the seven parties within the municipality in the two elections. To get a value for the distance from political balance the absolute value[8] was assigned to the municipality's political culture variable. This resulted in a value, which spanned between 0 and 0.685.

The administrative variables include the variable Administrative resources, which measures the number of municipal citizens per public procurement administrator. The data for the variable is statistics received from the organization for regions and municipalities in Sweden, SKL. In the case of administrative resources, the data received was a list of the number of public procurement officials of each municipality. However, if the number was less than or equal to three it was marked as such (<3). The municipalities that had less than three public procurements were assigned the number 2 as least impact on the overall result. When dividing the population of the municipality with the number of public procurement officials there was further considerations to observe. As some municipalities pool their resources for public procurement, having only one municipal organization serving the needs of multiple municipalities the number of distributed in the variable data according to population size, effectively giving the same number for the variable[9].

The municipal cooperation variable was acquired from SKL internal statistics. The list of municipal cooperations was narrowed down to only encompass cooperations with at least two municipalities as members, and by excluding companies owned by the municipalities. This resulted in a list of 145 municipalities available in appendix 24. The last groupings of variables, the official statistics, where collected from Statistics Sweden (SCB). These include the variables: Gini-index, Immigrant unemployment, Immigrant part of the population, housing segregation index, labor entry assistance, youth unemployment, and self-employment[10].

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[5] Social democratic party, left party, and the green party.

[6] Moderat party, the liberal party, the Center party, and the Christian democrats

[7] In both cases there had been a re-election which was not accounted for in the construction of the index.

[8] $\sqrt{(C^2)}$ where $C=((N_v*(-1))+(N_S*(-1))+(N_{MP}*(-1))+N_M+N_C+N_{FP}+N_{KD})/(N_v+N_S+N_{MP}+N_M+N_C+N_{FP}+N_{KD})$

[9] Number of officials assigned to a municipality= (municipal population/cooperations total population)*officials in the cooperation

[10] Links to the data sets are found under the Statistics headline in the reference chapter

6   Has the social requirements been used, and why?

The variation of implementation of social requirements in public procurement could not be fully explained by the models developed in chapter four as a result of both a low level of explanatory power and very high levels of uncertainty. However, the findings indicate that the implementation of social requirements into strategic guidelines are influenced by municipal cooperations, and that specific strategic guidelines and administrators play a role in implementing social requirements into the requirement specification. Furthermore, the analysis indicated that the right-left divide in labor politics in Sweden did not hold true for requirements of orrelating to equal opportunity.

This chapter will test, evaluate and discuss the models presented in chapter four. In summary, this chapter has concluded that the data collected did not suffice to neither prove nor disprove any real strengths to the models of chapter four. However, the data collected has indicated a variation in the usage of social requirements and traces of explanatory factors for the variation. The chapter will begin with the issue of optional full time as a social requirement will be discussed separately as no clear demands where found within the scope of this study. After which the overall status of implementation of social requirements in Swedish municipalities' public procurement will be discussed, before the strategic guidelines and specific requirement in requirement specification is presented separately with results on why there is a variation.

6.1   No optional full time

There were no measurements made, in neither the Strategic Guidelines nor the Requirement Specifications selected, of optional full time. Due to this the optional full time variables, in the three types of Specific Requirement and in the strategic guidelines variety, where not included in the regression. The absence of any provisions or specific requirements for optional full time makes it fairly certain that, within the fields of construction and transport, the use of optional full time as a requirement was rare in 2015. Due to the limited sample of requirement specification within the cleaning category the same certainty cannot be achieved.

In the Strategic Guidelines there were no specific provisions that directly opening for the usage of optional full time as a requirement in public procurement. This included any provisions that contained the words work-time, employees, full time. There is a degree of uncertainty as provisions that did not include any of the search words could open for optional full time.

6.2 How have the Swedish municipalities implemented social requirements in public procurement?

Among the Swedish municipalities, there is a variation in the implementation of social requirements of or relating to both collective agreement and equal opportunity. The difference between the two types of requirements studied, namely collective agreement and equal opportunity, was bigger in the actual usage of social requirements than in the strategic guidelines. Furthermore, the implementation of social requirements into the strategic guidelines does not seem to be a prerequisite or a guarantee for the implementation of social requirements as the overlap between the two types of implementations is not perfect. The relation between the two types of implementation will be developed in the section below which analyses the strategic guidelines role in the implementation of social requirements into requirement specification.

As stated in the previous chapter, the data collection of strategic guidelines from Swedish municipalities resulted in a set of strategic guidelines from 235 municipalities. Out of the 235 municipalities, 70 had provisions for requirements of or relating to collective agreements, see *Table 1*. This means that 30% of the municipalities have direct requirements for collective agreement, requirement equivalent to those in collective agreements, or requirements of keeping the norm for employment conduct within the collective agreement business area. Of the 235 municipality's strategic guidelines, 69 contained provisions of or related to equal opportunity; see *Table 1*. 29% of the municipalities had provisions of either anti-discrimination, opening for requirement of internships, or requiring the employment of groups that have difficulty in the labor market.

Table 1: Provisions for social requirements in strategic guidelines

		Count
SG_Collective_Agreement	NO	165
	YES	70
SG_Equal_opportunities	NO	166
	YES	69

As described in the previous chapter, the collection of three types of procurements from Swedish municipalities differed, in terms of volume, between the different kinds of procurements (*Table 2*). The procurement type, which produced the most extensive body of data, is that of construction which totaled at 120 construction procurements from different municipalities. Of the 120 procurements, 36 contained requirements of or relating to collective agreement and twelve contained equal opportunity type requirements. This means that, in the collected sample of construction procurement, 36 % of the procurements contained requirements of collective agreement, requirement equivalent to those in collective agreements, or requirements of keeping the norm for employment conduct within the

collective agreement business area. Furthermore, 10% of the construction procurements contained equal opportunity type of requirements.

For the other two types of procurement, cleaning and transport, the result was similar to each other. Of the 34 cleaning procurements, nine and six respective requirements of the types collective agreement and equal opportunity was measured, translating into a presence of 26 and 17 percent. The transport type of procurements, represented by 60 procurements, have 16 (26%) instances of collective agreement type of requirements, and nine occurrences (15%) of equal opportunity type requirements.

Table 2: Social requirements in requirement specification

		Count
SR_CollectiveA_Clean	NO	25
	YES	9
SR_Equal_oppor_Clean	NO	28
	YES	6
SR_CollectiveA_Construction	NO	84
	YES	36
SR_Equal_oppor_Construction	NO	108
	YES	12
SR_CollectiveA_transport	NO	44
	YES	16
SR_Equal_oppor_transport	NO	51
	YES	9

6.3   Explanation for the variation of Social Requirement provisions in Strategic Guidelines

The variation in the implementation of social requirements into the strategic guidelines could not be statistically explained with the models presented in chapter four. However, there was a trend where variables with a regional component often producing better results. Therefore, one should suspect that a further investigation into the impact of municipal cooperations could be fruitful.

The statistical analysis of the implementation of social requirements in Strategic Guidelines was conducted through three regressions and trough the observation of municipal cooperations that had a tendency to use social requirements. The first regression is conducted with the occurrence of provisions for requirement of or relating to collective agreement as a dependent variable. Provisions in the strategic guidelines that enables requirements of equal opportunity is the dependent variable in the second regression. The third regression was made on an index created from an additive combination of the variables measuring the existence of the two types of provisions. This thesis has taken departure in the traditional significance test level of $p<0.05$, presented by the Sig. value in the regression tables, which tests whether there is a 95% certainty that the correlation is not 0.

All of the three regression are initially conducted with the variables predicted to have an impact in chapter four. However, for each of the three regressions other demographic and economic variables will be tested to see if any other measurements hold more explanatory power for the formation of the strategic guidelines.

Table 3 summarizes the result of the three original regressions (the OMs) and the three revised models (the RMs) overall explanatory power and the statistical significance of the models. As T*able 3* indicates, the original data models are limited in their explanatory power, only accounting for 1-2% of the variation in the dependent variables, and statistically insignificant, as the sig. value is higher than 0.05. While none of the revised models achieves statistical significance, the models are closer to the optimal explanatory model, with Sig. approaching 0.05. However, none of the revised models account for more than 3,2% of the variation measured.

Table 3: Strategic Guidelines regression summary

Model	Appendix number	R Square	Sig.
Collective agreement, OM	1	0.022	0.277
Collective agreement, RM	2	0.032	0.058
Equal opportunity, OM	3	0.010	0.657
Equal opportunity, RM	4	0.023	0.147
SG index, OM	5	0.015	0.477
SG index, RM	6	0.028	0.086

Political impact on the formation of strategic guidelines and provisions for social requirements therein

The political variable had no statistically significant correlation with the presence of the provisions of social requirement. In the revised model for provisions of equal opportunity (Appendix 4), the political leadership variable indicates a positive, though statistically uncertain, relationship between the political left and the provision. The lack of correlation between the composition of the politicians in municipal assemblies and the strategic guideline, which are often adopted by the same assemblies, could be due to an error in assumption of the compilation of the variable. As described in chapter four, the period selected for the variable was the election period 2010-2014. As the European Commission released their handbook on social requirements in 2010, the assumption was that the political leadership during the subsequent four years had a bigger impact than the period 2014-2015, and was thereby selected for study.

The Internal Demographic and economic factors which impact the form of the strategic guidelines and the provisions for social requirements therein

The demographic and economic which were initially part of the regressions, the Gini index, immigrant unemployment and youth unemployment, did not produce any clear correlation to the dependent variables in the two models for requirements of collective agreement and equal opportunity in the municipal strategic guidelines.

In the revised models, the only significant correlation was the immigrant unemployment variable that had a significant correlation with the provisions for collective agreement in strategic guidelines (Appendix 2). The variable segregation index, which is an official index created for the comparison over time with itself seemed to have decent correlation with the strategic guidelines variables. The significance, which is still above the 0.05 level, value could be a misleading result of the composition of the index. The index contains immigrant population numbers in the regions which is then divided into a municipal value. Therefore, it is likely that the combination of region membership and immigrants might mislead the regression somewhat. The following section on the impact of municipal cooperation will discuss the impact on municipalities' memberships in regions as a factor.

A municipalities' cooperation's impact on social requirements in procurement strategic guidelines

As explained in chapter four, the impact of municipality's memberships in different municipal cooperation on the usage of social requirements are expected to fluctuate between different individual cooperations. Different cooperations have differing degrees of interaction, and different policies in focus. Therefore, this chapter will identify the cooperations with the most homogenous positive occurrences of collective agreement, and equal opportunity provisions separately.

Of the 145 municipal cooperations which had at least two member municipalities, eight cooperations where at least two thirds of the municipalities had a provisions for collective agreement was found. When looking closer at the five cooperations that had more than three member municipalities, presented in *Table 4,* no clear theme of the cooperations were found. The two biggest municipal cooperations had the same member municipalities, namely those

in the region of Kalmar, the regional cooperation and a cooperation for coordination of rehabilitation.

Of the other three cooperations, one was a fire-fighting cooperation[11], one was a cooperation for coordination of rehabilitation[12], and the last was a cooperation[13] for handling of sewage, waste, parks, roads, etc.

Table 4: Municipal cooperations with a high degree of provisions for collective agreement

Cooperation	SG_CA	members
regionförbundet i Kalmar län	0.9	12
samordningsförbundet i Kalmar län	0.9	12
Bergslagens kommunalteknik	0.75	4
Samordningsförbundet i norra Örebro län	0.75	4
Brandkåren Attunda	0.666667	6

When observing the cooperations that have provisions for equal opportunity in the same fashion it results in a grouping of ten cooperations, four of which were the same as had provisions for collective agreement[14]. A general theme out of the ten cooperations, presented in *Table 5,* is their geographic nature, namely that the members are geographically close. The natures of the six cooperations not present in the former category mirrored those that were. Three were fire-fighting cooperations[15], two were cooperations for coordination of rehabilitation[16], and the last was a cooperation[17] for handling of sewage, water supply and waste.

