

A Fossilized Democracy

The Fossil Free movement's work in liberating democracy from the fossil fuel industry

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Abstract:

The science of climate change stipulates that fossil fuels must be kept in the ground in order for earth's global temperature to stay below the 1.5 degrees' Celsius increase pre-ordained as safe for continued human civilization, and to avoid catastrophic natural, social, and economic disasters. Although this is scientifically proven and agreed upon, governments around the world continue to pursue and endorse fossil fuel extraction because of the undue political influence that the fossil fuel industry and their immense wealth have over states.

The Fossil Free (FF) social movement targets the fossil fuel companies, and the fossil fuel industry at large, for wrongful profit from "wrecking the climate", but their campaign narrative also attacks the undemocratic nature of the relationship between the fossil fuel industry and government. The case study of the FF campaign in the San Francisco (SF) Bay Area revealed that through their actions, they expose this corruption in democracy whilst also democratizing the political regime in which their campaign operates, including the college campus administration, the city council, and the state of California. Charles Tilly's framework of democratization is used to analyze the FF campaign in the SF Bay Area. It was found that their actions fulfilled all the required changes set out by Tilly as crucial to democratization. Measures of democratization were then identified and analyzed to show the effects that the FF campaign has on the political regimes in which they operate.

It was found that the relationship between the FF social movement and democratization is reciprocal: democratization must occur in order for FF to achieve its goals, and the FF social movement is creating greater democratization through its actions. The campaign illuminates this necessary political change to achieve environmental sustainability, an understanding of utmost importance in the pursuit of continued human civilization.

Keywords: Fossil Free, social movement, democratization, neoliberalization, Charles Tilly
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"I don't really know what success is. Any benefit we receive is directly tied to the efforts and challenges of others; of all beings." - Eric Mathias, Vancouver 2014

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1 Introduction

The Fossil Free (FF) campaign began in 2012, and grew from an isolated movement “against mountaintop removal coal mining in Appalachia” (Klein, 2015 p. 267) to pushing for divestment from fossil fuel companies on college campuses across the USA, to today’s global span of divestment campaigns. Its aim is to push universities, faith-based institutions, cities and other organizations to dis-invest, or divest, from fossil fuel companies (and the industry at large), because of their immoral activities.

Its aim seems simple enough: it is a movement of finances and an act of consumer voting with dollars from a polluting and unsustainable energy resource toward earth-friendly renewable alternatives. However, I intend to show that the relationship between fossil fuels and society is deeper and more complex. This thesis analyzes the FF campaign through a framework of democratization (Tilly, 2007), in the context of a neoliberal, globalized political regime. My research questions are the following:

1. *Does* the FF campaign increase levels of democracy?
2. *How* does the FF campaign bring about greater democracy?

I will first deconstruct the FF campaign’s claims in an effort to link it to political interactions, and then delve deeper into these interactions in the context of neoliberalism and democracy and this is presented in section two. To understand the campaign as a whole, my focus is on the movement in the San Francisco (SF) Bay Area, a historically diverse and prominent hub for many social movements (Diani & McAdam, 2003). This will afford a substantial base of campaigns to accrue interview data using a methodology presented in section four, which will be analyzed using Tilly’s (2007) framework of democratization as presented in section three. A discussion of results and insights follows in sections five and six, the thesis concluding with suggestions of implications and areas of further study.

2 Background

2.1 Fossil Free

Anthropogenic climate change is not a recently discovered phenomenon (Uppenbrink, 1996; Sawyer, 1972). Although the environmental movement has long been canvassing for protection of the earth, climate justice social movements are a relatively new breed of campaigns, framing the climate change problem as one that is human-driven, but more specifically is driven by a privileged group, whilst its effects are felt by the underprivileged (actclimate.org, 2016; Goodman, 2009). In particular, the Fossil Free (FF) campaign calls out the fossil fuel companies, and the fossil fuel industry at large, for wrongful profit from “wrecking the climate”.

Their mission statement is as follows:

“If it is wrong to wreck the climate, then it is wrong to profit from that wreckage. We believe that educational and religious institutions, governments, and other organizations that serve the public good should divest from fossil fuels.” (gofossilfree.org, n.d.)

The campaign is one of many organized by 350.org, an organization “building a global climate movement that can hold our leaders accountable to the realities of science and the principles of justice”. (350.org, n.d.) FF is both a campaign and a social movement: It is a global social movement that is made up of smaller, local campaigns. The terms campaign and social movement are quite similar. A campaign is often used to describe a shorter course of action for more locally specific goals, whereas a social movement denotes a group working towards shared political and social ideals. For this study, FF is both – at the local scale of university students asking for divestment, it is a campaign, but broadly, that campaign is part of a greater social movement to keep fossil fuels in the ground. The term campaign is used most in reference to FF in this thesis.

Cities, pension funds, churches, and other institutions are also targeted for fossil fuel divestment, with the commitments to divestment continually growing (Ayling & Cunningham, 2015). The idea of divestment, or dis-investment, is not a new idea. Past campaigns for divestment include a call to divest from Darfur, part of the Save Darfur Coalition. Other divestment campaigns throughout history include calls for divestment from tobacco companies (Wander & Malone, 2004), from Sudan (Patey, 2009), and divestment from companies doing business in or with South Africa during the apartheid regime (Arnold & Hammond, 1994). FF asks for organizations (i.e. faith-based, non-governmental), cities, universities - anyone or anything with invested funds - to divest from fossil fuel companies. As Bill

McKibben once said, the aim is not to bankrupt the fossil fuel industry, but to “politically bankrupt them”. (Howard, 2015)

2.2 The fossil fuel industry and the current global political environment

“Fossil fuels companies cultivate sponsorship relationships to help create a ‘social license to operate’. This contributes to the veneer of legitimacy that enables them to keep expanding operations at a time of climate crisis and to stifle the demands for justice of those communities who live on the frontline of their destructive, polluting operations. We are an international network of campaigns and campaigners working toward freeing communities from fossil fuels.” (gofossilfree.org, n.d.)

In this section I will deconstruct the main claim as written above by the FF campaign in order to illustrate its assertion, however secondary, for greater democracy.

The argument against fossil fuels is grounded in the science of climate change: To stay below the 2 degrees’ Celsius increase of global temperature that is designated as a safe operating space for human civilization, the extraction of fossil fuels must cease immediately (McKibben, 2012). After the recent Conference of Parties 2015 in Paris, this temperature increase has been limited even further, to “1.5 degrees’ Celsius above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC, 2015). This is because the combustion of fossil fuels is the highest contributor to the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions creating global warming, contributing to “about 78% of the total GHG emissions increase from 1970 to 2010, with a similar percentage contribution for the increase during the period 2000-2010.” (IPCC, 2014, p.5) FF targets the fossil fuel industry as those who continue extraction of fossil fuels - oil, natural gas, and coal - in spite of this urgent warning. These are extracted in a variety of methods, depending on the state of the fossil fuel. For example, extraction of oil from tar sands requires a different process than conventionally extracting oil through a well (Humphreys, 1999).

The argument against the fossil fuel *industry*, however, is manifold. As is shown in the quote above taken from the FF website, the divestment from the industry is also in response to its illegitimacy of fostering “sponsorship relationships” that allow a “social license to operate”, and the injustice of burdening their costs on frontline communities (i.e. communities that are directly impacted by these companies). To understand this claim thoroughly, the idea of “sponsorship relationships” must be carefully deconstructed. Note that the FF social movement targets the industry as a whole by calling for divestment from the top 200 fossil fuel companies by reserves, a list put together by Fossil Free

Indexes (2015). Among these, familiar names include Peabody Energy, Gazprom, BP, ExxonMobil, Petrobras, Chevron, and Statoil (Fossil Free Indexes, 2015).

Defining the fossil fuel industry's political ties as a "cultivation of sponsorship relationships" is a euphemism, as the long history of mining fossil fuels as an energy resource has been fraught with major economic and political discord (Kaldor, Karl, & Said, 2007; Silverstein, 2014, Mayer, 2016). As a resource that generates immense wealth based on profit from economic rents, the battle for rights to ownership and extraction is often underhanded and bloody (Kaldor, Karl, & Said, 2007; Silverstein, 2014). Silverstein's (2014) *The Secret World of Oil* exposes the undemocratic nature of secret meetings and backroom deals between corrupt politicians and middlemen for oil rights, often involving a deal between a political leader in a less developed state and an executive of an oil firm like ExxonMobil. The deal is profitable for the leader and his beneficiaries, but leaves the nation's citizens impoverished and the environment destroyed (Silverstein, 2014). And so the story has gone for many nations, including Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Angola, Kazakhstan and Nigeria (Silverstein, 2014). The funding of state atrocities can be traced to various oil companies, and due to the profit that this would mean for a country like the US, often these states have no shortage of American "lobbyists and PR specialists" to ameliorate their media image (Silverstein, 2014). Fossil fuel interests have created a political order that is corrupt and obfuscated by profit (Mitchell, 2011; Malm, 2016; Klein, 2015).

