

Challenges of the European Migration Crisis

Case Study on Securitization of Migration

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Abstract

Migration is a multidimensional phenomena presented in various political debates, discussed from economic perspectives to human rights features. Historically, migrants have been considered both as possibilities contributing to the economy and diversity as well as threats to the economy, society and the cultural identity of the host community. One of the aftermaths of European Migration Crisis has been the securitization of migration policy area. Securitization of migration empowers the politicians with the possibility to take *extra-ordinary* measures and normalization of the “us” and “them” discourse; simply put, politicizing migrants as threats to the european society. Here, the aim has been to carry out a single case study of securization. To validate this claim, Copenhagen school’s notions of securization have been applied finding indicators of securization. Later a content analysis on the politicians ‘speech act’ is conducted, examining the discourse from the early stages of the crisis in 2014 until early 2016. In doing so, European parliamentary debates have been chosen as the primary source, giving the opportunity to gather comprehensive data confirming securitization of migration.

Key words: Securitization, Migration, European Migration Crisis, Speech act, content analysis

Words: 12 451

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1. Introduction

Year 2015, Europe faced an unprecedented challenge of receiving and receptioning approximately 1, 255 600 asylum seekers; almost double amount of the year before -mainly due to the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan- (Eurostat, 2016). Shores of Greece, Italy and other border countries witnessed many tragedies. More than 5000 migrants lost their lives reaching european soil in the same year (IOM, 2016). During this time, discussions on migration have been broadcasted all over Europe in a vastly manner with highly divergent views. From sympathetic documentaries visualising Syrian families' journey to northern european countries to heated political debates on how these individuals are to threaten and undermine security of european capitals.

Summer 2015 european citizens and civil society united to take in and help migrants as the governmental agencies had reached their capacities to take in and care for incoming flow of asylum seekers. While by the end of Autumn 2015 member states took measures to close borders and build fences stoping the flow. The EU aimed to find ways to reconcile the matter in Brussels, yet have been accused of failing to find solutions or taking concrete measures. Consequently, member states took measures on their own; for instance closing borders, while repeatedly declaring the unbearable burden of the large number of migrants. Therefore, for months the question of responsibility and solidarity have been leading the political discourse. In the same year EU calls for mutual measures to protect borders and combat human trafficking in its security agenda. Members states have expressed themselves divergently simply based on the number of people that have sought asylum. Many such as Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden endeavoured all through this year to deliver and be an example of *open policy* towards the practice of this human rights; seeking asylum.

Yet, this is to change dramatically after ten months from the beginning of 2015, almost all borders are closed to stop migrants. Many member states such as Hungary, deny Dublin regulations; i.e. with not responding to the Dublin enquiries from other member states. The sequences of political tension led to unexpected measures and radical comments from the recognized '*migrant-generous*' or '*welcoming*' countries. For instance Sweden and Germany, well recognized as the advocates of refugee rights, changed course later in 2015 introducing dramatic regulations on immigration laws/procedures. Explicitly early 2016 politicians / power holders considered and express this matter as '*the threat*' discussing the risks that these asylum-seekers will bring to our societies, leading to the securitization of this policy area. Significant number of power holders appointed migration as a security matter that needs to be taken care of. Changing the referent object of security from a '*single country*' or '*actor*' for example a terrorist group to the '*migrants*'.

In the beginning of 2015 some politicians and media avoided using the terminology of ‘*Migration Crisis*’, since it would increase the politicization of the matter, however, later the same year it was natural to use the term repeatedly. Later in 2016, all over Europe the news about migrants have shifted from the rescuing migrants to closing borders and defending each member states from the possible threats. Consequently, already in early 2016 it became highly visible that the majority of political parties and interest group represented the crisis as a threat undermining the EU.

In this study I aim to explain and describe securitization of the migration discourse during the course of migration crisis. Emphasise is to illustrate the shift of the major political parties¹ within european parliament, changing their positions and considering migration issue to be more of a security matter instead of a social one. This study is dedicated to examine the question of securitization of migration in the EU during the crisis timeline (2014-2016). Thus, the objective here is to examine the following hypothesis:

“In the course of the events of 2014-16, there has been a shift of discourse in migration policy area simply put: the securitization of migration in Europe”.

Conducting this research, I will be applying the Copenhagen School theoretical description on how this case of securitization can be explained. Consequently applying a single case study technique and content analysis to test the above mentioned hypothesis.

¹ European Peoples Party (EPP), Green Alliance and Socialist and democrats (S&D).

2. Theoretical framework and literature review

To conduct the examination of the research's claim, there is a need for feasible theoretical framework. The framework of the Copenhagen School, '*securitization*' and '*speech act*' is then applied; examining the presentation of the migration crisis and whether it has become politicized/securitized. Following, a literature review on '*securitization*' is carried out, mapping out the framework suitable for this research. Finally this section will justify how this theoretical framework will be employed.

2.1 Literature review: Securitization

The *Copenhagen School* is introduced by scholars Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver. In different pieces of scholarly they have outlined how and why a problematic -political- issue can lead to the securitization of the discourse. In their piece together "*Security: A new framework for analysis*", Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (1998) define how securitization of a policy area takes place, and how the concept of security have been altered after the cold war and finally how this phenomena can be justified. Ole Wæver clarifies '*securitization and desecuritization*' process, arguing how any policy area can be politicized and securitized (Wæver, 1995). In this piece Ole Wæver describes what he calls as '*societal security*'; basically the causes of securitization in social matters and how social matters are politicized (Ibid). Furthermore, Copenhagen school illuminates the role of non-state actors in the securitization process, how non-state actors and historical events can contribute to politicization and eventually securitization of a specific issue.

Securitization is defined as: "more precisely to the process of presenting an issue in security terms, in other words as an existential threat"(Buzan and Hansen 2009, p.214). Securitization is about survival, should there be a reason that the '*referent object*' is to be threatened, there are legitimate reasons that create the demand to take measures of survival. Securitization theory is then giving room to anyone to make a move that can securitize a special policy area. Yet it is mostly common that actors such as 'political leaders, bureaucrats, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups' who can fully exercise securitization (Buzan *et al.*, 1998: 40–41).

But how does securitization happen? Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010, p. 79) describe the process of bringing about securitization consisting of three stages. The first is the so called '*speech act*' known as '*plot of securitization*', here the speaker or actor is representing an '*existential threat*' legitimizing the '*use of extraordinary measures*' to overcome the problem. Second, it is then up to the the actor who is representing the matter. This means that it depends on the actor, whose '*social and political capital*' can convince the relevant audience of a possible so-called '*existential threat*'. Finally, the background of the matter in hand convinces the audience of the need for extraordinary measure; if the object is related with or having historical background of posing a threat, danger, harm and inhering a '*historical hostile sentiment*'. At this stage the actor or institutions play a significant role; depending on the credibility of the actor to the relevant audience, still the historical background goes hand in hand in the procedure. Should the audience be sceptical of the threat due to the background then the actor needs to make a stronger case than others. However, this process is very dependent on the presentation act, how an issue or event can be seen as threatening.

To investigate whether or not the migration policy area have been securitized during the events of 2014-15, the notion of '*speech act*' is applied looking for indicators that can illustrate the '*plot of securitization*'. Therefore, the emphasis will not be on the actor or the historical background but only on the content's role in securitization of migration. The content to be analyzed are the speeches given by the politicians with high political credibility, therefore the manner of presentation is expected to have strong influence on the audience and the political discourse.

2.1.1 Speech act: plot of securization

As mentioned before, securization framework argue for that threats do not necessarily have to be as extreme as traditional wars however there is a need for the existential threat to the referent object. Which then bring up the need for extraordinary measures that is not very far from traditional military-political definition of security (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010, p. 80). Scholars of Copenhagen school argue for various kinds of security. Amongst them societal security described then, raising threats to a group's identity; the dynamic is that there is an existential threat to the collective identity, language or culture. Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010, p. 81) make the example of the influx of migrants as a possible societal security matter, should these migrants have '*rival and potentially competing values*', being presented in a way that can pose a threat to the '*way of life*' of a community.

