

Humans as a terrain

- A connection between human terrain systems and neoliberalism

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Abstract

This thesis tries to connect how the human terrain system is a development of neoliberalism that anthropologists need to consider. I have explained how the history of anthropology has always have had a connection with the military. The problem with anthropology is that anthropologists need a consent from the informants that they use, and this is harder if they use ethnographical methods in a war zone. What some anthropologists argue as a problem is that policy-makers are using a western bias which is founded in human rights which takes no position to the cultural relativity of the region that external parties are trying to stabilize. What I have tried to do is show arguments from both sides and discuss towards my solution. My solution is that anthropologists need to sit down and discuss a new method for how to use applied anthropology.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Aim and Background

This paper is a study of the US military strategic policy called “the human terrain system” (HTS). I will go into further detail what this means, how it is used and the critique of it. The interest in this subject is based on my intention to work alongside law enforcement or military in order to create a safer environment for all parties. There are many social aspects to the HTS. It is very important to remember the civilian part in war. Another aspect is that the people actually fighting the war also have commitments, to jobs and to families. The idea of the HTS is based on the assumption that conflicts can be solved without violence and that there are other viable conflict resolutions such as embargo humanitarian intervention to mention a few. The focus of this study is the problems the human terrain system can bring when implemented in war zones and what its usage is.

Once the HTS was implemented, it expanded fast from the start of six teams which later became twenty-six teams after a short period of time. These teams were implementing the HTS in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the HTS has also received critique from many, including the American Anthropological Association (AAA) which has made critical remarks on the problematic relationship between the military and anthropology. According to the AAA anthropology is not meant to be used in a military context and it is against the code of research ethics to use the cultural knowledge accumulated by these teams in warfare. Since research ethics have been for a long time, and is continuously, a controversial subject within anthropology, this study aims at bringing up how anthropologists are dealing with this ethical problem.

The problem when studying a field with more than one party is that the intention of one party could be different from the interest of the field (host)¹. It brings out the questions on the true intentions and the methods used to gather the intelligence - a main concern by

¹ I am referring to Erving's (2000) use of the term host. The idea of the term host is to further precise the connection between all the parties in applied anthropology. Host is a word used to describe the research subject or the field. Host insinuates the idea that the people being researched are hosting the anthropologist which is a description of the relationship between the informants and the anthropologist.

anthropologists who are critical of applied anthropology. But companies have for long been involved in research. In the medical sciences it is common to be funded by an interested party rather than being completely funded by researcher institutes. It would be interesting to explore this and look at why ethics in social sciences is of such an importance.

It would be interesting to explore how the policy to use anthropologists has made an impact on the relationship between the government in the US and the AAA. I have used the thoughts of Susan Wright and Chris Shore (1997) and her theory of policy making in order to bring a more complex discussion around the involvement of anthropology in war-zones or otherwise active zones. I have used applied anthropology to analyze and collect the data that I have used in the discussions.

The intention is, in a heated debate, to shed some new light on the collaboration between anthropology and the HTS. It is presented what the purpose is with HTS and how it is being used. The intention is to explain the positive effects of using the HTS and I have tried to present some of the critique against HTS. My aim can be summarized in two key points;

1. This is a study on the anthropological discussions on what is called the HTS used by the US Military in Afghanistan and Iraq. How was HTS being used more concretely and what is the critique against the usage of it? How did HTS develop out of the context of neoliberalism and how are those two connected?
2. Another aim of the study is to discuss what role anthropology can play, in the form of applied anthropology, in doing practical and concrete work outside academia. Is this possible or even something anthropologists should involve themselves in?

1.2 Disposition

- **4.0** Usually it is not suggested to include history when doing anthropological research if it does not have any relevance to the thesis. In this case I do believe that the history of HTS has created the situation today, and understanding it is paramount in order to comment on the human terrain system.

- **4.1** Is the starting chapter where I have chosen to present what the human terrain system is, since much of my thesis is founded upon this framework.
- **4.2** Here I discuss the benefits of using this system in a combat situation. I have chosen to include McFate (2005, 2016) who is a big name within the concept of human terrain system.
- **5.0** Here I will discuss the critique that the human terrain system have received. I have focused on Price (2011, 2016) who is one of the major critics on the use of applied anthropology in war.
- **6.0** This chapter revolves around the transparency concept and the new neoliberal military.
- **7.0** This is my own analysis, I have chosen this structure to make it easier for the reader to understand where I discuss my own opinion and where I am discussing the writing of others. In order to make the thesis more coherent.
- **8.0** Conclusion and final words

2.0 Method

This is a literature study and the literature is chosen because of its ability to contribute to this discussion on different levels. To be able to understand how the HTS was developed it is important to know how HTS developed and the history behind it. Montgomery McFate (2005) made a comprehensive timeline of many of the events during history that contributed to the heated discussion surrounding the development of the HTS. During the progression of HTS the subject of ethics have been in the spotlight which is why the history of anthropology is important. Wikileaks leaked a handbook which is a manual on how to use the HTS which is included later. The HTS has met critique and I have included David Price (2011, 2016) and his critique on the HTS. Sindre Bangstad (Bangstad 2016) made an article on how anthropology became ambivalent because anthropology is considered the voice of the weak. Applied anthropology as a method, created a new idea of anthropology instead of the former idea as the voice of the weak. The connection between HTS and the new neoliberal state is made by the help of Mattias Viktorin (2008). His study on conflict preventionism and humanitarian intervention makes it possible to connect the HTS to the need for a more effective military. The idea of the military as a neoliberal production creates a need for policy

on how to handle insurgency more effectively. The conclusion is a new set of ethics that I suggest in the end of the thesis.

My method is founded on applied anthropology, this thesis is in a way a form of applied anthropology as an evaluation of the discussion of HTS. I have been inspired by the anthropology of documental analysis where anthropologists use other mediums besides fieldwork. I thought that much of the information is available and also due to my time limit I had to create a some kind of limitation. My thesis is more of an invitation to a future discussion of a subject that has been infected, a new mindset that the HTS is a development of the modern world.

I have chosen my literature by how popular many of the articles or books were. I have done this by looking at how often some of the material is referenced to by other researchers. The reason for this is because I wanted to bring forth the most prominent and well known arguments and critic on HTS. The connection with neoliberalism is something that grew with the writing and later became one of the key pieces in the thesis. I decided to make it one of the key points when I could connect it to the rest of my project.

The problem with ethics within applied anthropology has been a problem for a long time, not only in connection with the military. In applied anthropology some of the discussion concerns the connection between how the host, the third part (client) and the anthropologist is affecting the research. There is no problem if the host and the third part is the same person but this is usually not the case. Another problem is that often a host is not very homogenous but rather fragmented into different smaller groups. For instance, if anthropologists want to look at Cross-fit participants they need to define this group, they need to determine how it is built and how it is constituted. This could in itself be an anthropological research field (Ervin A.M 2000:27-29). There is often a possibility for the anthropologist always to find a subculture within a culture that leads to another subculture. The problem is often how do researchers limit themselves in their research and furthestmost, can they limit themselves?

3.0 Theory

3.1 Previous Research

Janice H. Laurence (McFate 2016) wrote that the US invaded Afghanistan in 2002 and were swift in removing the current government from its position. But the realization that the war was not in a big scale of superior force but rather in the formation of insurgency, required the military to adapt. The US military realized that the amount of in-house knowledge of cultural awareness was one problem because there was no interest in this subject before. This spawned the ground for a development of the human terrain team (HTT) with teams consisting of academical anthropologists and soldiers. Their primary task were to enable the cooperation between coalition, villagers and the US military (McFate 2016).

The HTS has been under discussion by multiple anthropologists such as David Price (2011, 2016) and Montgomery McFate (2005). McFate is one of the pioneer who helped create the HTS together with the US military. She believes that the use of anthropology can provide cultural knowledge which can improve the operations of military forces in the area. Her idea is that the HTS is a framework that can provide with tools to asses how the situation in the region is developing and how to continue the military operations. Price is one of the anthropologists who is critical of the development of applied anthropology in general. He is critical of the HTS because of the use of cultural knowledge in a context where informed consent is not respected. He is critical to the idea of implementing different programs within academia which support only the students committed to agencies. The students are required to keep this involvement in these programs secret since the information that they are given are operational secrets. Price is critical of the idea of applied anthropology in general since he believes that the third part in the connection of host, researcher and third party creates a bias which destroys the good science and ethics of anthropology. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban (McFate 2016) is discussing how the historical impact of past controversies within anthropology in the context of military involvement has resulted in the outrage caused by the development of HTS.

