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Political Motivation and Annexations

A comparative study of the political motivation to annex a
sovereign territory.

Carl Ursing

Peace and Conflict Studies

Department of political science

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Supervisors: Maria Småberg

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“The best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is to keep the subjects in amity one with another, and to this end, to find an enemy against whom they can make common cause.”

Bodin, Jean.¹

¹Bodin, Jean, 1556:168

Abstract

Unveiling political motivation as a feature in the actions of states has since the mid 20th century been a rising subject of interest in the academic research of International Relations. Research has predominantly focused on the incidence of war as a method to foster domestic support, however the manifestation of political stimulus stretches past these events. This study aims to research the political motivation behind annexations. By comparing the annexations of East-Timor and Tibet from a theoretical perspective of political incentive, this thesis aims to compare and analyse the structural setting in which the decision to annex is made. The study will utilize two theoretical approaches to provide a larger scientific validity for the answer. First, using the diversionary war theory to analyse the structural incentives for a political motivation to be relevant. Second, rational choice theory will analyse the choice to annex. Each theory is analysed independently, presenting strong evidence that the annexations were politically motivated. The sub-conclusions will then be merged into one conclusion that briefly summarizes the results.

Keywords: [political decision] [Indonesia] [China] [annexation] [Tibet] [East-Timor] [diversionary foreign policy] [rational actor]

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1 Introduction

The 27th of February 2014, armed soldiers stormed the Crimean peninsula's parliament. Roughly 1 month later, the 18th of March, Russia declared its official annexation of the Ukrainian territory. At that point, the purpose of annexation, besides liberating a Russian-friendly population from increasing anti-Russian sentiments, was not declared. Ensuing, the event rapidly became a hot topic within the contemporary discourse of International Relations. While the discourse mainly revolved around if the annexation was a pretext of increasingly offensive or defensive state behaviour, several analyses suggested political motivation a reason for the decision.

The use of external means to divert domestic unrest, create national unity or mobilize the population has since the dawn of the nation-state been a practical strategy for leaders of society.² Nevertheless, studies on the phenomenon have received limited academic interest, and the function of foreign policy outside that of national security has traditionally been a non-researched subject.³ Owing to the Realist paradigm's domination of the International Relation-studies, the inside- and outside-aspects of governmental politics has been divided into two distinctive fields of research.⁴ Nonetheless, the discourse is changing, which is exemplified by how Hans Morgenthau in "*Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace*" reflects on the changing purpose of foreign policy in the 20th century towards a weapon of national propaganda.⁵

Building on this argument, the relationship between domestic sentiments toward the government, and how it shapes the foreign policy the government is conducting has been a growing topic in the academia surrounding post-event analyses since the last half of the 20th century.⁶

² Levy, Jack S., 1989:262-265

³ Levy, Jack S., 1988:654

⁴ Richards, D., et.al, 1993:3

⁵ Morgenthau, Hans J., 1993:165

⁶ See for example: Mueller, John, 1970; Levy, Jack S. & Vakili, Lily I., 1993; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, & Randolph M. Siverson, 1995; Manus I. Midlarsky, 1992; Kissinger, Henry A., 1996; Keohane, Robert O. & Nye, Joseph, S., 1987

1.1 Purpose of research and research question

What causes states to annex sovereign territory has previously mostly been a subject aligned with research on occupation. Nevertheless, considering that annexations are different in their objective to permanently control the territory, conceptualizing the act as something else should not be outlandish. Rather, it should be clear by now, considering the amount of dissimilar analyses on the Russian annexation of Crimea, that the practice of annexation *per se* is a subject that still is relatively unexplored.

Following, to shed light on the subject, the study aims to compare two cases of annexation by looking at the decision to annex as a decision made in context to its political benefit. The subject thus aims to unravel how annexations may be a tool for political purposes. The cases chosen for the study are: China's annexation of Tibet and Indonesia's annexation of East-Timor. The question of research is:

How does the annexations stand in relation to political motivation, and what similarities do they present?

2 Theoretical Framework

In order to research an annexation's political purpose, the study will outline the previous research to create a framework in which the study will contain itself within. Next, the study will use 2 theories to clarify the relation between the annexation and political motivation. First, a theory that explains how and through which preferences, foreign policy is and becomes a tool for improving the political situation for the reigning government will be applied to the annexation. Second, a behavioural theory will be utilized to research the government's choice of annexation and explain the reasons behind it.

2.1 Previous Research

John Mueller's paper "*Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson*" has received most attention amongst the studies that relate diversionary spectacles to domestic causes. Much attention is given to. In his research on presidential popularity in the US democratic system, Mueller finds that international events of certain character infuses the population with increased faith in the presidential representative, and subsequently creates a temporary boost to presidential popularity.⁷ Mueller coins this effect "Rally 'round the flag"; an expansion on Kenneth Waltz thesis, arguing that intense international events causes a population to "rally behind the chief executive".⁸

In Clifton and Bicker's article "*Domestic Discontent and The External Use of Force*" the use of aggressive foreign behaviour is proposed as a practical tool to build consent when domestic political problems arise. The article argues the use of foreign policy, in the cases of suspected diversionary action, needs to be conceptualized as a *political* decision.⁹ It is argued that the actions of governments need to be understood as not always utilitarian, but rather self-preserving.

⁷ Mueller, John E., 1970:25

⁸ Waltz, Kenneth, 1967:272

⁹ Morgan, Clifton T., Bickers, Kenneth N., 1992:26

In Jack S. Levy's article "*Diversionsary Theory of War: A Critique*", criticism is raised against the "too casual" relation between domestic unrest and aggressive foreign policy. As most quantitative empirical studies cannot draw a relation between the two, the majority of research that can prove an actual connection is conducted through qualitative methods.¹⁰ Further, the study distances itself from the perspective that diversionary action solely is found in international conflicts. Rather, lower levels of violence are equally preferred to rally domestic support.¹¹

Amy Oakes¹², Marianne Kneuer¹³ and Kilic Bugra Kanat¹⁴ has in separate instances researched, and proved, the use of diversionary measures in autocratic states. As domestic uprisings occur, autocratic leaders of military states are more prone than democratic leaders to direct the public's attention elsewhere,¹⁵ rather than to implement internal reforms, which often comes at a cost of reducing the regimes authoritative power. Much consideration is given to how it problematizes the often-accepted fact that autocracies are not dependent of domestic support. Nevertheless, dependency of public support cannot be overlooked as irrelevant even in regimes of repression, according to Bruno Bueno de Masquita.¹⁶ By recognising that repressive measures generate discontent rather than alleviate it, the chance to create same result by different measures has been argued as lucrative for authorial leaders.

