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WELFARE MAGNETISM IN SWEDEN AND DENMARK

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Abstract

This study agrees with previous research on the welfare magnetism for immigrants in generous welfare states compared to those with less generous welfare provisions. This study does not stop at just agreeing with the positive previous research of welfare magnetism, this thesis' focus is to present other important factors when dealing with forced immigrants movement choice. In this study case; asylum seekers, not only generous welfare benefits of a country attract forced immigrants, but a combination of immigration policies, networks(social media) and generous welfare provisions attract forced immigrants to a particular country compared to another. This thesis conducted the study by comparing Sweden and Denmark which fall under the same welfare model(Social-democratic) by using secondary sources; mostly recent newspaper articles and government publication statistics. The study concluded that most asylum seekers preferred applying to Sweden compared to Denmark due to their network information, more generous welfare provisions and more welcoming immigration policies in Sweden compared to Denmark. Despite the fact that, both these countries offer generous welfare provisions compared to other countries in the other two welfare models.

Keywords: International migration, Welfare magnetism migration, Europe, immigration policy, networks, Sweden and Denmark welfare model, Syrian asylum seekers and social media.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

EU - Europe

UN - United Nations

OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

WWII - World War Two

GMDAC - Global Migration Data Analysis Centre

IOM - International Organisation for Migration

1. Introduction

1.1 Research question

How crucial is the generosity of the welfare state as a “pull” factor in influencing the migration decision of Syrian asylum-seekers within the same welfare model (Social-democratic) in particular Sweden compared to Denmark?

1.2 Motivation

When you look at the UN report of 2013, which describes international migration as, “persons living outside their country of birth” (United Nations, 2013a), presented how international migration is at its extreme especially in Europe, by an increased number of people than at all times staying out of the country. This including both forced and voluntary migrants. The UN report supported this claim by showing the suggest figures of 232 million of

the population of the world in 2013 were immigrants as to 175 million in 2000 and 154 Million in 1990 (United Nations, 2013a).

When looking at the Eurostat figures, it shows the increased growth of population in the European Union(EU) since the 1960s to current; showing the EU-27 population growth of inhabitants in 2011 was raised by 100 million more people compared to 402.6 million in 1960. Whereby 32% of the population raise was due to natural increase and 68% remainder was a result of net-migration increase which remains as the primary root of population build-up and as of January 2012, it was estimated 503.7Million, a rise of 1.3 Million people from prior (Eurostat, 2013).

While according to EU-28, in the early January 2016, the habitant population was estimated to be at 510.1 million, which was 1.8 million greater than the previous year. EU-28 population enlarged by 1.8 million throughout 2015, whereby the population increase was unfairly spread over the EU members states:17 member states observed a rise in their respective population compared to others, these countries being Luxembourg, Austria, Germany, Malta and Sweden which registered the topmost population development ratio with an increase above 10.0 per 1000 persons in 2015 due to net-migration particularly from the high inflow of asylum seekers(Eurostat, 2016).

When looking at the asylum statistics(2 march, 2016), focusing on applicants from citizens of EU non-members, there was a gradual increase

in the number of asylum application within the EU-27 and later the EU-28 through to 2012, after which the numbers rose to 431 thousands in 2013, 627 thousands in 2014 and close to 1.3 million in 2015. Syrians accounting for the largest number of applicants in 12 of the EU-28 member states. Sweden among other few like Germany in EU-28 received very large increases applicants between 2014 and 2015 compared to Denmark (Eurostat, 2016).

1.3 Hypothesis

The welfare magnet hypothesis was first introduced in a seminar paper by Borjas, which speaks of how welfare generosity of a country or state acts as a “pull” factor for migration and how it influences the skill composition of immigrants. Precisely, this hypothesis states that, immigrants prefer to settle in countries with generous welfare provisions to secure themselves against labor market risks (Borjas, 1999). This paper will agree in accordance with Giulietti and Wahba(2012) understanding of the hypothesis where they suggests that, more generous welfare countries could attract immigrants who alternatively would have not immigrated and that the presence of social safety nets might also hold fast immigrants who would have if not returned to their origin country (Giulietti and Wahba, 2012).

