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The Online Network of Ethnonationalism:

Exploring the discursive frames of the extreme right in Finland

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Abstract

This thesis explores the structure and discursive frames in the rhetoric of the online extreme right network in Finland. Departing from the constraints of identity and ideology, the individual nodes are seen as a part of a network that mobilizes on the basis of shared discourses. Social network analysis is utilized to explore the structure and connections of the extreme right. This is followed by qualitative content analysis of the main self-identification doctrines that provides further insight on the shared principal issues in the network. These are understood through collective action frames and framing process analysis that shows how these groups understand their external reality and construct their political communication strategically to mobilize supporters. This results in identifying the main shared discursive frames of the network as populism, anti-modernism, ethnonationalism, and xenohobia. Even if there are peculiar differences between the groups, ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-establishment populism is the dominating discursive master frame of the extreme right network in Finland. Furthermore, the findings suggest that even though the Finnish extreme right is only loosely connected nationally, the majority have global connections. This emphasizes the transnationalization of the extreme right over the internet and urges for more research on these social structures.

Key words: Social movements, social network analysis, collective action frames, extreme right

Word count: 19441

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List of abbreviations

FDL	Finnish Defence League
ICT	Information and communication technology
RK	Rajat Kiinni (Close the Borders)
SE	Suomi Ensi (Finland First)
SMO	Social movement organization
SNA	Social network analysis
SS	Suomen Sisu
SVL	Suomen Vastarintaliike (Finnish Resistance Movement)
QCA	Qualitative content analysis

1 Introduction

Over the last few decades, processes of social modernization and thrusts of globalization have provided a ground for rapid increase in the political activity and media visibility of the highly diverse extreme right movements in the Western politics (Heitmeyer 2003:399, Tateo 2005). Recently, many far-right populist parties have been gaining popularity across Europe, giving space for other more radical extreme right organizations to rise (Kantor 2016). They are increasingly utilizing the information and communication technologies (ICT) to expand beyond national borders and create connections (Caiani and Kröll 2015:331). This creates new important research problems that arise from the ideological evolution of extreme right and the construction of a communication network facilitated by internet (Tateo 2005). Internet creates a new space for the groups to operate in by facilitating connections globally. It is important to understand how connected these groups are to each other online and what do they share in common, despite their ideological differences. Even if the rise of right-wing has been researched previously, conceptualizing them as a social movement with focus on their discursive frames, rather than ideologies, is still under-researched (Della Porta et. al. 2012, Caiani and Kröll 2015, Bennett 2012). This is even more relevant in the context of Finland, where the research on the extreme right is limited to more historical and descriptive accounts on the ideology of extreme right (see for example Koivulaakso et. al. 2012). With a focus on the collective aspect of extreme right and conceptualization as a network, their rhetoric can be understood in common terms beyond their differences. This enables to look on what issues and discourses they share in common in their rhetoric portraying their common understanding of reality. This is important as these groups unlikely exist in a vacuum, but rather belong to a larger network of like-minded organizations.

This research aims to build on this holistic account of extreme right by using explorative research design and mixed methods with a focus on the online network and shared discursive frames in the rhetoric of the extreme right movement in Finland. I will firstly employ social network analysis (SNA) to

explore the structure of the online network and connections of the extreme right by treating hyperlinks on their web sources as ties of affinities (Burris and Strahm 2005). This helps to identify the central actors of the network and the general structure on the national and global level. Secondly, qualitative content analysis (QCA) of the main self-identification doctrines of the central actors will provide further insight of the shared principal issues[1] and discourses in the network. The focus is on *how*, not only what, they communicate their political message showing the selected perceived reality. This will show how they represent themselves to the society through construction of salient and central discursive frames representing their understanding of reality with aim to mobilize supporters. This is done through exploring the collective actions frames in the rhetoric; diagnostic (punctuation of the problem and attribution of blame), prognostic (articulation of solution) and motivational frame (motivating participation). The findings of the research suggest that even if there are peculiar differences between the groups, they form a loosely connected network of like-minded groups, mobilizing on shared discourses of anti-modernism, populism, ethnonationalism, and xenophobia. These groups share certain principal issues in their rhetoric and portray a similar understanding of reality that unites in the master discursive frame of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-establishment populism. Moreover, the majority of this network is connected to global like-minded groups, stressing the transnationalization of extreme right and importance of considering global connections even further.

1.1 Purpose and research questions

The purpose of this thesis is to explore shared discursive frame of the extreme right network in the Finnish context. This is important because by conceptualizing the extreme right as a social network, ideologically different groups can be analyzed as a part of the same entity. This enables to look beyond their ideological emphasis to the issues they share in common in their rhetoric. Social actors do not exist in a vacuum, but rather in a dynamic interaction with other

[1] The main topics that these groups share in common

social actors (Flesher 2013:14). Therefore focusing on how these interactions between different extreme right groups form a structure and shared conception of reality can move us beyond their differences. Furthermore, framing process approach has the capacity to demonstrate how individuals become involved in collective action, highlighting the interplay between agency and structure in the development of social movements (Moussa 2012:404). More traditionally, the extreme right has been looked through the analytical lenses of identity and ideology in their geographical context (Mudde 2002) rather than departing from social movement theories with a focus on social networks in the context of the internet. By understanding structures of these extremist social networks and their shared political advocacy in the infrastructure of Internet can help us understand the groups themselves even further (Della Porta et. al 2012:55). Thus, to understand the extreme right in the Finnish context, the extreme right will be conceptualized as a social movement with network structure providing a holistic account on their principal issues. Then the focus will be directed towards their rhetoric and understanding of reality through the use of collective action frames. To support this research focus, the research questions are as follows:

1. To what extent are Finnish extreme right online movements connected with other similar groups at the national and international level?
2. How do they construct salient and central collective action frames to mobilize supporters online?

These questions will be answered through using mixed methods approach with explorative research design. The first research question focuses on the structure and connections of the network with a purpose to see the overall configuration and identify central actors of the Finnish extreme right with SNA. As scholars of the field have claimed, these extreme right movements are utilizing the internet to expand beyond national borders creating transnational cyber-communities of like-minded individuals (Caiani and Kröll 2015: 331). The first question can show how the Finnish networks are embedded in this larger picture. However, as social world consists of more than just social structures, it is important to look beyond

the structural constraints (Scott and Carrington 2011). The second question helps to move beyond the structures by providing insight on the shared principal issues in the rhetoric of the central actors of the extreme right network with QCA. These will be understood through framing process approach that builds on the principal issues by conceptualizing them as collective action frames. These collective action frames help to identify central and salient master frame through identification of problems, attribution of blame, articulation of solution and motivation to encourage participation. Moreover, salient and central collective action frames connect these principal issues to a larger belief system and are essential for mobilization purposes. Through these two questions, the thesis presents a comprehensive overview of the extreme right movements in Finland and provides insight of the structure, connections, shared principal issues, and framing efforts online.

1.2 Relevance to Global studies

The last few decades have seen a rapid increase in the right-wing extreme across the Western societies which is much to do with social modernization, the developing structures of the nation states, and intensifying globalization (Heitmeyer 2003:399). Even if it seems that certain movements are mobilizing on a local level, the influential factors and connections are increasingly global. Global influences are even further accelerated through internet (Caiani and Kröll 2015: 331). Internet facilitates a growing number of global networks, and the local groups are rarely functioning only at a local level, but connected to this global network for their benefits (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2001). Thus, globalization[2] is both bless and a curse for these groups. It is bless through opening up the opportunities and expanding the reality where these groups can exist through creating a global network of like-minded connections. In contrast, it is a curse as it brings in uncontrollable influences to the national landscape, not only these like-minded social relations. To understand the bigger picture, it is important first to

[2] Without going deeper into the definitional debates of globalization, herein globalization is understood as deterritorialization defined by Scholte: "'reconfiguration of geography, social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places" (2000:45) or "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities" (Giddens 1999 in ibid)

explore and understand the domestic details of the phenomena. Finland, being a home to some globalized extreme right groups (e.g. Soldiers of Odin) and lacking academic research with social movement focus, offers a fruitful case for the study. This thesis will not go into details in researching the global connections of the Finnish extreme right network, but it will provide a platform for the future research could build on. Without knowing what is happening at the local level, feasible research on the international and global level cannot be conducted.

1.3 Brief background to the case study

The violent right-wing extremism in Finland is rather small, according to the Finnish Intelligence Services (Interim 2015). However, they highlight that the recent refugee influx gives potential to the growth of islamophobia and extreme right organizations in Finland (ibid). Further introduction to the existing actors will not be given, as this becomes clear throughout the chapter 4, where the network is introduced with a focus on the central actors. Nonetheless, there are two relevant points for understanding the opportunities of extreme right operations in Finland; the general nationalist attitude based on historical precursors, and the electoral success of True Finns, a right-wing populist political party.

Firstly, in Finland, the attitude towards the extreme right and their ideas is to some degree more permissive and moderate than in other European countries, which is influenced by a stronger nationalist tradition (Kotonen in Lakka 2015, my translation). This strong nationalism is influenced by the history of Finland, and mostly the Winter War in 1939-1940 where Finland defended their independence against Russia. The Winter War has had a great impact in the Finnish society as one of the most important historical precursor, and its effects have been felt widely in the Finnish society (Suomi 2014, my translation). Winter War represents a symbolic value of incredibly persistent courage to defend something that you truly believe in (ibid). There is a special word for this in the Finnish language: *sisu*, which can be roughly translated to courage, persistence, resilience, willpower, and strength (Länsimäki 2003, my translation). It does not have a

direct translation to English, but it is a big part of the Finnish national identity. Traditionally it is connected to the national heroes of the war-time, understood to be unique to Finnish people (ibid), and due to this attribute, the underdog of the war was able to come out to the other side as a winner fighting for their Fatherland in the Winter War. Even though persistence and courage are not characteristics only applicable to Finnish people, it embodies the glorified attribute that Finnish people feel unique to their national identity; not giving up in front a challenge that feels impossible to overcome (Lahti in Yle 2014, my translation). This term has been adapted in the name of one of the Finnish extreme right groups: Suomen Sisu (Finnish Sisu), thus embodying a highly cultural and national connotation. Glorifying this successful past, strong patriotism and nationalism are visible in the general discourse and attitude of Finnish people.

Secondly, the electoral success of the True Finns can be seen further boosting the nationalist focus. Their party politics are described even as racist and chauvinist towards the immigrants and refugees, and their main political manifestation is on anti-immigration tenets (Poohl et. al. 2012:38, my translation). The anti-immigration movement in Finland grew during the 2000s, giving a platform for the True Finns claim their place; from 2006 onwards the popularity increased leading to election victories in European Parliamentary elections during 2009 and Parliamentary success during 2011 (ibid:37-38). These victories gave rise and legitimacy to other actors such as Suomen Sisu, a nationalist political organization, and the anti-immigrant movement at large (ibid:38). The election success of True Finns also made anti-immigrant rhetoric, or critical attitude towards immigrants, more acceptable in the society as a whole and in the everyday language of people (Raittila in Koivulaakso et. al. 2012:180-109, my translation). Making the overall Finnish political atmosphere more right-wing can be seen as a major achievement of True Finns (ibid:261). Without going deeper into the role of True Finns in the society, it is important to see their influence in boosting the mobilization of the extreme right movement in Finland through legitimizing more radical dialogue in the politics and the society at whole. This

opening of the political atmosphere can contribute to the rise of other more radical actors.

1.4 Disposition

This is thesis will begin by introducing the combined literature review and theoretical framework. These are discussed in parallel, as the literature review underpins the important developments of the concepts in the theoretical framework. There are two main parts in the chapter 2 *Theoretical Framework*: (1) the definition, terminology, and conceptualization of the extreme right; and (2) the development of (online) social movements and the construction of the collective action frames. This is followed by presenting transparently how this study was conducted through mixed methods, namely SNA and QCA, in chapter 3 *Methodology and methods*. The chapter 4 *Analysis* will firstly discuss the structure and connections of the network, and secondly assess the empirical material from the extreme right groups with the focus on the shared principal issues, and their diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames as well as the how these frames form the overall master frame. Lastly, chapter 5 *Conclusion* critically discusses the findings and suggests possible directions for future research. On the basis of the findings, the conclusion of this research is that even though there are peculiar differences between the extreme right groups, they form a highly transnational loosely connected network in which the central discursive frame is constructed with elements of xenophobic ethnonationalism and anti-establishment populism.

2 Theoretical framework

This theoretical framework aims to give a research review of the related literature of extreme right and social movement theory, as well as clarify the theoretical concepts and tools of the framing process theory used for the analysis. Firstly, I will review the literature around the contested definition and typology of extreme right using the identity and ideology literature as a departure points, moving towards extreme right classification as a social movement. The most important operationalization for the analysis is the establishment of strong definition of the extreme right. Secondly, I will review the literature around social movements and how it has developed from traditional collective action to personalized connective action to facilitate analysis of online movements and the growing influence of internet. Thirdly, the framing process and collective action frame approach will be introduced with emphasis on the construction of salient extreme right master frames. This provides the main theoretical tools utilized in the analysis section allowing exploring the way the groups construct their political messages through punctuation of problem, attribution of blame, articulating a solution and motivating mobilization. Through these stages the aim is to have a clear definition of the object of the study, clear conceptualization of theoretical tenets, and the most important tools for the analysis.