2.2 Theory 1 - Diversionsary War Theory

The first theory utilized to research the annexations political purpose is the thesis of Diversionsary War. The theory argues that a government/leader in the need of a temporary boost to popularity may use a strategy of aggressive foreign policy to create diversionary spectacles in order to cultivate domestic public support.¹⁷

Fundamentally the theory's scientific foundation rests on 2 assumptions of sociology: a

¹⁰ Levy, Jack S., 1989:267-268

¹¹ Ibid. 281

¹² Oakes, Amy, 2012

¹³ Kneuer, Marianne, 2011:5

¹⁴ Kanat, Kilic Bugra, 2011:270

¹⁵ Belkin, Aaron & Evan Schofer, 2005:151

¹⁶ Bueno de Mesquita, Bruno, et. al, 2002:44

¹⁷ Oakes, Amy, 2012:14-15

common goal builds homogeneity within the population¹⁸; steadfastness of executive actor builds confidence in leadership¹⁹, both stemming from the academic field of group psychology. The theory's primary focus is the occurrence of war, though in conducting this study, the assumption provided by Jack Levy's "*Diversionsary Theory of War: A Critique*"²⁰ that lesser forms of violence are as suitable as wars in building domestic support, will be utilized. Similarly, the successful use of lesser forms of violence has been confirmed by several other studies.²¹

In the case a "diversionary spectacle", the act aims to:

- Divert the public from its woes
- Whip up nationalist sentiments and rally the population behind the government
- Shift blame for internal troubles to an external enemy or
- Demonstrate the government's competence in foreign policy to improve its image.²²

The two sociological assumptions that Diversionsary Foreign Policy utilizes to construct a casual relation between governmental action and public support are the Rally 'round the flag-effect and "In-and Out-Group", which are outlined below.

¹⁸ Mueller, John E, 1970:21

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Levy, Jack S., 1989:259: Also referred to as Diversionsary Foreign Policy

²¹ Oakes, Amy, 2012:17; Kenner, Marianne, 2011:13

²² Oakes, Amy, 2012:17-18

2.2.1 Rally 'round the flag-effect

For a diversionary spectacle to generate a boost in popularity, beneficial to the executive decision-maker, it has to adhere to certain preferences in its execution; outlined by Muller's Rally 'Round the Flag-effect (RRTF). The 3 fundamental principles are:

- The act is international, because only something confronting the nation as a whole is likely to generate homogenous sentiments.
- The act involves the United States and particularly, the president itself.
- The act is specific, extraordinary and sharply focused, in order to gain the public's interest.

The prerequisites for an RRTF-effect to occur has since Muller's study²³ been applied in a more general context, and accordingly the variable concerning the nation and actor has been possible to be universalize. Thus the universal application of the variable is:

- The act involves the nation where the effect is to take place, and particularly, the decision-maker itself.

2.2.2 In-Out-Group

The casual relation between homogenization and aggressive foreign policy is researched and scientifically proven by George Simmel in his research on sociology; most prominent his literary work *Conflict & The web of group-affiliations*.²⁴

Simmel's thesis rests on the assumption that the feelings of *friend* or *foe* during conflicts are polarized in *ally* or *enemy*. As consequence, the identification with the inside or outside of the majority's opinion is representative of if the individuals support their own group or not.²⁵ This de-incentivizes aberration from homogeneity, and provokes the minority of different opinion to abandon their adherence to ideas that may suggest non-alignment.

²³ Mueller, John E, 1970

²⁴ Simmel, Georg, 1964:99-102

²⁵ Ibid.18-20

2.3 Theory 2 - Rational Actor Model

In order to provide further enlightenment into the political motivation of an annexation, the behavioural theory of Rational Actor Model will be applied. The model assumes that actors behave in a rational, value-maximizing behaviour in relation to the predictability on a preferable outcome.²⁶ By treating the actions of a state as the consequence of governmental unitary reasoning of uttermost efficiency, the action of a state is always the result of a calibrated calculation of different alternatives.²⁷ Ensuing, the theory's fundamental analytical value resides in its explanatory approach to events through observing the different approaches to set goal, the cost and the outcomes of those approaches, and regards the deterministic choice of the most value-maximizing outcome.²⁸ Like John Harsanyi states in his research on rational action, "[...] if a person acts rationally, his behaviour can be fully explained in terms of the goals he is trying to achieve".²⁹

In order for the theory to be applicable, the study will use the methodical framework developed by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow in their literary work, *Essence of Decision*, which outlines the reasoning behind the choice of a government.³⁰ The framework describes the process of reasoning from 4 general principles of rational behaviour: (1) the actor identifies a problem that needs to be solved. (2) The actor lists the options to accomplish the objective. (3) The actor estimates the consequences of such an act. (4) The actor chose the option that maximizes value over cost.

As the analytical assumptions, which are derived from researching a certain event rests on the universally applicable model of rational behaviour; and rational reasoning is the fundamental consideration in the process of state decision, the same act should be rational in equal contexts,³¹ in relation to the studies aim of offering a degree of generalizability.

Also, as there is no indication on what information the actor possessed during the initial decision, absolute rationality cannot be ensured. In order to adjust the model to this assertion on the choice of action, the theory will be limited by *bounded rationality*.³² The study

²⁶ Schelling, Thomas C., 1960:15

²⁷ Allison, Graham T. & Zelikow, Philip D., 1999:24

²⁸ Ibid.13

²⁹ Freyberg-Inan, Annette, 2004:82

³⁰ Allison, Graham T. & Zelikow, Philip D., 1999:25

³¹ Huber, Evelyne, & Dion Michelle, 2002:2

³² Allison, Graham T. & Zelikow, Philip D., 1999:20

hence acknowledges unavoidable limits to absolute knowledge as an accepted defect of the probable incomplete information, not irrationality *per se*.³³ Simplifying, a smaller degree of flexibility to rationality is accepted, although a better solution in hindsight could be proposed.

2.4 Concluding remarks

The criticism against universal methods and rational behaviour has since the emergence of the Copenhagen school been highlighted within social studies.³⁴ That human behaviour is controlled by structural contexts and deterministic acting should, in the reader's eyes, prove contradictory, especially since she/he probably has acted in a way suggesting the opposite. While a qualitative comparison suggestively benefits in validity from adopting more relative relation to behavioural research, the choice is made to provide a clear-cut comparison, abstract of individual preferences.

³³ Ibid.21

³⁴ Grenfell, Damian & James, Paul, 2009:36

3 Methodology

3.1 Epistemology

The study will rest on an epistemological approach of *explaining* presented by Martin Hollis and Steve Smith in *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*.³⁵ By doing so, the study will exclude the relative on the cost of objectivity; treat positivism a superior to ambiguity.³⁶ While this causes a subjective approach to be lacking, the choice is made in consideration to the principle that it provides a perspective where causes are *compelling* to their effects.³⁷ Consequently, the lack of evidence will be alleviated by theoretical objective conclusions, such as the relation between unpopularity with the government and the chance to say in power. This causes the reliability of result to perhaps conflict to some degree with the context of reality, as is acknowledged to improve the results validity. Summarizing, the study's ambition to apply the theories to the material is simplified, and the choice must be understood in consideration to the scope of the study.