1.4 Aim and structure

Due to most studies on welfare migration focusing on either voluntary migration or both voluntary and forced welfare migration at the same time mostly in the United State with a few studies on Europe focusing on only welfare benefits as an added “pull” factor for migration reasons. This paper focusing on Europe; Sweden and Denmark in particular during the time frame of 2012 up to 2015, where Europe saw its largest forced migration influx since WWII (Eurostat, 2016). This analysis will concentrate on only forced migration(asylum-seekers) arguing that it is true as stated in the hypothesis for both the forced and voluntary set of migration being attracted mostly by the most giving welfare states and that in some way or the other, all immigrants are acquainted with good information of their target country beforehand to migrating for either work or asylum (Samuel, 2014). Furthermore this paper will try to show that when it comes to forced migration, it is not only the welfare benefits that should be added to the migration “pull” factors, but instead a interaction of both welfare benefits, networks (social media) and the immigration policies of one country greatly influence forced migrants` decision making to migrate to one country compared to the other.

This paper will do so by first, clarifying the difference in the welfare typologies: the corporatist/conservative (France), the liberal (UK) and the social- democratic/Scandinavian/Nordic welfare regime in order to better understand why some countries are more preferable than others. However the Social-democratic model which will be the main focus of this paper due to agreeing with previous research that, the most attractive welfare states

for asylum-seekers is the Scandinavian regime due to its generosity in welfare provisions (Schulzek, 2012). Just as this study will show in chapter 4 where the Scandinavian model will be compared to the other two typologies.


However, this study too will compare Sweden and Denmark from the same typology; Scandinavian welfare regime. In order to show that however much a state has generous welfare provisions, the state's immigration policies together with networks greatly influence the choice of forced migration decisions. Therefore, this study has chosen to compare these two countries because they are similar in many ways; historically, relatively homogenous population, strong egalitarian values and comparatively generous welfare model, yet they have chosen rather differing immigration policies (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012: 2) which will give a good comparison for this study.

This paper's` point of departure is thus; the comparison of two countries that, in most internationally comparative contexts are placed within the same welfare state regime: the Scandinavian/ Social-democratic/ Nordic model (Esping-Andersen, 1990). So meaning many similarities as mentioned above, but this study focusing on mainly there generous welfare provisions.

The illustration below shows the percentage in 2015 of forced migrants; asylum seekers by their first time of registration in the different European

states. Showing the study's` focus group(Syrian asylum seekers) as the largest forced migrant group.

First time asylum seekers in the EU Member States by country of citizenship, 2015



* Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244/99.

Source: (Eurostat, 2016).

1.5 Study Limitation

This study just like any other study, has its limitation. The main one being representation: due to this study being conducted on only one welfare model (Social-democratic), the findings in the other two models might be hard to know and due to the time period chosen (2012-2015) if put under different time period like from 2016 different results might show due to a lot of changes in the government laws. The other limitation being the scope of materials used for this research: mainly being based on pooled data from various web sources, literature review, images and one newspaper, different findings could be found if the same study is researched under different qualitative or quantitative methods. However i believe the study area of this paper can still be clearly understood by using the materials used in this study.

2. Previous Research

Due to the considerable variation of numbers of economic migrants(voluntary) and asylum applicants(forced) inflows in Europe, the question whether welfare benefits pull immigrant to certain countries and not others is relevant especially when it comes to the category of asylum seekers. Due to little or no research done on comparison of two countries under the same welfare regime, Previous research is conducted mainly on the US and fewer on EU about welfare magnetism within the decision making process for immigrants to migrate. Some studies show contradicting results as we shall see below.

