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Securitization of U.S. Development Policy: The Obama Administration

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Abstract

Development and security have been increasingly interlinked since Cold War times. In the U.S. the concern over national security trumped aiding people in despair, and development resources were used to prop up friendly governments to the U.S. in a response to Soviet expansion. Now, in a post-9/11 world where security efforts are largely focused on fighting the War on Terror launched by George W. Bush, development policy once again risks being subordinated to security matters as the lines between development and security are getting more blurred. Bush received fierce criticism regarding his security priorities, which current President Obama has not yet encountered. This thesis seeks to explore whether Obama has continued the trend of his predecessor in prioritizing security matters to such an extent that development policy has become undermined. By conducting a thematic analysis using the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization as an analytical tool the language and rhetoric in Obama's most essential speeches and policy documents have been scrutinized in order to establish the degree of securitization that has occurred. The findings have been cross-referenced with Official Development Aid flows stretching from prior to the election of Bush until 2015. The thesis concludes that Obama has subordinated development policy to security matters.

Abbreviations

MDG - Millennium Development Goals

PPD - Presidential Policy Directive

QDDR - Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

ODA - Official Development Assistance

IPC - Interagency Policy Committee

MCC - Millennium Challenge Corporation

NSS - National Security Staff

DoD - Department of Defense

PPL - Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Economically, politically, and militarily, the attacks of September 11, 2001 (hereby 9/11) and the launch of the War on Terror that ensued have directly and indirectly made a huge impact on security and development alike (Carmody 2005:98). President George W. Bush, who prior to the attacks was highly skeptical to development assistance, reversed this thinking overnight and increased U.S. foreign aid to historic levels (Owusu 2007:1). This does not come as a surprise. The U.S. has always used development mechanisms such as foreign aid strategically (Moss et al. 2005:3). The first major U.S. foreign assistance program, The Marshall Plan, was launched to rebuild a War-torn Western Europe (Moss et al. 2005:3). This was motivated largely by concerns over national security and would simultaneously act as a bulwark against Soviet expansion (Herrling & Radelet in Birdsall 2008:275). Similarly, disbursements to Egypt and Israel in support of the Camp David Accords point to the same conclusion (Moss et al. 2005:3). In recent years, development policies such as aid have taken on a broader strategic significance, as U.S. policymakers established links between “security, global poverty, and weak states.” (Moss et al. 2005:3) Although such links have always been drawn, 9/11 and the launch of the War on Terror brought this ‘nexus’ back to unprecedented levels (see Duffield 2010). Large increases in U.S. aid to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan following military invasions are obvious examples of such effects (Moss et al. 2005:3). The conventional wisdom is that 9/11 and the War on Terror changed everything. The securitization of development policy is one example of this change, and in the aftermath of 9/11, U.S. security policy has come to rival development as an increasingly explicit rationale (Miles 2012:27). Previous research has established a subordination of development policy to security affairs under Bush, even though levels of aid have skyrocketed (Christian Aid 2004; Fleck & Kilby 2010; Beall, Goodfellow & Putzel 2006; Putzel 2005; Picciotto 2004; Bachmann & Hönke 2010; Krueger & Maleckova 2002; Woods 2004). No such consensus currently exists regarding President Obama’s policy priorities. The question

then becomes whether or not this trend has continued under the Obama Administration?

1.2 Aim and significance

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the discussion on securitization of development policy in general in the post-9/11 world. Specifically, this research aims to investigate whether President Barack Obama has followed the path of George Bush in subordinating development policy to matters of security. The aim is therefore not to investigate whether development efforts have worsened per se. The securitization of development policy and cooperation is by no means a new topic and can be dated back to the Cold War era. While the development security nexus can be constructed positively, the linkage has changed considerably in the contemporary context. A vast amount of academic literature already exists on this topic, especially post-9/11 during the Bush Administration. This broad literature provided the inspiration to add to the debate, but at the same time research something that is relatively unknown. The securitization of development policy under the Obama Administration is arguably a new and relevant topic, and previous research has only predicted that Obama would not change much. As Obama is currently transitioning to leave office, this presents an ample opportunity at evaluating his development policy. A combined empirical and theoretical approach will be used; empirical in the sense that the language in policy documents and speeches under the Obama Administration will be reviewed and levels of aid will be analyzed prior to Bush taking office until present times; and theoretical in the sense that the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization developed by Ola Waever and Barry Buzan will be utilized as a departure point to investigate to what extent development policy is being subordinated to security matters.

1.2.1 Research question

Is U.S. development policy under the Obama Administration being subordinated to security matters?

1.2.2 Outline

The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter aims at situating the aim and significance of the thesis within a wider context. The subsequent chapter will present previous research on the development security nexus, the Bush Administration, and the Obama Administration. The theoretical approach of the study can be found in chapter three, followed by a section on methods which encompasses the academic material and data that will be analyzed in chapter five. The final chapter will conclude the main findings.

2. Literature Review

To organize the extensive amount of preexisting literature on the topic, the following literature review section will take the form of progressive coherence. According to Golden-Biddle and Locke (1993, 1997 in Bryman 2012:100), progressive coherence: “portrays the building up of an area of knowledge around which there is considerable consensus.” This strategy is relevant for this study in particular because there is a general consensus that the development-security nexus can be constructed positively, that Bush subordinated development policy to security concerns, and that the predictions for the Obama Administration were that he would follow Bush.

2.1 Development-Security Nexus

The notion of a development-security nexus was arguably pioneered by Mark Duffield (2010), but has been widely accepted in mainstream academia. In his article, Duffield explores this linkage. Duffield argues that development and liberalism are also interconnected. Development, liberalism, and security come together in the commonly believed phrase that not only is reducing global poverty ethically right, if ignored it leads to “civil wars, failed states, and safe havens for terrorists” (Duffield 2010:56). As will be discussed in later parts of this study, Obama similarly views development as a ‘moral imperative’. Furthermore, Duffield explains that development and security have been

linked since the “dawn of industrial capitalism” and was brought into focus again after the Cold War (Duffield 2010:54). In recent years, the nexus has been rediscovered, especially in the way aid donors embrace aid as a means of conflict resolution under the UN integrated mission (Duffield 2010:54). However, perhaps one of the most explicit signs that the linkage is undeniable is the fact that development is one of the three core pillars that Bush rolled out in the 2001 National Security Strategy (Miles 2012:31). As a result, development policy risks being subordinated to security concerns as it is often part of a ‘security package’.