2.1 Defining the extreme right

"*We know who they are, but we do not know what they are*"
(Mudde 2007:7)

Increasing amounts of scholars are interested in various aspects of extreme right groups developing approaches beyond the more traditional identity and ideological understanding. One of these approaches is to conceptualize the extreme right as a social movement and look at the how they construct a shared meaning over the internet hence providing a more holistic account (see for example Della Porta et. al. 2012, Caiani and Parenti 2011, Tateo 2005). However,

this type of research has not been done in the Finnish context before. In Finland, the most recent literature has focused more on the historical accounts providing descriptive details of the development of extreme right ideology in contemporary Finland (Koivulaakso et. al 2012). Despite being a major contribution to the study of extreme right in Finland, it ignores the holistic structure of these groups that looks beyond their ideological differences. Other research has focused on single group, the right-wing populist political party, True Finns, discussing their ideology and political success (see e.g. Arter 2010) leaving out other non-party organizations and the networked connections between the groups. This highlights the need to expand the field with a more holistic research focusing on the structure of the network and their shared discursive frames.

Before going into definition of the extreme right, it is important to clarify the terminology: what is the object of the study, and what should we call it. In the extreme right literature there is a clear "terminological chaos and…absence of clear conceptual framework" (Mudde 2007: 11- 14). Gidron addresses that this is partially due to the fact that the term has been used to describe variety of entities such as "political movements, parties, ideologies, and leaders across geographical, historical, and ideological contexts" (Gidron 2013:2-3). Scholars in the field focus on different entities in different contexts when defining the extreme right, as the term is not bound on singular group or context. In this research, the focus of this thesis is on a social movement including a variety of actors. Extreme right is conceptualized as a social movement as (1) social network, based on (2) shared beliefs, which mobilize on (3) controversial issues, through (4) various forms of protest (Tateo 2005). This stresses the focus on shared beliefs in a social network including variety of social movement organizations (SMO), not limited to their ideological direction or political status.

Adding on to the terminological chaos, scholars have not agreed on the terms to use to describe the actual extreme right. The literature includes terms such as extreme right; radicalized right-wing; far-right; radical populist and ultra-nationalist, to mention few (Mudde 2007:11-12). Although the terms differ, the

underlying assumptions are similar. For the purposes of this thesis, the term extreme right is adopted. This is the most frequently appearing term in European non-Anglo-Saxon research (Kopeček 2007). Moreover, as this thesis is interested in the notion of extremist political expression and movement, the term of extreme right seems suitable for this paper, as opposed to "radical" or "far" that implies strong connection to the political spectrum (Bush 1963:64). Extreme right is neutral enough not to point to certain shared characteristics and broad enough to include variety SMOs.

Having clarified the terminology and conceptualization, it is important to turn to defining what extreme right actually means. The definition of extreme right is extremely contested. Mudde has found 26 different definitions in the literature on the extreme right (2002:11). Scholars are disagreeing on the features, categorization, and boundaries between different types of extreme right groups (Della Porta et. al 2012:5). This has been partly caused by the fact that the term is not only used for scientific purposes but also for political purposes (Knütter 1991 in Mudde 2002:10). The only thing commonly agreed is that extreme right is an ideology, but the features vary tremendously (Mudde 2002:10). To establish a clear definition of extreme right for the purposes of this thesis, some widely used definitions will be reviewed to establish a strong definition.

Some most used definitions are provided by Carlisle (2005), Heitmeyer (2003) and Mudde (2000). To begin with a basic minimalist definition, Carlisle has defined right wing as “an ideology that accepts or support a system of social hierarchy or social inequality” (2005:693). This viewpoint is most visible in the attitude on immigration policies, as immigrants are seen on the lower latter of social hierarchy, and native citizens should be treated superiorly. Yet, this definition is rather minimalist, as it is not only extreme right that supports these social structures. Following this inequality tenet, Heitmeyer addresses that to be identified as an extreme right, the group needs to fulfil two core concepts: ideologies of inequality (such as racism or anti-Semitism) and varying level of acceptance of violence (Heitmeyer 2003:401-402). Koehler notes that this

definition is too broad to identify exclusively extreme right groups, but also too narrow by stressing ideological components of inequality in the core (2014:3). This would leave out some groups based on more nationalist focus that do not necessarily express ideologies explicitly in terms of inequality. To expand the definition, Mudde has researched extreme right widely, and based on his findings presents definition with four core concepts: "nationalism[3], xenophobia[4], law and order[5], and welfare chauvinism[6]" (Mudde 2002:117). Mudde's approach is unable to define boundaries between different of the extreme right entities (Kudôvic 2007), yet it is able grasp the most essential of the central belief system. As differentiation between groups is not essential for this research, Mudde's definition portrays the most important tenets of the groups that the research aims to identify, and most importantly builds on the more minimalist account provided by Carlisle and Heitmeyer by enabling to exclude some groups not fitting this to definition.

These three definitions are certainly not mutually exclusive and the concepts are overlapping. In order to define and identify the extreme right groups adequately, this research takes a qualitative approach to the definition of extreme right. This means that only three features are required for the core definition to identify as an extreme right (Mudde 2002:11). Following the discussion by Mudde and Heitmeyer, in order to be classified as an extreme right, the group needs to fulfill at least three criteria out of five possible:

1. nationalism,
2. ideologies of inequality (racism/xenophobia),
3. law and order
4. varying level of acceptance of violence, and

[3] "States should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group...nonnative elements are fundamentally threatening " (Mudde 2007:19).
[4] An attitude of fear towards of what is perceived to be foreign" (Heitmeyer 2003:402)
[5] For example demand for a stronger police force (Widfeldt 2003:238).
[6] Nation should provide social welfare primarily to the benefit of their "own citizens", rather than to "foreigners" (Kudôvic 2007).

5. welfare chauvinism

(Heitmeyer 2003:401, Mudde 2000:177). These aspects relate to each other as they all somehow dehumanize opponents, and for example ideologies of inequality are more likely to justify violence (Della Porta et. al 2012:6). Utilizing these five core concepts for identifying the groups, the tenet of social hierarchy and inequality is embodied in the ideologies of inequality, but avoiding too broad and minimalist defining criteria. As the focus of the study is on rather how the groups frame and construct themselves in their political advocacy, more attention is paid for their understanding of the reality rather than creating too binding definition and claiming features of their ideology beforehand. This definition leaves space for interpretation, yet justifies which groups can be identified as extreme right. This definition is essential especially for the operationalization of SNA which is used to identify the actors in the network.

Besides the definitional issues, there are various ways to approach the study of extreme right, from which the identity and ideology of the extreme right are the more traditional ways (Mudde 2002:3). In the literature focusing on the identity of extreme right, the stress point is on the individuals (Gidron 2012:17). It provides more individualistic accounts, ignoring the holistic patterns between the organizations. In contrary, the research on ideology of extreme right focuses on the set of ideas or opinions on the nature of society and politics (ibid). However, according to Snow and Byrd, this focus on ideology is encumbered by two misguided tendencies: (1) to view ideology as homogenized and monochromatic; and (2) to conceptualize it as a strictly linked set of inelastic values and beliefs (2007:132). This is problematic as extreme right groups can vary greatly, consider for example the differences between Neo-Nazi group and anti-immigration street patrol. Yet, these two groups can share connections and common principal issues that link them to a larger belief system. Classifying extreme right as a social movement, their differing beliefs can be seen being a part of more elastic, heterogeneous belief system that consists of their shared principal issues. This also recognizes the role of individuals as being part of the collective action that is

at the core of any social movement. This latitude makes social movement approach most suitable and inclusive to include various actors in a holistic pattern. The social movement approach will be further elaborated in the following section.

2.2 Social movement theory: From collective action to connective action

The social movement theory has been developed interdisciplinary influenced by sociology, communication studies, and political science utilizing disciplinary approaches and techniques (Klandermans and Roggeband 2007:1). The interdisciplinary aspect is visible in reviewing the literature as social movement theory tends to be heavily loaded with concepts which differ depending on the discipline of the scholar. This makes the overall field somewhat fragmented, but also contributes to certain shared central concepts across the disciplines (ibid:2). The traditional social movement theory emerged during 1930s with a focus on collective action and mobilization to address free market failures (Friedland and Rogerson 2009:2). However, collective action and movements are complex and multidimensional. Therefore, the theory developed to multiple interrelated subfields from 1960s onwards from which the main ones are focusing on the organizational resources, mobilizing structures, political opportunities, and framing processes (Garrett 2006:202). As the ICT is changing the ways in which activists communicate, collaborate and demonstrate, since mid-1980s social movement scholars started to analyze these changes in each subfield (Garrett 2006:202-3). Given the increased importance of the internet, all these subfields have aimed to include the research of online movements and it has underlined the capacity of online networks to generate collective identities (Della Porta et. al 2012:54). Moreover, it has been shown that the Internet can have an impact in facilitating the exchange of resources and information and create solidarity (ibid). Garrett has outlined three key types how internet relates to social movements, namely reducing participation costs, promoting collective identity and creating a web-based community (2006:204). The latter of these is the central focus of this research. All in all, the role of internet and ICT has developed the dynamics of contemporary social movements.

The definition of social movements varies depending on the approach the scholar utilizes. McAdam (1982) and Tarrow (1994) are one of the key scholars in the field and their definitions are widely quoted. McAdam defines social movements as "organized efforts, on the part of excluded groups, to promote or resist changes in the structure of society that involve recourse to non-institutional forms of political participation" (1982:25). Tarrow's definition provides a more inclusive view on social movements as "collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities" (1994:3-4). Yet, in both definitions the dynamics of the internet are not included. In an attempt to unify the field, Mario Diani argued that nearly all definitions share three criteria: (1) a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, (2) engaged in a political or cultural conflict, (3) on the basis of a shared collective identity (1992:1). This resonates with the definition utilized to conceptualize extreme right as a social movement (Tateo 2005). What is the irreducible factor from all these definitions is the persistence of contentious collective action (Tarrow 1994:3) which is the main element to classify something as a movement. Diani's definition of a social movement is the most inclusive and incorporates the developments that internet has brought in play, thus it will be adapted as the base understanding for the term social movement.

The interesting development in contemporary social movement landscape is that "widespread social fragmentation has produced individuation as the modal social condition in postindustrial democracies" (Bennett 2012:22). Participation in social movements is not merely a matter of common purposes and solidarity, as defined by Tarrow, but the motivation for participation needs something that is personally appealing for the activists. The contemporary collective action is less like conventional social movements described by McAdam and Tarrow, and more like what Micheletti describes as individualized collective action (2003 in Bennett 2012:26). This means large numbers of people joining in loosely coordinated activities centered on more personal and emotional rationale, therefore changing

the dynamics of social movements and reinventing the repertoires of participation (Ibid:27). Therefore, the framing efforts of the SMO need to appeal in a more personalized manner. This aspect also questions the organizational efforts emphasized by McAdam in his definition by shifting the focus on the agency of the activists and reducing the strength of ties in the movement to a more personalized and loosely connected format. Social movement dynamics have developed from collective action for common purposes, to individualized collective action with personalized purposes.

This development has been widely influenced by the internet and easier communication between the people. ICT has radically altered communication, through a creation of a new symbolic universe that exists in cyberspace and connects people from all over the world (Castells 2004 in Flesher 2009:19). Moreover, due to easy accessibility, it provides valuable possibilities for SMOs to disseminate information and mobilize new members (Adams and Roscigno 2005:775). To accommodate the influence of the internet, Bennett and Segerberg have identified logic of connective action that explains how activists and individuals can avoid self-interest obstacles in contentious politics (2012). They can participate through "intrinsically motivating personal expression" that can be shared to a larger social network, in turn linking people to a larger protest network (2012:754-756). Shirky further argues that the successful creation of online groups relies on a successful fusion of "plausible promise, an effective tool, and an acceptable bargain for the user" (Shirky 2008:260). The figure 1 below shows this development through identifying two types of connective action, and contrasting them to more traditional collective action model. The more traditional type of collective action relies on organizations to facilitate the mobilization and action, wherein the two typologies of connective action show the decreasing inclusiveness of organizational efforts, and rather stress on self-mobilization of the activists (Bennett and Segerberg 2012: 754-756). The connective action frames describe the contemporary elements of social movements and the development of the traditional forms. Leadership, organization, and common

collective action are increasingly losing their importance in many online-based social movements and networks. This logic will be applied to the Finnish case in chapter 4 to see the contemporary dynamics in play.