Both Price and McFate are agreeing that the need for cultural knowledge is one of the key aspects of the modern world. But the sharing of this information is one of the things that they are disagreeing on. I will further discuss this later in the thesis.

3.2 Anthropology of Policy: A Theoretical Perspective

Policy is today a central part of any organization in any constellation, every instance creates their ideas in codified and published types of policies which are seen as guidelines for the organization. Policy is a fragmented process with many ends. The purpose with a policy is for decision makers to have a tool in order to solve problems and to create change, a principle that govern action directed towards a given end. Foucault mentions *governance* as a principle where governments want to affect the social norms of the population both consciously or unconsciously to create a general norm, decided by the government. As an example, the VAT is a common way for the government to affect how people spend money on things. Higher taxes means that people are less likely to buy the particular items and this is a way for the government to consciously regulate spending habits (Shore, C., & Wright, S. 1997:5-10).

The reason why anthropologists have taken an interest in policy is because it is a governed political order which is contained in a cloak as neutral and an objective solution. The reason for this is to increase effectiveness in *governance*, the key thing about policy, for example if a company want to increase production in an agency or a company they create a policy to do this. Dryfus and Rabinow explain that what is happening today is that politicians take political problems out of their context in order to make it possible to transform them into a scientific problem that needs experts in order to resolve the problem (ibid).

One of the key aspects of policy is, as I mentioned before, the need of experts. This makes it possible for anyone with a knowledge within the topic of a policy to become a key informant on this subject. Meaning that within trade policy-makers look to economists and within law they look to lawyers, while earlier decision makers did not have professions such as company lawyers working for a company. Their goal is to provide companies with policies to increase effectiveness externally and internally. The main goal of lawyers was earlier to work for the state and support the justice system.

There is a similarity between policy and morality, they both seek to be objective and to be universalizing. Policy and morality is part of a cultural ideology with underlying philosophies and rationalities. The purpose with policy is to make the government or the state

to run without hitches, but ethics is about moral. Policy becomes something above the human existence as something superstitious beyond the human agency, a form of universal, objective law. This is a central part when discussing policy since this distance between policy and policy-makers is important with the perception that policy is based on objectiveness and neutral ideas (Shore, C., & Wright, S. 1997:10-12).

When reviewing my material you may find that anthropologists have had to support military operations and governmental operations at different occasions. This is because many of these operations needed cultural knowledge in order to be successful. Due to this reason the discussion around transparency became more important. The ethics when using applied anthropology became an interest to researchers. The problem with transparency became a problem since a third party is involved in applied anthropology and the third party is not always interested in disclosing what they have concluded. Viktorin's doctoral thesis (2008) is interesting because he manages to create a relationship between a micro level exercise in Sweden called Viking 03, and connect it to a macro level and to the global system. He discusses how transparency today has to do with where investigators look and where they are allowed to look. Usually the most interesting things are in the shadows. I choose to connect this with ethics and how anthropologists are more and more aware of how their research can be used in ways they did not anticipate. With the crisis of representation that evolved after the postmodern influences during the 70s this became even more clear. There has been a connotation between anthropology and the support of the weaker which affects how anthropologists do research since it has been an important moral issue in anthropology. This creates a clash between the people interested in using HTS and the academics who are devoted to the representation of the weaker.

David Harvey (2005) discusses the development of neoliberalism in the world, mostly in western countries. He discusses that the state has become more decentralized which affects all the public sectors. Infinite accumulation of capital in a free flowing open market is the idea of neoliberalism. According to neoliberals there is a need to keep democracy to a minimum since it is biased because of personal interests and benefits of leaders (Harvey 2005:66-67). The state's responsibility is to provide a secure market platform for companies and people which can support a free and open market. The state needs to enforce laws and regulate the market only to support the freedom of the market. What this means is that the

state should only operate as little as possible but enforce laws in the contexts of justice and national safety. The idea that the justice system can use violence if deemed necessary to enforce a market is important and the same goes for the military. The military can be deployed and used to enforce violence with the aim to achieve freedom and supporting a free market. The idea is to give power to the individual by the decentralization of the state and let the consumers decide. That the freedom of man was threatened by the policy-making of the state is one key argument of neoliberalism. The idea of giving power to the consumer to choose themselves is one of the key arguments. Their idea of democracy is the free and open flow of markets where the consumers have the power because of the limitations of the state (Harvey. D 2005:1-38). This idea of neoliberalism is discussed in the chapter about the connection of HTS and the new neoliberal state.

3.3 Neoliberalism and the Human Terrain System

The connection between HTS and the new neoliberal state is based on the need for experts in the creation of policy. When policies are being created the need for expert knowledge is one of the key factors in order to make the policy scientific and objective. One of the concrete frameworks that has been created in order to satisfy the new need for knowledge within policy making, is HTS. Applied anthropology and HTS are being used in order for policy makers to have a tool to collect cultural knowledge in order for them to create policy. Price (2011) is critical of this usage of anthropology since it creates an environment where a third party becomes more important to satisfy than the host. The problem is that anthropology presupposes that it will be used in the best interest of the host. But due to the involvement of HTS this might not always be the case. The connection between HTS and the neoliberal military is supported by Viktorin (2008), his thesis is built upon the realization that the military is adopting to a new world order. The new world order demands that the military operates outside the national border on different missions beyond the formerly established framework. This creates an ambivalent situation and is one of the reasons that the Viking 03 exercise was created. The intention of the exercise is to combine military and civilian efforts in order to make the operations more effective. This line of thought on effectiveness and audit, is built on a neoliberalistic ideology.

4.0 The Origin of the Human Terrain System

There have been scandals and events that are paramount when anthropologists are researching the development of ethics and more importantly the HTS. During the 19th century the early anthropologists were involved in the war against the Indians in the US. The involvement of anthropologists became a factor in the World Wars as anthropologists became spies in order to collect information on other countries. Boas made a critical remark on the work of anthropologists in Central America in World War I in 1919. The scandals during the Vietnam war were criticized by academics and the scandal in Thailand lead to the Mead Report in 1971 which criticized anthropologists involved in the military. These are some of the scandals that are important (Eriksen, T. H., & Nielsen, F. S. 2001).

Richard Medina (2006) argues that the need to use sociocultural analysis in warfare was discovered during the Vietnam war or even during World War I where a lot of countries were involved on an ethnical level (Medina 2006:138-140). Many of the conflicts during World War I had ethnical grounds founded on a thought about the national identity. One of the key persons who were taking a stand in the discussions was the founding father of American anthropology Franz Boas. He wrote a letter to the AAA where he stated that some researchers had prostituted science and that they had destroyed the good word of anthropology. The reason for this was the work of some anthropologists in Central America where they worked as anthropological researchers with the hidden connection with the government as spies (URL 6, URL 7) . Medina goes on and argues that it became apparent for the US army after the World Wars and the Cold War that in order to avoid a disaster like the Vietnam War they had to get the local communities involved and have them support their side. Navigating through the maze of new sociocultural contexts in other regions demanded a new expertise. That is why the US army employed anthropologists to work in teams alongside the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The term evolved from a metaphor, think of navigating through a geographical terrain and needing a map or a kind of pilot to find the fastest and most efficient way. This led to the term human terrain. I will go into further detail what human terrain is and what it involves in the body of the paper. When studying ethics and human terrain systems it is impossible to not

mention the Mead report in 1971. It contained critique about the current state of anthropology and critique of the use of anthropology in different war zones. I will get into further detail on these scandals in 4.0. Gerald D. Berreman (Fluehr-Lobban 2003) writes about this in the book "Ethics and the profession of anthropology". He tells us about the major impact that the Mead report had on Anthropology. This was due to how big of a scandal the involvement of anthropologists in Thailand and South America became. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used the information gathered by anthropologists in Thailand in order to conduct operations against the opposition. The Mead report was presented at a conference in New York during AAA's annual meeting. This report mainly explained the involvement of anthropologists in Thailand and how anthropologists are responsible for creating a framework and policy about how they cooperate and release information to other agencies (Fluehr-Lobban 2003:56-62). These internal conflicts within anthropology have created two different sides where there are people who believe anthropologists should keep to themselves within academia and not take part in anything else besides that. There is another side claiming that anthropologists should take part of the development and become a part in applied anthropology. I want to give my take on why anthropologists should not back away from applied anthropology and how they can contribute to policy making. There are not only two sides to this problem but the problem is much more complex. I want to explore this and expand the discussions. Since it is very repetitious and monotonous.