3.2 Case selection

The event of annexation is an unusual phenomenon in International Relations, and has only occurred several times during the 20th century. By focusing on military interventions framed as liberations, where force is practiced against the local population, the cases viable for selection are restricted. However, this is a choice made in relation to the paradox of violence against those in need of salvation, and so, its occurrence births questions of real intention. Following, the cases are chosen for this specific purpose.³⁸

³⁵ Hollis, Martin & Smith, Steve, 1991:45

³⁶ Ibid.47

³⁷ Ibid.64-65

³⁸ George, Alexander L. & Bennett, Andrew, 2005:23

Outlining the cases, the selection creates 4 distinct factors.

- The annexations took place in different timeframes of governmental reign; China was a “reborn” nation under a new political rule after decennia of conflict and occupation; Indonesia was an established nation of 30 years, under a political rule of 7 years.
- Both annexations were framed as “liberations”, but embraced armed struggle against the local population.
- Both nations experienced national instability at the time of annexation.
- Both were authorial dictatorships at the time of annexation.

The timeframe of research is limited to only two years, on the sole reason that China experienced a regime change only 2 years before the annexation; China: 1949-1951; Indonesia 1973-1975. The only exception is when explaining the origins of certain key concepts, such as regime change, or important information to offer a closer explanation to certain acts. While the timeframe causes the study to lack a historical understanding of the regimes action, the study’s aim is primarily to explain the action from the context in which it took place.

The choice of two cases, which have a high chance of suitability to the theories, may cause the research to be deterministically directed towards a certain outcome.³⁹ The choice to use of two theories is a consequence of balancing this bias.

3.3 Selection of method: Comparative Study

The study seeks to compare the contexts in which the annexations were conducted. Ensuing, it will be compelled to adhere to a comparative methodology. The comparative method provides the study with three advantages. Firstly, it sheds light on the same variables in each case, which provides the research with a material basis for analysing the common features. Second, the abstraction of selected information from its surrounding environment holds significant value in the exploration of relation between variables.⁴⁰ Thirdly, the comparative methodology, although by selective abstraction, expands the

³⁹ Ibid.24

⁴⁰ Lijphart, Arend, 1971:683

ability to generalize certain causes and outcomes and provides additional leverage to further studies on the subject.⁴¹

To employ a methodical basis to the comparative approach, a “structured comparison”, will be utilized. This model of comparison focuses on a chosen approach of explanation to the cases, which is beneficial, considering the multiplicity of factors that international events may play into.⁴² Consequently, the holistic approach needs to be narrowed down, in order for the study’s scope to be achievable. Further, the method requires the variables to be standardized in relation to the chosen perspective, in order for the acquisition of comparable data to be contained within the subject of interest. While discussion of how benefits in adhering to a more flexible approach to variables can be beneficial to offer a deeper model of exploration are valid, the use the same variables creates a practical model to generate generic knowledge of historical cases, which in this study is relevant.⁴³

3.4 Selection of Material

The media in each nation was at the time highly regulated, and thus the majority of first-hand material by internal sources cannot be confirmed as accurate. Similarly, first hand personal bibliographies seldom offer an objective view of the national context, and national statistical sources are seldom accurate in the case of negative results. To adhere to the lack of reliable first-hand material, the study will consist solely of second-hand research. Historical recapitulations, political analyses, and descriptive case descriptions will all incorporated into a general bank of information, which will be used for the outlining of empirical material.

On the other hand, there may occur a portion of scientific bias⁴⁴ to some of the reports published by political scientists. In order to avoid this bias as best as possible, an extensive amount of literature has been used to describe each case. Further, to prevent too extreme bias from interfering with the general bank of information, the study will avoid sources that are too contradictory to the overall consensus of the material, i.e. an internal evaluation.⁴⁵

⁴¹ George, Alexander L. & Bennett, Andrew, 2005:69

⁴² Ibid.70

⁴³ Ibid.67

⁴⁴ Xie Yu, 2011:279-280

⁴⁵ Höglund, Kristine & Öberg, Magnus, 2011:40-41

3.5 Selection of research variables

The variables are selected to highlight the contextual framework in which the decision was taken, and what may have influenced it.

Firstly, the *political* context in which the government acted will be depicted. This is to provide a conceptual framework of the political workings during the decision. Secondly, *economic*- and *social control* will represent factors that may threaten the government's exercise of authority (*control* will in this study represent possibility of regulation). Thirdly, the study will take the *international* context in consideration. Seeing that aggressive foreign policy can cause heavy backlash in the international system; for example the economic sanctions against Russian after the annexation of Crimea, the choice ought be linked to the self-preservation of its government, which is reduced if, for example, intervention is the consequence. Final, a variable examining *the process of annexation* will be used. This variable serves to highlight the annexation in itself, how it was conducted, through what means and to what purpose, in order to research the event itself for possible indicators of political purpose.

3.6 Operationalization

In order for the theories to be applicable to the task of analysing the annexations as politically motivated, their abstract statements has to be slightly limited to the subject at hand. First, the context in which the government's adopt a diversionary policy needs to be contextualized, and how the annexation conforms to such a policy. Second, the Rational Actor Model has to be limited to a framework appropriate to the subject of research.

3.6.1 Political Decision

A decision of political implications, intended or unintended, may be defined as a political decision.⁴⁶ Although political decision's manifests within the entire range of society, this study aims to highlight the governmental use of a diversionary spectacle to increase support

⁴⁶ Kurt Riezler, 1954:1

of the domestic public. In order to outline the concept's operational applicability, a political decision will be defined as “*based on or motivated by partisan or self-serving objectives*”.⁴⁷ However, considering the government is the decision-maker in this study, a political decision will only be relevant as self-serving. In turn, this allows for the definition to apply to the practice of *consolidating domestic political-power*. If a political decision is made therefore, the governmental reason for adopting it should therefore conform to the scenario of “*decline/deficiency of domestic political authority*”. Following, a decision to adopt a diversionary spectacle should adhere to this scenario, which will be indicative for its occurrence.

It needs to be noted that within the government there may be strive for different goals, by different units. Nevertheless, the study will value the leader's final judgement as deterministic for the foreign policy adoption, building on the argument of Hermann and Hagan that autocratic leaders, compared to democratic, has higher influence on the enforcement of policies.⁴⁸

Undeniably in studies of governmental self-preservation, the individuality of the executive decision-makers is influential in the decision. Yet, as the aim of research is to explain the actions by their adherence to a situation, regardless of individual aims, individuality is of no importance to the situation, as the government itself acts on a pretext. In order to clarify the political decision to conduct a diversionary spectacle a figure⁴⁹ developed by Amy Oakes,⁵⁰ outlining the relation between the contextual variables and the adoption of a diversionary spectacle will be used in order to simplify the relations of indicators.

3.6.2 RRTF & In-and Out-Group

While the annexations may be accomplished through different methods and by different means, applying the theoretical concepts of RRTF & In-and Out Group to the empirical variable *process of annexation* will assist the analytic task of unveiling the annexations coherence to the certain preferences in execution of a diversionary spectacle. The application of these sub-theories to the variable will therefore jointly represent the indicators required to create a rallying-effect.