Table 5: Municipal cooperations with a high degree of provisions for equal opportunity

Cooperation	SG_EO	Members
Räddningstjänsten Storgöteborg	0.833333	6
regionförbundet i Kalmar län	0.8	12
samordningsförbundet i Kalmar län	0.8	12
bergslagen kommunalteknik	0.75	4
Samordningsförbundet i norra Örebro län	0.75	4
Nerikes Brandkår	0.714286	8
Borås Samordningsförbund	0.666667	8
Samordningsförbundet Sydnärke	0.666667	4
Sydöstra Skånes Räddningstjänstförbund	0.666667	4
VA SYD	0.666667	4

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[11] Brandkåren Attunda

[12] Samordningsförbundet i norra Örebro län

[13] Bergslagen kommunalteknik

[14] The exception beeing the fire-fighting cooperation Brandkåren Attunda

[15] Brandkåren Attunda

[16] Samordningsförbundet i norra Örebro län

[17] Bergslagen kommunalteknik

In summary, this thesis has been unable to prove or disprove any correlation between municipal cooperations and the provisions in the strategic guidelines. However, there are indications that geographical closeness, which could be a factor in unofficial cooperation, influences the municipalities.

6.4   Results of the models for the usage of Social Requirement in Public Procurement

The variation of implementation among Swedish municipalities in how they use social requirements in public procurement cannot be fully explained by the models presented in chapter four. However, the absolute number of administrators had a correlation with the use of social requirements, where every extra administrator made it more likely the municipality would use social requirements. Furthermore, while the correlation between the strategic guidelines and the actual usage of social requirements was weak, the presence of an open-ended provision allowing for social requirements made it less likely that the municipality would actually use social requirements.

The model for explaining the variation in Social Requirements in Public Procurement was tested in seven separate cases, namely for equal opportunity and collective agreements separately for the three types of procurements, construction, cleaning and transportation. The seventh case is a model tested on an index created from the other six cases. This section will present the result of the seven cases by beginning with a presentation of the seventh case, the index, before discussing the seven cases together for each variable. The reason for combining the six cases into an index variable is to develop a richer dependent variable, which can indicate correlation with more certainty. As stated earlier, this thesis has taken departure in the traditional significance test level of $p<0.05$, presented by the Sig. value in the regression tables, which tests whether there is a 95% certainty that the correlation is not 0.

Furthermore, the memberships in municipal cooperation is expected to have an influence, even if the relationship is not expected to be linear and therefore is unsuited for a regression analysis. Therefore, this sub-chapter will have a section for the relation between the municipal cooperations and the usage of social requirements in public procurement.

The Social Requirements index case

As described in chapter 5 the creation of the index is a mean value of a municipality's number of social requirements in the collected public procurements. The municipalities are thereby assigned a scale value between 0 and 2 which allows for a more detailed regression. The result of the regression indicates that 12%[18] of the variation in the index value is explained by the included variables[19]. However, the original index model, with all the predicted variables from the third chapter, had a fairly high degree of uncertainty, with a P=0.122[20].

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[18] $R^2= .121$, for further figures see appendix 6 which contains the model summary, the ANOVA test, and the Coefficients table for the case.

[19] The variables included are: Political culture, Political leadership, Strategic guidelines specific purpose, Strategic guidelines open-ended, Strategic guidelines equal opportunities, Strategic guidelines collective agreement, Administrative resources, and feedback (self-employment)

[20] The usual null-hypothesis is that P<.05, meaning that the likelihood that the connection is not 0 >95%

When observing the individual variables in *Table 6* it becomes clear that the significance of three of the for Strategic guideline variables does not account for any significant, individual, portion of the variation in usage of social requirements. Furthermore, the Administrative resources seems to lack explanatory power in the model.

Table 6: Coefficients of Appendix 6: SR Index, original model

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.790	.301		2.620	.010
	Political_leadership_15	.224	.264	.096	.847	.399
	Political_culture_absolut_15	-.539	.367	-.156	-1.467	.146
	Admin_resources_15	4.331E-6	.000	.041	.401	.690
	Self_employment_14	-.032	.025	-.138	-1.277	.205
	SG_Specific_purpose	.080	.109	.074	.733	.465
	SG_Collective_Agreement	.117	.134	.100	.872	.385
	SG_Equal_opportunities	.065	.132	.056	.494	.623
	SG_Open_ended	-.256	.117	-.226	-2.182	.032

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Index

As much of the regression results for each variable, and for the regression in total, is interdependent on all the other variables the model will have to be revised to get a clear picture of the actual correlations at play. In *Table 7* the coefficients of the revised model is listed. The new model gives the biggest significance, with the biggest explanatory power to the variables *Administrators* and *SG_Open_ended.*

The *Administrators* is a non-population adjusted number of administrators in each municipality[21]. As visualized in the *B* column each extra administrator in a municipality on average increases the index value by 0.028. While this might not sound like a dramatic, it accounts for the biggest portion of the variation explained by the model, according to the *Beta* value. The entire model, within the rules for statistical significance, accounts for 18,2 % of the variation[22].

The significance of the *SG_Open_ended* variable is somewhat surprising, which will be discussed further in the section on the strategic guidelines impact on the requirement specification. Not only is that one of the variables not specifically supported by previous literature, but it also has a negative impact which is counter intuitive. What it means in real terms is that municipalities which have vague or open-ended provisions which opens for

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[21] Still adjusted in terms of municipalities which have a centralized procurement office, according to part of population of the municipalities involved, similarly to the way described in chapter 5 for the *Administrative resources* variable.

[22] $R^2=0.182$, Sig.=0.001

social requirements to be used in public procurements are less likely to actually use the two social requirements measured.

That the two specific provisions variables, *SG_Collective_Agreement* and *SG_Equal_opportunities,* did not produce good results, which will be expanded to further in the variable section on Strategic guidelines impact, which is likely due to each only explaining a fraction of the index. However, when an index of the Strategic guidelines was created they still failed to grant any significant explanatory power, as illustrated by the *SG_index_new* which is a variable that is the sum of the *SG_Collective_Agreement* and *SG_Equal_opportunities*.

Table 7: Coefficients of Appendix 7: SR Index, revised model

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.674	.243		2.769	.007
	Political_leadership_15	.244	.245	.105	.997	.321
	Political_culture_absolut_15	-.372	.351	-.108	-1.059	.292
	Administrators	.027	.009	.295	3.140	.002
	Self_employment_14	-.027	.023	-.118	-1.204	.232
	SG_index_new	.079	.064	.118	1.233	.221
	SG_Open_ended	-.244	.106	-.216	-2.312	.023

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Index

The Political Leaderships impact on Social Requirements in requirement specification

The Political leadership, as described in chapter 4, are expected to correlate with the usage of social requirements through the impact the leadership has as bosses of the bureaucracy. The variable created for political leadership had values between -0.739 and 0.727, as described in chapter five. The poor significance value for the political leadership variable for the in the previous two index models, *Table 6* and *Table 7*, is likely due to a difference between the impact on collective agreement variable and the equal opportunity variable, as well as a difference between types of procurements. This seems to indicate that the assumption that the issue of social requirements follow the traditional left right divide on labor issues. Collective agreement requirements seems to have a positive correlation to the political left in construction procurements, and a negative correlation to the political left in the cases of cleaning and transport.

As described in the introductory paragraph of this sub-chapter, there is a lack of statistical relevance in the six basic models. Despite the overall weak significance of the non-index models, some indications of correlations can be gleamed. In the cases of construction procurements, which was the type of procurement with most data collected, the data seems to

indicate a positive relationship between the left political spectrum and requirements on or relating to collective agreements[23]. Furthermore, the relation between the equal opportunity type of requirement and the political variable seems to be close to non-existent[24] in the case of construction procurements (Appendix 15).

As the cases of cleaning procurements only contained 34 procurements, the two models for collective agreement requirements (Appendix 9) and equal opportunity requirements (Appendix 11) have particularly uncertain results[25]. However, the collective agreement model seems to indicate a negative relationship between the political left and requirements of or relating to collective agreements[26], which is in contrast to the case of collective agreement in construction (Appendix 13). Similarly, to the case of Equal opportunity in construction (Appendix 15) the case of Equal opportunity in cleaning (Appendix 11) seems to indicate a lack of correlation between political leadership and requirements of Equal opportunity[27].

The transportation procurements seems to have a negative correlation between the political left and requirements of both collective agreement (Appendix 17) and Equal opportunity (Appendix 19)[28]. This means that it is likely that the social requirements selected for study in this thesis is not considered as one type of issue by the political leadership of the municipalities, but rather different kinds of requirements are framed in different ways. However, this thesis has not been able to statistically prove that any correlation between political leadership and the usage of social requirements exist.

The Political Cultures impact on Social Requirements in requirement specifications

The Political Culture variable measures the distance from a political left-right balance in the political culture. This is interesting, as described further in chapter 3, because of the impact this has on the bureaucrats working in a given municipality. The political culture of the Swedish municipalities had values between 0 and 0.685.

In the six cases of collective agreement and equal opportunity requirements in procurements of cleaning, construction and transportation there was one statistically proven correlation. The negative correlation between political culture and collective agreement requirements in construction requirement (Appendix 13)[29]. Furthermore, the political culture variable seems to be one of the main explanatory variables included in the model. This means that a municipality is less likely to have requirements of or relating to collective agreements the further from balance between the right and left wing the political culture is.

Administrative resources impact on the use of Social Requirements in requirement specification

As stated in the segment about the index case the administrative resources variables, which was controlled for the population in a municipality, had an almost non-existent correlation

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[23] For the Political leadership variable the *Beta*=-0.144, Sig.=0.251
[24] For the Political leadership variable the *Beta*=-0.061, Sig.=0.626
[25] Collective agreement model Sig.= 0.565, Equal opportunity model Sig.= 0.730
[26] Political leadership *Beta*= 0.326 with a Sig.=0.096
[27] *Beta*= 0.036, Sig. =0.854
[28] Collective agreement requirement: *Beta*=0.219, Sig.=0.272; Equal opportunity requirement: *Beta=0.340, Sig.= 0.085*
[29] *Beta*= -0.258, Sig.= 0.031

with the social requirements. However, a variable without the adjustment for population size had a statistically proven correlation. This also holds true for requirements of or relating to collective agreement in construction and transport procurements, as well as requirements of equal opportunity in transport procurements[30], as they all had a Sig.<0.05. Furthermore, the adjustment also improved the significance number for the correlation between administrators and Equal opportunity in construction from Sig.=0.111 to Sig.=0.059. In the cases of cleaning procurement the adjustment moved the significance values from insignificant (Sig. =0.437 and 0.426 respectively) to truly insignificant correlation levels (Sig.= 0.825 and 0.796). Due to the limited data on cleaning procurements it is impossible to draw any conclusions from this development. Because of the improvement the removal of population adjustment entail, all of the models will use Administrators rather than Administrative resources if nothing else is specified.

The data seems to indicate that there is a clear correlation between the number of administrators conducting public procurement and the occurrence of requirements of or relating to collective agreements and equal opportunity. The lack of impact of the size of the municipality's population might be the existence of what could be described as a minimum floor of procurement. The minimum floor would represent the procurements all municipalities would have to preform, regardless of size, and thereby nullifying the difference in population as a good controlling factor. At what level of procurement the floor is situated is a question which requires more study, and could have implications on questions of optimal size of municipalities.

The impact of the Strategic Guidelines on the Social Requirement in requirement specification

The Strategic guidelines variables, as described in chapter four, stem from previous research that indicates that the form of policy influences the implementation of that policy. The variables created were specific purpose that measured if there was an overarching purpose in the document that was compatible with the notion of social requirements. Specific provisions that specified the usage of collective agreement, equal opportunity, and optional full time requirements. Lastly, vague provisions which could allow social requirements to be used in public procurements where measure by the variable open-ended. None of the models illuminated any clear correlation for any of the other strategic guideline and the dependent variables.

However, there is a trend of non-significant positive correlation. In *Table 8* shows the weak positive correlation in another way. The table shows that, out of the 102 municipalities from which data for both strategic guidelines and construction procurements, roughly half had neither provisions for requirements of or relating to collective agreements, nor any use of such requirements in construction procurement. Moreover, out of the 66 municipalities that did not have any provisions 18 still used the collective agreement type of requirements in construction procurement. In the reverse case, out of the 36 municipalities that had provisions for collective agreement requirements 24 did not use them in their construction procurements. The procurements for cleaning and transport have a very similar relation to the strategic guidelines in terms of collective agreement provisions and the related requirements

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[30] Collective agreement, construction: *Beta=0.118,* Sig.=0.031. Collective agreement, transport: *Beta*=0.359, Sig.=0.024. Equal opportunity, transport: *Beta=0.486*, Sig. 0.002

(Appendix 20). Furthermore, the provisions of equal opportunity and the related requirements had a very similar relationship to that of collective agreement (Appendix 21).