How does a proclaimed democratic state such as the US justify the prioritizing of profit and money over human rights? This justification comes in the form of the ideology of neoliberalism (Chomsky, 1999; Monbiot, 2016; Mayer, 2016; Peck, 2001). Neoliberalism is a political and economic ideology that purports free markets and the privatization of social services as the best way to advance human well-being (Harvey, 2005; Friedman 2009; Hayek 1944; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Monbiot 2013, 2016), and that the state's sole purpose in the interference of public policy should be to protect the "proper functioning of markets" (Harvey, 2005, p. 2) Monbiot (2016) also describes neoliberalism's mission as a prioritization of the market, with little to no state interference. However, the relationship between the state and the market freedoms held by corporations is thickly interconnected. It is not only that the big corporations holding most of the world's wealth (Korten, 2015) are creating an immensely widening gap of wealth disparity, but they are also founders of right-wing think tanks and business schools, where neoliberal thought is disseminated through economics departments. Jane Mayer's (2016) *Dark Money* follows the history of the Koch brothers' infiltration into the US political system through immense power bought by wealth, namely to fund the ideology of neoliberalism. She reveals that these ideals of free market principles and economic freedom from state intervention are hardly

free, but that they are funded and perpetrated by an intricate network of billionaires through manipulation of the state. This is demonstrated further in the current US presidential election campaign, as candidates' relations to big industry and corporations through "Super PACs" (political action committees) are being exposed and the public more intimately acquainted with the skewed sharing of power in their country (Briffault, 2012). Wendy Brown (2006) is also acute in her diagnosis that neoliberal ideology devalues "political liberty, equality, substantive citizenship, and the rule of law in favor of governance according to market criteria" and thus undermines "both culture and institutions of constitutional democracy." (p. 690)

Neoliberalism is an ideology that drives politics and economics globally, and its history is directly related to environmental sustainability and the extraction of natural resources, in large part fossil fuels. Andreas Malm (2016) and Naomi Klein (2007, 2015), are amongst others who link the corruption associated with fossil fuels to a greater ideology of capitalism and neoliberalism (Mitchell, 2011; Mayer, 2016; Chomsky, 1999). In one example, the Koch brothers are oil magnates whose assault on climate change action and environmental protection is orchestrated through their creation and funding of a network of think tanks and institutes, along with a close network of billionaire friends (read: energy tycoons) who also have a vested interest in the fight against climate action (Mayer, 2016). The ideology of neoliberalism has afforded the wealthy incommensurate political power, which has been used not only to reproduce and emulate these power relations, but to fund the continued extraction of fossil fuels and stop policies that might threaten their operations (Mayer, 2016; Silverstein, 2014; Klein 2015).

FF's challenge to the fossil fuel industry points out the power imbalance held by this industry in society. Their claim implies that a more equal playing field, the inclusion of the underdog voices, *their* voices, is necessary to curb the burning of fossil fuels - and more broadly, for environmental sustainability. And like Silverstein (2014), Klein (2015), Monbiot (2016), and Mayer (2016) describe, the neoliberal proliferation of corporate industry in its underhanded control of the global political system is profoundly corrupt and undemocratic.

As a FF campaigner at Lund University (LU) myself, my understanding of the actions and strategy employed by the LU campaign is its close alignment with a rhetoric of equalizing power, of pointing out injustice, and banding together to voice an opinion of the masses. More widely, other climate justice campaigns also carry this narrative. The Climate Action Network pledges to "protect the atmosphere while allowing for sustainable and equitable development worldwide"

(climatenetwork.org, n.d.). The Dogwood Initiative believes that “British Columbians should have the right to make their own decisions about how the land they live on is used” and they “don’t just work to protect the environment - [they] work to change how decisions are made in B.C.” (dogwoodinitiative.org, 2015). Similarly, Global Justice Now spearheads a climate justice campaign, and their mission statement self-identifies their cause as a “democratic social justice organization working as part of a global movement to challenge the powerful and create a more just and equal world” (globaljustice.org.uk, n.d.). Naomi Klein’s (2015) *This Changes Everything* speaks specifically about the FF campaign and divestment, congratulating its success as the fastest growing divestment movement historically, and points not only to the success of the movement in bankrupting the fossil fuel industry’s reputation, but also in taking “away their political power” (p. 269) Klein then goes one step further to label the entire climate justice movement as a “democratic uprising” (p. 271). She, in resounding agreement with so many other movements (including those mentioned above), demands justice and equity, but more concretely connects the fossil fuel industry with institutional government, questioning its level of democracy, and indeed its legitimacy: “The real problem is not that trade deals are allowing fossil fuel companies to challenge governments, it’s that governments are not fighting back against these corporate challenges. And that has far less to do with any individual trade agreement than it does with the profoundly corrupted state of our political systems.” (Klein, 2015 p. 272) It is a sentiment echoed by many others, an issue broadly covered by many scholars (Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller & Teichman, 2007; Hertz 2001; Rock, 2009; Warren, 2004). Framing the problem of continued fossil fuel extraction in this way, as part and parcel of the problem of undemocratic politics, reveals the complicated relationship between society and sustainability. As a campaign that targets the fossil fuel industry directly, the FF campaign’s claims demonstrate their understanding of this relationship. However, is the FF campaign a democratic uprising? If so, how do they achieve democratization? The term democratization must first be understood.

3 Theory

The FF campaign advocates for divestment from the fossil fuel industry to reduce its political power, asserting democratic values but also pointing out shortcomings of democracy. In order to discern between these values and shortcomings, democracy as a theoretical concept must be understood: first, in relation to social movements, and second, in relation to democratization.

3.1 Democracy and social movements

Social movements have been defined by countless social movement theorists through different perspectives throughout history (Tilly, 2004; Tarrow, 1994; Diani, 1992; Kolb, 2007; Della Porta &

Diani, 1999), but in simple terms, a social movement is a concerted group (of individuals or organizations) effort to achieve change regarding a social issue. Of interest to this study is the link between social movements and democracy, which I will introduce and explain here.

“New left-libertarian social movements invoke an ancient communitarian democratic theory against the contemporary practice of competitive elite democracy.” (Kitschelt, 1993, p. 13)

In the quote above, Herbert Kitschelt succinctly summarizes a global phenomenon seen in contemporary social movements and their rallying call for democracy. These movements include peace and social justice organizations, environmental movements, and women’s groups - the crux of which is seen at the World Social Forum (WSF), a large gathering “of civil society that seeks solutions to today’s problems.” (World Social Forum, 2016)

It is revealing that a plethora of social movements with seemingly different claims now come together in advocacy of the same cause: a common narrative that runs through all of the groups is a critique of neoliberal globalization (Leite, 2005; Fisher & Ponniah, 2003; Santos, 2003) and a desire for justice and equality. The social movements united under the titles Global Justice Movement (GJM) and Global Citizen Movement (GCM) have similar claims, where groups with demands against unequal distribution of wealth, unite with groups fighting for gender equality (Della Porta, 2005; Kriegman, 2006). Although these movements fall under the category of “new social movements” (Habermas, 1981; Melucci, 1980; Buechler, 1995; Offe, 1985), they do not adhere to the new social movements’ characteristic of seeking “to bring about change through value change and alternative lifestyles” (Scott, 1990). In addition, they do not seek only to bring about social change, but also target political change. This is something highlighted well in the FF social movement.

3.2 Democracy and the political process of democratization

The FF social movement, along with the GJM, GCM, and all of the other social movements and groups rallying together for democracy at the WSF, have an idealized vision of this particular form of political regime, often stating democratic values in conjunction with justice, equality, and community (Della Porta, 2005; Kitschelt, 1993; Reiter, 2009). These ideas are stated, however, in opposition to the hegemonic liberal democracy so championed by developed countries. The hegemony of liberal democracy is an idea so ingrained into the societal psyche of the West that it must be critically analyzed in order to discern exactly what aspects of democracy the aforementioned social movements desire, and which they do not.

Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2005) claims that this hegemonic liberal democracy exists globally, an ideal not isolated from the extent of neoliberal globalization, and affords society “no more than low-intensity democracy, based on the privatization of public welfare by more or less restricted elites, on the increasing distance between representatives and the represented, and on an abstract political inclusion made of concrete social exclusion” (p. xi). de Sousa Santos (2005) goes on to purport that a counter-globalization against neoliberal globalization is made up of social movements, and places particular importance on the more participatory democracies, distinguishing the global South as the birthplace and stronghold of this counter-hegemony, much like the WSF and its associated social movements. The liberal democracy that de Sousa Santos speaks of is the familiar representative democracy already discussed in this paper, and for the purposes of my case study, the political system enshrined in the United States. Liberal democracy recognizes the freedom and liberty rights of the individual in constitutional law, in which an elected representative is entrusted with the handling of state policies, a process that is now dominated by Super-Pac money sourced from elite corporatists (Briffault, 2012). It is now clearer that the GJM democratic values of justice, equality, and community are insufficiently upheld when there is a prioritization of capital and a focus on the market economy (Chomsky, 1999; Della Porta, 2009).

If, as according to Aristotle’s Book IV on Politics, democracy is defined as a state where the citizen is sovereign, and oligarchy is the state where the rich are sovereign (cited in Hussey, 1983), it is easily seen that global and US politics falls into the latter of the two categories. The word democracy, as was shown extensively in the previous sections, would be merely a guise in Aristotle’s eyes in the form of an elaborate campaign and electoral process with extensive media coverage (Cunningham, 2002; Dahl, 1989). However, he concedes that democratic constitutions are often working oligarchies due to the resources that the wealthy can devote to public politics (Cunningham, 2002). Robert Dahl’s theorization on democracy comes with a similar caveat: “Yet a term that means anything means nothing. And so it has become with ‘democracy’, which nowadays is not so much a term of restricted and specific meaning as a vague endorsement of a popular idea.” (Dahl, 1989, p. 2) The restricted notion of democracy and its expansion will prove to be a main theme in this study.

In contrast, the democratic ideals of the libertarian-leftist social movements invoke elements of participatory and deliberative democracy, such as “bottom-up” (Hendriks, 2010, p. 2) policy creation, with an emphasis on the citizen’s engagement in politics, which is seen as intrinsically valuable, and lesser emphasis on instrumental effect and efficiency. For Dryzek (1990), social movements

fundamentally exhibit these qualities, however indirectly in conversation with the state. Participatory democracy necessitates an overhaul of the decision making process in politics, whereas deliberative democracy tends toward an opening up of the political space that allows greater inclusion of citizens (Hauptmann, 2001).