⁴⁷The American Heritage Dictionary: 4th Edition; “*Political Decision*”

⁴⁸Hermann, Margaret G. & Hagan, Joe D., 1998:126-127

⁴⁹Appendix: Figure 1,2

⁵⁰Oakes, Amy, 2006:463

3.6.3 Rational Actor Model

The theory is modified to fit the limitations of a decision to consolidate domestic political power. This limitation is made in accordance to limitations of governmental knowledge proposed by Ostrom and Job.⁵¹ The reasoning behind this is assumption is Ostrom and Job's criticism on how decision makers on the basis of impatience and fast results selects a more palpable solution instead of considers all the alternatives to solve the situation.⁵² So instead of including all possible options to achieve the desired goal, the rational actor model will in this study conform to only two alternatives of action, either a diversionary spectacle, or internal reform. Instead of incorporating this into the theoretical framework, its fundamental concept rather provides an operationalization of the already established concept of bounded rationality. The alternative to select an internal reform will however be preferred by the regime to an external aggression; following the logic that actions involving more actors increases the chance of triggering impediments against the action. To further simplify the analytical effort of Rational Actor, a figure representing trade-offs between the alternatives relevant to the situation has been developed for this study.⁵³

3.6.4 Annexation

Lastly, regarding the use of the term annexation, clarification on its use needs to be addressed. As the annexations were accomplished through the use of force the issue of legality is of question by standard of international law. Since the use of offensive force is illegal, the annexation cannot be legitimized by the principle of *ex injuria jus non oritur*.⁵⁴ This will be left out; as both cases have been recognized by sovereign states, which will be accepted as enough evidence of its nature as annexation.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Ostrom, Charles W., & Brian, Job, 1986:66; Suggests that leaders do not consider all alternatives. Rather, leaders select the easiest alternative that maximizes the *expected* utility of interest in the existing circumstances.

⁵² Ibid. 543

⁵³ Appendix: Figure 3,4

⁵⁴ Bernhardt, Rudolf (red.), 1982:20-21

⁵⁵ Both annexations were condemned by the UN, however accepted by certain sovereign nations;

Tibet: India, US, USSR

East-Timor: Australia, arguments can be made that the US also acknowledged it un-officially, as evidence of their role as main suppliers of arsenal during the action has been revealed.

4 Case Briefings

4.1 Indonesia

“Everything Suharto does is calculated to help him maintain his power [...] That’s what motivates him, and all his decisions are rooted there.”⁵⁶

4.1.1 Political context

The New Order’s (TNO) rise to power began in 1965.⁵⁷ Under the command of General Mohammed Suharto who in 1965 revealed a communist plot to assassinate the previous president Sukarno⁵⁸ and subsequently rallied Indonesia into a bloodthirsty killing spree against all with connection to the communist ideology,⁵⁹ TNO was officially acknowledged as the legitimate successor of authority in 1967.⁶⁰ TNO immediately initiated reforms to regulate its rule of society.⁶¹ By establishing ABRI’s (Armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia) presence within the elite ranks of the regime, the army was efficiently incorporated in the process of governing. The relationship was mutually beneficial; for the army, the function as both a military force and civil control mechanism increased their power on the political and social sphere. For the political sector, the incorporation of the army eased aligning the military for political purposes.⁶² Nonetheless, the relationship was a

⁵⁶ Winters, Jeffrey A., 1996:48

⁵⁷ Vatikiotis, Michael R. J., 1993:2-3

⁵⁸ Schwarz, Adam, 1994:19

⁵⁹ Vatikiotis, Michael R. J., 1993:102

⁶⁰ Schwarz, Adam, 1994:30

⁶¹ Taylor, Jean Gelman, 2003:364

⁶² Schwarz, Adam, 1994:30

union between two groups of differencing goals⁶³; while the political sector had its interest in the consolidation of power⁶⁴, the military sought to increase their share.⁶⁵

Ergo, when TNO regime experienced a number of setbacks⁶⁶ and vocal protests from society during the latter half of 1973-1974, tensions within the regime began to develop.⁶⁷ As the military was largely unregulated in its business with society, high officials began to support public uprisings against the ruling elite.⁶⁸ A practical example of the sentiments during 1974-1975 was the exceedingly prominent, though unconfirmed, rumours that a coup from inside TNO was in the making.⁶⁹ Summed up, the internal structure of TNO was delicate by 1975.

4.1.2 Economic control

The economical situation of Indonesia in 1973 was grim. Two consecutive years of drought caused a deficit in the rice harvest between 1972-1973.⁷⁰ As rice holds the role of fundamental supply for food in Indonesia, the overload in price passed through to other economic sectors, such as consumer goods and services, creating a national inflation.⁷¹ Considering that similar conditions were global,⁷² a program of importing additional resources was impossible.⁷³ Consequently, widespread starvation occurred in the peripheries,⁷⁴ while heavy inflation on food costs in urban areas⁷⁵ caused sporadic domestic unrest. Whereas the regime did its best to respond to the economic misfortunes, problems surfaced in the funding of counteractive measures. Firstly, Indonesia, in its separation of the people and regime experienced high levels of unregulated institutional corruption, which caused much of the country's relatively high income⁷⁶ to finance the elite's personal interests. Secondly, the main supplier of governmental funding was experiencing hardships.

⁶³ Liddle, R. William, 1996:217

⁶⁴ Ibid.218

⁶⁵ Crouch, Harold, 1978:244

⁶⁶ Further explained in 4.1.2: Economic Stability

⁶⁷ Vatikiotis, Michael R. J., 1993:72-74

⁶⁸ Schwarz, Adam, 1994:34-35

⁶⁹ Vatikiotis, Michael R. J., 1993:75; Dewa Soeradjana & Peer Holm Jørgensen's *The Missing History – planning to topple President Suharto* further explores this event.

⁷⁰ Crouch, Harold, 1978:325

⁷¹ Nasution, Anwar, 1984:8-9

⁷² Schnittker, John, 1973:499-500

⁷³ Nasution, Anwar, 1984:8

⁷⁴ Crouch, Harold, 1978:325

⁷⁵ Nasution, Anwar, 1984: Food prices rose about 80% in the beginning of 1973 alone.

⁷⁶ Schwarz, Adam, 1994:135

Pertamina, the state's oil-and gas-enterprise between 1973-1975 diverted around 820 million dollars of its income to pay of its short-term debts.⁷⁷ The government used the enterprise as an inter-mediator between the state and the international market, taking loans in the international system to transfer them into governmental institutional capital.⁷⁸ However, the loans skyrocketed due to corruption, and by 1975 the company's short-term debt was approximately 10.5 Billion dollars⁷⁹

While economic decline was plaguing the nation, the OPEC embargo of 1973⁸⁰ was initiated. Subsequently, the exports of oil increased by 61% in 1973.⁸¹ Nevertheless, the increasing capital was filtered through the governmental budget converting into national currency, and caused further inflation. So, while there was a high control of the economy, it was only beneficial to the personal goals of the individuals composing the regime.