The reason for the contradicting results according to Schulzek(2012), is because these studies fail to put a clear definition of immigrants despite being voluntarily or forced (Schulzek, 2012). Instead just take both groups as a collective group such as Borjas(1999) and Morissons (2008) study, yet what still sets these two immigration groups apart is vital for the assessment of welfare impact on immigration because their motives to migrate are not similar. (ibid: 2012).Nevertheless according to Böcker and Havinga(1998), Peterson(1970), they formed the first distinction of approved immigration on voluntary and forced migration ground. Yet up until now,

“... there are little cross-references between scholars concerned with labour-migration flows, on the one hand, and those interested in refugee flows, on the other hand” (Böcker and Havinga, 1998: 14).

Despite the contrary, Borjas (1999), establisher of the welfare magnets study who greatly motivated the discourse in relation to the effect of welfare on immigration, claims to have found empirical support both for the negative self-selection of immigrants as a whole and for the welfare magnet impacts with regards to immigration in the US and concludes that welfare structures draw attention towards immigrants. He continues to reason that, the choice of migrant's destination correspond certainly with the divers levels of welfare provisions in individual states in the US (Borjas, 1999: 608-616). However, his study is based on the US evidence where indirect and direct cost associated with moving to another state may be lower when compared to European countries with diverse linguistic, cultural barriers

and bureaucratized immigration regimes across EU countries which may pose additional constraints for the intra-EU mobility of both native and immigrant population (Ryndyk, 2013).

Robinson and Segrott(2002) qualitative study, describes how forced migrants make no choice of journey`s end at all due to most asylum seekers using travel agencies, decide their destination choices.

Furthermore, this writers concluded that chance, language similarities, shared past colonial ties, security, financial constraints and networks of friends and family, throw light upon the goal countries of involuntary migrants compared to welfare provisions (Robinson and Segrott, 2002: 1-2). This being our departure point on networks as an additional “pull” factor in this study.

In another way, the qualitative research of Zavodny (1999), Thielemann (2008) and Böcker and Havinga (1998), prove welfare magnet facts for asylum seekers (Schulzek, 2012: 5), where Zavodny (1999) study, displays that stateless people are attracted by greater welfare benefits so does Thielemann (2008), who documents that, until when the asylum case has been dealt with, the constraints to work has important downside effect on the corresponding amount of involuntary migrants in OECD countries (ibid: 6).

Brücker et al(2002), in theirs analysis on non-EU immigrants in 11 EU countries began similarly to that of Borjas(1999),with a simple theoretical model that shows benefit is a deciding element of immigrants when

choosing area preference. Particularly it shows how less-skilled individuals variously are more likely to reside in nations which provide greater welfare programmes (Brücker et al, 2002). However, just like Borjas, Brücker et al study, mention that immigration location decisions can also be motivated by factors like the presence of ethnic networks in destination country, by which the simple predictions of the model can be weak (Barrett, 2012). When we look at Boeri(2010), who appraises some of the elements of Brücker et al(2002), when he looks at the relationship between the generosity of social spending and the skill composition of immigrants across countries and he finds that total social expenditure is much tied up with a lower-skilled immigrant inflow, nevertheless, he also finds out that specific forms of payment like; active labour market programmes and unemployment benefits come into sight to be associated with higher skilled inflows (Barrett, 2012).

The study of De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2006), too just like that of Borjas (1999), examined the issue of whether immigrant location decisions are determined by the welfare generosity allowances. Just like Brücker et al (2002), they also used the European Community Household Panel data covering the years of 1994-2001 in 14 countries. The model considered the interplay within and among variables along with individuals characteristics, whereby they involved measurements of unemployment, wage and generosity benefits across destinations for the year each immigrant made their location choice. De Giorgi and Pellizzari conclusion was that, welfare provisions act in the determining country choice process of immigrants.

Nevertheless their study demonstrates that, the effect is small particularly when considered in regards to the impact of wages (De Giorgi and Pellizzari, 2009).