Politicians' presentations known as *speech act* can lead to a spill-over effect, having the capacity to change the discourse of a subject matter for instance an economic issue then transform to a societal security matter raising stronger threats. Societal security is also associated with the larger concept of "*us*" vs "*them*", for example we as a nation or religious groups vs others. Huysman and

Wæver have in different pieces made use of this framework to assess *how, when* and *by whom* migration is securitized -specially in the european union- posing an 'existential threat' to the identities of the host countries. In this case, the referent object is altered to the national identity, meaning that instead of political stability one represents threats to traditional concepts of identity. As Wæver (1995 p.16) argues, there are possibilities that cultural identity are rooted from 'classical nation-state thinking' that is then related to the concept of state sovereignty and autonomy influencing the cultural and political sphere; leading to complex and diverse political representation of migration and integration in Europe.

2.2 Framework

In this study the focus will not be on whether the migration crisis can be identified as societal security or likewise. This thesis is neither going to examine the why and how securitization has come to take place, rather only on whether the content and political discourse on migration have been securitized or not during the migration crisis. The emphasis is then only on the securitization process and the presentation of the migration. The 'speech act', or the presentation of the issue is the very first step of securitization process, which can alter or manipulate the discourse overtime. Ultimately it is the actor and its political credibility that can make this process happen. Consequently, through this procedure the politicians can turn almost any policy area from a non-politicised to politicised and finally securitized status; demanding to collectively address the problem as a strong threat. Securitization of a policy area entitle states with special rights. As Wæver (1995 p.6-7) argues, when naming a 'certain development as security problem' we are permitting the politicians to take extraordinary measure to solve the problem. Therefore, power holders attempt to use these instrument to gain control over even if the matter is not inherently a security issue. The actor wishing to exercise speech act has the capability to securitize any policy area/issue: "With the help of language theory, we can regard 'security' as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act."(Wæver, 1995 p.6).

Studying this area give the opportunity to investigate cases that can contribute to the above mentioned framework. Yet, the aim here is not to develop any further theoretical framework but to make use of the existing theory for carrying out the research question. The paper is emphasizing to look for any trend that can prove or disprove the securitization of migration policy during the crisis in 2014-16. I will then be using indicators that illustrate the 'existential threat' or representing threats to the european community as a whole; the social and economic background. In the Method section the selection of these indicators are explained thoroughly, referring their basis to the above outlined theoretical framework

3. Method and material

In this section the methodological framework are introduced, giving a comprehensive explanation on the choice of single case study of securitization through content analysis. Followed by, the presentation of the practical collection process of the empirical evidence as well as application of content analysis.

3.1 Method

This study conducts a content analysis to test the hypothesis; ‘securitization of migration’ within European political discourse, during the migration crisis 2014-16. Using a single case study method, migration policy area in EU is then chosen as a case of securitization. The hypothesis sets the case study nature of the paper, thus ‘*comparison*’ is not a viable methodological framework here. As there are no other competing actors or cases of events that entail similar content: “Hence the primary criterion for case selection should be relevance to the research objective of the study, whether it includes theory development, theory testing or heuristic purpose” George and Bennett (2005, p.83). Here, the objective is to test the hypothesis using the securitization framework of the ‘*speech act*’ process. The theoretical framework enables a test in the case of the European Union.

Examining the hypothesis, a careful content analysis will be carried out. Content analysis approach will enable the study with the tools investigating the way-*speech act*- has been exercised during the time of so called ‘*migration crisis*’. Hence, I will be using the EU parliamentary debates to find indicators of politicization or rather the process of securitization. Both qualitative and quantitative content analysis framework will be used here. Quantitative method will enable us to study the ‘How often/how many’ the frequency of a matter being represented by politicians, the qualitative analysis entitle the analysis with tools to not only look at the frequency of the indicator being mentioned but also what the content is representing (Halperin Heath 2012, p. 319). This combination will help the study to provide both qualitative and quantitative analysis proving securitization of migration. Analyzing politician's ‘*speech act*’, the content is presented and finally mapped in a quantitative manner formed in graph illustration with comparable data.

3.2 Empirical Evidence

There are various *primary and secondary sources* that can be used for this research; yet, I have chosen to study the parliamentary debates carrying out a deep analysis on the content of European political discussions and behaviour. These debates provide *primary sources* on the political debates with various tendencies stretched out all through out the continent -from the very far right parties to the non-attached. Members of parliament are chosen through a democratic election and represent almost all political matters in the parliament. This means that, their standpoints and expressions represent the European political discourse. Thus, the European parliamentary debates on migration have been chosen as the primary source of this research. These debates are the solid and appropriate *first-hand* evidence for investigation of this research's claim; '*securitization of migration policy area during the crisis in 2014-16*'. These debates enhance the research with an non-subjective or manipulated content, reflecting on the political discourse at the time being.

Seven debates, almost all the debates on migration policy, have been studied and analyzed from November 2014 until June 2016. The debates are available and accessible through the European Parliament homepage available with unofficial translation in English. The debates are also provided in form of text online in the original language of the speaker. This first hand material gives room for a thorough content analysis on the securitization of migration throughout this time span; providing the necessary information and content to identify the change in speech act of political parties. These debates provide concrete content on the political discussion at the time while other resources such as second hand material will not have the similar originality. To avoid bias, I have chosen not to make use of second hand material. Hence, media reports and analysis have been only used to elaborate the background and historical research of the migration crisis.

3.3 Indicators

To analyze the content of these debates, I have made use of indicators that identify securitization in form of the 'speech act'. These contents represent migration in a way that it poses an '*existential threat*' to Europe as the referent object. The following indicators have been described in more details in the analysis section, yet here I aim to argue for the choice of these indicators and how and why these indicators illustrate the securitization of migration.

The first indicator of securitization is naming or referring to migrants as '*Economic migrants/illegal migrants*'. Through this, the politician is arguing for the illegal act of the individual who is not a true asylum seeker entering European borders. Thus, the speaker aims to delegitimize and criminalize the migrant asking the audience not to sympathize with the migrants but rather consider them as individuals who aim to misuse the asylum system. The speaker is representing an existential threat to the welfare system, and economy of European Union as these economic migrants are only in Europe because they desire better socio-economic circumstances.

The second indicator is when the speaker focuses on the *'country of origin/transit'*, by this the speaker is asking for solution at the country of origin and transit. Demanding a mutual measure in terms of foreign policy to stop the influx of migrants, the speaker usually then ask the responsibility to be taken by the transit country and even ask for mutual project to stop the influx at the country of origin. It can be argued that, this indicator is simply the solution to stopping the migrants from fleeing; building infrastructures and providing aid to transit countries. However, the actor is usually arguing that the problem should be solved outside of european union borders asking for *'extraordinary'* measures to stop incoming migrants and in extreme cases demanding military measures .

The third indicator is the emphasis on *'Border control/frontex '*, the actor is finding the solution by safeguarding the borders, considering that migration poses an existential threat to the european borders by illegally crossing them. Therefore extraordinary measures are welcomed stopping the existential threat to the european borders/integrity. Commonly the speaker relates migration to the rise of terrorism and how human traffickers can smuggle anyone in the EU, consequently, posing threats to the security of Europe. Subsequently migrants are represented as possible terrorists, threatening the security of Europe. This indicator is the most clear indicator of securitization as almost all migrants are then considered to threaten the security of Europe in various forms.

The fourth is the concept of *'returns'*; the speaker emphasises on the return policies. The actor usually discusses the challenges of the high number of undocumented migrants residing in the EU illegally, those who usually do not have the right to asylum. Migration is represented as a problematic issue as many might not be considered in need of protection, consequently, Europe is going to end up with a large number of illegal population that can pose an existential threat to the security of legal system and the society.