4.1.3 Social control

Although 1973 meant severe conditions in the peripheries, caused by decreased political representation,⁸² a resource centralization-policy⁸³ and widespread starvation,⁸⁴ there was no vast presence of vocal protests. Yet, the atmosphere in the cities grew increasingly hostile towards the regime near the end of 1973,⁸⁵ and in the last three months of 1973, frustration with the government escalated, and reached its climax during the later half of 1974, resulting in a proliferation of student demonstrations and riots.⁸⁶ The most prominent that gained international attention, was the *Malari*⁸⁷ incident in 1974,⁸⁸ which resulted in ABRI soldiers killing a dozen rioters.⁸⁹

⁷⁷ Nasution, Anwar, 1984:9

⁷⁸ Sutowo, the director for Pertamina is famously to have said: " - You can't find a single road or school or hospital that wasn't partly founded by the money I borrowed through Pertamina"

⁷⁹ Crouch, Harold, 1978:276

⁸⁰ Vatikiotis, Michael R. J., 1993:34-35

⁸¹ Nasution, Anwar, 1984:9

⁸² Vatikiotis, Michael R. J., 1993:103

⁸³ Schwarz, Adam, 1994:62

⁸⁴ *See*: Harvest failure 1972-73; Economic Stability 4.1.2

⁸⁵ Crouch, Harold, 1978:313

⁸⁶ Samsom, Allan A., 1973:164

⁸⁷ *Malapetaka Limabelas Januari* or "the January Fifteenth disaster"

⁸⁸ Schwarz, Adam, 1994: 34; Winters, Jeffrey A., 1996:107

⁸⁹ Crouch, Harold, 1978:315

Based on “the violation of law, raging corruption, abuse of authority, rising prices and unemployment”⁹⁰ the students’ rose against the regimes failed policies during its 7 years in power, and subsequently was the main protestor against the regime during the periods of 1973-1975. Though social control was conducted through regulating the middle class,⁹¹ who found faith in the pure ideology of capitalism under TNO, the mismanagement of capital costed the regime its most influential apparatus of public manipulation. Accordingly, policies to repress the uprisings was adopted, yet had lacklustre effect in calming the population.

4.1.4 International Situation

The Indonesian military intervention in East-Timor has to be explained in context to the Cold War polarity of global interests in the then, present global system.⁹² Considering FRETILIN was a communist political party; the ideological pressure it would radiate in the Indonesian archipelago, which 10 years back was heavily embedded in communist ideology, presented a ideological threat to TNO and a geopolitical threat to the western block.⁹³ The territorial sovereignty of an independent East-Timor also presented a threat to the Western block’s submarine mobility in the area, which at the time, was highly valued.⁹⁴ Subsequently, the US, although secretive,⁹⁵ supported the annexation through supplying TNO with arms and financial measures.⁹⁶ Similarly, the Australian government acknowledged the intervention as justified,⁹⁷ and was the only nation that in 1976 officially recognized East-Timor as a part of Indonesia.⁹⁸

⁹⁰ Ibid.311

⁹¹ Vatikiotis, Michael R. J., 1993:109

⁹² Weldemichael, Awet Tewelde, 2013:45-46

⁹³ Cohen, Saul Bernard, 2015:5

⁹⁴ Weldemichael, Awet Tewelde., 2013:45

⁹⁵ Burr, William, Evans, Michael L., 2011

⁹⁶ Gunderson, Shane, 2015:16

⁹⁷ Monk, Paul, M., 2001:182

⁹⁸ Ibid.206-207

4.1.5 The process of annexation

In the backwater of Portugal's *Carnation Revolution*⁹⁹ in Lisbon April 1974, the de-colonization of East-Timor was set in motion.¹⁰⁰ As Portugal began the process of de-colonization, Suharto and his military advisors initiated the plans regarding the newly freed territory's annexation.¹⁰¹ In the period leading up to the first election in East-Timor, TNO initially began to assist the (very few¹⁰²) parties desiring integration into Indonesia.¹⁰³ The plan of de-stabilisation, *Operation Komodo*, was nevertheless hindered as the Marxist political party FRETILIN seized power in November 1975 and exclaimed independence.¹⁰⁴

In response, Suharto and TNO reacted by force. Using the anti-communist sentiments that flowed deep in Indonesia, the population of Indonesia was incited to gather behind the government in their campaign to vanquish the returning communist threat¹⁰⁵ that endangered the entire population of the Indonesian archipelago, and liberate their "blood brothers" of East-Timor.¹⁰⁶ Said and done, 9 days after FRETILIN had proclaimed itself the legitimate authority of the now sovereign nation of East-Timor, Indonesia entered East-Timor by air, land and sea.¹⁰⁷ February 1976, about 60.000 Timorese citizens,¹⁰⁸ argue as communist supporters, had fallen victim to the Indonesian army. What followed was a brutal political cleansing of East-Timor, which officially was annexed 1976.¹⁰⁹

⁹⁹ A coup d'état against the regime *Estado Novo*, resulting in the complete de-colonization of Portugal's colonies.

¹⁰⁰ Weldemichael, Awet Tewelde, 2013:33

¹⁰¹ DeRouen, Karl R. & Heo, Uk, 2007:432

¹⁰² Cotton, James, 2001:135 Around 5% of population

¹⁰³ Weldemichael, Awet Tewelde, 2013:98

¹⁰⁴ DeRouen, Karl R. & Heo, Uk, 2007:435

¹⁰⁵ Hicks, David 2015:5

¹⁰⁶ *Minority Rights Group International* 2001:10

¹⁰⁷ DeRouen, Karl R. & Heo, Uk, 2007:432

¹⁰⁸ Bertrand, Jacques, 2004:138

¹⁰⁹ DeRouen, Karl R. & Heo, Uk, 2007:439

4.2 China

”In the early years of the People’s Republic of China, the Communist Party of China (CCP) was more concerned with consolidating its position than with implementing programmes of radical change.”¹¹⁰

4.2.1 Political Context

The 1st October 1949 Mao declared the CCP emerged victorious from the civil war between the Communist and Nationalist political movements, ravaging China since the end of World War 2.¹¹¹ Yet, CCP’s administrative control over China was far from established. As the expansive territory of China was in the ruins of a century of conflict (both civil and foreign), landlord feudalism had rose as the conventional social structure, making China a nation of political fragmentation.¹¹² The political structure of CCP, considering CCP’s transition to power ensued though a military campaign against the previous ruling political party; Kuomintang of China (KMT), its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), dominated the CCP’s internal structure.¹¹³

The CCP and PLA had, much like in the case of TNO and ABRI,¹¹⁴ a mutual beneficial relationship. The military was the *modus* of executing the government’s political decisions, while gaining influence through the execution *per se*.¹¹⁵ The hierarchal decision-making between the two was however clear; as Mao stated: “- the party must always control the gun”.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁰ Goodman, David S. G., 1994:11

