

A Case Study of the “Dağlıca Event”

From Chaos to Election Victory:

Media and Politics of Fear in the Political Communication of
Terrorism in Turkey



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“If you can control the meaning of words, you can control the people who must use the words”

-Philip K. Dick

Abstract

This thesis aims to examine the complex relationship between the realm of politics and media during a ‘terrorist event’ in Turkey by focusing on the politics of fear and the power relations between two. The research uses Critical Discourse Analysis as a primary method to analyse political communication and media coverage of a ‘terrorist attack’ in Turkey.

In 6th of September 2015, a military convoy was attacked in Dağlica, Turkey only two months before the snap elections. The event was one of the most important turning points before the election. Following the elections, Turkey had a strong turn towards authoritarianism and populism resulting in the erosion of media freedom and democracy. This research identifies the Dağlica event to analyse Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s (President of Turkey) interview and three news channels’ media coverage of the event in order to examine the political communication’s discursive mechanisms. By doing so, the research focuses on the appearances of relations between discursive and social practices. Finally, the thesis aims to contribute to broaden the knowledge of media critique for minimising media attributions to the political gains during such tragic events.

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1. Introduction

The Oxford dictionary defines somebody who unlawfully uses violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, for the pursuit of political aims as a ‘Terrorist’. The pursuit of political goals, however, is not solely the aim of those who commit acts of violence and intimidation. Political parties also pursue political aims. However, two different actors, political parties and ‘terrorist’ organizations, aim at their political goals in different ways. Political parties operate within the legal framework of the respective country they exist in. ‘Terrorist’ organizations operate outside of the legal framework and without concern for a country’s borders or jurisdiction. However, political parties have the state apparatus at their service to declare an organization a ‘terrorist’ because of its violent acts against the state or the political, social, economic and cultural status quo that exists on regional and/or global levels. The state apparatus enables political parties to have both structural and communicative power to create and reproduce narratives and discourses in line with their political aims.

Within the legal/illegal dichotomy, the media is the main arena for the struggle between the different political aims of two actors, since both actors, however different their aims are, communicate their aims to the masses *through* the media. The moment that those political aims are carried to the media they become socially symbolic acts, which are expressed via different discourses and narratives *in* the media. Socially symbolic acts *in* the media, however, have real social consequences since the social sphere constantly interacts with the meanings created by those socially symbolic acts, which eventually are transmitted *through* the media.

Terrorism, politics and the media in Turkey have been the focus of research for decades. The discourses and narratives of different political actors such as ruling political parties and different organisations, are widely available. The most studied organization is the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (later referred to as PKK). The PKK was a self-defined Marxist-Leninist political party that was founded with the goal of establishing an independent Kurdistan, a region that was understood to be occupied by Turkey (Öcalan, 1978) per their manifesto. The party aimed to liberate Kurdistan through armed struggle (ibid.). However, the party and ideas of the party’s founder Abdullah Öcalan have shifted to ‘Democratic Confederalism’ (Öcalan, 2005, 2009, 2011) and its aim is no longer independence but a ‘democratic co-existence’ (ibid.) within Turkey. The PKK is currently listed as a ‘terrorist’ organization in Turkey and its founder, Abdullah Öcalan, is in jail for life. The armed struggle of the party is still ongoing. PKK’s existence is part of a bigger issue called the ‘Kurdish Question in Turkey’. In the last decade,

Turkey has been through the three different periods in the ‘peace process’ trying to address the ‘Kurdish Question in Turkey’ under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (later referred as AKP). All these peace processes have collapsed. Since the foundation of PKK, forty years ago, and during three ‘peace processes’ of the last twelve years, media research has been limited to hegemonic and counter hegemonic discourses in the media.

Research that examines the concept of terrorism as a ‘stand-alone’ entity that mediates different sorts of nationalisms, public mobilization and power capitalization in the political realm via the media is absent. Therefore, this thesis will analyse how the politics of fear reveal themselves as socially symbolic acts *in* and *through* the media in Turkey via different discourses and narratives that aim to capitalize political gain during the presence of ‘terrorism’. This thesis identified an event that a political party, the AKP and the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (later referred to as Erdoğan) – the founder of AKP – communicated as a ‘terrorist attack’ in line with political aims for an upcoming election. The identified event took place two weeks after the official announcement of the snap elections that were going to take place in 1st of November (Hurriyet, 2015). Consequently, an important date that overlaps with the launch of the election campaign for the upcoming elections. The aim of this thesis, to theorise the coverage of ‘terrorism’ in the Turkish media landscape by analysing how the discourses and narratives launched by the political realm disseminates both symbolically and systemically *in* and *through* the media.

In the 7th of June 2015, Turkey had an election in which the ruling party lost the majority in the parliament. The results indicated a coalition government: AKP (41%), CHP (25%), MHP (16%), HDP (13%) (Hurriyet, 2015). The electoral threshold is ten percent in Turkey. The coalition negotiations ended without a meaningful solution. President Erdoğan decided to hold a ‘snap election’ the 1st of November the same year, without giving a chance to CHP, the second-place party in the election results, to form a coalition government (Hurriyet, 2015). The 22nd of July 2015, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, declared the “War on Terror” against the PKK after the alleged assassination of two police officers by PKK in Ceylanpınar, Şanlıurfa, Turkey (Hamsici, 2015). Within this context, this thesis will analyse the political communication of the ‘Dağlica terrorist attack’.

In 6th of September 2015 a military convoy was attacked by PKK militants’ (BBC Türkçe, 2015). The military convoy was attacked sometime between 12 p.m. and 3 p.m., according to

multiple sources (HPG Basın İrtibat Merkezi, 2015) (Yukus, et al., 2015). 16 Turkish soldiers died, the number of dead on PKK's side is disputed (BBC Türkçe, 2015). The mainstream media in Turkey didn't communicate any information about the attack until President Erdoğan confirmed the attack of the military convoy via live television at 9.45 p.m., in an "exclusive live interview" on A Haber, a Turkish news channel. Therefore, the thesis will take Erdoğan's live interview as the *communicative event* (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Erdoğan's interview is a critical point in how the Dağlica event is defined in Erdoğan's political discourse. The analysis will focus on the interview's attributions to the politics of fear following Altheide's emphasis on the importance of how an event is defined for the politics of fear (Altheide, 2006, p. 17).

After the communicative event, Turkish citizens organised 'response against terrorism' walks (Vatan, 2015). The public mobilization went on for two more days and led to fires being set to Kurdish shops around the country, as well as in the Pro-Kurdish party's headquarters in Ankara. Following the event, AKP and related NGOs organised rallies called 'Millions of Souls United Against Terrorism'. On the 1st of November 2015 'snap elections' took place, and the AKP won the majority (49%) that granted the party the right to form a government by itself (NTV, 2015).

Within the core of theorising lies the 'stand-alone' position of the 'terrorism' narrative as a socially symbolic act in the Turkish media landscape. The broader goal of this thesis is to understand relations between the politics of fear and social control in the Turkish context for political parties to reach their goals. The questions this thesis attempts to answer are:

1. How does the terrorism narrative in the mainstream media 'stand-alone' as a socially symbolic act?
2. In what ways do the politics of fear interact with the civic subject through the media?