Lastly this paper will look at a semi-recently study by Giulietti et al (2011) which aimed at finding evidence for existence of welfare magnet in EU. Their study took an angle of looking for a correlation between spending on unemployment benefits across countries and the rates of immigrant inflow, without taking specific account of skill composition of the inflow. They use data from 19 European countries over the period of 1993- 2008 in order to examine whether there is a relationship between spending on unemployment benefits and the rate of immigrant inflow. The concluded results of the correlation among these variable lead to the evidence of welfare magnetism (Giulietti et al., 2011).

3. Methodology and ethical issues

Traditionally, quantitative and qualitative methodologies are broadly considered literature research methods to belong to two specific research practice. Quantitative research being all about accumulation and examining numerical data: a orderly experimental determination of social development by way of numerical, statistical and mathematical techniques, which sets up designs, builds assumptions and tries out the hypotheses of the “development” and it is interested in the root cause (Bryman, 2016: 149-191). According to Givens(2008), commonly information acquired for purposes in quantitative research design, are traced back from some

conduct of qualitative work like interviews, surveys and so forth (Givens, 2008). Hence ethical issues may arise in numerous areas during the process for the quantitative research: from data accumulation, to the phrasing of the research question and the method which the data gathered is reported and analyzed (Bryman, 2016: 162-168).

On the other hand, qualitative research is used in various academic disciplines, although commonly in the social sciences which objective goal is to attain full-scale knowledge of people conduct and their reasoning to their behaviour. It does this through looking within the action of decision making

pursuing to understand why, what, where, when and how to reveal meaning and develop the idea of the observations of the research subordinates

(Givens, 2008). From the previous research, it shows that studies on welfare magnet effects are carried out qualitatively or quantitatively, although there is a powerful draw towards qualitative methods in this model field for the reason that, according to Thielemann(2008) states, “who else than the migrants themselves know which factors pulled them to migrate” (Thielemann, 2008: 448).

Nevertheless, the systematic analysis of qualitative method established upon interviews if conducted would have needed a carefully elaborated standardized procedure which is both expensive and labour exhausting,

but mostly this study did not choose qualitative approach due to the sensitivity of the migration group(asylum-seekers) chosen being difficult to get in touch with, due to security reasons. Furthermore because interviews might be conflictingly biased as asylum-seekers may abstain from replying truthfully with worry of being deported. Concurrently there might be a problem of generalisation if interviews are conducted with a small number of individuals at a certain organisation or locality and that researcher's bias will be included in and inevitable (Bryman, 2016: 398-399).

Therefore, this study will apply a descriptive analytical approach because according to De Vaus(2001), a good descriptive research is important to the research conduction enterprise and it has built-up considerably to our understanding of the society character and structure(De Vaus, 2001).

Therefore this study will use the help of pooled data acquired from a variety of sources like GMDAC, IOM, EUROSTAT, MercyCorps, migration agencies, and secondary data from government publications reports along with newspaper articles from `The Local`. The reason why i choose this newspaper is because it contains news from both Sweden and Denmark and it is written in English which eases my understanding better compared to many newspapers in Sweden and Denmark written in their native languages

4. Theoretical framework and migration

According to IOM(2015)definitions, Migration is the movement of a person or group of persons either across an international border or within a state

which includes migration of refugees, economic migrants, displaced persons, persons moving for other purposes including family reunification. While forced migration is a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes for example movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, famine, development projects and chemical or nuclear disasters (IOM, 2015).

4.1 The Push and Pull model

This model by Lee(1966) using Ravenstein's(1885) initial work as motivation, making no differentiation between forced and voluntary nature of migration nor either inward or outward migration, Lee hypothesised an idea known as 'push' `pull` design. This is among the mostly famous universal migration theory, which takes on a neoclassical approach emphasizing a diverse push and pull factors that determine the movement of migration. Lee suggests that these push and pull factors are present forces in the country of origin that push migrants such as war, whereas factors related to the destination country pull the migrants such as, economic, social factors and intervening events and personal features of the individuals interfere in the midst of these sets of barriers, is the "distance of move which is always present" (Lee, 1966: 49).

