



# From Refugees to Citizens: What Happens to Livelihoods?

– A Study of How New Tanzanians Utilize Their Citizen Rights

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*“[A]lthough virtually all refugees initially expect to return home at some time, there will very often be large numbers of people who will be unable to return home safely for months or years to come. It is impossible to deal with these refugees as if all that is required is temporary relief from distress. They must as quickly as possible be given a means of producing or earning their own livelihood. The only practical way of proceeding is to work as if they are likely to be permanent inhabitants of their host state. Investment to meet their needs will never be wasted in the growing African economies even if these refugees should all in the future return to the place from whence they come.”*

*Late President Julius K. Nyerere at the 1979 Arusha Conference  
(Nyerere in Eriksson et al., 1981: 68-69)*

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## Abstract

The purpose of this study was to find out how attaining citizenship had affected livelihood opportunities and strategies among the approximately 200,000 Burundian refugees who after more than 40 years in exile became Tanzanian citizens in late 2014. It is a case study of local integration and development, analysing the situation for new Tanzanian citizens through the sustainable livelihoods framework. The data was collected through qualitative interviews with new Tanzanians in Kaswa village in the Old Settlement in Ulyankulu, Tabora Region in February 2016. Key legal rights attained through citizenship were full freedom of movement, full access to employment and higher education, and the right to vote. A previous study had also suggested that citizenship could increase access to credit and fertilisers. This study found that the legal rights to move around freely and to vote were claimed to be highly accessible and utilized as livelihood strategies by the new Tanzanians. But the full access to employment and higher education stipulated by law had only partly improved the opportunity to access employment and higher education in reality. Lastly, citizenship was found to have only a very minor effect on increasing the access to credit, and no effect on accessing fertilisers.

**Keywords:** protracted refugee situation, local integration, citizenship, citizen rights, sustainable livelihoods framework, new Tanzanians, Old Settlements, Ulyankulu, Tanzania

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## Foreword

I started out with just an idea: I had a keen interest in refugee issues since many years back and I was eager to go to East Africa for the first time. A friend gave me a contact in Dar es Salaam, and so the embryo to this thesis slowly started to take shape. Reading up on refugee politics in Tanzania, the case of the 1972 arrivals from Burundi and their recent gaining of citizenship caught my interest. The world praised the unprecedented generosity of the Tanzanian government (and it is indeed worth praising). But I have always been more interested in what happens in the lives of people, *de facto*. I wanted to know what difference citizenship made in these people's lives. After all, they had already lived, farmed and been self-sufficient in Tanzania for a generation. They were even said to be well integrated and having a living standard similar to the communities surrounding the refugee settlements. What difference could a legal recognition make after 42 years of living without it?

Yet scholars in development studies often promote the acquisition of human rights – wherein citizen rights are part – as a key element to overcome poverty. Knowing that, I wondered whether the new Tanzanian citizens had started utilizing their newly acquired set of rights to earn more money, reduce vulnerability, influence decisions affecting them, or reach other aims they may have. Searching through previous studies, I could only find descriptions of the situation in the so called 'Old Settlements' in Uyanakulu, Mishamo and Katumba *before* citizenship, pointing out some of the limitations that refugee status entailed on livelihoods. A curiosity grew to go and ask the new Tanzanians themselves what happened *after*. So I did. And I learned a lot, not only from the very interesting interviews and conversations I had with new Tanzanians in Kaswa village in the heart of Uyanakulu, but also from everyone I made contact with in the process of getting there. It has been a challenge to boil down all the impressions, learnings, insights and reflections I have made into what you are currently about to read. I hope you will find it interesting.

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## Acronyms

DFID	(British) Department for International Development
'Diwani'	Swahili word for local councilor
dTS	Development & Training Services Inc., U.S. Department of State
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GOT	Government of Tanzania
IDP	Internally displaced people
IDS	(British) Institute of Development Studies
INGOs	International non-governmental organisations
MoHA	(Tanzanian) Ministry of Home Affairs
MP	Member of Parliament
NaSCIP	National Strategy for Community Integration Programme
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
TANCOSS	Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy
TSH	Tanzanian shilling
UN	United Nations
UNDaO	United Nations Delivering as One
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Programme

## 1. Introduction

There are 65.3 million forcibly displaced people in the world today and the numbers are increasing (UNHCR, 2016: 5). Already in 2011, the figure stood at then record high 42.5 million, which means the last five years have seen the highest increase rate of forced displacement ever recorded in history (ibid). Of all forcibly displaced people in the world today, 21.3 million are ‘refugees’ (UNHCR, 2016: 2; see textbox for definitions), and of those, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 6.7 million are in a so called ‘protracted situation’<sup>1</sup> with no immediate solution in sight (UNHCR, 2016: 8). Most of these protracted situations have lasted for more than 20 years, and people who sought refuge with the hope to soon return home have seen their children and sometimes even grandchildren grow up in exile (UNHCR, 2016: 20).

The high numbers of forcibly displaced people, the unprecedented growth rate of displacement and the simultaneously high prevalence of protracted refugee situations all suggest that there is a need to find durable solutions to enable refugees to rebuild their lives. The responsibility to assist refugees can be argued from an ideological, rights based perspective as well as from a political perspective factoring in state economy, development and security aspects. The former is manifests for instance in Article 14 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stating that “[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (UN General Assembly, 1948) and through conventions in the UN, the OAU the EU stating the rights of refugees. Within the latter perspective, refugee assistance can be tied to development issues. This connection will be discussed further below.

Three possible ways to end displacement for refugees are commonly brought up by scholars and institutions, and have been adopted by the UNHCR as key commitments: *voluntary repatriation* to the country of origin once it is safe to do so, *local integration* in the country of asylum, and *relocation* to a third country for integration there (UNHCR, 2011: 183-206; Dryden-Peterson and Hovil, 2003: 1).

### A note on definitions

While refugees have fled *outside* their country of nationality, internally displaced people (IDP) are still in their home countries even though they have fled their homes. One third of all forcibly displaced persons worldwide are categorized as refugees and roughly two thirds are IDP (UNHCR, 2016: 2).

For a precise definition of who is a refugee, see *The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* (UNHCR, 2010: 3). This study will not deal with IDP, only with refugees and former refugees.

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<sup>1</sup> The UNHCR defines a refugee situation as protracted when “25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five years or more in a given asylum country” (UNHCR 2016: 20).

Without taking a stance in the complex and politicized debate over which of the solutions is to be preferred, this study delves into local integration. The concept of local integration can be split up into *de jure* (legal) and *de facto* (actual, on the ground) local integration (Hovil, 2014; Jacobsen, 2001: 9-10). International refugee law, most notably the 1951 UN Refugee Convention Article 34 (UNHCR, 2010: 30) suggests that the aim of local integration is to *naturalise* refugees into becoming citizens, thereby obtaining the same rights as the native population (Hovil, 2014: 489-491). This is the *de jure* aspect. *De facto* integration on the other hand, is an informal process of becoming socially and economically incorporated into the local community of residence (*ibid*). As will be put forward in Chapter 2, both *de jure* and *de facto* integration are needed for local integration to be durable. However, this study takes a particular focus on the role of *de jure* integration for (former) refugees.

This study is carried out in a development context. Developing countries have long hosted a large proportion of the world's refugees. It was estimated by the end of 2014 that 86 per cent, or 12.4 million, of all refugees were hosted in developing regions in the world, and that 3.6 million were provided asylum in the least developed countries, Tanzania being one of them (UNHCR, 2015: 15). The manner in which refugee populations are being hosted in developing countries has been pointed out as problematic, because geographical and political marginalisation as well as legal restrictions counteract local integration and place refugees in a situation of vulnerability. Firstly, refugees are usually hosted in remote and poor areas given low priority by governments (UNHCR, 2003: 4-5). Secondly, the refugees themselves are given low priority by governments since they are not voters; refugees are commonly excluded from development plans made by governments or development actors who adhere to government priorities (*ibid*; Jacobsen, 2001: 25). In effect, refugees and the communities they reside in become marginalised. The marginalisation is in many countries deepened through national legislation limiting refugees' legal ability to shape productive livelihoods, for instance by limiting the right to travel outside refugee camps or settlements, or the right to access employment (UNHCR, 2003: 4-5).

### 1.1 Introducing the Case of the New Tanzanians

Local integration and naturalisation is politically sensitive and is therefore not practiced very often on a larger scale (Hovil, 2014: 491-492; Jacobsen: 2001; see also Chapter 2). Therefore, the decision by the Tanzanian government to naturalise and give citizenship to some 200,000 Burundian refugees is unusual for a refugee hosting state (Hovil, 2014: 491-492; Milner, 2014). For a

comprehensive account of the historical and political context leading up to that decision, and for a note on figures, see Appendix 1. This study had chosen the case of these former Burundian refugees, henceforth referred to as the '1972 arrivals' or the 'new Tanzanians', precisely because the case provides an unusual opportunity to study the effects of citizenship on livelihood opportunities and strategies.

The now new Tanzanians were in a protracted refugee situation for 42 years until they received Tanzanian citizenship in late 2014 (Rutinwa, 2015: 25-26). They fled what has been called "the first genocide in the Great Lakes Region" (COR Center, 2007: 1) in mid-1972 when the Burundian government's campaign of violence killed some 200,000 Hutus and forced some 150,000 (COR Center, 2007: 1) to 300,000 (International Crisis Group, 1999) to flee. Many of them sought refuge in Tanzania and were allocated land for housing and farming in what is nowadays commonly referred to as the Old Settlements in Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Katumba (see their location on the map in Appendix 2). The settlements fall into the pattern described above in the sense that they are located in remote areas in regions of Tanzania with low human development (Economic and Social Research Foundation, 2015).

It is worth noting though that the new Tanzanians, unlike most refugees in developing countries (UNHCR, 2003: 4-5) including refugees who arrived in Tanzania more recently, are self-reliant. They became self-reliant long before obtaining citizenship much thanks to their ability to farm in the settlements (Development & Training Services Inc. [dTS], 2014: 8-11; Andersen and Crisp, 2010: 19-24). Self-reliance is an attainment considered key to ensure durability in any solution proposed to a refugee situation (UNHCR, 2003: 4-5) and it was one of the major arguments for the Government of Tanzania (GOT) to offer citizenship to the 1972 arrivals (Andersen and Crisp, 2010: 19-24; Milner, 2014: 562-563). Hence, it should be noted that the case examined in this study does *not* represent the *most* marginalised of refugees: those without ability to farm and be self-reliant. Rather, the case has been chosen for the purpose of learning the effects of citizenship – an attainment reachable only to self-reliant refugees (Andersen and Crisp, 2010: 19-24; Milner, 2014: 562-563). Yet, the inhabitants of the Old Settlements are claimed to be in a situation of poverty; an evaluation of local integration carried out in May and June 2014 suggested that:

While the 1972 Burundians are self-reliant, they struggle economically. Their economic situation parallels their impoverished Tanzanian counterparts in the same area: they are generally subsistence farmers, some produce cash crops, and they often do not have

enough food to feed their families or cash to pay school or clinic fees. The former refugees differ from native Tanzanians in that they do not have full freedom of movement, require permits to legally work in the formal job sector, and do not have full access to fertiliser or credit. These have affected their ability to access markets, acquire modern farm equipment, and take advantage of training opportunities. Had that access been less limited, more of the 1972 Burundians would have been in a better position to produce cash crops, access markets, and obtain jobs that would have allowed them to move beyond their current level of poverty (dTS, 2014: 9).

If what the evaluation suggests is true, it indicates that obtaining citizenship holds the key to unlock a range of options to better new Tanzanians' living conditions. Placing the suggestions from the evaluation (ibid) in the sustainable livelihoods framework (described further in Chapter 3), obtaining citizenship is proposed to make a number of assets available to the new Tanzanians, open up new opportunities and influence households to adopt new strategies to overcome poverty or reach other goals they may have. Whether citizenship has actually brought about changes to livelihood opportunities and strategies will be examined in this study.