The literature review will explore current discussions and concepts that help to shed light on the connections between the political realm, media and terrorism in the Turkish context. The PKK-Turkey conflict has a long history; thus, the literature review will deal with representations of the 'Kurdish Question in Turkey' in the media to contextualise the research with the purpose of setting out the *order of the discourse* (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). The contextualisation will furthermore provide a critical analysis of Turkish nationalism and the representation of Kurdish identities in the production of television news in Turkey. The

literature review will also synthesise the politics of fear concept with mass-mediated terrorism to understand how “them” vs. “us” discourses and narratives *in* and *through* the media are symbolically and systemically constructed. Those concepts will concentrate on the intersections of media power and political power to understand politics of fear mechanisms in the Turkish media ecology after the Dağlica event.

The third chapter lays the ground work for the research design of the thesis. Critical realism constitutes the methodological epicentre and basis of the research design. Critical discourse analysis (later referred to as CDA) will be used to analyse the video material from a 24-hour period after the Dağlica event took place. The analysis will mark a communicative event within a timeframe of 24 hours, starting from Erdoğan’s live television interview after the Dağlica event and apply CDA to the text that is produced by Erdoğan. Furthermore, the analysis will both quantitatively and qualitatively analyse how the discourse about the Dağlica event spread in three different mainstream television channels in Turkey: A Haber, CNN Türk and NTV during the following 24 hours. To conclude the chapter, the rich data will be used quantitatively to shed light upon the multifaceted relation between the political realm and the media coverage of ‘terrorism’ in the Turkish media.

The fourth chapter will enhance the concepts in the literature review and assess them with the data by applying CDA to the text produced by Erdoğan and Davutoğlu after the Dağlica event. This will contextualize the concepts and ideas in the thesis and enable the research to theorise the intersectionality of the ‘terrorism’, the political realm and the media ecology in Turkey. Secondary qualitative analysis of the media coverage/non-coverage following the 24 hours of the Dağlica event will shed light on the symbolic power and systemic power of the media in Turkey. The analysis will formulate *how* political communication works after a ‘terrorist’ attack and the role of the media in Turkey.

The conclusion will assess the analysis with the relevant concepts from the literature review with the aim to reflect on the various social practices such as ‘Millions of Souls United Against Terrorism’ rallies, the violence against HDP buildings (the pro-Kurdish party) and the ‘snap elections’ on the 1st of November 2015. This project aims to develop an inclusive media coverage in Turkey, that is not alienating cultural, ethnic or social groups hence the probability of political gains by relevant actors over similar events that might happen in near future can be limited.

The overall theoretical framework will rely on concepts about politics, terrorism and the media developed in the US and Europe after 9/11 and additionally draw from media power and system concepts from the same region. The thesis will contextualise a critical approach against Turkish nationalism and historicize the Dağlıca event by presenting representations of Kurdish identity from existing research.

2. Literature review

“This is a book about power”, says David L. Altheide in the first line of his book *‘Terrorism and the Politics of Fear’* (Altheide, 2006, p. 1). So is this thesis. In this chapter, the research will make use of different key concepts and contexts to theoretically unfold the complex mechanisms of the discursive practices where the political realm and the mainstream media in Turkey intertwine by utilizing fear, via profiteering from people’s fears, in the case of a ‘terrorist’ event.

The mass media plays an important role in constructing social life. Power sits in the centre of this construction in the Foucauldian sense of a *productive force* (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) that reveals itself through different discourses and narratives. In times of crisis, the productive essence of power enables the ones holding power to impose their agenda over the society through fear. In Turkey, the political elite constructs fear before an election using Turkish mass media. The analysis of the Dağlıca event’s political communication will provide an understanding of how the construction of this fear takes place *in* and *through* the media.

The first section of the literature review will provide a framework for the representation of Kurdish identity in the Turkey’s public discourse by looking at the historical context and the PKK-Turkey conflict. The second section will examine different theories regarding mass-mediated terrorism and its translation to the politics of fear and its ideological implications in ethno-nationalist and ‘us vs. them’ discourses. The third section will explore the systemic and symbolic power concepts and contextualise them in the media ecology of Turkey.

2.1 The Kurdish Question and Turkish Nationalism

When a research topic is related to the Turkey-PKK conflict, it is important to consider its long history and how it came to be. The Turkey-PKK conflict is more than 40 years old, but, like every conflict, it has a historical background. The ‘Kurdish Question’ is as old as the foundation of Turkish Republic, if not older. It is also one of the most discussed topics in academia. The extent of the literature varies, from publications that highlight security to those that focus on socio-economic, political, and cultural aspects. This review will focus on the discourses and narratives that occupy the public sphere in Turkey for media research purposes.

There are 13.8 million Kurds in Turkey, according a survey done by Konda (Erdem, 2013). Throughout the history, the relationship between the earlier Ottoman Empire and then the later Republic of Turkey went through distinct eras. From the 16th until the 18th century, the Kurdish region had a “buffer-zone status” between the Ottoman and the Safavid Empire, mainly based on delicate "balances of power” between the two rival empires (McDowall, 1996). Coinciding with the fall of Safavid Empire in the 18th century, the buffer-zone status of the Kurdish region transformed, and the region was integrated into the Ottoman ‘system’ (Ciment, 1996).

Hobsbawm’s (1992) concept of different stages of nationalism is helpful for better understanding the relationship between the Kurdish Question and Turkish nationalism after the 18th century. The first stage of nationalism takes place between the French Revolution and 1918. The second stage can be placed between 1918 and 1950, while the third one presents the last stage of Turkish nationalism, nationalism in the late 20th century.

2.2.1 The First Stage of Nationalism (1789-1918)

During the 19th century the Ottoman Empire entered the centralization and reformation period. Hobsbawm (1992) argues that the origins of nationalism(s) should be sought at the point of intersection between *politics, technology and social transformation*. The Kurdish Question emerged in the midst of these intersections, during the formation of Turkish nationalism. To understand the relationship between the roots of the Kurdish Question and the origins of Turkish nationalism, it makes sense to shed light on the centralization process of the Ottoman Empire at that time. During the centralization period, Mardin (2007) emphasizes the intersection of politics, technology, social transformation, all of which had an impact on the definition of the Kurdish Question. The *social transformation* can be seen in the “Imperial Edict of Reorganization” (Tanzimat Fermanı (1839)), the first document in Ottoman history that gives

an 'equal status' to Christian, Jewish or Muslim subjects in the eyes of the state and can therefore be considered as a step towards a contemporary definition the state. Before that Muslims were seen as the superior class.

The centralizing reforms by the Ottoman state had profound impacts on the Ottoman community/society (Heper, 1980). According to Heper, the aim was to establish a uniformed and centralized administration that was directly linked with each citizen and working with its own rational principles of justice, that was equally applied to all (1980, p. 92).