Montgomery McFate (2005) is one of few anthropologists who have decided that the collaboration between the military and academia is a necessary step in the postmodern world. McFate has written an article which assaults the passive community of social science as the military screams for our help. McFate starts with analyzing the start of anthropology and the origin of the anthropological research method that is called fieldwork. It started out during the colonial era when the idea of controlling the indigenous population was key in order to have a relationship with the central country. It would empower the central country without upsetting the colony. In order to do this there was a need for a new type of understanding of the local community and their political, religious and cultural view of the world. This is the origin of anthropology as Price (2011) also mentions. McFate continues that anthropology got a new arena during World War I as spies and anthropology became major players in the intelligence community. Anthropologists were involved in many operations during the World

Wars both indirectly and directly. McFate mentions that Margaret Mead was one of the first to speak out around this relationship between military operation and anthropology. She said that anthropology should be actively involved in the policy-making and not be external advisors since this was ineffective. Mead's idea of the military culture is still one of the ideas that can be considered. Her idea is that aggression is a response and not a primary behavior, violence is used for altruistic purposes and never for one's own interests. The idea of going in, complete a task in an altruistic purpose, and leave is a key thought in the US military culture.

This is still a highly regarded thought and used in the current conflicts especially in Iraq where there was a supposedly imminent threat of weapons of mass destruction and the military wanted to go in and bring democracy to Iraq (McFate 2005:28-32).

Edward Lansdale was interested in military anthropology and did research about the idea of using psychology in warfare. His idea was to use the superstition of the local community in order to deteriorate their moral and in turn weaken their military capacity. Paul Bohannen was an anthropologist working in this period and believed in the minimal use of force in order to control counterinsurgency. His idea was that the use of force (military, governmental or juridical) would only strengthen the opposition towards the government. Only unabashed totalities² would attempt to capture all the insurgents in a region. The idea of using psychological warfare was not foreign to the military but what Lansdale pushed for was that there is a difference between using and understanding it (McFate 2005:32).

Many of the ethical disagreements around using anthropology in a military capacity and the effects of anthropology started to become obvious during the Vietnam War. One of the key anthropologist in the Vietnam War was an anthropologist named Gerald Hickey. He was involved in the RAND³ research group in the Vietnam war, their primary task was to advice on psychological and social factors that could be used in the war. Even though they had an influential position with policy makers they were often ignored. The main thought was still that overwhelming force was the way to win the war. Hickey did research on lowland peasants on how to gain their support and presented this to Marine General Victor Krulak who refused to implement Hickey's suggestion. To educate the people about how their

² Totalities with reference to Total institutions by Erving Goffman (2014)

³ "Research and development", a think-tank that advised the US Air Force

contribution to the government would benefit them later in stability, healthcare and education. This was considered too pacifistic by the Pentagon and they continued the campaign. Hickey became more and more frustrated and did further research which resulted in an idea of uniting all the different groups in Vietnam on the mutual foundation of religion and politics. However this was considered heresy and the US continued their campaign with overwhelming force and lost the war. When Hickey returned to the US he was refused back into the academic world due to his involvement in the RAND. RAND also rejected him because of the lack of interest in counterinsurgency (McFate 2005:33-36).

Project Camelot was a new acknowledgement that there was a need for social science in the context of insurgency. Johan Galtung, a Norwegian anthropologist, was offered to go to Chile to conduct research on insurgency. He kept it as a secret at first but once word got out about the true origin of the research, protests started around in the academic world. During this period anthropology suffered from another scandal in Thailand where it was discovered that anthropologists were used by the Thai government in order to control tribal villages. They did this with humanitarian aid in order to refrain them from joining the insurgent forces. A concern was starting to form in the anthropological community that if this kind of research continued it would make our work in the future (military or civil) impossible due to the suspicion that anthropologists could be spies. This created the current statement by the AAA (McFate 2005:36-37). The current statement by the AAA is that anthropologists need to consider how they conduct their research and how they achieve informed consent. Anthropologists have a responsibility to keep their informants anonymous and to keep them out of harms way. There are other points but these are a few as an example (URL 5). Roberto J. Gonzalez writes in “Anthropology Today” an explanation of the HTS and what it is. The origin of HTS started out in the discussions of senior officers in the Soviet Cold War on how 21th century fighters have to fight in areas populated by civilians. Therefor the only way to have success with an operation you will have to control the civilian population (URL 3, page 22). When the US army adopted this technique in the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the realization was that in order to control the local population they needed to explore all of the aspects of the tribal structure of people. A central part of the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq is Islam which is the foundation of their political constitution, which demands a new view on how to consider the problems in these ethnical conflicts. A problem with the region is that it

is fragmented and decision-makers need to understand why there is an ethnical conflicts between Sunni, Shia and the Kurds (ibid).

The United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The war is somewhat reaching an end but have for long been a thorn in the idea of implementing democracy in both countries. During this time many discussions surfaced about the human terrain team, which leads to my next chapter.

4.1 What is the Human Terrain System?

I was traveling on the train to the library and I was listening to a podcast. This podcast is called Revisionist History and is made by Malcolm Gladwell. I was listening to episode two of this podcast and why I am mentioning this is because he told the entire episode about the covert research project that went on in Saigon during 1965 (URL 10)⁴. He does not mention anything about if it was anthropologists who did the work but I choose to include this in my paper because his opinion is interesting on why research is done in war. Gladwell discusses that since World War I interest have gone from having wars about territory but now was is conducted on the basis of ideology. In World War I it was about creating a better empire and having access to natural resources. We had the ideological growth of nationalism that was growing within Europe, but the main reason of the war, was territorial. During World War II there was still an obvious matter of territories where countries got invaded by Nazi-Germany but during this war there was a growing factor of ideology. During the Vietnam war the shift became more apparent, the start of the war were between ideologies, there was the Vietcong which represented communism and the South Vietnam backed by the liberalistic United States. What is interesting is that decision-makers started to discuss that they needed to know more about the enemy. Research was done in Vietnam on the Vietcong in order to understand the enemy in order to convince the other side of their ideology. Gladwell continues to argue that during 9/11 in the United States there was a discussion by President Bush that decision-makers needed to know more about the enemy. The point he makes here is that they needed

⁴ It is possible to listen to this podcast on different platforms. I use the podcast as an entry into the discussion about what might be the thought of the use of anthropology in war. This is because that Gladwell is not doing this as research but as in depth journalism.

to know more about the enemy. This is where the human terrain system was built upon and I will go into depth about what it is and how it is being used.

McFate was one of the pioneers in creating a system where the military could have a framework on how their operations should be conducted in order to maximize the effect of their operations. The main goal is that when the military is planning an operation they use the human terrain system (shortened HTS) in order to decide on different factors that could affect how the civilian population supports either the coalition or the insurgency (URL 2).

Wikileaks have leaked a handbook from the Fort Leavenworth HTT which other anthropologists have commented on. I have looked into this handbook because it is a very good way of trying to get an idea of how the human terrain system is applied and in what instance they use anthropology. When reading the handbook and going into the method chapter it becomes clear that there are clear references to anthropology, they have used different terminologies that are key to anthropology and the methods of establishing how a society works from an ethnographical standpoint. I will comment on some key points in the handbook.

It is clear that the anthropologists who helped writing the handbook had ethical key points that they took into account. This handbook is an example on a form of applied anthropology. For instance it is clear that they want the work they do to be transparent and that all research they conduct should be reported back into a data bank at Yale University in order for other researchers around the world to be able to use it. It is clear that they wanted all people to stay anonymous at all costs and that no identification would be possible. Many of the normal ethical principles that anthropologists implement in an ethnographic field work. The aim the HTT is to provide cultural information in order for the coalition forces to be more effective in their humanitarian and supportive work (URL 12, 11-91). The HTT provides access to a field that otherwise would have been impossible for them to research. This will provide the academia with useful research that otherwise would only be speculation.