## 1.2 Aim and Research Questions

This study contributes to the academic debate on whether local integration can be a durable solution for refugees in a protracted situation. It does so by examining what has happened in a former protracted case where full de jure local integration has recently been actualized. This study also explores whether new prospects have opened up for a marginalised group through acquisition of citizenship and the attached citizen rights, which gives the study a development and poverty reduction angle. The aim of the study is to find out what difference obtaining citizenship has made regarding opportunities and strategies for livelihoods among the new Tanzanians, as experienced by the new Tanzanians themselves. It concentrates on what difference a change of legal status from 'refugees' to 'citizens' has made on livelihoods in reality, and follows up on changes that could be anticipated, deriving from previous research on local integration and previous studies in the Old Settlements as well as Tanzanian law. Only changes that can be linked to the obtainment of citizenship are within the scope of this study. The main research questions guiding the study and the sub-question to help answer the main question are:

- To what extent has obtaining citizenship influenced livelihood strategies among the new Tanzanians in Ulyankulu?

- Comparing legal and experienced changes, how do the new Tanzanians themselves perceive that obtaining citizenship has influenced their livelihood opportunities?

As will be described further in Chapter 3, 'livelihood strategies' refers to the combination of different activities that people or households undertake, utilizing the assets they have to reach the goals they strive for (Krantz, 2001). Consistently, 'livelihood opportunities' encompasses all the options available, given what assets are accessible and what actions the context and structures around a person allows or restricts. 'Legal changes' refers to the change of status from refugees to citizens (outlined further in Section 5.2) while 'experienced changes' are what the new Tanzanians approached for the study has experienced as actual, apparent and noticeable changes for them.

Since the core interest of the study is to learn about the experiences of those who has obtained citizenship, the data was collected through qualitative, semi-structured interviews with 36 new Tanzanians. The interviews were carried out in Kaswa village in the Old Settlement in Ulyankulu, Tabora Region in February 2016. To nuance the understanding of the context, key informants from authorities, UN bodies and other organisations working with refugees or development were also consulted. Because livelihood opportunities and strategies as experienced by new Tanzanians themselves are the focus of the study, the sustainable livelihoods framework was chosen as a suitable tool for interpreting the data. The data gathered indicates that the respondents had indeed experienced some changes, most notably from gaining full freedom of movement as citizens. However, some legal changes had *not* (yet) affected their livelihood opportunities or strategies in reality. All this will be explained and discussed in Chapter 5.

### 1.3 Disposition

The following chapter, **Chapter 2**, gives an orientation to previous research on local integration. Thereafter, **Chapter 3** familiarises the key concepts 'sustainable livelihoods' and 'citizenship' and introduces the sustainable livelihoods framework. **Chapter 4** accounts for the methods used for data collection and provides a methodological discussion. Next, **Chapter 5** declares the legal difference between having citizenship contra refugee status, and then presents and analyses the findings of this study. Finally, **Chapter 6** offers concluding remarks and suggestions for further research.

## 2. An Orientation to Local Integration

As mentioned in the introduction, local integration has been suggested as a durable solution to protracted refugee situations. This chapter gives an orientation to what local integration means, why it is suggested and what is expected to come out of it. It also describes briefly why local integration is politically sensitive.

### 2.1 De Jure and De Facto Local Integration

Being integrated means being accepted, included and “incorporated” into the local host community (Castles and Miller, 2009: 245-250). Kibreab (1989 in Jacobsen, 2001: 1) refers to local integration as a “a process of legal, economic, social and cultural incorporation of refugees, culminating in the offer of citizenship.” Challenging such rather linear view, Hovil (2014: 490-491) describes local integration as a negotiation to acquire belonging, and distinguishes between ‘de jure’ and ‘de facto’ local integration. De jure local integration refers to the formal process of obtaining national belonging, ideally citizenship, and the attached citizen rights (see also Section 5.2). De facto local integration refers to the *informal* process of becoming part of the local neighbourhood and community in terms of social, economic and cultural aspects, plus involvement in decision-making. Both de jure and de facto integration are by Hovil (*ibid*) deemed highly needed for refugees to be safe and prosperous in their new country of residence; however, the two don’t necessarily go together. Refugees can integrate themselves well de facto, become self-reliant and socially accepted by their neighbours, but still lack de jure recognition and thereby lack a sense of security that they may remain in the country and build a future (*ibid*). In some instances, refugees have acquired duties over time such as paying taxes, but have received no or only some rights. Castles and Miller (2009: 268-269) refer to such a state of being as ‘denizenship’ or ‘quasi citizenship’. On the other hand, having de jure integration through citizenship is insufficient for a group of former refugees to become part of the host community where they live; citizenship status alone cannot prevent discrimination or marginalisation from the host community if de facto integration is missing (Hovil, 2014; Castles and Miller, 2009: 245-276). The concept of citizenship is defined in Chapter 3.

Researchers who have studied the case of the new Tanzanians<sup>2</sup> have followed a similar line of

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<sup>2</sup> At the time of that study still referred to as the ‘former Burundian refugees’ or the ‘newly naturalised Tanzanians’, since the process of obtaining citizenship was then under a moratorium (described more in Appendix 1).

thought as Hovil (2014), dividing local integration into *legal*, *social* and *economic* integration (dTS, 2014: 3-4; Rutinwa, 2015: 16-21). Legal integration in these studies means obtaining legal status to reside in the country, comparable to Hovil's (2014) *de jure* integration. The concept of social integration is similar to Hovil's (2014) *de facto* integration and looks at how refugees or new citizens interact with the host community: trade, make friends, get married, celebrate national holidays together etc. Lastly, economic integration is measured by comparing the living standard of refugees or new citizens with that of the surrounding communities (dTS, 2014: 3-4) or by assessing refugees' degree of self-reliance (Rutinwa, 2015: 16-21). However, it should be noted that comparisons with surrounding communities could be misleading, given that the whole region is poor. Ager and Strang (2008: 173) warn that "by comparing outcomes for refugees with others in their locality/.../this risks comparing outcomes for one disadvantaged group with those of another."

As stated in the introduction, previous studies found the inhabitants of the Old Settlements to be self-reliant. They also found that the new Tanzanians were socially integrated (dTS, 2014: 3-4; Rutinwa, 2015: 16-21). In Hovil's (2014) terminology, *de facto* local integration was already in place when *de jure* local integration followed. This study has adopted Hovil's (2014) distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* to be able to focus specifically on what difference *de jure* integration has made for new Tanzanians regarding livelihood opportunities and livelihood strategies (concepts explained in Chapter 3).

## 2.2 Why Local Integration is Suggested

Local integration has been advocated for as a highly viable solution by forced migration scholars (Hovil, 2014: 489-490; Castles and Miller, 2009: 245-276). As mentioned above, naturalising refugees into citizens was suggested to manage refugee situations already in the 1951 Refugee Convention (UNHCR, 2010) and it is included in the UNHCR's Agenda for Protection (Riera and Achiron, 2003). These documents both represent a rights-based approach, urging states to recognize refugees' rights to, for instance, own property, earn a living, access public services and enjoy a degree of freedom of movement (Crisp, 2004). Complementing the rights-based approach, practical arguments that scholars use to suggest local integration stem from evidence that host communities can expect economic and social gains out of strengthening refugees' rights to travel and work, increase access to markets and in other ways encourage and strengthen refugees' self-reliance. If permitted, refugees contribute with skills and labour, bring new goods and services to the market and also help the markets grow by contributing demand for products and purchasing

power (Crawford et al., 2015; Jacobsen, 2001). A recent case study based on over 1,500 surveys and over 300 qualitative interviews in two refugee settlements plus the urban capital in Uganda revealed the existence of strong trade networks between refugees and the host community and a positive contribution by refugees to the host economy through consuming goods and services and even creating job opportunities (Betts et al., 2014). Compared to most other refugee hosting countries, Uganda allows refugees a relatively high degree of freedom to travel, work and access markets; something which is to be understood as a key factor explaining refugees' self-reliance and economic prosper in the Ugandan settlements<sup>3</sup> (ibid). But refugees in Uganda used to be more restricted in the past, before the current refugee law was adopted in 2006 (Akello, 2009). In the early 2000s scholars (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil, 2003) pointed out that Ugandan refugees' ability to overcome aid dependency was held back because they lacked freedom of movement and were confined to live in remote, isolated and insecure refugee settlements (ibid).

### 2.2.1 Reluctance Towards Local Integration

Given the positive effects described above, it could be assumed that local integration would be a favourable strategy to alleviate refugee situations. Local integration is however contested as a durable solution. Politicians in many refugee hosting countries are hesitant or even reluctant to consider refugees' stay under their jurisdiction to be more than temporary. Jacobsen (2001: 2) claims that "[i]n both developed and developing host countries, the preference is for temporary protection and restrictions on refugees, including encampment, until repatriation takes place" and that local integration "has fallen out of political favour" for the reason that it is associated with permanency. Trying to explain this reluctance by developing countries in particular, Long (2014: 482) proposes that politicians fear that conflict would arise between the native population and the new citizens over limited state resources. Despite arguments from scholars that refugees can become a positive social and economic contribution to a community if integrated well, politicians persistently characterize refugees as 'burdens' that could not be afforded in "settings where local communities are also often neglected or marginalised by underdeveloped or poorly governed states", in other words in developing regions (ibid). Therefore, Long (ibid) suggests that local integration has to be regarded as a *development issue* for it to gain ground.

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<sup>3</sup> Like the 1972 arrivals in Tanzania, Ugandan refugees also had plots of land to cultivate (Betts et al., 2014).

### 2.3 Anticipations for this Study

Reflecting on the essence of what has just been presented about local integration as a durable solution, some anticipations can be made for what might happen in the wake of citizenship for new Tanzanians. Firstly, previous research on local integration suggests that local integration is incomplete and insecure when de facto integration is not matched by de jure integration. As stated, the new Tanzanians had already reached a high degree of de facto integration in terms of social and economic incorporation into the host communities before obtaining citizenship (dTS, 2014; Rutinwa, 2015). Hence, acquiring citizenship could be foreseen to primarily add a sense of permanency to their lives and livelihoods. It is expectable that people have started making longer term plans, feeling certain that their future is in Tanzania.

Further, taking into account claims from scholars (Crawford et al., 2015; Jacobsen, 2001) as well as the large case study on refugees in Uganda who benefitted from less restrictive refugee legislation (Betts et al., 2014), it could be assumed that the new Tanzanian citizens would utilize their increased freedom and increase their own and the communities' economic activity. The full freedom of movement, the right to work without seeking permission and the right to access higher education anywhere in the country if merited, are likely to have opened up some new livelihood opportunities outside the refugee settlements, at least for those who could afford to travel or move. Reasonably, new Tanzanians could be anticipated to travel around more, and some new Tanzanians could be anticipated to have moved out of the settlements to try to fulfil their desired livelihood outcomes elsewhere.

### 3. Key Concepts and Analytical Framework

To enable an analysis later on concerning to what extent obtaining citizenship has influenced livelihood strategies among the new Tanzanians in Ulyankulu, this chapter defines and familiarises the concepts of citizenship and sustainable livelihoods. Thereafter it introduces the sustainable livelihoods framework which is a tool commonly used to understand a poverty situation from a holistic perspective. The chapter ends with a clarification of how the framework will be used to analyse the findings of this study.

#### 3.1 Citizenship

The core idea with having citizenship is according to Castles and Davidson (2000: 26-28) for people to create order and rule of law with the purpose of empowering oneself. All acts, rights and obligations created for citizens are just necessities to ensure own empowerment, they suggest (ibid). Similarly, Arendt (1986 in Hovil, 2014: 3) underlines how citizenship means that someone belongs to a nation state as a citizen and has the 'right to have rights'. It is this recognition of the right to have rights that is central to the understanding of citizenship in this study. The rights deriving from citizenship – in this study referred to as 'citizen rights' – are commonly categorized into civil, political and social rights (Castles and Miller, 2009: 268-269) or the aforementioned plus economic rights (Hansen, 2014: 254). In return for rights and freedoms, states demand of citizens that they fulfil duties ranging from everyday obligations like paying taxes to the more extreme commitment of going to war to defend the country if need be (Ager and Strang, 2008: 175-176; Hansen, 2014: 254). For refugees, obtaining citizenship is the ultimate proof of being de jure integrated, as described above (Hovil, 2014). Ager and Strang (2008: 169-175) claim that for integration to be effective, citizenship is needed as a foundation on which 'operational integration' such as housing, employment, education and access to social services must rest.