In contrast to this view, a Foucauldian perspective of history sheds light on how a central power structure, the Ottoman rulers, implemented a top to bottom change that aimed to uniform the subjects under the conditions of a central power figure. Along with reforms that strengthened 'centralization' the conditions of the Kurdish region [as well as other parts of the Empire] had been reshaped (Mardin, 2007). Mardin explains that the Kurdish region became more attached to the 'centre' [Ottoman central power] and was expected to become 'Ottoman' with "consciousness of being Ottoman" ('Osmanlılık') by 'fusing' a large variety of cultural units among the empire with presenting nationwide administrative, judicial and economic measures of centralization (2007, p. 12). This is the first modernity-type relationship between the central power structure and Kurds in Turkey. Within this intersection, the Kurdish region fell into chaos (Van Bruinessen, 2005, p. 108). Local Kurdish notable leaders resented losing their local powers and privileges. They disapproved of the implementation of centralization and rebelled (ibid. p. 109). Consequently, the centre-periphery relationship is the first important point to consider as the normative defining element of the Kurdish Question in the Turkish central power structure.

Another aspect to discuss during this period of centralization is the rise of 'Islamic Unity' within the Ottoman Empire in the last quarter of the 19th century. Even though dissenting voices were present against the centralization process in the empire, Islam was the main bond that kept the Kurdish region and Ottoman Empire together (Yeğen, 1999). As Yeğen suggests, Islam was a significant point of reference in the organization of Ottoman politics and administration (1999). However, as the decline of the empire went on and the centralization polices increased the 'Turkification' process that gained momentum with the start of the Committee of Union and Progress' (CUP) rule, along with the rise of 'Young Turks' (Yeğen, 2007). Kurds became the "Muslim elements" of the empire "soon to be Turks" via assimilation (ibid.). Yeğen underlines

that the politics of westernization and nationalism mutually culminated in the gradual erosion of the role of Islam in the organization of Ottoman politics and administration (1999). Yeğen sees the process of the CUP's coming to power as the victory of Turkish nationalism over Ottomanism (ibid.).

However, this thesis' approach is rather different. It is the centralization process, which is constituted by the knowledge and power relations that aim to define the Ottoman's subjects position, which is the central/periphery position. Islam and the 'Ottoman citizenship' aspect was only a tool in the service of power to gain control over the Kurdish subjects. Against this backdrop, this project disagrees with Yeğen's (2007) positive depiction of the Ottoman citizenship idea attempting to define Turkish nationalism over a good/bad dichotomy. Because as Yeğen also suggests, Turkish nationalism flourished in the very same milieu, where Ottomanism arose (2007, p. 122). It developed, in other words, in the bosom of a reform programme (ibid.).

From a Foucauldian perspective, Turkish nationalism arose within the already existing power structure with discursive and non-discursive elements that were already established. Turkish nationalism won as Yeğen suggests (2007) but the subjectification didn't change regarding the Kurdish Question, it merely changed with respect to the tools and institutions. Rather than replacing Islam and Ottomanism, institutions and discourses attached to them such as 'Turkification' and secularization were added to the central power structure. The author of this thesis prefers a fractal reading of history over power relations aligning with a Foucauldian perspective similar to Friedrich Nietzsche's work *Beyond Good and Evil* (1989). Overall, the modernization and centralization process of the empire gave birth to Turkish nationalism along with the development of nationalist discourses in Turkey.

2.2.2 The Apogee of Nationalism (1918-1950)

After World War I the Ottoman Empire came to its end to soon become the new-born 'Republic of Turkey'. During the foundation of the new republic, Kurds were allied with state founding republican forces. Sofos and Özkırımlı (2008) underline the importance of the 'Islam' factor during the foundation of the new republic and present two viable reasons: the struggle against the 'infidel' West and the fear of an Armenian state in the Kurdish region. This transition period went on until 1924. After this period, Turkey, the new nation, followed the footsteps of Turkish nationalism. According to Yeğen, Turkish nationalism conceived 'Turkishness' as the only

possible ground for political unity on Ottoman territory (2007) and Turkish nationalism became the constitutive ideology of the modern ‘nation-state-society’ according to Özkırımlı (2002). There are different elements to consider in the foundation and the application of Turkish nationalism. One of them is the element of fear. There is a lack of the literature on the issue of fear regarding the foundation of the republic. Sofos and Özkırımlı provide an explanation for the ‘psyche’ of the nation builders of that time:

“‘Survival’ and ‘fear of extinction’ remained a central element in the motivation of the Turkish nation builders. Faced with a Western gaze that exoticized the Ottoman Empire and at the same time ostracized it from what was perceived to be the family of modern nations, and living through the slow yet irrevocable dissolution of the empire—experienced as a painful and protracted process of ‘implosion’—the first Turkish nationalists were indelibly marked by an obsessive fear of annihilation that has often taken the form of a ‘collective paranoia’ in the subsequent history of the republic. This has often translated itself into a perception of being trapped, or of being surrounded by enemies, as the oft-quoted slogan ‘The Turk has no friend but the Turk’ illustrates; this has led to an excessive emphasis on ‘unity and togetherness’ which manifested itself in persistent attempts to create a homogeneous society, a society without any cleavages.” (Sofos and Özkırımlı, 2008, p. 188-189)

Following Sofos and Özkırımlı’s explanation, this thesis focuses on the Turkish discourses of nationalism that were constituted by fear.

2.2.3 The Politics of Fear in Turkish Discourses of Nationalism and the Kurdish Question

The thesis located two elements of fear related to the Kurdish Question and Turkish nationalism in the literature: fear of the past and fear of the ‘outer enemies’. The first one is explained by Yeğen as “tension with the past”. The Kurdish question became a tension between the past, where the Ottomans and Islam represented the old, undeveloped, ignorant periphery and where the present represented the modern, secular, centre (Yeğen, 1999). The newly founded Turkish state didn’t even name ‘the problem’ over “Kurdishness” because the new nationalists denied the identity of the Kurds through the Turkish History Thesis, according to which the Kurds and Turks were descendants of a Turanian race that came from Central Asia five thousand years ago (Özkırımlı & Sofos, 2008).

Yeğen explains that Turkish nationalism attributed “backwardness” to the definition of the Kurdish Question. Political reaction, banditry, local religious leaders (sheikhs) and feudal landlords were on the one side and the republican government and army were on the other side promising progress and prosperity. Against those resisting the modern, secular and national ‘state-society’ were the protectors of such a state-society, namely the republican state and the republican military (Yeğen, 2007, p. 128). Because it played a constitutive role in the discourse

of Turkish nationalism within the fear context and Turkish nationalisms relation to the Kurdish Question the Turkish military is one focus of this thesis. The army, as the crystallized evidence of the existence, power, and manifestations of the nation-state, takes on a central role in the regeneration of official nationalism (Bora, 2003, p. 437). Yeğen suggests the Republican government and army as the centre of the nation state (2007), with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Ataturk means ‘Father of Turks’) being a leader of both with dictatorial powers (Ahmad, 1993). Consequently, two figures, Mustafa Kemal and the army are represented as the guardians of the modern state-society in the official discourse of nationalism. Bora argues that each actor completes the other one. As a consequence of the “state-founding military” character of the Turkish Armed Forces, which are identified with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his mission, the army considers itself to be the “true owner” and personified symbol of nationalism (Bora, 2003, p. 437).