¹¹¹ Chang, Jung & Halliday, Jon, 2006:369

¹¹² Weatherley, Robert, 2006:15

¹¹³ Dreyer, June Teufel, 2006:204

¹¹⁴ See: Chapter Indonesia, 4.1.1 Political Context

¹¹⁵ Nathan, Andrew James & Scobell, Andrew, 2012:56

¹¹⁶ Dreyer, June Teufel, 2006:204

4.2.2 Economic control

The economic situation in China between 1949-1950 was disastrous. As a result of the effects from the previous decade,¹¹⁷ China was in a situation where movement of capital was heavily constrained, outside the reach of government. Except the own-produce of agriculture, which in turn was heavily regulated by local landlords as a consequence of China's return to feudalism,¹¹⁸ individual economic yield was almost non-existent.¹¹⁹ For example, in the worst years 1948-1949, agricultural harvest experienced about 30% less efficiency compared to the pre-years of the decennia of conflict.¹²⁰ Subsequently, it caused a raise in food prices, and inflated the economy, causing "one of the most virulent inflations in world history".¹²¹ Similarly, nearly all economic infrastructure that was operational the previous decennia were by the end of the 1940's either non-functioning or completely destroyed.¹²²

The economic divide between the urban and rural was enormous, and in the end of 1950, China had one of the larges income gaps between rural and urban residents in any nation though history.¹²³ Subsequently, repairing the economy became one of the chief goals of CCP after their rise to power.¹²⁴ The reforms mainly focused on the re-location of cultivated land from landlords to the rural grass roots, predominantly peasants,¹²⁵ the re-establishment of proper communication and transportation to revive the flow of economic activity and centralizing the banking system under "The Peoples Bank of China". But, none of the measures caused any major instantaneous implications (except for the last one, which ironically had up to no effect due to lack of capital). Following, the economic situation in China 1950 was relatively unchanged.

4.2.3 Social control

With the end of the civil war, and CCP's taking of the northern and eastern parts of China, the nation found itself divided between the previous government's nationalist-bourgeois sympathizers, the local landlords and the communist working class.¹²⁶ Given the

¹¹⁷ Brown, Jeremy & Pickowicz, Paul, 2007:2

¹¹⁸ Weatherley, Robert, 2006:16

¹¹⁹ Ibid.30-31

¹²⁰ Worden, R. L., et al, 1988: 214

¹²¹ Ibid. 215: Prices in 1948 were that of 2500 times the level of 1945.

¹²² Young, Arthur N., 1965:299-300

¹²³ Whyte, MK, 1999:46

¹²⁴ Worden, R. L., et al 1988:213

¹²⁵ Weatherley, Robert, 2006:30

¹²⁶ Brown, Jeremy & Pickowicz, Paul, 2007:56

disintegrated unity of China, effective administrative control was mainly located in the urban areas,¹²⁷ and subsequently had to be re-established in the rural landscape. This “mass mobilization” campaign was essential to the rebuilding of China, as the people could be utilized as a tool of reconstruction, if only the right guidance.¹²⁸ As the CCP took to establish policies to redistribute wealth and territory, a wave of anti-establishment responses from those opposing the new system resulted in hostilities against the regime and its supporters. It was expected by CCP that the peasants themselves, acknowledging their responsibility to build the system in which they were the foundation, would deal with the reformative processes in rural areas of the nation.¹²⁹ Yet, this was not the case. Instead, peasants, often hesitant to act in political uncertainty against the traditional structure of local feudal owners, passively expected change to be delivered and refused to rise up, consequently, the support was evidently lower than expected.¹³⁰

4.2.1 International context

While Tibet progressively through the year of 1950 had good contact with India,¹³¹ England and the US¹³² regarding possible aid against a Chinese invasion, the support was very low. England had in the second de-colonisation lost all its influence in the East-Asian subcontinent, and so, had no interest in sending troops.¹³³ Similarly, India, through initial discussion with China, believed the intention of incorporation was valid, and was not to offer direct military support¹³⁴ As to the US, which was at the time involved both in the Korean Peninsula and the escalating situation of Western-Eastern block conflict of Europe, the significance of Tibet was not convincing enough to enter a third front without additional support from its allies.¹³⁵ As to the UN, the discussion was passive,¹³⁶ and

¹²⁷ Ibid.40-41

¹²⁸ Walder, Andrew G., 2015:39

¹²⁹ Chan, Lai-Ha, Chan, Gerald & Kwan, Fung, 2011:67

¹³⁰ Weatherley, Robert, 2006:30-31

¹³¹ Goldstein, Melvyn C. & Rimpoche, Gelek, 1989:634

¹³² Ibid:626-628

¹³³ Ibid.629-631, 661

¹³⁴ Ibid.634-635

¹³⁵ Abanti Bhattacharya, 2007:260

¹³⁶ Goldstein, Melvyn C. & Rimpoche, Gelek, 1989:729-736

through its co-operation with the Soviet-Union,¹³⁷ any future intervention was to be vetoed.

Resulting, the annexation was undertaken in a context where international attention was diverted into other issues, and in response, did not pay any noteworthy attention to China's annexation of an area that in the global context had a minor influence.¹³⁸

4.2.2 The process of annexation

The shared history of China and Tibet had through the 2nd millennia been closely linked, through mutual co-operation and religious bonds, creating a symbolic relationship.¹³⁹ Nevertheless, in the start of the 20th century the two had separated indefinitely,¹⁴⁰ where Tibet had turned its attention to build a close relationship with the US and England through its border with the colonial nation of India.¹⁴¹ The fate of Tibet had through CPP's campaign across China been regarded as up to the Tibetans themselves,¹⁴² as the forceful incorporation of minorities had no place in the Marxist ideology. Nevertheless, by 1950, the agenda had changed. The incorporation of Tibet was necessary to complete the unification of China.¹⁴³

As plans to incorporate Tibet into China was declared, resistance against absorption was vocal in Tibet. Nevertheless, CCP began amassing troops on the border in mid 1950.

By playing on how China was humiliated by the imperial European powers in the 18th-19th century, and Tibet's rightful place in the new nation, Mao argued a similar fate had to be prevented from occurring to the Chinese population of Tibet,¹⁴⁴ and the western influence on China had to be counteracted.¹⁴⁵ Following, 20,000 PLA troops entered Tibet in¹⁴⁶ crushing the resistance of "western sympathizers" and established Tibet as a semi-province of China in May 1950¹⁴⁷ through the 17th Point agreement,¹⁴⁸ which according to the Chinese was valid, but by

¹³⁷ Nathan, Andrew James & Scobell, Andrew, 2012:56:67

¹³⁸ Brown, Jeremy & Pickowicz, Paul, 2007:138: Despite a *de facto* independent status, Tibet never received recognition as an independent state by the international community.

¹³⁹ Dawa Norbu, 2001:19

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.175

¹⁴¹ Feigon, Lee, 1996:140

¹⁴² Brown, Jeremy & Pickowicz, Paul, 2007:135

¹⁴³ Ibid.13

¹⁴⁴ Goldstein, Melvyn C. & Rimpoche, Gelek, 1989:638

¹⁴⁵ Brown, Jeremy & Pickowicz, Paul, 2007:134

¹⁴⁶ Goldstein, Melvyn C. & Rimpoche, Gelek, 1989:639

¹⁴⁷ Brown, Jeremy & Pickowicz, Paul, 2007:154

¹⁴⁸ An excellent outlining is presented in Goldstein, Melvyn C. & Rimpoche, Gelek 1989:765-769; Also incorporating first hand reports of Tibetan's response to each point.