#### 3.2 Sustainable Livelihoods and Poverty

The concept of 'sustainable livelihoods' is most often used to estimate and design interventions to alleviate poverty, especially in rural settings where a majority are small scale farmers (Krantz, 2001: 6). It is used as a complement as well as a contrast to estimating poverty in dollars a day, since livelihood "seeks to convey the non-economic attributes of survival, not just the economic ones" by including a person's or household's access to different assets or resources negotiated through

institutions and social relationships (Ellis, 2000: 290-291). It emphasizes how overcoming poverty involves obtaining security and stability and building capabilities through for instance acquiring knowledge and contacts. The introduction of the sustainable livelihoods concept is attributed to the Brundtland Commission, and to a UN conference on environment and development in 1992 which adopted and expanded the concept. That same year, Chambers and Conway proposed a definition of sustainable livelihoods that later scholars and organisations have adopted and built on (Krantz, 2001: 2). For instance, a modified definition proposed by the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) and the Department for International Development (DFID) in the UK reads:

A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base (IDS Discussion Paper 296, N.D. cited in DFID, 1999: section 1.1).


Out of this definition the IDS and the DFID elaborated a sustainable livelihoods framework (described below). The core idea of the sustainable livelihoods approach builds on three understandings: firstly that economic growth is not enough to alleviate poverty if the poor lack capacity to utilize increasing economic opportunities, secondly that poverty can manifest itself not only through lack of money but through for instance poor health, vulnerability, lack of influence in decisions affecting ones' community, etc. and lastly that the poor themselves know their situation best and should therefore be involved in designing poverty alleviation interventions (Krantz, 2001: 10-11). However, the livelihoods concept gives no exact definition of what poverty *is*, but rather suggests that poverty must be defined and assessed for each case or context (DFID, 1999).

This study embraces the definition of 'sustainable livelihoods' by the IDS and the DFID, and uses the framework as an analytical tool to understand the effects of citizenship on new Tanzanians' livelihoods. The strength of the framework is its holistic approach where multiple aspects of a person's life and the context around her are interconnected. The weakness is found on the other side of the same coin; it is hard to map, track and analyse all aspects of a livelihood (Krantz, 2001). Thus, limitations in mapping for this study will be carefully stated in the analysis.

### 3.3 The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework

The sustainable livelihoods framework can be described as a chain of logic where the assets available to someone, the societal structures and processes preconditioning what options are open to someone, and the trends, shocks and vulnerabilities in the surrounding context all shape what livelihood strategies that person will embark upon in order to reach desired livelihood outcomes (Krantz, 2001). The framework can be visualised in a linear manner as well as in a circular manner. This section will first describe the linear model by the IDS and the DFID (Figure 1). Then it will suggest a slight adaptation, visualizing the framework as a circle (Figure 2).

*Figure 1: The sustainable livelihoods framework by the IDS and the DFID*




The figure shows the IDS's and the DFID's outline of the sustainable livelihoods framework. Source: DFID, 1999: Section 1.1. Used under Crown Copyright and the Open Government License: <https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/>

The model by the IDS and the DFID (Figure 1) shows the chain of logic just described. In addition, the model suggests that the transforming structures and processes are not only affecting what strategies people adopt to utilize their assets, but also the trends, shocks and vulnerability context. For instance, political decisions to improve the infrastructure in an area can reduce vulnerabilities from floods or hurricanes, etc. The model further suggests that livelihood outcomes of a certain strategy are in turn affecting the assets someone acquires – assets that can be utilized for future strategies (DFID, 1999). It is worth noting that the walk from context and assets through structures, processes and strategies to outcomes is not a once-in-a-lifetime undertaking, but rather a circle or


spiral where one achievement will impact the next (see the arrow connecting livelihood outcomes back to livelihood assets in Figure 1). The imaginary spiral can go up or down or remain stagnant; the sustainable livelihoods framework is primarily a tool to suggest how livelihood assets, strategies and outcomes are interconnected and affected by the vulnerability context and the transforming structures and processes (Krantz, 2001).

To visualise this circular flow better, this study chooses to adapt the model slightly, as can be seen in Figure 2. The adaptation builds on a very similar, but more detailed, visualisation of the IDS/DFID's framework made by the FAO (2005: module 2 page 3) displayed in Appendix 3. Figure 2 shows the same elements and arrows as Figure 1, just with more emphasis on how achieving desired livelihood outcomes in turn builds the precondition for future assets and strategies to reach new outcomes (or sustain the level reached) in a continuous circle. Each element in the sustainable livelihoods framework is described more in detail on next page.


*Figure 2: The sustainable livelihoods framework – visualisation adapted for this study*




*The figure shows the sustainable livelihoods framework visualised in a circle instead of the square boxes found in Figure 1. This adapted visualisation builds on a very similar, but more detailed, visualisation of the sustainable livelihoods framework made by the FAO (2005: module 2 page 3) displayed in Appendix 3.*




The **'livelihood assets'** comprise of: the *financial* means a person or household has, basically money or items that can be quickly traded to get money if need be; *natural* capital, i.e. farmland, livestock, fishing water; *human* capital like crafting skills, an educational degree or knowledge about how to claim one's political rights but also good health and strength to work; *social* capital in the form of friends, relatives or other contacts who can help with anything from babysitting or repairing a caved-in roof to giving recommendations leading to a good job position; and *physical* capital in the form of a roof over one's head, a motor vehicle to go places, etc.




The **'vulnerability context'** comprises of: *trends* like economic fluctuations, population trends or technological advancements, *shocks*, i.e. natural disasters, crop failure, outbreak of diseases or conflict, and *seasonality* affecting availability food, number of work opportunities open, proneness of falling ill, etc.



The **'transforming structures and processes'** contain the governing structure of the country as well as of the community, the global and local market for goods and services, and the degree of access a person has to influence those. It also includes actions and processes of for instance making or enforcing the law. The list of examples can grow long, but the important thing is to include such factors that are seen to effect the livelihood assets, livelihood strategies and vulnerability context in a given case.



The **'livelihood strategies'** that people adopt are conscious strategic choices or survival strategies calculated from what the aforementioned three elements contain. A farmer can for instance choose to intensify the cultivation of a certain crop, diversify into growing other crops or start doing non-farm activities. A person can choose a certain education or move to improve his or her chances to get a desired job, etc.



This leads on to the fifth factor, **'livelihood outcome'** which is what the individual or household is striving for. It can be shelter, political influence, a well-paid job, improvements in the community, and much more. The sustainable livelihoods framework is people-centred, meaning that people themselves will define what livelihood outcomes they strive for (DFID, 1999; Krantz, 2001).

A sixth factor or concept that is not visualized in the sustainable livelihoods framework but nevertheless central to this study is **'livelihood opportunities'**. Krantz (2001) uses the term loosely

without stating any definition and seems to encompass any opportunity to somehow better one's livelihood. In this study, 'livelihood opportunities' should be understood to cover all options available to someone when putting together what assets are accessible and what actions the vulnerability context and transforming structures and processes around a person allows or restricts. In other words, while a livelihood strategy is what someone *does*, a livelihood opportunity is the opportunity to embark on a strategy.

### 3.4 Operationalising the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework

This study seeks to explore how obtaining citizenship has influenced what possibilities new Tanzanians deem available to them and what strategies they adopt to reach the goals they want to achieve. Obtaining citizenship contra having refugee status means a change of legal status and legal rights, which can be sorted under *transforming structures and processes* in the framework. The research questions, put in other words, asks whether and how a change in *transforming structures and processes* has made a difference through influencing and regulating access to *livelihood assets* (thereby altering *livelihood opportunities*) and through motivating or pushing people to adopt new *livelihood strategies* in the given case.

When using the sustainable livelihoods framework as an analytical tool, it has no clear formula for predicting a certain chain of events. Therefore, it does not predict any specific outcome of the acquisition of citizenship; rather, the framework suggests *that* a change in the transforming structures and processes can be anticipated to have *some kind of* effect on livelihood assets and strategies as well as on the vulnerability context, but not *what* will change or *how* it will play out. The framework offers a mind-set, a way of thinking holistically (Krantz, 2001). Bearing in mind how the framework is a tool for analysing rather than predicting outcomes, the framework could suggest two things for the case examined in this study: firstly, that one bottleneck somewhere could hold back expected changes because multiple elements interplay to shape a person's or household's livelihood opportunities, and secondly and subsequently that each element in the circle (see Figure 2) has to be functioning reasonably well for a livelihood to improve.

## 4. Methodology

This chapter gives a brief orientation to the research design, explaining the choice of doing a qualitative case study to find out to what extent obtaining citizenship has influenced livelihood strategies, and how new Tanzanians themselves perceive the changes brought about by citizenship. It thereafter accounts for how the respondents were sampled, how the interviews were carried out and how the data was analysed. Throughout the chapter, strengths and weaknesses of the methods and approaches chosen are reflected upon, and limitations and possible biases are accounted for and discussed. Last, research ethics and reflections on validity and reliability are brought up in separate sections.

### 4.1 Research Design

This study was born out of an interest to learn about local integration in relation to development and poverty reduction. Since the nature of such a relationship between two spheres of 'human affairs' is best examined and understood within an actual context (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 221-224), the research was designed as a case study. Further, an awareness of the complexity of the relationship between local integration and development, plus a wish to acquire in-depth knowledge, led to the choice of pursuing a qualitative study (Creswell, 2009: 3-5; Ragin and Amoroso, 2010: 111-113). The study can be positioned ontologically and epistemologically within 'interpretivism' (Mikkelsen, 2005: 135-137), since it seeks to learn about people's own experience of the changes brought about by citizenship, as perceived by people themselves. Given this approach – which is also manifested in the second research question – it was natural to choose semi-structured interviews as the main method for data collection, since the interviews enabled the researcher to ask for people's own perceptions and use their responses to further the questions and dig deeper (Mikkelsen, 2005: 89). The analytical framework was selected at an early stage. The sustainable livelihoods framework suited this study well given the researcher's wishes to adopt a people centred approach and to use a holistic tool to make sense of the data (DFID, 1999; Krantz, 2001).

### 4.2 Sampling

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with both key informants and new Tanzanians (see interview guides in Appendix 4). For the interviews with the new Tanzanians, respondents were sampled through purposive sampling, using occupations to put together a quota sample (Laws et

al., 2003: 356-376) with farmers, business entrepreneurs, craftsmen, day labourers, housewives, students, teachers, pastors, a health professional and local officials (see a list of interviewees in Appendix 5). The researcher decided to use occupations for sampling with the hope that interviewees from a variety of occupations would give a broader range of input on livelihood opportunities and strategies than if all interviewees would have had the same occupation. A mix of young and old, male and female respondents was strived for, also with the aim to capture a broad range of views and opinions. Most of the 19 interviews with new Tanzanians were conducted with two respondents at a time, and the total number of respondents amounted to 36 people. The ideas with meeting two respondents at a time were both that more respondents could be heard, and that respondent would not have to feel exposed from sitting alone with the researcher and translator, but could discuss answers with a friend. This was hoped to create a relaxed atmosphere and good dynamics. For most of the interviews, this assumption held true, but in a handful of the interviews, power dynamics deriving from unequal social status – by Chambers (2008: 35-38 and 44) called person bias – manifested itself in that women spoke less in the presence of men and young people spoke less in the presence of someone much older. When this problem was identified, the matching of interviewees was altered to avoid the bias. Basing the sampling on occupations unfortunately had the effect that only 15 of the 36 interviewees were women. This is another manifestation of the aforementioned person bias, that men are overrepresented in power positions – in this case in influential occupations such as teachers, pastors and local officials. Due to time constraints, the researcher did not manage to balance this up. Hence it has to be kept in mind when assessing the result of this study that women were underrepresented among the respondents.

Most of the respondents were contacted by the village chairman secretary in Kaswa village and agreed to be interviewed for this study and paired up with someone they knew from before.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, some respondents were contacted spontaneously by the researcher in the village (see Appendix 5). The choice to rely mainly on the village chairman office was made acknowledging that the office's extensive contacts and credibility in Kaswa would enable reaching respondents with the desired characteristics promptly. It can't be ruled out that respondents being picked by a local government official overrepresented a certain view or had more knowledge than the general

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<sup>4</sup> In one interview (Interview 7) two respondents were called, but one of them took the initiative to bring four friends along and the interview became an unexpected but dynamic and meaningful group interview.

villager; but the variety in knowledge, views and opinions recorded in the collected data suggests that this gatekeeper did not impact the reliability considerably. Since the sampling was not random, it cannot be deemed representative for the Ulyankulu settlement or even Kaswa village, which has to be considered when interpreting the findings (ibid).