Table 8: Bivariate relation between collective agreement in strategic guidelines and in construction procurements

		SR_CollectiveA_Construction	
		NO	YES
		Count	Count
SG_Collective_Agreement	NO	48	18
	YES	24	12

As shown in the index variable model above, in *Table 7*, the overall influence of the strategic guidelines on the usage of social requirements in public procurements. The only statistically significant result is that there is a negative correlation between open-ended provisions for social requirements and the social requirements measured by this thesis, i.e. requirements of or relating to collective agreements and requirements of equal opportunity. While the same correlation is not statistically significant in the other data models, procurement and requirements specific, this is likely due to a limitation of the data and measurement[31]. The negative correlation could indicate that an open-ended provision sate the political desire for social requirements but does not actually produce any other results. This would result in the negative regression result as municipalities that otherwise seemed more likely to use social requirements would be less likely to use them if they were regulated vaguely in the strategic guidelines. For example, a municipality which has all the other factors (even if they are not statistically proven) which positively influences the usage of social requirements. Instead of having any specific provisions for social requirement, the municipality have open-ended provisions, resulting in a decreased likelihood that the actual social requirements measured will be used.

The effect of feedback from those affected by the policies on the usage of social requirements in requirement specification

As described in chapter four, the feedback from those affected by the policy is measured, or indicated, by the part of population who are entrepreneurs. The value for this variable span from 4.2 (%) and 20.3 (%). As stated in chapter four, the correlation between the variable and the use of was uncertain, both in terms of the strength of the correlation and its direction. As seen in the index model, a higher percentage of entrepreneurs in a municipality seems to lessen the likelihood of social requirements, the correlation is however not statistically significant (Appendix 7).

In all of the other, requirement and procurement specific, models the feedback variable is not statistically significant, and the *beta* values are both positive and negative. This is likely due to the percentage of entrepreneurs in a municipality being a poor representation of the feedback. However, the significance numbers, while above the 0.05 level, which is the limit for acceptable statistical certainty, have a fairly stable significance number between 0.102 and

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[31] The limited sample size of *cleaning* and *transport*, combined with the binary coding of the dependent variables.

0.289, with the exception of the case of collective agreement requirement in transport procurements which has a Sig. value of 0.777. This could indicate that there is a presence of feedback that influences the usage of social requirements in public procurements, but that the variable is a suboptimal measurement.

Municipal cooperation's impact on the usage of social requirements in public procurements

As described in chapter four, implementation scholars have claimed that horizontal inter-organizational relationship can have an impact on implementation. The following segment will look for indications on the impact of municipal cooperations on the usage of social requirements in public procurement. As discussed under the section on municipal cooperations impact on the form of the strategic guidelines, the number of municipalities in each cooperation limits statistics as a tool for analysis. Further limitation is put on any conclusions by the limited number of procurements each cooperation can have. Therefore, only construction procurements will be used as a case, due to that type having more data points.

In the case of requirements of or relating to collective agreement in construction procurements there are eight cooperations of note, as presented in *Table 9*. As mentioned above, the conclusions which be drawn from the cooperations averages are limited, however some observations can be made. Firstly, as with the impact on the strategic guidelines, the cooperations that seems to have the most homogeneous requirements of collective agreement are not always cooperations one would intuitively connected with public procurement issues. This could, once again, indicate that unofficial local cooperation is affecting the implementation. Furthermore, there could be an effect created by a local culture within public procurement bureaucracy of the member municipalities created by a lack of mobility, which creates a revolving door effect, where bureaucrats changes municipalities but not their old ways. In case of the equal opportunity only one cooperation was of note, namely VA SYD. The lack of other cases makes it impossible to speculate on the impact of cooperation on the usage of equal opportunity requirements in public procurement.

Table 9: Municipal Cooperation with high average of collective agreement requirement in construction procurement

Cooperation nr	Average CA per construction procurement	Number of construction precurements	Number of members
FINSAM UDDEVALLA FÄRGELANDA ORUST	1	2	3
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET DALSLAND	1	2	5
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET NORRA DALSLAND	1	2	5
TOLKFÖRMEDLING I VÄST	1	2	5
VÄSTRA MÄLARDALENS RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUND	1	2	4
VÄSTRA MÄLARDALENS SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND	1	2	3
FYRBODALS KOMMUNALFÖRBUND	0.857142857	7	14
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET NORRA BOHUSLÄN	0.666666667	3	5
VA SYD	0.666666667	3	4

7   Steps taken and the way forward

This thesis found that there was a variation in both types of implementation, and that the variations did not fully overlap between the strategic guidelines and the specific requirements used. The analysis found that a perfect overlap, where the existence or lack of social requirements where the same in both strategic guidelines and in requirement specifications, only occurred in two thirds of the selected cases. Both municipalities which had provisions which were apparently not used, and municipalities which used social requirements without provisions in their strategic guidelines where recorded. However, the measuring of provisions of optional full time and the usage of full time as a social requirement in requirement specifications did not find any such occurrences in the data collected.

In general, what could be said for the results in this study is that the political leadership of a municipality, and the political culture, seems to matter less than many other factors when determining why the usage of social requirements in public procurement differed among municipalities. The model determined that the absolute number of administrators per municipality mattered. Furthermore, a negative correlation between open-ended provisions for social requirements and the actual usage of social requirements. The actual negative correlation is a weak one and might be due to increased autonomy for bureaucrats' trough open-ended strategic guideline provisions, resulting in the negative correlation when considered with the other variables.

The implications of the findings are multiple. Firstly, the fact that the absolute number of administrators matter in the implementation of social requirement seems to indicate that larger organizations for public procurement have an easier time implementing. This has implications on the optimal organization of the local level, and the efficacy of smaller municipalities. Secondly, the negative influence of open-ended provisions are interesting as it strengthens the findings of previous research that specific provisions are of importance in implementation (though a positive relation between the specific provisions and specific requirements could not be proven). Lastly, the fact that the political variables seemed to matter less than the two for mentioned organizational factors indicates that the implementation of social requirements is not a democratically dictated process. The lack of a political correlation by extension also means a lack of voter influence on the implementation.

To recap, this thesis has attempted to map and explain the variation in the optional implementation of social requirements in public procurement, by measuring both the implementation into the strategic guidelines, and the actual usage of social requirements in public procurements. In chapters three and four the previous research was used as a basis for developing models for explaining variation in implementation, and a way to measure it. The two separate models for implementation of social requirement into the strategic guidelines for public procurement, and the implementation of the use of social requirements in public procurements, entailed a total of seven types of variables. To test the models, this thesis has collected strategic guidelines from the Swedish municipalities, as well as requirement specifications from three different kinds of public procurements, namely cleaning, construction and transport. The study of the strategic guidelines was conducted on 283

documents from 235 municipalities, while the requirement specification from the three types of procurements was conducted on 214 requirement specifications from public procurements in 146 municipalities.

During the course of this thesis other venues of research has been discovered. Firstly, the method of this thesis could be developed to strengthen the statistical results. Both the measurements of provisions and of specific requirements could be developed. As described in chapter four and five, this thesis has looked at the measurements in a very black and white way, either a municipality has or uses provisions or requirements or it does not. Future studies would probably be well served by grading different wordings into categories of strictness to achieve a greater dept, in both the descriptive picture of how social requirements has been implemented and which factors influences the implementation.

Additionally, there are theoretical lines of studies that could be pursued. A mapping of how open-ended provisions are used in occurrences of optional implementation could shed some further light on whether open-ended provisions produces different ways to implement which was not measured in this study, or if the open-ended provision actually reduced the likelihood that any social requirements where used at all, due to its optional nature. Moreover, future research should try to further map the implications and effects of municipal cooperations, both official and unofficial organizations. Socialization has been proven to have a great influence in other bodies of literature, and even to some extent in implementation. However, the extensive nature of municipal cooperations opens for a greater understanding of how socialization on the macro level can influence the implementation in the Swedish municipal system. Such a study could try to map internal factors in the cooperation that influences the degree of socialization and the impact implementation.

Lastly, there are some issues of public procurement that could be researched further. For instance, a few municipalities have posed requirements of staffing in their public procurements. While not systematically studied in this thesis, the nature of such demands are interesting as it limits the contracting companies in *how* they should fulfill their contract rather than regulating *what* should be done. Furthermore, a significant number of municipalities tend to use language requirements in their public procurements. While not a social type of requirement, and therefore outside the scope of this study, the language requirement constitutes a hindrance to those who are willing to employ immigrants who have yet to obtain language skills, and therefore is socially interesting.

8   Appendix

Appendix list:

Appendix number	Name of appendix	Page
Appendix 1	Collective Agreement, Strategic Guidelines, Original model	37
Appendix 2	Collective agreement, Strategic Guidelines, Adjusted model	38
Appendix 3	Equal opportunity, Strategic Guidelines, Original model	39
Appendix 4	Equal opportunity, Strategic Guidelines, Adjusted model	40
Appendix 5	Strategic Guidelines, index	41
Appendix 6	SR index, Original	42
Appendix 7	SR index, revised	43
Appendix 8	SR. CA. Clean. Original model (admin resources)	44
Appendix 9	SR.CA. Clean. (Administrators)	45
Appendix 10	SR. EO. Clean. Original model	46
Appendix 11	SR.EO. Clean. (Administrators)	47
Appendix 12	SR.CA. Construction. Original model	48
Appendix 13	SR.CA. Construction (Administrators)	49
Appendix 14	SR. EO. Construction (Admin resources)	50
Appendix 15	SR.EO. Construction (Administrators)	51
Appendix 16	SR.CA. Transport (Admin resources)	52
Appendix 17	SR.CA Transport (Administrators)	53
Appendix 18	SR.EO. Transport (Admin resources)	54
Appendix 19	SR.EO. Transport (Administrators)	55
Appendix 20	Bivariate relation between collective agreement provisions and requirements of/relating to collective agreement	56
Appendix 21	Bivariate relation between equal opportunity provisions and requirements of/relating to equal opportunity	57
Appendix 22	List of material: Strategic guidelines	58
Appendix 23	List of material: Public procurements	64
Appendix 24	List of municipal cooperations	69

Appendix 1: Collective Agreement, Strategic Guidelines, Original model

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.148[a]	.022	.005	.457

a. Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment_20_24_yo_14, Pol_leader_14,

Immigant_unemployment, Gini_index

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1.074	4	.268	1.284	.277[b]
	Residual	48.075	230	.209		
	Total	49.149	234			

a. Dependent Variable: SG_KA

b. Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment_20_24_yo_14, Pol_leader_14, Immigant_unemployment,

Gini_index

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.717	.445		1.610	.109
	Pol_leader_14	.058	.165	.030	.349	.727
	Gini_index	-1.371	1.107	-.115	-1.238	.217
	Immigant_unemployment	.013	.009	.120	1.492	.137
	Unemployment_20_24_yo_14	-.011	.012	-.082	-.917	.360

a. Dependent Variable: SG_KA

Appendix 2: Collective agreement, Strategic Guidelines, Adjusted model

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.139[a]	.019	.002	.458

a. Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment_20_24_yo_14,

Immigrants_part_of_pop, Pol_leader_14, Gini_index

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.950	4	.237	1.133	.342[b]
	Residual	48.199	230	.210		
	Total	49.149	234			

a. Dependent Variable: SG_KA

b. Predictors: (Constant), Unemployment_20_24_yo_14, Immigrants_part_of_pop, Pol_leader_14,

Gini_index

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.023	.440		2.325	.021
	Pol_leader_14	.118	.173	.062	.685	.494
	Gini_index	-2.272	1.181	-.190	-1.923	.056
	Immigrants_part_of_pop	.005	.004	.091	1.276	.203
	Unemployment_20_24_yo_14	-.006	.011	-.043	-.519	.604

a. Dependent Variable: SG_KA

Appendix 3: Equal opportunity, Strategic Guidelines, Original model

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.102[a]	.010	-.007	.458

a. Predictors: (Constant), Immigant_unemployment, Pol_leader_14,

Unemployment_20_24_yo_14, Gini_index

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.510	4	.127	.608	.657[b]
	Residual	48.231	230	.210		
	Total	48.740	234			

a. Dependent Variable: SG_WE

b. Predictors: (Constant), Immigant_unemployment, Pol_leader_14, Unemployment_20_24_yo_14,