Figure 1 Elements of connective and collective action



*(*From Bennett and Segerberg 2012: 756*)*

The new wave of literature with the inclusion of influence of ICT was born as a criticism to more traditional social movement research. The aim was to develop the social movement theory to understand the new online dynamics (Garrett 2006:208). There is a tension in the literature between scholars emphasizing on the structural constraints and those stressing cultural variables (Giugni 1998:365). This has been taken into account through the development of the theory and understanding of individualized connective action, thus, the structural constraints and cultural variables are not in the center of the analysis. However, Bimber has pointed criticism towards the central role of ICT and the assumption that easier communication increases the political participation. This supports a more skeptical view on the influence of the internet. He argues that people have limited capacity to absorb information, thus lowered costs through ICT does not

necessarily equate to increased movement and political participation (Bimber 1998 in Garrett 2006). Tilly supports this skeptical viewpoint by arguing that "neither in communications nor in transportation, did the technological timetable dominate alterations in SMO, strategy, and practice. Shifts in the political and organizational context impinged far more directly and immediately on how social movement worked than did technological transformations" (Tilly 2004:104 in Van Laer and Van Aelst 2009:234). Moreover, Keck and Sikkink argue that ICT is valuable, but not necessarily essential for transnational advocacy and social movements contemporarily as there are more traditional means for mobilization (Keck and Sikkink 1998). So even if there is an increasing amount of literature on an optimistic view on the relation of the internet and social movements, not all scholars agree on the degree it is actually influential and lean more towards skeptical view on the issue.

To conclude this section, we must understand contemporary social movements as networked social movements as Castells has argued (2015:249). This means that there is no distinction between online and offline actions, and the networks are multimodal: within the internet, over national borders, and within society at large (ibid:249). These network structures configure the center of social movements making the structure more decentralized and open for participation (ibid). Collective action is possible through shared collective social identities to establish social involvement online (Postmes and Brunsting 2002:291) This understanding leaves the interpretive space open for the role of the internet, thus not assuming that it has barely am operational function, but that it changes the normative guidelines by creating a space with anonymity and individualized communication networks (Holmes 1997:148-150); a networked social movement.

2.1.1 Networking extreme right online

As seen in the previous section, the internet has changed the dynamics of contemporary social movements opening up opportunities also for the extreme right groups. It offers a variety of benefits for the extreme right groups for mobilization purposes, especially to gain control over resources needed for

collective action (Zhou et al. 2005 in Della Porta and Wagemann 2012:53). Through an easy platform to mobilize globally, the internet has an important role to support and expand the operations of the extreme right (Caiani and Kröll 2015: 331). This influences the motivations of the activists as these groups often have a marginal status, and are represented even as laughable, unintelligent and only nominally threating (Adams and Roscigno 2005:1). As extreme right groups are often stigmatized by the majority of society, the activists can easily feel alienated from the popular culture. The internet offers a platform to seek for social support and other like-minded without limitations of the geographical context (Schafer 2002:72). They can also share and distribute information that is outside of the control of national government, such as in forms of alternative media free from mainstream media constraints, making the communication and information-seeking more appealing (Adams and Roscigno 2005:759). Hence, the internet offers an easy access, anonymity, huge audience, and lack of regulations (Weimann 2004:3). This somewhat changes the ontological assumptions as it is constructing an environment where extreme right groups can freely exist by shifting the normative guidelines of communities and liberating activists from social constraints and stigmatization (Holmes 1997:148-150). Given these organizational and individual advantages, it is easy to see why extreme right groups increasingly mobilizing online.

The role of the internet within extreme right has increased scientific interest among scholars, yet this topic is still empirically under-researched (Garrett 2006). It is especially social movement scholars who have expanded the web-based research as it allows easy identification of structured networks that might be hard to recognize outside the virtual world (ibid). The research has focused on how radical groups use the internet to communicate with other like-minded groups and form extreme-right networks used to boost the construction of collective identity and mobilization efforts (Burris and Strahm 2000:216, Tateo 2005). Further research has looked at online communication, mobilization, and diffusion of propaganda (Caiani and Parenti 2013). The research has noted that extreme right

groups are increasingly using the internet as an important communication medium (Abbasi and Chen 2008:286). Other research has pointed out promoting the use of violence through online propaganda (Glaser et. al. 2002 in Della Porta et. al. 2012:56). Della Porta suggests future research to focus on movement's understanding of external reality, and how they see their own' position within this reality by using concepts from social movement studies (2012). This is exactly what this thesis aims to build on. Through the use of framing processes approach and focus on internet's role, the aim is to expand in this area by emphasizing how the movements in Finland present reality online.

2.3 Framing process in social movements

To see how the Finnish extreme right presents and frames itself to the society connecting to a larger belief system, collective action frames are a suitable conceptual tool for the analysis. The framing process approach is used to understand extreme right as a social movement and their rhetoric as cognitive mechanisms that capture their contemporary understanding of the external reality (Della Porta et. al. 2012:11). Framing process theory has been developed from linguistic studies and sociology, and it focuses on how shared assumptions and meanings shape the interpretation of external the reality (Oliver 2000:1). One of the early pioneers of the theory was Goffman, who stated that the world is too complex for individuals to understand (1974). To simplify this reality, the discursive frames are "schemata of interpretation" that enable individuals "to locate, perceive, identify, and label" occurrences within their life space and the world at large (Goffman 1974:21). Collective action frames are action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that simplify, inspire, and legitimate activities and campaigns (Ibid). This enables to research on actors with different ideologies, and simplify their understanding of reality as frames that guide the action repertoire of the movement, but it is still distinct from their ideological orientation (Oliver 2000:13). Therefore, a frame itself is a structure, which allows grasp the reality and to build expectations about what is to happen (Donati 1992). Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to "select some aspects

of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (Entman 1993:52). In the rhetoric of extreme right, they frame to focus on certain aspects of their understanding of reality, leaving out others as a strategic choice to mobilize supporters. These chosen frames connect to a larger belief system through saliency of chosen approach.

Oliver argues that frames themselves are just a conception of a political idea and too simplistic to recognize the full complexity and depth of ideologies and social construction process (Oliver 2000:1-2). Moreover, due to interdisciplinary aspects of framing theory, it has been criticized for 'conceptual obliqueness', and even fallacious reasoning (Iyengar 2004:1-3). However, Tarrow has responded to this criticism by arguing that:

"*Symbols of revolt are not drawn like musty costumes from a cultural closet and arrayed before the public. Nor are new meanings unrolled out of whole cloth. The costumes of revolt are woven from a blend of inherited and invented fibers into collective action frames in confrontation with opponents and elites*" (1998: 118 in Snow and Byrd 2007).

Thus, Oliver's statement of frames oversimplifying is not as black-and-white. Even though frames collect traditional ideological components, many are also invented to suit and appeal in the national context, as argued by Tarrow. The frames are combining both inherited extreme right ideology and invented nation-specific frames. Thus, ideologies can function as frames, but not all frames are ideologies (Oliver 2000:13). The frames for this thesis will not be treated as fixed, but more as constructed, thus aiming to avoid simplifying the complexity of the ideology. By providing a clear conceptual understanding of the framing process theory, I aim to consider the criticism and include the understanding of the complexity of extreme right ideology, avoid conceptual ambiguity, and provide a valid, reliable analysis of the issue. The research does not aim to find a binding truth, or clear causal effects, but rather provide an explorative account on the

reality of extreme right groups. Frames simplify this reality enough to be able to talk about shared schemata and enable consideration for context-related particularities.

2.3.1 Collective action tasks

In order for a social movement to be successful, they must complete three framing tasks to create salient and central collective action master frame. To create a clear, structured categorization, the three core collective actions by Snow are adapted (2000:616) which are based on the earlier work of Goffman (1974):

1. Diagnostic frames: punctuation of a problem and attribution of blame
2. Prognostic frames: articulation of a solution
3. Motivational frames: call to arms
    - ➔ Salient and central master frame that connects to a larger belief system

Diagnostic frame refers to the problem and the source of the problem, prognostic is the solution to the aforementioned problem, and motivational is the rationale for action. These frames are the way the movement can construct a collective identity and a common meaning that relates to a larger belief system. The focus is on *how*, not what, they communicate their political message showing the selected perceived reality. These three collective action frames will be introduced in detail below, as they form the core of the analysis.

Firstly, diagnostic frame underscores injustice of a social condition and identifies a problem that can be attributed to others, against whom they can mobilize (Snow et al. 1986:469). The focus is on the punctuation of the problem and attribution of the blame. Punctuation is about pointing out the source of the problem and providing a warning of a threat to the society (Pytlas 2015:57). The attributional component focuses on pointing the blame or responsibility to someone else. Diagnostic framing often contributes to a struggle over the meaning, especially in the case of extreme right movements, as the identification of the source can be complex (Tateo 2005). Considering for example how a more radical Neo-Nazi

organization could recognize the punctuation as declining racial purity, and attribution of the problem as foreigners. In contrast, a more moderate populist political party could punctuate the problem as a declining national identity, and the blame as the government being not able to protect against these changes. Both of these instances underline an injustice of a social condition and attribute the blame, but to different directions, even though they would operate in the same social movement. These differences can contribute to the overall struggle over the meaning if the rhetoric of the groups is not strategically constructed.

Secondly, prognostic framing focuses on identifying a solution for the problem. Through the articulation, the frame can align seemingly unrelated "events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and meaningful fashion" (Buffonge 2014:14-17). The articulation includes a proposed solution to the problem or the strategies for carrying out the plan (Snow and Benford 2000:616). They must come to believe that collective action is both a necessary and effective means of addressing their problem (Snow et al. 1986:469). Prognostic framing activity often includes consideration of solutions advocated by opponents as well as a rationale for its own remedies, which is referred as counter-framing (Ibid). The solution is often articulated in a fashion that parallels the proposed solution to a contemporary scapegoat, such as ethnic groups or national minorities, with historical events (Pytlas 2015:57). The prognostic frame is very interrelated to the identified diagnostic frames as it offers a solution to the problem. Referring to the example of the decline in national identity as a diagnosis would likely result in a prognosis demanding for enforcing the role of nationalism. In contrast, diagnosing foreigners at the blame for racial impurity would lead to demand reforms in the immigration policies. Thus depending how the diagnosis is framed, the prognosis can offer multiple strategies to tackle the issue.

If an activist has been convinced by the diagnostic and prognostic frames, the last step is to get them involved and actually do something about their concerns; metaphorically to call “from the balconies to the barricades” (Snow and Byrd

2007:128). Motivational framing is the rationale for engaging in collective action and the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive, thus justifying the collective action (Snow and Benford 2000:618). This gives a rationale for engagement and action through emphasizing the importance of collective action and enforcing the role of shared collective identity (Ibid:617). Motivational frames are especially central for facilitation of recruitment and mobilization of the activists. Diagnostic and prognostic frames are not enough to provoke people to participate in a collective action, but motivational framing aims to intensify these punctuations and articulations in the sense of calling for protection or defense (Minkenberg 2002:249 in Pytlas 2015:56). Moreover, motivations relying on affective cues that activate feelings are more effective than frames purely relying on cognitive cues, such as fear of a presumed threat (Marcus 2000 in Figenschou et. al. 2015:67). They constitute a "dramatization of the vulnerability of the nation in times of real or presumed crisis or moral decay" (Minkenberg 2002:249 in Pytlas 2015:57). Motivational framing aims to appeal to feelings and emotional cues through emphasizing shared collective identity and dramatization of the presumed problem.

2.3.1 Discursive master frame

As an outcome of completing these three framing tasks, a master frame can be seen as the encompassing generic frame that captures the key points of the collective action frames. It has an ability to synchronize the different SMOs in the network (Rydgren 2005:478). Even if the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames can be differing, the overall master frame can synchronize the framing efforts of the actors. If the master frames have been created to facilitate the similar, but divergent views, the movement participants will direct their unjust claims in resonance of the main cause (Oliver 2000:4). The master frame guides the resistance and opposition of the movements, which can be shared by different groups, but it is still distinct from their ideological orientations. It is a more of a general category or a perspective to a social problem, rather than an ideology (ibid). Given the changed dynamics of contemporary social movements, the master frame needs to appeal to more personalized preferences of the activist, and

be wide enough to accommodate individualized collective action on a personal and emotional rationale (Bennett 2012:26-27). This means that for the master frame to reach saliency and centrality, it needs to have personalized manner, yet synchronizing differing collective action frames.

Rydgren argues that most common master frame shared by various extreme right groups in Western countries is based on two key points: "to mobilize on xenophobic and/or anti-immigration attitudes without being stigmatized as racists, and to pose serious critique on contemporary democratic systems, and thereby foment political protest, without being stigmatized as anti-democrats" (2004:475). According to him, the old master frame of the extreme right was more focused on biological racism and anti-democratic critique of the political system, but as the political atmosphere evolved in Europe after Second World War, these attributes became stigmatized (ibid). The groups needed to innovate new ways to express their concerns in a manner that was not stigmatized and was salient to the society. The master frame built on xenophobic ethnonationalism and anti-establishment rhetoric could accommodate these claims (Rydgren 2004:479). Ethnonationalism means that people should be kept separate in order to preserve the unique national characteristic of each nation. The anti-establishment refers to expressing concerns of the government, without being labelled as anti-democratic, as this aspect is not resonating in Europe, where majority of people value the principle of democracy (Rydgren 2014:12-19). With following these attributions in the master frame, it becomes possible for the extreme right to mobilize on xenophobic and anti-immigration frames without being stigmatized and excluded as racists, and mobilize on political discontent without being stigmatized as anti-democrats (Rydgren 2005:432). This master frame seems to be applicable in the case of Finland as well, as will be further elaborated in sub-section 4.2.3.