The key informants were found through snowball sampling (Laws et al., 2003: 356-376) whereby two initial key informants recommended others who were knowledgeable about the situation for the new Tanzanians, development issues in the region or the situation for refugees in Tanzania in general. A list of the key informants is found in Appendix 6. No recommendation on whom to interview was neglected. However, time constraints for both the researcher and potential informants impacted the sampling.<sup>5</sup>

### 4.3 Data

Among the new Tanzanians in Ulyankulu, 19 interviews were conducted during ten days in February 2016 in Kaswa village, Ulyankulu. The choice fell on Ulyankulu since it is the nearest settlement to Dar es Salaam where most of the key informant interviews took place (see map in Appendix 2), and it is reachable on road despite rains. The original idea for the study was to also visit the Old Settlements in Mishamo and Katumba, but time constraints as well as heavy rains flooding the road from Tabora region to Katavi region directed the choice to only visit the Old Settlement in Ulyankulu. Having interviews from only one location was a limitation to the study in that the testimonies from Ulyankulu could not be compared to, and validated by, testimonies from Mishamo and Katumba (Laws et al., 2003: 332-355). Further the choice to do all the interviews in Kaswa village was made for convenience and feasibility reasons. Yet it exposed the study to the risk of 'roadside bias' and 'spatial bias' as coined by Chambers (2008: 31-33 and 42-43). These biases suggest that constraints to livelihood opportunities may be more visible outside of the villages, even if a village consists of only a few streets; and that other locations in the settlement may have had different preconditions than Kaswa since some of the roads were impassable in the rainy season. These limitations regarding location shall be kept in mind when assessing the results of this study.

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<sup>5</sup> Had time and timing allowed it, it was the intention of the researcher to also consult with the Centre for the Study of Forced Migration at the University of Dar es Salaam. The key informant interviews in Dar es Salaam took place from late January to early February and then at the end of February. During this time, the members of the centre were about to finalise the new integration plan for the new Tanzanians. This included travels both within and outside Tanzania. It was therefore not possible to arrange for any interviews in Dar es Salaam.

Further, the timing of the fieldwork was both an asset and a drawback; the naturalisation process being completed and certificates of citizenship issued only 15 months prior to the data collection gave the advantage that the respondents could easily remember and compare their experiences pre and post obtaining citizenship. At the same time, it had the drawback that it might have been premature to search for changes after 15 months of citizenship, especially since the Tanzanian election in October 2015 was only four months prior to the data collection.

Moving on to the interview guide (see Appendix 4), it was inspired by the legal changes brought by citizenship (see Section 5.2) and by suggestions made both by previous research on local integration (see Chapter 2) and by previous studies in the Old Settlements regarding what effects obtaining citizenship status could potentially have (Andersen and Crisp, 2010; dTS, 2014; Milner, 2014). Throughout the interviews, the interview guide was a living document, undergoing adjustments and additions as the researcher learned more about the situation for livelihoods from interviewees.

All interviews with the new Tanzanians were carried out with the help of an English-Swahili translator and were recorded on paper by the researcher during the interviews. With the exception for minor technical difficulties, the interviews were also audio recorded. Working with a translator meant it was likely that some detail was lost in translation. To mitigate this, the interview time allowed for control questions,<sup>6</sup> and the researcher and translator had time to discuss the interviews afterwards, go through the written notes and if need be listen to the recordings to gain clarity (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003: 131-135; Laws et al., 2003: 259-270). The location for the interviews offered privacy, but was unfortunately on the same compound as a local authorities' office. To avoid misunderstandings, the researcher's independence from any authority was stated extra clearly before each interview. In addition to the interviews, observations made during the time the researcher lived in Kaswa and spontaneous conversations with villagers on the street, at the market and in local restaurants deepened the researcher's understanding of village life and livelihoods.

The key informants interviewed represented the UNHCR, other UN bodies and INGOs as well as the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and the Settlement Office in Ulyankulu (see a full list in Appendix 6). Even though the interview guide (Appendix 4) served as a basis for each interview, the expertise of each informant has to a large degree guided the conversation. The knowledge extracted from

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<sup>6</sup> The average interview took a little over one hour.

the key informant interviews has mainly served to deepen and nuance the researcher's understanding of the context for the study in terms of refugee issues and development issues.

Additionally, secondary sources have been consulted through searching the Lund University online library catalogue for literature on the new Tanzanians, the naturalisation process, protracted refugee situations, citizenship and livelihoods. The search has been furthered by using the reference list of the resources found to snowball into more written sources. Also, some of the key informants have shared or recommended reading relevant for the case.

#### 4.4 Method for Analysis

As commonly done in qualitative research, the data has been coded into themes and concepts allowing a condensation and analysis of what was found, theme by theme (Mikkelsen, 2005: 181-185). Adhering to recommendations for coding from Creswell (2009: 186-187) a preliminary list of themes was created based on anticipations (see Chapter 5), and then the findings were as far as possible sorted into it. But, similar to the interview guides described above, the preliminary list of themes was allowed to be a living document. When needed, it was adapted to ensure it could also include topics that were not anticipated but came up repeatedly in the interviews. The coding and sorting was done with the help of the computer software NVivo (see Appendix 7 for an overview of themes and topics used for sorting the data). It should be noted that, from the interviews and written sources, the researcher gained an excessive amount of data *not* directly related to changes deriving from citizenship, but helpful in gaining a holistic understanding of new Tanzanian's lives and current situation for livelihoods in general. This data was also coded and sorted into themes, but due to the limited scope of the study, such data is *only* included is the analysis where the researcher has deemed it necessary in order to answer the research questions. The five themes presented and discussed in the following chapter stem from a comparison of legal differences and anticipations indicated by previous research on what would change through obtaining citizenship, but they also encompass topics and reflections that emerged from the interviews.

#### 4.5 Ethics

Striving to comply with good research ethics (Laws et al., 2003: 259-270; Mikkelsen, 2005: 342-342) a number of precautions were taken. Prior to all interviews, all respondents were informed about the purpose of the study, the independence of the researcher from any authority or organisation, how the results would be presented, and that it was voluntary to participate in the interviews (for

details, see the 'Before the interview' section in the interview guides in Appendix 4). All new Tanzanians were granted confidentiality, and therefore their real names have been substituted for generic Burundian names when quoted in this study. Key informants on the other hand agreed to be mentioned by name in the appendix of this study. No monetary compensation was offered to any of the respondents. However, refreshments were offered during the interviews with new Tanzanians. Although two respondents asked whether payment was offered, none opted out when learning that no money was given. All interviewees gave their spoken consent before the interviews started and before the audio recording was switched on.

#### 4.6 Validity and Reliability

Inquiring about what had changed in a group of people's lives following a set event was deemed by the researcher to be a feasible aim, given that the researcher had access to interview a sample from that group and could compare their testimonies with secondary sources on how things were before the event. The new Tanzanians interviewed could clearly comprehend that the researcher sought a comparison of before and after citizenship, and were able to share their experiences and perceptions. Yet the data retrieved from the interviews could not fully cover *to what extent* obtaining citizenship had influenced livelihood strategies, since the perceptions conveyed turned out to be difficult to transfer into figures, and no figures *after* citizenship were found in secondary sources. This is a weakness of the study. Striving to be as clear as possible, the findings are described with detail, different opinions among the respondents are discussed, and ambiguities arisen out of contesting data or insufficient data are accounted for (Mikkelsen, 2005: 196-198). Throughout the interviews and analysis of the findings, the researcher has strived to remain aware of that her own position as a foreigner with some but not extensive previous knowledge, visiting for only a limited period of time, may have affected both the answers given, and the researcher's interpretations of the same (Chambers, 2008: 29-31). Such reflections are also accounted for.

## 5. The Case

Coming back to the case of the new Tanzanians, previous research, cited in the introduction (dTS, 2014: 9), claimed that before obtaining the same rights and freedoms as born Tanzanians, the new Tanzanians had to struggle to feed their families and pay school fees. Despite having reached a high level of social and economic integration, most of the 1972 arrivals were found to “live a hand-to-mouth existence” before they were fully recognised as citizens (ibid: 8). Below, this study will shed light on what had happened to some of the new Tanzanians in the Old Settlement in Ulyankulu almost a year and a half after receiving certificates of citizenship, in terms of livelihood opportunities and strategies. The analysis builds on the research questions (reviewed in the box below) as well as anticipations deriving from previous studies in the Old Settlements (Chapter 1 and Appendix 1), previous research on local integration (Chapter 2), the analytical framework (Chapter 3), and legal differences between refugees and citizens (described below).

Hence, this chapter is divided into the following sections: **Section 5.1** briefly reviews what changes could be anticipated to come with citizenship, given previous research on local integration and given what can be predicted out of the analytical framework. Next, **Section 5.2** accounts for the legal rights for refugees and citizens respectively. Thereafter, **Section 5.3** presents and discusses the main findings from the data collected in Ulyankulu, structured in five themes. Lastly, **Section 5.4** analyses the findings using the sustainable livelihoods framework and the anticipations reviewed in Section 5.1, and answers the research questions.

### Research Questions:

- To what extent has obtaining citizenship influenced livelihood strategies among the new Tanzanians in Ulyankulu?
  - Comparing legal and experienced changes, how do the new Tanzanians themselves perceive that obtaining citizenship has influenced their livelihood opportunities?

## 5.1 Anticipations

Briefly reviewing from Chapter 2 what implications previous research on local integration may have for this case study, citizenship could be foreseen to add a sense of security and permanency to the lives and livelihoods of the new Tanzanians. Further, it could be assumed that new Tanzanian citizens would utilize their increased freedom and increase their own and the communities' economic activity. Some new Tanzanians could also be anticipated to have moved out of the settlements seeking to fulfil desired livelihood outcomes elsewhere.

Additionally, reviewing from Chapter 3 what the sustainable livelihoods framework could stipulate for this case study, it can be suggested that one or more bottlenecks somewhere in the sustainable livelihoods framework could hinder citizenship from igniting changes in livelihood opportunities. Subsequently, for a livelihood to improve, each element in the framework must be functioning reasonably well. When analysing the findings presented below, it should therefore be relevant to ask:

- Was a change experienced?
- If so, in what way was the legal status a bottleneck before?
- If not much changed, did the legal change have little importance for livelihoods?
- Alternatively, what else in the sustainable livelihoods framework seems to be lacking?

The anticipations proposed in this section will be discussed in relation to the findings in Section 5.4.

## 5.2 Legal Rights for Refugees Compared to Citizens

The rights and obligations for refugees in Tanzania are regulated in the 1998 Refugees Act and outlined in the 2003 National Refugee Policy (Milner, 2014). Among other things, the Refugees Act determines that refugees shall live in so called 'designated areas' and are only allowed to leave the area if the Settlement Officer has issued permission to do so (Refugees Act: Part III). Similarly, anyone who is not a refugee must obtain permission to enter a designated area. The act entitles every refugee child the right to primary education, and it regulates that refugee students may continue to "post primary" education in accordance with rules made by both the minister responsible for refugee matters and the ministers for education and higher education regarding what "categories of schools, colleges or universities a refugee student can, be enrolled [sic]" and what fees to pay (Refugees Act: Part III, Article 31). The act also determines that work permits are

required for a refugee to be allowed to be employed<sup>7</sup> (ibid). In contrast, the Constitution of Tanzania declares that citizens have the right to freedom of movement (Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania: Article 17) and uphold both the right and duty to work (ibid: Article 22 and 25). Regarding education, a citizen has the right to pursue education up to the highest level attainable, and is only limited by own “merits and ability” (ibid: Article 11). Also, every adult citizen holds the right to vote (ibid: Article 5).

Two other differences between refugees and citizens were suggested by the 2014 evaluation (dTS, 2014). The evaluation found that very few had borrowed money, mainly since people feared they would be unable to repay, but also because access to credit was “...limited because they are not yet considered citizens, so cannot approach banks or cooperatives for loans” (ibid: 10). Though in one settlement (which one was not specified) the evaluation found that people “...have been allowed to borrow money and have successfully repaid the loans” (ibid). Picking up this thread, this study seeks to clarify how citizenship influenced access to credit. As will be discussed below, there seems to be a distinction between *different types of loans* that the evaluation did not differentiate between. The evaluation (ibid) also suggested that non-citizens had limited access to fertilisers. This claim will also be examined and discussed below.