Gini_index

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.281	.446		.630	.530
	Pol_leader_14	-.217	.165	-.115	-1.312	.191
	Gini_index	.181	1.109	.015	.164	.870
	Unemployment_20_24_yo_14	-.008	.012	-.059	-.658	.511
	Immigant_unemployment	.004	.009	.040	.496	.620

a. Dependent Variable: SG_WE

Appendix 4:Equal opportunity, Strategic Guidelines, Adjusted model

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.153[a]	.023	.010	.455

a. Predictors: (Constant), Labour_entry_assistance, housing_seg_index,

Pol_leader_14

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1.122	3	.374	1.807	.147[b]
	Residual	46.774	226	.207		
	Total	47.896	229			

a. Dependent Variable: SG_WE

b. Predictors: (Constant), Labour_entry_assistance, housing_seg_index, Pol_leader_14

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.187	.090		2.076	.039
	Pol_leader_14	-.161	.138	-.084	-1.167	.245
	housing_seg_index	.007	.004	.124	1.840	.067
	Labour_entry_assistance	-.037	.037	-.071	-.985	.326

a. Dependent Variable: SG_WE

Appendix 5: Strategic Guidelines, index

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.258[a]	.067	.037	1.18905

a. Predictors: (Constant), Gini_index, housing_seg_index,

Labour_entry_assistance, Unemployment_20_24_yo_14, Pol_leader_14,

Immigrant_unemployment, unemployment_tot_14

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	22.425	7	3.204	2.266	.030[b]
	Residual	313.875	222	1.414		
	Total	336.300	229			

a. Dependent Variable: SG_Index

b. Predictors: (Constant), Gini_index, housing_seg_index, Labour_entry_assistance,

Unemployment_20_24_yo_14, Pol_leader_14, Immigant_unemployment, unemployment_tot_14

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.905	1.226		.738	.461
	Pol_leader_14	-.471	.487	-.092	-.967	.334
	housing_seg_index	.032	.010	.220	3.253	.001
	unemployment_tot_14	-.247	.108	-.319	-2.277	.024
	Immigrant_unemployment	.060	.034	.207	1.745	.082
	Unemployment_20_24_yo_14	.034	.040	.097	.834	.405
	Labour_entry_assistance	-.114	.142	-.082	-.804	.422
	Gini_index	1.784	3.198	.055	.558	.578

a. Dependent Variable: SG_Index

Appendix 6: SR index, Original

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.347[a]	.121	.047	.52589

a. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Open_ended, Self_employment_14,

Political_culture_absolut_15, SG_Equal_opportunities, Admin_resources_15,

SG_Specific_purpose, Political_leadership_15, SG_Collective_Agreement

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	3.641	8	.455	1.646	.122[b]
	Residual	26.550	96	.277		
	Total	30.190	104			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Index

b. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Open_ended, Self_employment_14, Political_culture_absolut_15,

SG_Equal_opportunities, Admin_resources_15, SG_Specific_purpose, Political_leadership_15,

SG_Collective_Agreement

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.790	.301		2.620	.010
	Political_leadership_15	.224	.264	.096	.847	.399
	Political_culture_absolut_15	-.539	.367	-.156	-1.467	.146
	Admin_resources_15	4.331E-6	.000	.041	.401	.690
	Self_employment_14	-.032	.025	-.138	-1.277	.205
	SG_Specific_purpose	.080	.109	.074	.733	.465
	SG_Collective_Agreement	.117	.134	.100	.872	.385
	SG_Equal_opportunities	.065	.132	.056	.494	.623
	SG_Open_ended	-.256	.117	-.226	-2.182	.032

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Index

Appendix 7: SR index, revised

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.441[a]	.195	.145	.49812

a. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Open_ended, Self_employment_14,

Political_culture_absolut_15, Administrators, SG_index_new,

Political_leadership_15

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	5.875	6	.979	3.946	.001[b]
	Residual	24.316	98	.248		
	Total	30.190	104			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Index

b. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Open_ended, Self_employment_14, Political_culture_absolut_15,

Administrators, SG_index_new, Political_leadership_15

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.674	.243		2.769	.007
	Political_leadership_15	.244	.245	.105	.997	.321
	Political_culture_absolut_15	-.372	.351	-.108	-1.059	.292
	Administrators	.027	.009	.295	3.140	.002
	Self_employment_14	-.027	.023	-.118	-1.204	.232
	SG_index_new	.079	.064	.118	1.233	.221
	SG_Open_ended	-.244	.106	-.216	-2.312	.023

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Index

Appendix 8: SR. CA. Clean. Original model (admin resources)

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.473[a]	.223	-.013	.428

a. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Open_ended, Self_employment_14,

Admin_resources_15, SG_Collective_Agreement, Political_leadership_15,

Political_culture_absolut_15, SG_Specific_purpose

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1.210	7	.173	.945	.493[b]
	Residual	4.209	23	.183		
	Total	5.419	30			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_CollectiveA_Clean

b. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Open_ended, Self_employment_14, Admin_resources_15,

SG_Collective_Agreement, Political_leadership_15, Political_culture_absolut_15, SG_Specific_purpose

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.867	.414		2.092	.048
	Political_leadership_15	.693	.373	.350	1.858	.076
	Political_culture_absolut_15	.274	.684	.082	.401	.692
	Admin_resources_15	-1.051E-5	.000	-.148	-.792	.437
	Self_employment_14	-.055	.035	-.300	-1.583	.127
	SG_Specific_purpose	-.247	.177	-.294	-1.398	.176
	SG_Collective_Agreement	.076	.182	.083	.419	.679
	SG_Open_ended	.069	.170	.077	.406	.689

a. Dependent Variable: SR_CollectiveA_Clean

Appendix 9: SR.CA. Clean. (Administrators)

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.452[a]	.204	-.038	.433

a. Predictors: (Constant), Self_employment_14, SG_Open_ended,

Political_leadership_15, Administrators, SG_Collective_Agreement,

Political_culture_absolut_15, SG_Specific_purpose

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1.105	7	.158	.841	.565[b]
	Residual	4.314	23	.188		
	Total	5.419	30			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_CollectiveA_Clean

b. Predictors: (Constant), Self_employment_14, SG_Open_ended, Political_leadership_15, Administrators,

SG_Collective_Agreement, Political_culture_absolut_15, SG_Specific_purpose

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.738	.386		1.911	.069
	Political_leadership_15	.646	.373	.326	1.731	.097
	Political_culture_absolut_15	.216	.702	.064	.307	.761
	Administrators	-.002	.009	-.043	-.224	.825
	SG_Specific_purpose	-.233	.179	-.277	-1.303	.205
	SG_Collective_Agreement	.064	.184	.070	.349	.730
	SG_Open_ended	.071	.172	.079	.411	.685
	Self_employment_14	-.053	.035	-.290	-1.503	.146

a. Dependent Variable: SR_CollectiveA_Clean

Appendix 10: SR. EO. Clean. Original model

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.425[a]	.181	-.069	.386

a. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Equal_opportunities, SG_Open_ended,

Political_leadership_15, SG_Specific_purpose, Admin_resources_15,

Self_employment_14, Political_culture_absolut_15

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.758	7	.108	.725	.652[b]
	Residual	3.435	23	.149		
	Total	4.194	30			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Equal_oppor_Clean

b. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Equal_opportunities, SG_Open_ended, Political_leadership_15,

SG_Specific_purpose, Admin_resources_15, Self_employment_14, Political_culture_absolut_15

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.795	.381		2.088	.048
	Political_leadership_15	.101	.336	.058	.300	.767
	Political_culture_absolut_15	.101	.639	.034	.157	.876
	Admin_resources_15	-9.699E-6	.000	-.156	-.811	.426
	Self_employment_14	-.058	.031	-.362	-1.854	.077
	SG_Specific_purpose	-.108	.155	-.146	-.699	.492
	SG_Open_ended	-.040	.154	-.051	-.260	.797
	SG_Equal_opportunities	.165	.152	.219	1.091	.286

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Equal_oppor_Clean

Appendix 11: SR.EO. Clean. (Administrators)

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.400[a]	.160	-.096	.391

a. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Equal_opportunities, SG_Open_ended,

Political_leadership_15, Administrators, SG_Specific_purpose,

Self_employment_14, Political_culture_absolut_15

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.671	7	.096	.625	.730[b]
	Residual	3.523	23	.153		
	Total	4.194	30			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Equal_oppor_Clean

b. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Equal_opportunities, SG_Open_ended, Political_leadership_15,

Administrators, SG_Specific_purpose, Self_employment_14, Political_culture_absolut_15

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.625	.353		1.768	.090
	Political_leadership_15	.063	.337	.036	.186	.854
	Political_culture_absolut_15	.113	.656	.038	.172	.865
	Administrators	.002	.008	.051	.261	.796
	SG_Specific_purpose	-.101	.156	-.137	-.649	.523
	SG_Open_ended	-.042	.156	-.054	-.271	.789
	Self_employment_14	-.054	.032	-.338	-1.702	.102
	SG_Equal_opportunities	.169	.153	.224	1.104	.281

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Equal_oppor_Clean

Appendix 12: SR.CA. Construction. Original model

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.329[a]	.108	.027	.452

a. Predictors: (Constant), Self_employment_14, Political_culture_absolut_15,

SG_Specific_purpose, Admin_resources_15, SG_Collective_Agreement,

SG_Open_ended, Political_leadership_15

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1.906	7	.272	1.332	.247[b]
	Residual	15.742	77	.204		
	Total	17.647	84			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_CollectiveA_Construction

b. Predictors: (Constant), Self_employment_14, Political_culture_absolut_15, SG_Specific_purpose,

Admin_resources_15, SG_Collective_Agreement, SG_Open_ended, Political_leadership_15

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.214	.289		.739	.462
	Political_leadership_15	-.302	.267	-.143	-1.129	.262
	Political_culture_absolut_15	-.773	.342	-.266	-2.258	.027
	Admin_resources_15	4.907E-6	.000	.055	.482	.631
	SG_Specific_purpose	.141	.103	.154	1.359	.178
	SG_Open_ended	-.228	.113	-.239	-2.008	.048
	SG_Collective_Agreement	.028	.112	.029	.249	.804
	Self_employment_14	.023	.024	.118	.951	.345

a. Dependent Variable: SR_CollectiveA_Construction

Appendix 13: SR.CA. Construction (administrators)

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.342[a]	.117	.036	.450

a. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Collective_Agreement, SG_Specific_purpose,

Political_culture_absolut_15, Self_employment_14, Administators,

SG_Open_ended, Political_leadership_15

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2.060	7	.294	1.454	.196[b]
	Residual	15.587	77	.202		
	Total	17.647	84			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_CollectiveA_Construction

b. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Collective_Agreement, SG_Specific_purpose, Political_culture_absolut_15,

Self_employment_14, Administators, SG_Open_ended, Political_leadership_15

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.181	.267		.679	.499
	Political_leadership_15	-.305	.264	-.144	-1.156	.251
	Political_culture_absolut_15	-.751	.342	-.258	-2.198	.031
	Administrators	.014	.014	.118	1.000	.321
	Self_employment_14	.025	.024	.131	1.067	.289
	SG_Specific_purpose	.114	.105	.125	1.088	.280
	SG_Open_ended	-.211	.112	-.221	-1.881	.064
	SG_Collective_Agreement	.005	.114	.005	.041	.968

a. Dependent Variable: SR_CollectiveA_Construction

Appendix 14: SR. EO. Construction (Admin resources)

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.381[a]	.145	.067	.338

a. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Equal_opportunities, Admin_resources_15,

SG_Specific_purpose, Political_culture_absolut_15, Self_employment_14,

SG_Open_ended, Political_leadership_15

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1.494	7	.213	1.865	.087[b]
	Residual	8.812	77	.114		
	Total	10.306	84			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Equal_oppor_Construction

b. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Equal_opportunities, Admin_resources_15, SG_Specific_purpose,