As the idealized democratic form so desired by social movements of the left becomes more clearly separated from hegemonic liberal democracy, this study's preliminary research question of "Does the FF campaign increase levels of democracy?" still leaves the operationalization of democracy to be desired.

To do this, it is first useful to conceptualize democracy in four different types of framing: "constitutional, substantive, procedural, and process-oriented" (Tilly, 2007, p. 11). All of these types of framing describe attributes possessed by a certain democratic regime. A constitutional understanding looks at the laws regulating political activity; a substantive viewpoint shifts the focus to quality of life upheld in a regime; a procedural focus is a checklist of political processes undertaken by the state, such as elections; lastly, a process-oriented understanding of democracy is another checklist of state actions, with the caveat that they must be regularly in practice (Tilly, 2007). A question pertinent to this thesis is which framing is relevant for FF. The democratic uprising that Klein (2014) speaks of where FF is concerned focuses not on the particularistic attributes of democracy, but rather points to the process of engagement, of opening up and widening the space of interaction between citizen and state. Although it is similar to the process-oriented focus on democracy, it concerns not only state actions, but an interaction between civil society and state. Charles Tilly (2000, 2007, 2004) is one particular long-time scholar of this political-process model of democracy and, most conveniently, has expanded the definition of political processes to first "compare regimes with regard to how democratic they are; second, to follow individual regimes through time, observing when and how they become more or less democratic." (Tilly, 2007, p. 10) I will use Tilly's model to elaborate and operationalize democratization.

Tilly takes the political-process approach another step further than his fellow political-process theorists (Schmitter and Karl, 1991; Held, 2006;) when he invokes not a checklist of processes that constitute a democracy, but an inquiry into the processes that bring about greater democratization, and alternately the steps that are de-democratizing to a regime. From this definition, democracy is not, then, an ideal to be reached, but an ongoing work in progress (or regress) of continued social interaction. This thesis is focused on exploring this process of democratization for the FF movement.

In addition to his theorization on democracy, Tilly's (2004, 2007) conception of the social movement is a culmination of years of historical analysis, a detailed narrative from a study of centuries of movements (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001).

His interest in the social movement is manifold, from the intimate study of displays of contention and structure within a movement, to the reciprocal influence of social movements and policy, and, of particular interest in this study, the relationship between democracy and social movements. In his analysis, democratization allows the proliferation of social movements within a regime, and, to some extent but a lesser degree, social movements also create democratization. In both cases, the birth and progression of a movement relies on continuous interplay between state, outside actors, and citizens (Tilly, 2004, 2007). Charles Tilly's understanding of democracy and social movements is a perfect entry point for this study, given the aforementioned current undemocratic political environment in the US (and globally), along with the FF social movement's claims toward democratization. I will thus analyze the FF campaign based on his theorization of democracy and social movements.

3.3 Tilly's democratization: an explanation and an updated framework contribution

How is democratization operationalized? Tilly first suggested a causal sequence that specified "processes and mechanisms of democratization" in a 2000 exploratory article of the same name. Tilly (2000) is careful to note that this causal sequence is not based on empirical fact-finding; rather, it is an exploration of theory based on his accumulation of knowledge through years of study. The paper's (2000) parting words urge future researchers to "sort out, cull, refine, augment, test, modify, and codify the miscellaneous democracy-promoting mechanisms so casually proposed here" (p. 15) My intention is to do exactly this.

Tilly's (2000) earlier exploration of theory culminates in a real theoretical framework in his book *Democracy* (2007). Although Tilly (2007) outlines the theoretical framework of democratization extensively in his book, he does not present clearly the same causal sequence, although elements of this sequence are present. He has also altered the theory, with a greater focus on the types of processes that lead toward democratization. Through an extensive analysis, I have interpreted and expressed Tilly's model with the aid of my empirical data on the FF campaign. The following figures show 1) Tilly's (2000) model of democratization, and 2) my updated causal sequence based on my analysis and interpretation of his latest theorization on democratization. In Tilly's work, there has been an evolution in his model of democratization. The first figure is an

illustration directly out of his earlier (2000) article whilst the second is my rendering of what I interpret from his 2007 writings as the new form of the model. I have also contributed to his theoretical framework in section six, through an application of the updated causal sequence to my empirical data from the FF campaign.




Figure 1. Tilly's (2000, p. 3) causal sequence to democratization




Figure 2. Updated causal sequence based on analysis and interpretation of Tilly’s old (2000) and new (2007) theorization (author’s own illustration)

I will now explain the causal sequence in its old and new form. In Figure 1, the top box of “Shock: conquest, confrontation, colonization or revolution” is, for the most part, irrelevant to our study. “Confrontation” is the only term that corresponds closely with social movement mobilization. However, the FF campaign actions do not wholly fall under “confrontation” as defined by Tilly, as there is much participation in public politics without necessarily contesting governmental structures or political processes (Tilly, 2000, 2004). In addition, Tilly’s (2007) theorization on democratization focuses largely on processes within public politics that give rise to democratization, with only a short

acknowledgement that shocks to a regime may create conditions favourable to democratization. Thus this first box is left out of the new sequence in its irrelevance to this study.

Public politics are the state-citizen transactions or interactions “that visibly engage state power and performance”, including but not limited to, “elections, voter registration, legislative activity, patenting, tax collection...”, as well as “collective contention in the form of coups d’état, revolutions, social movements, and civil wars” (Tilly, 2007 p. 13). Public politics figures in both Figure 1 and 2, however, instead of speaking of change mechanisms that target trust networks, inequality, and public politics (Figure 1), Tilly (2007) changes his conceptualization to a focus on changes within three types of social interactions *in* public politics in which processes of democratization and de-democratization occur: trust networks, categorical inequalities, and autonomous centers of coercive power. For the purpose of looking at democratization, these three centers will be termed in this thesis as *arenas of change*, and only the processes related to democratization will be analyzed: *integration* of trust networks, *buffering from* categorical inequality and *reducing* autonomous centers of power. The last box of Figure 1 denotes “democratization”, but does not specify what these are. In Figure 2, these measures are shown as: *breadth* (number of persons who qualify as citizens), *equality* (the similarity of citizenship rights), *binding consultation* (the degree to which citizens have binding collective control in state action), and *protection* (against arbitrary state action) (Tilly, 2000; Tilly, 2007). These measures will be elaborated on in section three.

It is from my development of Figure 2 that the FF campaign’s actions will be analyzed to ascertain whether it follows the democratization pathway. To determine whether the FF campaign is democratizing to a governance regime, there will be three separate spaces for analysis within Tilly’s theoretical framework: the regime environment in which FF operates, the three different arenas of change in which processes bring about democratization or de-democratization, and lastly the presence of measures that indicate that democratization has occurred. The following section elaborates on the definition of these three sections of the causal sequence using examples from historical observations as well as my own empirical data from this study. I will use both historical examples as well as examples from my own data to explain the framework.

3.1.1 Regime environment: State capacity & measures of democratization

In this section I will interpret and explain the first part of the model: regime environment, which consists of state capacity and level of democracy (ascertained by measures of democratization). According to Tilly (2000), the democratization causal pathway is first determined by the regime environment. A regime can be understood two-dimensionally: in its capacity to enforce policies that

affect citizens, and in its level of democracy. The following figure from Tilly’s (2007) book *Democracy* illustrates a general overview of four extremes of regimes at varying levels of state capacity and democracy.




Figure 3. Crude regime types (Tilly, 2007, p. 19)

Greater democratization is measured by four variables (Tilly, 2000, 2004, 2001). An increase in these variables within a regime demonstrates democratization. These variables include the increase of “breadth (the proportion of all persons under the government’s jurisdiction that belong to polity members), equality (the extent to which persons who do belong to polity members have similar access to governmental agents and resources), consultation (the degree to which polity members exercise binding collective control over governmental agents, resources and activities), and finally protection (shielding of polity members and their constituencies from arbitrary action by governmental agents)” (Tilly 2000, p. 4-5). Tilly (2000) defines polity members as citizens under a regime who have regular access to governmental agents and resources.

The distinction between breadth and equality is the simple differentiation between members of society who are citizens, and the level of citizenship held by different categories. For example, a regime showcasing an equal level of citizenship amongst all polity members would be more democratic than a regime showcasing multiple categories of citizenship with each level exhibiting different rights. A well-known historic example from the United States can demonstrate the difference: African-Americans received citizenship after the American Civil War in 1865 (increase in breadth), but did not have voting rights until the Voting Rights Act was enacted in federal legislation in 1965 (increase in equality). The differentiation here is made simple because of legislation. Although Tilly (2007, 2000) speaks of regime environment only at the state level, this definition is complicated when analysis occurs at the four different levels regime environment outlined above. Take the example of a student at the University of California Berkeley:

“We’ve been ignored for the most part, and when they do need to pay attention to us they pay the minimal amount. You can get a meeting with chancellor Dirks - but that isn’t going to do anything.” (College campaign, 2016)

The student here falls into the category of a constituted political actor, but there is a definite lack of binding consultation between student and administration. This is complicated further in the following quote:

“[The regents’ meetings] are on Wednesday, so we have to skip class and it’s hard for us to get to at UCSF. We had signs that said let her speak, the director of Fossil Free Cal... but they tried to shut her down after 2 minutes.” (College campaign, 2016)

Although the student is able to attend the meeting, the quality of her access is restricted. In the democratic dimension of regime environment, UC Berkeley seems to be lacking in equality as well as binding consultation.