Table below showing some of the push and pull factors with three added factors for this study which will be highlighted.

PUSH FACTORS (Home country)	PULL FACTORS (Destination Country)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Not enough jobs ● Political fear or persecution ● forced labour ● Discrimination ● Desertification ● Famine ● War ● Death threats ● Desire for more political or religious freedom 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Family links ● Job opportunities ● Education ● Better living conditions ● Attractive climates ● The feeling of having more political and/or religious freedom ● “Generous welfare provisions” ● “Immigration policy” ● “Social media”

This paper will argue in line with Thielemann(2008) argument, that the push and pull model was formed with regards to economic migration, therefore it has its disadvantages. However it does provide some wisdom for research on forced migration (Thielemann, 2008) which is the focus of this study, therefore this thesis will have it as its starting point.

4.2 Network migration

Generally, this theory being applied to economic(voluntary) migrants, as that they their home country in pursuit of a new country in which case migrants receive better salaries, get better chances of employment, greater political freedoms and improved standards of living through search for ethnic enclaves. Just as Mincer(1978) argues, that family ties have an important bearing on people's migration through easing the channels of

change of residence by providing means of entry, sharing knowledge how the country operates along with its labour market (Kaushal, 2005).

According Böcker and Havinga(1998), many players can collect information about the goal country through: family ties, television, development workers, tourist, soldiers, internet (Böcker and Havinga 1998: 51). On this point, similar to Thielemann(2008), this paper argues that, asylum seekers together with economic migrants (voluntary) are well acquainted about their place of destination and that, they “render a rational cost-benefit analysis about access, determination and integration/welfare measures” (Thielemann, 2008: 447). Just like this study shows that asylum seekers have enough knowledge where to seek asylum before their arrival to specific countries of settlement.

4.3 Three models of welfare regimes

Welfare states according to Esping-Andersen(1996), are concepts built on the idea that the state should care for and push for social and economic welfare of its residents basing on standards of; even wealth diffusion, fairness for all citizens and account for all people not able to make their living situation meet the minimum standards of that country (Esping-Andersen, 1996). He continues to state that, a welfare state is a rare blend of capitalism and welfare which initially was developed as a bureaucratic projection of forming nation that supported the proclamation to liberal government opposing socialism and unlimited rule. Therefore the

welfare state vowed to administer a universal equal fairness and unity of all and this offered a beam of hope and faith in the war periods (ibid, 1996). Hence, many countries after that, announced to be welfare states to uphold people's social unification (Samuel, 2014). However according to Esping-Andersen(1990), welfare states bear to be acknowledged as structures of social laying and not partial as means for providing benefits to the deprived (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Therefore, he created three separate welfare typologies in line with their properties: corporatist/conservative, liberal and social-democratic as shown below.

4.3.1 The Corporatist/Conservative welfare regime

This type of regime is common amongst the European countries like France, Germany, Austria, Ireland, Italy and according to Hilson(2008), this regime has a medium degree of decommodification whereby it is influenced by the authoritarian conservative states and Catholic church for example the Bismarck welfare model. Under this regime there is state dominated provision of social welfare programs that depend on the family as major co-provider where the key role of social protection entitlements is tied to individual employment status. Hence welfare structures foster unify present social systems. This regime is consisted of semi-exclusive system based on the traditional family and `male- breadwinner´ model, and a limited degree of defamilisation; where women are viewed as care-providers (Samuel, 2014).

Just as according to Scruggs´ (2006) argument, that customary patterns of family partnership in the conservative regimes were strengthened by

solacing single income families using great taxation on dual earnings which lead to discouraging of female labour-force attendance. Therefore this regime does not look for equality, rather social security allowances which are connected to the work force market benefits which accumulate with length of coverage and age, where wage is accurate and the pay is a must. Hence conservative welfare regimes arouse migration mostly through labour (Samuel, 2014).