What can be discovered by this is that in order for the coalition forces to be able to restabilise the region they need to find out what they have uprooted and what the population

needs in order to get back on their feet⁵. The UN works according to the human rights which are based on a Western ideology. Some of the critique raised towards human rights is that when implemented onto another culture, it can be perceived as post-imperialistic. That the UN forces a new cultural framework onto another culture based on Western ideology.

It is easy to see the correlation between the human terrain system and the anthropology of policy. Most of the data collected by the human terrain teams is easily perceived as politics and ideology. The HTT helped to determine different policies that affected the military operation. The data is perceived as neutral and objective as a part of expert knowledge in policy-making.

The goal of the handbook is to provide a tool for military personal and social scientists in the field with a framework that they can use in order to decide whether the operation has the desired effect. The framework is built on different cultural factors from applied anthropology such as politics, geography, social and religion to mention a few. The idea of using a HTT is that they are specialized in using the handbook and can provide a background, a course of action and what consequences it will bring to the region for the population based on their ethnical diversity. The idea is that it provides a framework with a clear “this action will result in this” kind of context. The thought of the handbook is to create an effective way of deciding if an operation is going to upset the civilian population or if it can be conducted without raising a negative sentiment. As an example think of a building where there is a known insurgency position. The problem with this building is that it is holy to the local population. It is thus not possible to attack the building, so the military needs to find another solution on how to engage the insurgents. Without the cultural awareness and cultural knowledge of the HTT the military would have been unable to know that this building was holy in a cultural context. This means that an engagement which resulted in damage to the building could have affected the relationship between the coalition and the local population. In turn it would have helped the support for the insurgency rather than

⁵ Stability in a country or region is always a relative term based on some kind of scale. I have chosen some general guidelines, for example Fund for Peace and their Fragile State index. They have a clear definition of factors they believe destabilize countries or regions. <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org>

I have also used the general guideline by the United States Institute of Peace <http://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction-the-web-version/8-stable-governance>

When I refer to a stable region these are the guidelines that I am using. Due to the many factors in the guidelines and the limited space of my thesis, I have chosen not to mention them. They are easily understood on their website. The factors are based on quantitative statistics and not based on anthropological studies.

supporting the coalition. Another example is that sometimes different sites can have a meaning in a local context because it is an everyday place. The local marketplace is a place that some visit every day and it means something to them. This means a site or region can have a significant value to us even though it is not written anywhere, it could all be based in culture. Without the HTT it would be impossible for the coalition to identify and understand these places and why coalition-forces need to pay special attention to them. As an example on a site in this category, think of the first place where you kissed, this is a special place to you and like that there are similar places to the population. All these places contributes to a form of culture that coalition forces need to acknowledge (URL 12, URL 4).

The coalition forces realized they needed expert help and created the human terrain teams which consisted of experts in the field of social science. Their main objective was to support the coalition forces with intel on how they should continue their operations and at the same time receive the support of the local population. I believe that in order to stabilize the region coalition forces have to come to help, that they need to reach some sort of understanding of their ways and the population's way in an effort to create an environment for both of them.

Policy-making is something that is everywhere no matter where researchers look in the modern world. What I choose to research is the belief that policies are always correct and objective. What I believe anthropologists need in the question about HTS is the possibility for insight into the operation conducted by the different expert groups. The reason for this is that otherwise it will impossible for us to review how effective different operations are and how they actually come to stabilize or destabilize a region. It is not impossible that this in turn will make the process of HTS to be more bureaucratic and more slow but these operations have to be ironclad for the simple purpose that it is their home that anthropologists are researching. The insight should be available to the public and this is one of my key points. One of the problems that Price (2011) later discusses is the secrecy and the confinement of information. One of the big problems with policy in general in my opinion is that people believe them as neutral and objective when they need to see them as an opinion. Policy is a direction of opinion supported by a foundation of a current paradigm of the general opinion which make them easy to implement without a hitch. When the motivation is that the US wants the Afghani government to run more smoothly and to operate better it is hard to argue against the

different operations or even policy created by the coalition forces. I mentioned in the theory chapter that Wright and Shore discussed on how the difference between policy and moral is that moral is based on ethics discussion and that policy is based on a need to be more efficient. This is one of my key points, that people need to differ between when implementing moral and implementing policy because the difference between them are little but the underlying philosophy makes all the difference.

4.2 The Curious Relationship between Anthropology and the Military

A Major General in the US military argued that before warfare had to do with a technologically overwhelming force that created the advantage in a war (McFate 2005:24). Today there is a new type of warfare which is called asymmetrical warfare (insurgency) that demands an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture and their motivation - the knowledge of culture. The traditional methods in war are proving to be inadequate in an urban environment where combatants and ordinary people are mixed together. There is no clear border or front for the military to engage (McFate 2005:24).

The major combat operations conducted were easy for the US military to win in Iraq with powerful air support and overwhelming fire power. This “hot” phase as McFate calls it was easy and the coalition forces knew how to handle it. Afterwards they became involved in a complex war they did not understand, with no clear hierarchy or any of the traditional organizational structures. Rather they met tribal leaders and insurgents with tactics that were not conventional, they did not use airplanes or tanks and they did not abide to the Geneva convention. It was ordinary people combined with combatants who hid in plain sight that you needed to find. The US have national powers in the form of knowledge within politics, diplomacy, intelligence and economics. However they have none about formation of policy on the culture of an adversary (McFate 2005:24). This absence has a simple cause and it is the cause of the failure of the Vietnam war according to McFate, as I have discussed above and the failure of Hickey in his attempt to persuade policy-makers to open their eyes to a new set of methods made many anthropologists hostile towards the use of their research in a

military context. This lack of knowledge have had grave consequences for countering the insurgency in not only Iraq, but Afghanistan and other countries as well. Particularly as McFate claims because political and military operations not based on any cultural knowledge or partial knowledge is worse than nothing at all (ibid).

The main purpose of counterinsurgency is to weaken the government in their power and legitimacy, the political power is the central issue in insurgency. McFate tells us about soldiers who are opening up and explaining their experiences in Iraq. They tell us that they had knowledge of technical aspects, they had perfect situational awareness but they had no idea how to handle social interactions and cultural differences. A soldier tells us about how many officers got invited for tea or coffee and were supposed to redress to native attire but they had no training on how to handle these situations. They could not understand if this was a friendly gesture or if it was some kind of hostility.

The lack of cultural awareness in counterinsurgency and a failure to understand foreign cultures have resulted in intelligence and national security failures before. An example is Pearl Harbor during World War II where no one believed that the Japanese could do something as irrational as attacking the whole naval fleet of the United States.

Ethnocentrism is very dangerous because the thought that “I would not have done it” and assumptions are always wrong since they are not based on data. The lack of anthropology within Department of Defense and within the intelligence community and the knowledge of cultural relativism as understanding the natives point of view is paramount in any given situation. Our main goal as anthropologists is to study a culture and try to translate and to make the culture understandable in the context of our own. On this note it is also noteworthy to look at the status of anthropology in the public sphere and academia. There are still people who believe that anthropology is a “nuts and huts” science and it is impossible for anthropologists to conceive any useful research that can be used. This is a perception that still plagues the anthropological community and creates an engineering hegemony that hinders the development of research on counterinsurgency (ibid).

McFate writes that another key ingredient is that the United States prefers conventional wars since they already have an understanding and know how to deal with them. Casper Weinberger the Secretary of Defense said in the mid 1980s that the United States would only participate in wars with the clear intention of winning and their interest

would only be in big wars and not small skirmishes. McFate writes that a tactic of overwhelming forces often have an opposite effect. When trying to overwhelm a population their primary response is to resist and this results in insurgency. In other words winning in the battlefield is completely irrelevant in the context of modern conflicts (McFate 2005:24-27).