These four measures *breadth*, *equality*, *binding consultation* and *protection* contribute to the democratic nature of a regime, and constitutes one dimension of our figure. The other dimension is state capacity: the ability of the state to enforce its political decisions (Tilly, 2007, 2010; Hendrix, 2010). For example, a state has high capacity if its actions have the ability to affect citizens significantly - through access to resources, access to authorized activities, and connections between citizens. Russia exhibits high state capacity in its control of press, recently stepping up a “propaganda campaign to justify its actions and vilify its opponents” (freedomhouse.org, 2015), in which servicemen for the state would encounter mysterious deaths, the investigations of which would be bureaucratically and

legally blocked (freedomhouse.org, 2015). However, measures of equality of citizenship, binding consultation between state and citizen, as well as protection of the citizen from arbitrary state action - are very low. Russia's state capacity, however high, coincides with low democracy, placing it in the top left corner of Figure 3. On the other hand, Jamaica features a lower-capacity state due to influential militant gangs who coerce voters' turnout, and any "government whistleblower who object to official acts of waste, fraud or abuse of power are not well protected by Jamaican law" (freedomhouse.org, 2015). What is interesting here is a clear differentiation between state power and militant gang power, in one instance creating a high capacity state and in another creating a low capacity state, respectively. This relationship is complicated when elite corporations effectively coerce state power itself, or when the relationship between the two are blurred unrecognizably. Together, state capacity and level of democracy make up the regime environment, which affects the pathway to democratization (Tilly, 2007, 2010).

Note here that Tilly's (2004) earlier theorization on social movements and democratization places some *measures* of democratization as *processes*. In *Social Movements 1768-2004*, Tilly describes the measures of increasing breadth and increasing equality as processes that promote democratization, as well as including "insulation of public politics from existing social inequalities" and "integration of interpersonal trust networks into public politics" (p. 132). However, his most recent theorization on democratization (2007) is a much more complete look at the historic processes of democratization within regimes, and a more systematically founded definition of the political-process framing of democracy. The measures listed in this section will thus be used to analyze democratization in the FF campaign, and the following sections will delineate the separate processes required in order to achieve these measures. These processes occur in three different arenas of social interaction.

3.1.2 Arenas of change

This section will explain the three arenas of change (social interaction) in which processes toward democratization occur.

3.1.2.1 Trust networks

Citizens regularly engage in social transactions predicated on trust - trust that placing money in a bank will keep it safe, trust in the neighbour - relationships which are embedded in larger networks of trust (Tilly, 2004, 2007). Trust networks in public politics is one way that the state and citizen are connected. Tilly has written extensively on trust networks (Tilly 2005, 2007, 2004, 2011, 2000), and it is a complicated and multi-tiered concept. It is useful to begin with his definition of trust networks, which

“...contain ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes or failures of others.” (Tilly, 2007 p. 86)

He stipulates that the increasing *integration* of trust networks into public politics is democratizing to a regime, but the removal or segregation of trust networks from public politics is conversely de-democratizing (section three). The integration of a trust network into public politics shows trust both in the state as an actor, and trust in the political process of democracy through the network’s willing participation in it. This also gives those in a trust network more incentive to participate in public politics (Tilly, 2005, 2005, 2007). This theory of trust networks looks at the paradoxical requirement of trust in a democracy and its political process, with the simultaneous exposure of already-existing trust to increasing political conflict and deliberation amongst polity members (Warren, 1999), through integrating networks of polity members in social relationships of trust, such as labour organizations, and religious or cultural groups (Tilly, 2007).

Immediately, given my study interests, a differentiation of two opposing networks of trust is evident: the globally connected FF social movement and their allied movements and groups vs the fossil fuel industry and their network of powerful patrons and politicians. The fossil fuel industry’s relationship with the political regime constitutes a segregation of a network of patronage between the industry and politicians, away from public politics, which includes (as earlier defined) “voter registration,” and “legislative activity” (Tilly, 2007 p. 12). In fact, Tilly (2007) points out a fine line between partial integration of trust networks into public politics and the total integration in the style of “theocracies, lineage-connected oligarchies, and fascism” (p. 89), which is distinctly undemocratic. On the other hand, the FF campaign and its allies engage openly in public politics, without using coercion or patronage in the sphere of public politics. Quite simply, the refrain of the FF campaign is the assertion of and belief in “people power” (NGO campaign, 2016; college campaign, 2016; city campaign, 2016; city council, 2016). Interestingly, however, Tilly (2004) warns of the “increasingly frequent proposals to organize social movements and practice democracy through electronic mediation” (p. 25), which is a medium that the FF campaign relies on heavily for communication and mobilization. Tilly (2004) contends that electronic media excludes those who do not have access to it, promotes overall decrease in action through its frequency of messaging, ultimately disintegrating person-to-person interaction through proliferation of e-communications. This argument against electronic communications will be better understood after presentation and analysis of the FF case, and will be elaborated on in section six.

Tilly (2007) singles out three different processes as the main drivers of integration of trust networks into public politics: “dissolution of segregated trust networks, integration of previously segregated trust networks, and creation of new politically connected trust networks” (p. 96) In particular, Tilly (2007) specifies a move away from patron-client networks towards more direct integration of networks into public politics when the regime environment tends towards a patronage (elements of which, as noted previously, are present in the US political regime). These are processes to keep in mind relevant to an analysis of the FF campaign.

3.1.2.2 Categorical inequality

Some examples of categorical inequalities within public politics include divisions along racial lines, gender roles, nationality, and religion (Tilly, 2007, 1999). Categorical inequality can be explained from a structuralist perspective, in which social relationships allow mechanisms to create inequality, specifically the four mechanisms of: exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation, and adaptation ((Tilly 2000, 1999, 2005). Exploitation involves the commandeering of a resource by powerful elites, who enlist those without access to aid in the production of value, and then withholding the full value from them whilst keeping most of it for themselves. Opportunity hoarding is the maintenance of elitist power, when those with access to resource exploitation keep that access for themselves, while profiting from control of that resource by collecting usage fees. Emulation is the reproduction of organizational structures that are presently embedded with categorical inequality, while adaptation denotes the ways those without access deal with their lack of access, and manage this exploitation, with the assumption that these categorical inequalities will persist. (Tilly, 2000, 1999, 2005; Voss, 2010) These four devices are more fully elaborated on in his later work (2007), with the additional acknowledgment that movement of some have-nots across unequal boundaries still contributes to the reproduction of that boundary, and the haves will contribute not only to the reproduction of boundaries, but also the unequal relations (i.e. continued accumulation of capital).

This is primarily the form of categorical inequality relevant to the case of FF. Often, as seen in my interview data, there is a lack of binding consultation in public politics when money is involved. The fossil fuel industry, already in possession of a resource that creates a categorical inequality between ownership and rent, exhibits qualities of opportunity hoarding as well as emulation in its functioning. An interesting concession Tilly (2007) makes is that capitalist societies are better equipped for a pathway towards democratization, as states only “rely on a small circle of capitalists or a large circle of taxpayers” and “must simply acquire enough capital to pay for their states’ major activities” (p.

117). However, this simple relationship with capital is complicated in the face of fossil fuels - in particular where oil is a prevalent resource. Tilly (2007) mentions “states prospering through their monopolies of salable resources such as oil”, are “block[ing] the way to thoroughgoing capitalism” (p. 116). He is speaking here specifically about authoritarian states, but the immense wealth associated with fossil fuels has created an imbalance of power in which oil magnates have leveraged their wealth to obtain a huge imbalance of political power - in effect, relaying huge categorical inequality into public politics.

“Both the organization of major political actors around the boundaries of significant categorical inequalities and the enactment of rules for political participation that correspond to such boundaries - especially if excluded parties are those whom existing categories inequalities already disadvantage in general - undermine democracy.” (Tilly, 2007 p. 118)

The FF campaign acknowledges the ways that the fossil fuel industry does exactly as Tilly describes. Keep in mind the two major processes of lowering categorical inequality in public politics as “equalization of categories” and “buffering of public politics from categorical inequality.” (p. 119) These will be discussed further in the section five.

3.1.2.3 Autonomous centers of coercive power

The last arena of change deals with autonomous centers of coercive power. Tilly (2007) recounts the complicated case of the Soviet Union and Russia to showcase interactions in this arena. Of particular relevance to our study of the FF campaign is Putin’s rise to corrupt rule, often termed by media as totalitarianism or, at the very least, authoritarianism, but coincides with a reduction of the autonomous power held by a small circle of capitalists prior to his ascent (Tilly, 2007). Given an increase in integration of trust networks and reducing categorical inequality within public politics, Putin may have set up a possible pathway towards future democratization, though by no means present democratization (Tilly, 2007). Conversely, the oil magnates who coincide intricately with the Koch brothers of the world embody the definition of autonomous centers of coercive power. These centers of power are not subject to public politics, with little to no popular participation (Mayer, 2016). The lowering of these centers’ autonomy manifests either through more direct pressure of inhibiting their power “within and outside the state” (Tilly, 2007 p. 139) or an indirect pathway, such as engagement of a wider circle of polity members or equalization of access to political resources (Tilly, 2007).

There are three main processes connected to democratization in this sphere of state-citizen interaction, shown as the top three boxes in this causal connections diagram:




Figure 4. Processes reducing autonomous centers of coercive power (Tilly, 2007, p. 138)

Interestingly, “broadening of popular political participation”, “equalization of access to non-state political resources and opportunities” and “inhibition of autonomous and/or arbitrary coercive power within and outside the state” are very similar to the processes associated with the integration of trust networks into public politics and the insulation of public politics from categorical inequality. For example, integration of previously segregated trust networks would effectively broaden popular political participation, and could also equalize categories that were previously unequal. It is possible that one process targets all three arenas of change necessary for democratization, something that is demonstrated through the FF campaign as will be shown in section five.