In his article, Stewart (2004:261) argues that policies concerning security and development tend to overlap because: “insofar as they enhance security they will contribute to development” and “policies towards development may become part of security policy, because enhanced development increases security.” He points out that the cost of global threats to security includes the budgetary costs of conflict prevention, the budgetary costs of military operations, peacekeeping and reconstruction, and economic costs resulting from global insecurity (Stewart 2004:280). Hence, development can be seen as a part of a security promotion package. Additionally, Stewart estimates that from 2001-04, expenditure on defense dwarfed that of aid by 8 times (Stewart 2004:280).

Picciotto (2004) discusses the issues relating to the convergence of development and security, and argues that development is in the process of becoming ‘re-securitised’ thus security has to be ‘developmentalised’ (Picciotto 2004:544). He fears that aid will revert back to Cold War habits when aid was used as an incentive for repressive regimes to be friendly towards the West (Picciotto 2004:544). He also worries that aid will be used to meet the demands of ever-growing defense-related needs (Picciotto 2004:544). He backs these claims up empirically by pointing out that ODA budgets have already been affected by 9/11 and the launch of the War on Terror as funds have been diverted towards peacekeeping and military interventions (Picciotto 2004:544). In addition, rich countries spend on average 11.5 times more on defense than on development (Picciotto 2004:544). As a result, the 9/11 attacks threw ten million people into poverty (Picciotto 2004:547).

2.2 Bush Administration

When Bush, within days of the 9/11 attacks, announced that he would increase foreign aid to historic levels, many were surprised. His proposal was significant because it came from a conservative President from the Republican Party with a long-standing antagonism towards foreign aid (Owusu 2007:3). Indeed, months before were spent rejecting calls to increase foreign aid on the basis that it was a waste of resources, especially to areas that had little geopolitical importance to the U.S. (Owusu 2007:3). In 2000, a year before Bush's inauguration, Clinton used the development-security nexus rhetoric in relation to the state collapse in Afghanistan to garner political support for foreign aid. Bush used this same rhetoric, along with the redefinition of U.S. actions as part of a broader 'war on terrorism' to lobby Capitol Hill in a way that was never possible for Clinton (van de Walle 2009:7). Subsequently, Bush created the Millennium Challenge Corporation, an organization independent of traditional aid allocation bodies like USAID. Its main purpose was to combat the biggest threat facing humanity in the twenty-first century: the threat of global poverty and international terrorism (Owusu 2007:2). These facts point towards two things. First, Bush wanted to make sure that his newly established aid body could evade traditional procedures of disbursing aid. Second, he deliberately used the rhetoric of linking development and security to strategically target aid to conflict areas where alleviating poverty would combat terrorism. As a result, his development policies were subordinated to security affairs, as the next section will discuss further.

In Miles (2012), he discusses how U.S. security matters have come to rival development in importance. The article revisits Cold War tactics of using development to shore up friendly governments in opposition to the Soviet Union, and draws parallels to post-9/11 where development under Bush is once again only considered as an 'ex post facto rationale' to security (Miles 2012:28). The author uses the example of USAID replacing the Public Law 480 or "Food For Peace", one of their signature activities, with a Food For Peace Act. This added a dimension of conflict to USAID's work (Miles 2012:34). Thus USAID activities in 7 or so African countries are now inextricably linked to counterterrorist priorities dictated by Washington (Miles 2012:45).

2.3 Obama Administration

The literature on President Obama's development policy is what Golden-Biddle and Locke (in Bryman 2012:101) refer to as incomplete. There is simply not enough literature evaluating his development policies at this point in time. This is surprising considering that Obama is currently transitioning to leave office after being President for 8 years. However slim the literature is, the majority of it points to the same conclusions: Obama will and has continued along the same lines as Bush, with only a few minor changes.

Parmar (in Jackson 2011:402) argues that: "the war on terror' continues to operate as the dominant framework of the Obama administration." For instance, Obama has done nothing to end the Patriot Acts that Bush implemented, close down Guantanamo Bay like he promised, give terrorist suspects full legal rights within a criminal justice framework, or end policies of conditioning aid to developing countries on counterterrorism cooperation (Jackson 2011:404). Ending the war on terror discourse would simply run counter to material and political interests of U.S. hegemony. Jackson does not offer input on his development policy other than mentioning collapsed or failed states as safe havens for terrorists.

Dale (2010) goes more in-depth in evaluating Obama's development policy. Specifically, she evaluates the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD). She argues that Obama's policy is inadequate and does not fulfill what the President said he would accomplish during his MDG speech at the UN. The three key development-related initiatives are: a Global Health Initiative, which among other things improves disease treatment; Feed the Future, which addresses food security; and a Global Climate Change initiative, which seeks to lower carbon footprint (Dale 2010:1). Dale notes that these are all reactive concerns that will not achieve the kind of economic development Obama referred to in his speech that can pull nations out of poverty and raise living standards (Dale 2010:2). Hence, she concludes that the PPD is nothing but a soft power tool part of a wider national security package that inevitably fails at promoting development.

3. Theoretical Framework

The Copenhagen School's theory of securitization is the backbone and theoretical framework of this study. The theory, pioneered by Ole Waever and Barry Buzan, posits that securitization is a speech act (Waever in Lipschutz 1995:55). As such, "By uttering "security," a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it." (Waever in Lipschutz 1995:55) Securitization theory emerged during the last couple of decades as a response to traditional realist and neo-realist theories, which tend to be narrow in scope as they deal primarily with issues relating directly to the state and to military security. By identifying five 'sectors' of security: military, environmental, economic, societal, and political security, it allows security theory to go beyond such traditional views and enables it to cater to non-traditional issues (Buzan, Weaver & Wilde 1998:23). This becomes particularly relevant in recent times when concepts such as the development-security nexus blur the lines between what is traditionally considered to be development and security as separate dimensions.