The British approach is very different after their trial and error in Northern Ireland. They discovered that through alleviating the political condition which spawns the insurgency they could limit their use of lethal force. The British government realized that doing this through military and civil co-operation was most effective. The use of force could be kept at a minimum. A primary goal became to recover deep intelligence. McFate never defines what deep intelligence means but I would suggest that it is cultural knowledge. Key to the British approach is the usage of deep cultural knowledge of the adversary. This is a key factor when fighting insurgency, however the US military have never had a policy for this, their policies only surround economic, politics and security. The US military only have policy on how to handle the major combat operation and they succeed with it. However today it is a very different story, the big fights are more or less irrelevant. Today many officials are starting to realize the problems involved and know that in future operations the need for anthropology and cultural knowledge is the difference between insurgency or stability. The problem is that very few anthropologists are willing cooperate with the military because of the history between them. McFate argues that has been isolating itself in the Ivory Tower and very few have sought to help or work even though there are a lot of advantages for those who choose to do it (McFate 2005:27-28).

Looking at how McFate discusses the problem with the involvement of anthropology in the military context it becomes clear that both Price and McFate are questioning the same thing. History is a key factor and I believe that many anthropologists are moving away from the military because of this reason. 30-40 years ago a well known anthropologist was rejected by the academic world when he returned from service in the Vietnam War. The key thing that Price is pushing for is the opening up and the transparency of the work conducted within the military in the context of social science. There are many parts of the military that are more or less open and this should be possible to do since most of the research and information is already public. What I believe is the problem is that often the tactics involved in controlling

or using social science in this context is questionable in an ethnical standpoint. It leads into my last chapter about Viktorin who writes about the new neoliberal army and transparency.

The problem with peace-keeping operations is that it is hard to be protesting the goal of the operation. That civilian organizations and the military should be co-operating in order to provide more thorough operations in order to avoid violence (Viktorin 2008:251). The principle is often well meant and most people agree, but they disagree on the methods. The cultural knowledge should be used after completing the military task and encourage the possibility to restabilise a region founded in cultural knowledge. The minimal force principle should be used and support from the external party should support the local government in order to bring order. This is not something anyone would object to as a bad idea, the question is rather, which method.

Anthropology has had identity crises before about their methods and how they conduct their research. These conflicts have resulted in the methods and the discussions today. Anthropologists look back at what anthropology has been and many anthropologists laugh and say *“well, anthropologists are doing it a lot better today”* and I believe this is true. There is always progress towards something more thorough in any context. Since there are other disciplines which manage to work along side the military, for example the medical sciences, I believe that it is possible. In medicine the US military asked for the creation of exoskeletons with the purpose of creating stronger soldiers but it also created the ability to create new prosthetics that could make it possible for people to walk again. My question in this is why should it be harder for us to work together with the military? It is time for anthropologists to sit down and have a talk about methods and how they are going to handle this instead of using secrecy and hide everything they do because it is impossible in the long run. I agree with Price that transparency is always better than secrecy and I am a believer in that if everything is out in the open the possibility for making decisions will be easier.

5. The Anthropological Critique of Human Terrain System and the Involvement in Violent Conflicts

The whole foundation of anthropology rests on the principle that the information is gained from informants who are willingly giving the information about themselves. This information reaches the anthropologist under the assumption that it is going to be used in the best interest of the informant. This could be either done with the consent of the informant or it is done unknown to the informant. If anthropologists do research without consent it is against the code of ethics of anthropology according to the AAA. However as said by David Price this is something that has been done several times and it is known that some anthropologists have been working with or alongside intelligence agencies or multinational companies in order to use anthropological theory (Fluehr-Lobban 2003:29-32). It began already around 1940 when the US entered the World War II. The US scrambled to assemble social science projects that could aid them in their war efforts against the Axis. It was widely recognized that these projects were very valuable during the war efforts and that the projects should continue.

Price claims that the problem during the Cold-War era was that it was very unclear in what ways the information given to an agency was going to be used⁶. In many ways it was unclear to anthropologists in what way the information they gave or got from another agency would be used either by academia or government organizations (Fluehr-Lobban 2003:35-41). Prince continues to argue that it was not in any way disconcerting that the American Anthropology Association (AAA) had a collaboration with the CIA since during the Cold War it was not general knowledge what the CIA was working on. There was not a policy or any set of framework which told what kind of information and in what way anthropologists used the information gained from informant. Even to this day there is no set of rules nor any policy that adjust how much information an anthropologist can give another agency or organization. As long as you live up to the Nuremberg's set of ethic code which mostly argues around informed consent you are as an anthropologist in the clear (Fluehr-Lobban 2003:40-43).

⁶ As an example he used the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States of America (CIA)

This raises the question how you inform your informants that you will disclose your research to a military or counter intelligence organization? The question is how social sciences can be used in warfare since the ethical dilemma is a part of all the social sciences. The whole idea with a peace-keeping force is to restore stability to the population in question and create a better environment, but this is impossible without the possibility to scrutinize the operation before, under and after. The whole democratic processes is based on the idea that everyone should be able to have a say and a free flow of information. This is something that I have not found any discussion about in academia. In the case of counter-intelligence or warfare this is not in the interest of the party conducting the research, meaning that informed consent will not be respected and the risk of covert research is higher due to the power-imbalance between informant and anthropologist. For me a peace-keeping operation and warfare are two different things since the idea of a peace-keeping operation is usually the involvement of different countries (URL 8). The goal with a peace-keeping operation is also different from warfare. More often it is transnational agencies which create peace-keeping operations today, meaning that a change has occurred in the world.

The goal with HTS is for local coalition forces to be able to help the local population so they can start supporting themselves. In this way the goal is similar to the help government gives in the countries where they try to support people in need and try to defragment their own population. So why are people against HTS and how do decision-makers apply it in Afghanistan? I believe the reason for this is the ethics behind the semi-imperialistic approach that Westerners are able to go in with force and teach other societies the Western way of living, Western ideology and Western political concepts in order for other societies to have a better life. This is something I have seen reading some texts concerning topics similar to HTS, where the people who are critical claim that our neoliberalism of today is another form of imperialism. Considering the HTS as a policy deployed by the coalition forces in Afghanistan, creates need to continue researching the goal with the human terrain system and what goals the coalition forces had when deploying this policy in order to understand HTS.

5.1 Heroes of the Weak

The third part in applied anthropology is nothing new in the context of the war on terror. Sindre Bangstad has made an article in “Anthropology of the Century” which comments on

David Price's book (URL 9, (Price 2016)). Sindre writes that anthropology is a subject where anthropologists always have been in opposition against power and marginalized from it. He goes on and argues that anthropologists have even been characterized as being heroes of the weak. Sindre continues how this look on anthropology as telling the victim's story and being their collaborator is something that during the Cold War era was destroyed, due to the fact that reports surfaced during the Cold War Era containing information on anthropologists working along side Nazi-Germany and contributing to racial biology or in the collaboration with the CIA (ibid).

5.2 Critique by David Price

One interesting remark by David Price (2011) is that warfare has for long been a factor for consideration in anthropology. It started with the colonies where anthropologists deployed the idea of studying exotic cultures. They were reporting to their commanders in order for them to have an understanding on how to control the population in a colony. In World War II anthropologists had a huge involvement both directly and indirectly. After World War II there was a thought of creating a code of ethics and a code of conduct on how anthropologists should do research. During the World Wars anthropology had lost its innocence and the public started to question how research was conducted. After World War II and the Nuremberg trials, a set of codes were created in order to control how research was conducted in the future. Margaret Mead was one of the key persons to be involved in writing many of these codes. The moral of the codes were that anthropologists need to realize that they are involved and responsible for the work that they do and how it can be used. Anthropologists should also avoid doing work that could result in the loss of life. Price continues and points out that this was not an easy task during the Cold War when big parts of funding came from front companies created by the CIA. This made it hard for anthropologists themselves to control where they got their funding from (Price 2011:15-31).