One example of overlap is showcased in the events leading up to the Spanish Civil War: the 1931-1933 “substantial integration of workers’ and peasants’ trust networks into national public politics” prior to the 1933-1935 “confrontations between partially integrated workers, peasants and regionalists on one side and national authorities on the other.” (Tilly, 2007, p. 158) Likewise, in the FF campaign, the

City of SF office of District 11 pointed to shifting gears in their strategy and “doing outreach to city employees and retirees and worker unions” (City council, 2016) to broaden political participation in the discussion of divestment, in hopes of reducing the retirement board’s power in deciding investment strategies. The retirement board is made up of “three members appointed by the mayor and three elected by city employees and retirees”, who “have exclusive fiduciary responsibility for the retirement fund.” (City council, 2016). These processes would insulate public politics from categorical inequality, with the ultimate intended effect of reducing autonomous centers of power in public politics. Interestingly, the categorical inequality that is most relevant is the one produced by the hoarding of wealth by those in the fossil fuel industry, and that wealth is poured into campaign finances and relationships with politicians (Mayer, 2016; Victor, 2009), thereby creating autonomous centers of power in public politics.

The close ties between the arenas of change will be more clear after a closer look at the processes suggested by Tilly (2007, 2005, 2000) within each arena in the following section.

3.1.2.4 Reflections on the arenas of change

After this overview of the three arenas of public politics within which democratization occurs and the ways FF might work within these three arenas, a few preliminary insights can help augment Tilly’s theory.

Tilly (2007) notes that these three subsets of social interactions within public politics are often difficult to separate, and he uses the history of the Spanish Civil War to provide examples. I will deconstruct this action from the Spanish Civil War in relation to each of Tilly’s (2007) arenas of change towards democratization:

“Substantial integration of workers’ and peasants’ trust networks into national public politics through the mediation of unions and political organizations, combined with partial exclusion of the military” (p. 158)

This comprises social interactions that fit into all three arenas of change. Tilly’s intent, in his theorization of democratization, was not to point out necessary particular processes present in three different arenas of interaction, but rather the necessary implication of all three arenas in order for democratization to occur. This could be through a multitude of processes, or one, as shown in Table 1

below:

Table 1. Breakdown of one action into three arenas of change toward democratization

Arena of change	Process	How 1931-1933 fits in
Integration of trust networks	“formation of similar commitments between major political actors and their citizen members or clientele, as when legally recognized trade unions become administrators of workers’ pension funds” (Tilly, 2004, p. 22)	“The substantial integration of workers’ and peasants’ networks into national public politics...” (Tilly, 2007, p. 158)
Insulation from categorical inequality	“Formation of politically active coalitions and associations for cross-cutting categorical inequality” (Tilly, 2007, p. 11)	“...through the mediation of unions and political organizations...” (Tilly, 2007, p. 158)
Decreasing autonomous centers of power	“Bureaucratic containment of previously autonomously military forces” (Tilly, 2007, p. 141)	“... partial exclusion of the military.” (Tilly, 2007, p. 158)

As the processes are broken down into the arenas in Table 1, it is even more apparent that there are close correlations between all three arenas of social interaction within public politics.

See Appendix C for a compilation of various democratization tools that are relevant to my study from across texts on the matter by Tilly. The terms “processes” and “mechanisms” are used interchangeably in Tilly’s (2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2007) texts - where one democratization tool is referred to as process earlier in a text and a mechanism later in that same text, or is a process in one text and a mechanism in another. They are thus placed within one column, and this is another theoretical contribution I have made to Tilly’s theory.

4 Methodology

4.1 A case study of FF in the SF Bay Area

The case study is used to explore intensively and in great detail a single case (Bryman, 2015), often to infer insight to a wider phenomenon (instrumental case study), or chosen because of “uniqueness, inherent interest, importance, or likely insights” (intrinsic case study) (Yin, 2011, p. 310). In this instance, this thesis falls into both categories. Firstly, the SF Bay Area boasts the highest number of successful campaigns (gofossilfree.org, n.d.) for the movement as a whole, and was chosen because this is helpful for both procuring interviews and providing useful comment to the movement as a whole for furthering its success in other regions. In addition, the SF Bay Area has a long history of social activism (Diani & McAdam, 2003), and many campaigners are either involved in

other historical social movements (civil rights movement) or are very aware and proud of the legacy of social justice movements in the area.

4.2 Regime environment

The focus of this study is the FF campaign in the SF Bay Area. The Bay Area's regime environment is not separate from that of the State of California, which lies within the United States of America, a powerful player in global economy and hence world governance. These are four levels of environment that are relevant (FF campaign, SF Bay area, State of California and the United States of America), as well as the separate regimes of college administration, various NGO governing structures, and city council offices.

These four main levels of regime environment are used because the campaign targets governance at these different levels. Tilly (2007) speaks of regime environment only in terms of the nation state. For the purpose of this study, both processes toward democratization as well as measurements of the presence of democratization will be looked at according to the level of regime in which the campaign operates. For example, the coding participation for a college regime pertains to participation in politics at the college level, with the administration. Though there are nuanced differences to college, NGO and city council office regimes, the final results will be looked at for democratization within the SF Bay Area as a whole, as the regime environments operate within one another and are thus connected. The effect of the campaign globally will be considered in the section six.

4.3 Data collection and coding

Interviews were set up with three different subsets of subjects involved in an FF campaign in the Bay Area: philanthropic or faith-based non-governmental organizations that had committed to divestment, divestment campaigns within colleges, and city jurisdictions that had committed to divestment. The interviews were semi-structured. A preliminary set of questions was outlined (Appendix A), but may not have been answered or applicable to some interviewees, which follows the semi-structured conditions of open questioning leaving space for exploration (Yin, 2011). The overarching themes of all of the interviews were democracy and social movements, in particular the FF campaign (Appendix A). The twenty interviews lasted anywhere from 30-60 minutes. A breakdown of interview participants is found in Appendix B.

The interviews were completely transcribed, from which common themes were identified and organized. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the intent of distilling interviewee's ideas

on what constituted democracy, whether the FF campaign was democratizing to a regime - be it their institution/organization, the city of Berkeley/San Francisco, the state of California, or the USA, as well the mechanisms used in this democratization. The questions can thus be organized into categories ascertaining the current regime environment, definitions of democracy, and the FF democratization effect (whether it is present or not, and if it is - how so). As shown in section two, the claim for greater democracy can be distilled through an analysis of the FF campaign's mission statement, but it is not part of the explicit framing of the campaign. Therefore, interviewees were asked whether FF was democratizing or not, to ascertain 1) the accuracy of my analysis, and 2) in partial answer of my research question, *Does the FF campaign increase levels of democracy?*

The FF actions of *participation, increasing transparency, equalizing political power and recognizing congruence and building coalitions* were found as recurrent and dominant narratives throughout all of the interviews. Nvivo was used to code interview answers into these categories of actions. According to McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2008), mechanisms of contention can be measured using a mixed methods approach in which evidence for social interactions supporting processes and mechanisms of contention is found through interviews, surveys, and observation. For this study, the mechanisms of contention are Tilly's (2007) processes of democratization, and the FF actions were thus coded. See Appendix D for the qualifications of coding interview answers within these FF action categories.

4.4 Data analysis

Breadth is a measure of democratization that is not present in the observed or desired effects of the FF actions. Tilly (2007) describes breadth and equality as measures of democratization that, together, make up citizenship. The FF campaign is made up entirely of citizens of the United States, although they form coalitions and recognize similar goals in other social justice movements that may be concerned with citizens outside of the United States (i.e. Divest Israel). In the case of FF, every interviewee and the peers within their campaign or organization has citizenship, which leaves out breadth as a measure of democratization that the campaign is targeting. Thus, the breadth was not a measure of democratization present.

To answer our research questions, the FF data was analyzed both for *processes* of democratization, as well as *measures* of democratization. The processes are grouped into three arenas of change in public politics: integration of trust networks, buffering from categorical inequality, and reducing autonomous centers of power. The actions described by the interviewees were analyzed against these arenas of

change for democratization that Tilly (2007) describes, and then the outcome or intended goal of that action was then analyzed against Tilly's (2007) *measures* of democratization.

4.5 Limitations

4.5.1 Interviews

Twenty campaign participants were interviewed, with an overwhelming majority from college campaigns for FF. The results may therefore be skewed toward representation of college campaigns more than other campaigns at the city level or within NGOs. Campaigners from all levels were invited to interviews, and participants were interviewed on the basis of availability, with no bias in selection. However, my limited access to SF Bay campaigners may be due to a time constraint related to thesis work.

4.5.2 Data

The data collected to determine the presence and degree of a democratization effect of the FF campaign is one-sided, as only proponents for the campaign were interviewed. As campaigners committed to the movement, the interviewees are relatively predetermined to agree with campaign claims - such as the overarching claim against the fossil fuel industry's unjust political power. This places the data precariously in the realm of self-fulfilling prophecy, where I am looking for affirmative data precisely where I expect to find it. In addition, the data is self-reported and cannot be independently verified. The data coded is also my own selection from the complete interview transcriptions, and my own interpretation. However, I relied on Tilly's (2007) theory of democracy to understand the data. This research is conducted within a deadline, and time constraint played a factor on thoroughness and intricacy of the findings.

5 Results and Analysis

It is pertinent before I embark on presenting results and analysis to acknowledge the resounding agreement amongst all but one interviewees that FF *is democratizing*, which was stated outright and found in analysis. The theme “FF not democratizing” will be reviewed in section six, which includes some reservations about FF democratization, from one particular respondent who stated doubts in the reinvestment of money to the same autonomous centers of power. However, an analysis of all interviews showed substantial evidence of processes of democratization, as the following section will show. Again, Tilly’s (2007) democratization framework was applied and both processes necessary for democratization and resulting measures of democratization were found in the FF campaign in the SF Bay Area. This section also answers my second research question of *how* the FF campaign brings about greater democracy, or in other words, *how* it is democratizing. The FF regime environment, though important, is not analyzed here. It was introduced in the section three, and will be referred to throughout this section, and then reviewed in section six.