3 Methodology and methods

The aim of this chapter is to outline the methodology and methods of the thesis. Firstly, the epistemological and ontological positions will be discussed as the logical structure and procedure for the scientific inquiry to clarify the underlying philosophical assumptions (Jackson 2008:131). Secondly, the mixed methods approach with exploratory research design will be outlined as the logic of the research. Thirdly, the social network analysis (SNA) and qualitative content analysis (QCA) will be presented with transparent descriptions of their usage, the samples sizes, and material. Lastly, the delimitations of the research will be evaluated. Through these stages, the aim is to present a clear framework of the overall philosophical assumptions, how the data has been collected, and how the data will be interpreted.

3.1 Epistemology and ontology

As the theoretical framework aims to uncover the structure and discourses in the extreme right online rhetoric and mobilization through the framing tasks, the goal is not to seek for an objective truth, but rather to reveal the conditions of social processes and political practices (Jackson 2008:130). This guides the research towards interpretivist paradigm by seeing reality as subjective and socially constructed by participants' experience (Halperin and Heath, 2012:40). The participants of the movement play a big role in the construction and framing of their external reality, as it is for them that the collective action frames are constructed. Epistemologically this interpretivist research focuses on the connections and relations between the subjects, and how organizations construct the patterns of discourses in their rhetoric (Bryman 2008:15). As the internet is the environment where these movements are present, it changes the ontological assumptions of the research as it enables an environment where extreme right groups can freely exist by shifting the normative guidelines of communities and liberating activists from social constraints and stigmatization (Holmes 1997:148-150). Thus, the participants influence their external reality and the constructed normative guidelines of their existence becomes the key focus; interpretivist

ontological postulates correspond by understanding reality as a product of social processes rather than as independent variable (Halperin and Heath 2011:43).

The participants are freed from the social pressure, constructing a new reality through social interaction and relations, yet all subjectively experiencing it on their own terms. The theoretical framework focuses on a network constructing their shared values and the principles of their co-existence which is observable through their rhetoric. The methods of data collection enable to get an overview and structure for the actors (SNA), and their principal issues (QCA), which can be then further interpreted in light of framing process. These methods are treated merely as tools to collect relevant background information of the reality of the movements, not changing the epistemological and ontological postulates of interpretivist. Data collected with these methods are not treated as the only truth, but rather as a way to enable the research to focus on the social processes through the analysis.

3.2 Mixed methods approach

The mixed methods approach with exploratory research design is chosen to collect and analyze the data. This is done in a sequential manner: starting with collection and analysis of mostly quantitative data to specify the object(s) of study (SNA) and then followed by qualitative focus to find the principal issues of the object(s) and provide in-depth knowledge on the specific framing and mobilization processes (QCA) as a way to elaborate on the previous data sets and improve the findings (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007:83, Creswell 2008). This approach supports the aims of this thesis, as the quantitative data will allow a general understanding of the research problem by identifying key actors and connections in the networks. Moreover, it helps to demonstrate the density of the network which is essential in research of social movements (Carpenter and Betcy 2012). Followed by qualitative analysis, this will enable to provide an overview of the principal issues and to explain the results further by going more in-depth of the activists' understanding of their external reality and framing, as well as reasons for their mobilization (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007:83-86). Given the

mixed methods approach, it is important to note that the ontological and epistemological postulates of quantitative and qualitative methods are different. However, the quantitative positions are seen more as tendencies (Bryman 2008) and the methods as data collection tools, separate from the interpretivist paradigm and theoretical position of the thesis.

Table 1 below illustrates the sequential mixed methods approach with exploratory design. Firstly, the SNA on the web sources helps to identify the right-wing online presence answering the first research question with a focus on structure and connections. With this step the five central actors for the following step were selected. Secondly, QCA helps to uncover the discourses in the web content with categorizing the principal issues. This is guided by the theoretical framework of collective action framing, enabling the data collection and analysis to develop naturally. This will allow the third step to provide in-depth answers to research questions on principal issues, framing, and mobilization of the extreme right.

Table 1 Mixed methods and exploratory design of the research

Step 1: Structure and connections of the network		
RQ1	Social network analysis	Identifying key actors and connections
Step 2: Principal issues and collective action frames		
RQ2	Qualitative content analysis	Categorizing principal issues in connection to the collective action frames
Step 3: Discursive frames and mobilization of activists online		
RQ2	Analysis of the results	In-depth analysis of the discursive frames in the identified principal issues of the key actors

The chosen exploratory design and sequential mixed methods are used to find information for a case study over the internet. The aim is not to draw causal links or predictions, but rather explore the extreme right network and aiming to provide a comprehensive account on the different framing tasks. Yin has defined case study as “an empirical enquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon

within its real-life context; when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (2003:13). The geographical context is in a single country, Finland, but the environment where these groups exist is on the internet. Thus, the data of this case will be collected from the web, as web sources connect activists and provide lenses to the framing and mobilization processes. This provides a proxy to actual interviews and surveys as the manifest documents are produced by the SMOs themselves (Carpenter and Betcy 2012:526). The case study relies on multiple sources and mixed methods as a way to provide accurate information of the case at hand.

3.3 Social network analysis

The first step of the data collection is SNA and this provides the underlying structure and overview of the extreme right movement's online presence in Finland as well as help to identify the key actors and (global) connections. SNA is a large and growing body of research on the measurements and analysis of relational structures in networks (Butts 2008). It is an interdisciplinary research method which seeks to research the structure of relationships among social entities, as well as the impact of said structure on other social phenomena (ibid). The substantive element of SNA is built around a shared core concepts and methods for the measurement, representation, and analysis of social structure (Ibid). SNA might normally fall to more positivist paradigm due to its' certain quantitative and structural elements, but SNA supports the interpretivist paradigm of the research as the importance of interaction and relations between social units is recognized (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Moreover, SNA is used more as a way to collect data to enable the following steps; the main emphasis is put on the further qualitative analysis, thus, it is not contradictory to the philosophical underlying of the research.

The operationalizing definition of the object of study was discussed in detail in section 2.1. The actors have to fulfill three defining characteristics to qualify as an extreme right group from the criteria: (1) nationalism, (2) ideologies of inequality (such as racism and xenophobia), (3) law and order, (4) varying level of

acceptance of violence, and (5) welfare chauvinism (Heitmeyer, 2003:401, Mudde 2002:11). This qualitative definition allows identifying the extreme right groups, and limiting out some that do not qualify as such. Actors that did not fulfill these criteria were not included in the results. To identify the groups, I utilized direct observation with snowballing method which produced also hyperlink connections and based on these results measurements were drawn on who are linked to whom and which web sources are linked to others (Park 2002). Thus the links between web sources are treated as ties of affinity, communication, or potential coordination (Burris and Strahm 2000:215). I was gathering the data of the connections manually from the websites and Facebook pages of the extreme right groups using a snowballing strategy. Identification of the groups was done by looking at the self-identification pages on the sources (About us or similar) and seeing if they fit the defining criteria. In Finland, between the age group 15-55 years, 76,8% uses Facebook (MTV 2015). Due to this, Facebook was an essential addition on top of the website.

Snowballing method started with a focal actor of the network identified externally from other literature (Hanneman and Riddle 2005) which is for this case Suomen Sisu (SS), a well-known nationalist organization in Finland (Koivulaakso et. al. 2012). The ties of affinities on both respective online platforms were hyperlinks to other sources on the websites and likes to other pages in Facebook. Through this strategy, I was able to see the connections between the groups as well as to identify all the extreme right actors of the network. A total of 29 groups were identified which are presented in appendix A with respective source information. The downside of snowballing strategy is that it cannot locate isolated actors who are not connected (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). However, I was looking for a *network* of extreme right, these isolated actors are not necessarily important to the network and playing a marginal role. It is important to note here, that True Finns, well-known Populist Party, is not included in the results, as the snowballing did not show ties of affinities to the identified groups.

By utilizing tools created by SNA, the data is presented based on the connections between actors in a matrix with binary measurements (see appendix B). Binary measurements of relations is the most common approach in SNA, which means scaling relations simply by being absent (coded zero), and ties being present (coded one) (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). The resulting data were arranged in a binary N x N matrix with one row and one column for each node (Tateo 2005). As the purpose is to look at the overall pattern and structure of the network, the strength of the ties is not important, binary measurement is a suitable choice. The data is seen in two ways as described by Hanneman and Riddle (2005). Firstly, looking at the embeddedness of the actors in the overall network by comparing the results in a square array of data to identify the key actors. Secondly, focusing on the network as a holistic unit by comparing the amount of connections and the centrality of the network gives the overall structure and pattern. This is be done by looking at the degree centrality through in-degree[7] and out-degree[8] with univariate statistic determining the central actors of the network. These results are visualized and analyzed by using UCINET 6.0 software to reveal the directed attributes of the network (Borgatti et. al. 2002) which can be found in the sub-section 4.1. The UCINET software assisted in calculating the preset metrics of nodes and presents the quantitative data through both numerical and visual representation. The following step, QCA will help to embody these purposes by categorizing their principal issues and ideological paradigms.

3.3.1 Identification of the central actors

For the QCA, five groups were selected based on their principal position, degree measurements and the amount of information they provide on their websites. With principal network visualization (see sub-section 4.1), the actors' position is determined by centrality measurements and reciprocity of relations resulting to an identification of five central actors: Suomen Sisu (SS), Rajat Kiinni (RK), Finnish Defence League (FDL), Finnish Resistance Movement (SVL) and Finland First (SE). These five actors have a balanced in- and out-degree with a minimum of 4.0

[7] How many other actors connect to certain actor
[8] To how many other actors certain actor connects to

degree and at least two reciprocal ties. Some other central actors lacked the presentation of self-identification documents on their websites, which is why they were not selected for the second step of the analysis, namely Soldiers of Odin and 612.fi. These five actors will be presented and discussed in-depth in section 4.2.

Table 2 Selected central actors of the Finnish extreme right network

Group	Indgr	Outdgr	Description
Rajat Kiinni (RK)	10	6	Nationalist Anti-Immigration movement
Suomen Vastarintaliike (SVL)	8	8	Neo-Nazi nationalist socialist movement
Suomen Sisu (SS)	5	6	Nationalist political association
Finnish Defence League (FDL)	5	6	Nationalist Anti-Islam movement
Suomi Ensin (SE)	4	10	Nationalist political movement

3.4 Qualitative content analysis

SNA helps to get the overall pattern and structure of the connectedness of the actors, but it does not provide further inside on the movements' principal issues and collective action frames in the political discourse of extreme right (Moussa 2008). The second step of the research is a QCA to uncover the discursive frames of the five identified central actors of the network. This is done by identifying certain issues related to the frames in their central self-identification doctrines[9] that are visible in the rhetoric based on deductively and inductively created categorization. The aim is to find the principal issues in their online rhetoric and the collective action framing implying their understanding of external reality. Thus, it allows recognizing cognitive mechanisms that are relevant in influencing organizational and individual behavior determining the framing and mobilization processes (Della Porta et. al. 2012:11). QCA is a valuable step as it creates a strong foundation by providing insight on main themes and frames of extreme right rhetoric by identifying the principal issues in their manifest content and their construction in the discursive network of extreme right.

Content analysis is more commonly known as a quantitative research method defined as for objective analysis of texts by using predetermined categories to

[9] This material is in Finnish, and all the citations used in my thesis are *my translations*

quantify the data in a systematic and replicable manner (Bryman, 2008B, p. 274). QCA employs these key components as the "fundament for a qualitative oriented procedure of text interpretation" (Mayring 2000). Built on the same foundations, QCA differs from its' quantitative counterpart in the level of interpretation and understanding of the context. Hsieh and Shannon define it as "a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes" (2005:1278). QCA goes beyond quantitative content to focus on meanings and themes that may be manifest or latent in a particular context thus allowing understanding of social reality as a subjective in a scientific manner (Zhang and Wildemuth 2009:2). As the extreme right communication is largely complex area and the rhetoric largely varies between different actors in the movement (consider for example difference between the language used by a Skinhead groups and a political organization[10]), exact words or phrases cannot be set deductively that could be counted or extracted from the text. And as the aim is to get a clear understanding of political advocacy and frames of the Finnish extreme right network as a whole, the research naturally shifts towards QCA as a way to identify the principal issues in the rhetoric.

In order to establish valid and reliable inferences, the analysis has a set of systematic and transparent procedures for processing data (Zhang and Wildemuth 2009:2). The data analysis and collection are described by both deductive (the research objective of collective action frames) as well as inductive manners (multiple readings and interpretation of raw data) (Thomas 2003:3). The material has been coded to identify punctuations (what is the problem), attributes (who is to blame), and articulations (what is the solution). These categories help to identify the correct issues in the text but leaves space for the issues to immerse from the context freely. Samples used were central self-presentation documents, such as policy documents, of identified by the organization and shared publicly. This transmits their main purpose and how they wish to represent themselves to

[10] For further elaboration on these difference, see for example Caiani and Parenti 2011 and Tateo 2005

the society. The unit of the analysis was selected to be sentence, as it is broad enough to include a wider idea, but also narrow enough to separate different ideas in a paragraph. Sentence can symbolically assign a summative attribute for the data (Saldana 2009:3). By using sentences as a coding unit, it is possible to consider them in their context as well as provide insight on their articulation, attributes, and punctuation. I was looking for the principal issues and frames as binding together ideas, actions and events (Snow and Byrd 2007:133). With a focus on issues and frames, a wider variety of things can be included that might be left out of the equation if the focus would strictly follow the ideological components (ibid). The QCA was conducted in a rather directed manner to get immersed with data, and allow issues emerge through careful comparison and consideration relevant for the framing tasks (ibid). Similar issues were grouped together, with an aim to start seeing separate principal issues. The found issues were assigned to a relevant collective action frame. Lastly, the coding consistency and revision of the categories was done by working through the documents with an aim to reduce overlap. The coding scheme and findings are shown in the appendix D with the principal issues highlighted.