Finally the fifth concept is *'the concept of solidarity'*. This concept does not indicate securitization, however not mentioning or de-prioritization of solidarity means that the speaker do not consider the matter to be of importance. The actor does not recognise the need to focus on the humanitarian aspect and sharing the economic and social burden within EU. Thus, consider the relocation of people or other kinds of involvement as economic and social burden to their home country.

3.4 Quantitative method and material coding

To conduct the content analysis, the above mentioned indicators have to be first interpreted and measured and then compared and analysed. In doing so, I have chosen to analyze three speeches of representatives of each political party in every debate as the recording units. The choice of three is then due to the practical limitations that not all political parties are given the opportunities to express themselves more than three times in every debate. Thus, to be able to compare, three speeches of every political party in every debate are randomly chosen to be analyzed as the *'recording unit'*.

This entitles the research with concrete guidelines in conducting a quantitative data. Counting the the number of times each indicator is represented-by the speaker- or rather which indicator the speaker is emphasising on. For example if one speaker chooses to devote the speech only focusing on one point (e.x. border control) then the person is focusing on that specific indicator in hundred percent ratio. Should the rest of the political party also focus on the matter then the whole party is emphasising on that specific indicator hundred² percent³ in that specific debate. Afterwards, each speech is analyzed and coded into numbers counting the frequency of times the speaker or writer refers to the indicators of securitization. The result is then documented in the index section, where the data (results) is transformed on a percentage base; providing comparable data at the end. The data is then illustrated in form of graphs in the analysis section, showing each political party's standpoint on migration. Finally in the conclusion section I have illustrated a comprehensive graph where all political parties are then compared to one another using solidarity indicator only.

3.5 Limitations

This study will be focusing on the the time period of Autumn 2014 until Spring 2016. The initial design of this thesis was set out to only focus on year 2015, yet after first attempt of analyzing the content, I came across the fact that it is very difficult to analyze only the transition time. Nonetheless, the migration crisis never ended in 2015 and the politicians did not come up with mutual solutions or remedies in 2015 but rather only representing the problem negotiating. In fall 2014 the crisis almost begun to attract attention in the bigger european political discourse, and in 2015 european parliament held a number of debates on the issue of migration that is not comparable to the year before- due to the emergency nature of the matter. It is not until early 2016 where european parliament hand in hand with the commission come up with concrete ways to solve the problem of migration; such as the deal with Turkey. This is why a study on the securitization of migration crisis focused on a shorter time would not illustrate the whole picture of transition.

However, this study can be conducted considering the migration policy in longer time framework proving the securitization of migration in the EU in a larger scale. Nevertheless, my aim here has been to prove that migration policy area has been securitized during the migration crisis in a way that politicians and power holders legitimise the use of extraordinary power towards migrants in this specific time.

² For instance, one politicians might make three different points while another might only focus on one. To be able to compare these data we will need a common base through a percentage setting, to be able to compare various speaker's and political groups's emphasis on the indicators/themes.

³ The complete data can be found in the index section.

This study is also limited to the first-hand primary sources on the debates, due to the nature of the hypothesis and the theoretical frame work. Yet one can question the role of media and public opinion here and why it has not been examined. As mentioned in the theoretical section, the aim is to test the Copenhagen school's securitization conceptualisation on the current case. Yet, I like to acknowledge the strong role of the media and public opinion in the alteration of politicians mindset. However, analysis have been limited to primary speeches for a concrete analysis confirming the hypothesis. Nevertheless, a study on the role of media in securitization is a compete different puzzle to be examined and not the one presented in this paper.

Finally, there is also room to critique the way the quantitative measures have been carried out. Politicians have different time limited speeches, meaning that one politician can be giving a speech for three minutes while the other given seven minutes. How can these two then be compared? To avoid this problem, I have chosen to analyse the content and not the number of word/indicator being mentioned. This is as one speech might be focused on one indicator or point while the other might express three points. Therefore, it is then up to the number of points made in every speech, not the number or the amount of time spent on the presentation of the discussion.

4. Discussion and analysis

During the years 2014-16 the migration phenomena and its challenges have been discussed in various aspects/themes. In this section I attempt to analyze the content of the debates at hand. In doing so, indicators/keywords of securitization are chosen-that help identifying- as indications of the shift of discourse from *migration* to *security* issue that needs to be taken care of. This section is divided into themes that the debates have been mostly revolved around. Here, I connect indicators of securitization to these themes, comparing the use of indicators by different political parties.

4.1 Securitizing indicators

Economic migrants/illegal migrants, during the whole extend of this crisis migrants have been given different titles, yet what is important is that the term economic migrants/illegal migrants is used when referred to individuals who migrate/flee due to economic aspects. This mean that these individuals are not considered in clear need of protection only on the basis of their nationalise and not their protection claims. This terminology delegitimize the migration act of many, referring to other third safe countries as alternative responsibility holders. To be more exact the term illegal migrant illustrate an individual committing crime by illegally- missing the right documentation- crossing the borders/ entering a country. Categorising all migrants as this group give the speaker the possibility to securitize the discourse and delegitimize the act of migration, considering individuals of no rights, as they are breaking the laws of the host country.

The country of origin/transit, by this the speaker/writer changes the focal point of solving the challenge that Europe is facing, focusing on the solving the problem in the country of origin. This could be in terms of measures/negotiations with the counterpart countries for stopping the flow in forms of granting aid and economic assistance, which then eventually leads to less number of people that migrate. The same measure can be taken in regards to the transit countries, for instance, countries like Turkey or Libya in this case. Focusing on these two alternative illustrates how one wish/aim to stop the flow as well delegitimization of migrants act of crossing the border, enabling the counterpart a set of tools to deny their entrance and avoiding the further challenge in Europe or rather pushing back the problem.

Frontex/border control, Human traffickers and the rise of terrorism, terrorist and security threat. These issues/indicators might seem more obvious when

discussed it leads to the securitization of the discourse. Migrants are then referred to as security threat, bringing in more terrorist in the European territories. Also emphasizing on safeguarding the border visualises the security measure taken to combat a social phenomena.

Returns, using this term in a speech illustrate that instead of focusing on the reception and integration of migrants, speaker chooses to focus on the returns policy, aiming to find national/international solutions for efficient return policies. This term is not on its own an indicator of securitization of the discourse, however this shift of this focus on a non-welcoming signal to the public, increasing insecurities.

The concept of solidarity is both in regards to other member states and migrants. This issue is vastly discussed and challenged during the whole migrant crisis both in terms that all member states have the obligation to assist the bordering countries i.e, Italy, Greece, Malta; such as sending resources for save and rescue missions. Solidarity is then illustrated for the temporary/permanent quotas, to redistribute the burden too all the members of the union. This concept is not exactly an indicator of securitization, yet many politicians have chosen to be silent or in practice not prioritizing the human aspect, wishing to limit the economic commitment they need to live up to. Low prioritisation of this matter, sends the signal to the migrants that it is security that comes first and not rescuing them, also dividing Europe into single countries that do not wish to share the burden be it economic or political.

4.2 Themes

4.2.1 Save and rescue / the humanitarian aspect


This theme has been discussed extensively throughout 2014 and early 2015, while in comparison to 2016 it is less focused on. There is clear change of course in this theme, almost all political groups are mutually asking for the rescue and humanitarian actions to save people at the sea. Yet this is to change in 2016 many political parties, begun to refer to the issue of a more of a security matter and the priority should be then give to stop '*illegal migration flows*'. In this section, I have attempted to exemplify and draw the following conclusion: *The concept of save and rescue or rather the humanitarian aspect have been reshaped in 2016.* This mean that during the course of time of the migration crisis in Europe, political parties have changed track and consider migration issue to be a security matter to be combated fully, instead of a humanitarian matter to be taken care of.