4.3.2 The liberal welfare regime

This regime includes countries like, United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Japan, New Zealand. Here, this regime is consisted of low degree of de-commodification with employment based social insurance and targeted social assistance to the poor, market-dominated provision of regressive and targeted policy programs, exclusive and individualistic system; where the poor depend on means-tested and state-provided social security and the non-poor on market on insurance schemes or public services. The state minimizes the impacts of de-commodification and reproduce market dependency with social safety net for those unable to compete in the market by covering the basic lowest benefits to persevere (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This resulting into according to Samuel(2014), a divided nation of two kinds where the poor are condemned and the average income earners instead divert to the private sector in order to receive higher benefit achievements. In this regime, immigrants` way to social

safety provisions alike to other population, is based on their fee of social security contribution and their taking part in the work force (Samuel, 2014).

4.3.3 Social-democratic/Scandinavian/ Nordic welfare regime

This model is consisted of countries like Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland. This form of regime, is established upon rich transfer fee, where principles of universalism and social rights based on citizenship are the layout of this sort of regime. Mostly it's known for its considerable social allowances for all social categories and exemplify equality of the highest standards. Welfare is funded particularly by public taxation, a strong state involvement; functioning workforce policy making; well-established gender fairness policies and a high scope of de-commodification and de-familisation through social programmes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Therefore according to Hilson(2008), “Scandinavian models are not merely safety nets for those less fortunate” (Samuel, 2014: 42). Due to this regime being highly wealthy distributed, securing the greatest level of electing support and high levels of service of the welfare nation from its people. Therefore this regime managed to create a unification of economic effectiveness and social fairness (ibid, 2014).

Due to the regime descriptions above, asylum seekers according to Schulzek(2012), should be greatly drawn by social-democratic welfare states due to their great levels of welfare benefit allowances with fewer conditions. While attraction of asylum seekers to the corporatist welfare states should be lesser because welfare benefits up to the final decision


are limited in contrary to the social-democratic regime. In addition, Schulzek continues to argue that, when it comes to the liberal regime, the states have a negative effect on the place asylum seekers want to settle due to social benefits on the whole being lower (Schulzek, 2012: 13). Hence this paper using the social-democratic model as a study bases for the current inflow of asylum seekers in EU.

Using the illustration below, this paper tries to prove the point of the welfare magnetism for forced migrants(Asylum-seekers) in the three different countries which fall under different welfare regimes.

A comparison graph for the welfare regime countries respectively

Total First Time Asylum Application Numbers 2014 - 2015.

Graphs may be created by selecting reporting countries using the boxes on the right of the screen.



Source:GMDAC,2015


However the impacts of welfare is different for voluntary migrants and asylum seeker migrants, as according to Menz(2008) economic migrants having a better chance at attaining work after arriving in their goal countries through being opted for by companies or point-based enrollment system, guest-worker schemes while as asylum seekers who flee their homes are probably being banned from laboring or even no knowledge of working opportunities in host countries, therefore they mostly rely upon welfare programmes due to this provisions frequently related to workforce participation (Menz, 2008: 395).

5. Discussion and Results

First, according to Samers(2010), the common definition of asylum-seekers and refugees are mostly confused, an asylum-seeker is a migrant who enters a country either by legal or illegal means and then request asylum (Samers, 2010). However according to UNHCR (2015), an asylum-seeker might also be someone who claims to be a refugee, but whose claim is yet to be validated. Therefore a person might request asylum from outside of the country hence entering the country as an asylum-seeker. Whereby later the person may or not be granted asylum or refugee status by the national government which decision is based on their predation of the 1951 Geneva Convention and the succeeding 1967 protocol (Imner, 2015: 12).