Five different SMOs were selected based on the results from SNA: SS, FDL, SE, SVL and RK. Five samples, one from each group, were selected[11]. The total number of coding units considered was 509 from which 386 were assigned to a certain framing task, as shown in appendix D. A category was chosen if at least two groups expressed this issue in their document. On the first round, a total of 25 possible diagnostic frames and 34 possible prognostic frames were found. After this, the results were revised with consideration for overlapping and superfluous themes, with guidance of the theoretical and empirical considerations. Respectively 143 units were coded to the diagnostic frames, and 243 units to the prognostic frames. This resulted in a total of eight diagnostic frames as well as eight prognostic frames, which are shown in appendix D with the narrative that was used for identification, as well as the amount of units assigned.

[11] The document from SS dates back to 2006, but they still actively refer to it as their central document thus it is justifiable to include it in the analysis

Some of the categories can be seen as overlapping (for example P3 law and order – P6 immigration reforms). However, there was clear proof that these legal reforms were directly directed towards immigration and in law and order rather on the general toughening of penalty code, thus, a distinction between these two was necessary. From these, the most popular frames implied the principal issues of the network. There are three main issues that the five groups brought up in their diagnostic framing: (1) the immigration threat, (2) globalization and multiculturalism and (3) decline of national identity, tradition and cultures. The main attribution is directed towards the government, multiculturalism and immigrants. For the prognostic frames, the most articulated solutions are (1) anti-establishment measures, (2) law and order, (3) immigration reforms, (4) reinforcement of nationalism and (5) emancipation of freedom of speech. These frames are the most visible in the rhetoric of the groups, comprising of 321 units, which is 83% of the total coded content. This justifies the choice to include these eight principal issues for further analysis in chapter 4.

3.5 Delimitations

As the study has adopted interpretivist paradigm as the basis for the research, it is important to notice that "our very experience of the world is inescapably mediated by the conceptual and linguistic apparatus that we bring to bear when producing knowledge of the world" (Jackson 2008:131). As a big part of the analysis is based on theory-dependent observations and interpretation, my role as a researcher becomes is influential in this process. As Dey (1993) states, "there is no single set of categories waiting to be discovered. There are as many ways of 'seeing' the data as one can invent" (110–11 in Ryan and Bernard 2003:103). This shows that facts and data are not value-free in positivist sense, but rather to more about the interactive relations between facts and values (Halperin and Heath 2010:74). To reach reliability and validity, it is important to understand subjective role as a participating observer, researcher, in the study.

I have aimed to be transparent by providing a detailed theoretical framework, coding manual, and categories to demonstrate the analytical lenses I have

employed to interpret the data. This is especially important in a case of the extreme right that can be emotionally very appealing and prejudices are apparent. I aimed to study the extreme right as objectively as possible by employing mixed methods to conduct an exploratory study to shed light on the discursive frames, rather the ideologies, of the movement in Finland. Portraying the principal issues as discursive frames helps to avoid expansion of the scope and impact of the phenomenon, thus not forcing to take a side in favor or against it, which is the case when certain discursive frames, such as populism, are conceptualized as an ideology (Aslanidis 2015:94). However, the knowledge produced here is embedded in my own experience and interpretation despite my effort to maintain as an objective observer.

Besides the subjectivity of the research, there are three main delimitations connected to the collection of data: problems with Web-based research, direct observation, and amount of empirical data. Firstly, when data is collected from Web-based content, information can quickly emerge and disappear (Kim and Kuljis 2010:370). However, by using rapid data collection and downloading websites I aimed to tackle this issue. I did encounter disappearance of web pages in the beginning but saved the pages needed later on to avoid losing the information. However, as the extreme right is constantly evolving, it is possible that some recently emerged groups were not included in the research. Thus, the results should not be treated as the exhaustive list of all the possible groups out there. Secondly, direct observation and manual coding in both SNA and QCA has a high amount of labor and it makes the research open for possible human and coding errors (Park 2000). This has been aimed to be limited by providing detailed and transparent steps on how the information has been collected. The process was also repeated to avoid mistakes. Moreover, by employing sequential mixed methods, the two-phase structure of data collection makes it straightforward to implement as the data is collected separately and collecting only one data at a time (Creswell and Plato Clark 2007:74-75). This has been possible to conduct as a single researcher, possibly limiting errors as there is no

simultaneous mixing of data. For the future, using computer-assistance would allow an analysis of even a larger sample and avoid possible coding errors. Thirdly, this research has a high amount of empirical data due to utilizing two methods. Due to this, not all of the data can be analyzed fully, but there is a need to select the central actors and principal issues. Through justifying the choices in limiting the study based on results of data collection, the aim has been to sharpen the focus only to the key features. However, the vast amount of data can make the overall study blurry. As this study employed exploratory design, the results could not be fully known before the data collections, thus making it hard to delimit the study before beginning. In the future, stricter limitations for the data collections would be recommended to avoid too much empirical data.

4 Analysis

This analysis chapter is divided into two sections to adequately provide answers to the set research questions: (1) the connections at the national and international level of the network, and (2) the construction of salient and central collective action frames to mobilize supporters online. Firstly, the structure and (global) connections of the network will be discussed to give the overall picture of the network. Secondly, the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational collective action frames will be discussed in parallel, which construction of the larger salient and central master frame through political discourses. Lastly, the summarizing conclusion of the analysis will be provided to highlight the key findings. The main conclusion is that despite differences, the loosely connected network is mobilized on the master frame of xenophobic ethnonationalism and anti-establishment populism with a high level of global connections.

4.1 Structure of the network

The structure of the network was determined by SNA that has been conducted on the websites and Facebook pages of the actors with binary data measurements. The transparent methods have been outlined in chapter 4. This section presents the structure and connections of the network in terms to their national and global counterparts. This is done through SNA tools: firstly by reviewing the binary data to see the overall picture of the network and secondly by determination of the in-degree and out-degree which helps to identify the central actors of the network (Caiani and Parenti 2011:725-726, Hanneman and Riddle 2005). UCINET software has been used to represent the numeric data and NetDraw for the visualizations. Based on these results, a representative sample of five actors was drawn for the QCA to categorize the main manifestation topics of the network.

The overall configuration of the Finnish extreme right online network comprises of 29 groups and it appears to be fragmented with some level of internal cohesion. The network centralization for out-degree is 44.005% and for in-degree 32.908%, showing that the actors are more slightly more likely to show ties of affinity to other actors. Appendix C shows the detailed numbers of each of the groups in a

Freeman's Degree Centrality Measures displaying the univariate statistics for in-degree and out-degree in a more detailed view of the groups (UCINET 2016). RK is the most central with 10 incoming ties, followed by SVL and 612.fi with 8.0 in-degree. RK is an actor mobilizing for resistance against mass immigration, whose action repertoire is characteristic by physical protests around Finland. Thus, other actors come together over the shared concern of immigration in these protests. A similar explanation applies to 612.fi which is mainly organizing a march for the Finnish Independence Day on 6th of December annually. This event brings a variety of actors together for a common cause, which explains its' central position. In contrast, SVL is an organization with strong national-socialist and Neo-Nazi characteristics. Thus, its' central position is the network is more surprising; however they do have a strong action repertoire of both online and offline activities, and they are mobilizing over the internet actively. This points out to acceptance of more 'radical' extreme right in the general network, even if many of the actors claim not supporting these tenets.

The ones with most outgoing ties are Pravyi Sector (PS) with outdegree of 16.0 and Valkoinen Kapinahenki (White Resistance), PKP, and SE following after with 10 ties each. The three former groups have commonalities; they are all more informal groups spreading mainly xenophobic material on various matters. PS is connected to a Ukrainian far-right political party, but having just an informal social media account in the Finnish context. PKP is sharing mostly racist and violent memes or photos online, wherein Valkoinen Kapinahenki is a more subcultural white supremacist website sharing information of biological racism. They do not necessarily have to be as careful in implying ties of affinities to more radical groups given their more marginal status. In the other hand, SE is aiming to increase their popularity and mobilize more supporters to become a political organization. Hence, their active connections to other groups can be seen as a way to recruit more potential supporters through other like-minded groups.

Figure 2 displays the overall principal network of the Finnish extreme right with directed ties. The position of each actor is determined by reciprocity of their ties

and centrality degree. What is interesting to see in the network is how the actors are grouped together. On the left side, a clique of the musical groups and fanzines is visible, connected to the broader network through subcultural Skinhead and White Supremacist group Valkoinen Kapinahenki. These music groups are all very limited on providing self-identification documents as their main focus to express ideological component through musical expression. The national-socialist SVL is located closer to the subcultural groups, than the other nationalist organizations located more on the right side of the network implying its' more radical connections. Alternative media outlets are located in the bottom of the network with reciprocity with each other. It becomes apparent, that groups sharing similar belief systems are more likely to be reciprocating to each other and group closer to each other on the network, which is something that many social movement scholars have notified (Burris and Strahm 2000, Tateo 2005, Caiani and Parenti 2011, Della Porta et. al. 2012). This comes not as a surprise as these connections are links of affinity, and the ones with more open Neo-Nazi and racist rhetoric on have a marginal position in comparison to the others who aim to claim their place in the society and avoid stigmatization.

These findings support the assumption indeed, the Finnish extreme right network can be conceptualized a social movement (following Diani's 1992 definition): (1) It is a network of informal interactions through the connections between websites and Facebook including a plurality of groups and organizations. (2) They are all engaged in a political or cultural conflicts relating to the declining role of the nation-state and national identity as well as the destructive forces brought by globalization and immigration. (3) The shared collective identity is visible through the connections and principal issues that they advocate: their identity is built around tenets of ethnonationalism seeing the ethnic, native Finnish pure and superior. These will be elaborated in the next section. Moreover, it seems to support the tenets of Bennett and Segerberg by being an organizationally enabled network. There is a loose organizational coordination of actions; it provides social technology outlays through the websites and strong social media presence. The

communication is centered on organizationally generated inclusive action frames and the organizations on the background are loosely linked to each other. This highlights the importance to consider extreme right as a cooperating social movement, rather than individual nodes.

4.1.1 Global connections

Out of 29 groups, a total of 22 groups were connected to international like-minded groups. This shows that total of 75% of the groups have global connections. Further 21 groups were offering translated content totaling to 72% of the groups. These measurements show that the Finnish extreme right network is strongly embedded in the global network by providing translations to other languages and showing affinity to global counterparts. Many of these actors are part of a larger, global extreme right movement. SVL is part of Nordic Resistance Movement movement mobilizing over the Nordic countries and sharing the same ideological assumptions (SVL 2016). Soldiers of Odin, a nationalist street patrol movement, have emerged in multiple countries after it was established in the Northern parts of Finland (HS 2015). Also, Finnish Defence League is part of a movement of Nationalist Defence Leagues which are present in multiple countries, all coming together to oppose Islamization (FDL 2015). Thus, these movements show a mobilization cross borders and high levels of transnationalization. It is important to notice the transnational mobilization of these groups within Europe and other Western countries, as they accommodate information exchange and further mobilization of the movement (Della Porta et. al. 2012). These global connections imply that the Finnish ER network is informed of the global counterparts' movements. It highlights the point that even domestic phenomena are likely to have global influences, making it important to focus on domestic issues to capture the important global connections. Furthermore, these findings support the argument that the extreme right is increasingly operating over national borders and creating global connections, thus urging for more research on the level of these connections.

Figure 2 Overview of the Finnish extreme right principal network



4.2 The construction of discursive frames

The previous section has shown the overall pattern and connections of the network, but it does not provide further inside on the movements' principal political advocacy issues and the main collective action rhetoric (Moussa 2008). This section will discuss the principal issues in the shared discursive frames. These are the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames, and how they connect to a larger belief system through a master frame aiming to gain centrality and salience.

4.2.1 Diagnostic and prognostic frames

The diagnostic framing focuses on underscoring an injustice by identifying a problem as well as attributing this problem to an opponent or an enemy against whom they can mobilize, wherein prognostic frames refers to an articulated solution to the issues by highlighting the scapegoat (Snow et al. 1986:469). These categories are overlapping; therefore, it is possible to relate the punctuation and offered articulation together with the respective attributional components. There are three main issues that the five groups brought up in their diagnostic framing: (1) the immigration threat, (2) globalization and multiculturalism and (3) decline of national identity, tradition and cultures. For the prognostic frames, the most articulated solutions are (1) anti-establishment measures, (2) law and order, (3) immigration reforms, (4) reinforcement of nationalism and (5) emancipation of freedom of speech. The main attribution is directed towards the government, multiculturalism and immigrants.