The second element of fear in the discourses of Turkish nationalism is the fear of outside incitement. According to Yeğen Turkish nationalism did not hesitate for long to establish a connection between the unrest of the Kurds and the *outside* (Yeğen, 2007, p. 130). The claim that the Kurdish unrest could be attributed to outside incitement was first put forward in 1925. The Court of Independence had concluded in its verdict that the rebellion was incited by foreigners. However, Yeğen suggests that the anxiety was not without a reason (*ibid.*) which is yet another linear historical reading. Yeğen states that the anxiety of foreign infiltration was driven by the traumatic experience during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and that the empire had been the object of some strategic manoeuvre between the imperialists of in the nineteenth century (*ibid.*). Because it is the knowledge (outside incitement) produced by normative institutions (The Court of Independence) that was founded by the central power structure (the Republican government), the anxiety of foreign infiltration can also be seen as a constituted discursive practice.

Current perceptions of the Kurdish Problem show the constitutive impact on the subject position in Turkey. According to Yeğen Turkish nationalism’s notion of the outside, i.e. the foreign states which were believed to be the major threat for the Turkish state as well as the state that was believed to be inciting the Kurds changed from one period to another. Outsiders inciting the Kurds sometimes included Western imperialists and northern communists, at other times southern neighbours. This perception was shared by all versions of Turkish nationalism at almost all times (*ibid.*). Therefore, such a reading of Turkish nationalism can be objected by

the following argument: The notion of the outside has changed but the constituted fear element – outside incitement – has stayed same.

Overall, the stage of the apogee of nationalism was where the root language of Turkish nationalist discourse was constituted entailing two fear elements. There are discursive and non-discursive elements that can be considered. First, the past was defined as a ‘problem’ by the power structure. As a non-discursive power institution; the nation state was ‘the solution’ to that problem, implementing an ethicist modernization and further centralization. Meanwhile, the Kurdish Question was associated with the past as well. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire meant disintegration of the central power structure, not a traumatic event as Yeğen suggests. The solution was the creation of an institution which is the modern secular state to hold on to power with an even more centralized version of the state and defining opposing elements as representatives of the past. The second step and problem to confront in this process was to create unity inside the country. The solution was the creation of an outside enemy that could be utilized for the sake of centralizing power and relating it to the Kurdish Question.

2.2.4 Liberal Neo-Nationalism and Islamist Nationalist Discourses in the Late Stage of Nationalism

This strand of nationalism carries the development aspect of the official discourse of nationalism. According to Bora liberal neo-nationalism uses a discourse that interprets modernization, using the ideology of economics, and that focuses the progressivist-developmental aspect of the process of modernization (Bora, 2003, p. 440). This strand relates to the Kurdish Question by means of economic integration. The “backwardness problem” of the Kurdish Question was marked as economic underdevelopment. However, development was seen as the mediator for ‘civilizing’ the region (Yeğen, 2007, p. 132). The aim was to integrate Kurds into the new nation-state-society through the market (ibid). The civilization and the *fear of the past* element in the official nationalist discourse was carried into this discourse even though its articulation changed.

The globalization wave during the 1980s and 1990s caused profound impacts on liberal neo-nationalism. According to Bora, one very important source of pride for liberal nationalism is the degree to which the domestic market integrates with the global market and becomes identical to world markets (2003, p. 442). As a consequence, the definition of civilization had a shift with liberal neonationalism. Today, the indicator of the “rank of modern civilization” is

consumer culture, which is also a sign of “universal culture” (ibid.). In this era, the discourse of liberal nationalism returned to the elements of official nationalism. Because of the rise of political Islam, the fear of the past, a past that was related to the Islamic heritage of the Ottoman empire does not constitute an element of this dialect of Turkish nationalism. Yeğen suggests that the rising political Islam ‘saved’ Kurds from such an accusation. What was left of the language of the past was a set of categories such as banditry, foreign incitement and regional underdevelopment.

Although mainstream nationalism perceived the Kurdish resistance of the 1990s by virtue of all these concepts, foreign incitement was by far the predominant one (Yeğen, 2007, p. 137). Yeğen connects this perception with the growing strength of ideas concerning identity, difference, culture, human rights and new division of labour in Turkey that arrived the globalization. However, this is another point this research objects. It is important to examine the development aspect of Islamist nationalism in this case. Liberal neo-nationalism was a discursive practice with economic aspects that went together with the development of institutions, such as first private TV channels and the liberalization of the economy. In terms of development in an economic sense liberal nationalism was more inclusive. The Islamist discourse successfully bonded itself with the liberal nationalistic discourse from the economic backdoor liberal neonationalism opened. As Bora suggests the Muslim technocratic elite and the new Muslim bourgeoisie is a faithful disciple of the “cause for national progressivism”. In this vein, the possibility for a bond between the nationalistic elements within the RP (Welfare Party, a party AKP emerged from in which Erdoğan was an important figure as the mayor of Istanbul)-centred Islamist movement and the liberal nationalistic discourse was created (Bora, 2003, p.449). In doing so, Islamist nationalism excluded the fear of Islam from the fear of past and only left other concepts such as banditry, foreign incitement and regional underdevelopment (Yeğen, 2007, p. 137) related to the Kurdish Question for the liberal discourse of neonationalism.

While Islamist nationalism was also perceived as the ‘ghost of the past’ in the 1990s, it has overcome the ‘other’ status by sharing the same fear elements with liberal neonationalism, which are overall shared and derived from official nationalism as well. The aspect of outer powers appears in the form of anti-western xenophobia in combination with a feature of “being national” that centres on Islam (actually “Turko-Islam”) as the core of authenticity for the Turkish national identity in Islamist nationalism (Bora, 2003, p. 449). Sofos and Özkırmılı’s

concept of ‘existential schizophrenia’ (2008, p. 12) fits in this case. According to Sofos and Özkırmı, in the quest of a safe haven with an “undisputed past”, mechanisms of projection of modern designs to the murky waters of history have become an obsession (ibid). Excluding Islam from official definitions of Turkishness, or at least repressing some of its manifestations, was the option favoured by Kemalism in all its variants. In both cases though, nationalists had to straddle the dividing line between two competing universes and make significant compromises (Özkırmı & Sofos, 2008, p. 72)

Overall, liberal neonationalist discourse is a loose one; it is not yet articulated. For this reason, it can easily succumb to the hegemony of other nationalistic discourses (Bora, 2003, p .445). It is still in the making and it has become a dominant factor in Erdoğan’s political discourse as the analysis will show.

2.2 Politics of Fear and Media Power

This chapter examines the current discussions and ideas about the politics of fear, nationalism and media power in order to provide a better understanding of the complex conditions of the media and political landscape in Turkey after a ‘terrorist attack’.

The feeling of fear is as old as humanity itself, if not older. It well may be independent of social construction (Bourke, 2005, p. 8). However, the emotions people express through their bodies are another thing. Nevertheless, the body is not simply the shell through which emotions are expressed (Bourke, 2005, p. 8), as Bourke suggests. Bourke focuses on the experience of fear, or in other words on how subjects experience emotions through their bodies shaped by discourse. Discourse shapes bodies (ibid.). However, bodies also shape discourses: people are “weak or pale with fright”, “paralysed by fear” and “chilled by terror” (ibid.). The affect and effect mechanisms though aren’t the focus of this research. The research focuses on the conditions where political discourses and discursive practices are produced under conditions of fear with an aim to explain the *hows* in the process which is articulated as *politics of fear*.