5.1 FF actions: processes and measures of democratization

All interview data of FF actions under the themes *participation*, *increasing transparency*, *equalizing power* and *recognizing congruence and building coalitions* have been coded to Tilly’s (2007) arenas of change necessary for democratization - with insightful and interesting results. Each theme showcased either an action or desired outcome that fell within one or more particular arenas of change. This is an unsurprising finding given the aforementioned acknowledgement that the three arenas regarding social interaction are often interwoven and difficult to separate, which was both shown through an overview of Tilly’s (2000, 2007) proposed processes and mechanisms, as well as through his own admission (Tilly, 2007). Through this organization of themes into arenas of change, it is clear that all categories of the FF actions correlate with one or more arenas of change, confirming the presence of all prescribed necessary processes for democratization (Tilly, 2007).




Figure 6. A showcase of the multiple arenas of change targeted by FF actions

As the following sections will show, there are trends for arenas of change targeted within each of the data themes, as well as measures of democratization achieved or desired. At the start of each section detailing the analysis of each FF action (*participation, transparency, equalizing political power, and*

congruence and coalitions), I will present two bar charts: 1) showing the distribution of processes for democratization within the three arenas of change (*trust networks, categorical inequality, and power centers*), and 2) the distribution of the three relevant measures of democratization observed (*equality, binding consultation, and protection*).

5.1.1 Participation




Figure 7. FF action participation: arenas of change and measures of democratization

This is the only theme recurrent amongst all groups of interviewees - 350 employees, divested NGOs, college campaigns, city council members, and divested church members. When talking about participation, interviewees overwhelmingly referred to actions that fell into the categories of buffering public politics from categorical inequality as well as reducing autonomous centers of power, with the integration of trust networks mentioned about a third as often.

Most notably, participation often centered around narratives of “voicing concerns” (college campaign, 2016), “working with board members” (city campaign, 2016), “putting pressure on politicians” (city council, 2016) and “collaborative effort” (divested church, 2016). Of the processes suggested by Tilly in the arena of change dealing with insulation from categorical inequality, the most relevant are “wholesale increases of political participation, rights or obligations that cut across social categories” (Tilly, 2007, p. 198), “formation of politically active coalitions and associations for cross-cutting categorical inequality” (Tilly, 2007, p. 119) and “education and communication that alter adaptations supporting current relations of exploitation and opportunity hoarding” (Tilly, 2000, p. 11). These processes often cross over in affecting other arenas of change, particularly with the arena dealing with autonomous centers of power. This could be, as mentioned earlier in section three, due to the fact that the blurred lines between the fossil fuel industry and the state make the processes of insulating

public politics from categorical inequality as well as reducing autonomous centers of power in effect target the same actor.

For example, one college campaign interviewee spoke of increasing participation in public politics through a “reinvestment ask” into “community run climate solutions” (college campaign, 2016).

“I’d be happy for them in invest in larger clean-tech companies but to make sure that some fraction of the divestment ... specifically goes to people who have been most impacted by climate change and are ready to start to lead the way in their own communities from the ground up towards a clean energy transition. Where they are determining what the transition should look like in their community and actually having control of it on the ground there.” (College campaign, 2016)

The desired end goal would achieve both an equalizing of categorical inequality between citizens and the fossil fuel industry, as well as reducing the autonomous power of the fossil fuel industry.

The measure of democratization most observed was *binding consultation*, by a large margin, which follows the very act of participation in dialogue and communication with other polity members, in order to be “heard”, to gain more “people power”, to “build a stronger community”, and to show that they “care”, as reflected in the words of my interviewees (NGO, 2016; college campaign, 2016).

5.1.2 Transparency




Figure 8. FF action transparency: arenas of change and measures of democratization

Transparency was the least discussed theme amongst interviewees, but was prominent and distinctive enough to merit its own category in my analysis. Given the aforementioned secret deals between corporations and politicians, it is unsurprising that the actions within this theme showcased processes, by a sizable majority, targeting a reduction in autonomous centers of power more than equalizing categorical inequality, and without any of the processes aiming to integrate trust networks. The narratives in this theme included demands for a “well-informed electorate” (350 employee, 2016),

calling out leaders as “hypocrites” (350 employee, 2016), and holding politicians accountable to their actions (college campaign, 2016).

“What’s really resonated with me is the damage [the divestment movements] do to the reputation of the industry. I think that’s our hope is that divestment will lead to the ostracizing of the fossil fuel industry. And educating the public about what bad actors these companies are, with complete disregard for the climate and that sort of recklessness is making them bad investments.”
(City council, 2016)

In this particular interviewee answer, divestment itself is the tool used to reduce the autonomous power of the fossil fuel industry in public politics, by exposing its disregard for the well-being of the climate, and by extension, the well-being of citizens. The exposure, or transparency, is intended to invoke outrage and distaste at the industry’s practices, and shift public opinion towards disallowing their continued operation.

“Packed in that concept of democratization is transparency - a well-informed electorate, perhaps... and what I’m getting at is that the divestment movement has done a great job at pulling back the black curtain where these funds are sitting behind, where there’s language that the finance community uses that confuses people. And students and retirees, blue collar workers - haven’t been exposed to that language. And sort of by design you’re left out of the process.”
(350 employee, 2016).

Increasing transparency here is shown to also be a process that allows “wholesale increases of participation... that cut across social categories” (Tilly 2007, p. 198), and insulates public politics from categorical inequality. The end goal, however, is the same: to reduce the autonomous power centers controlling the movement of finance, and by extension hold a great amount of political power.

There is a strong correlation in this data theme between the process of *reducing autonomous power centers* and the observed democratization measure of *protection*, which refers to protection against the “state’s arbitrary action.” (Tilly, 2007 p. 15) The reasoning behind increasing transparency is to reduce the state’s arbitrary action with the autonomous power centers of fossil fuel companies, and thus increase protection of citizens. The assumption held here is that public dissent at the revealed injustices committed by the fossil fuel industry and the state, will somehow circumvent arbitrary action by the state. There is an underlying reliance on people power, or citizens, to hold the state accountable, something that occurs in a high capacity and fairly democratic regime environment, and would be of little significance in an outright totalitarian state (Tilly, 2007).

5.1.3 Equalizing political power




Figure 9. FF action equalizing political power: arenas of change and measures of democratization

Unsurprisingly, the theme of equalizing political power is discussed most in reference to reducing autonomous centers of power, and to a lesser degree, buffering public politics from categorical inequality. These are some sentiments from interviewees:

“I think the goal of divestment is to take away the power the fossil fuel industry has in the US political system.” (350 employee, 2016)

“The same forces that are promoting voter repression and access and things like that are the same forces that are promoting environmental... things that are preventing us from attaining environmental goals like development of clean energy. Kind of the stranglehold of fossil fuels... the fight of the XL pipeline and all of that - it’s all the same.” (Divest NGO, 2016)

“Fossil fuel companies have a lot of political power by spending millions of dollars... and we can see the injustice going on - we have lower income people and people of colour - they keep fighting... but I feel like they don’t really have a voice with the officials. That’s not a democracy.” (College campaign, 2016)

“I’m not against big business making money I’m just against them ripping people off and screwing the earth and the people that work for them. Unfortunately, the wealthy, powerful interests really control most of government and most of what happens.” (City council, 2016)

What is apparent in all of these quotes discussing a necessity for equalizing political power is the targeting of undue political influence of the wealthy fossil fuel companies. This theme combines all of the instances in which interviewees discussed a desire for equalizing power in their actions, which can be seen as the overarching goal for all of their actions - both expressed through their interviews, and demonstrated in their mission statement and media narratives (fossilfree.org; 350.org).

Just as in the theme of transparency, protection was the most prevalent measure of democratization, with binding consultation coming in second. In section six, a pattern in the data themes, arenas of change, and measures of democratization is revealed.

5.1.4 Congruence and coalitions




Figure 10. FF action congruence and coalitions: arenas of change and measures of democratization

This theme is where the integration of trust networks into public politics figures more prominently than in any other theme, but is still overshadowed by the discussion of insulating public politics from categorical inequality. However, many of the actions discussed by interviewees targeted both of these two arenas of change.

“There’s the campus administrators on every campus and then there’s the board of regents. and so... as a senator... there’s 20 of us, we represent these groups, and so in terms of the history, I’m in this political party called CALSERVE (Cal Students for Equal Rights and a Valid Education). There’s a long relationship between ECO the environmental coalition of CALSERVE... a multicultural coalition... founded by... originally it was the third world liberation front, and it grew out of ... its founding campaign was the anti-apartheid campaign.” (College campaign, 2016)

“Black lives matter is calling particular attention to the fact that black people in this country has been de-prioritized since they were brought over as slaves. And the divestment movement is telling a story of how ... with the fossil fuel industry, profits are being prioritized over the well-being of people. And so I think the two movements overlap in terms of who is prioritized and powerful in this country and who isn’t.” (350 employee, 2016)

The recognition of solidarity and similarities of claims between the FF campaign and movements like anti-apartheid and Black Lives Matter was collectively agreed upon by all interviewees, amongst other “social justice” movements (College campaign, 2016). Again, it is unsurprising that much of the interview data dealt with both the integration of trust networks as well as buffering from categorical inequality, given that the creation of “publicly recognized associations ... pursuing friendship, kinship, and shared belief with such organizations” (Tilly, 2009, p. 90) as a process of integrating trust networks

is similar to a process that creates a buffer from categorical inequality, the “formation of politically active coalitions and associations for cross-cutting categorical inequality” (Tilly, 2009, p. 119).

Intersectionality was a concept brought up many times in the recognition of solidarity between groups, with an oft mentioned overarching narrative of neoliberalism as the oppressive ideology.