The decline of national identity, traditions and culture is one of the most visible diagnostic frames shared by the groups for mobilizing collective action. The prognosis for this is the reinforcement of nationalist thinking in the Finnish society. All of these claims are strongly shadowed by the idea of ethnonationalism and xenophobia as a state should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native groups (the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are threatening to the homogenous nation-state (Mudde 2007:19). SS speak of a

problem of "internationally mixing people" and "destruction of historically developed cultures" (2006), wherein SVL articulates the need to protect the "Finnish culture and the Finnish national identity" (2016). FDL points the blame towards the government and political elite for "deliberately weakening the indigenous culture" (2016). Only one group openly declares an issue with race in their diagnosis by saying that it is important to oppose "blending with other races and ethnicities" (SVL 2016). The Finnish groups aim to hide the racist elements in their content, some of them even declaring "not being racist" in their document (FDL 2016). However, these ethnonationalist claims can be seen as cross-point of racism and nationalism as importance is pointed to keeping the nation pure with respect to the historical ethnicity and culture that would disappear otherwise. By reinforcing the nationalist thinking the aim is to make "Finnish people proud of their national heritage" (SVL 2016) and avoid the decline of national identity, culture, and tradition. The appreciation for national heritage, and respect for the culture are seen as key for the collective identity formation. As racism itself is stigmatized in the Finnish society, the groups try to frame their message in a manner that would resonate with the society and thus make it legitimate to practice ideas of inequality in a society on the backdrop of nationality. In their understanding, the concern over declining national elements justifies the use of xenophobic rhetoric and the need to enforce more ethnonationalist measures to protect the unique characteristic of Finnish society.

This type punctuation and articulation enforcing the nationalist tenets is closely linked to the threat of globalization and multiculturalism. Interestingly, multiculturalism is both seen as the source of the problem, and the blamed entity. The groups see it as some sort of destructive force of external influences that we need to protect against. Globalization is described to **"**destroy the historically developed cultures by replacing them with a global spectrum of subcultures" (SS 2006). Further, multiculturalism is seen to destroy the mankind's natural diversity, and at worst it is defined as "infringement of all the traditional values and societal destruction" (SVL 2016). These narratives support the xenophobic ideas as seeing

multiculturalism as an abstract, external threat. The blame is pointed towards the corrupted government for being weak as it is not able to protect against these destructive external forces, but rather uses it as a propaganda tool and glorifies this multicultural diversity to further the destruction (SS 2006, SVL 2016). Surprisingly, in relation to multiculturalism, the narrative does not mention immigrants as the source of the problem, but the discussion is at an abstract level of the multiculturalism and globalization as the enemy destroying everything precious for the unique characteristic of the Finnish nation. Indeed, this enemy influences the decline of the Finnish national identity and also undermines the strength and sovereignty of Finnish state (SVL 2016). But if multiculturalism and globalization are some abstract forces, how can we protect against them? These groups see an urgent need to resist and protect against invading forces globalization and multiculturalism that are contributing to the disappearance of national identity, culture and traditions, yet do not offer a direct prognosis other than of enforcing the nationalism to protect the Finnish identity and culture.

These xenophobic ideas and destructing force of multiculturalism lead us to the threat of immigration which offers a suitable scapegoat for the destructive global forces as well as enforces the ethnonationalist thinking by establishing a social hierarchy of immigrants. Firstly, immigrants are seen as the scapegoats or the physical formation of the evil minions of multiculturalism coming to Finland to break the ethnic purity and historical cultural heritage. Mass immigration is seen as disadvantageous to Finnish national heritage (SE 2016), but also described as an "external threat towards native Finnish people" by bringing "violence towards the Finnish ethnicity and ideologies" (FDL 2016). They see immigrants coming with a purpose to violate towards the victimized Finnish people, as they are the messengers of multiculturalism to infringe the pure ethnicity (SVL 2016). Secondly, these groups make a distinction between the superior "good immigrants" and the inferior "bad immigrants" establishing a social hierarchy. Western people are able to integrate and immigrate for a legitimate purpose, such as job, so they are welcomed to enter Finland (SE 2016). In contrast, the inferior immigrants coming from third world countries are seen as aliens who are not able

to integrate and threaten the Finnish nation (SVL 2016). This refers again to very ethnonationalist tenets, as the white Westerners are not seen as a threat, but the ones with different ethnicity are. There is variety of solutions under the prognosis of immigration reforms to limit the influx of the latter groups such as: "deporting all illegal immigrants without an appeal" (SE 2016), "sending all asylum seekers back to United Nations refugee camps" (RK 2016), and "sending all aliens unable to assimilate back home" (SVL 2016). However, it seems contradictory as a strong emphasis is given to the importance of Finnish identity and heritage; yet white Western culture is not seen threatening it. This is a very contradictory aspect in the documents, pointing out how these groups are beating around the bush with clear xenophobic, and even racist, tenets in their framing efforts. This highlights that the white or Western multiculturalism is seen acceptable as it does not contradict with the Finnish ethnicity, but the influx from third world countries would infringe this purity due to their assumed inability to assimilate in the Finnish society.

The immigration reforms proposed reflect the demand for more authoritarianism[12] in the form of law and order due to increased insecurity and external threats. These two prognoses are closely related; however immigration reforms directly refer to the reformation of immigration policies, wherein law and order refer to toughening other laws and order in the society. These reflect authoritarian values that many extreme right groups share (Della Porta et. al. 2012:208) even if in the Finnish context they are more latent. SE is asking for a comprehensive reform of the criminal laws and tougher punishments as the security of native Finnish people has decreased (2016). The groups reflect under this category also protection of the Finnish society and people, implying the inability of the current police force to protect against the external threats (FDL 2016). More protection is demanded especially for the weaker citizens of the society, namely women and elderly (FDL 2016), who are currently seen in a position of "legal prey" (SVL 2016). These groups pose themselves as taking the protective position to defend

[12] "The enforcement or advocacy of strict obedience to authority at the expense of personal freedom" (Oxford dictionaries)

these weaker ones, presenting themselves in the image of heroic elite (Della Porta et. al. 2012:203), especially in the case of SVL. Thus, they see themselves in a superior latter of the social hierarchy by being strong and righteous, protecting the weak gender and citizens in the lower latter. This is opposed to the weak nation-state, contrasted to the strong, heroic elite that would have the ability to protect against the external threats of immigration and multiculturalism through enforcing more authoritarian law and order.

The authoritarian aspects are projected through the prognostic frame of populist anti-establishment measures. As the groups have emphasized, the government is unable to make suitable reforms to the law and order. The government is ignoring the demands by the extreme right justifying the widely articulated prognosis of anti-establishment measures: urging to move the power to the people (SS 2006, RK 2016). By blaming the government and framing it as an oppositional force, the actors aim to enforce their own legitimacy and credibility by being able to tackle these issues as the true friends and voice of the average citizen (SS 2006). There is a demand for shifting the power from the political elite to the people and establishing a true nation state where decisions are made by the people (SS 2006) through city-level voting on all matters (SE 2016). The only different view comes from SVL who wishes to establish a nationalist-socialist Nordic state, where the government is formed from the members of SVL (2016), yet strongly supporting the anti-establishment rhetoric in a more radical manner. These all reflect rather anti-democratic discourse, but as this is something that is stigmatized, they are articulated in a more anti-establishment populist agenda. This frame is built in opposition to the government who is blamed for being weak against supranational influences, corrupted, utilizing a dictatorship by not listening to the people, and sharing multicultural propaganda (SE 2016, SVL 2016). Thus, they framed as not being a credible and trustworthy actor, opposing the legitimacy of the extreme right actors who are pointing out the faults and posing as the true voice of the people. As the blame is attributed to the government as a responsible for many of the diagnostic frames at the expense of common people, the solution is offered in

a form of shifting the power to the people through populist anti-establishment measures.

Lastly**,** these groups all refer to the limitations on the freedom of speech and ask for the emancipation of this reflecting a more anti-modern discourse. They are feeling that their freedom of speech is limited, as they are the ones who have understood the truth about the true nature of problems, but the government and mainstream media are trying to keep it behind the curtains by limiting their freedom of expression legally by practicing censorship (RK 2016). Through emancipation of freedom of speech, hate speech or incitement against ethnic group would be made legal, decreasing the stigmatization the groups are still facing in the society. This way the groups would be able to spread their message to a larger audience without fear of consequences. In this manner, they are the ones who are feelings victimized by this binding legal code, as they do not have the right to express hateful messages against other entities. However, I would argue that this supports a more anti-modern discourse as human rights are symbols of modern society, and through allowing hate speech and incitement against ethnic group, it would allow infringement of these human rights. Furthermore, the groups ask not for a true freedom of speech, but only for their rhetoric saying "opinion influences should face penalties" (SS 2006). Thus, their goal is not to truly liberate everyone from constraints of expression, but only theirs, enforcing tenet of inequality, social hierarchy, and anti-modernity.

4.2.2 Motivational call for action

As discussed above, the stigmatization around the extreme right is evidently still strong. Given the high stigmatization, only dissatisfaction with the actions of the government is not enough to motivate people to act. Pointing out the problem and offering a solution is not yet enough to necessarily convince people to support the cause, but they need a further reason to motivate mobilization. The motivational frames promoted by each group differ a bit in their characteristic, but they are built around emphasizing a moral obligation to protect against an external threat. They are all attaching their rationale to *defend of our Fatherland* as a moral

obligation to *protect our children*. This rationale establishes emotional cues for participation, but also in a personalized manner enabling the possible activist to reflect it to their personal situation.

To motivate mobilization, the groups have built their motivational frames around appealing to the patriotism[13] of Finnish people. SE has as their motto "If you are not ready to defend it, you do not deserve it" and "Never submit, never surrender" (2016). Similar patriotic motivational frame is also emphasized by SS, who highlight the aspects of our Fatherland being inherited from our ancestors to us, thus *we* have the *moral obligation* to protect *our* children's right to their national identity and Fatherland (2006). Their motivation supports again the tenets of ethnonationalism, as the pure ethnicity is seen as a heritage through a bloodline. This motivational frame could be called that of national romanticism, where the emphasis is put on the romanticizing the idea of bloodline from our ancestors, that we need to protect and keep pure so that our children can live in the same ethnically, culturally and traditionally pure Finland as they did. FDL is emphasizing also "our children", but poses the threat more to the direction of Islam and sharia law. Their motivational frame is built around the question: "What kind of future do we want to leave for our children?" (FDL 2016) They highlight how radical Islam is destroying democracy and human rights, so we need to act now in order to protect against the destructing force of Islam to the Finnish nation. SVL uses the same rationale, but highlights aggressive view by saying "if need to fight against the globalizing forces to protect our Fatherland, so be it!". RK says that the only solution to protect our Fatherland is to close the borders and we all need to participate in through resistance. These all aim to active patriotic feelings in the possible activists, and to give a rationale to act in defense and protection for the Fatherland.

All these motivational frames are tied around the romanticized idea of the Fatherland which is tied strongly to the historical influences in Finland. The Finnish Winter War in 1939-1940 is a major societal influence in Finland which a lot of the national pride and identity comes from, as well as the concept of Finnish

[13] vigorous support for one's country (Oxford dictionaries)

sisu, as discussed in section 1.3. During the Winter War, the Finnish soldiers fought against Russia with notably fewer soldiers, but they were still able to defend the Finnish independence and the Fatherland. This highlights the persistence and courage of Finnish people. In these frames, the immigrants coming in are seen as "cowards", "betrayers" of their country, as they are not staying behind to protect their Fatherland. But appealing to the Finnish courage is to build this motivational reasoning against the *immigrants* who are seen to come to Finland betraying their country, and glorifying the successful past of "our nation". This can be seen to reflect the current situation as a war-like (Winter War) with immigrants and multicultural influences flooding in as the enemies (Russians). This is how the issue is frame as 'we the must unite as the courageous Finnish people to fight against these external threats'. This reflects to a moral obligation as by not fighting and resisting, the activists are betraying their Fatherland and being a disgrace to the ancestors who defended Finland with their life to have an independent nation. Thus, by connecting the motivational frame to something bigger, to a *moral obligation to your Fatherland*, the aim is to call the support to the barricades, to act collectively. This motivational rationale is built around the historical rhetoric from the war-time and framing the protection in these terms as a moral obligation to the Fatherland to mobilize collective action.

4.2.3 The centrality and salience of the master frame

The master frame is a generic frame that captures the key points of the collective action frames. The centrality and salience of the master frames refers to how these proposed diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames reflect a larger belief system. The master frame thus guides the resistance and opposition of the movements, which can be shared by different groups, but it is still distinct from their ideological orientations. It is a more of a general category or a perspective to a social problem, rather than an ideology (Oliver 2000:13). Following the discussion of these collective action framing tasks of the groups, there are four overall discursive frames that can contribute to the creation of salient master frame connecting it to a larger belief system. These are ethnonationalism,

xenophobia, populism, and anti-modernism. These tie the principal diagnostic and prognostic collective action frames to the overarching Master frame is shown in figure 3 below.

Figure 3 Construction of discursive frames in the Finnish extreme right



These reflect the findings of Della Porta who found the main discourses in the German, Spanish and Italian extreme right to consists of anti-modernism, racism, anti-capitalism and authoritarianism (2012). Moreover, these seem to support clause by Rydgren (2004, 2005) who identified ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-establishment populism to be utilized master frame amongst extreme right actors in Europe. These characteristics are following in line with the emerging

“new racism” and third wave of extreme right in Europe, with implementing country-specific motivation through the emphasis on Winter War and Finnish courage.