If the feeling of fear is as old as humanity so is the use of the feeling of fear for controlling populations. Fear was used for justifying social control measures and has been part of the game plan to control populations for centuries (Altheide, 2006, p. 17). Politics of fear in our age refer to an element attached to institutionalised social control that acts through power, which may be

defined as the ability to define a situation for self and others (Altheide, 2006, p. 15). When social control expands, we can see the growth of politics fear (ibid.). According to Altheide politics of fear is about decision makers. Decision makers promote and use of assumptions about danger, risk and fear in order to achieve certain goals (Altheide, 2006, p. 15). The research's topic overlaps with the definition of politics of fear since – as Altheide suggests – it is examining a period when social control had intentions of expanding before and after an event, here the Dağlıca event. The politics of fear appear when social control is perceived to have broken down and/or a higher level of control is called for by a situation or events, such as a “terrorist attack” (Altheide, 2006, p. 16). With Altheide this research emphasizes the acts of power.

When an event such as the Dağlıca event happens, it is already connected to established beliefs and assumptions in the society before it is explained via discourses. Against this backdrop, the Dağlıca event becomes a crisis-like event that has a cumulative public definition already. While a specific crisis might erupt suddenly, the politics of fear emerge gradually when there is a cumulative public definition of a crisis that will challenge political leadership, sovereignty, national identity, or ideology (Altheide, 2006, p. 17). At this point, social control mechanisms have an opportunity to expand by having the power to define the situation which is the critical point of how an event is defined (ibid.). It is the way in which this definition is shaped and engineered that also requires some attention. The basic process of defining the situation and justifying politics of fear involves propaganda or the manipulation of information for a specific purpose (Altheide, 2006, p. 17).

Manipulation and propaganda have different ways to operate, for example sports events, advertisement, crime shows, news and so on. This project focuses on news media coverage regarding the Dağlıca event to examine different discourses of nationalism in this process. Altheide underlines the nationalist figures, symbols and discourses in the application of the politics of fear. The politics of fear rely on nationalism and perceived consensus against an enemy. Engineering the appearance of consensus and applying pressure to get on with the program and to demonstrate consensus is part of the propaganda apparatus that underlies all efforts to achieve politics of fear (Altheide, 2006, p. 39).

2.3 Construction of Politics of Fear in Nationalism

In her book “Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean”, Wodak (2015) offers a detailed explanation on how the politics of fear function in the service of nationalism. According to Wodak, a “Us vs. Them” rhetoric is the core of the politics of fear. She suggests that national as well as ethnic and racialized identities are discursively constructed to create an ‘imaginary’ with nativist borders between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ (Wodak, 2015, p. 9). Wodak argues that there is an emotional dimension of belonging and attitude of the “us vs. them” polarization that aims group formation. The shared emotional dispositions resonate with the members of a given in-group as well as with their attitudes towards members of an outgroup (Wodak, 2009, p. 4).

The “Us vs Them” rhetoric is a common discursive practice among right wing populist movements. Wodak argues that right wing movements endorse essentialized concepts of nationalism and express it in more restrictive (nativist) body politics. (Wodak, 2015, p. 71) However, mainstream political parties are afraid of losing votes and heading towards to same direction (ibid.). Similar nativist opinions are now endorsed by the mainstream parties, who out of fear to lose votes welcome such right-wing populist views. In addition to polarization, right-wing populists depends on the “will of the people” Wodak argues. What is inside and outside of their definition of the body of the nation is trying to be determined through new “historical” claims (Wodak, 2015, p. 21). A general claim of right-wing populist movements is ‘the people’ being a homogenous idea which is based on nativist ideologies, thus on traditional body politics. Attempts on the redefining ‘the people’ are accompanied by a revisionist view of history which has become a trend in the public discourse as Wodak suggests. The rhetoric of exclusion has become part and parcel of a much more general discourse about strangers within and outside the ‘body’, that is, the nation state (Wodak, 2015, p. 21).

Another concept of Wodak that will be considered in the analysis of Erdoğan’s political discourse is the one-man ruler hegemony. Wodak underlines the rise of the “one-man ruler” phenomenon in politics in the application of the politics of fear. Wodak argues, that the current commodified and personalized political atmosphere brought ‘charismatic’ leaders to the ‘spotlight’. Leaders, usually male, operate with a hierarchical structure to exploit modern trends of the political profession to perfection. (Wodak, 2015, p. 21)

2.4. Terrorism, Victimization and Media Power

The “terrorist attack” occurs in a political communication triangle, that consists in the interconnectedness of the media, public officials, and the general public (Nacos, 2002). Within this triangle, the media play an important role. When it comes to the coverage of terrorism the media has a part in the construction of the politics of fear (Wodak 2015). According to Altheide, the current predicament of the politics of fear and nationalism is related to the “media logic” of our time. News formats or the way of selecting, organizing, and presenting information, shape audience assumptions and preferences for certain kinds of information. The mass media are important in shaping public agendas by influencing what people think about and how events and issues are packaged and presented (Altheide, 2006: 116). Media logic is constituted by different elements of fear and consumption together. Altheide suggests:

- “(1) Fear supported consumption as a meaningful way for audiences to sustain an identity of substance and character.
- (2) The consumption and giving were joined symbolically as government and business propaganda emphasized common themes of spending/buying to ‘help the country get back on track’ (and related euphemisms).
- (3) The absence of a clear target for reprisals contributed to the construction of broad symbolic enemies and goals.
- (4) Consumption as investing promoted a massive increase in military spending.” (Altheide, 2006, p. 89)

The product status of terrorism provides an opportunity to the realm of the politics to market their own ‘products’ and their own brands. Crisis serves as an opportunity for heads of state to present themselves as leaders and to dramatically define a situation as tragic but hopeful and to bring out the “resolve” of national character (Altheide, 2006, p. 89). Altheide argues that the military also markets its own product which is war, in this case war against terrorism by forming a complex with the media. Corner underlines the harmony in the media systems and explains the “power reinforcement” role of the media. Power reinforcement occurs where there is broad harmony between tendencies and orientations of the political and economic system (Corner, 2013, p. 20). Altheide suggests that the military-media complex a part of this harmony.

Programmes in the entertainment era are dominated by popular culture and communication forms that relay sophisticated information technology promoting visual media and evocative content (Altheide, 2009, p. 91). While marketing their products the military-media complex familiarized audiences with coalitions against evil. For example, the collective response to the terror attacks of 9/11 was framed as a communal patriotic experience that provided opportunities to “come together” and be “united” (Altheide, 2006, p. 92). The military-media complex works with four elements: news, the discourse of fear, news sources and the politics

of fear. Altheide suggests that the way the news are presented or “framed” in TV and newspapers constitutes the discourse of fear. News rely on certain symbols and promote particular relationships between words, deeds, and issues while guiding the perspectives, frameworks, language, and discourse that we use in relating to certain problems (Altheide, 2006, p. 115). Related to that Altheide argues, journalists are depending military and administration sources as “news sources”, therefore enabling the government to direct the language of news (2006, p. 117).