Securitization theory then becomes a useful tool for this study. Firstly, the theory facilitates identifying the referent object, i.e. who's security is at stake, which in this case is the U.S., and the various securitizing actors, which may be states, international organizations, NGOs, and so forth. Secondly, by being part of a speech act, the language used by securitizing actors in speeches and official documents can be analyzed to establish the degree of securitization. Since the main method employed will be a thematic analysis, using securitization theory as an analytic tool helps answering the question whether or not development policy is being subordinated to security matters. However, according to Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:69), thematic analysis is not sufficient in itself for analysis and has to be coupled with theory if something is to be said about the broader social, economic, and political context. Using the combined approach of both thematic analysis and securitization theory compensates for this problem.

The role of language is central to this study. According to Waeber, security is a socially constructed concept insofar as it has a specific meaning only in a specific social context (Waeber in Lipschutz 1995:10). As such, he has constructed his argument around the views held by consistent constructivists such as Fierke who argue that language use is fundamentally social (Fierke in Dunne et al. 2013:196). Consistent constructivists are not so much concerned with the intentions of individuals, but much more so about the intention expressed in social action. The intention and action of, for instance state representatives, are defined in a public language by socially constructed actors (Fierke in Dunne et al. 2013:196). Consider the case of Bush and the War on Terror. Bin Laden declared jihad on all Americans, and in an abominable act destroyed World Trade Center and the Pentagon claiming thousands of lives of innocent Americans whom he labeled “infidel Crusaders” (Fierke in Dunne et al. 2013:196). By painting the picture of an existential threat to the survival of the American community and labeling the attacks a security threat, Bush securitized the attacks, “elevating it above all others” and “justifie[d] a suspension of the normal rules of politics, allowing elites to take extraordinary measures.” (Fierke in Dunne et al. 2013:196) Constructivists argue by deploying the terms war and security, Bush increased the threat and deepened the conflict (Fierke in Dunne et al. 2013:196). By coining the term ‘War on Terror’, it confused two fields of practice that have traditionally been distinct: war and terror (Fierke in Dunne et al. 2013:196). War was traditionally viewed as interstate conflict with a declared start and end. Terrorism on the other hand traditionally, and in recent times, deals with non-state actors and an area of crime. Fierke posits that: “In naming a war of indefinite duration involving an obscure enemy who is outside of the rules of war, Bush brought the War on Terror into being... [and] gave reasons for a range of acts that would not otherwise have been considered acceptable.” (Fierke in Dunne et al. 2013:196) Declared and potential terrorists were all of a sudden subjected to torture under U.S. law, and they were placed in Guantanamo Bay without charge for years on end because it was outside of U.S. jurisdiction and therefore constituted a legal black hole. International laws like the Geneva Convention were defied, and all of this made possible because the power of language allowed these non-state protagonists to be seen as unconventional soldiers (Fierke in Dunne, Kurki & Smith 2013:196).

In the case of Obama, Jackson (2011) predicted that he would phase out the notion of a “war on terror” to construct it differently from Bush. Coupled with several high-profile policy announcements and initiatives and being awarded the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, investigating his language-use in his development policies becomes all the more relevant (Jackson 2011:391). According to Jackson (2011:407) Obama “is not a norm entrepreneur determined to change the war on terror, but is rather its guardian.” Hence, he concludes that Bush’s practices of the war on terror will continue along their current trajectory (Jackson 2011:407).

4. Methods

4.1 Research Design and Strategy

This research will take form as a mixed-methods approach due to both qualitative and quantitative research methods being employed (Bryman 2012:628). However, the thesis will not utilize a “pure” mixed methods approach seeing as the majority of the focus will be on its qualitative part. The quantitative part was introduced only to buttress the qualitative arguments. There are numerous ways in which mixed-methods research can proceed. In this case, the logic of triangulation will be applied. This approach “implies that the results of an investigation employing a method associated with one research strategy are cross-checked against the results of using a method associated with the other research strategy.” (Bryman 2001:477) The qualitative dimension of this research will encompass a thematic analysis whilst the quantitative dimension will investigate aid flows as the main component of development policy.

4.2 Qualitative

The first part of the research will through a thematic analysis interpret the most relevant speeches and official documents that make up U.S. development policy. Since it has already been established that Bush subordinated development policy to security, we exclusively look at speeches and official documents published under the Obama

Administration. However, to compensate for that limitation and to investigate whether there is a trend from Bush to Obama, the quantitative part in the next section will look at aid flows just before 9/11 until now. The qualitative part aims is to analyze the language and rhetoric used in these documents in order to conclude whether development policy is being subordinated to security policy. Since the documents were published for developmental purposes, a significant mentioning of development can be expected, and possibly even more so than security matters. As such, it would be unfeasible to use formal coding or counting words to establish the degree of securitization because it is simply too blunt. Analyzing the rhetoric and themes of these documents is more in line with securitization theory and the research question, and should highlight the actual meaning behind said documents.

4.3 Quantitative

The second part of the research will use a quantitative approach to look at aid flows from Bush to Obama, starting from the period prior to 9/11 to the present day. Only doing a thematic analysis would be insufficient if the goal is to make inferences about the broader context because it would only look at the theory part of the issue, thereby only considering what the securitizing actors are saying. Adding a quantitative dimension where aid flows are being analyzed is a way to look at the reality: what is actually happening in practice. The reason for using aid flows is because it is a vital dimension of development related work. Arguably, there are equally important parts of development work, however, since the interest lies in finding a trend between Bush to Obama, looking at aid flows suits this purpose. It is also a necessary empirical component for triangulation to be effective.