Ethnonationalism is very visible through the entire collective action tasks. The Finnish extreme right is expressing concerns over the dissolution of culture and nationality, and wish to reinforce that the unique characteristic of the Finnish nation. However, as it is based on the idea of keeping people separate, it echoes unequal and exclusive views. However, by replacing word race with ethnicity, national identity or similar, the groups manage to avoid stigmatization of being racist to some level. Even if the texts certainly echo certain racist undertones (most manifest examples: mixing of people SS; blending with other races SVL), the groups make a notable effort to avoid manifestly racist rhetoric thus making the overall frame more connected to ethnonationalism.

Xenophobia, the attitude of fear of the foreign, is dominant in the documents as well. This is the very attitude towards mass immigration from third world countries especially. Xenophobia is presented especially as emphasizing the differences between the in-group, Finnish people, and the out-group, immigrants. Here the inability of third world immigrants to integrate or assimilate into the Finnish society is highlighted, with notes on national identity that can be only inherited, not learned. This is framed to question the capability of foreigners to become part of the society and highlights the inevitable cultural differences. However, this rhetoric is especially xenophobic towards the “foreign” third world immigrants and refugees, as opposed to the ”familiar” white Western immigrants, constituting to patterns of social hierarchy.

Populist discourse is implied through a promotion of anti-establishment policies with an aim to pose serious critique on contemporary democratic systems, and thereby foment political protest, without being stigmatized as anti-democrats (Rydgren 2004). This populist, anti-establishment discourse is basically promoting the protection of people against the corrupted political elite which is strategically adapted with the declining trusts towards political institutions (Della

Porta et. al. 2012:207). This is done in the tenets of promoting to move the power to the people. This general discourse allows attribution of blame towards the government and ability to undermine their political credibility, while it gives an opportunity for the groups to frame themselves as the legitimate actors to protect against the government by moving the power to the grassroots level.

Anti-modernism refers to the resistance against multiculturalism and globalization that is very visible in all these discursive framing tasks. This is connected also to the larger belief system of the extreme right as "enemy is the modernization of society, the institutionalization of rational models, a universalist egalitarianism among people and groups" (Ferraresi 1994:151 in Della Porta et. al 2012:207). This anti-modern discourse was especially expressed through the criticism of multiculturalism and globalization that is destructing the national identity, culture and traditions that Finland is built on. The traditionally ethnically pure Finnish society is transforming into something new through modernizing forces of globalization, and rather than following the discourse of universalist egalitarianism, the groups advocate for anti-modernist tenets to reverse and resist this development, and return Finland back to its' old glory. Furthermore, the anti-modern tenets were visible in the framing of freedom of speech that was based on social hierarchy, rather than on equal rights.

Following these main issues discussed, these groups have strategically utilized the xenophobic ethno-nationalist master frames with anti-establishment populist elements for mobilization purposes and collective action. This master frame is accompanied with some anti-modernist assumptions highlighting the destructive power of globalization. It is supported by the rhetoric of SVL who tend to have a more aggressive narrative and racists elements in their document (2016). They share same the same discourses, but their overall master frame would have a resemblance to more racist and anti-democratic tenets. Despite the certain fragmentation, this master frame is supported by all the central groups. However, we cannot conclude that all of the individual 29 groups identified are utilizing this master frame. But as these actors belong to the same loosely connected network

with ties of affinities, the overall network is depicted by this master frame despite their differences.

4.3 Concluding summary of the analysis

This analysis has aimed to present the structure and connections of the Finnish extreme right and discuss the principal issues in the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames of these groups, and evaluate how these connect to a larger belief system through saliency and centrality. The aim is not to say that the groups in the Finnish extreme network are identical; all of these groups have their own peculiarities and focal points. But to provide a holistic picture of the operating extreme right forces in Finland, the analysis has focused on discussing them together as a network to look for patterns of similarities that are common between these actors.

The Finnish extreme right is loosely connected online on the national level. Not surprisingly, the groups are reciprocating mostly with other groups sharing values close to their own. This positions the groups with more radical ideologies, such as Neo-Nazism, principally on a more marginal place in the network. The groups mobilizing for one issue area (immigration, independence) not directly linking to a certain larger belief system are the most popular in the network. The more informal actors in the network are more likely to show more ties of affinities to other groups due to no fear of stigmatization. In the other hand, the majority of the groups show ties of affinities to the global level, thus implying transnationalization of the like-minded movement over national borders. The findings point out that it would be beneficial to consider the extreme right as a network rather than treat the nodes separately; they do have common ties of affinity and shared discourses on certain issues. Even the more moderate right-wing organizations are connected to the radical ones which have manifest racist remarks in their content. Even if one does not openly promote more radical ideas such as racism, but shows clear ties of affinity to a more radical group, does it not contribute to furthering the cause and level of acceptance to the message? Saying "we are not racist", but supporting someone who is clearly racist is contradictory.

With the findings of this research, it cannot be concluded on how much these organizations actually cooperate. However, it is visible that it is not just individual actors operating separately, but certainly part of a bigger movement.

The construction of the discursive frames for the Finnish extreme right starts at the bottom: identifying a problem. The findings pointed to that the principal issues in the diagnostic frame were the immigration threat, globalization and multiculturalism, and decline of national identity, tradition, and cultures. These problems point out to concerns of ethnonationalism of mixing the pure ethnicities and destructing the natural diversity of mankind, with an aim to avoid racist slurs and rather referring to ethnicity. The immigration threat as a problem is described in xenophobic terms as well creating a social hierarchy between the third world aliens, and the superior Western immigrants. In contrast, the multiculturalism and globalization as a problem is described as some form abstract force contribution to the destructing the native elements in Finland with strong anti-modernist tenets. In contrast, the majority of groups are sharing global connections, and even stating support for other international like-minded groups. Therefore, they are contradicting their own anti-modernist advocacy. Supporting globalizing forces and connections are welcomed, yet the ones that contradict their political message are not. The blame is directed towards the government, multiculturalism, and immigrants thus supporting the creation of the master frame with constructing their identity against the establishment to support the populist views, against the immigrants to support xenophobic fear, and against multiculturalism to support ethnonationalist tenets of a fading nation.

The five principal solutions, prognostic frames, were anti-establishment measures, law and order, immigration reforms, reinforcement of nationalism, and emancipation of freedom of speech. All of these connected to the bigger discourses and contributed to the master frame. However, in terms of solutions, these seemed to be bit more fragmented, and there were generally more solutions offered, than problems identified. Firstly, given the general decline of trust towards the political institution, portraying solution with anti-establishment and

populist tenets is highly strategic in the communication of these groups. They advocate for shifting the power to the people, but yet still holding themselves a position of power as heroic elite to make this happen. Secondly, law and order was demand of more authoritarian elements in the society supporting the populist discourse. Thirdly, demand for immigration reforms followed the social hierarchical establishment in the definition of the problem and clear xenophobic attitudes; deportation of illegal immigrants and closing the borders should be done in these terms. Fourthly, reinforcement of nationalism was seen as the carrying pillars of the society, contributing to the ethnonationalist discourse through emphasizing the role of ethnicity. This would help to overcome most of the stated problem with resistance and pride in own ethnic roots. Lastly, in order for the groups to be able to spread their doctrine, the demand for emancipation of freedom of speech was evident in the rhetoric of all of these groups. This was done in supporting the anti-modernist discourse by establishing a social hierarchy of only allowing freedom of speech to their supporters in terms of hate speech. If we were to follow the prognoses provided by the groups, the Finnish society would be a populist state with authoritarian political elite with strict anti-immigration policies revolving around the idea of pure nationality, thus enforcing strong social hierarchies in the society.

These diagnostic and prognostic frames build up to the motivational frames based on moral obligations and glorifying the Finnish past, highlighting the protection of children and defending the Fatherland. The motivational framing utilized emotional cues and used very nationally specific connotation. Based on these, the findings suggest that the main discourses in the rhetoric were anti-modernism, populism, ethnonationalism, and xenophobia. These four discursive frames connect the principal issues to a larger belief system. These groups have strategically utilized the xenophobic ethno-nationalist master frames with anti-establishment populist elements for mobilization. This shows their relation to other similar extreme right movements in Europe who have utilized similar master frames for their mobilization purposes. Even though there are differences between the groups, all of them are employing similar discursive frames, and these shared

discourses are the ones that construct their common master frame. It is important to note, that it cannot be concluded that all of the identified 29 groups utilize this master frame, based on the analysis of five central groups. However, given the central position of these groups, the other actors somehow recognize this master frame through ties of affinities, thus being part of a network based on similar discourses. The point here is not to downplay the unarguably existing differences between groups, but to recognize more holistic patterns providing valuable information by showing that the differences do not prevent the connections and that there is a certain shared reality. The key argument here is that despite the differences, the groups share a common standpoint and common discourses, thus emphasizing the importance to further research extreme right as a holistic network with similarities, rather than separate ideological entities.

5 Conclusions

This thesis was set out to explore the network and discursive frames at play in the Finnish extreme right network. The purpose was to look at the structure and shared discourses of the extreme right in Finland through the methods of SNA and QCA with explorative research design. The research questions were:

1. To what extent are Finnish extreme right online movements connected with other similar groups at the national and international level?
2. How do they construct salient and central collective action frames to mobilize supporters online?

Through these questions, the research identified the central actors in the network and their connections to a local and global level, the main shared collective action frames between the actors, and the principal discourses in these. The first one focused on the structural side of the extreme right and how they are connected to the local and international level with SNA. The second question was to see how the groups shared certain diagnostic, attributional and prognostic frames coming together in a bigger overarching master frame that compounds it all together as a way to appeal to the supports. These built up to a larger master frame of

xenophobic ethnonationalism and anti-establishment populism. The findings will be discussed in the following section, with respectively evaluating the value of research with concluding remarks on the possible future direction of further research.

5.1 Discussion of the findings

The findings from the SNA suggested that the Finnish extreme right network is loosely connected on the national level. Interestingly, the more moderate groups are connected to more radical groups showing signs of affinity. These findings highlight the importance of focusing on the extremist actors as a network, rather than as individual nodes and implying connections between the more moderate and radical groups mobilizing on shared discourses. Further supporting this argument is that majority of the actors have ties to global counterparts, therefore suggesting that the extreme right is mobilizing over national borders and showing elements of transnationalization.

The key findings from the framing process approach support the conceptualization of extreme right as a network. The groups further shared a variety of principal issues and the shared generic frame pointed that the extreme right network utilizes the master frame on xenophobic ethnonationalism and anti-establishment populism. This is constructed with the discourses of anti-modernism, populism, xenophobia and ethnonationalism. This hateful rhetoric based on exclusiveness and inequalities are aimed to be distributed online and have a potential reach more audience and mobilize supporters. Similar strategy that has been adapted by the Finnish extreme right, discursive frames of xenophobic ethnonationalism and anti-establishment populism, has been successful in other countries before (Rydgren 2004:149). This further reconfirms the important role of global connections in the extreme right network. Most importantly, despite their differences in their ideology, these groups come together through shared discursive frames. This constructs a common space for these groups to exist together, in a network based on ethnonationalism. Rather than looking for differences, emphasizing similarities show that the distance between the more moderate and radical groups might not

be that far. These groups are mobilizing and creating connections locally and globally over the internet with a shared understanding of the reality.

5.2 Evaluation of the research

This thesis has contributed an explorative account to the social movement field with focus on the Finnish extreme right network. The results have shown value and potential for the SNA and social movement understanding of the extreme right. SNA allows us to see how these groups connect on a national and international level, which should be further developed to a more global scale. This networked focus allows researchers to look beyond the differences and emphasize the similarities that they share. Interestingly, rhetoric on the more moderate right and the more radical right shares a lot of commonalities and same discourses.

However, looking only at a network of extreme right on a superficial level, the study cannot further elaborate on the strength of these ties. This would require further examination beyond SNA to see what these ties of affinities actually entails, and how these groups cooperate. Furthermore, looking at how the groups frame themselves in their rhetoric does not provide further information on how influential they are outside this discursive network, or how successfully they resonate with the outside world. To achieve this, the rhetoric of the opposition and supporters would need to be included in the research. Thus, this study cannot evaluate their overall success in the society, yet it has offered an explorative account of how the groups connect with each other and how they link to a more salient master frame accommodating their mobilization efforts, and embodying their understanding of the reality. Collective action frames have offered a useful tool in this matter; however, Oliver's notion on frames over-simplifying historical ideological precursors (2013) might hold certain truth to it as this research has largely looked beyond the differences of the groups, emphasizing the shared conceptions of reality. This might be unilateral without a comparison of the relevant differences. However, emphasizing the pattern and commonalities is also valuable as to understand the role and influence of the extreme right as a movement.