Yet another difference regards owning land. The key informant at the Ministry of Home Affairs (Mziray, S., interview 2016-02-10) explained that foreigners cannot own land, while citizens can. However, this change had not reached the new Tanzanians in the Old Settlements yet; the settlements were still designated areas, which by law prevented land ownership. Transforming the settlements into regular villages was explained to be a legal process that required a number of steps to be taken and a number of state departments to coordinate their work (ibid). By February 2016, the process was still under way with no set date revealed for its planned completion. For new Tanzanians, this had the effect that no one could obtain documented proof of ownership of the land they farmed. A consequence of this will be discussed below.

**To sum up**, citizenship would by law give new Tanzanians freedom of movement, full access to higher education if merited, ability to take employment without first seeking permission, and the

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<sup>7</sup> Such permits are issued, and can likewise be revoked, by the Director of Refugees Services – a post appointed by the President and seated in Dar es Salaam (Refugees Act: Part III, Article 31).

right to vote. Also, citizenship has been suggested to increase access to credit and fertilisers. These differences have been examined by this study, and are discussed in the themes below.

### 5.3 Findings Sorted in Themes

In this subsection, the findings from the interviews with new Tanzanians are sorted into themes deriving from anticipations suggested by previous research as well as topics and reflections that came up during the interviews and subsequent sorting of the data.

#### 5.3.1 “Now we are free!”: Travel, Move and Move In

This study found that the legal change from travel restrictions for refugees to freedom of movement for citizens had really become noticeable. Literally all interviewees acknowledged that with citizenship they were free to travel as they pleased, and together with the right to vote, the freedom to travel – without needing to seek travel permits, hide or fake identity papers, and without risking fines or imprisonment – seemed to be the most noticed change brought about by citizenship. For instance, Victor, a business entrepreneur stated that:

Compared to before I have freedom to travel and do my business anywhere. Before that was hard because we had to ask for permission. Some got and some didn't. It's hard to plan your life when it is like that (Victor, Interview 5).

Also in spontaneous conversations on the streets, new citizens mentioned increased travelling as a difference deriving from citizenship. The quote in the heading comes from a mother and daughter expressing “Oh how happy we are for citizenship! Now we are free! We can travel as we want.” Even interview respondents who expressed disappointment over that citizenship had *not* changed anything essential in their everyday lives, pointed out that at least they were free to travel (Interviews 6 and 8). Travelling was facilitated by an increased number of buses: now three busses went to Tabora and back daily, compared to only minibuses before (Makunga, S., interview 2016-02-16).

When asked what it was like to travel before, the two business entrepreneurs Gloria and Nella (Interview 10) explained how they previously used a number of bold tactics to travel under cover<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> Like for instance leaving the settlement on foot on small forest paths, dressing in niqabs so that immigrations officers could not see what they looked like, insisting on that they were Tanzanians from the Sukuma tribe (which is a tribe living near the settlement), or hitchhiking with the Coca Cola truck to get out of the settlement unseen.

Other interviewees were less daring, and would either seek travel permits from the Settlement Officer or just abstain from travelling. Even though travel permits for up to 14 days would generally be given to those who applied (Brahim, J., interview 2016-02-26), in practice few applied because the Settlement Office, situated in Makonge village in one corner of the settlement (see map in Appendix 8), was claimed to be too far to reach from most villages (Joseph, Interview 2).

The effect freedom of movement had on livelihood outcomes varied between respondents. The four business entrepreneurs interviewed praised how smooth travelling had become, but called attention to that their business had not grown notably despite increased travel, because they lacked access to affordable loans (Interviews 5 and 10; see also next subsection). The food farmers interviewed would only occasionally sell some of their yield on the market in Kaswa, but would not seek out markets outside the settlement, despite having the opportunity to travel. The farmer Gustave (Interview 6) explained that even if he knew he could sell his crops to a higher price elsewhere, the travel cost would eat up the profit. He nevertheless praised travelling for giving him new ideas for his farming.

Moving out of the settlement was also an option opening up with the full freedom of movement deriving from citizenship; yet this study was not able to find figures for how many new Tanzanians had left Ulyankulu or information on what livelihood outcomes they were seeking when doing so, only that some were said to have moved. Gustave (Interview 6) suggested that “some people have moved out but it’s few compared to the total population, and these people made plans to move even before citizenship”. A couple of the respondents said they had relatives who had moved out of the settlement after obtaining citizenship, and one reason stated for travelling was to visit those relatives (Cathy, Interview 2; Patrick and Emanuel, Interview 4; Gilbert, Interview 9).

For others, travelling or moving was mainly unaffordable.<sup>9</sup> But even without leaving Ulyankulu, the effects of free movement was experienced; many native Tanzanians had started coming into the settlement for business (Frédéric and Gustave, Interview 16).<sup>10</sup> One newcomer estimated that around half of the restaurant owners were born Tanzanians like herself. Likewise François,

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<sup>9</sup> How many among the respondents was not possible to tell, since respondents described travel costs as a bottleneck for part of the population in the settlement rather than for themselves personally.

<sup>10</sup> Knowing that it would just be a matter of time before the settlement would become normal villages, outsiders had started coming even though by law, the area was still a refugee designated area that non-refugees needed permission to enter (Victor, Interview 5).

(Interview 19) estimated that up 60 per cent of the business people in Kaswa were from outside.

**To conclude this subsection**, most interviewees pointed out that travelling had increased, yet none would suggest any figures, apart from the aforementioned buses. It seemed to be more of an unmeasured, yet perceivable feeling of freedom, happiness over official recognition, and relief from not having to go through an application process or risk punishment for travelling. Travelling was open to all new Tanzanians, and appeared to be affordable by most, even if it might just be an inexpensive trip over the day. Naturally, the reasons stated for travelling were several. Viewing freedom of movement from a livelihoods perspective, it can be deemed to have opened up a number of new possibilities.

### 5.3.2 “Only those with education get jobs”: Education and Employment

As noted above, refugees who wished to study outside designated areas had to obtain permission. Patrick (Interview 4) described how he had to ask for study permission and return to Ulyankulu to prolong it every three months for all his study time in order to become a pastor. He said that “the difference now is wide” and exemplified it with that one new Tanzanian aspiring to become a pastor was currently studying in Kenya – something Patrick claimed would not have been possible before citizenship (ibid). Yet students (Yasmina and Elise, Interview 15) and mothers (Gloria and Nella, Interview 10; Francine and Yvette, Interview 7) highlighted that poor economy stopped many families from sending their children to higher education, even though they expressed joy over that students were now by law free to advance on equal terms as any Tanzanian. The teachers Frédéric and Gustave (Interview 16) pointed out that citizenship had opened up the possibility to get scholarships for higher education from the government. However, it was unclear to the researcher how common such government scholarships were for Tanzanian students in general.

Unexpected by the researcher, when asked about what citizenship had meant in relation to schools and higher education, many of the interviewees (Interviews 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11, 15, 17) brought up that the grades from primary and secondary school no longer stated the student’s nationality as ‘Burundian’ or ‘refugee’, but

#### A note for contextualisation

There are eleven primary schools in Ulyankulu settlement, one in each village (see map in Appendix 8) and currently two secondary schools. There is also one vocational training centre. The nearest high school is in the regional capital Tabora, and for students continuing to higher levels, Tanzanian colleges and universities are generally boarding schools (Makunga, S., interview 2016-02-16). From Ulyankulu Secondary School, with in total 800 students and 43 teachers, approximately 20 students a year continue to high schools, according to the teacher Samuel (Interview 3).

instead as ‘Tanzanian’.<sup>11</sup> This change was claimed to give markedly better chances to compete for jobs or higher education (Interviews 5, 7, 10, 11, 17). Before citizenship, respondents explained how many people would, illegally, fake their or their children’s names and identity papers to appear Tanzanian when seeking employment, higher education or admission to well-renowned secondary schools in order to circumvent both law and discrimination (Interview 7, 10, 13).

Moving on to employment opportunities, this study found that even though citizenship meant that new Tanzanians could get permanent contracts, and no longer had to seek permission to be employed, in practice the job opportunities in Ulyankulu were said to be few – most people were self-employed as farmers, some business entrepreneurs and some craftsmen. Instead one would have to go to towns and cities outside the settlement in search for employment (Interview 16). Gustave (Interview 6) underlined that “only those with education get jobs”, a view shared by other respondents (Interviews 4, 11, 14). Jean, a health professional who had studied at university and worked outside the settlement (Interview 13) pointed out that “we have teachers, doctors, engineers, headmaster in fine schools who are Burundian. So you get employment depending on your qualification, no problem”. From what Jean described, it seemed to the researcher that permissions for studies and work had been easy to get before citizenship, but also that faking identities had been a viable option since Tanzanian authorities would generally overlook it. In Jean’s opinion, education and employment opportunities had always been open in practice, while citizenship eliminated the risk to be punished or the procedure to seek permission. A recent situation analysis (Rutinwa, 2015: 38-39) foregoing a planned new local integration strategy added one dimension to the issue of fake identities; it pointed out how new Tanzanians who had been using faked names before faced problems when trying to seek higher education, employment or renewal of contracts using their real name, because the names in previous and current documents did not match.<sup>12</sup>

**Summing up,** this study found that even though refugees were said to have studied and worked outside the settlement before, either with permissions that regularly needed renewal or under fake identities (to what extent was not possible for the researcher to assess), citizenship had made the livelihood opportunity to go for higher education or employment more accessible, removed

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<sup>11</sup> Apparently, students had to state their nationality when applying to sit for the national exams, and therefore their nationality would show on test results and grades (Kanyoni, A., interview 2016-02-22).

<sup>12</sup> The situation analysis (Rutinwa, 2015: 38-39) advised that the planned local integration strategy would include legal assistance to new Tanzanians to solve such issues.

incentives to break the law, and enabled (legal) permanent employments. Having written proof of being Tanzanian through school grades also seemed to improve chances to compete for jobs, while having a mismatch of names in past and present official documents complicated it. Yet education was unaffordable to many, and without education, employment would generally not open up as a livelihood opportunity despite citizenship, since most of the few employment opportunities around required education.

### 5.3.3 “Money circulation is high”: Market, Business and (Lack of) Access to Credit

The local officials Jonathan and Alexandre (Interview 18) suggested that the economic situation in Kaswa had changed, although not that much yet, because the villagers had not been citizens for that long. The clearest economic change they could see was that a steadily increasing number of born Tanzanians would come to Kaswa for business.<sup>13</sup> A born Tanzanian business entrepreneur who had moved in from Tabora a few months back, illustrated this change when she explained that:

Many come here to buy crops and sell different items/.../people from Kahama, Urambo, Tabora come here on the market days twice a week and then we sell a lot! It’s much better that in Tabora (born Tanzanian restaurant owner, 2016, conversation in the restaurant).

The students Yasmina and Elise (Interview 15), highlighted how the economic growth since the settlement started opening up was in clear contrast to a few years back when “people didn’t know what was going to happen.” They referred to a period from 2010 to 2014 when the government had an intention to close the settlements and had instructed the new Tanzanians not build or repair anything, but instead stay prepared to move out of the settlements (Kanyoni, A. interview 2016-02-22; see also Appendix 1). Now, as a contrast, the market was expanding even outside of Kaswa, Yasmina and Elise (Interview 15) claimed, and also more permanent houses and shops were being built, replacing previous mud houses. Frédéric and Gustave (Interview 16) confirmed that the market was growing and that more permanent structures were being built, and stated that the “money circulation is high now”.

Yet, as aforementioned, the business entrepreneurs interviewed (Interviews 5 and 10) pointed out that lack of access to affordable loans hampered them from scaling up business. For instance,

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<sup>13</sup> Technically, outsiders were still prohibited by law to visit unless they sought permission from the MoHA and the settlement officer to enter, and they were not allowed to settle, because the process of turning the settlement into regular villages was still ongoing. But outsiders had increasingly started coming in anyway. Also, a few outsiders were said to have visited even before citizenship (Interview 18) although far less than after citizenship.

Mariette (Interview 5) declared that “my business has not gone up or down notably. I have what I need but I lack opportunities to be empowered. I will never become rich.” She and Victor (ibid) explained that there was something called development loans from the government with better interest rates and longer repayment time than regular bank loans, and that these were earmarked to empower women, youth and elderly people. But such development loans were hard to get around Ulyankulu, even for native Tanzanians, they claimed. This information was confirmed by Bernice (Interview 14) who told that she belonged to the first and only group from Ulyankulu settlement who had applied for a development loan from the government.<sup>14</sup> To Bernice’s knowledge, such loans had not been available when they were refugees, but became an option when the naturalisation process (see Appendix 1) started. Still the waiting list was long for new Tanzanians and born Tanzanians alike, because the district was large and the funds limited, Bernice explained.