Political_culture_absolut_15, Self_employment_14, SG_Open_ended, Political_leadership_15

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.156	.217		.717	.476
	Political_leadership_15	-.092	.203	-.057	-.453	.652
	Political_culture_absolut_15	-.113	.258	-.051	-.437	.663
	Admin_resources_15	1.230E-5	.000	.179	1.613	.111
	SG_Specific_purpose	.083	.078	.119	1.072	.287
	SG_Open_ended	-.045	.083	-.062	-.544	.588
	Self_employment_14	-.020	.018	-.135	-1.112	.270
	SG_Equal_opportunities	.161	.084	.213	1.908	.060

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Equal_oppor_Construction

Appendix 15: SR.EO. Construction (Administrators)

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.395[a]	.156	.080	.336

a. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Equal_opportunities, SG_Specific_purpose,

Political_culture_absolut_15, Self_employment_14, SG_Open_ended,

Administrators, Political_leadership_15

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1.611	7	.230	2.038	.061[b]
	Residual	8.695	77	.113		
	Total	10.306	84			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Equal_oppor_Construction

b. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Equal_opportunities, SG_Specific_purpose, Political_culture_absolut_15,

Self_employment_14, SG_Open_ended, Administrators, Political_leadership_15

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.195	.199		.980	.330
	Political_leadership_15	-.099	.202	-.061	-.489	.626
	Political_culture_absolut_15	-.110	.256	-.050	-.431	.668
	Administrators	.021	.011	.229	1.917	.059
	SG_Specific_purpose	.035	.079	.050	.444	.659
	SG_Open_ended	-.017	.082	-.024	-.213	.832
	Self_employment_14	-.019	.018	-.128	-1.067	.289
	SG_Equal_opportunities	.101	.089	.134	1.143	.257

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Equal_oppor_Construction

Appendix 16: SR.CA. Transport (Admin resources)

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.303[a]	.092	-.063	.471

a. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Collective_Agreement, Self_employment_14,

Political_leadership_15, SG_Open_ended, SG_Specific_purpose,

Admin_resources_15, Political_culture_absolut_15

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.917	7	.131	.591	.759[b]
	Residual	9.083	41	.222		
	Total	10.000	48			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_CollectiveA_transport

b. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Collective_Agreement, Self_employment_14, Political_leadership_15,

SG_Open_ended, SG_Specific_purpose, Admin_resources_15, Political_culture_absolut_15

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.166	.393		.424	.674
	Political_leadership_15	.142	.416	.073	.342	.734
	Political_culture_absolut_15	-.433	.633	-.145	-.684	.498
	Admin_resources_15	1.129E-5	.000	.144	.858	.396
	SG_Specific_purpose	-.017	.151	-.019	-.116	.909
	SG_Open_ended	-.147	.158	-.158	-.932	.357
	Self_employment_14	.016	.036	.073	.447	.657
	SG_Collective_Agreement	.166	.154	.173	1.081	.286

a. Dependent Variable: SR_CollectiveA_transport

Appendix 17: SR.CA Transport (Administrators)

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.429[a]	.184	.045	.446

a. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Collective_Agreement, Self_employment_14,

Administrators, Political_leadership_15, SG_Open_ended,

SG_Specific_purpose, Political_culture_absolut_15

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1.841	7	.263	1.322	.265[b]
	Residual	8.159	41	.199		
	Total	10.000	48			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_CollectiveA_transport

b. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Collective_Agreement, Self_employment_14, Administrators,

Political_leadership_15, SG_Open_ended, SG_Specific_purpose, Political_culture_absolut_15

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients B	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.126	.330		.380	.706
	Political_leadership_15	.428	.384	.219	1.114	.272
	Political_culture_absolut_15	.125	.624	.042	.199	.843
	Administrators	.021	.009	.359	2.338	.024
	SG_Specific_purpose	.014	.142	.015	.097	.923
	SG_Open_ended	-.161	.148	-.173	-1.088	.283
	Self_employment_14	.009	.032	.042	.285	.777
	SG_Collective_Agreement	.187	.146	.194	1.281	.207

a. Dependent Variable: SR_CollectiveA_transport

Appendix 18: SR.EO. Transport (Admin resources)

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.268[a]	.072	-.086	.369

a. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Equal_opportunities, Admin_resources_15,

Political_culture_absolut_15, SG_Specific_purpose, Self_employment_14,

SG_Open_ended, Political_leadership_15

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.432	7	.062	.454	.862[b]
	Residual	5.568	41	.136		
	Total	6.000	48			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Equal_oppor_transport

b. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Equal_opportunities, Admin_resources_15, Political_culture_absolut_15,

SG_Specific_purpose, Self_employment_14, SG_Open_ended, Political_leadership_15

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	.479	.312		1.536	.132
	Political_leadership_15	.351	.338	.232	1.039	.305
	Political_culture_absolut_15	.326	.496	.141	.656	.516
	Admin_resources_15	-3.120E-6	.000	-.051	-.302	.764
	SG_Specific_purpose	.022	.121	.031	.184	.855
	SG_Open_ended	-.013	.125	-.017	-.101	.920
	Self_employment_14	-.041	.029	-.238	-1.424	.162
	SG_Equal_opportunities	.074	.123	.100	.598	.553

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Equal_oppor_transport

Appendix 19: SR.EO. Transport (Administrators)

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.519[a]	.270	.145	.327

a. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Equal_opportunities, Administrators,

SG_Specific_purpose, Self_employment_14, Political_leadership_15,

SG_Open_ended, Political_culture_absolut_15

ANOVA[a]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1.617	7	.231	2.161	.058[b]
	Residual	4.383	41	.107		
	Total	6.000	48			

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Equal_oppor_transport

b. Predictors: (Constant), SG_Equal_opportunities, Administrators, SG_Specific_purpose,

Self_employment_14, Political_leadership_15, SG_Open_ended, Political_culture_absolut_15

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.197	.250		.789	.435
	Political_leadership_15	.514	.291	.340	1.766	.085
	Political_culture_absolut_15	.788	.458	.340	1.722	.093
	Administrators	.022	.007	.486	3.347	.002
	SG_Specific_purpose	.039	.106	.055	.369	.714
	SG_Open_ended	-.060	.110	-.084	-.547	.587
	Self_employment_14	-.033	.024	-.194	-1.386	.173
	SG_Equal_opportunities	.085	.109	.116	.779	.440

a. Dependent Variable: SR_Equal_oppor_transport

Appendix 20: Bivariate relation between collective agreement provisions and requirements of/relating to collective agreement

		SR_CollectiveA_Clean	
		NO	YES
		Count	Count
SG_Collective_Agreement	NO	17	6
	YES	7	2

		SR_CollectiveA_Construction	
		NO	YES
		Count	Count
SG_Collective_Agreement	NO	48	18
	YES	24	12

		SR_CollectiveA_transport	
		NO	YES
		Count	Count
SG_Collective_Agreement	NO	29	9
	YES	11	6

Appendix 21: Bivariate relation between equal opportunity provisions and requirements of/relating to equal opportunity

		SR_Equal_oppor_Clean	
		NO	YES
		Count	Count
SG_Equal_opportunities	NO	17	2
	YES	9	4

		SR_Equal_oppor_Construction	
		NO	YES
		Count	Count
SG_Equal_opportunities	NO	63	5
	YES	27	7

		SR_Equal_oppor_transport	
		NO	YES
		Count	Count
SG_Equal_opportunities	NO	32	4
	YES	15	4

Appendix 22: List of material: Strategic guidelines

Municipality	Document	
Ale	Upphandlingspolicy	2011-06-01
Ale	Upphandlingsbestämmelser	
Alingsås	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2014-02-26
Älmhult	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2014-09-08
Älvdalen	Reglemente för Inköps- och upphandlingsverksamhet	2015-01-02
Alvesta	Inköps & Upphandlingspolicy	2005-03-18
Älvsbyn	Inköpspolicy	2007-05-21
Åmål	Riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2012-12-19
Aneby	Policy avseende Upphandlingsverksamgeten	
Ånge	Policy för upphandling och inköp	2009-09-28
Ånge	Riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2015-10-06
Ängelholm	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	
Arboga	Riktlinjer för upphandlingsverksamhet	2014-12-02
Arboga	Uppghandlings- och inköpspolicy	2009-06-17
Åre	Upphandlingspolicy	2009-04-06
Årjäng	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2015-05-20
Arvidsjaur	Inköpspolicy	2014-10-27
Arvika	Inköpspolicy	2014-06-23
Askersund	Upphandlingspolicy	2010-12-20
Åstorp	Upphandlingspolicy	2013-11-18
Åtvidaberg	Riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2012-05-30
Avesta	Riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2012-04-20
Båstad	Inköps- och upplandspolicy	2015-11-04
Bengtsfors	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2007-09-03
Berg	Upphandlig	2009-04-06
Bjurholm	Inköpspolicy	2007-10-22
Bjuv	Upphandlingspolicy	2011-10-01
Boden	Upphandlingspolicy	2012-02-20
Bollebygd	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2015-01-01
Borlänge	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-03-12
Botkyrka	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2012-12-13
Bromölla	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2014-11-25
Burlöv	Inköpspolicy	2014-09-15
Dals-Eds	Policy för inköp och upphandling	2014-08-27
Dals-Eds	Riktlinjer för inköp och direktupphandling	
Danderyd	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2014-06-30
Danderyd	Styrdokument för upphandling	2010-07-13
Degerfors	Upphandlingspolicy och inköpsregler	2011-04-26
Dorotea	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2014-02-06
Eda	Inköpspolicy	1999-12-06
Ekerö	Upphandlingspolicy	
Eksjö	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2014-09-02
Emmboda	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2011-11-02
Eskilstuna	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2011-05-26
Essunga	Upphandlingspolicy	2013-02-25
Fagersta	Upphandlingspolicy	2007-03-14
Falkenberg	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-09-16
Falköping	Upphandlingspolicy	2010-04-06
Falun	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-03-12
Färgelanda	Policy för inköp och upphandling	2014-03-18
Filipstad	Upphandlingspolicy	2006-04-03
Finspång	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2008-08-27
Flen	Upphandlingspolicy	2006

Forshaga	Upphandlingspolicy	2009-10-27
Gagnef	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-03-12
Gällivare	Inköps- och upphandlingsanvisningar	2012-05-07
Gällivare	Riktlinjer avseende upphandling	2009-09-07
Gnesta	Upphandlingspolicy	2013-05-13
Göteborg	Policy och riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2012-10-11
Götene	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2009-08-12
Gotland	Upphandlingspolicy	2015-09-07
Gotland	Riktlinjer utifrån gotlands upphandlingspolicy	2015-06-18
Grästorp	Riktlinjer för inköp	2013-03-20
Grästorp	Upphandlingspolicy	2011-06-07
Grums	Riktlinjer för inköp och upphandling	2014-09-02
Grums	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2001-06-14
Gullspång	Policy för Upphandling och inköp	2000-12-04
Habo	Policy och riktlinjer för upphandling	2008-12-18
Håbo	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2014-07-28
Håbo	Upphandlingspolicy	
Hagfors	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-11-26
Hällefors	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	
Hallsberg	Upphandlingspolicy	2015-06-08
Hallsberg	Policy för upphandling	2003-09-22
Hallstahammar	Upphandlings-och inköpspolicy	
Halmstad	Riktlinjer för upphandlingar och inköp	2011-02-22
Härjedalen	Upphandlingspolicy	2009-07-01
Härnösand	Riktlinjer för hållbar upphandling	2012-11-06
Härnösand	Riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2012-10-19
Härryda	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2011-08-29
Härryda	Upphandlingspolicy	2011-09-19
Hässleholm	Inköp och upphandling, policy	2015-04-27
Heby	Riktlinjer upphandligar	2015-10-08
Hedemora	Riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2006-12-12
Helsingborg	Policy för upphandling	2012-11-21
Herrljunga	Upphandlingspolicy	2003-03-04
Herrljunga	Upphandlingspolicy	2015-06-16
Hjo	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-02-27
Höganäs	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2010-09-25
Högsby	Inköpspolicy	2006-10-19
Höör	Tillämpningsanvisningar för all upphandling	2005-06-09
Höör	Inköpspolicy	2005-06-09
Hörby	Inköpspolicy	2014-04-04
Hultsfred	Upphandlingspolicy	2015-02-11
Hylte	Upphandlingspolicy	2010
Örebro	Riktlinjer för hållbar upphandling	2014-06-30
Järfälla	Upphandlingspolicy	2011-10-03
Järfälla	Tillämpningsanvisningar för upphandling	2014-06-10
Jokkmokk	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2015-02-09
Jönköping	Pogram flr upphandlingsverksamhet	2005
Kalix	Riktlinjer för inköp och upphandling	2014-12-08
Kalmar	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-11-25
Karlsborg	Riktlinjer för inköp	2014-09-23
Karlsborg	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-09-23
Karlshamn	Riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2013-06-24
Karlshamn	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2013-06-24
Karlskoga	Upphandlingspolicy	2010-11-23
Karlskrona	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2013-03-21