5.3 Suggestions for future research

The scale of this research is rather multifaceted; therefore, it offers possible departure points for future research. To understand these groups further, there are two directions that the future research could take for fruitful results: to look beyond the connections at a local and global level, and research the resonance of the collective frames. These would allow further assessment of the contemporary nature of extreme right groups in their local and global context. Firstly, further research utilizing SNA could look deeper into the strengths of ties in the extreme right movements both at local and global level. The research could build on the results found in this thesis and further pay attention on how much are they cooperating with other groups. This would be an interesting departure point to look beyond the ties of affinities to see how the cooperation looks in practice. Secondly, more focus should be paid on the resonance of the messages and the role of social media in the network. The narratives presented on websites and social media vary a lot. At websites the information is more constant, thus, the SMOs may be able to present themselves in a more careful and constructed manner with more consideration to the content. In social media, these narratives are open for comments from the supporters and opponents. This influences the types of messages distributed. Looking at discursive frame construction through social media with a respective focus on the transmitted messages and the comments to these could help to evaluate their actual resonance, and see how successful these groups actually are.

Based on the findings of this research, social movement focus on extreme right can provide interesting results of their construction of organizational and mobilization strategies, and these merits should not be overlooked. These future directions could help to strengthen the role of SNA and social movement theory in the research of extreme right. It has provided useful tools to understanding the overall loosely tied structure and the shared discursive frames between these groups. Despite their certain ideological differences, the groups are essentially constructing an online network of ethnonationalism based on shared principles and discursive frames. The power of a network should not be belittled.

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Appendices

Appendix A: The Finnish extreme right network and source information (my translation is provided in the bracket when necessary)

1. SS Suomen Sisu (The Finnish Sisu) Nationalist, party politically independent cooperation organization
   URL: http://suomensisu.fi https://www.facebook.com/suomensisury/
2. Sarastus (The Dawn): Alternative media
   URL: http://sarastuslehti.com https://www.facebook.com/iSarastus
3. Homma forum ("Thingy" forum): A discussion forum focused on critical view on immigration
   URL: http://cms.hommaforum.org/index.php
   https://www.facebook.com/Hommaforum
4. RK Rajat Kiinni! – Kansanliike (Close the borders movement) Politically independent nationalistic movement
   URL: http://www.rajatkiinni.fi/ http://kansanliike.net/
   https://www.facebook.com/groups/1469548606685280/
5. SOO Soldiers of Odin Finland Nationalistic street patrol group
   URL: https://www.facebook.com/Soldiers-Of-Odin-Finland-ry-1535890053369400
6. FF Ferus Finnum: *Webshop*
   URL: http://ferusfinnum.com/ FB. https://www.facebook.com/ferusfinnum
7. FDL Finnish Defence League: Nationalistic organization part of transnational coalition
   URL: http://www.fdl.fi https://www.facebook.com/finnishdl/?nr
8. SVL Suomen Vastarintaliike (The Finnish Resistance Movement) Nationalistic movement
   URL: www.vastarinta.com / https://www.facebook.com/kansallinen.vastarinta
9. RNW Refugees not welcome Finland European wide network against immigration
   URL: https://www.facebook.com/Refugees-Not-Welcome-Suomi-1039302792754692
10. Pegida Finland European wide Anti-Islam network
    URL: https://www.facebook.com/pegidasuomi/
11. SE Suomi Ensin (Finland First) Politically independent nationalistic movement
    URL: https://www.facebook.com/Suomi-Ensin-1414979258802542
12. Siniset RY (The Blue Association) Nationalistic popular movement
    URL: http://aitosuomalaiset.siniset.me/ https://www.facebook.com/siniset.ry/
13. Veriyhteys (Blood connection) Music and culture with Nazi references
    URL: http://veriyhteys.tumblr.com https://www.facebook.com/veriyhteys2014
14. PKP Poliittisen korrektiuden parhaat (The Best of Political Correctness) Art project for Finland and Europé

URL: http://poliittisenkorrektiudenparhaat.tumblr.com
https://www.facebook.com/Poliittisen-Korrektiuden-Parhaat-PKP-564429757055217

15. SD Suomidemokraatit (The Finnish Democrats) Nationalistic party (collecting supporter cards)
URL: http://www.suomidemokraatit.net/
https://www.facebook.com/sdemokraatit/
16. Musta Sydän (Black Heart) Skinhead network collective
URL: http://www.mustasydan.com/
17. Pravyi Sektor Finland (The Right Sector) Finnish supporter branch of Ukrainian far-right party
URL: https://www.facebook.com/PravyiSektorSuomi/
18. Kadulle.com (To the streets) Webshop by SVL
URL: http://kadulle.com/ https://www.facebook.com/Kadullecom-221082264700224
19. Itsenäinen Suomi RY (Independent Finland Association) Politically independent nationalistic movement
URL: http://www.xn--itseninensuomi-9hb.fi
https://www.facebook.com/ITSENAINENSUOMI2015
20. Valkoinen Kapinahenki The White Rebellion White supremacist website http://whiterebelsfinland.blogspot.se/
21. Vapaudenristi The Freedom Cross ER Musician/Band
https://www.facebook.com/vapaudenristi/?fref=ts
22. Marder ER Musician/Band
URL: https://www.facebook.com/Marder-191172501005915/?fref=nf
23. 612.fi (6.12 is the Finnish Independence day) Politically independent organization organizing f torch march on 6.12
URL: http://612.fi https://www.facebook.com/elakoonsuomi612
24. MV-lehti (What the Fuck Magazine) Alternative media
URL: http://mvlehti.net/ https://www.facebook.com/mitavittualehti
25. MD Magneettimedia (Magnet media) Alternative media
URL: http://magneettimedia.com/ https://www.facebook.com/Magneettimedia
26. RM Riippumaton Media (Independent Media) Alternative media
URL: https://riippumatonmedia.com
https://www.facebook.com/RiippumatonMediacom-1512054399110655/
27. Suomalaisapu (Finnish assistance) Charity organization to help Finnish people
URL: http://www.suomalaisapu.fi/ https://www.facebook.com/suomalaisapu
28. Crew 38 Finland Neonazi Music and culture
URL: https://www.facebook.com/Crew-38-Finland-896586793747136
29. Riimuradio ("Runic" Radio) Nationalist internet radio
URL: http://riimuradio.com/about

Appendix B: Asymmetric adjacency matrix with binary data (visualized with NetDraw)

		1 Suomen sius	2 Sarastus	3 Homma	4 Rajat Kiinni	5 SOO	6 FF	7 FDL	8 SVL	9 RNW	10 Pegida	11 Suomi Ensin	12 Siniset Ry	13 Veriyhteys	14 PKP	15 Musta Sydän	16 Pravyi Sektor	17 Kadulle	18 Itsenäinen Suomi	19 612.fi	20 MV	21 MM	22 RM	23 Suomalaisapu	24 SD	25 Crew 38	26 Valkoinen Kapinahenki	27 Riimuradio	28 Marder	29 Vapauden Risti
1	SS	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	Sarastus	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	Homma	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	Rajat Kiinni	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	SOO	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
6	FF	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	FDL	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
8	SVL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
9	RNW	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	Pegida	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	Suomi Ensin	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	Siniset Ry	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	Veriyhteys	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1
14	PKP	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	Musta Sydän	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	Pravyi Sektor	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	Kadulle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	Itsenäinen Suomi	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
19	612.fi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	MV	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	MM	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	RM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	Suomalaisapu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
24	SD	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	Crew 38	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
26	Valkoinen Kapinahenki	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
27	Riimuradio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
28	Marder	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
29	Vapauden Risti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0

29 rows, 29 columns, 1 levels.

Appendix C: Freeman's Degree Centrality Measures (visualized with NetDraw)

		1 OutDegree	2 InDegree	3 NrmOutDeg	4 NrmInDeg
16	Pravyi Sektor	16.000	1.000	57.143	3.571
11	Suomi Ensin	10.000	4.000	35.714	14.286
6	FF	10.000	6.000	35.714	21.429
26	Valkoinen Kapinahenki	10.000	1.000	35.714	3.571
14	PKP	8.000	3.000	28.571	10.714
1	SS	6.000	5.000	21.429	17.857
4	Rajat Kiinni	6.000	10.000	21.429	35.714
7	FDL	6.000	5.000	21.429	17.857
13	Veriyhteys	5.000	4.000	17.857	14.286
2	Sarastus	4.000	4.000	14.286	14.286
28	Marder	4.000	5.000	14.286	17.857
15	Musta Syd•n	4.000	2.000	14.286	7.143
24	SD	3.000	4.000	10.714	14.286
9	RNW	3.000	4.000	10.714	14.286
5	SOO	3.000	6.000	10.714	21.429
29	Vapauden Risti	3.000	5.000	10.714	17.857
8	SVL	3.000	8.000	10.714	28.571
25	Crew 38	3.000	4.000	10.714	14.286
18	Itsen•inen Suomi	3.000	3.000	10.714	10.714
27	Riimuradio	2.000	4.000	7.143	14.286
3	Homma	2.000	1.000	7.143	3.571
21	MM	2.000	5.000	7.143	17.857
17	Kadulle	1.000	4.000	3.571	14.286
23	Suomalaisapu	1.000	3.000	3.571	10.714
20	MV	1.000	3.000	3.571	10.714
12	Siniset Ry	0.000	2.000	0.000	7.143
10	Pegida	0.000	4.000	0.000	14.286
19	612.fi	0.000	8.000	0.000	28.571
22	RM	0.000	1.000	0.000	3.571

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

		1 OutDegree	2 InDegree	3 NrmOutDeg	4 NrmInDeg
1	Mean	4.103	4.103	14.655	14.655
2	Std Dev	3.670	2.107	13.109	7.523
3	Sum	119.000	119.000	425.000	425.000
4	Variance	13.472	4.438	171.837	56.602
5	SSQ	879.000	617.000	11211.735	7869.898
6	MCSSQ	390.690	128.690	4983.287	1641.450
7	Euc Norm	29.648	24.839	105.885	88.712
8	Minimum	0.000	1.000	0.000	3.571
9	Maximum	16.000	10.000	57.143	35.714
10	N of Obs	29.000	29.000	29.000	29.000

Network Centralization (Outdegree) = 44.005%
Network Centralization (Indegree) = 21.811%

Appendix D: Coding scheme and the results of QCA

Diagnostic frame	Example of a narrative	Units
D1 Immigration threat	***Mass immigration from third world countries is disadvantageous to our national heritage (SE) External threat and violence towards native Finnish based on their ethnicity or ideology (FDL)***	**35**
D2 Globalization and multiculturalism	***The destruction of mankind's natural diversity with misleading concept of multiculturalism has to come to an end (SS) Multiculturalism means in itself an infringement of all the traditional values and societal destruction SVL)***	**34**
D3 Government and politics	*The government does not have a four-year dictatorship, they need to listen to the people (RK)*	10
D4 Economic issues and capitalism	*People cannot be suppressed to the control of supranational economic forces (SVL)*	12
D5 Islamization	*Sharia law marks a major difference between Muslims and non-Muslims and such unjust apartheid system can never take root in our country (FDL)*	9
D6 Limited freedom of speech	*Use of normal words is almost criminal to eliminate the problems of the scope of critical debate (SS)*	12
D7 Decline of national identity, tradition and culture	***People shall not be intentionally mixed with each other and not to destroy the historically developed cultures by replacing them with a global spectrum of subcultures (SS)***	**45**
D8 Security concerns	*There is an external threat and violence towards native Finnish based on their ethnicity or ideology (FDL)*	3

Attribution of blame	Example of a narratives
The goverment	Propaganda machine, uncertain rulers (SS), weak, corrupted, dictator-ship (RK)
Political elite and bourgeoisie	Bourgeoisie playing political games (SVL) Bourgeoisie using social justice as a tool to satisfy the masses (SS)
Financial institutions	Suppressing the people (SS)
Multiculturalism	Destroying natural diversity (SS) *a destructive force that threatens the pillars of our society* (SVL)
European Union and global institution	Endangering national benefits (SS), Brussels' corrupted elite (SE), intrusion of globalists must be presented (SVL)
Media	Corrupted and biased. Must value the Finnish interests and values of the majority (RK)

Prognostic frame	Example of narrative	Units
P1 Anti-establishment measures	***Establishment of a genuine democracy, where the will of the people is the supreme authority***	**56**
P2 Nationalization	*The independent Finland must immediately resign from EU* (SVL) *Keeping the Finnish nation state separated from international associations that might jeopardize its national interests* (SS)	12
P3 Law and order	***We demand a comprehensive reform of the criminal laws of and we want the criminal punishments tougher. Add substantial resources to the maintenance of internal security as the surveillance of external borders* (SE)**	**40**
P4 Welfare chauvinism	***We insist that economic and foreign policy should be primarily for the benefit of our own people* (SE)**	**9**
P5 Emancipating freedom of speech	***Restrictions on freedom of expression in the legislation must be dismantled. Incitement against ethnic group must be removed from the penal code as it enables censorship* (RK)**	**29**
P6 Immigration resistance and reforms	***More resistance towards mass immigration* (FDL) *Deport all illegal immigrants and criminals without appeal* (SE) *Every alien that cannot be assimilated needs to be sent home* (SVL)**	**61**
P7 Reinforcement of nationalism	***The Finns will once again learn how to be strong and proud of their national heritage* (SVL) *Having national culture at the heart of a society is an essential driving force for development* (SS)**	**21**
P8 International co-operation	*Although nationalistic reforms can be implemented independently, we support the efforts of other nations to change their society towards a nationalistic state structure and philosophy. (SS)*	15