Coming back to the claim from the 2014 evaluation that non-citizens could not “approach banks or cooperatives for loans” (dTS, 2014: 10; see Section 5.2), this study found that the evaluation (dTS 2010) had not differentiated between development loans from the government and regular bank loans. Respondents for this study claimed that citizenship had not affected their access to regular bank loans<sup>15</sup>. Bank customers needed surety, for instance salary from employment or proof of ownership of land or a “nice house” to get a loan (Interviews 2, 3, 16), which in practice excluded a majority from qualifying.<sup>16</sup> This had not changed in any way with citizenship. A handful of the farmer and business entrepreneurs (Interviews 1, 2, 5, 10) said they had not, or could not take a loan, but would like to do so if they were allowed and could afford it. However, interest rates for bank loans were described to be high (Gustave, Interview 6), and as aforementioned, development loans were few.

**To sum up**, this study found that the local market had grown due to outsiders coming in. But, new Tanzanian business entrepreneurs said they didn’t benefit much from the growth and claimed they lacked access to affordable credit to scale up their business. Refugee status was found *not* to be a

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<sup>14</sup> 20 women, including Beatrice had registered in 2013 and were still standing in line to get a collective loan which, when split up, would be about 100 000 Tanzanian shilling per person.

<sup>15</sup> Also, the CRDB customer support online chat (on <http://crdbbank.com>, 2016-04-12 12:40 AM EAT) confirmed that non-citizens who had legal permit to be in Tanzania were allowed to take loans.

<sup>16</sup> Tanzanians were by the time of the study not yet able to obtain documented proof of owning land and thereby use their land as surety for loans, but would be able to do so eventually when Ulyankulu settlement would become regular villages (see more in Section 5.2).

bottleneck to access regular bank loans, while not having any surety *was*. Obtaining citizenship had by law, but not in practice, increased the access to the more affordable development loans. Further, farm produce was said to attract more buyers to come to the market, but since most farmers in the settlement only sold a small proportion of their yield (see Subsection 5.3.1), this study assumes that any substantial increases in revenue for farmers is unlikely. Lastly, new permanent houses were being constructed as a result of citizenship – or rather the subsequent decision by the government to turn the settlement into regular villages.

#### 5.3.4 “The land is tired”: Farming and Fertilisers

Starting with a note on existing livelihood strategies before citizenship, the 2014 evaluation (dTS 2014: 10) found that the farmers in the settlements were efficient in utilizing the limited assets they had and produced a notable surplus of cassava, maize, sweet potatoes, beans ground nuts and tobacco, contributing significantly to supplying the entire regions. This could be confirmed by other studies (Andersen and Crisp, 2010: 12-13, 20; Rutinwa, 2014: 9) as well as key informants who proposed that Burundians in general are known for being skilled, productive and more hard-working farmers than their Tanzanian counterparts (Carr, R., interview 2016-01-27; Kanyoni, A., interview, 2016-02-22). A local official, François (Interview 19) suggested that “they work harder than other farmers, because farming is for most new Tanzanians their only income”. With farming being so central, this study presumes that access to fertilisers could really influence both livelihood opportunities and strategies on what to farm.

The 2014 evaluation (dTS 2014: 10) further found that the farmland given in 1972 had been divided among children and grandchildren and had been intensely cultivated for over 40 years. Consequently, the land per person has decreased and the soil had become less fertile. The market price for fertilisers was found to be unaffordable to most farmers, and the evaluation claimed that “[t]o obtain the subsidized price, a farmer must belong to one of the agricultural cooperatives that are currently only open to citizens” (ibid). A number of respondents (Interviews 1, 2, 6, 7, 12, 17) confirmed that fertilisers were indeed hard to afford, but contested that subsidized fertilisers would be more accessible to citizens than non-citizens. Instead, Cathy (Interview 2) explained that subsidized fertilisers were sold to citizens and non-citizens alike:

Before, those who could not afford to buy fertilisers to the market price could get to buy subsidized fertilisers from the government. But still many people were too poor to buy even the subsidized package, so they changed the rules so that everyone could buy these

packages. The opportunity comes once a year, and you can only buy one package per person. One package costs 135 000 TSH and gives you maize, seeds and fertilisers for 1 hectare of land. This deal was the same before and after citizenship. If you have more than 1 hectare, you need to buy the rest of the seeds and fertilisers to the normal market price which is 163 000 TSH at the regular shops without subsidies (Cathy, Interview 2).

To this, Joseph (also Interview 2) added that “the land is tired, we get less from it now than we did a few years back. Right now what we get is not enough.” Richard (Interview 8) also expressed that “the land is tired”, and confirmed both that the harvests used to be larger before, and that, despite a great need, the subsidized fertilisers had not become more available with citizenship. Contextualizing this, farmers in Ulyankulu were also found to be very dependent on the right amount of rain, since they lacked natural bodies of water nearby for irrigation (Interview 6).

**To conclude**, this study found that fertilisers were increasingly needed because the land was “tired”, but fertilizers weren’t more accessible than before citizenship.

### 5.3.5 “It's too early to see any changes”: Voting

For the first time, the new Tanzanians were allowed to vote in the general election, which was held in October 2015. They voted for president and member of parliament (MP) for Ulyankulu.<sup>17</sup> The researcher noted that people seemed proud and happy about voting, and one respondent proudly showed the researcher his voting ID which stated that he was a “Tanzanian national”. Since the election was recent, Eric (Interview 1) expressed that “it's too early to see any changes resulting from that”, but added that he had a number of expectations on the MP:

I expect a lot of change! The MP is close to us, and what we tell him he will take to parliament. Before we had no one representing us, but now we hope that our MP will remind the government about our concerns. For example, we want to fix the poor infrastructure, [have more] dispensaries, and do something about the water problem (Eric, Interview 1).

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<sup>17</sup> Not only the Old Settlement in Ulyankulu, but the entire locality Ulyankulu. To give a sense of scale, Ulyankulu comprises of in total 15 wards, whereof three wards constitute the Old Settlement (Interview 19). A UNHCR factsheet from April 2014 (cited in dTS, 2014: 6) estimated the population in the Old Settlement in Ulyankulu to be just under 50 000 people.

Other respondents agreed that it was too soon to see changes deriving from politics (Interviews 13 and 15). However, when asked about what concerns they would want to raise through political representatives, interviewees listed a number of things (see the textbox).

A handful of the respondents (Interviews 3, 5, 8, 10) expressed disappointment over that they had not been able to vote for local councillors on ward level, henceforth referred to by the Swahili word ‘diwani’, in the 2015 election. A diwani’s core responsibility was said to be to represent the villagers and forward political requests raised on village meetings to the MP, who in turn would take the requests to parliament (Interviews 13 and 18). Jonathan and Alexandre (Interview 18) explained that even though the new citizens held the right to vote for diwani(s) to represent them, the Old Settlement they lived in could, by law, not have elected representatives, because it was still categorized as a designated area (Refugees Act; see also Section 5.2).<sup>18</sup> Yet, both Patrick (Interview 4) and Victor (Interview 5) claimed that the other two Old Settlements, in Mishamo and Katumba, had successfully elected and installed new Tanzanian diwani(s). The researcher was unable to verify or explain this claim. While Patrick (Interview 4) expressed that “we feel optimistic” because the other settlements had gotten diwani(s), Victor (Interview 5) instead voiced that “we feel tricked”. Elaborating on what difference it would make to have diwani(s), Frédéric and Gustave (Interview 16) suggested that, apart from forwarding concerns, diwani(s) could keep the inhabitants in the settlements informed about the government’s plans for the area and the ongoing process of transforming the settlement into regular villages. Currently, a number of respondents (Interviews 5, 16, 17, 18, 19) highlighted that they lacked knowledge about the government’s plans for the settlement. This was understood by the researcher to in turn limit the respondent’s abilities to make plans for the future.

#### Concerns voiced by interviewees that they wished politicians would help solving

- **Roads** got damaged or even impassable in the rainy season and would need to be tarmacked.
- **Electricity** was available through solar power and diesel generators, but interviewees wished to be connected to the national grid.
- **Water** was scarce and thus expensive to get in the dry season, and farms had no irrigation. Interviewees wished for water supply systems.
- **Dispensaries** were claimed to be few, far between, understaffed and often out of supplies.
- **Hospital** or operating theatre was said to be needed in Ulyankulu, especially for deliveries and blood transfusions.
- **Primary schools** needed more classrooms and teacher.

*Source:* A summary from interviews 1, 3, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18.

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<sup>18</sup> Currently the settlement was governed by a settlement officer appointed by the MoHA. The settlement officer had in turn appointed village chairmen for each village.

**To conclude this subsection**, this study found that citizenship had unlocked the livelihood opportunity to vote and the new Tanzanians had proudly utilized it. By the time of the study it was too soon to see any changes in the settlement deriving from that. Patrick's and Victor's respective comments illustrate well the spectra of attitudes found among respondents towards what politics could be anticipated to bring about; some expressed hopefulness, others disappointment over the absence of diwani(s), some patience, yet others reveal no specific feelings.

## 5.4 Interpreting the Findings

Below, the findings accounted for in the last section are analysed using the anticipations reviewed in Section 5.1 and the sustainable livelihoods framework. Finally, the research questions are answered.

### 5.4.1 Correspondence with Previous Research on Local Integration

Linking back all the way to the introduction, the 2014 evaluation (dTS, 2014: 9) indicated that citizenship could help the new Tanzanians to “move beyond their current level of poverty”. Similarly, previous research on local integration (Chapter 2) pointed out how decreasing the legal differences between refugees and citizens could spur economic prosper for refugees and host communities. It also indicated that de jure integration could bring security and permanency. Looking at the findings presented in Section 5.3, they do confirm some of these anticipations; citizenship brought security in the sense that people would no longer have incentives to travel without permits or use fake identities and thereby risk criminal charges and punishment. Citizenship also brought permanency since the government decided to turn the settlement into villages instead of closing it down. This sense of permanency had become observable in the form of concrete houses gradually replacing mud houses. Regarding economic prosper, the new Tanzanians were found to travel more, and the market in Kaswa was claimed to have started growing – which resembles the aforementioned case study in Uganda showing economic growth in refugee hosting areas (Betts et al., 2014). Yet some bottlenecks, described below, held back the new Tanzanians from fully benefitting economically from the travel and the growing market.

Reflecting further on the findings, this study can also detect signs of the interplay between de jure and de facto integration as laid out in Chapter 2. This study suggests that the new Tanzanian's increased chances to compete on the labour market – put forward by the respondents as a consequence of the rights to seek employment and go for higher education on equal terms as

natives – would point to both increased de facto integration and a potential step up from the current level of poverty. For even though the 1972 arrivals were claimed by other researchers to have reached de facto integration long ago, this study argues that de jure integration had taken de facto integration further for the new Tanzanians, with citizenship bridging a gap in the competition for jobs. Yet, as discussed further below, higher education, and through it employment, was still out of reach for many poor families.

#### 5.4.2 Making Sense of the Findings with the Help of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework

To elaborate on the findings and estimate to what extent citizenship has influenced livelihood opportunities and strategies, the sustainable livelihoods framework is a helpful tool. To exemplify, the findings for education and employment can be placed in the framework in the following manner: the change of status from refugees to citizens was a political decision, and therefore fits under *transforming structures and processes*. When the changed status started appearing on new Tanzanian student's grades, *structures* (regulating who is allowed to take a permanent job or seek higher education) and *processes* (the competition for jobs and admittance to popular schools) were altered slightly. For those with enough *financial capital*, to afford to study, or sufficient *human capital* (in the form of knowledge and skills) to secure an employment, documented citizen status made these two *livelihood opportunities* more accessible. Further, to exemplify how the sustainable livelihoods framework is a continuous circle or spiral, what happens next could be that: those who take the opportunity to study past primary school embark on a *livelihood strategy* (by studying) to reach a *livelihood outcome* (an educational degree) which in turn increases their human capital and improves their opportunity to take on some new livelihood strategy (like securing an employment) to reach whichever livelihood outcome the person seeks (could be stable income, means to support other family members to afford studying, etc.) and the spiral goes on.