Karlstad	Upphandlingspolicy	
Katrineholm	Upphandlings- och affärspolicy	2008-11-17
Kävlinge	Inköpspolicy	2012
Kil	Upphandlingspolicy	2004-09-07
Kinda	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-07-03
Klippan	Inköpspolicy	2007-05-29
Knivsta	Riktlinjer för inköp och upphandling	2014
Knivsta	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2014-09-25
Köping	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2009-05-25
Kramfors	Riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2015-03-10
Kristianstad	Upphandlingspolicy	2011-06-21
Krokoms	Upphandlingspolicy	2009-04-06
Kungälv	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2014-04-09
Kungsbacka	Tillämpningsanvisningar för upphandlingspolicy	2009-04-09
Kungsbacka	Upphandlingspolicy	2009-04-09
Kungsör	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2011-06-20
Laholm	Riktlinger för upphandling	2011-11-22
Landskrona	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-03-31
Laxå	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-10-02
Lekeberg	Upphandlingspolicy och inköpsregler	2010-07-15
Lerum	Upphandlingspolicy	2008-11-19
Lessebo	Upphandlingsregler	2009-04-15
Lidingö	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	
Lidköping	Sociala hänsyn gällande upphandling	2011-05-23
Lidingö	Upphandlingspolicy	
Lilla Edet	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2012-03-21
Lindesberg	Riktlinjer för hållbar upphandling	2014-09-30
Lindesberg	Upphandlingstrategi	2013-06-25
Linköping	Upphandlingspolicy	2010-12-12
Ljungby	Policy för upphandling	2011-09-16
Ljusnarsberg	Upphandling och inköp. Policy med riktlinjer	2015-03-16
Luleå	Policy för inköp	2012
Lund	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2008-12-18
Lycksele	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2012-11-05
Lysekil	Policy för inköping och upphandling	2011-02-24
Malmö	Upphandlingspolicy	
Malung- Sälen	Riktlinjer gällande upphandling och inköping	2014-11-03
Mariestad	Riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2014-01-27
Mark	Policy för inköp och upphandling	2015-03-26
Mark	Riktlinjer för inköp och upphandling	2015-05-27
Markaryd	Policy för upphandling och inköp	2014-11-01
Mellerud	Inköpspolicy	2014-10-22
Mölndal	Upphandlingspolicy	2011-02-23
Mora	Riktlinjer Inköp och upphandling	2015-02-11
Mörbylånga	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-03-13
Munkedal	Policy för inköp och upphandling	
Munkfors	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	
Nacka	Inköpspolicy	2013-10
Nässjö	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-04-24
Nora	Upphandlingspolicy	2013-06-18
Norberg	Upphandlingspolicy	2012-12-10
Nordmaling	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2014-12-15
Norrköping	Riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2014-03-12
Norrtälje	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2012-02-02
Norsjö	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2013-06-24

Nybro	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2013-01-15
Nyköping	Upphandlingspolicy och riktlinjer	2008-12-03
Nykvarn	Upphadnlingspolicy	2006-06-21
Öckerö	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-09-18
Olofström	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2014-10-27
Örebro	Upphandlingspolicy	2012-06-19
Örebro	Riktlinjer flr miljökrav och social hänsyn vid upphandling	2011-11-14
Örkelljunga	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2012-10-22
Örnsköldsvik	Inköps- och upphandlingsstrategi	2014-06-04
Örnsköldsvik	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2014-06-16
Orust	Bestämmelser inköp/avrop	2013-09-26
Orust	Upphandlingspolicy	2013-09-26
Osby	Upphandlingspolicy	2013-06-17
Österåker	Policy för upphandling	2014-12-15
Östersund	Upphandlingspolicy	2009-04-06
Östra Göinge	Upphandlingspolicy	2012-12-20
Övertorneå	Inköpspolicy	2008-05-05
Oxelösund	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2014-12-08
Ocelösund	Upphandlingspolicy	2015-03-27
Pajala	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2012-04-23
Partille	Etiska regler vid upphandling	2009-04-29
Partille	Upphandlingspolicy	
Perstorp	Upphandlingspolicy	2009-08-27
Piteå	Inköpspolicy	
Rättvik	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2015-05-12
Ronneby	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-04-11
Säffle	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2012-11-24
Sala	Policy för upphandling	2015-06-15
Salem	Upphandlingspolicy	2010-06-17
Sandviken	Upphandlingspolicy	2007-06-18
Sävsjö	Reviderade riktlinjer för direktupphandling	2014-10-13
Sävsjö	Upphandlingspolicy	2010-09-20
Sigtuna	Riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2011
Simrishamn	Upphandlingspolicy	2008-05-26
Skara	Upphandlingsföreskrifter	2009-10-26
Skellefteå	Upphandlingspolicy	2015-08-21
Skinnskatteberg	Policy för upphandling	2012-02-20
Skövde	Upphandlingspolicy	2013-06-17
Skurup	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2015-05-27
Söderköping	Upphandlingspolicy	2010-12-15
Södertälje	inköpspolicy	
Sollefteå	Upphandlingspolicy	2011-04-26
Sollentuna	Regler för upphandling	2013-04-01
Sollentuna	Upphandlingspolicy	2011-04-13
Solna	Policy för konkurrensutsättning	2014-04-28
Sölvesborg	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2011-05-25
Sorsele	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2014-02-06
Sotenäs	Policy för inköp och upphandling	2014-12-18
Stenungsund	Riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2012-01-23
Stenungsund	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2011-12-12
Stockholm	Upophandlingspolicy	2014-02-17
Storfors	Inköpspolicy	2011-09-08
Storuman	Upphandlingspolicy	2012-11-27
Strängnäs	Upphandlingspolicy	2008-10-30
Strömstad	Policy för inköp och upphandling	2012-02-16
Strömsund	Upphandlingspolicy	2009-04-23

Sundbyberg	Upphandlingspolicy	2012-01-01
Sundsvall	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-04-28
Sunne	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-04-28
Sunne	Riktlinjer för upphanlingsverksamhet	2005-12-02
Surahammar	Upphandlingspolicy	
Svalövs	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-01-01
Svedala	Inköpspolicy	2015-04-01
Svenljunga	Inköpspolicy	2010-04-12
Täby	Policy för upphandling	2010-04-12
Tanum	Policy för inköp och upphandling	2014-11-24
Tibro	Riktlinjer flr upphandling	2007-10-09
Tidaholm	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2008-11-24
Tierp	Upphandlingspolicy	2011
Timrå	Vägledande råd och besämmelser	2013-05-07
Timrå	Upphandlingspolicy	2013-05-07
Tingsryds	Inköps och upphandlingspolicy	2015-06-22
Tjörn	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2008-03-13
Tjörn	Riktlinjer till inköps och upphandlingspolicy	2008-03-13
Tomelilla	Tilläkmpningsanvisningar till upphandlingsreglemente	2014-10-21
Tomelilla	Upphandlingsreglemente	2014-01-27
Töreboda	Riktlinjer flr inköp samt upphandlingspolicy	2015-12-14
Torsby	Upphandlingspolicy	2004-05-27
Torsby	Riktlinjer för upphandlingsverksamhet	2004-05-10
Tranås	Upphandlings, beställnings- och inköpspolicy	
Tranemo	Inköpspolicy	2000-11-15
Trelleborg	Upphandlingspolicy	
Trollhättan	Bestämmelser för upphandling	2015-05-13
Trosa	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2015-09-23
Tyresö	Upphandlingspolicy	
Uddevalla	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	
Ulricehamn	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2015-05-28
Umeå	Inköps och upphandlingspolicy	2010-09-20
Upplands Väsby	Upphandlingspolicy	2013-05-05
Upplands-Bro	Upphandlingspolicy	2010-03-22
Uppsala	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-02-24
Vaggeryd	Upphandlingspolicy	
Valdemarsvik	Riktlinjer för upphandling och inköp	2015-09-14
Valdemarsvik	Policy för upphandling	2011-10-06
Vallentuna	Policy för upphandling	2010-10-04
Vannäs	Policy för inköp och upphandlingar	2011
Vansbro	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2012-11-26
Varberg	Riktlinjer för inköp och upphandling	2011-08-30
Varberg	Upphandlingspolicy	2010-12-14
Värmdö	Policy för inköp och upphandling	2014-02-19
Värnamo	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-02-27
Värnersborg	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2014-10-08
Värnersborg	Upphandlingspolicy	2009-10-21
Västerås	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2011-05-05
Västervik	Upphandlingspolicy	2015-04-27
Västervik	Riktlinjer för upphandling	2015-04-13
Vaxholm	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2011-08-12
Växjö	Upphandlings- och inköpspolicy	2014-08-26
Vellinge	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-01-15
Vetlanda	Upphandlingspolicy	2014-01-10

Vindeln	Inköps och upphandlingspolicy	2012-02-27
Vingåker	Inköps- och upåphandlingspolicy	2008-02-04
Ystad	Inköps- och upphandlingspolicy	2015-01-15

Appendix 23: List of material: Public procurements

Municipality	Cathegory	Procurement name	Ref nr/Date
Storuman	Transport	Skolskjutsar Storuman	KS2015:51
Ale	Transport	Bussresor med chaufför	KS.2015.113
Alingsås	Construction	Rivning av garage och förråd Bollvägen	UH-2015-31
Alingsås	Transport	Flytt- och transporttjänster	2014.384
Älmhult	Construction	Ny skola i Hagabo, Älmhults kommun Kv. Täppan 1 och del av Lyckan 2 – totalentrepenad	2015-12-07
Älmhult	Cleaning	Fönsterputsning 14/46	2015-11-16
Älvdalen	Construction	Generalentrepenad- Älvdalsskolan	2015-10-23
Älvsbyn	Transport	Upphandling av skolskjutsar inom Älvsbyns kommun 0012/15	2015-0819
Aneby	Construction	Furulidskolan Utbyte av luftbehandlingsaggregat m.m.	Referens.nr 15/3
Ånge	Construction	Maskintjänster	Ref nr 2014/33
Ånge	Transport	Bussresa personalfest 9 maj	2015-04-16
Ängelholm	Construction	Anläggning av toalettbyggnad i Hembygdsparken	2015/116
Arboga	Construction	Ramavtal Byggarbeten	VMKF-U 2015.57
Arjeplog	Construction	Asfaltering, Arjeplogs kommun.	2015-06-03
Arvidsjaur	Construction	Renovering av WC och våtutrymmen sandbackaskolan och fritidshem	UH-2015-47
Arvidsjaur	Transport	Skolskjuts Suddesjaur - Moskosel 2015/2016 från Arvidsjaur kommun	
Arvika	Cleaning	Fönsterputsning	Dnr 2015-139
Arvika	Transport	Resor, dagling verksamhet	Dnr 2015-202
Avesta	Construction	Cirkulationsplats Kungsgatan- Dalavägen m.fl.	Dnr 14-159
Bengtsfors	Construction	Ekhagsskolan gymnastikbyggnad, baldersnäs 1:177	2015-01-07
Bollebygd	Construction	Tyftet etapp 2, Erikstorp 5:19 mfl.	KS2014/169
Borgholm	Construction	Södra run sten 9:1 borgholm	2015-09-15
Botkyrka	Construction	Renovering och ombyggnad av Fittjahallen	2015-04-10
Botkyrka	Cleaning	Upphandling Lokalvård för Upplev Botkyrka AB 2015:64	2015-03-23
Botkyrka	Transport	Upphandling av flyttransporttjänster 2015:30	2015-02-13
Burlöv	Construction	Förlängning av Flansbjersvägen	2015-07-10
Burlöv	Transport	Färdtjänst till Burlövs kommun 14/31	2015-06-15
Danderyd	Construction	Djurholms slott Objekt 618 Ombyggnad av kontorslokaler	2015-11-20
Ekerö	Construction	Rivning av byggnader Färetuna skola	Dnr KSUH15/5-052
Eksjö	Construction	Toalettbyggnad 15/247	2015-12-01
Eksjö	Transport	Mattransporter 15/108	2015-10-02
Eskilstuna	Construction	Pråmskjulstorget	1514-014-008
Eslöv	Construction	Huvudentreprenad för grönyte-och gatuskötsel	2015-12-01
Eslöv	Transport	Måltidstransporter 14/37	2015-11-30
Falkenberg	Construction	Ramavtal avseende underhålls- och reparationsabete/BYGG 2016	KS2015-407
Falkenberg	Cleaning	Lokalvård	KS2013-117
Falkenberg	Transport	Mattransporter	KS2015-331
Filipstad	Construction	Rivning av Folkpark, Filipstad	Dnr 1523
Gällivare	Construction	Maria förskola om-och tillbyggnad	13044
Gotland	Construction	Om- och tillbyggnad av hus 03 samt uppställning och förhyrning av paviljonger	TN2014/929-2
Gotland	Transport	Måltidstransporter från Solklintsköket	2015/121