During autumn 2014 and later in spring 2015, the European People's Party (EPP) group- representing 215 members of parliament- express themselves sympathetic to the migrants urging for the stop of tragedies in the mediterranean. Although that this group also express their concerns on the economic aspect of the number of people entering; at this point they believe and argue for that all the

member states (MS) should find a mutual solution to the problem and focus on avoiding more tragedies at the sea. Focusing on the humanitarian aspect and the responsibility that Europe bears at this point. This change of course is very clear once we look at the data generated from the indicators. PPE/EPP owning the biggest MEP groups in the parliament clearly have changed their standing points when it comes to migration and how the crisis should be solved. In November 2014 they mostly have focused on saving people considering the matter to be a humanitarian issue and that EU can actually overcome the numbers. Considering the best way to solve the matter is through solidarity within Europe, dividing the responsibility and economic burden to save people fleeing from conflict and persecution. The following three speeches illustrate this change, from November 2014 to June 2016.

Comodini Cachia, Therese (PPE): “A new European strategy must adopt a holistic approach to migration management, respecting human rights, establishing coordination among Member States and with countries of origin and/or passage... Proper systems must be put in place to assist migrants when they arrive, process applications faster and integrate or resettle them if they are granted asylum... Triton is not enough: we need missions that search and rescue but also measures that bring smugglers and traffickers to justice and collect data that would enable better and more effective actions in the future” (European parliament, nov 2014)

Graph 1: PPE/EPP group



Frank Engel (PPE): “Mr President, I believe that we, as elected representatives of the people, have a duty to orient public opinion towards real representations. When I hear the stupid, narrow-minded and populist claims of the right of this house, I feel the need to

provide you with some figures. Across the world, today you find 480 million emigrated Europeans and their descendants. It is the equivalent of the population of the European Union that left Europe at some point in its history. Rare were those who did it for pleasure.....let us keep this in mind: Europe is a continent of emigration, Being a continent of immigration. If, today, people knock at our door, we have no right to leave it closed.”⁴ (European parliament, April 2015).

Roberta Metsola (PPE): “As politicians, we need to move away from just fire-fighting and start to tackle the causes of migration, otherwise we risk our actions always being too little, too late. Our focus must be on preventing these situations from occurring in the first place... Europe needs thinking that goes beyond tomorrow’s headline and focuses on tomorrow’s generation...We need to pump investment into developing countries, a form of Marshall Plan that will give people a chance of a future there without fear.....Safe third countries must do more to accept their nationals back. This must be part and parcel of our negotiations, and then we can work to build capacity in their law enforcement, judicial and, crucially, asylum systems, so that people in need of protection can also find safe haven in states outside of the European Union” (European Parliament, June 2016).

Comparing jun 2016 to November 2016 in graph 1, and the above mentioned speeches, it is clear how the focus has been altered. The party has more focus on returns and avoiding similar influx of migrants to the EU, employing foreign policy measures and investments. Here we can argue for how the PPE have attempted to keep the solidarity notion through time,-yet lowered priority from over 60 percent in 2014 to ca 25 percent in 2016- ,working against the far right and bringing back the focus on how the EU can mutually resolve the matter together.

The alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE)-representing 69 MEPS- also traditionally support the recognition of asylum rights, yet welcome mostly regulated migration; migration of individuals who are mostly highly-educated and can be considered to contribute to the labour market through regulated working migration. However, like others they have been influenced by the tragedies and consider ‘*saving & rescue*’ the most important challenge asking for holistic measures from the Europe in assisting people fleeing during 2014/15. The focus of the speakers and the party is basically emphasizing on saving and rescue, the human costs and how Europe shall solve the problem mutually.


Cecila Wikström (ALDE): “Mr. President, Everyone remembers the tragic images of the 366 white coffins after the disaster at Lampedusa, about a year ago. What we forget to say is that there is a Lampedusa every day, for this year already has more than 3 000 people died in Mediterranean waters - compared to 600 people last year.We must now ensure that we put a stop to it and put a stop to traffickers, for it is a fact that people are completely in the hands of traffickers. It is not possible to come to Europe legally. Therefore, it is now our great political challenge to create safe and legal ways to Europe.”(European parliament , 2014).

⁴ The english texts are cited from the official translation through the parliaments publish text/video on the debate.

ALDE group is highly focused on the human factor *save and recuse* as well as sharing the burden equally within Europe during the early phase of the crisis. The events in 2014/2015 touched many citizens and politicians hearts and it is visible how the focus changes as the borders are closed in 2016 leading to a more of a discussion on that the issue should be solved at the transit country or even at the country of origin. What is also interesting is that the death rate at the sea is not lowered either nonetheless politician chose to not represent it.

Sophia in 't Veld, ALDE: "Mr President, the images of hundreds of dead bodies floating in the Mediterranean is profoundly horrifying, but the most tragic aspect of this disaster is that it is avoidable – people have died unnecessarily. Now, giving asylum to those who have fled war and persecution is a legal as well as a moral duty. This year alone, 2000 people have drowned in the Mediterranean. But some politicians are shamelessly exploiting this tragedy for their own populist, xenophobic, anti-EU agenda. Some merely call for closing the borders. That is cheap rhetoric; it is not a solution. But some, like Mr Farage here, are inventing scare stories about these operations bringing in thousands of jihadists into Europe. But Mr Farage knows full well that this is complete and utter nonsense and that it is about as likely as thousands of Martians coming to Europe" (European Parliament, April 2015).

Graph 2: ALDE group



Petras Auštrevičius (ALDE), in writing : "As the stronghold of democracy and liberal values, the EU should care about those lives lost at the sea. In the name of the security and prosperity of our peoples the EU should develop a well-functioning, strong mechanism to be able to adequately respond to this challenge of our highly globalised and interdependent world...The common external border of the EU should be

strengthened and managed effectively and inside the EU the Schengen rules must be obeyed... Moreover, crucial measures should be taken not only inside the EU managing migration. The Union should also help build necessary capacities in third countries to address the root causes of migration” (European parliament, April 2016).


The comparison of May 2015 to April 2016 in the graph 2 show how the party has shifted its priority to security and country of origin/transit. Therefore, it can be argued that this shift has happened as the politicians have decided to express their priorities on a different aspect than solidarity or human factors. Comparing the speech given in 2016 it is interesting to observe the change of concern and argumentation for a ‘stronger external border’ the focus on border control and ‘managing migration’. Basically demanding more control on who migrates and those who shall return as well as capacity building in third countries that the migration flow comes from. All these might not on its own seem as indicator to securitization of the migration, yet this shows how this party have changed its standpoint of sharing burden and guarantee safer ways to protection than to rather ensuring stronger borders and investments on third countries, in a time when migration flow is not stopped neither the conflicts in the region.

The green alliance(Vert/ALE)- representing 52 MEPS - have almost all through this period of time condemned the legal procedure of seeking asylum in Europe, the fact that there are no legal/safe ways to seek asylum. Asking for a mutual action on protecting those in need also asking for an end to the discrimination/prejudice on those who are crossing the seas to seek refuge in Europe. This group, unlike the liberals usually have stated their support for humanitarian migration to Europe, considering that Europe has a responsibility to take in those in need. This group have expressed itself quite strongly against security measures/operations. This groups is one of the only who have been straightforward about the importance of solidarity and how the human factor cannot be negotiated. It is worth pointing out how their standpoint on solidarity is upheld all through 2016 yet decreases to from a full support (see graph 3) on this aspect to how the problem can be taken care of at the country of origin or the transit country.

Alyn Smith (Verts/ALE): in writing. “The EU is seen by many of the most vulnerable and oppressed people of the world as a zone of stability and safety. Migrants risk and lose their lives trying to reach our shores. ... The situation in the Mediterranean is a pressing issue and it is only going to get worse; war in Syria, Libya and elsewhere is creating millions of new refugees, and the next exodus is underway in Iraq. Faced with the most dangerous border crossing in the world, Europe is deciding to make that journey even more dangerous – betting that, if we make it hopeless enough, no one will attempt to cross....This is not something we should be proud of as a union of member states, hence we need to act together so our actions reflect our common values” (European Parliament, April 2015).