While news reports strengthened the connection between terrorism and fear, a critical symbol in the politics of fear and the media is “victim and victimization” (Altheide, 2006, p. 125). The victim and victimization are promoted through the media with the assumption that we are all actual or potential victims and needed to be protected from the source of fear – terrorists (Altheide, 2006, p. 115) and even anticipate further victimization, through the curtailment of civil liberties, and stifle dissent as being unresponsive to citizen needs or even “unpatriotic” (Altheide, 2006, p. 129). Therefore, Altheide suggests that terrorism and fear have been merged through victimization (2006, p. 127). Overall, the media have a crucial position in constituting the politics of fear. During the process media promotes and markets a ‘feeling’ and/or experience through which terrorism enables social participation. According to Altheide, community and commensurability were joined reflexively through consumption as an act social participation. On the one hand, mass-media symbolic constructions of victims and terrorism contributed to a “national experience” oriented toward communal values and reaffirmation of cultural narratives. (Altheide, 2006, p. 111)

3. Methodology

This research used video footage from three thematic (news) television channels in Turkey for assessing the ideological and hegemonic power structures/relations represented in and through the media after the Dağlıca event. By taking the President of Turkey’s political communication as the starting point, the analysis can provide an explanatory critique of the media coverage of a ‘terrorist’ event, if not to the ‘terrorism’ concept in Turkey as a whole.

The questions this thesis sets to explore are about the *how* mechanisms in terrorism narratives and the politics of fear which are impossible to quantify. In order to spatially locate such

unquantifiable issues a qualitative approach was taken. Thus, Critical Discourse Analysis is applied to different texts that appeared on three television channels in a 24-hour time span. In addition, the analysis was supported by quantitative data for grounding the research's qualitative findings.

The research has certain ontological and epistemological archetypes it derives from that should be articulated. It explores the experiences of subjectification via media that are constituted and/or constrained by the power structures. Foucault's concept of power is always bound with knowledge (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). Meanings are defined through power. Power structures can constitute the discourse that defines a 'problem', which in this research is terrorism. At the core of that power structure is the dialectical relationship between the Kurdish Question and Turkish nationalism in those areas where Turkish nationalism as the modernist ideology of the founders or the founding ideology of Turkey defines what the Kurdish Question 'is' or 'is not' as well as how it is related to terrorism. Hence, the produced knowledge creates a discourse along with normative power systems such as institutions, security systems in Turkey's case, specialized to define the 'problem'. Therefore, subjects experience 'terrorism' within pre-defined conditions and founded institutions of the state apparatus, to tackle the problem of 'terrorism'.

An issue or a condition may already exist materially, for example the cultural right of the Kurds, however it becomes a problem because it is defined as a 'problem' by the existing power structures. The ontological aspect here is the material world that is transformed by the human experience and human experience that is transformed by the material world. For making it clear, Foucault (1977) explains in "The Birth of Prison: Discipline and Punish" (1977) how "the legal" defined what "illegal" is and thus developed normative systems, prisons, constituting a social order within a power structure. From this point of departure, the discourse, which is the foundation of CDA, consists of three different relations: firstly, the relations between institutions, secondly relations in the language – linguistics, rhetoric, logic, grammar and thirdly, discursive relations, that is the relation between non-language (material) and language (ideal). According to Foucault, the discourse appears within the relation between non-language and language aspects of power structures. Overall, this research has a Foucauldian understanding of discourse as an ontological assumption.

Following this ontological assumption, the research focuses on discourse from a critical realist perspective. For critical realists, material practices are not reducible to discourse or without meaning unless interpreted discursively. Material practices are given an ontological status that is independent of, but in relation with discursive practices (Bhaskar, 1989, p. 4). By looking at the coverage of the Dağlica event in Turkish media, the research explores how the power mechanisms during a ‘terrorist’ event work and attempts to discover if and under what conditions in the discursive formation they have been activated. In a further step, the research brings an explanatory critique of the ‘problem’ identified by individuals or groups in society. Since the research also has the stand point of critical realism as an epistemological assumption, the analyst has to work with what has actually been said or written and explore “patterns in and across the statements” and identify “the social consequences of different discursive representations of reality” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 21). Locating the patterns and representations of reality entails two dimensions related to the ontological assumption of this research. First, the grammatical aspect that constitutes the micro analysis of the text, will be Erdoğan’s interview which will be analysed with the help of using Van Dijk’s (1993) and Wodak’s (2009b) CDA methods. Second, the macro analysis focuses on the meaning of ideology in the service of power (Fairclough, 1995, p. 14) and on hegemony, to analyse how discourse practice is part of a larger social practice involving power relations (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 76). Therefore, the research uses Fairclough’s three-dimensional CDA method (1992, p 73) to understand the *how* mechanisms of Erdoğan’s political communication in and through Turkish media. Critical theory is about focusing on the observables by considering the mechanisms behind a phenomenon (Jackson, 2011). In line with this approach the research examines the relations between politics of fear, Turkish nationalism, the Kurdish Question and the media by analysing the discursive formation in order to contribute to the future media coverage of an event similar to the Dağlica event.

3.1 Primary Method: CDA

Erdoğan’s interview will be identified as the *communicative event*, an instance of language use such as a newspaper article, a film, a video, an interview or a political speech (Fairclough, 1995). Therefore, Erdoğan’s interview is transcribed on the basis of the research goals, examining the relations between politics of fear, Turkish nationalism, the Kurdish Question and the media. The transcribed text will be analysed with Van Dijk’s and Wodak’s CDA methods in order to provide a “detailed description, explanation, and critique of the textual strategies

writers use to ‘naturalize’ discourses, that is, to make discourses appear to be common-sense, apolitical statements.” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 253) Van Dijk’s and Wodak’s methods can help to display the discursive strategies that Erdoğan uses through different semantic, lexical and rhetorical tools in his language. The aim of this linguistic analysis is to examine how Erdoğan positions himself against the backdrop of the research questions. As Wodak says, CDA regards “language as social practice” and considers “language use to be crucial” for one who is interested in the relation between language and power (Wodak & Weiss, 2003, pp. 1-3). The use of Wodak’s and Van Dijk’s methods furthermore aims to show Erdoğan’s productive power, in terms of defining the Dağlıca event, via the use of the language. The macro-analysis of his speech aims to show *the order of discourse*, that is the configuration of all the discourse types that are used within a social institution or a social field (Fairclough, 1995, p. 66).