4.4 Material

The analysis will be centered on 5 different official speeches and policy documents under the Obama Administration, and aid flows data stretching from the years 2000-2015. The analysis is structured according to the material, which is sorted in

chronological order to logically structure the changing views on development throughout the years. Also, organizing the material as such compliments the quantitative data section because it similarly seeks to map out a trend over time. The analysis was not structured according to the indicators of securitization, introduced in a later section, because they will appear in the respective paragraphs in any case. 2 of these 5 texts are speeches delivered by President Obama: one at the Accra International Conference Center held in Ghana 2009 when Obama was relatively new in office, and one at the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Summit held in New York in 2010. The remaining 3 texts are policy documents titled the President's Policy Directive on Global Development (PPD), which discusses the importance of an integrated approach to national security that elevates development as a core pillar of American power; the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which advances steps to better align diplomatic and development capabilities in relation to foreign policy goals; and USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015, which aims to clarify USAID's development priorities. These 5 speeches and documents have been chosen because they are the most vital documents that make up the foundation of U.S. development policy. As such, they directly represent the Administration's views on development. The Ghana speech was included because Obama does not only address Ghanaian development but his entire approach towards development policy in Africa. That carries enough weight to be of relevance to this study. The Millennium Challenge Corporation has been left out on purpose because of impracticality: their annual reports are not easily accessible. Although their reports are available on their website, one can only view them there, in web-form, and without being able to download them. Therefore it makes searching the texts a lot more difficult and tedious. The data has been gathered from the OECD database and shows ODA flows from 2000-2015 in USD. 2000 is the year before Bush was elected, and 2015 is the year with the latest data. The data dimension of the study was added to provide a reality-check to the underlying views in the speeches and policy documents.

4.4.1 Ghana Speech

President Obama's speech in Accra, Ghana addressing the Ghanaian Parliament signified the President's first visit to sub-Saharan Africa since taking office. The speech is relevant to this study because it set the tone for Obama's Africa policy. In the speech he referred to Mr. Bush's "strong efforts" and announced that his Administration had committed \$63 billion to continue along the same lines (The White House 2009). Ghana also constitutes an important development partner to the U.S.

4.4.2 MDG Summit Speech

President Obama's speech in New York was held in conjunction with the MDG Summit 2010 for the purpose of revitalizing the importance of development. The speech is relevant to this study because it is a continuation of his speech in Ghana, which he makes an explicit reference to, except this time it is about the broader development agenda. In fact, Obama presented the new U.S. Global Development Policy as "the first of its kind by an American Administration." (The White House 2010) Therefore, his speech set the tone for the coming years of global development policy.

4.4.3 PPD 2010

The PPD documents are one of the three principle documents that build the core foundation on which U.S. defense, development, and diplomacy policy rests (Miles 2012:29). The PPD was implemented to re-establish development as a core pillar of American power and to re-emphasize the link between international development and national security (Miles 2012:29). Essentially, what the PPD does, which is also one of the reasons why it is of relevance to this study, is placing the State Department in charge of developmental and diplomatic prongs of the strategy.

4.4.4 QDDR 2010

The fact that the State Department was made the leader in the coordination of developmental and diplomatic parts of the strategy urged it to produce a second

document: the QDDR. The QDDR was implemented as State's "blueprint" to enhance "civilian power" on the international stage, and advanced steps on how to become "a better partner to the U.S. military." (Miles 2012:30) The QDDR is relevant because it tries to shift foreign policy from military means to a civilian path. Whether or not it succeeds at doing so remains unanswered.

4.4.5 USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015

The third component of the strategy is the agency USAID. In response to the PDD and the QDDR, the USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015 was drafted to clarify USAID's development priorities. The documents are relevant to this study because they place significant emphasis on poverty and security being linked.

4.4.6 Data

The data was collected from the OECD website and represents the net disbursements of ODA from 2000 to 2015 in USD (millions). These years are important because 2000 is the year prior to Bush's election, and 2015 is the year with the latest data.

4.5 Indicators of Securitization

This section aims to explain which indicators of securitization will be looked for in the speeches and policy documents. It will also explain how and why they were chosen. By using a deductive approach to analyze the material, several key indicators that could potentially establish a degree of securitization were identified.

The first indicators are institutional, administrative, and procedural changes. These refer to establishing new agencies for a specific purpose, for instance the creation of the MCC immediately after 9/11 with the specific aim of disbursing aid to countries of geopolitical importance to the U.S. and their declared War on Terror (Andreasen 2014:16); altering traditional procedures of disbursing aid; and administrative changes,

for instance combining USAID, which traditionally dealt with issues such as poverty reduction, with the State Department to carry out more security-related tasks. These indicators are imperative to this study because they reveal the political agenda of securitizing actors and they also highlight ways in which development policy can be subordinated in very public ways, available to the public in political discourse.

The second indicator is resource allocation. This refers to the diversion of for example foreign aid that is traditionally used for poverty reduction purposes to more security-related ones. Resource allocation also includes the introduction of new security-related programs or measures that are financed by development funds thus take away means that would normally be spent on development activities. This indicator is important to this study because of the quantitative dimension it offers. What the securitizing actors state and what they actually do oftentimes do not align with one another. If for instance Obama talks about the vital role of aid and how it needs to be increased, but in actuality aid is reduced or funneled to other areas, then one can look at the extent of securitization that is occurring vis-a-vis aid flows. In turn, it can be determined whether or not security matters are being prioritized.

The third indicators are the more overarching rhetoric and themes used surrounding the linkage between development and security. These refer to terms and concepts such as poverty and terrorism, and weak and failed states. These indicators are of paramount importance to this study because they act as mirrors to the true intentions of securitizing actors. For instance, linking poverty to terrorism is a well-known way of securitizing an issue and in doing so it displays what is being prioritized.