The problem rose again during the Vietnam War where counterinsurgency became a major problem. The armed forces came to the campuses asking for help about how to solve the problem with counterinsurgency, a problem they had never met on this scale before. The recruitment for this started within the American Association of Anthropologist (AAA) where ads were put in the newspaper of the association (Price 2011:15-31). This caused an uproar

within the community which resulted in the creation of the principles of professional responsibility. These principles stated that anthropologists should do no harm, anthropologists should disclose where they get their funding from and what aim or angle the research is going to have. The discussion transitioned into that anthropologists need to consider their interaction with the armed forces, no matter if the country is at war or not. During the 1980s the ethics became less important due to the increased use of anthropology for commercial purposes (Price 2011:15-31). I want to add that the crisis within anthropology with the postmodern influences from other disciplines contributed as well. Price continues to discuss what happens next with George W. Bush campaign on the War on Terror where everyone with any college degree needed to join the battle against terrorism in the world. Price criticizes McFate who is an anthropologist that created the HTT in Afghanistan and Iraq. Price claims that this project started the remilitarization of anthropology in the United States. The remark that I find most useful in this is what he writes last, that warfare has long been a factor for the consideration of ethics within anthropology. The problem is that today people are worried that a revision of the ethics is done in wartime. The revision may get effected by emotional or political factors because of this, however will there ever be a vacuum of non-war to make these adjustments? In the wake of this turbulence the board of AAA decided in 2008 to appoint an ad hoc committee with the goal of creating a code of ethics and Price is a member of this committee (Price 2011:15-31).

Price is working on the committee of ethics at the AAA and believes it is a problem that the AAA refuses to take a stance on basic political and ethical issues like oppressing imperialism, neoliberalism and human rights. The AAA has in the past taken a stance on some political matters but not on principles. This results in that it becomes harder to decide and debate what “best practice” for an anthropologist is. AAA wants to keep a neutral position but according to Price there is no such thing as a neutral position, rather it is a lack of engagement (Price 2011:30-31).

As one example Albert Einstein raised his concerns regarding the Manhattan project. He went through with it in the end but argued for other uses of nuclear science. We never know what kind of purpose our research can be used for but a key thing to bear in mind is why, to whom and by whom I am doing this research. I prefer to look at it that anthropologists always try to avoid causing harm to people if possible, but they can never

safeguard themselves against every possible use of their research to any extent. Some of the research anthropologists conduct is sensitive and can be used to cause harm. Anthropologists decide a purpose of their research and if the purpose is research I believe it is innocent. If anthropologists on the other hand decide to create research with the sole purpose of doing harm then they are not conducting research either as academia or as applied anthropology. It is not academia and it should not be conducted in the name of science. Anthropologists who start working for agencies or applied anthropology have taken a stand and it is their own choice. They have to consider their ethical problems on their own. There is no reason for us to forbid or in other ways try to delimitate ourselves from the intelligence community. It is possible to create these kind of relationships in secrecy as proven before. It is better to have it in the open and make it transparent that some professors or student do work for an agency on different matters, but again I believe it is up to these people to decide if it is a morally and ethnically acceptable research in the same way as Einstein had problems with the research he was conducting in the Manhattan project.

5.3 Recruitment on Campuses

Price writes about his concerns about the public silence regarding the current recruitment of student and professors at campuses in the United States. He presents us the history of different funding and scholarship programs that the congress created in order for students to have a healthy academic career with the demand that they repay their scholarship by working for an agency⁷. Price is concerned with that the agencies recruit students who are not allowed to in any way disclose the involvement they have with these scholarship programs or agencies. This is one of the key things Price is opposing. The PRISM program to bring out an example, is a program that the congress passed after 2001 that had the purpose of making it possible for students to pursue a career in academia. After finishing their degree they have to go and work for an agency. Price is not opposed to the recruitment or that the intelligence community is using academia, because he knows that the intelligence community is in need of intelligence and new knowledge that they do not have at the moment. Price is trying to convey that there is no need for the secrecy regarding who and what they are

⁷ NSA, FBI, DEA, CIA, DoD, the Pentagon to mention a few.

studying. Price urges anthropologists to keep the academia free and an open source of information where everybody can take part of the research that is being done (Price 2011:34-39).

6. The Connection between Human Terrain System and the Neoliberal State

The progress of globalization and a more neoliberal state is not a new phenomenon. David Harvey (2005) defines a neoliberal state as the following:

“What the US evidently sought to impose by main force on Iraq was a state apparatus whose fundamental mission was to facilitate conditions for profitable capital accumulation on the part of both domestic and foreign capital. I call this kind of state apparatus a neoliberal state” (David Harvey 2005:7)

Harvey discusses the modern globalization as a matter of closing the distances from a geographical and technological standpoint. Some things seen as a state responsibility by many states is now transforming, for instance in Slovakia and Chile the pension system is now privatized. The state is becoming more decentralized and the only remaining responsibilities that the state have is to secure a proper functioning of a free flow market structure. The state is required to set up a military, defense and police in order for the state to guarantee a functioning market, even by force if required. Democracy should be kept to a minimum according to neoliberalists since it creates a bias and inevitably distorts state interventions for somebody's own benefit (Harvey 2005:1-4, 64-65). I have included this part as an introduction to the neoliberal development all over the world. We are consciously acknowledging the hegemony of neoliberalism since people accept the power of WTO, IMF and other transnational agencies. The context that I want to convey is that the state is now not only affected by its own population. All countries are in a collaboration on many levels. Looking at how the decentralization of the state is affecting the military one must keep in mind that neoliberalism is not a new phenomenon in other sectors of the state.

Mattias Viktorin's (2008) thesis is about how an exercise was created in Sweden with 26 different NATO countries and different non-government organizations (NGO). The purpose with this exercise was to make a new policy on how to handle ethnic conflicts. The

thought was to make it obvious that peace-keeping operations need to make a combined effort with both the military and NGO:s. Viktorin questioned how much transparency there really was. The audit and evaluation of the exercise was discussed before the exercise actually started (Viktorin 2008).

The goal with the exercise was to try and combine NGO:s (Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières , etc.) with the military in order to make an intervention more effective during ethnic conflicts around the world. During the exercise all the participants were presented with a fictive country named Bogaland. They had to simulate operations concerning how to deploy peace keeping forces in order to stabilize⁸ Bogaland. What I find most relevant to my discussion is the new interest of the military to be transparent and how this is a part of a democratic model. Viktorin found that during the exercise, he had access everywhere and it almost made him uncomfortable. He discusses this throughout his thesis. He writes about how this is interesting since the military has for a long time been a totality⁹ especially considering culture, but has now become more open and more post-modern as many other public instances as a part of neoliberalism (Viktorin 2008:15-24).

Viktorin had access to a review group which made it possible for him to evaluate other people involved in the exercise without any hinder. This group was called EXEVAL and their purpose was to evaluate the exercise and the participants and report this to their decision-makers and politicians in their respective countries. Viktorin it found interesting that even before the exercise started, this group was formed and started evaluating the exercise. They made plans on how to evaluate and whom they were analyzing for. Viktorin mentions how he is skeptical about the transparency when EXEVAL are from the start putting it into a context with preset outcomes. Viktorin made a metaphor about the old man looking for his keys in the night, the man proceeds to look under the light cast on the ground because this is the only place he can see even though he knows that he most likely dropped them in the darkness (Viktorin 2008:21-23,131-135, Viktorin 2008:254-255).

A terminology that Viktorin uses is *conflict preventionism* which is an assemblage of the decreased military presence in national states but an increased military presence outside the national borders in coalition with transnational agencies. We now export our military into

⁸ I refer to the definition of stability in the start of my thesis

⁹ I refer to the definition of a total institutions by Erving Goffman (2014)

different types of transnational agencies like NATO, UN and EU. The goal with this is to be able to stop conflicts and prevent them even before they spawn. Viktorin discusses that the military have transformed and started using different neoliberal terminologies. The militaries around the world have started using terms as audit, revision and production in order to improve their operations. The military has in this instance been transformed as many other public agencies into a post-modern agent with the key goals of being effective and better as a part of neoliberalism (Viktorin 2008:15-17, URL 14).

Viktorin continues to present how peace keeping forces started within the framework of the UN. He explains that the foundation started in the aftermaths of World War II. Everything had to do with unity and universality within the military between countries, where all countries would deliver a form of a joint military force with mandate of UN. This never happened, rather UN kept it to a case-to-case basis and had to evaluate every conflict and decide how to create a military operation. Viktorin calls this the first generation of peace keeping forces. After the Cold War it became possible again within the Security Council to start to cooperate and this brought a lot of change to the peace keeping operations at the time. These new operations were called second generation peace keeping operations and contained a civil involvement. As an example Viktorin mentions Kongo as a more successful operation. During the next operations the troops started to experience problems, especially during the operations in Somalia and Yugoslavia. In these operations the troops involved had to act outside their normal framework of self-defense. Peace-keeping forces started to pick sides and conducted their own operation against targets. This created a new discussion about peace keeping forces. Many of these operations were considered failures because that they were insufficient and delayed. This is something that decision-makers still discuss today during active operations around the world (Viktorin 2008:46-47).