Grums	Construction	Hantverkstjänster bygg, el, vs ventilation och styr- och regler	-
Habo	Construction	Om-och tillbyggnad av Hagabodaskolan hus 5 och 6	2015-03-23
Hallsberg	Construction	Takrenovering Stocksätterskolan	2015-08-12
Hallstahammar	Construction	Trångfors högreservoar	TN351/15
Halmstad	Construction	Entreprenad/hantverkstjänster- elarbeten	KS2015/0634
Halmstad	Transport	Transport av tillagad mat och specerier mellan kommunala enheter	KS2013/0452
Härjedalen	Construction	Ombyggnad för korttidsboende Tallen Segsmon	Dnr 287-67-15 Sbn
Härjedalen	Cleaning	Entreprenad för städning av Härjedalens kommun och Härjegårdars fastigheter i hede, Frunäsdalen och Sveg 14/73	2015-03-06
Härryda	Cleaning	Fönsterputsning	2014KS733
Härryda	Transport	Mattransporter	2015KS74
Hässleholm	Construction	Ombyggnad av kök till Finja skola	2015/117.059
Hässleholm	Transport	Skolskjuts med Taxi inom Hässleholms tätort och närområde	2015.353. 059
Helsingborg	Construction	VVS-konstult helsingborg	FF 185/2015
Helsingborg	Transport	Mattransporter 2016	685-2015
Herrljunga	Construction	Uppförande av bostadsmoduler för ensamkommande barn	2015-01-20
Herrljunga	Transport	Distribution av varm och kall mat 318-15	2015-08-17
Höganäs	Transport	Upphandling av mattrasporter med varm mat i höganäs kommun	2015-10-29
Hörby	Construction	Upprustning väntsal i Önneköp	2015-05-29
Huddinge	Construction	Dansbana, Vårby gård	2015-09-14
Hudiksvall	Construction	Östanbäck 54:1, om- och tillbyggnad	2015-06-26
Järfälla	Construction	Utförande- /total- entreprenader	TEN 2015/25
Järfälla	Cleaning	Upphandling av städtjänster för gymnasieskolor m.fl.	Kst 2015/159
Jokkmokk	Transport	Skolskjutsar	2015:141
Kalmar	Construction	Nybyggnad av förskola	14.037.01
Kalmar	Transport	Upphandling av Bussresor	2015-25
Karlsborg	Construction	Nybyggnad flerbostadshus kv. Strömmen	Unr 14216
Karlsborg	Cleaning	Fönsterputs Karlsborg kommun	15/112
Karlskoga	Construction	Gruppboende 2.0	2015-015
Karlstad	Transport	Mattrasporter	Dnr: 0023-15
Kävlinge	Construction	Ramavtal gällande ledningsrenovering av huvudledningar med hjälp av infodring/relining av dag- och spillvattenledningar med armerade flexibla foder.	2015-06-15
Kil	Construction	FÖRBÄTTRING RESP. NYA BUSSHÅLLPLATSER UTMED VÄG 715 (GA 61:AN) KIL	2015-08-21
Kinda	Construction	Ramavtal beläggningsarbeten	2015-02-18
Kinda	Transport	Inomkommunala transporter	-
Kiruna	Transport	Mattransporter, Kiruna C	Ref nr. 2015-049
Knivsta	Cleaning	Lokalvårdsavtal Alsike sporthall	KS-2015/374
Köping	Construction	Ombyggnad av skola, etapp 2 Annexet	2015-03-13
Kramfors	Cleaning	Städtjänst gångbro	-
Kristianstad	Construction	Kulladals förskola renovering	2015-11-20
Kristinehamn	Construction	1547 Skymning badplats	2015-06-05
Kumla	Construction	Ombyggnad Kumlahallen Totalenreprenad	KS 2015/308
Kumla	Cleaning	Städtjänster till Örebro Läns Flygplats 15/6	2015-04-28
Kumla	Transport	Måltidstransporter/varutransporter	KS 2014/800

Laholm	Construction	Laholmskolan, Om- och tillbyggnad kök och matsal	2015-02-11Stä
Landskrona	Cleaning	Städtjänster	2014/569/080.200
Landskrona	Transport	Skolskjuts	2014/316.080.600
Leksand	Construction	Renovering leksandsbron	20-174-1
Leksand	Cleaning	Städning av offentliga toaletter	2015/371
Lidköping	Construction	Om- och tillbyggnad Örlösa skola	2015-2
Lindesberg	Transport	Livsmedelstransporter	Dnr 2015/379
Ljungby	Construction	Om och tillbyggnad av sporthall i Lindhult	AVT2015/0030
Ljungby	Cleaning	Flyttstädning av lägenheter	AVT2014/0123
Ljusnarsberg	Construction	Konstbacken Östra 15 Renovering av mur	2015-01
Lomma	Construction	Nybyggnad av 1-3 Skola och aktivitetshus samt ombyggnad av matsal mm	2015-10-01
Luleå	Construction	Hertsön 12:130, Ängskolan- Ombyggnad storkök	Pnr. 14190
Luleå	Transport	Elevtransport med buss	13/195
Malmö	Construction	Annetorpsvägen	8542/8642
Malmö	Cleaning	Städtjänster till Stadsarkivet	KN-2014-2553
Malmö	Transport	Grupptransporter med buss inom pedagogisk verksamhet	STK-2014-728
Malung-Sälen	Construction	Rivning av byggnad på fastigheten Malung	61:4
Mark	Construction	Upphandling entreprenör nybyggnation återvinningscetral Skene Skog	15/4
Mark	Cleaning	Fönsterputs	15/48
Markaryd	Transport	Mattransporter	20151201
Mölndal	Construction	Hantverkstjänster- byggarbeten	165/15
Mölndal	Cleaning	Fönsterputs	35/16
Mölndal	Transport	Transport av färdiglagad mat	291/14
Mönsterås	Cleaning	Städning Mönsterås kommun	6845
Mora	Construction	Nybyggnad av LSS-boende, Ljungvägen	15/30
Mora	Transport	Mattransporter- Mora kommun	2015/00085
Motala	Construction	Förskolan nya Humlan	2015-04-28
Mullsjö	Construction	Takrenovering del av Mullsjö kommunhus	2015-04-13
Munkfors	Construction	Forsnäshallen Munkfors kommun: Ombyggnad	MUKO 0008
Nässjö	Construction	Brinellgymnasiet: Renovering ytterväggar och tak	Pnr. 23101-144
Norrköping	Construction	Ektorpskolan nytt kök inkl matsal	2015-01-12
Nyköping	Construction	Nybyggnad av gata Kv. Förrådet 1 m.fl.	KK15/74
Olofström	Cleaning	Fönsterputsning	2015-02-13
Örebro	Cleaning	Lokalvård städ 30	KS 644/2015
Örebro	Transport	Samordnade varutransporter	KS 304/2014
Örkelljunga	Transport	Skolskjutstransporter	-
Örkelljunga	Construction	Ombyggnad av skolbyggnader	2015-11-20
Örnsköldsvik	Construction	Nybygget i Själevad. Vård- & Omsorgsboende	Pnr. 140185
Orust	Construction	Ventilationsarbeten	Dnr. 71-2015
Orust	Transport	Mattransporter	Dnr. 14-2015
Oskarshamn	Construction	Råvattenledning	Pnr. 1834596
Oskarshamn	Transport	Mattransporter	6934
Östersund	Construction	Kv. Valla Centrum 2, VALLA NYBYGGNAD Skollokaler	Pnr. 97173
Östra göinge	Construction	Entreprenad Grimsboda, Rädda Immeln	Dnr. KS 2015/00713.20.2
Övertorneå	Construction	Ny Serveringsbyggnad Ruskola	2015-06-02
Övertorneå	Transport	Skolskjuts 2015	-
Pajala	Construction	Anslutning strandpromenad	2015-06-18
Pajala	Transport	Matvarutransporter	0625

Partille	Construction	Ombyggnation Kåsjöns vattenverk	Pnr. 102 41 40
Partille	Cleaning	Lokalvård	KS/2015:34
Piteå	Construction	Ombyggnad Sjulnässkolan	Pnr 12005
Piteå	Transport	Mattransporter 2015	2015-04-15
Ragunda	Transport	Avfallstransport	2015-08-13
Ronneby	Construction	Ronneby horse center	2015-05-25
Ronneby	Transport	Hyra av fordor inkl förare och utrustning	15/30
Säffle	Construction	Ombyggnation av Östra Storgatan i Säffle	Dnr. Tfnså 2015-192
Säffle	Transport	Transport av avlidna	2015-06-09
Sandviken	Transport	Transporter av avlidna	IE2015/60
Sävsjö	Construction	Förskolan Spången	Pnr. 13102
Sävsjö	Transport	Mattransporter Sävsjö kommun 2015	2014/220/050
Sigtuna	Construction	St:Per Skola Ombyggnad	Pnr. 7224
Simrishamn	Construction	Ombyggnad av Östergatan/Brunnsgatan	2015-09-23
Simrishamn	Cleaning	Fönsterputsning	2015-11-04
Skara	Construction	Byte Panel och fönster skola Källby gård	2015-04-10
Skinnskatteberg	Transport	Färdtjänst Skinnskatteberg	15-020
Skövde	Construction	Ombyggnad av 3st storkök etapp 4	2014-12-15
Skurup	Transport	Skolskjuts 2016	KS2015.866
Skurup	Construction	Beläggningsarbete	KS 2015.86
Smedjebacken	Construction	Söderbärke Folkets park	Pnr. 8891
Söderhamn	Construction	Rivning av flerbostadshus	Pnr. 15002
Sollentuna	Construction	Beläggningsarbeten i Sollentuna kommun	2014-11-26
Sollentuna	Cleaning	Städtjänster till verksamheten Turebergs förskolor	2015/0048 UPPH. 158
Sollentuna	Transport	Flyttjänster	2015/0070 UPPH.158
Solna	Construction	Tak inclusive skottning	TND/2015:269
Solna	Cleaning	Städupphandling Solna stad	12/48
Solna	Transport	Skolskjuts och turbundna resor	KS/2014:294
Sölvesborg	Cleaning	Fönsterputs	2015-04-08
Sotenäs	Construction	Solhagens förskola, nybyggnad	Pnr. 61531356810
Staffanstorp	Construction	Nybyggnation förskola Uppåkra, Staffanstorp	2015-10-28
Stenungsund	Construction	Nybyggnad Gymnastiksal Kyrkenorumskolan	0091/15
Stockholm	Cleaning	Lokalvårdstjänster till Farsta stadsdelsförvaltning m.fl	2.2.2-567/2014
Stockholm	Transport	Bårtransporter av avlidna 2016	3.3.1-034/2015
Storfors	Construction	Byte av glaslanternin på Kommunhuset, Djupadalsgatan 20, Storfors.	2015-08-24
Storuman	Construction	Älderboendet Tranan, Om- och tillbyggnad	Pnr. 130303
Strängnäs	Construction	Sidöparken, ny lokalgata och GCbanor	2015-10-12
Stängnäs	Cleaning	Städning av offentliga toaletter	TSN/2015:265
Strängnäs	Transport	Färdtjänst med beställningscentral	SN/2015:873
Strömstad	Construction	Ombyggnad Strömstad Stadshus	2015-11-02
Strömsund	Construction	Byggnadsarbeten Strömsunds kommun	2015-001B
Svedala	Construction	Renovering av avloppsledningar 2015	2015-05-15
Svenljunga	Construction	Tillbyggnad Svenljunga Kommunfrråd	2015-08-11
Täby	Construction	Arninge- Hägerneholmskvarteren, entreprenad	SBN 59/2011-20
Täby	Cleaning	Lokalvård 2016	KS 2015/163-05
Tanum	Construction	Väg och ca-utbyggnad i Falkerödsvägen	TN 2015/0311-541
Tidaholm	Construction	Barnens hus	Pnr. A070658-01
Tidaholm	Transport	Skolskjutsar Tidaholm	BUN 2015/57
Timbro	Cleaning	Fönsterputs Tibro kommun	2015-000080.05
Tomelilla	Cleaning	Fönsterputsning 2015	15/36
Töreboda	Construction	Ombyggnad- Storkök samt omklädningslokal	2014-11-20