Ska Keller (Verts/Ale): “Madam President, some colleagues have mentioned partnership and addressing poverty, human rights violations and that sounds very nice. ..What the Commission is actually proposing here colleagues is to use all foreign policy instruments that the EU has as its disposal for one sole purpose, namely to stop refugees and migrants on their way to Europe. .. now we will use trade sanctions when a country is not taking back the refugees, the people that fled from that specific country....I think the problem we need to address is inside the European Union. It does not help to externalise the problems and look for solutions elsewhere. We have to find the solution inside the European Union” (European parliament, June 2016).

Graph 3: Vert/ALE group




Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D); representing 187 MEPS the socialist group- one of the strong political groups, has traditionally supported and expressed the need to develop the reception of asylum seekers, emphasizing that right to seek asylum sending a strong messages against the measures through Frontex and operations that involve border control. They constantly underline the responsibility that EU has with regards to people fleeing from their home, also the need to act quickly making it possible for all to avoid these life threatening trips to seek asylum.

Birgit Sippel, S&D: “That is why we also need a binding distribution key, so as to involve the Member States, which have so far failed to fulfil their responsibilities. ... I believe that a distribution key would not only help relieve countries such as Greece or Italy, it would also help countries like Germany and Sweden, when finally all Member States participate in a distribution according to their own responsibilities. Finally, we also need

legal ways to Europe, and we need to think about this” (European parliament ,April 2015).

Graph 4: S&D group



Many believe that the conservatives (the socialist block), would claim more focus on the human factor and the solidarity within the European Union, and this is true all through the 2016. Yet what is noteworthy is that through the last final debates the S&D changes the focus and argue for the economic assistance at the country of origin and even ask for a stronger external border.


Knut Fleckenstein (S&D): “First and foremost, it is really about a partnership. It is about combating the causes of flight together; investing in jobs in democracy, in the environment, so that people no longer have to get on their way. It is about putting the trafficking of the human smugglers, also by cooperation in the coast guard and the like. It is about enabling legal migration because we need it partly in Europe. The aim is to create a situation in the partner countries that allows for return and withdrawal. This is not only true, it is long overdue. This plan goes beyond short-term crisis management. Only a long-term sustainable cooperation can help us to make up for what we have neglected over decades....” (European Parliament, June 2016)

Maria João Rodrigues (S&D). “– The priorities are clear: we need to address the root causes in our neighbourhood countries, we need to ensure the proper reception, redistribution and integration of refugees across Europe, and we need to build up a real European border. But we need to have a clear vision about what the European border should be. This is not a wall. This is rather a border system ensuring control of movement but, most of all, decent, dignified reception and distribution of refugees in connection

with the relocation centres and in connection with the whole system of resettlement in our neighbourhood countries..”(European Parliament, April 2016)

Even though S&D blames the EU for the deal with Turkey recognising the deal of being inhumane and non functional, they chose to not represent similar ideas in late spring 2016. This means that even the socialist group have shifted their emphasis choosing to mostly represent discussions on returns and the ways to avoid further crisis through foreign aid to the transit and country of origin.

Graph 5: ECR group



It is also interesting to point out how even smaller liberal groups also considered the save and rescue missions rather the humanitarian aspect as europe’s biggest responsibility during 2014-2015. The European conservatives and reformists (the ECR); that is represented by 74 MEPS, during 2014/15 they have also underlined the importance of the human cost and the role of EU, arguing for action to save people’s lives and sharing the burden equally within Europe. In the meantime, this party already then expresses their point of view on how this flow of migrants are not only consisted of people in need of protection but also those who free-ride and are so called economic migrants. The discussion on ‘returns’ and differentiation that needs to be made on ‘refugees and economic migrants’ have been of the major interest from this party already in early 2015. The following example illustrates and reflects on these conclusions.

Timothy Kirkhope, the ECR: “– Mr President, in saving lives, addressing the criminality of human trafficking and stabilising the EU’s external borders through cooperation are vital factors. We have a moral duty to assist one another, but I do not believe that this

assistance should undermine the key international principle of humanitarian and asylum law: that an individual should be able to seek sanctuary in the first safe country reached. True solidarity is offering assistance because it is the right thing to do – not through compulsion. ...It is a mistake to have a strategy which addresses all kinds of migration in one document. Economic migration and asylum are two very different issues, with separate challenges, and this joint strategy blurs lines which should be clear. We do agree on the important role of Frontex, EASO, returns and Eurodac, and the need for increased funding in tackling the issue at source, and we look forward to working with the Commission on this important issue” (European Parliament, April 2015)

Looking at the graph 5, and the the content reprinted during the debates, we can argue that the human factor/solidarity factor has not been prioritized for ECR when compared to other political parties. On few occasions ECR representatives chose to present the importance of european union working together to rescue and take measure with regards to the crisis. Yet in march 2016, the whole focus is then shifted to the border control and how to safeguard the external borders, arguing that not all migrants are in need of protection and bordering countries should not allow their entrance to the EU.

During 2014-15 all most all political parties mutually expressed the importance of saving lives, demanding for ways to reduce the human cost of coming to Europe and seek refugee also the sharing of burden through solidarity within the european union. With the exception of the political parties such as Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy Group (EFDD)-graph 6- and non attached members (NI); that emphasise only on closing borders and learning from the Australian counterparts to control the *illegal migratory flows*. Nevertheless during autumn 2015 this is to change, for instance political groups such as ECR and EPP are to hold back and ask for a more sharper border control and protection of external borders of Europe. With the above mentioned examples and arguments it is clear how the content has been securitized; how the matter has shifted from a social phenomena or humanitarian issue to a foreign policy matter to be taken care of with strong security measures.

4.2.2 Security measures and border controls /combating traffickers

As discussed in the previous theme the context is still very much neutral and sympathetic in the parliament, many politicians trying to push back claims that consider migrants as a threat to Europe. Yet this is to dramatically change in autumn 2015 and spring 2016. Many member states -the so-called arrival countries- begin to introduce border control after many missions to stop human traffickers and boats reaching the Italian/Greek border. Consequently, the council and the commission encounter the problematic as a security challenge, threatening Schengen agreements as well as a threat towards the external borders. The liberal block/ conservatives and right wing are highlighting even more the importance of

safeguarding Europe's borders and prioritizing the border control to stop the flow of migrants.

Already after the introduction of Migration agenda, in Autumn 2015 EPP begin to changing course and focusing on the border control. This means that one of the strongest political parties chosen to stand down and consider the border issue to be more vital for the European citizens.

Csaba Sógor (PPE): “Mr President, the forces driving people away from their homes and pushing them to take on deadly perils to arrive on the shores of Europe – war, persecution, poverty, famine – are huge and will not go away anytime soon....The Agenda rightly identifies the fact that a determined fight against irregular migration and human traffickers should be coupled to a fairer and stronger asylum policy and integrated development action that is capable of addressing, in the long term, the root causes of migration in the countries of origin. We should be hopeful that this paper will fuel the right debates among Member States and eventually bring more solidarity, coherence and efficiency to our asylum and immigration policy” (European Parliament, Sep 2015).

Referring to the gathered data from these debates, it is highly evident how the paradigm have shifted from ‘solidarity’-September 2015- to ‘border control’ in April 2016. This is the consequence of a large influx of migrants during autumn 2015, that eventually led to border controls all through the migratory map from Greece/Italy all through northern European countries like Germany and Sweden. EPP politicians then express their priorities as to protect the external borders of European Union; now that the situation is escalated and there are almost little ways to solve the crisis mutually within Europe.

Consequently, in 2016, EPP, ALDE and ECR chose also to loudly ask for the stop of Migration and safeguarding external borders. Thus, other political parties begin to highlight the importance of security aspect and how migrants can underestimate the security of the continent.

Maria João Rodrigues (S&D). – “the Greek solution and the Turkish solution will show their limits quite soon. So we really need stronger European solutions to regain control of the situation: in order to safeguard Schengen, to respond to refugees according to European values. We also need a real European border, not a kind of wired wall, but rather a new concept of a border system which should be advanced infrastructure, with the proper information and logistic capacity and providing useful services. A border control, managing the refugee flow and also assisting the refugees with human standards. We believe this should be organised, promoted and financed as a strategic public investment, which should be there to prepare Europe for the 21st century and to reorganise its relationship with the neighbourhood in more positive terms “(European parliament, April 2016).