Historically, according to the Local newspaper, on 4 January Sweden hosted a hug number of asylum seekers along with the largest number per capita among OECD countries in 2013 (Local, 2016). When looking at the figures at the swedish migration site(migrationsverket: 2015), Sweden got 160,000 asylum requests in 2015, which showed a sharp development from 80,000 applicants in 2014. The largest five country group of asylum applicants in order coming from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea and Somalia, of which 35,000 of 160,000 applicants were from children travelling alone. Of all these five countries, Syria being the leading country in asylum applicant, it showed in 2014 a rise from 30,583 to 51,338 the next year, an increase of 68% asylum applicants compared to 18,000 in Denmark (Library of congress, 2016).

As the illustration below show, Syrian being the largest refugee population in the world.



Source: (MercyCorps, 2016)

5.1 Welfare provisions

Sweden as well as Denmark both fall under the same welfare regime typology: Social-democratic as described by (Esping-Andersen, 1990), making both countries to fall under the generous welfare model. Both this

countries having a concept of universalism, where their welfare schemes like social assistance include its whole population including the immigrants legally living in the country which include asylum applicants (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). However even if both these countries provide generous welfare provisions to asylum seekers, they differ to some extent as seen below.

According to the Swedish Migration Agency's website, during the applicant's period, they are entitled to free housing if they can not arrange it themselves, financial support which is meant up of daily sum in order to meet their regular costs like telephone costs which financial help is not recovered in case of person's asylum application is denied. In addition, the applicants are granted access to dental care and health care that can not be postponed but minor's share similar rights just like the Swedish citizen children. Asylum seekers are legally allowed to attend school whereby in 2015, the Swedish minister for Education Gustav Fridolin announced a legislative bill that prioritizes asylum seekers in schools over regular citizens. Finally, Sweden has travel limits anticipating asylum seekers from going back to their homelands, where by in case of lack of passport, they are provided with alien's passport. This was until the change in the law in 2014 (Library of Congress, 2016).

Just like in Sweden, asylum applicants in Denmark are entitled to welfare benefits like provision for living expenses by the immigration services, where they receive cash allowances for clothes, personal hygiene, food

unless food is freely provided by a cafeteria in the centre where they live, child education, accommodation at an asylum centre, education and other activities for adult asylum seekers, necessary healthcare and social initiative (Danish immigration Agency, 2016). Finally asylum seekers receive transport costs to and from meetings with officials, health care providers and so forth. Nevertheless, in Denmark if the asylum seeker is married to a person legally residing in Denmark, the asylum seeker's spouse is required to support him/her. However, since the DPP(Danish People's Party) secured more than a fifth of the seats in parliament, which made it the second largest political party of the nation, it managed to push for harsh cuts to welfare services for asylum seekers and immigrants (ibid, 2016). This lead to less welfare provision to immigrants compared to before.

Hence the illustration below showing that asylum seekers look for countries with more generous welfare benefits by not wanting to settle in Denmark and heading for Sweden instead.



Tens of thousands of migrants have passed through Denmark to enter Sweden during 2015 and 2016, attracted by Sweden's generous welfare payments and free housing.

Source: Gatestone institution by (Pour, 2016).

5.2 Immigration policy

As seen above, both countries falling under the same regime, both offering generous welfare provisions to asylum seekers although to different extents. Nevertheless their degree of asylum applicants varies. This paper argues that, this could be due to immigration policies taken up accordingly and agreeing with Barthel and Neumayer(2014) , who argue that,

“western policy-makers can use a multitude of policy levers to render their country less attractive for asylum seekers, such as restriction on welfare benefits and employment opportunities, increasing the risk of being rejected due to low recognition rates,

providing limited opportunities for appealing against a decision and raising the threat of forced removal” (Barthel and Neumayer, 2014: 1136-1137).

On this point, This paper will agree with the above, just like according to Traub's (2016) arguments, Sweden compared to Denmark has received ample applicants of asylum-seekers due no barriers put forth by officials to limit the increase of applicants and due to swedes being more helpful towards outsiders. For example, eager free willers hang around the Stockholm and Hyllie train station in order to help new arrivals where they were also greeted by several police officials who were unarmed and escorted them upstairs to buses that transported them to the Migration Agency office in Malmo, this kind treatment was the opposite in Denmark (Traub, 2016). This making Sweden a better choice for asylum seekers compared to Denmark.