The key to assess to what *extent* obtaining citizenship has influenced livelihood opportunities and strategies is to look at how the elements in the framework are connected and identify bottlenecks. In Section 5.1, the following questions were suggested to be helpful in analysing the findings:

- Was a change experienced?
- If so, in what way was the legal status a bottleneck before?
- If not much changed, did the legal change have little importance for livelihoods?
- Alternatively, what else in the sustainable livelihoods framework seems to be lacking?

For education and employment, respondents *did* express that citizenship had brought changes. Refugee status showing in student's grades was pointed out as a bottleneck that got removed by obtaining citizenship. But education and employment continued to be inaccessible to some. The attainment of citizenship status was *not* deemed unimportant; instead two other bottlenecks could be identified, namely insufficient level of financial capital, or insufficient level of knowledge and skills. Concluding on what has just been put forward, this study proposes that citizenship has influenced *livelihood opportunities* to study and seek employment to some extent. Yet, the influence was smaller than for freedom of movement, supposedly due to the remaining bottlenecks found. From the data presented in the last section, this study is not able to assess to what extent citizenship has influenced *livelihood strategies*. This limitation will be discussed in the conclusion in Chapter 6.

Delving into travelling and freedom of movement, this study found that all respondents had experienced a clearly noticeable change deriving from citizenship. Before, the holdup constituted primarily of Tanzanian refugee law and the enforcement of law when travellers risked getting caught by immigrations officers. Such holdup under *transforming structures and processes* could, metaphorically, be removed by the stroke of a pen. When the authorities issued and distributed proof of citizenship status, that was sufficient to make travelling assessable to a majority – given that the household economy allowed it (livelihood assets) and that the seasonal rains would not make the roads impassable (vulnerability context). To answer the research questions, citizenship did open up a livelihood opportunity previously restricted: all respondents mention that they had the opportunity to travel. Citizenship did also influence the livelihood strategy to travel and move: respondents said that travellers were more in numbers and that travels were more frequent. However, exact figures were not possible to make out from the data collected.

Looking at the findings presented for market, business and access to credit (Subsection 5.3.3), some changes deriving from citizenship were found to affect livelihood opportunities somewhat. First of all, people in Ulyankulu were said to have started replacing mud houses with concrete houses. The bottleneck up until citizenship had been that a refugee settlement is not meant to be permanent. With citizenship, or more precisely with the government's decision to turn the settlement into permanent, regular villages, it was possible to start preparing for a permanent stay in Ulyankulu.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Technically, people were not yet allowed to start building concrete houses. They were told via letters from the MoHA to wait until the process was finished (Victor, Interview 5), but many seemed to have started building anyway.

Having a nice, permanent house could be a livelihood outcome in itself. It could also be a livelihoods strategy to build a house for one's expected long-lasting future in Ulyankulu, or for acquiring a physical capital that could be used as surety to get a bank loan. Hence, regarding houses, citizenship had influenced livelihood strategies. Again, the exact scale in figures was not detectable. A bottleneck keeping the number down could supposedly be lack of financial capital or skills to build.

Looking at market and business next, the settlement opening up had motivated native Tanzanians to embark on the livelihood strategy to come in and do business. This had in turn made the market grow. For the new Tanzanians, the growing market could be a livelihood opportunity, but the lack of access to affordable loans meant that new Tanzanian business entrepreneurs could not utilize such opportunity. Examining the lack of access to credit through loans, citizenship had not really brought about any noticeable changes because the development loans that only citizens were allowed to get were too few. To sum up, citizenship influenced livelihood strategies related to building permanent houses. It increased the livelihood opportunity to do business somewhat by growing the market, but it did not really influence the access to credit.

Briefly linking back to the access to fertilisers, there is not so much to say since it didn't change with citizenship. If it had changed it would potentially have decreased farmer's vulnerability, improved yields and thereby increased livelihood assets. Considering that the new Tanzanians were said to be skilled farmers, gaining increased access to fertilisers could be anticipated to render noticeable effects on livelihoods. But such speculations are beyond the scope of this study.

Moving on to voting, a clear change was experienced, comparable in scale to the freedom of movement. The government had, with the stroke of a pen, opened up the opportunity to vote. Citizenship gave the new Tanzanians this new livelihood opportunity and it seemed like a majority had voted. The new livelihood strategy (to exercise influence on politics) was undertaken with a wish that it could bring some of the livelihood outcomes that respondents said they strived for: improved roads, access to electricity and water supply systems, more dispensaries, more classrooms, more teachers and a hospital (see the textbox in Subsection 5.3.5). Whether the strategy to vote would lead to the desired outcomes was too soon to judge only months after the election.

### 5.4.3 Answering the Research Questions

Summing everything up, this subsection has for each of the themes presented in Section 5.3 suggested how the new Tanzanians themselves perceive that obtaining citizenship has influenced

their livelihood opportunities: obtaining citizenship had clear influence on the opportunity to travel and move as well as on the opportunity to vote. Citizenship had some, but limited, influence on the opportunity to go for higher education and employment, and it had limited influence on the opportunity to do business. But citizenship did not influence the access to credit or fertilizers.

Finally, *to what extent has obtaining citizenship influenced livelihood strategies among the new Tanzanians in Ulyankulu?* This study suggests that citizenship has clearly influenced the livelihood strategies to travel and vote. What pursuing these strategies will lead on to is too early to say. As for the other areas, this study was not able to find enough data on how many people had utilized the aforementioned increases in livelihood opportunities to estimate to what extent citizenship has influenced livelihood strategies.

## 6. Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to find out what difference obtaining citizenship had made regarding opportunities and strategies for livelihoods among new Tanzanians living in the Old Settlement in Ulyankulu. It focussed on what difference a change of legal status from 'refugees' to 'citizens' made in reality, and followed up on five themes wherein changes could be anticipated, based on previous research as well as Tanzanian law. The research questions guiding the study were:

- To what extent has obtaining citizenship influenced livelihood strategies among the new Tanzanians in Ulyankulu?
  - Comparing legal and experienced changes, how do the new Tanzanians themselves perceive that obtaining citizenship has influenced their livelihood opportunities?

This study found that the legal rights to move around freely and to vote were claimed to be highly accessible and utilized as livelihood strategies by the new Tanzanians. Citizenship was also perceived to have had some, but limited, influence on the opportunity to go for higher education and employment, even though the new citizens by law had the right to study and seek permanent employment just like any Tanzanian national. The limited influence citizenship had on opening up education and employment as viable livelihood opportunities could be explained by that many people lacked the financial capital needed to afford to study, or the right qualifications to be employed. Despite suggestions made by previous researchers, citizenship was found to have only a very minor effect on increasing the access to credit; being Tanzanians *did* give the new citizens the right to apply for development loans targeted to empower certain groups, but these loans turned out to be very few in numbers, and none of the respondents had by the time of the study been able to get one.

Lifting the gaze to look at the academic debate on whether local integration can be a durable solution for refugees in a protracted situation, this study is too small and narrow to present an argument in the debate. Yet, it could detect that de jure integration had led to increased travel and a sense of permanency and security; effects that previous research suggested that de jure integration would be likely to lead to. Further, when examining the influence citizenship had on accessing higher education and employment, this study detected that the respondents placed significant importance on having documented proof of being Tanzanian. Their claims that it mattered a lot to have a certificate from secondary school saying that you were "Tanzanian" instead of "Burundian" or a "Refugee" indicated that they had previously faced discrimination. It was

beyond the scope of this study to compare the prevalence of discrimination before and after citizenship, but this area could be a suitable topic for further research.

Lastly, the data collection for this study was carried out only 15 months after the new Tanzanians received citizenship. Therefore, it was too soon to estimate in figures to what extent citizenship had influenced different livelihood strategies. Also, the transformation of the settlement into regular villages was still under way. When it is finished, it can be expected to have a number of effects on livelihood opportunities and strategies. This study therefore recommends further research – both qualitative and quantitative – to be conducted in the Old Settlements in order to find out more about what influence citizenship has on livelihoods.

Word count: 14 574

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
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## Appendix 1: Brief Historical and Political Context

For readers who wish to learn more about the historical background and political context, here follows a comprehensive account of refugee politics in the Great Lakes Region in general and Tanzania in particular, including a summary of the main events on the new Tanzanians' road to citizenship.

### Refugee Flows in the Great Lakes Region

Looking back 50 odd years in time, all countries in the Great Lakes Region (see map) except Tanzania have at some point had refugees fleeing their country, and all countries have also hosted large numbers of refugees (Kibreab, 2014: 572-584). For instance, tensions between the ethnic groups of Hutus and Tutsis in both Rwanda and Burundi have rendered waves of refugees in the region in the 1960s, 70s and 90s<sup>20</sup>; the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 probably being the most well-known example (ibid). From the 1960s to the mid-1980s, most countries in the region pursued relatively open-door policies, providing land for housing and farming in refugee settlements. The UNHCR would build settlement infrastructure while the WFP and INGOs would provide food and social services until the refugees were self-sufficient (ibid). The Old Settlements in Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Katumba are typical examples of such settlements (L'Ecluse, 2010: 14-15). But the open-door policies were abandoned in the 1990s as large waves of refugees were said to have had notable negative effects on infrastructure, economic systems, food security and the environment in refugee hosting areas (L'Ecluse, 2010: 42-43). It was suggested back then that under such circumstances, host countries could no longer be expected to 'absorb' large numbers of refugees into their societies. Instead, refugee camps run by international donors were proposed as solution (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil, 2003: 4; Kibreab, 2014: 572-584).



Map of the Great Lakes Region. Source: d-maps, country names magnified by researcher.

<sup>20</sup> Some news agencies suggest that the 2010s might also fit the list, since the violence surrounding the 2015 election in Burundi, which rendered new waves of refugees, shows indications of 'ethnicisation' (Graham-Harrison, 2016). See also Rosen (2015) and Ifejika (2015).

## Refugee Politics in Tanzania

From the 1960s up to the 1980s, Tanzania was one of the champions for the aforementioned open door policy, much thanks to the president Julius Nyerere. Nationals from neighbouring countries were regarded as African brothers, and few restrictions were imposed on refugees (L'Ecluse, 2010: 13-19). In the mid-1980s, grave economic recession made it necessary to launch an economic recovery programme and shrink public spending. In the wake of the economic downturn in Tanzania, attitudes towards refugees hardened (Andersen and Crisp, 2010: 19-24). The political debate increasingly emphasized internal security. When very large numbers of refugees came in the 1990s, like in other countries in the region, Tanzania made it praxis to host refugees in camps without access to farmland. Tanzania even closed the border to Burundi in 1995 to stop further refugee arrivals and also demanded all Rwandan refugees in Tanzania, over 480,000 people (dTS, 2014: 17) to return home by the end of 1996. During this period, the laws were updated; the current Refugees Act was adopted in 1998 and a National Refugee Policy was launched in 2003 (Milner, 2014: 558). The settlement officers both in the refugee settlements and the refugee camps started using their legal right (Refugees Act: Part III) to restrict the movement of refugees (Brahim, J., interview 2016-02-26). In the 2005 election campaign, the party CCM continued the political focus on internal security and promised to make Tanzania 'refugee-free' if re-elected (Milner, 2014: 558). Subsequently, some 363,000 (Andersen and Crisp, 2010: 23) to 430,000 (Seleli and Wolfcarius, 2009) of the Burundians who came in the 1990s were repatriated from Tanzanian refugee camps during 2002-2009, and by 2009, only 36,000 Burundian refugees from the 1990s arrivals remained in Tanzania, residing in the Mtabila camp (ibid). In this process of making Tanzania free from refugees, finding a durable solution for the 1972 arrivals living in Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Katumba came on the political agenda (Milner 2014). Their road to citizenship is described below.