Even political parties like S&D and Green coalition change course in 2016, from completely supporting with solidarity while in 2016 highlighting the importance of safeguarding external borders and returns of those illegal/economic migrants, who are not recognized as refugees. Referring to graph 3, political

group such as green alliance have through time always expressed themselves in a way that human factor is the most important, yet in April 2016 this focus changes also in line with the measures of other political parties and EU institutions.

Ska Keller, Verts/ALE Group: “We do indeed need a holistic approach...What we need instead in the European Union is legal and safe passage for people in need of international protection, because even the best asylum system does not do its job if we close access to that asylum system. I recognise that the Commission acknowledges this problem in its communicationFar too few governments in the Member States are willing to welcome refugees, but it is our duty and our international obligation to open the doors to those people in need...We can contribute to a fairer trade system and a fairer agricultural system. There are a lot of things we can do, and we should never forget that we are talking about people who are in need of protection – not problems, not numbers, but people.”(European Parliament, April 2016)


March 2016 the European Union signed an agreement with Turkey to tackle irregular migration, this agreement involved economic aid and possible visa waiver for Turkish counterpart, in turn for sending back illegal migrants who arrive at the shore of Greece. Since then the EU took comprehensive measures to tackle irregular flow of people; returning many from Greece to Turkey, initiating revisions on Dublin/and asylum procedure, drafting updated safe third countries, finally working on a permanent quotas within Europe for those in most need of protection. This paradigm shift from focusing on the reception of migrants to safeguarding borders and sharpened politics. These proposals are also backed by almost many except the socialist/left block as migration is simply considered now an economic and security threat and no member state can consider the continuation of the flow of people.

Geoffrey Van Orden (ECR). – “Madam President, I think we need a fundamentally different approach, with absolute priority on reducing the number of migrants entering the EU from outside. The current human-rights-driven agenda merely encourages migration. The pull factors of an open door, the near certainty of remaining once arrived on European soil, poor enforcement and repatriation, excessively generous welfare payments, and a legal straitjacket of international human rights conventions, are of far greater significance than the lack of physical barriers to migration..... I am also concerned about the effects of visa liberalisation. There are indications that many people from third countries enter the Schengen area legally and then overstay.”(European Parliament, June 2016)

Cecilia Wikström (ALDE): “Madam President, there is no doubt that we must cooperate better with third countries..... I agree with the Commissioner on this, but we must get our act together and manage migration flows....Let us instead now focus on the creation of a dignified European asylum system assisting our neighbourhood but never, outsource European responsibility to third countries, otherwise this continent, this Union, will be held hostage indefinitely”(European Parliament, June 2016).

Considering the above two speeches while looking at graph 2, we can argue that the security and border control have become the utmost importance of all most the majority in 2016. The above two speakers both argue for the importance of flow management and stronger external borders. Yet what is different when it comes to ALDE group is that solidarity is still one of the issues brought up even in April 2016, yet the focus has been altered to how to build the external border and safeguard the Schengen relations- as almost all member states have introduced border control since September 2015. Unlike others, Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group (EFDD) group has backed up the border control measures as the only viable response to the crisis, arguing for a never ending flow of people in Europe since 2014. This political party has been unique in a sense that in the beginning of the crisis they also expressed the importance of solidarity yet this changes radically in may 2015. Although that the content of the statements have been highly against solidarity for example in November 2014 many EFDD politicians called for measures in the countries of origin and transit countries as the only way to overcome the crisis.

Graph 6: EFDD group



Gerard Batten (EFDD): “Mr President, ... The unfortunate inhabitants of these countries now leave in droves by any means that they can. If we want to have a holistic approach to this problem, then it has to recognise the root cause, and the root cause is, of course, a fundamentalist and extremist interpretation of Islamic ideology, most notably expressed by the so-called Islamic State. The countries best placed to tackle the problem and with the money to do so are, of course, the vastly wealthy, oil-rich Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia, etc. These are the countries that should take these people because they

can afford it. They share similar cultures and the same religion” (European Parliament, nov 2014).

Nigel Farage : “We are guilty for this crisis, we are directly guilty for the drownings that are going on, and we are hypocrites in this place when we talk about poverty in Africa,...I am not blind to the human suffering that we have caused in many of these countries. I would call on this Parliament, this Commission to end the barriers to trade, to stop the fisheries policy, to ask the United Nations to get involved and to try and help. But the real question we face is: what are we to do? Are we to go down the Australian system in dealing with this crisis (and indeed the Australian Premier, Tony Abbott, has offered us his advice and help). Australia faced this and Australia not only have stopped the boats from coming, they have stopped people from drowning. But no, we are not interested in what the Australians have done; we have decided that we can deal with this on our own. So we decided that people can come and that people will not be sent back....But there is a real and genuine threat. When ISIS say they want to flood our continent with half a million Islamic extremists, they mean it, and there is nothing in this document that will stop those people from coming. Indeed, I fear we face a direct threat to our civilisation if we allow large numbers of people from that war-torn region into Europe”(European Parliament, April 2015).

There is a clear statement from this party representing the immediate need to focus on the security threat of the migration flow and possible consequences. From ISIS fighters being exported to Europe to the fact that the ones crossing oceans are mostly not refugees but rather economic migrants who are seeking only better socio-economical living situation. This political group welcomes the Australian style of managing the migrants which is basically returning and sending migrants that wish to reach Australia/Europe through smugglers and boats to a deserted island like Nauru. The Australian system has been criticized highly for breach of human rights and dismissing the human costs of this method.

According to the the data illustrated above and the various representation, it is quite evident that in late 2015 and early 2016 political parties choose to prioritise the security and border control; highlighting the importance of border control in order to manage the flow. PPE -graph 1- in April 2016 clearly express their support for safeguarding the border focusing on the security issues. Relating the importance of regaining control over migration to public concerns on security and legitimacy of EU as a whole.

Artis Pabriks (PPE). “Here is an example to take when looking at the migration crisis. Applying the method of deduction to the migration crisis shows the weaknesses of our current system and politics, which arose as a result of delaying foreign and security policy. It also shows the current weaknesses in our value system, our border-security system and in internal cooperation between different institutions, as well as weaknesses in the institutions themselves. If we really want to regain the trust of our citizens, we must be successful in solving the migration crisis...I see the upcoming file at Parliament on our border agency and more secure European external borders as a contribution to this holistic approach. This is because we cannot survive with our current values and

Schengen system of open internal borders without fixing our external borders” (European Parliament, April 2016).

Finally, it can be claimed how almost all politicians have shifted from ‘*problem solving*’ discourse to survival mode as sovereign states and sharper migration policies. Meaning that almost all MEPS represent the issue to be highly sensitive thus a matter of security in all aspects -economic, social and classical-, many even argue how migration should be solved through foreign policy measures.

4.2.3 International relations aspect: transit and origin countries

This theme illustrates the dramatic changes in 2016 and proposals for permanent measures, showing how the issue is then highly securitized and pushed back to the countries of origin, both due to economic and security/foreign policy reasons. Right after ‘*the closing border praxis*’ in late 2015 and early 2016, politicians begin to present the challenge a more of a foreign policy and security matter to be taken care of. This is quite visible from all political parties statements in June 2016. This argument is also touched upon on previous themes yet here I aim to describe how referring the problem back to the transit and country of origin have actually transformed migration policy to a matter of security.

Below there are four different examples of speeches given by various political parties on June 2016, where they address the suggestion on economic aid to third countries or countries of origin. A similar deal has been settled with Turkey -as a transit country- during spring 2016. It is clear below how even those who historically have supported solidarity with migrants, now can represent the solution to the crisis at the countries of origin solving the matter with international measures and with the objective to secure european borders.