Since Sweden has usually understood the ethics for asylum more better compared to Denmark, in 2005 Sweden acknowledged those escaping persecution by governments and non-state actors and permitted all asylum seekers to bring in all their family relatives, although in 2016 the law has been tightened see more in (Migration Agency Sweden, 2016). Just as we see in The Local (2016), that Sweden permitted residency permits to close family relatives of those already allowed as asylum migrants unlike Denmark which only allowed family reunification if a refugee's first year residency permit was extended (The Local, 2016).


Still from The Local, Swedish migration authority ruled on 3 september-2013 that, all Syrian asylum seekers who have come to Sweden will be given permanent stay permits due to the escalating problems in Syria. This making Sweden the prime country in EU to rule to offer permanent residency to all Syrian refugees. While Denmark launched temporary one year permits instead for Syrian refugees and with the aim of transporting them back to Syria when the circumstances become better (The Local, 2016).

Last but not least, Denmark among other laws, orders for age-testing using measurements of bone density due to many claims inflows of asylum seekers minors in EU, because the immigration policies on minors are lenient compared to those for adults. However in Sweden doctors have greatly refused to apply the test due to morals (Traub, 2016). Therefore Sweden took in more asylum seekers(163,000) in 2015 compared to Denmark(18,000) due to Denmark's track record of taking on some of the strongest immigration policies in Europe (The Local, 2016).

The illustration below shows the total asylum applicants by sex and age in EU, but this paper`s focus being Sweden which is number (4) from top on the graph and Denmark number (9).

Total Asylum Applications by Sex and Age 2015

Total asylum applications compared to age groups.
Use the drop-down menus on the right to select specific combinations of sex and citizenship.
Q4 figures are not final yet.



Source:GMDAC, 2015

5.3 Networks (Social media)

Due to the increase of social media, many asylum seekers increasingly get information on which countries favour their migration move. According to Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke(2015), policy announcements as well as creative use of social media, this might have created a new enabling “pull” factor. They go on to argue that, some individuals who had formerly opposed to leaving may feel encouraged by news of their fellow citizens having successfully arrived in Europe. Besides that, they see reports of countries like Germany and Sweden granting status to most Syrians who

make it to their territory alongside with clues on how to navigate the journey and how to obtain critical services upon arrival in the host countries (Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke, 2015). Hence all immigrants (forced and voluntary) having enough knowledge of their destination country before arrival and many others influenced to migrate too.

The illustration below is to show what is discussed above.



Source:(Migration Policy Center, 2016).

Just like social media quickly spreads the “success” stories, the opposite is the same, where it spreads the negativity on asylum seekers in some countries like Denmark. According to Traub(2016), Denmark posted ads in Arabic language newspapers warning asylum seekers of not being accepted plus its new strict immigration laws (Traub, 2016). This lead to a drop in asylum seekers in Denmark compared to Sweden, which proves that many immigrants have enough knowledge prior their travel.

6. Conclusion

This study first, agreed with positive findings of welfare magnetism in previous research conducted, through the descriptions of the three different welfare models. This paper went on to argue that, when it is about forced migration and in this paper's case (asylum seekers), generous welfare benefits only can not explain the choice of choosing one country over the others. Then this paper tried to explain this by comparing Sweden and Denmark which both countries fall under the same generous welfare model (Social-democratic) and the inflow of Syrian asylum seekers which results show that most Syrian asylum seekers preferred Sweden compared to Denmark despite their both generous welfare benefits, due to Sweden offering slightly more provisions and less conditions. Therefore this paper argues that generous welfare of a state alone can not influence the asylum seeker's decision where to migrate but an interplay of immigration policies of a country, network (social media) and generous welfare benefits go hand in hand. Therefore this paper urges more researcher in the future who look at researching welfare magnetism of forced migration to compare two or more countries in the same welfare model in the future.

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