“We’re living in this system where there exists institutional oppression, that’s been perpetrated by just a multitude of institutions. Even the privatization of the UC system and other public schools has been marginalizing for communities that historically haven’t had access to education. These same communities are the ones that have not had just access to other privileges in this world - from a healthy environment to good infrastructure, and this has been just perpetrated throughout history.” (College campaign, 2016)

This quote showcases claims that are recurring in movements around the world that many scholars (Della Porta, 2007, 2009; De Sousa Santos, 2006; Johnston, 2011) group together as the GJM, and targets corporate globalization as the cause of the disputes in various movements. Although the FF campaign does not explicitly align itself with the GJM, there are interesting coalitions forming that connect environmental justice claims, cultural and racial justice claims, and claims targeting economic inequality. These connections will be discussed further in the following section.

The most prevalent measure of democratization in this theme is binding consultation. Tilly (2007) explains the link between the integration of trust networks and increased binding consultation as a way that government and citizens become subject to the scrutiny of the other. On the other hand, when “rich, powerful people can buy public officials or capture those pieces of government bearing most directly on their interests” (p. 95), i.e. insulate their networks *from* public politics, “they weaken public politics doubly: by withdrawing their own trust networks and by undermining the effectiveness of less fortunate citizens’ consultation.” (p. 95) The FF campaign is directly targeting the insulation of trust networks on the side of the fossil fuel industry through the process of creating their own coalitions and trust networks in public politics.

6 Discussion

In this part of the thesis, I reflect on the implications of my research and its results for theorizing democratization, how it might move the FF movement forward, and the implications for FF and social movements in a sustainability and neoliberal context. To me, FF exemplifies the intersectionality of society and science, and of knowledge and action – the perfect embodiment of the core tenet of transdisciplinarity in sustainability science.

6.1 Tilly expanded: theorizing democratization

6.1.1 A testing, elaboration, and expansion of Tilly's democratization

This thesis uses Tilly's (2007) framework on democratization to analyze one case study, and through this case, I have empirically tested his model, assembled his fractions of his theory, and updated and elaborated on his framework. This section is a further discussion on these aspects.

The Results from this study have already shown that Tilly's (2007) arenas of change are very interconnected. I have taken an even closer look at the results, and an interesting pattern is evident. In general, the actions taken by the FF campaign work to increase participation in public politics. Whether they do this by educating the public on the fossil fuel industry's injustices or through the importance of climate justice, or grow their campaign in numbers and through a network of coalitions - they want more people to care and participate in the political conversation. So we see that integrating trust networks and reducing categorical inequality both work to reduce the fossil fuel industry's power in politics. In addition, recall that the wealth of the fossil fuel industry creates both categorical inequality in public politics, and is simultaneously an autonomous center of power, so participation often aims to both reduce categorical inequality and autonomous power. Tilly's (2007) arenas of change may then, in actuality, bear a more linear progression:




Figure 11. Possible linear progression of democratizing arenas of change

Further insight is possible if I deconstruct Tilly's (2007) definitions of the three arenas of change through the lens of the FF action *participation* in public politics.

When I deconstruct Tilly's (2007) description of trust networks - I see that the integration of groups of people into public politics make it so that the state and citizen hold each other accountable. Holding each other accountable means that state actions are subject to public scrutiny, and the public have an incentive to participate in politics - participation serves to protect and promote their interests that are now integrated into politics.

The insulation of categorical inequality from public politics can likewise be deconstructed: when categories of people are more equal, it allows more people to be part of the political conversation: more people have the same rights and access to state resources - more people are participating in public politics. The trend seen then in both the integration of trust networks and buffering from categorical inequality is a widening of the space for political conversation - firstly, by creating a reciprocal desire from state and citizen to participate, and secondly by greater inclusion of the public. The last arena of change for democratization deals with reducing autonomous centers of power. Deconstructed, it is similar to the last two arenas of change: voices are heard more equally - some voices are not stronger than others. Do all arenas of change work to promote greater participation, which ultimately leads to democratization? The FF campaign has shed insightful light into Tilly's framework, and to definitively draw this correlation there is need for further research.

Another interesting point is Tilly's 'transparency oversight'. The words transparent and transparency do not appear once in the entire text of *Democracy* (2007), but is closely linked to the narrative of "protection from arbitrary governmental action" (p. 18) My analysis of transparency as an FF action also linked it with the democratizing measure of protection. It would serve the theory well to include transparency as an important process towards democratization, especially given the current political climate of backroom meetings and client-patron networks incentivized by money.

6.1.2 A concession to the knowledge deficit model

Why is transparency used as a tool by FF at all? The campaign expects people to act on the knowledge that the fossil fuel industry is immoral. The assumption is that knowledge will spur action, which follows the knowledge deficit model: the belief that the public is willing and able to process and act on information if it is made available (Brunk, 2006; Simis, Madden, Cacciatore, & Yeo, 2016), a theory that has strong counter-evidence. One relevant example is the inaction on anthropogenic climate change.

But Tilly (2007) designates *three* arenas of change for democratization - and transparency is only one process towards it. My results showed transparency worked mainly to reduce autonomous power that then primarily produced the measure of protection against arbitrary state action. It is still necessary that there is buffering from categorical inequality, and integration of trust networks. Recall that integrated trust networks creates incentive for the public to participate in politics - and could be the missing link to creating informed action. Transparency in and of itself will not create democratization, but will work as one of a series of steps towards social change.

6.2 Knowledge to action for FF

This section is an exploration of what my analysis of the FF campaign can offer to other social theories related to democracy and political action, as well as how my findings can further FF's success.

6.2.1 *The public sphere reclaimed*

What then, is the assumption behind participation as an action? FF assumes that the greater inclusion of citizens' voices will increase binding consultation between citizen and state, a notion that is reminiscent of Habermas' idea of communicative action (1985). Originally, Habermas (1991) noted that access to the public sphere (Tilly's public politics) is limited to the bourgeois class, and this access maintains political rationality, which upholds democracy.

“[The public sphere] became an arena of competing interests fought out in the coarser forms of violent conflict. Laws passed under the ‘pressure of the street’ could hardly be understood any longer as embodying the reasonable consensus of publicly debating private persons. They corresponded more or less overtly to the compromise between competing private interests.” (Habermas 1991[1962]:132)

His more recent theorization on the public sphere includes the notion that capitalism allows dominant elites and private interests to form public opinion, and they now make up the public sphere (Kellner, 2014). In this sense, Habermas views the current public sphere as a space where “struggle among groups to advance their own private interests characterizes the scene of contemporary politics” (Kellner, 2014), an argument that is well-founded, and the dominant elites he speaks of are clearly outlined in this study.

Tilly's (2007) framework and the FF campaign offer some insight - and a possible solution - to this problem. Habermas says private interests in the public sphere only skews politics toward their personal goals. What Tilly (2007) offers is framing the dominant elites' takeover of the public sphere as the *insulation* of trust networks *from* public politics.

Consequently, it is not a matter of keeping private interests out of the public sphere, but subjecting these interests to the appraisal and critique of the masses - the more citizens, the more democratic. Herein lies the limitations of understanding state-citizen relationships as a duality of public vs private spheres. Tilly's conception of democratization as a political process is exemplified in the FF campaign,

a social movement that may constitute a reclamation of Habermas' public sphere - albeit with a more inclusive membership.

6.2.2 Local campaigns for a global movement

The campaign aligns itself with frontline communities where they are most affected by the injustices of the fossil fuel industry. These frontline communities do not possess similar rights or access to resources as more privileged members of society, and so desire increasing equality as a measure of democratization. Although FF speaks to this, their focus is not on increasing equality but on increasing measures of binding consultation and protection. One way they could focus on this measure is through the action of *recognizing congruence and building coalitions* where the measure of increasing equality was most observed. Often, interviewees stated a desire for greater intersectionality and growing their network, and some identified this as an area for improvement (college campaign, 2016). As the narrative of FF often speaks of climate justice in relation to "frontline communities" (gofossilfree.org, n.d.), this may be one way for FF to support its claims with its actions, by increasing their efforts in building coalitions with these very communities. This is one way they can ground themselves more firmly in being a local campaign for a global movement.

One way the campaign already does this effectively is indeed through their narratives, and also in their connection to other campaigns globally (350.org; gofossilfree.org) mainly through the use of electronic media - most notably, the use of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. However, in section three, I made the note that Tilly (2004) found the proliferation of electronic communications a threat to trust networks, because heavy reliance on these forms of media could dissolve network connections without in-person interaction. There is both evidence and theory to refute this.

Bennett & Segerberg (2012) assert that "digitally mediated action networks" display "higher levels of WUNC than their more conventional social movement counterparts" (p. 742). WUNC here alludes to social movement participants' displays of Worthiness, Unity, Numbers and Commitment (Tilly, 2004; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly & Tarrow; 2006), displays of which Jaschek (2015) has confirmed within the FF campaign, placing the movement on the "right track in order to achieve a sustained political outcome" (p. 36). Indeed, electronic communications allow for the individual local campaigns to operate within their own leadership, but in solidarity and unity with the rest of the campaign globally (Jaschek, 2015; Diani & McAdam, 2003). In addition, the advancement of electronic communications sees a shift toward more "personal communication conduits" (Jaschek, 2015, p. 16) such as social media and

electronic mail, which could signal a potential way to prevent Tilly's fear of the dissolution of in-person connections.

Notwithstanding, FF campaign poses a solution to Tilly's critique of electronic communications by grounding their global digital network with real, substantial actions locally. This could be the very solution to the issue raised by Kriegman (2006): "Today's civil society efforts remain too dispersed, diffused, and small scale to systematically transform the dominant trends of globalization led by powerful state actors and multinational corporations" (p. 4) The FF campaign grounds a global network in real connections at the community level, which is democratizing not only college administrations or city states, but could be democratizing on a global scale.

In one example, on February 14, 2015, FF campaigns all over the world participated in a Global Divestment Day of action, in which more than a few campaigns capitalized on the theme of the coinciding holiday: Valentine's Day, and urged organizations and cities to "break up" with fossil fuels. That narrative has grown and manifests today in the biggest global campaign of peaceful civil disobedience against the fossil fuel industry that the climate justice movement has seen: Break Free from Fossil Fuels (breakfree2016.org, 2016).