By locating different discourses related to already existing social order and power structures in Turkey Erdoğan draws on, the research will identify how the text is reproduced in three different television channels as a discursive practice. In the macro-analysis, the historical contexts of the different discourses will be taken into consideration. From that point of departure, *interdiscursivity*, different discourses articulated in a communicative event and *intertextuality*, “the condition whereby all communicative events draw on earlier events” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 73) in Erdoğan’s discourse will be explored to give a better understanding of the concepts of ideology and hegemony in the discursive practice of Erdoğan’s text. Overall, the research uses Fairclough’s three-dimensional model (1992, p. 73) to comprehend the mechanism between the realm of politics and media in Turkey after the Dağlıca event. Social practice related aspects of the model will be highlighted in the conclusion of the thesis. Overall, CDA has, as cited in O’Halloran (2003) accepted the following features: CDA addresses social problems, considers power relations as discursive, considers discourse to constitute society and culture and to do ideological work. Discourse is historical and the link between text and society is mediated. Furthermore, discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory and discourse is a form of social action (O’Halloran , 2003, p. 12).

The text is transcribed from the video material that has been acquired from a Turkish private company, Interpress, that records all televisions broadcasts. It is important to say that all three television stations were contacted for acquiring the material directly. However, no channel answered the acquisition request positively. Therefore, the researcher bought the footage from the private company (Appendix 5). The material contains a total of 72 hours of footage, that

was reduced from 144 hours of footage to locate the exact communication time of the Dağlica event. First, Erdoğan's interview in A Haber was examined to code other material.

3.2 Secondary Quantitative Analysis

The research also used rich data to quantify the appearance of certain representations related to the research questions. The quantitative data shows the coherence of the discourse in Erdoğan's text. Therefore, quantification strengthens the validity of the analysis.

3.3 Choice of the Material

The material was chosen because of the interest of the researcher. The choice of the research material depends on several aspects: the research questions, the researcher's knowledge, "the relevant material within the social domain or institution of interest, and whether, and how, one can gain access to it" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 73). The Kurdish Question is a long-discussed issue and many researchers have analysed the issue from media perspective. However, the Dağlica event has a unique position given the timing of the event.

Turkey had an election on the 7th of June where the AKP lost its one party ruling majority in the parliament. Before the election, HDP representatives and ministers from the AKP government got together and released a statement (El Cezire Turk, 2015). In the statement a roadmap to peacefully solve the Kurdish Question was provided (El Cezire Turk, 2015). Following the event, Erdoğan made a statement denying the existence of the Kurdish Question (Sabah, 2015). According to the HDP co-leader Demirtaş (T24, 2015), Erdoğan ended the process because of the upcoming elections, with the fear of losing votes (T24, 2015). The AKP did indeed lose votes. However, if that is related to the Kurdish Question or not is the scope of this research. Neither are the political discussions surrounding the 'Kurdish Question'. The research aims to understand the power mechanisms related to the 'Kurdish Question' which are articulated via discursive practices.

After 7th of June another election was held on the 1st of November. The AKP gained the ruling majority as the result of elections. The period between the two elections was a violent one. A long-standing cease fire between Turkey and PKK ended in the 22nd of July with an incident in which two security forces got killed (BBC Turkce, 2015). The incident still stays in the dark as PKK didn't claim responsibility and the court couldn't find any suspects (Diken, 2015). Regardless, the conflict started with this event. The Dağlica event took place as a continuation

of this incident, two months before elections. Following the Dağlıca event, rallies, with the name of *Millions of Souls is One Voice Against Terrorism*, were organised. Thousands of people joined these rallies. (Bianet, 2015) The escalation of the conflict and the hard turn towards terrorism mobilized the public prior to the election, which in nature can be considered a social practice. The Dağlıca event is the starting of public mobilization. During the process, there have been discursive and institutional shifts, securitization and curfew. As of today, the process continues. In 15th of July 2016, there was a coup attempt in Turkey (Guardian, 2015). Power manifestations are ongoing in the non-discursive field as well as in the discursive field. The researcher's choice of the Dağlıca event was made to provide an example for power relations during the Dağlıca event.

3.4. Data Analysis: Coding

The text was coded in two phases. First, Erdoğan's interview was transcribed. Erdoğan's text was coded by the lexical and semantic tools provided by Van Dijk (1995). First, semantic structures were given to two different features: past/present and future. Erdoğan's sentences were coded differently when is referring to the past/present and future. According to Van Dijk it is quite typical for much political discourse that references to the present tend to be negative and those to the future positive (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 27). Within this distinction, the future and past was divided into different themes and subthemes. The same process was applied to Erdoğan's lexical style and choice of words that reflect values and judgment, until relevant themes and subthemes emerged. This procedure was repeated for Erdoğan's rhetorical style, his use of metaphors, when information that is unfavourable to 'us' was made less prominent whereas negative information about 'them' was emphasized (Van Dijk, 1995). The first table emerged as a result of coding Erdoğan's political discourse.

Secondly, Erdoğan's interview was coded into a macro perspective using already existing frameworks mentioned in the literature review by Bora (2003), Yeğen (1999, 2007) and Sofos and Özkırımlı (2008) as critical stand point of Turkish nationalism's relation with the Kurdish Question. Different discourses were coded in Erdoğan's interview by using this literature. After coding those, the media coverage of the event in three channels were examined. Furthermore, the material from the media coverage that has the same pattern from both micro and macro perspectives of Erdoğan's interview was transcribed. The reproduction of the text was contextualized by examining the subjects who reproduced Erdoğan's text in three categories:

title (media elite representatives), media affiliation (name of the media company) and the media company's affiliation with the power structure. Finally, for quantitative reasons, the segments in the media coverage of the Dağlica event were coded in relation to the headlines they were presented in, such as Erdoğan, Davutoğlu, Citizen Protest and Demirtaş.

4. Data Analysis

The Dağlica event took place sometime between 12 and 5 pm according to multiple sources (HPG Basın İrtibat Merkezi, 2015), (Yukus, et al., 2015). However, this thesis examines the political communication of the event. Therefore, four television channels were examined to locate the first information relayed about the event. Among the three channels, A Haber was the first TV channel that released the information. The information was communicated at 21:02 (A Haber, 2015) during another news related to "terrorism" (A Haber, 2015). It is important to say that the release of the information coincides with Erdoğan's exclusive interview on the same channel, that was scheduled to 45 minutes later. The data analysis showed that no information was communicated in three television channels. However, in the next Fox morning show the anchor-man suggested that the information was available online (Fox TV, 2015). During the show the anchor-man mentioned that the information about the Dağlica event was available online and he implied that Davutoğlu attended the football game nevertheless (Fox TV, 2015).

Three mainstream news television channels, which are focus of the analysis, didn't communicate any information about the Dağlica event until shortly before Erdoğan's interview (A Haber, 2015), (NTV, 2015), (CNNTurk, 2015). Three mainstream news channels have the most watched news shows among Turkish news televisions (Medyatava, 2015). The non-communication of the event makes Erdoğan's interview crucial to understand the defining moment of the event for political communication. For this purpose, the thesis will focus on the text produced by Erdoğan. The text analysis has two dimensions: micro discourse analysis and macro-discourse analysis. Micro-analysis will draw on Van Dijk's (1993, 1995, 1997, 2006, 2016, Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) and Wodak's (2009, 2009b, 2015, Wodak & Meyer, 2001, Wodak & Weiss, 2003) methods focusing on the language, in terms of semantic structure and discursive strategy, lexical style and rhetoric, used by Erdoğan. In addition, macro-analysis will draw on Fairclough's three-dimensional model (Fairclough, 1992, p. 73) to examine the power relations between the realm of politics and the mainstream media in Turkey. Micro-analysis

examines how the event is ‘framed’ in Erdoğan’s interview, hence provides a starting point, as a symbolic power element – how he (re)presents himself during the interview in the context of the Dağlica event –, for analysing media coverage of the event. Macro-analysis provides a framework to examine how a text produced by Erdoğan spreads within the context of an ideology, Turkish nationalism, in the Turkish mainstream media. Thus, macro-analysis focuses on the systematic power mechanisms of three news channels. In addition, secondary quantitative analysis of the material that is produced in three TV channels following 24 hours after the Dağlica event will ground the macro perspective of the discourse analysis.