Viktorin mentions that this is called *humanitarian intervention* which was a discussion that started early when talking about operations conducted with an interest of conflict preventionism (Viktorin 2008:44-50). What I find interesting about humanitarian intervention is how media and politicians portray it to the public. What is *humanitarian intervention* and what is war? Many of these decisions become a statement of morality. When are decision-makers acting within the altruistic framework and when are they solely acting as an act of war? This is something researchers need to consider in the context of what McFate

writes in the discussion of overwhelming forces and big wars as a policy for the US military (McFate 2005:24-27, Viktorin 2008:17, 43-55).

The demand on the military is very different today considering what was demanded of the military during the early 20th century. The main goal for the military was to protect its national borders and the national interests. It was forced upon the public and every man had to do a compulsory military service as a citizen of a country. Today as a soldier you have a career, you have a choice and you do it on a somewhat voluntary basis. The times have changed and today you choose as a citizen to be a soldier rather than before when you were forced to do it as a compulsory service as a citizen. When anthropologists discuss the military in this context it becomes natural that anthropologists consider that soldiers start a career, they talk about their working environment, their schedule and their salary. We bring in new set of ideas into a context that has never been presented to the military before, there are neoliberal terminologies in the military (Viktorin 2008:17, 43-55, Ettinger 2005:743-764, URL 15).

What does this do to our time and our peace keeping operations? The central thing is still the UN. When the US invaded Iraq they asked for permission from the UN, even though they disregarded it. A strange thing with operations in a peace keeping environment is that troops should only act as self-defense. Instead of entering this hostile environment as observers in order to control both sides, the UN should be present with such a robust and major force that it threatens both sides. Any transnational agency such as NATO can be legitimized to act as a peace keeping force. A foundation for a peace keeping operations is to maintain and ensure that the human rights are being respected. This is a key change since the Cold War when the sovereignty principle was the key factor during discussions of interventions (Lafont 2016:427-445). Viktorin discusses this because the human rights are under debate since they are based on a western ideology and contain bias. The other solution would be to create a relative code of human rights based on cultural relativism. This would enable particular things within a culture to be important rather than using a static framework as the current human rights.

The problem Viktorin lifts is that neoliberalism is a form of consequence by which modern nations project their authority onto other regions. We see this in many different discussions today where countries claim they have authority to act on a region, such as the war in Vietnam and Korea (Viktorin 2008:15-22, 26, 43-55, URL 13).

My discussion here is relevant for the discussion about using applied anthropological research in the context of human rights. There are anthropologists who work for different transnational agencies such as the Monetary Fund. This problem has been raised within the discussion about applied anthropology. As seen, the problem is not as black and white as people wish. A new norm within the military is to employ civilian experts to consult on problems new to the military. All these small pieces build the new foundation on which the modern society is now formed on. The micro process in Afghanistan and Iraq can be seen as a global phenomenon and as a new neoliberal army.

7. New Ways for Ethics in Anthropology

My intention is in a heated debate, to shed some new light on the collaboration between anthropology and HTS. It is presented what the purpose is with HTS and how it is being used. The intention is to explain the positive effects of using the HTS and I have tried to present some of the critique on HTS. This thesis operates in a field that is often called applied anthropology. Applied anthropology is often defined as a more practical use of anthropology, that is, when anthropologists are using research methods and theories in order to solve more practical problems of sorts. A more simple definition of applied anthropology is that it is what anthropologists are doing outside the university. The participation of anthropologists in the field as military, in the HTS, or in the analysis of policies can be considered to be applied anthropology. In many other aspects a lot of critique have been voiced towards anthropologists who engage themselves in other areas outside of academia. But, the possibility for anthropologists to find information in the field that would otherwise be closed to an anthropologist, could help develop the academic field (Ervin A.M 2000:155).

The opposite sides within applied anthropology are the people in academia and the people who are working with applied anthropology. The difference that the different sides want to emphasize is that in academia they can choose how they do their research themselves. They do research from their own interest and are able to change the focus of an investigation during their fieldwork. Critics of applied anthropology claim that they do not choose their focus or goal on their own. The goal with the research and the methods are decided by a third party who rarely have anything to do with academia. The critics claim that by letting a third party decide the research factors it makes the research biased. In turn this would make the research irrelevant for anyone to use, especially for the party ordering the research. The problem is that people will still look at this research and believe it to be well done and reliable because of the involvement of anthropologists. This is one of the key arguments from the critics of applied anthropology. The applied anthropologists are involved in the direct decisions, not only on an advisory level. Applied anthropology and policy are connected in that applied anthropology contributes to policy (Ervin A.M 2000:1-12).

A major subject in applied anthropology is the study and use of policies, it was further discussed in the theory chapter. HTS can certainly be categorized as a military policy based

on anthropological methods and epistemology. A policy in general, is a guide to action, a translation of general goals in the context of a more general ideology. Policies are often missing the same concretion and completion as a law. Anyone can create a policy but what keeps a policy living as a norm or even as a legal guide is the external and internal motivation. The power of a policy is in collaboration with how people affected by it is motivated internally but also how it is enforced externally (Shore, C., & Wright, S. 1997:240).

Price discusses that there will never be a vacuum to discuss these subjects. The globalization of the world is a factor that anthropologists need to consider as it affects how the possibility to move ideas, people and cultures over long distances is easier than ever before. I may agree with Price that there is no neutral standpoint in cases concerning complex moral questions in the relationship to other cultures and political structures. I find it hard to decide what a good practice is for an anthropologist. Mead wrote in her first debate about the code of conduct that anthropologists needs to realize how their work can be used. In that process they need to adjust how they conduct their research. This is a key thing that anthropologists need to consider. I think it will be an impossible task to decide a strict set of principles for anthropologists because their field is one of the widest of all the disciplines. In the natural sciences it is much easier to create principles and rules on how to conduct research. The problem for the natural sciences is to decide whether the research should be done in the first place¹⁰ (Price 2011:30-31).

7.1 My own View

After considering books and articles surrounding the topic HTS, covert research and the new neoliberal military I have reached a few conclusions. It is by no accident that I chose to include Viktorin and his discussion on transparency and how the neoliberal development of the military have affected how the process of operation is now conducted. What I have come to see is that after 2000, when looking on what Price and McFate are saying, they aim for the same goal. Price is explicitly saying that McFate is doing something wrong and that she should be banished in the way she uses anthropology in a military context. That is also my

¹⁰ This is of course a simplification of a more complex problem. Natural sciences can consider many of their ethical dilemmas before starting their research, which I think is a difference between us and them.

feeling when reading what he has written. Price is trying to give us the image that using anthropology in a military context will damage the ability for future anthropologists to conduct their research, since the reputation of anthropologists could be affiliated with CIA and other intelligence agencies. Price also suggests that the damage done by anthropology is unforgivable considering the human terrain teams and the scandals all over the world for the past years.

The problem is that the military needs cultural knowledge and McFate says they will look at other sources to get it. Is it not better that anthropologists bite the sour apple and find a solution on how they conduct research in a military context in order to help? The key thing in this is that anthropologists want to help both parties. I can understand that some anthropologists are worried about the problem that could evolve, that anthropologists get the label as spies for the government. I can also see the label where anthropologists help stop an ethnic conflict due to the information they provide in order to prevent genocide.