Tibet illegitimate, signed through the method of force. Subsequently, by 1951, China had sent 100.000 Tibetans into exile.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁹ Warren Smith, 2004:46

5 Analysis

5.1 Analysis of Theory 1 - Diversionary War Theory

Examining each case through the indicators that outline when a diversionary spectacle may be adopted to consolidate domestic political power, concluding assumptions can be made.

Indonesia experienced evident criticism against the regime's continued rule between 1973-1975. Protests and riots were frequent in the urban regions, and proliferated until the climax of domestic unrest in the transition to 1975. The protests were instigated from the overlap of several policy failures, and the regimes inadequacy to deal with the effects. This was partly a consequence from lack of funding and partly a consequence of the political system. Ensuing, the regime experienced a decline of domestic political authority parallel with the escalation elements that could potentially endanger the regimes political rule. Analogous, discord became apparent within the regimes military ranks, as high officials joined, and supported, the uprisings.

Given the army benefited from the opportunity to gain increased political power, the threat against TNO was both stemming from the external influence of domestic pressure and internal ambitions. Regarding the international context, the international system was heavily regulated by the influence of the Cold War and its polarized opponents Soviet Union and the US. Hence, acting on behalf of either provided the state with approximate immunity to particular international backlash.

Moving on. In China between 1949-1959, criticism against the regime was predominantly subtle, however it was fundamental in obstructing the establishment of the centralized government. As the political landscape of rural China was fragmented, authoritative political control was predominantly regional, and the rural citizens lived either in or around feudal semi-autonomous societies under the rule of bourgeois feudal landlords, causing deficiency of domestic political authority. Since the initial implementation of rural economic policies was only beneficial to the peasants, the initiative caused widespread rejection of affiliation with the regime and its policies from the bourgeois landlords.

Although the support of the grass roots was perceived as resulting the radical agricultural reforms, the alignment of the peasants was lesser than expected. Considering the infrastructure of transportation and communication was non-existent; uncertainty in the new regimes possibility of implementing practical national reforms deterred the support of the rural population, mainly because of the risk to lose the only source of livestock available. In turn, this counteracted the campaign of mass-mobilization and decelerated the ideological transformation of China.

The international context was in a phase of conflict fatigue after the end of World War 2, and the nations with most incentive to intervene showed a lack of interest. Similar, the alliance with the Soviet Union provided a likely veto in the United Nations if an intervention was to be brought up.

5.1.1 RR'TF & In-and Out-Group

During the prearrangement for the annexation of East-Timor, TNO adopted a hostile stance towards the newly declared sovereign territory. By re-inciting the collective animosity against the newly adopted communist ideology of East-Timor, a collective threat was presented.

According to the regime, the communist ideology had the potential to cause havoc in the Indonesian archipelago if left unchecked. Ensuing, every individual became a possible target of the impending threat, which the government promised to defeat. Thus, the annexation was perpetrated in an effort to “protect” the Indonesian population from an independent threat.

Similar, the *blood brothers* of Indonesia were to be protected from communism by its neighbour, inducing the population with a sense of national pride.

The annexation was a spectacle of display of power, where the army participated by sea, land and air, in a campaign that only demanded the ousting of a political party. Nevertheless, the liberation soon was transformed into a political cleansing of East-Timor, similar to what rallied the population of Indonesia between its leader 10 year's prior.

Similar to the annexation of East-Timor, the CCP experienced a change in their initial position to the sovereignty of Tibet. Arguments of its righteous place with China were expressed, which implied its position as a Chinese region as being legitimate. Considering Tibet held a symbolic historical value in China, the annexation of such a territory would signal the reclamation of the old and powerful China's rise from the ashes. Propaganda was conducted, blaming the western imperialistic system to corrupt and marginalize the Timorese “Chinese” population into submitting to the destructive will of the west, which previously had caused the great nation of China to lose its foothold of its own nation. Thus, the CCP had to, in the name of Chinese self-

reconciliation, liberate its fellow members by defeating an historical enemy who the Chinese population found a common resentment in. Amassing the PLA in numbers, clobbering the Tibetan defence, on the borders of Tibet, the initial invasion was met by low resistance by “western-sympathizers”, who quickly were defeated, proving CCP with the will and strength of the CCP was not to be reckoned with. Following, the liberation was followed by a common agreement, showing the Chinese people the “thankfulness” of the Tibetan population, as a massive number of people were driven into exile.

5.1.2 Conclusion: Theory 1 - Diversionary War Theory

The operational political condition before the annexation, and the event of annexation *per se* illuminate’s the similarities that were present in both cases precluding the annexation and through what means the annexation was conducted. Comparable, the CCP and TNO experienced domestic impediments that precluded the annexation. The reason for domestic complications similarly originated from the deficiency of trust in the governments ability to establish functional policies, either resulting in protests or/and dismissal of the regimes administrative authority. Likewise, both regimes faced political pressure from other actors striving to preserve or gain their political power, challenging them on the basis of the failed policies. The main reason for the inability to implement functional policies was economical, either directly self-induced, or in China, indirectly self-induced from the previous war. In turn, the lack of trust in the regime reduced the regime’s regulative ability. In both cases, this was necessary for the political structures to function properly. Therefore, both regimes needed consolidate domestic political power in order for the regimes continued uninterrupted reign, which effectively could not be achieved by internal reform.

Concerning the event of annexation, the defeat of an historical enemy was presented as the main reason for the annexation to take place. In each of the cases, the enemy was ideological, so the identifiable face of the enemy was never concretely revealed (although FRETLINE represented the communist ideology, the violence against civilian supporters suggests otherwise). Similar, the choice to not act against the threat allowed its expansionist destructive nature to reach past national borders, and demolish all in its path. Thus, not endorsing the actions of the regime was potentially dangerous for the sole individual, as non-alignment with the annexation would suggest his/her support of the enemy. Although the ideological threat had not exposed itself in the nation conducting the annexation, the arguments of common ancestry underlined how blood is

thicker than social structures, in this case national borders, and needs to be acknowledged as important. Contrary to this argument, both the annexations were followed up by political cleansings of the masses, argued to harbour the enemy in secret. Although, while the indicator of extraordinary suggests something above the norm, the severe permeation of nationalist symbolism presents itself speaking for such an abnormality.