4.6 Methodological Strengths, Limitations and Delimitations

The strength of the methods in this study is how they seek to corroborate one another. Thematic analysis cannot be used in isolation to make inferences about the broader context. It has to be coupled with theory in order to do so. Such limitations were considered thus a theory dimension was added. Simply doing a thematic analysis is also

unfeasible because it is too common sense driven and therefore not empirical or scientific enough. Bryman highlights another limitation pertaining to the use of thematic analysis and anecdotalism as part of a qualitative approach. He notes that for instance analyzing a striking statement made by someone “may have more significance attached to it than might be warranted in terms of its frequency.” (Bryman 2012:624) This becomes a serious limitation when using thematic analysis if it is not properly accounted for. A quantitative dimension was added to give a sense of reality to such issues. If for instance the policy documents prove that Obama is subordinating development to security matters, analyzing aid flows gives validity to such findings. Hence, the strength of using a mixed approach allows the qualitative and quantitative methods to corroborate one another. They are also essential if triangulation is to be possible. Another limitation is the data available on Iraq (see figure 5.6.2). As Fleck & Kilby (2010:188) argue, Iraq lacks “basic macroeconomic data” some years. However, at the same time, Herrling and Radelet (in Birdsall 2008:277) point out that for instance in 2005, \$4 billion in debt relieve was excluded from Iraq ODA levels. Apparently “Debt relief affects official development assistance figures every year.” (Herrling & Radelet in Birdsall 2008:281)

In order to delimit the scope of this study, several measures have been taken. The research question focuses on the “is” instead of the “how” because the ultimate goal is to establish whether development policy “is” being subordinated to security matters, not looking at “how” securitizing actors justify this subordination. Subsequently, going with a “how” approach assumes that it is already so. Previous studies have established that Bush did that, however, there are no such studies relating to whether or not Obama is doing the same. Thus it is more feasible to explore the “is”. Another delimitation is the type of aid analyzed. Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been chosen as there is accurate, sufficient, and consistent data available on the OECD website. Yet another delimitation is the years selected for the analysis of aid flows. No earlier years than 2000 were selected because the interest lies in investigating the period from Bush to Obama, and Bush was inaugurated in 2001. Therefore, 2000-2015 will provide a good overview of this trend. The study has been further delimited by only looking at one chapter in the QDDR. The QDDR is around 220 pages long and is very security centered. Chapter 3

was therefore chosen because it is more relevant to this study as it explains which aspects of development work have been changed under the Obama Administration.

5. Analysis

5.1 Ghana

President Obama's speech in Ghana is a good place to start because he explains America's views on African development policy, which are similar to Bush's. His speech can be divided into three parts: sustainable democratic governments, supporting development that provides opportunity for more people, and conflict. Unfortunately, the Ghanaian speech does not offer enough insight on the institutional and resource indicators of securitization. The overarching themes and rhetoric, however, are clear thus the next section will be structured accordingly.

The first two parts of his speech do not "dwell on security" matters, even though "his biggest headaches in Africa, as for Mr. Bush, do still relate to armed conflict." (The Economist 2009) What they do reveal, however, is that Obama's policy will be similar to Bush's. Obama makes an explicit reference to the "strong efforts" of Bush, and announced that his administration would commit \$63 billion in aid to the African continent (The White House 2009). Exactly what this money is going to be used for is not explained.

As for the conflict section, several themes stand out. First, unlike Bush, Obama avoids using the contested notion of the War on Terror and instead talks about peaceful conflict resolution through sustainable democratic governments. This highlights a "difference in strategic direction and rhetorical packaging from his predecessor." (Jackson 2011:401) Second, just because he avoids this notion it does not mean that Obama is planning on shifting development policy. On the contrary, he is planning on doing the exact same thing as Bush. Obama stated that: "... we encourage the vision of a strong regional security architecture that can bring effective, transnational forces to bear

when needed. America has a responsibility to work with you as a partner to advance this vision...” (The White House 2009) One word stands out in this passage: “partner”. Obama makes clear in his speech that in order to be a partner of the U.S., two things must be upheld above all others: following the principles of democracy, and development depends on good governance. In a later part of his speech, Obama says: “And that’s why we stand ready to partner through diplomacy and technical assistance and logistical support...” (The White House 2009) Once again, the partner role is emphasized. But why is this important? In the PPD, which will be explained later in further detail, one of Obama’s three pillars of his strategy is strengthening American’s role as a partner. Specifically, resources will be allocated and prioritized to countries that reward good governance. In that same document, Obama pledges to increase funds to the MCC, which rewards partners that help America achieve strategic and military goals and promote good governance. The good governance rhetoric used as a justification to disburse aid was indeed used by Bush as well. This suggests that Obama, by using the language of “partner”, essentially says “either you are with us or against us”, the same War on Terror rhetoric used by Bush (Murphy 2003:616). It is difficult to extrapolate to what extent securitization has occurred based on his speech because institutional changes and resource allocation are not mentioned. Then again, Obama is unlikely to go into details in a speech. A speech is a good starting point to see how he “sells” his policy to the American public and to the rest of the world (Jackson 2011:390). The official policy documents can then be analyzed to see how statements made by state representatives are translated into practice.

5.2 MDG

President Obama’s speech at the MDG Summit introduces the new U.S. Global Development Policy (PPD), which according to Obama is “the first of its kind by any American administration.” (The White House 2010) Obama makes a conscious effort not to turn this speech into an issue of security. Nonetheless, the few times he does mention it, he makes striking statements. As with the Ghanaian speech, the MDG speech does not

offer much on the institutional and resource indicators of securitization. The next section is therefore organized according to the overarching themes and rhetoric.

Early on in the speech, but not in a way that it sets the tone for the rest of it, Obama says: “My national security strategy recognizes development not only as a moral imperative, but a strategic and economic imperative.” (The White House 2010) In just one sentence, he makes a stark connection between development and security. He then says: “progress even in the poorest countries can advance the prosperity and security of people far beyond their borders, including my fellow Americans.” (The White House 2010) Obama demonstrates that the role of development ultimately is to provide security at home. In the Administration’s view, poverty and poor living conditions provide safe havens for terrorists and extremism, which threatens democracy and the American people. This logic was used time and time again by the Bush Administration, and has continued with Obama: “When fathers cannot provide for their families, it feeds the despair that can fuel instability and violent extremism.” (The White House 2010) This quote illustrates that view, which has only been exacerbated in the post-9/11 world.