Torsås	Construction	Renovering av avloppsledning, Söderåkra-Bergkvara	2015-04-01
Tranås	Construction	Rivning och sanering av fastigheter	IN422750
Tranås	Cleaning	Lokalvård	IN422788
Tranemo	Construction	Ombyggnad av Träningsskolan Tranemo	P14 5523A
Trelleborg	Construction	Busshållplatser Valldammsgatan - Allén	SEN 2015/263
Trelleborg	Transport	Mattransporter	SEN 2014/280
Trollhättan	Construction	Drottninggatan, ombyggnad samt ny GC-Väg	Pnr. 14-056
Trollhättan	Cleaning	Fönsterputs 2015	2014/590-01
Trollhättan	Transport	Skolskjuts och omsorgsresor 2015-2019	KS 2014/602
Trosa	Construction	Rivningsentreprenad. Två avdelningar, Fagerängs förskola	2015-02-27
Tyresö	Construction	Ombyggnation LSS- och omsorgsboende, Tärningen	2015-04-23
Uddevalla	Construction	Agnebergshallen, golvbyte	2015-03-10
Uddevalla	Transport	Bussresor med förare	64-2015
Upplands Väsby	Construction	Baldersvägens LSS-boende	I24071
Upplandsbro	Construction	Ombyggnad av VA-ledningar Vagarvägen	2015-03-06
Uppsala	Construction	Rivningsentreprenad Ullåker Hus 1, 56, 75, 78	KSN-2015-1381
Uppsala	Cleaning	Städning	KSN-2015-0674
Uppsala	Transport	Skolskjutstransporter	OSN-2015-0206
Vallentuna	Construction	Exploateringsområde Haga 3	KS 2015.096
Vallentuna	Transport	Personaltransporter- Skolskjuts och Turbundna resor	KS 2015.464
Vansbro	Construction	Rivning av G:a Myrbacka skola	KS2015/361
Vara	Construction	Elarbeten 2015	15/7
Varberg	Construction	Beläggningsarbeten, Asfalt	KS 2015/0407
Varberg	Transport	Lastbilstransporter och entreprenadmaskiner inklusive förare	KS 2015/0042
Vårgårda	Construction	Lena Skola om- och tillbyggnad	2015-08-31
Västerås	Construction	Ramavtal avseende byggarbeten	Dnr. 2014/454-FN-061
Västervik	Construction	Toalettbyggnad vid Sandvikens badplats	Offert Vä 57 2015
Västervik	Transport	Transporttjänster m.m.	2015-03-27
Växjö	Construction	Hovshaga centrum, gator, VA-, fjärrvärme-ledningar samt el och optikkablar	Pnr. 82328
Växjö	Cleaning	Lokalvård utbildningsförvaltningen 2016	U-15-21
Växjö	Transport	Transport av mat	KS 2015-00638
Vellinge	Transport	Skolskjuts	-
Vindeln	Cleaning	Lokalvård Vindeln	2015-06-02
Ystad	Construction	Nybyggnad av sporthall	2015-01-16

Appendix 24: List of municipal cooperations

4:E STORSTADSREGIONENS KOMMUNALFÖRBUND
ALINGSÅS OCH VÅRGÅRDA RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUND
AV/MEDIA JÖNKÖPINGS LÄN
AVFALLSHANTERING ÖSTRA SKARABORG
BERGSLAGENS KOMMUNALTEKNIK
BERGSLAGENS RÄDDNINGSTJÄNST
BORÅS SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND
BRANDKÅREN ATTUNDA
FINNVEDENS SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND
FINSAM LEKEBERG OCH ÖREBRO
FINSAM UDDEVALLA FÄRGELANDA ORUST
FRYKSDALENS SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND
FYRBODALS KOMMUNALFÖRBUND
GÄSTRIKE ÅTERVINNARE
GÄSTRIKE RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUND
GÖLISKA IT
GÖTEBORGSREGIONENS KOMMUNALFÖRBUND (GR)
HÖGLANDETS KOMMUNALFÖRBUND
HÖGLANDETS RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUND
HÖGLANDETS SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND
HÖGSKOLEFÖRBUNDET ÖSTRA NORRBOTTEN
JÄMTLANDS GYMNASIEFÖRBUND
KALMARSUNDS GYMNASIEFÖRBUND
KALMARSUNDSREGIONENS RENHÅLLARE
KÄPPALAFÖRBUNDET (FÖR AVLOPPSSYSTEM)
KARLSTAD-GRUMS VATTENVERKSFÖRBUND
KARLSTADSREGIONENS RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUND
KFB RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTEN ÖSTRA KRONOBERG
KLARÄLVDALENS SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND
KOLBÄCKSÅDALENS GYMNASIEFÖRBUND
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET AV MEDIA SKÅNE
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET DALSLAND
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET GÄSTRIKE INKÖP
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET ITSAM
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET KOLLEKTIVTRAFIKMYNDIGHETEN I VÄSTERNORRLANDS LÄN
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET MEDELPUNKTEN
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET NORRBOTTENS LÄNS KOLLEKTIVTRAFIKMYNDIGHET
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET NORRVATTEN
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET PARTNERSKAP INLAND-AKADEMI NORR
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTEN ÖSTRA BLEKINGE
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTEN ÖSTRA GÖTALAND
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET SAM I GÄVLEBORGS LÄN
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET SÖDRA HÄLSINGLAND
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET SÖRMLANDS KOLLEKTIVTRAFIKMYNDIGHET
KOMMUNALFÖRBUNDET VÄSTRA SÖRMLANDS RÄDDNINGSTJÄNST
KUNSKAPSFÖRBUNDET VÄST
LÄNSTRAFIKEN KRONOBERG
LAPPLANDS KOMMUNALFÖRBUND
LINKÖPINGS SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND
MÄLARDALENS BRAND- OCH RÄDDNINGSFÖRBUND
MILJÖFÖRBUNDET BLEKINGE VÄST
MILJÖSAMVERKAN ÖSTRA SKARABORG
MJÖLBY-ÖDESHÖG-BOXHOLMS SAMORDNINGSF ÖRBUND
NEDANSILJANS SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND

NERIKES BRANDKÅR
NORRA ÄLVSBORGS RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUND
NORRA JÄMTLANDS RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUND
NORRA VÄSTMANLANDS KOMMUNALTEKNIKFÖRBUND
NORRA VÄSTMANLANDS SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND
NORRA VÄSTMANLANDS UTBILDNINGSFÖRBUND
NORRKÖPINGS SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND
ÖLANDS KOMMUNALFÖRBUND FÖR ÖVERSIKTLIG PLANERING
ÖSTRA SMÅLANDS KOMMUNALTEKNIKFÖRBUND
RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTEN DALAMITT
RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTEN ENKÖPING-HÅBO
RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTEN HÖGA KUSTEN - ÅDALEN
RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTEN ÖSTRA SKARABORG
RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTEN STORGÖTEBORG
RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTEN SYD
RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTEN VÄST
RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTEN VÄSTRA BLEKINGE
RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUNDET EMMABODA TORSÅS
RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUNDET MITT BOHUSLÄN
REGION BLEKINGE
REGION DALARNA
REGION VÄRMLAND KOMMUNALFÖRBUND
REGIONFÖRBUNDET I KALMAR LÄN
REGIONFÖRBUNDET JÄMTLANDS LÄN
REGIONFÖRBUNDET JÖNKÖPINGS LÄN
REGIONFÖRBUNDET ÖREBRO LÄN
REGIONFÖRBUNDET SÖRMLAND
REGIONFÖRBUNDET UPPSALA LÄN
REGIONFÖRBUNDET VÄSTERBOTTENS LÄN
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND RAR I SÖRMLAND
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET BOTKYRKA, HUDDINGE OCH SALEM
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET FALKÖPING TIDAHOLM
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET FINSAM KÄVLINGE -LOMMA
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET FÖR PSYKISKT FUNKTIONSHINDRADE I JÄMTLANDSLÄN
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET HANINGE
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET HÄRNÖSAND-TIMRÅ
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET I FILIPSTAD
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET I HALLAND
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET I KALMAR LÄN
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET I KRISTIANSTADS KOMMUN
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET I NORRA ÖREBRO LÄN, SOFINT
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET I NORRA SKARABORG
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET I SVEDALA
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET KARLSKOGA/DEGERFORS I ÖREBRO LÄN
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET KUNGÄLV
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET LYCKSELE
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET MITTSKÅNE
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET MÖLNDAL, PARTILLE, HÄRRYDA, LERUM
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET MOTALA-VADSTENA
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET NORRA BOHUSLÄN
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET SAMSPELET
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET SKELLEFTEÅ
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET SKÖVDE
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET SÖDRA ROSLAGEN
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET SÖDRA VÄTTERBYGDEN

SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET SYDNÄRKE
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET TROLLHÄTTAN
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET UMEÅ
SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUNDET VÄNERSBORG OCH MELLERUD
SJUHÄRADS KOMMUNALFÖRBUND
SKARABORGS KOMMUNALFÖRBUND
SKARABORGSVATTEN
SÖDERÅSENS MILJÖFÖRBUND
SÖDERTÖRNS BRANDFÖRSVARSFÖRBUND
SÖDERTÖRNS MILJÖ-OCH HÄLSOSKYDDSFÖRBUND
SÖDRA ÄLVSBORGS RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUND
SÖDRA DALARNAS RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUND
SÖDRA DALARNAS SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND
SÖDRA ROSLAGENS BRANDFÖRSVARSFÖRBUND
SÖLVESBORG/BROMÖLLAS KFB FÖR GYMNASIE- OCH VUXENUTBILDNING
SUNDSVALL-TIMRÅ RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUND
SYDNÄRKES UTBILDNINGSFÖRBUND (SUF)
SYDÖSTRA SKÅNES RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUND (SÖRF)
SYDÖSTRA SKÅNES SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND
SYDSKÅNSKA GYMNASIEFÖRBUNDET
TOLKFÖRMEDLING I VÄST
VA SYD
VÅRDFÖRBUNDET BLEKINGE
VÅRDFÖRBUNDET SÖRMLAND
VÄRENDS RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUND
VÄRMLANDS LÄNS KALKNINGSFÖRBUND
VÄRMLANDS LÄNS VÅRDFÖRFUND
VÄSTERBERGSLAGENS SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND
VÄSTERBERGSLAGENS UTBILDNINGSCENTRUM (VBU)
VÄSTMANLANDS SJUKRESE- OCH FÄRDTJÄNSTFÖRBUND
VÄSTRA MÄLARDALENS MYNDIGHETSFÖRBUND
VÄSTRA MÄLARDALENS RÄDDNINGSTJÄNSTFÖRBUND
VÄSTRA MÄLARDALENS SAMORDNINGSFÖRBUND
VOB KRONOBERG
YSTAD-ÖSTERLENREGIONENS MILJÖFÖRBUND

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