McFate argues that all these scandals are unforgivable and that a lot of lives were lost due to the fact that improper research was used. I believe that this is the key thing, that the military was using improper research. We need to find a method for conducting applied anthropology in a military context. We need to create policy and first and foremost anthropologists need to get into the room with policy-makers in governmental positions. During the 1970's, Hickey's ideas of solving some of the problems in the Vietnam War were interesting and would be more worth exploring than the idea of overwhelming force. Hickey's idea was based in the culture of the peasants of Vietnam. Most of them were aimed towards individualism in a Taoistic context which in turn would have supported liberalism. Of course this does not prove anything and I am not saying that liberalism would have saved the people of Vietnam. What I am saying is that it is likely that the use of liberalism in the context of Taoism would have had better success in working together than the ideology of communism. In that instance it would be hard for the Vietcong to conduct an insurgency if the population were supporting the Southern ideology of liberalism. What both Price and McFate are agreeing on is that in an insurgency it is clear that the goal is to undermine the government and create chaos. If anthropologists were in some way able to find a way for the government to reestablish itself as the national power in a country it would diminish the support for the insurgency. To reestablish itself with the use of minimal force. We all can see

the use of this kind of work and the problems this creates. The problem that evolves here is that decision-makers have no proper way of knowing if supporting a government is what the population is supporting. Again the problem with which framework decision-makers should follow, human rights or cultural relativism, become the central part of their problem. If decision-makers choose to export some of their values and their culture into a different society, how can they not say that this is a new form of post-imperialism? When Westerners want to export their values of human rights and democracy they are in reality doing a new form of post-imperialism. It is a major ethnocentric benchmark that Western structure of society is the most liberal and free-will minded culture in the world today.

What I want to push for here is that the idea of using a culture relativistic analysis on other cultures could be a much more effective way of reaching an understanding of the opposing side or a country. This in turn would help us with our humanitarian efforts and conflict preventionism. What I am suggesting is that decision-makers combine the values in a United Nations founded policy which is more open to analysis and to the adaption to different cultures around the world. Decision-makers need a new policy that is much easier and shorter in order for them to examine a conflict and decide whether an intervention is required. Today there is no such things, today decision-makers are bouncing back and forth between the human rights and the sovereignty principle. What is key in this kind of policy document is that it would need the use of anthropologists and their cultural knowledge in order to create a policy that would be useable in the context of ethnic conflicts. It would make it possible for anthropologists in a situation of a conflict to be able to assist in grasping the native's point of view in order to find the kind of support that would be the most effective in order to stabilize the conflict.

Anthropologists could find a common ground where both parties can find their base of ideas and it would open up the possibility for diplomacy. Diplomacy needs to start in a common place or on common ground where both parties feels that they have a saying. This is never going to be possible if decision-makers continue to use the tactic of overwhelming forces. If anthropologists were to start doing this kind of research there would be no need for secrecy or covert research since it would all be conducted in a humanitarian context. I believe in the idea of the Viking 03 project, that decision-makers need to combine civilian and military efforts in a more effective matter. I do believe that in these civilian efforts people in

need would benefit if decision-makers could include anthropologists who could support with their research on what the local or indigenous people believe to be their valuable cultural ideas. I want to bring out the story that McFate wrote in her article about the soldier not knowing how to handle the cultural situation. Imagine when you have invaded a foreign country and you are presented by a completely different culture that you have no training or any kind of knowledge how to understand. The opposing side want to make an impression and they present to you their most valuable cultural values. These soldiers who a few moments ago were in a firefight are now presented with a whole new set of problems in a situation that they have never been in before. It is no wonder that misinterpretations are made.

Imagine if decision-makers had the possibility to send in anthropologists who are educated in analyzing and structuring the cultural system of a foreign culture. For me it is easy to see that this last scenario is much more favorable. When our water pipe breaks people call the plumber and when the floor needs remodeling people call the carpenter, for me it is obvious that if somebody needs a cultural expert they call an anthropologist. Anthropologists need to start working together and they need to start creating a policy and method in order for them all to agree that the research they do is ethnical acceptable. Anthropology have the advantage that many other disciplines have already carried out these policies, in natural sciences these conflicts started out years ago. What I believe is an inevitable development is that the military is going to need more of our support, and as universities everywhere are getting less and less funding, the funding for research needs to come from somewhere else. The progress is underway and anthropologists are going to get more and more tempted to take money from the intelligence community when other funding is disappearing. I think that creating these set of rules now, when anthropology is a bit ahead of time will make the transition a lot easier.

I do not oppose the principles of transparency, I believe Price is right and in the best of worlds the academy should continue to be open and transparent, but I also believe that this sounds like an utopia. What I believe is rather that the world today is very different from before. The choice for people to choose between their personal moral or a more universal moral as human rights is becoming less and less possible. In a world where neoliberal terms as effectiveness, audit and review are key terms, it is hard for people to find funding. The

choice between moral and funding is becoming a bigger problem than anthropologists acknowledge. This is by no means an excuse for anything, but when considering all the different faculties in a university it is clear that this process of making a connection between faculties and companies started a long time ago. In medicine it is more common for a company to pursue a cure or a vaccine than for a person to get sponsoring from a faculty to conduct the research. In these contexts it has become clear that many ethical problems have occurred with fabricated laboratory reports and other bad-conducted research. What I suggest is that politicians need to make a stronger safety net for those people willing to blow the whistle on a project that is getting out of hand. In Sweden there is a law that secures a person from legal prosecution of the state if they blow the whistle on something that is a threat to the general public or if it is a matter of breaking the law or the ethics. What I suggest is concrete and more rigid than having different ethics committees that should decide whether on a research project is against human rights. Companies and agencies will continue to recruit people off the record and on the record no matter what AAA does, AAA cannot stop this process. Especially when faculties like social sciences get less and less money to do their research.

In my opinion there is no difference between the engineers or medical doctors working on project for company in order to discover a drug and have the full right for this and sell it to the highest bidder. This will harm people and in other ways the morality of it is highly discussable, this is also coming to anthropology and the best thing anthropologists can do is to learn from other disciplines' mistakes.

Viktorin discusses that often the government turns to experts within a certain field. When discussing taxes people talk to an economist and if people discuss law they turn to a lawyer. Viktorin then proceeds to write that he thinks that anthropology is more relevant today, since decision-makers call for experts within culture and ethnicity. He writes that there is a tendency for anthropologists to act as these experts as able to explain and know since "anthropologists have been there in person". What Viktorin advocates is that anthropologists must change our mindset. When anthropologists do their fieldwork they must consider how to use their research on culture while still keeping within the boundaries of anthropology. Anthropologists need to consider that what they discover when they do fieldwork it is only a reflection of the current state of something at that time. This does not in effect deem that this

is the current state (Viktorin 2008:31-33).

In summary what I want to suggest is that anthropologists and the AAA need to set a policy and a clear methodology for how to conduct their research in a context of military operation. The combined efforts of a civilian joint military operation is a development that is coming and anthropology needs to stay in front of this development if it wants to have a possibility to affect the policies set in future operations. There is a need for cultural knowledge and the best people available to research this is anthropologists. Either anthropologists give it to decision-makers or they will look for it elsewhere. Funding for anthropology is rapidly decreasing and anthropologists need a new sources for their research if they want to stay in campuses.

8. Conclusion and Final Words

The intention is in a heated debate, to shed some new light on the collaboration between anthropology and about the HTS. It is presented what the purpose is with HTS and how it is being used. The intention is to explain the positive effects of using the HTS and I have tried to present some of the critique on HTS. The HTS concretizes the idea of applied anthropology in a military context. The idea of HTS is built on the need for more cultural knowledge in the military due to the neoliberal development in the world. The reason for the cultural knowledge is because the modern conflicts are built on principles and ethnicities rather than natural resources and territory. The problem of insurgency is not new and the idea of implementing a new society in a country is not new either, but the idea of how to do it more effectively, is.

I have tried to combine HTS and neoliberalism in an analysis in how the New World Order is connected in the new neoliberal development in other instances and how this effects the military. The conclusion that I have made is that decision-makers are progressing towards a situation where they are going to need social research in order to understand some of the conflicts around the world. The idea of insurgency is not going to become lesser of a problem since politicians are expanding their ideology everywhere. The connection between the new neoliberal state and the development of applied anthropology is based on the need of expert opinion. But anthropologists do have an unwillingness to work and help the military and NGO:s. This will create problems for both anthropologists and the society in the future. I suggest that anthropologists create a policy and a method for how they want research to be conducted in a military context, like the handbook I pointed out earlier. I wanted to have some interviews with people involved in the HTS but I neither had space in the thesis or the possibility to get anyone to talk to me about this. I wanted to see how Sweden uses this system since I do know that a colleague at our institution worked in Afghanistan in some capacity. I did not have enough time to do this. I suggest future research in the context on how the neoliberal army and how private armies are affecting the transparency of the government. The ability to employ civilians to carry out missions (Blackwater, Brownshirts to just mention some) that armies under mandate cannot carry out is interesting in this context and this could be a possible subject for researchers.

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