Another theme that stands out, which was touched upon in the Ghana speech is the MCC. As previously mentioned, the role of the MCC was to reward governments facilitating U.S. strategic goals. This both undermines and securitizes development, and shows that Obama is willing to continue doing what Bush did. According to Ryan and Bernard (2003 in Bryman 2012:580), repetition is a good way of identifying a theme. The MCC is mentioned in numerous speeches and policy documents, often in relation to good governance and promoting democratic values. Framing an issue in such a manner is a way for state representatives to “[sell] policies to the public” as a “political technology” for the achievement of specific interests” (Laffey and Weldes 1997 in Jackson 2011:291).

5.3 PPD

The next section will be structured according to the indicators of securitization since they are more apparent and detailed. In the PPD, the Obama Administration introduces

the three main focus areas of U.S. development policy: sustainable development outcomes, a new operational model, and a modern architecture (PPD 2010:6). The first and second areas are clear in its development groundings: economic growth, democratic governance, innovations, and resource allocation to health and food issues. The third area however reverts back to matters of security. By “a modern architecture” the Administration refers to elevating development as a core pillar of U.S. foreign policy. It becomes clear what the Obama Administrations intentions are in the next passage: “This Policy Directive seeks to forge a new and lasting bipartisan consensus on development policy within the broader context of our National Security.” (PPD 2010:6) Interestingly, next, the document touches on “development agenda set in place by recent administrations.” In fact, Obama explicitly makes a reference to the MCC and argues that: “Critical, too, is a commitment to enhancing the capabilities of the Millennium Challenge Corporation...” (PPD 2010:15) This is the first time Obama mentions the MCC in official development policy documents. Therefore, the fact that he pledges to allocate resources to the MCC means there will be a budgetary trade-off, which suggests that funds will either be increased or reallocated from traditional development-related activities. In his defense, unlike Bush, Obama recognized the importance of coordinating efforts between USAID and U.S. development policy generally. At least so he states. In actuality, Obama further securitized development policy by enhancing the link between USAID, an agency traditionally only dealing with development-related tasks, with the State Department. Such a clear sign of securitization was made possible because Obama employed the language of the development-security nexus, linking poverty to terrorism. He played on Bush’s use of language to turn this issue into a speech act, which “enables emergency measures and the suspension of ‘normal politics’ in dealing with that issue.” (McDonald 2008:567) He then created the QDDR, a study by the State Department led by Hillary Clinton, and placed the State Department in charge of developmental and diplomatic prongs of his national security strategy. Obama also established the Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) on Global Development, but instead of making it development-led, the National Security Staff (NSS) was put in charge of it. These institutional, procedural and administrative changes highlight a further degree of securitization by changing traditional development practices.

Several overarching themes were identified in the document. The opening statement of the PPD immediately sets the tone: “In pursuit of a U.S. National Security Strategy ... my Administration views development as a strategic, economic, and moral imperative. To advance American interests, development is both an outcome we seek and a core capability in our toolkit.” (PPD 2010:4) Already in the first paragraph, President Obama makes it clear that development and security are inextricably linked. In fact, development is referred to as a “toolkit” hinting at the fact that development is seen as a part of a “security package”. Keeping in mind that this is the leading document of Obama’s development policy, this is damning evidence. In the following paragraph, an “aggressive development agenda” and “commensurate resources” is supposed to “... help us stop conflicts and counter global criminal networks.” (PPD 2010:4) Once again development is linked to security as a tool to be used to achieve a security goal. The following paragraph states: “Development is thus indispensable in the forward defense of America’s interests in a world shaped by... the persistent weakness of fragile states ... and risks posed by transnational threats.” (PPD 2010:4) At this point security has been mentioned so many times that one cannot help but wonder whether this is in fact a security document. Here, “weak” and “fragile” states are mentioned in relation to development, and so are “transnational threats”. The positive construction of the development-security nexus rhetoric is thus emphasized. Furthermore the next sentence mentions “poverty” as the last development-related problem. Whether this is done on purpose or not is questionable. The point to be made here is that “weak” and “fragile” states are being linked to “poverty”. It reveals that Obama is using the same language and rhetoric as his predecessor in justifying his security priorities, using development as a means of fulfilling them. The next sentence states: “The successful pursuit of development is essential to advancing our national security objectives ... Our investments in development – and the politics we pursue to support development – can ... facilitate the stabilization of countries emerging from crisis or conflict...” (PPD 2010:4) Yet again, there is conclusive evidence that development represents a part of a larger security agenda. The next page continues along the same lines: “... we elevate development as a core pillar of America’s power, we must ensure that our distinct development, diplomacy,

and defense efforts mutually reinforce and complement one another in an integrated comprehensive approach.” (PPD 2010:5)

As the PPD shows, development is clearly securitized and as such subordinated to security matters. Using the indicators of securitization, this becomes extremely evident. Institutional changes such as making the MCC more prolific, adding more security-related tasks to USAID’s agenda, and placing the State Department in the driver’s seat of development-related work show the extent of securitization that has taken place. The Administration has stated that recourses will be increased to the MCC, an organization that has been associated with security-related matters since its launch, and that resources will be increased to fund the IPC. Moreover, several key themes have been identified. Several explicit references to the National Security Strategy were made, viewing development as part of a “security package”. “Weak”, “failing” and “fragile” states were mentioned several times in relation to issues such as “hunger” and “poverty”, and “conflict” and “transnational crime” were identified as issues to be included in an aggressive development agenda.

5.4 QDDR

When it comes to the indicators of securitization, the QDDR is ridden with them. Therefore, this section will be structured according to them. As discussed in the delimitations, the QDDR is a 217-page document. The most relevant chapter was therefore chosen for the analysis, which is chapter 3 *Elevating and Transforming Development to Deliver Results*.