## The New Tanzanians' Road to Citizenship

When the now new Tanzanians came from Burundi in 1972, they were settled in what used to be a forest reserve in Ulyankulu in Tabora region. As the number of refugees increased and more space was needed, two additional settlements were created in Mishamo and Katumba in former Rukwa region, now Katavi region (Brahim, J., interview 2016-02-26; see map in Appendix 2). The refugees were given 5-10 hectares of land per family in the settlements to cultivate, and by the mid-1980s they had become self-reliant farmers contributing notably to the local economy through selling farm produce and paying tax (Andersen and Crisp, 2010: 19-24). The children followed Tanzanian school curricula and learned Swahili. Taken together, the access to land and self-reliance, the

shared language and the length of stay in Tanzania – all of them indications of de facto local integration (see Chapter 2) – are deemed important to explain why the GOT decided to offer naturalisation into citizenship (Andersen and Crisp, 2010: 19-24; Milner, 2014: 562-566).<sup>21</sup>

The initiative to naturalise the 1972 arrivals came around 2007 when the GOT together with the UNHCR and the government of Burundi worked out the Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy (TANCOSS). The strategy aimed to either repatriate or naturalise all Burundian refugees in Tanzania.<sup>22</sup> The 1972 arrivals were given the alternatives to either voluntarily return to Burundi with assistance to reintegrate there, or seek naturalisation and relocation<sup>23</sup> in Tanzania. Approximately 80% chose the latter, and from those, 98% were granted citizenship in 2009. However, the naturalisation process came to a halt and certificates of citizenship were withheld as hesitations towards completing the naturalisation and relocation were raised both in the Tanzanian cabinet and parliament, and by local government authorities.<sup>24</sup> As a consequence, the 1972 arrivals were stuck in limbo without recognition as citizens. During 2010-2014 now new Tanzanians in Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Katumba were told to be ready to relocate any day soon and were advised to plan their farming accordingly (Mua, M., interview 2016-02-01). Then eventually, the precondition to relocate in order to obtain citizenship certificates stipulated by the TANCOSS and outlined in more detail in the National Strategy for Community Integration Programme (NaSCIP) was cancelled by the GOT in 2014 and certificates of citizenship were distributed starting from October that year (ibid; Rutinwa, 2014: 1-6).

#### A note on numbers

Between 2008 and 2010, 53,600 of the 1972 arrivals chose to return from Tanzania to Burundi with assistance from the UNHCR while another 171,629 applied for Tanzanian citizenship.

In 2009, 162,256 of those who applied for citizenship were granted it.

When the moratorium was lifted in 2014, the aforementioned 162,256 plus their children born after the promise of citizenship in 2009 were given Tanzanian citizenship, amounting the total number of new Tanzanians to be around 200 000 people (Rutinwa, 2014: 1-6).

<sup>21</sup> Another factor taken into consideration by the government when suggesting to naturalise the 1972 arrivals was the risk that the fragile peace in Burundi, as seen around 2006, could be jeopardized if too many refugees repatriated home. Tanzania wished to avoid sparking new refugee arrivals (Andersen and Crisp, 2010: 19-24).


<sup>22</sup> Burundian refugees who came in the 1990s were only given the option of repatriation.

<sup>23</sup> The decision that naturalisation came with the obligation to relocate was taken early on (Milner, 2015: 560). However, some sources claim that the applicants for naturalisation were unaware of the obligation at the time of application (dTS, 2014). One possible explanation is that there were gaps in the dissemination of knowledge to all applicants – which would be understandable given the scale and the speed of the application process.

<sup>24</sup> The political debate is in itself a case worth studying to learn about the dynamics and controversies behind a decision on whether to locally integrate or repatriate refugees. The debate also provides a rich insight into the interplay between different political instances as well as between the government and international humanitarian donors in Tanzania. For a more thorough account of the political debate during the moratorium, see Milner (2014) and Andersen and Crisp (2010: 25-30).

## Appendix 2: Map of UNHCR's Presence in Tanzania


The Old Settlements are marked on the map with a red triangle.



Sources: UNHCR, UNCS, Tanzania NBS. Feedback: UNHCR Regional Support Hub in Nairobi [kenrsgis@unhcr.org](mailto:kenrsgis@unhcr.org) Creation date: 29 January 2015. Used under Creative Commons Licence CC BY 3.0 ICO: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/> Accessed at Reliefweb: [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/tza\\_hcrpresence\\_150701\\_0.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/tza_hcrpresence_150701_0.pdf) 2016-07-25

## Appendix 3: The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework by the FAO

The visualisation of the sustainable livelihoods framework used in this study builds on this, more detailed visualisation of the framework made by the FAO (2005: module 2 page 3).



Source: FAO. (2005) Building on Gender, Agrobiodiversity and Local Knowledge - A Training Manual. Publishing Management Service, Information Division, FAO, Viale delle Terme di Caracalla, 00100 Rome, Italy.

## Appendix 4: Interview Guides

### *Interview guide for interviews with key informants*

#### **Before the interview**

- Inform about the purpose of the study, how the results will be presented, that it is voluntary to participate in the interviews and that the respondent is free to opt out at any time.
- Clarify that I am affiliated with Lund University through enrolment in a programme of study, but independent from any organisation.
- Inform about that key informants are expected to agree to be mentioned by name in the appendix of the final product, which is the master's thesis.

#### **Personal data**

- What is your name?
- What is your position and your responsibilities in your organization?

#### **Expertise**

- In what way are you familiar with the naturalisation process and the current situation in the Old Settlements? (i.e. through research or work experience)
- How would you describe the role of citizen rights in the lives of the new Tanzanians?
- What *practical* meaning does citizenship have to these people when it comes to enhancing livelihood opportunities and standard of living? Please elaborate on:
  - o freedom of movement
  - o access to employment
  - o access to secondary schools and university education
  - o access to skills training
  - o access to credit
  - o access to fertilisers
- What expectations did the new Tanzanians express prior to citizenship? To what extent have these expectations been met, as far as you know?
- Which barriers do you see that hinder the new Tanzanians from utilizing their *de jure* citizen rights? Please elaborate on *knowledge about rights, access to infrastructure and social services, etc.*
- Do you think of other aspects regarding the transition from refugee status to citizenship and the current situation for the new Tanzanians that I should be aware of?
- Is there anything else that you would like to tell me?
- ***Thank you so much! Asante sana!***

*Please note that these questions have been used as **guidance** in semi- structured interviews. Not all questions have been asked to all key informants.*

## Interview guide for interviews with new Tanzanians

### Before the interview

- Inform about the purpose of the study, how the results will be presented, that it is voluntary to participate in the interviews, that it is confidential, that respondents are free to opt out at any time and that they will not be mentioned by their real name in the presentation of the results.
- Clarify that I am affiliated with Lund University through enrolment in a programme of study, but independent from any organisation.
- Ask permission to record the interview, given that only I and my translator will access the recordings.

### Personal data

- Name, age, citizenship status, occupation, family/household size, size of land, harvest size?

### Life and livelihoods before and after citizenship

- Can I ask, how is your household's economic situation? Satisfying or scarce? What do you/your family/household members do to obtain food and earn money?
- What would you say has changed, if anything, with citizenship? Did you start *doing* something new when you became a citizen that you did not do before?
- What about travel? Do you travel more, less or about the same as you did before? For what purposes do you travel? Where? What about your family/household/neighbors/friends?
- Do you have family members living outside the settlement? If so, did they move before or after citizenship? If before, how did that work?
- How is the employment situation if you compare before and after citizenship? In terms of paperwork required? In terms of employment opportunities available?
- How is your business going? Do you buy/sell more/less than before? What markets do you go to? Are you going to any new markets?
- What about schools and higher education?
- Have you borrowed money? More, less or same as before? Through associations/banks/government loans? Is there any difference comparing before and after citizenship?
- If you grow food or other crops, how is your access to fertilisers? How has your harvest size been over a longer time span? How did the period 2010-2014 affect you?
- What are social services and infrastructure like now compared to before? How has the availability been over time? How was it during 2010-2014? Are there any shortages? How are you being greeted and treated when seeking social services, i.e. going to the hospital or the police or some other office? Were you treated any differently as a refugee? And now?
- You got to vote in the last election and now you have an MP for Ulyankulu. Tell me about that! What are your thoughts and expectations? This area is being transformed from a settlement to normal villages: what do you know about current and planned changes?
- Are there any changes that you *expected* would come with citizenship that haven't come?
- Do you see any *obstacles* to utilizing your citizen rights? How much do people around here know about their rights?
- What challenges remain regardless of citizenship?
- Is there anything else that you would like to tell me? ***Thank you so much! Asante sana!***

Please note that these questions have been used as **guidance** in semi-structured interviews. Not all questions have been asked to all new Tanzanians.

## Appendix 5: List of Interviewees Among the new Tanzanians

Here is a list of the new Tanzanians interviewed in Ulyankulu from the 16<sup>th</sup> to the 24<sup>th</sup> of February 2016. Please note that all real names have been replaced with generic Burundian names by the researcher. Contacted by VCO means the Village Chairman Office.

Interview no.	Name	Sex	Occupation	Age	Contacted by
Interview 1	Eric	man	tobacco farmer	50+	VCO
	Alain	man	farmer	50+	
Interview 2	Cathy	woman	farmer	40+	VCO
	Joseph	man	farmer	45+	
Interview 3	Samuel	man	teacher	60+	VCO
	Oliver	man	teacher	60+	
Interview 4	Patrick	man	pastor	60+	VCO
	Emmanuel	man	pastor	50+	
Interview 5	Victor	man	business entrepreneur	50+	VCO
	Mariette	woman	business entrepreneur	35+	
Interview 6	Ella	woman	farmer	40+	VCO
	Gustave	man	farmer / local official	45+	
Interview 7	Francine	woman	farmer / day labourer	40+	VCO and Francine bringing friends
	Larissa	woman	unemployed	30+	
	Jocelyne	woman	housewife / day labourer	35+	
	Doriane	woman	housewife / day labourer	35+	
	Constance	woman	housewife / day labourer	30+	
	Yvette	woman	housewife / day labourer	50+	
Interview 8	Richard	man	farmer	50+	VCO
	Pascal	man	craftsman	30+	
Interview 9	Gilbert	man	craftsman, former teacher	65+	VCO
Interview 10	Gloria	woman	business entrepreneur	45+	VCO
	Nella	woman	business entrepreneur	50+	
Interview 11	Daniel	man	tobacco farmer	40+	VCO
Interview 12	Anitha	woman	farmer / day labourer	35+	VCO
Interview 13	Jean	man	health professional	50+	researcher
Interview 14	Bernice	woman	farmer / small business	40+	researcher
Interview 15	Yasmina	woman	just finished secondary school	18+	VCO
	Elise	woman	just finished secondary school	18+	
Interview 16	Frédéric	man	teacher	60+	VCO
	Gustave	man	teacher	60+	
Interview 17	Lambert	man	farmer	45+	VCO
Interview 18	Jonathan	man	local official	40+	VCO
	Alexandre	man	local official	60+	
Interview 19	François	man	local official	50+	researcher
	Kévin	man	local official	25+	


## Appendix 6: List of Key Informants

Here is a list of names of all the key informants consulted for this study. Not all of them are cited in the study, yet all of them have been of help to the researcher by deepening and nuancing the understanding of the context for the study in terms of refugee issues and development issues, and by recommending further reading.

Name	Affiliation	Date and place of the interview
Brahim, Johnson	Former Assistant Director (retired), Refugee Services Department, Ministry of Home Affairs	2016-02-26 Dar es Salaam
Carr, Robert	Chief of Field Operations, UNICEF Tanzania Country Office	2016-01-29 Dar es Salaam
Folkesson, Mona	Special Assistant to the Resident Coordinator, Coordination Specialist, UN Resident Coordinators Office, Un Delivering as One	2016-02-01 Dar es Salaam
Kanyoni, Agnes	Assistant Field Officer, UNHCR Field Office Ulyankulu	2016-02-22 Ulyankulu
Makunga, Samuel S.	Settlement Officer, the Old Settlement in Ulyankulu	2016-02-16 Ulyankulu
Mkude, Charles	National Project Officer – Mixed Migration, IOM Tanzania	2016-02-26 Dar es Salaam
Mua, Marjorie	Durable Solutions Officer, UNHCR Tanzania	2016-02-01 Dar es Salaam
Mziray, Suleiman E.	Assistant Director – Security and Operation, Refugee Services Department, Ministry of Home Affairs	2016-02-10 Dar es Salaam
Ruhundwa, Janemary	Country Director, Asylum Access – Refugee Solutions Tanzania	2016-02-26 Dar es Salaam

## Appendix 7: Themes and Topics for Sorting the Data

These themes and subcategories were used in the computer software Nvivo to sort the data.



## Appendix 8: Map of Ulyankulu Settlement



Map of Ulyankulu on display in the Settlement Office in Makonge. Photo taken by the researcher.

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