In relation to the RRTF-effect and In-and Out-Group, this would suggest itself pointing towards the applicability of the theories on the annexations. Concluding, although the annexations main purpose may not have been political, there is enough evidence to explain them as partly conducted in a political purpose.¹⁵⁰

5.2 Analysis of Theory 2 - Rational Actor Model

In Indonesia, the political system was constructed on agreements, which were relatively operational. The political contract between the two separate entities was functional when the state was in a *status quo*. The military benefitted from the repression of social discontinuity on the reward of reaping the gains of political policy implementation by stealing the resources aimed at benefitting the population, while the political sphere could continually construct policies that reduced the risk of political ousting. (1) However, when the means of repression fail, the regime becomes an unstable institution because of the army's chance to reap further benefits, and the regime experiences an overall higher chance of ousting. Ensuing, the occurrence of domestic unrest provides a context in which political power is threatened by mainly internal sources, and as such needs to be prevented. (2) To solve the occurrence of domestic unrest, there are two alternatives, which can achieve the goal, internal policy reform or external aggression. (3) In the structural context of 1973-1975, the implementation of an internal policy reform was not possible. On one hand, the funding of regime's budget was in a state of stalemate, and the income of capital during the last 7 year's had essentially disappeared because of the institutional corruption that roamed the political landscape. Measures to break down on corruption risked causing further divide within the regime, due to the army's reduced reward for upholding its deal of the agreement of co-operation. The change in the regional environment generated a situation

¹⁵⁰ For a simpler review of each case, outlining the central components adherence to a political decision, see appendix: Figure 1,2.

where external aggression could be used as a mean to temporarily divert the populations' woes to focus on defeating the common enemy of communism, and prove the regimes competence in foreign policy. Further, the international situation was beneficial to external aggression against certain ideological targets, in this case, which presented itself on the doorstep of Indonesia. (4) To consolidate domestic political power, the trade-off in this context would be either to use a diversionary spectacle, or take the risk of further escalation and a possible coup d'état. In this framework, the choice to use a diversionary spectacle is suggestively rational.

In China, the establishment of central governance was the chief task of the CCP in order to consolidate their newly attained power. *Per se*, the establishment of central governance was a necessary pretext for the new regime to start up the rebuilding of the nation through a campaign of "mass mobilization".

(1) The campaign's fundament was based on the idealistic perception of blind ideological grass-root support in the communist agenda. In relation to the deteriorating climate of China, the CCP initially believed that declaring profitable provisions to the grassroots could mould them a progressive bottom-up reform of society, making them the main tool to achieve a consolidation of domestic political power. However, the fragmented political landscape of China combined with the lack of communicatory means constrained the ability to convince the rural population to willingly abolish the traditional feudal system for a radical political transformation. (2) Following, in order to consolidate domestic political power, either effective internal policy's had to be implemented, or a popular foreign policy of external aggression had to be adopted. (3) In the economic context of 1949-1950, CCP's ability to effectively implement improving policies was very restrictive. Further, the lack of transportation made the mobility of the regimes agents heavily limited, considering amount of societies in the large nation. Although appeals were made to the rural population to revolt against their rulers and re-take the land in the name of the state, the initiative was regularly met by hesitation. Resulting, the effective measures to consolidate power through internal reformative policies could not be achieved, ironically, before the mass mobilization was accomplished. As Chinas political structure was a collaborative combination between the military wing and the political sector, the use of a popular foreign policy of external aggression presents itself as beneficial in comparison to the alternative. Considering the historical relationship of Tibet and China, the region also posed a practical target for a diversionary spectacle. In relation to the international context, the risk of international backlash was relatively low, due to the existing state of International Relations and the non-recognized sovereignty of Tibet. (4) The most advantageous choice in this context would therefore be to annex Tibet through methods generating national unity, over the restricted amount of progressive support

internal reforms would have created.

5.2.1 Conclusion: Theory 2 - Rational Actor Model

The need to consolidate domestic political power stemmed from two different contexts of governmental reign, where each regime originated its choice from. The common goal of achieving a consolidation of rule however links their reasoning into a comparable framework. (1) Both regimes were in a situation where non-consolidation of power could increase the risk of ousting. (2) As the domestic situation in both cases affected the regime's lack of authority, the adoption of a politically motivated act proves itself a valid assumption. (3) Akin, the inability to efficiently implement policies that would result in the consolidation of domestic political power suggest the choice to use the military for a diversionary spectacle as preferable, especially considering the close relationship between the military and the political sphere in both cases. Although the chance of external aggression to cause an international backlash places the choice as of lower probability than internal reform, the international context was in both cases regarded as "safe". (4) Thus, the annexations, which were easily accomplished, were a suitable choice. Therefore, as the annexations provided the most efficient way of achieving set goal, the rational decision should in both cases rest here.¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹ For a simpler review of each case, representing the trade-offs in each case, see appendix: Figure 3-4.

5.3 Final discussion

The culminating discussion will firstly outline the intertwined conclusion of both the sub-theoretical analyses. Secondly, it will discuss the use of methodology in relation to how the study benefited from its use, while mentioning the disadvantages of its application. Thirdly, future research on the subject will be discussed, and possible applications of the result in contemporary research.

By drawing a line through the two sub-theoretical analyses, it can be concluded that the political influence on the annexations was considerable. The case briefings descriptions revealed an equal need to consolidate domestic political power in a context where internal measures were either fruitless or unavailable. While a definite link cannot be established between the context and the act, the outcome of the theoretical analyses provides support for the answer as valid. It should be noted that the failure to implement any alternative measures in relation to the growing deficiency or decline of domestic political authority has a substantial role in the conclusion that a diversionary spectacle was adopted. Although it would propose itself reasonable that systematically eliminating the other alternatives of accomplishing the task would present the remaining answer as logically validated.

While the comparative methodology provided the study with a greater amount of empirical *findings* supporting the non-researched relation between political decisions and annexations, not using Mill's methods makes a casual relationship problematic to reveal. However, the purpose was never to find the "golden apple" to a non-researched subject of academic studies. Rather, the study principally aimed to create a bigger pool of possible explanations to the occurrence of annexations. The study achieved in doing so. Also, the Rational Actor Model offers some degree of universal applicability of the result. Following, the results of the study show the application of this theoretical model can be utilized in similar context to study political motivations.

Regarding the results validity, the main cause for a question of validity is the permeating bias in the selection of material and the choice of deterministic theories. Since only a portion of the entire picture could be painted, only the main causes were highlighted, causing other factors that may influence the answer to go unnoticed. Also, in retrospect, the methodological approach suggests itself as overambitious in relation to the scientific result produced, and the selection of only one case would perhaps have served the study equally well, while providing further insight in the phenomenon.

The academic material produced for further studies on the subject does hold an important factor to the result. Firstly, it provides academic support for future studies on the annexations East-Timor and Tibet, due to how their relation to political motivation is an un-explored subject. Secondly, the academic research on annexations and political motivation is non-existent. Thus, the study (in a mildly assertive statement) holds a ground breaking potential for further studies to dig into. Additionally, several *findings* suggest an expansion of the operational framework to be of question. Variables as political competition and ideological attainment were noticed to present substantial weight in the decision, which may hold important value to further research on the subject.

Closing off, the study's use of multiple variables to analyse the structural context in which a political decision benefitted the study well, however the selection of cases and methodology prevented further conclusions to be drawn.

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Appendix

Figure 1.




Figure 2.




Figure 3.

Indonesia




Figure 4.