The first indicator is institutional, administrative and procedural changes. This is a huge part of the QDDR, as one of its chief tasks is to rebuild USAID as the U.S. government’s lead development agency, and as “the world’s premier development agency.” (QDDR 2010:76) Obviously, this is an extremely ambitious and monumental task, and an agency of that magnitude will undoubtedly carry a lot of weight. That is not something that USAID would be capable of doing by itself. Hence Obama forged a tie

between the State Department and USAID, a fact that the QDDR discusses all throughout the document. The QDDR reveals that USAID has established a Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance, housed within the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (QDDR 2010:90). This suggests that the new Center will to a large extent be security-driven, just like the IPC on Global Development was established and structured around the National Security Staff (NSS). As a result, a traditional development-oriented agency like USAID is securitized because institutional, administrative and procedural changes take place to refocus the attention away from development towards security. Another change that has taken place is the emphasis on humanitarian assistance. A new framework called the International Operational Response Framework was created to meet the demands of the new agenda. Basically, the new framework will expand the scope of cooperation so that USAID can work with other agencies in order to better meet the challenges of complex crises and conflicts. Although such a change might sound logical, it risks undermining traditional development-related issues such as poverty alleviation because it redirects resources towards security-related tasks. Alongside the new framework, State and USAID announced that they would set up a Humanitarian Policy Working Group to “strengthen the international humanitarian architecture for a more effective response to disaster and complex crises.” (QDDP 2010:91) The same can be said about the new group as for the new framework in terms of undermining development. Furthermore, USAID and State have initiated the development of a National Action Plan to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace, and security and by creating a taskforce relating to their work on Afghanistan (QDDR 2010:93). Essentially, this expands the agenda of USAID to address issues such as trafficking, gender-based violence, and peace and security.

Additionally, and perhaps the final nail in the coffin in blurring the lines between development and security is the establishment of the Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning (PPL), a Bureau responsible for guiding policy relating to issues such as, global health, food security, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorism (QDDR 2010:109). This is something that Miles (2012) discusses. He poses the question: “How does an organization that most Americans would associate with providing food to hungry people in the Third World get restructured to countering violent extremism?” (Miles 2012:34)

According to Miles, initiatives to counter violent extremism, especially under the War on Terror banner, have been coming from USAID for many years. For instance, deploying an interagency team to Chad to make programmatic recommendations based on the notion that “extremism and support for terror are fueled by widespread poverty, unemployment, and failing educational systems...” (Miles 2012:35) That initiative was followed by several unpublished documents which in turn led to USAID documents entitled “Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism” and “Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming” (Miles 2012:36). Such early signs of a large focus on security, and the fact that USAID was created by Kennedy to “[promote] American values and advancing global security” point to the conclusion that USAID and the general view on development has to some extent always been tied to U.S. security interests. Also, the QDDR clearly illustrates that such views are still very much a reality today.

The second indicator is resource allocation, specifically the diversion of resources from for instance foreign aid to more security-related matters. Once again, the QDDR is ridden with such securitization indicators. To set the stage, “USAID has invested more resources to advance democracy and human rights than any other development agency.” (QDDR 2010:90) In addition, USAID made an assurance to substantially increase investments in three areas: developing human rights policy, working with local partners to make fragile democracies more responsive to their people, and advancing sound governance (QDDR 2010:90). Noticeably, “fragile democracies” stands out, as it involves reallocating resources to conflict areas and security issues. It is also a reoccurring theme in all the Obama documents and even in the documents of his predecessors.

In 2006, Secretary Rice appointed Randall Tobias and reformed how USAID and State distributed foreign assistance resources. In essence, he created a new agency specifically designed to manage such resources. Interestingly, Owusu (2007:19) points out that before Tobias was appointed, he was the CEO of Eli Lilly and Co, a large pharmaceutical company. Apparently, health activists opposed his appointment on the grounds that “his plans to integrate aid with security goals [would] threaten USAID

humanitarian principles.” The Obama Administration has taken a different approach, and made it more State centric (QDDR 2010:119). This means that any plans to distribute foreign assistance resources now has to be approved by members of State, which according to the indicators of securitization further securitizes a crucial component of development-related work. Resources now risk being taken away from more traditional development issues such as poverty alleviation. So make no mistakes, although Obama has pledged to increase foreign aid, this by no means guarantees that such funds will be spent purely on development activities.

The last indicator is one that appears in every Obama document and speech as well: the MCC. Early in the chapter, sharp emphasis is put on the importance of broad-based economic growth. To achieve favorable results, significant resources have been spent on creating an Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, and Environment (QDDR 2010:89). The efforts of the new body will be “closely [aligned] with those of the Millennium Challenge Corporation...” (QDDR 2010:89) As Obama has demonstrated in his speeches and other documents, he likes to exploit the rhetoric of “partners” just like Bush did, which gives a sense of legitimacy and justification in disbursing aid to cooperating governments through the MCC. As such, Obama stated: “To meet our goals, we must be more selective and focus our efforts where we have the best partners and where we can have the greatest impact.” (QDDR 2010:87). This quote, coupled with the continuous mentioning of the MCC suggests that the MCC and USAID will continue to “reward” governments that cooperate with the U.S. on issues of security as the lines between security and development continue to be blurred.

5.5 USAID

The USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015 serves as a natural transition from the PPD and QDDR as it seeks to “translate the PPD-6 and the QDDR into more detailed operational principles” (USAID 2011:Foreword). Hence, one can expect the language in the document to be similar in nature. This section will be delimited to the thematic indicators. This is because institutional and resource changes have already been explained


in the QDDR section. In the opening statement of the document, the current development environment in the world is contextualized: "... our world remains an uncertain and dangerous place ... negative economic growth has left expectations unmet, which can feed disaffection, extremism, and violence." (USAID 2011:1) Development is once again elevated as a key component of American power, along with defense and diplomacy. "Fragile" and "conflict-affected" countries constitute a large portion of the document, as they are linked to "transnational crime" and "terrorism". The document advances the seven core principles of USAID. Six out of these seven principles can be classified as traditional development issues. The seventh one, however, is to "Prevent and Respond to Crises, Conflict, and Instability: Applying Development Approaches In Fragile and Conflict-affected States." (USAID 2011:II) It is worth noting that this principle is mentioned last, as if to draw as little attention away from USAID's traditional focus on development as possible. In this principle, the part that sticks out is the bullet point "Apply sustainable development approaches with our interagency partners to address security and development challenges in key national security countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq." (USAID 2011:II) The three countries mentioned are the main areas where aid was disbursed to under the Bush Administration. The word "partner" is used again. Another reoccurring theme is the MCC: "We are deepening our collaboration with the Millennium Challenge Corporation in countries where we both have programs supporting growth to better leverage each other's investments and increase our collective impact." (USAID 2011:23) Other than these reoccurring themes, nothing in the document is particularly striking or new. However, to give a sense of reality to the language in this document, a quantitative dimension that investigates the current levels of aid disbursements is needed. The top 5 recipients are also included (see figure 5.6.2).