Geoffrey Van Orden (ECR): “The current human-rights-driven agenda merely encourages migration. The pull factors of an open door, the near certainty of remaining once arrived on European soil, poor enforcement and repatriation, excessively generous welfare payments, and a legal straitjacket of international human rights conventions, are of far greater significance than the lack of physical barriers to migration (European Parliament, June 2016)”

Josep-Maria Terricabras (Verts/ALE): “Madam President, I fully agree that our response to the present humanitarian crisis in Europe should be a comprehensive. I agree that Africa should receive our increasing political consideration...We seem only interested in getting rid of present and future refugees. Of course, we are ready to pay to get rid of them...Apparently, we totally trust all African leaders – morally and economically.Without defence of human rights, without a strong democratic control on our own procedures and on our agreements with third countries, we are about to repeat all the mistakes made in the recent past (European Parliament, June 2016)”

Comparing the above two speeches both speakers see a clear reason on why there should be investment done on the country origin both in terms of long term goals and the political signals that will be sent to the migrants. There is also a clear focus on how these relationships with African and middle eastern countries should be monitored and eventually followed up, yet all agree on a comprehensive and unified cooperation through European Union. The content of the speech given by the Green Alliance political is far different from the ECR group, yet both have the consensus that the migration issue should be solved at the country of origin and that Europe cannot take in more migrants therefore the only way is to provide funding and closer international cooperations with these third countries.

Richard Howitt (S&D)-“I admit that the idea of a grand bargain with third countries to halt refugee flows is distasteful to many. You do not bargain over people’s lives. But let us face it, the EU has done precisely that....Finally, this communication on first reading does appear to fall into the trap of assuming that Europe in its external policy is much more effective as a funder than as a political actor. I praise the commitments in the communication to global diplomacy on migration, but would have liked to see more emphasis on the EU’s diplomatic role in conflict resolution, as well as on active efforts to ensure that human rights and international humanitarian law are upheld, not just saying it, but doing it. Nevertheless, I know that to be the personal commitment of the High Representative/Vice-President and on this and other issues she and First Vice-President Timmermans have our support (European Parliament, June 2016)”

Séan Kelly (PPE): “The idea of a new partnership agreement with Africa make sense, using trade and development policies as leverage and, of course, ensuring that aid goes to those who need it most, and also bringing order to chaos and having legal rather than illegal immigrants. All that is necessary. People might not like it, but I think it is necessary, as is, in particular, the emphasis that this is a global problem which, like COP 21, Europe cannot solve on its own. It can give leadership and hopefully, as was the case with COP 21, we can get a global agreement that will deal with the situation in the long term and, hopefully, end the migratory flows, especially for those who have to flee” (European Parliament, June 2016).

Here, the S&D representative is clear that with the suggestions at hand, Europe is just excusing itself pushing back to avoid the responsibility of migratory flows. This party has been traditionally fighting against the securitization of migration from 2015, arguing for that Europe should not allow this policy area to be exacerbated by the extreme right. Although that they are critical of this solution; that instead of taking migrants at home but rather invest on the development of the neighbouring underdeveloped countries, S&D is still supporting the idea arguing for their support of these relations. Additionally, the PPE group -having a strong power in the parliament and big number of MEPs- have changed course focusing in a higher extent on the country of origin leaving the matter to be solved through foreign policy and aid. Many argue that this is the right initial way to stop the desperation of many who flee, building infrastructures in their home countries so that they do not need to flee in the long run. Yet the

argument is not similar here, in June 2016 the parliament and the commission consider the only way to manage migration -as a security issue- is to have economic cooperations with third countries as well as transit countries to see to it that migrants cannot illegally cross border. Therefore, the proposition in hand in 2016 is not as of solidarity to these individuals yet a way to send the signal to migrants that EU is not welcoming asylum seekers and Europe prefer to contribute in your home countries. This is as our citizens (MEPs) consider border control and security more of importance than the human rights/human aspect of this crisis. This is a clear illustration of the securitization of migration, how power holders represent the us and them discourse in a way that is considered legitimate and accepted.

5. Conclusion


Migration is a highly heated debate in the today's european politics, being high in the agenda on the daily basis, discussed both by the media and politicians. This study aims to examine the research hypothesis, a case study of securitization; whether the migration discourse has been securitized since the migration crisis begun. Later 2015, as time passed this crisis escalated into an unbearable human tragedy. Still today many lose their lives wishing to reach european borders with the desire to seek protection. We have all heard stories on how families risk lives, spending their life-savings just to reach Europe. The migration phenomena entail diverse challenges and discussions, from economic advantages and or disadvantages, integration problematics to the human rights aspects. This study has then claimed that through the course of this time, migration has become securitized; as a result of the shift of political discourse within the european union.

Securitization is a process; if succeeded then politicians have gained the necessary right and attention from the audience to take '*extra-ordinary*' measures against the problem that is posing an '*existential-threat*' towards us as a community. Consequently, the discussion of '*us*' vs. '*them*' will be extended to the civil society, which can also lead to demands for extraordinary measures in a larger scale. The sequence of events and political discussions in 2015 have led to strong measures- both from the EU and member states- against the influx of people entering the Europe; such as closing borders and prioritizing the safeguarding of european integrity and borders. This crisis is considered as a unique event in the european history of migration, many consider it incomparable to any other migratory waves; as many neighbouring countries are facing war, conflicts and insecurities. The high number of migrants led to challenging the european receptioning capacities. Many politicians believed in 2014 and early 2015 that Europe can manage and will contribute to the humankind with taking in and welcoming people in despair. Yet this is to change dramatically in the end of 2015 and early 2016, migrants are being considered as socio-economic problems and threats to the european community both to the economy and the society in the longer run.

The research in hand, have examined '*securitization of migration policy area*', proving the claim that political shift has taken place. In doing so, a careful content analysis is carried out based on political debates on migration at the european parliament. European parliamentary clearly resonate the ongoing political discussions, having the political and social capital for convincing the audience. To avoid bias, here I have only used first hand material that encompasses the content displaying the political agenda. These speeches and political discussions are

interpreted into measurable units and finally mapped out in form of graphs presented in the analysis section. In the analysis section these results are discussed thoroughly confirming the study's claim that migration have become politicized and securitized in early 2016.

Graph 6: Solidarity



Making use of the overall picture of the data gathered, in graph 6 we can see how the discussion on migration have changed course. This graph illustrates a comparison of different political parties as well as the paradigm shift from 2014 to 2016. In November 2014 all political parties mutually represented the humanitarian aspect, reflecting on the human costs and the responsibilities that Europe bears. Later in June 2016 only ALDE from the liberal front and the green alliance from the conservative alliance still argue for the solidarity aspect and the rights of migrants. While other larger scale political parties such as EPP, S&D and the rest, represent the matter of a clear security and foreign policy area to be taken care of pushing back the problem to the countries of origin and transit (Graph 1 and 4). These figures and conclusions illustrate how migration has been securitized throughout this crisis through the ‘speech act’ approach; meaning that actors have chosen to represent migration as threat to the European community asking for extra-ordinary measures.

What we can conclude from these results is that European Migration crisis is a case of securitization leading to a paradigm shift for almost the majority of the politicians and power holder; when representing the matter. Consequently, migration is then highly disputed being mistaken or rather overrated in away that

no one wishes to take responsibility, yet has to be taken care of. But the real question remains, is migration truly a security issue? Migration is simply misunderstood or misrepresented being used as a way to blame each other or used in trade offs. This process normalises discussions on the discourse of ‘us and them’ represent by power holders escalate beliefs that some individuals -migrants- are threatening our normality, identity, life and culture.