This mass mobilization is conscientious in its multiple, weeks-long, team-building trainings that facilitate safe and non-violent direct actions against the fossil fuel industry (breakfree2016.org, 2016). On May 13, 2016, thousands of people walked through police lines at "one of the largest lignite coal mines in Germany" (germany.breakfree2016.org, 2016), emblazoning the coal mine with a large banner visible from the sky: "Keep It In The Ground". The possible implication of the FF campaign and the climate justice movement is huge: through people power, grounding their real actions with a broad, electronically-connected global network, their inclusive and peaceful actions have the potential to reduce the categorical inequality created by the rogue fossil fuel industry and the "bullish, reckless, economy paradigm" (College campaign, 2016) they represent and fostering democratization. This idea will be presented and discussed further in the following section.

6.3 FF in a neoliberal context

When a global proliferation of an ideology that prioritizes money over human rights and well-being is dominating political reason (see section two), leftist-libertarian movements find the same villain: elite corporatism. The fossil fuel industry fits squarely into that category, which is one reason FF finds intersectionality with other social justice campaigns.

“It’s awful, the fossil fuel economy - when I first got involved - I was more nature focused, I knew about equity issues but not as much but now I fundamentally understand that the fossil fuel economy is a direct result of the spread of capitalism and neocolonialism and fundamentally it’s white supremacy that helps to promote this expansion and it’s all interrelated and it’s really fucked up and horrible. So it’s natural that campaigns would form coalitions like that. The environmental groups have really come together for racial justice and environmental justice. Against Chevron... they’ve elected mayors ... it’s really beautiful.” (College campaign, 2016)

In particular, the fossil fuel industry is pointed out as a perpetrator of all of these injustices, its practices as undemocratic, operating within an ideology of neoliberalism that is inherently undemocratic in its failure to perceive social equity.

“The fossil fuel industry kind of represents this bullish, and reckless, economy paradigm. Where it’s manifested in such a way with the fossil fuel industry that it seriously puts all life on earth at risk. What’s so appalling to me about the fossil fuel industry is not that it just continues its operations, because that’s natural and ... not intrinsically immoral thing to do but the fact that they pump so much money into the political system to ensure their longevity and in addition to all of the injustices that they’ve committed outside of simply burning and using fossil fuels, largely making our societies dependent on them through their political campaigns.” (College campaign, 2016)

FF has the potential to affect structural change - much like another divestment campaign before it: Divestment from South Africa during apartheid, a campaign often credited for the ending of apartheid (Coons, 1986; Lansing, 1981). FF, on the other hand, is the fastest growing divestment movement in history (Ansar, Caldecott, Tilbury, 2013), and the social change it is creating is very currently being seen and documented.

For example, Divest-Invest is an organization “calling on investors of every stripe - from sovereign wealth funds to institutional endowments and retirement fund holders - to divest from fossil fuel industries deepening the climate crisis and invest instead in climate solutions.” (divestinvest.org, 2016) A new report published in September 2015 cites a stunning \$3.4 trillion in total assets divested, from commitments made by “fiduciaries for pension funds, municipalities, universities, health organizations, faith groups, public charities...” to “private foundations and corporations” (Vondrich, Dorsey, Nicholas, Ferguson, Harrison, 2015). Recall from section five that one interviewee held

reservations about the democratization potentials of FF. The specific concern was with reinvestment, as this might still entail reinvestment in “private corporations that are driven by profit” (College campaign, 2016). This, ultimately, could be true, but the *process* of divestment is itself democratizing. As money is continually divested from the fossil fuel industry, the movement grows and dialogue is continued about the industry’s injustices and undue political influence, there is already a “broadening of popular political participation” (Appendix C). The public indignation that the campaign hopes to generate, and is generating, aims to reduce the influence of the autonomous power clusters of fossil fuel companies and their elite beneficiaries. Democratization is fostered by the campaign, and in so doing helps the campaign towards each new success. As Tilly (2007) cautioned, benefits accrued by democratization can be easily lost by subsequent de-democratization, and the political processes are continually in action. If money is reinvested into green tech companies who hold all the deciding power, de-democratization may once again occur. The campaign, however, is also conscious of the “re-investment ask” (College campaign, 2016)

“We're talking about, specifically, reinvestments in community run climate solutions. Of course, I'd be happy for them to invest in larger clean-tech companies, but to make sure that some fraction of the divestment companies doesn't just go to those companies but specifically goes to people who have been most impacted by climate change and are ready to start to lead the way in their own communities from the ground up towards a clean energy transition, so it would be reinvesting money in those cooperatives that are determining what that transition should look like in their community and actually having control of it on the ground there.” (College campaign, 2016)

The campaign would do well to keep this in mind as they move forward with reinvestment suggestions for investors. This is outside the scope of my study, however, and further research is needed to ascertain the full global impact of the FF campaign, and implications for democratization or de-democratization in the future.

7 Conclusion

Members of the FF campaign are aware of the socio-political roots in which the claims for climate and environmental justice are deeply embedded, and this awareness allows the campaign to organize its actions around divestment while also consciously rallying for democratization – achieved through their actions of participation, transparency, equalizing political power, and recognizing congruence and building coalitions. There is an inherent understanding that the greater inclusion of more voices is good for their cause, and there is an alignment of the FF campaign with demands for social equity - both of which are democratic qualities. FF is not only aware of its position in a globalized political regime, it is self-aware in the democratic actions taken to achieve its goals, and it is a divestment

campaign that boasts never-before-seen numbers and geographical range. In other words, FF has the capacity to truly democratize our global political regime.

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9 Appendices

Appendix A

Data categories, specific themes and sample questions

Data categories	Themes	Sample questions
Current environment surrounding FF campaign (regime environment)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capitalism and money • Globalization • Features of organizations (NGOs, university administration, governmental institutions) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structure • Consensus or majoritarian • Internal coordination 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How democratic is representative democracy? 2. Do you think the organizations investing in fossil fuels are willfully supporting damaging activities or simply ignorant? 3. How do the organizations respond to you? Does this change over time?
Definitions of democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Varying definitions of democracy 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is your definition of democracy? 2. What is a functioning democracy to you?
FF democratization effect	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FF actions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing transparency • Participation • Equalizing political power • Recognizing congruence/building coalitions • FF not democratizing 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is the relationship between FF and democracy? 2. What are some of the ways FF interacts with institutionalized governance? List some of these ways. 3. What are the tools of your campaign? Do you focus on education and sharing knowledge, or protest and group solidarity? 4. Does your campaign contribute to greater democracy? Has it contributed to greater democracy within your institutional setting? 5. How do you achieve your goals?

Appendix B

Breakdown of interviewee affiliations

Participant affiliation	Number of interviewees
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350 (employee)	3
Divested NGO (employee)	2
College divestment campaign (student)	12
Divested church (member)	1
Divested city (council member)	2

Appendix C

Amalgamation of Tilly's processes and mechanisms of democratization relevant to FF

Arena of change in public politics	Democratization processes and mechanisms
Integration of trust networks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disintegration of previously effective insulated trust networks (Tilly, 2005, p. 22) • Deliberate seeking of state protection or authorization for organizations embodying trust networks (Tilly, 2007, p. 89) • Formation of commitments directly binding governmental agents and citizens (Tilly, 2005, p. 22) • Creating publicly recognized associations, mutual aid societies, parties, unions, or seeking recognition for similar organizations that have existed underground (Tilly, 2007, p. 90) • Pursuing friendship, kinship, shared belief, security and high-risk enterprises with such organizations (Tilly, 2007, p. 90)
Insulation from categorical inequality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equalization of assets and/or well-being across categories within the population at large (Tilly, 2007, p. 119) • Buffering of public politics from categorical inequality (Tilly, 2007, p. 119) • Formation of politically active coalitions and associations for cross-cutting categorical inequality (Tilly, 2007, p. 119) • Wholesale increases of political participation, rights or obligations that cut across social categories (Tilly, 2007, p. 198) • Education and communication that alter adaptations supporting current relations of exploitation and opportunity hoarding (Tilly, 2000, p. 11) • Reduction or state containment of privately controlled armed force (Tilly, 2007, p. 197) • Adoption of procedural devices that insulate public politics from categorical inequalities (Tilly, 2007, p. 197)
Reduction of autonomous centers of power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broadening of political participation (Tilly, 2007, p. 76)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equalization of access to non-state political resources and opportunities (Tilly, 2007, p. 76) • Inhibition of autonomous and/or arbitrary coercive power both within and outside the state (Tilly, 2007, p. 76) • Expansion of state activities for which sustaining resources are only available through negotiation with citizens (Tilly, 2007, p. 198) • Imposition of uniform governmental structures and practices through the state's jurisdiction (e.g., creation of uniform nationwide taxes increases likelihood of equity, visibility, and conformity) (Tilly, 2007, p. 198)
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Appendix D

Qualifications for coding FF actions

FF action	Qualifications for coding within this action
Participation	Engagement in actions, dialogue, communication, and/or discussion of polity members with other polity members to further campaign goals, whether they are general members of the public or governmental officials or people in power, as well as an action whose ultimate goal is for any of the above
Increasing transparency	Degree to which actions, discussion, communications and dialogue amongst government officials, administration, and the fossil fuel industry is openly shared with all polity members, an expressed desire for all of the above, or expressed dissatisfaction with a low level of all of the above
Equalizing political power	An equalization of power amongst and across polity members, a desire of such equalization, or awareness and dissatisfaction with an unjust concentration of political power in the fossil fuel industry, corporations, and polity members with immense wealth
Recognizing congruence and building coalitions	A recognition of solidarity and similarities of claims in other groups and movements, building coalitions with said groups, or a desire to do so.