5.6 Data

As McDonald (2008:568) posits: "...an exclusive focus on language is problematic in the sense that it can exclude forms of bureaucratic practices or physical action that do not merely follow from securitizing 'speech acts' but are part of the process through which meanings of security are communicated and security itself constructed." Following that

logic, a quantitative section was added. What figure 5.6.1 makes clear is that aid has been rising steadily since the appointment of Bush, with the exception of 2007 when the Global Financial Crisis struck the world. The Bush era increase, however, was concentrated to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and other allies in the War on Terror (Herrling & Radelet in Birdsall 2008:274). The question is then: has Obama followed this trend? As figure 5.6.1 points out, ODA levels have increased on a yearly basis since Obama took office with the exception of late 2012 – early 2013. The table (5.6.2) indicates the top 5 recipients of ODA during the years 2001, 2005, and 2014. 2001 is the year Bush took office, 2005 is the year where the most ODA was disbursed during his time, and 2014 represents the period with the highest ODA levels. Clearly, the top recipients during the Obama Administration remain countries involved in the War on Terror. In fact, aid to Iraq accounted for nearly one-third of all U.S foreign assistance 2005 and 2006 (Herrling & Radelet in Birdsall 2008:277). According to Herrling & Radelet (in Birdsall 2008:277) the increase to conflict areas can be largely attributed to the fact that the Department of Defense (DoD) was responsible for 22 percent of U.S. foreign assistance “making it one of the largest foreign assistance agencies within the U.S government.” Such institutional shifts have raised concerns about the lack of development expertise in the DoD and a fear of further fragmentation of programs across the U.S. government (Herrling & Radelet in Birdsall 2008:277). Obama has only securitized the situation more by enhancing the link between the State Department and USAID.

5.6.1 Net disbursements of U.S. ODA in million dollars



5.6.2 Top 5 recipients of U.S. ODA in million dollars

| Recipient | 2001 | 2005 | 2014 | Average |
|-------------|------|-------|------|---------|
| Iraq | ? | 11228 | 357 | 3862 |
| Afghanistan | 8 | 1318 | 1928 | 1085 |
| Pakistan | 776 | 323 | 696 | 598 |
| Ethiopia | 94 | 609 | 665 | 456 |
| Colombia | 275 | 449 | 322 | 349 |

6. Conclusion & Discussion

This study has investigated whether the development policy under President Obama is being subordinated to matters of security. To achieve that, his most important development policy has been analyzed in chronological order using the Copenhagen School's theory of securitization. Several indicators of securitizations were created to establish the degree of securitization that has taken place, which were then cross-referenced with ODA flows prior to the election of Bush until 2015. In viewing the documents and looking at aid flows for the past 15 years, a clear trend has emerged. President Obama's development policy is being subordinated to security matters. Although Obama has phased out the War on Terror language, as Jackson (2011) points out, Obama is not a norm entrepreneur who intends on changing the War on Terror launched by Bush, but rather its guardian. As the institutional, administrative, and procedural changes indicator demonstrates, Obama has securitized development policy by expanding the role of the MCC, completely restructured a traditional development agency like USAID into a vastly security-oriented agency now led by the State Department, created the IPC, and created the PPL which incorporates counterterrorism and insurgency into the USAID agenda. Further securitization has been caused by resource indicators such as creating the QDDR study, increasing funds to the MCC, and reallocating resources to USAID's newfound focus on fragile democratic states. When it comes to overarching themes, many were identified. First, Obama has made it clear that development, security, and diplomacy go hand-in-hand, and are ultimately "tools" to be used to achieve the goals set out in the National Security Strategy. Second, Obama uses the same "partner" rhetoric as Bush, and reemphasizes the importance of the MCC. By

being a “partner” of the U.S., a nation has to show commitments to uphold the principles of democracy and good governance. Upon completing such goals or at least showing good will to do so, there will be a reward. When reviewing the speeches and policy documents, it becomes clear what such a reward is and how it is disbursed: aid through the MCC. Third, Obama uses the same development-security nexus rhetoric as Bush, which has further blurred the lines between the two domains. “Weak”, “fragile”, and “failing states” are linked to “poverty”, “terrorism”, and “transnational crime”. By painting the picture of an illegitimate and existential threat to the survival of the American community and labeling such threats a matter of security, Obama has managed to move the development discourse into the field of security, which has suspended the normal rules of politics, allowing him and his Administration to take extraordinary measures. Resources that could have been spent on traditional development related problems such as poverty alleviation have instead been diverted to combatting terrorism, responding to complex crises, and preventing gender-based violence. Such resource reallocations have become legitimized because in turning matters into a speech act, it has been approved by the audience, in this case the American population, and indeed by many world leaders around the globe. The clear signs of securitization cannot be extrapolated to make inferences about the broader context without the use of triangulation made possible by the quantitative dimension in this study. The data buttresses the view that development policy under Obama has continued along the same trend as the policy under Bush, because it shows a steady increase of ODA to the same recipients. Particularly to Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Where, then, should future studies be headed? As the world faces new threats from terrorist organization like ISIS, it would be interesting to investigate how that reality affects development policy, especially since ODA numbers are yet to be completed for 2016. Future studies should place greater emphasis on the MCC, as the role of such an agency has been stressed in every speech and document analyzed in this study.

As for the War on Terror, it too will one day experience the same fate as the Cold War and come to an end. If things continue along the same trajectory as today, however, we cannot expect this in the near future.

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