5.1 proposals for continued research

In this research the objective has been to confirm migration as a case of securization within european union during the recent crisis; finding evidence that illustrate and prove this claim. Yet, this puzzle can be studies in various ways and certainly here there has been very specific and narrow study line, due to the limitations. Here the claim that migration is securitized is fully challenged yet the *how* and *why* has not been touched upon. How and why did migration come to be a security matter in rather such a short time? Which actors have played a role in manipulating the discourse besides the politicians. There is also room to focus and study the role of media in the process of securization. Media has played a comprehensive role in covering stories during this period of time. In many the local news and media of european countries, migration was broadcasted highly for consecutive months in 2015. It is worth mentioning a personal remark here; in Sweden migration was discussed in a very comprehensive way throughout 2015 reflecting on the high number of people and how politicians are going to react; this was not only related to the traditional and conventional media such as the television but also the social media. Generally, media plays a big role in our lives presenting what is important or not, having the political and social capacity to convince us that an issue is very threatening or not. Therefore, this is great opportunity and room to study the role of media in securitizing the migration during this crisis.

The other development possibilities is to study the role of the extreme right political parties and the public opinion in altering the political discussion on migration both at national politics and within the larger european political discourse. A viable example to the reflection on this proposal is the Brexit as well as radical changes in migrations laws in many member states in 2015. Analysts argue the reasons for Brexit as the politicisation of migration and the larger discussion on migrants; migration considered as threats in terms of socio-economic and cultural aspects. Here is great room to study the role of the extreme right political parties in different countries, as the extreme rights are gaining more political power and representation in many EU countries; France, Denmark, the Netherlands, and many more.

Finally, the ‘why and how’ can be developed focusing on the role of security threats and the events that have taken place during 2015-16. Looking at the

historical background of the issue, how historically migration is politicized being related with criminal activities and terrorism. Therefore, historical reviews on the events such as the attacks in Paris, Niece and Berlin can definitely give the possibility to examine the public opinion, the media coverage and eventually politicization of the area in a larger scale.

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8. Index

The following data have been extracted from the debates of the parliamentary debated on the issue of migration crisis and how to solve the issue in hand. In order to objectify the selectivity of the data, three speeches of every political party at each debate have been chosen randomly. This is as many smaller political parties do not have the chance to express themselves more than three times in a debate while larger political parties such as PPE be able to do this for more than ten times. In mapping out the following data, i have used the indicators examining the content. The focus has been on indicating these keywords even if the actual concept is not mentioned (qualitative analysis). Thus the number of time represent the number of times each concept is presented by the speaker or writer and which category they fall into.

PPE Nov 2014

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	1	11.11
Solidarity/ Rescue	6	66.66
Country of origin	1	11.11
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	1	11.11
Returns	0	0
Total	9	99.99 \approx 100

PPE April 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	2	20
Solidarity/ Rescue	5	50
Country of origin	1	10
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	1	10
Returns	1	10

Total	10	100
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PPE May 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	6	75
Country of origin	0	0
Security	1	12,5
Border control/frontex	1	0
Returns	0	12,5
Total	8	100

PPE Sep 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	1	14,28
Solidarity/ Rescue	6	85,71
Country of origin	0	0
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	7	99,99 ≈ 100

PPE March 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	
Solidarity/ Rescue	1	10
Country of origin	5	50
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	4	40
Returns	0	0
Total	10	100

PPE April 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	
Solidarity/ Rescue	2	25
Country of origin	0	0
Security	3	37,5
Border control/frontex	3	37,5
Returns	0	0
Total	10	100

PPE June 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	
Solidarity/ Rescue	0	0
Country of origin	6	60
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	2	20
Returns	2	20
Total	10	100

ALDE Nov 2014

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	6	66.66
Country of origin	1	11.11
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	2	22.22
Returns	0	0
Total	9	99.99 ≈ 100

ALDE April 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	5	62,5
Country of origin	1	12,5
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	2	25
Returns	0	0
Total	8	100

ALDE May 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	5	83.33
Country of origin	0	0
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	1	16.66
Returns	0	0
Total	6	100

ALDE Sep 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	4	80
Country of origin	1	20
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	5	100

ALDE March 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	2	33.33
Country of origin	0	0
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	4	66.66
Returns	0	0
Total	6	99.99 ≈ 100

ALDE April 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	2	25
Country of origin	0	0
Security	3	37,5
Border control/frontex	3	37,5
Returns	0	0
Total	8	100

ALDE June 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	2	28.57
Country of origin	3	42,85
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	2	28,57
Returns	0	0
Total	7	99.99 ≈ 100

ECR June 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	2	20
Solidarity/ Rescue	0	0
Country of origin	2	20
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	2	20
Returns	2	20
Total	10	100

ECR April 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	1	12,5
Solidarity/ Rescue	0	0
Country of origin	2	25
Security	1	12,5
Border control/frontex	2	25
Returns	2	25
Total	8	100

ECR march 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	1	16.67
Country of origin	0	0
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	4	66.66
Returns	1	16,67
Total	6	100

ECR september 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
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Economic/illegal migration	1	16,66
Solidarity/ Rescue	0	0
Country of origin	3	50
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	2	33,33
Returns	0	0
Total	6	99.99 = 100

ECR May 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	2	25
Solidarity/ Rescue	0	0
Country of origin	2	25
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	2	25
Returns	2	25
Total	8	100

ECR April 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	2	33.33
Solidarity/ Rescue	1	16,66
Country of origin	3	50
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	6	99.99 = 100

ECR nov 2014

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	1	14,28
Country of origin	4	57,14
Security	1	14,28
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	1	14,28
Total	7	99.98 ≈ 100

S&D nov 2014

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	4	80
Country of origin	0	0
Security	1	20
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	5	100

S&D april 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	4	66,66
Country of origin	0	0
Security	2	20
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	6	100

S&D may 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	4	66,66
Country of origin	0	0
Security	2	20
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	6	100

S&D sep 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	1	25
Solidarity/ Rescue	3	75
Country of origin	0	0
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	4	100

S&D march 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	3	75
Country of origin	0	0
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	1	25
Returns	0	33,33
Total	4	100

S&D april 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
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Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	3	37,5
Country of origin	2	25
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	3	37,5
Returns	0	0
Total	8	100

S&D june 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	3	60
Country of origin	2	40
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	5	100

ALE/Vert Nov 2014

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	1	20
Solidarity/ Rescue	4	80
Country of origin	0	0
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	5	100

ALE/Vert April 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	5	100
Country of origin	0	0
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	5	100

ALE/Vert May 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	1	20
Solidarity/ Rescue	4	80
Country of origin	0	0
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	5	100

ALE/Vert Sep 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	1	20
Solidarity/ Rescue	4	80
Country of origin	0	0
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	5	100

ALE/Vert March 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	2	66,66
Country of origin	0	0
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	1	33,33
Total	3	100

ALE/Vert april 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	1	25
Solidarity/ Rescue	2	50
Country of origin	1	25
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	4	100

ALE/Vert June 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	3	50
Country of origin	5	50
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	6	100

EFDD Nov 2014

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	3	50
Solidarity/ Rescue	1	16,66
Country of origin	2	33,33
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	6	100

EFDD Nov 2014

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	3	50
Solidarity/ Rescue	1	16,66
Country of origin	2	33,33
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	6	100

EFDD april 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	1	20
Solidarity/ Rescue	1	20
Country of origin	1	20
Security	2	40
Border control/frontex	0	0
Returns	0	0
Total	5	100

EFDD may 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	0	0
Country of origin	1	25
Security	1	25
Border control/frontex	2	50
Returns	0	0
Total	4	100

EFDD sep 2015

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	2	40
Solidarity/ Rescue	0	0
Country of origin	2	40
Security	0	0
Border control/frontex	1	20
Returns	0	0
Total	6	100

EFDD march 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	1	25
Country of origin	0	0
Security	2	50
Border control/frontex	1	25
Returns	0	0
Total	4	100

EFDD april 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	1	25
Country of origin	0	0
Security	2	50
Border control/frontex	1	25
Returns	0	0
Total	4	100

EFDD june 2016

Concept	Number of times	Percent
Economic/illegal migration	0	0
Solidarity/ Rescue	0	0
Country of origin	1	14,28
Security	4	57,14
Border control/frontex	2	28,57
Returns	0	0
Total	7	100

The uncounted groups are : GUE/NGL: 52, ENF=39 , NI=19