4.1 Erdoğan’s Interview: How to Politically Define an Event?

- (1) “As the PM returns to Ankara now, he will have a security meeting. He will obtain the results before that. After obtaining the results, he will give a statement. The weather conditions over there have been very bad. The fight goes on there under bad weather conditions. This incident took place as result of a cleansing in Dağlica. As far as it is stated this incident took place against armoured vehicles caused by mine traps. So far, the briefing about the incident from the Chief of Staff is really sad. My wish is that the fight following the statement will be very different and determined. My condolences to our nation. May god give patience [to us].” (Erdoğan, A Haber 2015)

President Erdoğan starts his statement with distancing himself from the event. He first mentions Prime Minister Davutoğlu and is implicit about the content regarding the security meeting. It is the discursive strategy to distance himself from the negative outcomes of the event. A feature of political discourses during political speeches according to Reyes-Rodrigues. The speaker uses words to position different social agents within at the specific distance he wants them to be (Reyes-Rodríguez, 2008, p. 145). Wodak also emphasises the discursive strategies employed by politicians with the purpose of implying transformation during their term. The discursive strategy of change and transformation emphasises the difference in political significance between the past and the present (Wodak, 2009b, p. 174). There are two main semantic structures within a discursive strategy in Erdoğan’s political discourse during his interview.

M	S1 (Future): Explicit meanings, Change, Determination
I	S2 (Present, Past): Implicit meanings, Nominalizations, Vagueness
C	L1 (Values): Unity, Martyrdom, Strength, Solidarity
R	L2 (Judgement/Negativization): US vs THEM, Terrorist, Destruction, Separatism
O	Rhetoric: Dramatization, Exaggeration, Dehumanization, Metaphors

Figure 1

As it is categorized in Figure 1, the semantic structure 1 is about the future that is articulated with more positive words containing explicit meanings, prepositions, verbs and adverbs. Semantic structure 2 is about the past/present that is articulated in more negative words, prepositions, verbs and adverbs. He structures his speech with words that have implicit meanings when he is talking about the past and/or present. According to Van Dijk, common for much political discourse is that the references to the present tend to be negative and the ones to the future positive (1997, p. 27).

Erdoğan continues with the bad weather conditions and adds a natural phenomenon between himself and the responsible agent as he further distances himself from the event. In addition, he completes his remarks about the present condition by the briefing he got from the commander of the army to have been sad instead of simply stating that the event is sad, hence being even more implicit. After this point, he shifts to the future conditions and he says the fight will be different and determined. This is the point where he switches to a ‘positive’ semantic structure by implying the fight following the event will have new features and promising success that comes with determination. Predicates of the macrostructures of political discourse tend to be future-oriented. Given the role of discourse in the political process, we can expect references to threats about future developments, announcements or promises about future actions (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 27). These patterns go on throughout the interview’s present/past and future dichotomy. Finally, his rhetoric is built on the dehumanization of the ‘enemy’ with the use of words such as “cleansing”. Van Dijk suggests that specific rhetorical structures such as metaphors, may be a function of ideological control when information that is unfavourable to us is made less prominent whereas negative information about them is emphasized (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 29).

4.1.1 Us vs. Them

- (2) “Aiming 400 [representatives for the parliament] (1), regardless of any political party, was initially about making a new constitution. So, we can easily take a step forward to ‘New Turkey’ along with this new constitution. These [400 representatives] are a target to aim that purpose. In addition, how can we explain the destruction done by the ones that were aiming to enter the parliament [HDP], even though they are now in the parliament with 80 representatives? As you know, we experienced the 6-7-8 October incidents [post-Kobane events], the Suruç incident [ISIS bombing] and the Diyarbakir incident [ISIS bombing]. There is no sense in sending the bill to someone else. This was nothing but a result of a

collaboration and cooperation for terrorising our country. They are reaping profit off this by means of terrorism. That's what they always do.” (Erdoğan, A Haber 2015)

Erdoğan starts his answer talking about the past (S2) after he was asked to comment on his remarks before the election on 7th of June (he publicly asked for 400 representatives in the rallies for the upcoming elections) and its relation to the escalation of the conflict after the elections. He is again very implicit in his semantic structure. Van Dijk suggests that such implicitness may have different types of implications and indirectness through a strategic use of verbs or adverbs (Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). Erdoğan distances himself (using a discursive strategy) from the escalation of the conflict and presents it as a “constitution” issue rather than an instability issue derived from his party affiliated desire to rule the country. Then, he switches to his future aspiration, in line with semantic structure 1, of the “New Turkey” with an implication of change.

Right after that, his lexical style presents the elements of judgement and negativization in creating in-groups and outgroups through wordings like ‘them vs. us’ and ‘destruction’ (Van Dijk, 1993). Therefore, he starts mentioning the obstacles, as an excuse, that hindered his “New Turkey” aspiration. Meanwhile, his semantic structure about the past is (S1) still in use. After the first half of his quote he starts talking about the past and is still very vague about what kind of destruction was done by HDP. Meanwhile, he is also vague even with respect to the name of the political party. He doesn't name the political party but HDP had 80 representatives in 7th of June elections. He continues with different events that took place in the past and relates them as an attack against “us”. His use of “them and us” is vague (L2) because he mixes different unrelated events, ISIS bombings and Kurdish population's discontent after the siege of Kobane by ISIS. Wodak argues that it is a “us vs. them” discourse entails predicative discursive strategy that labels social actors negatively and/or deprecatorily (Wodak & Meyer, 2001).

Erdoğan's rhetoric is dramatizing with the use of words like “destruction” however, it is very unclear what kind of destruction HDP caused. He uses a metaphor, “sending the bill”, a metaphor in Turkish which means paying the price for something you did. Van Dijk argues that the metaphors are used for “belittling” item in the political discourses. Inegalitarian ideologies refers to minorities with demeaning metaphors that belittle, marginalize or dehumanize others (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 29). Erdoğan further states that ISIS and HDP allegedly are collaborating and that they are against “us”, an in-group Erdoğan assumes to represent. His representation goes with another metaphor, “reaping off profit”, that implies allegedly an axis of evil,

constituted of HPD – a political party – and ISIS, terrorising Turkey together. Overall, his semantic structure, future and past/present, and distancing semantic strategies are evident. His lexical style is polarizing via judgement and negativization.

- (3) “Here, it is necessary to openly express something. A known political party is already gathering votes by being backed by a separatist terrorist organisation. They are openly saying this. They are saying we are backed by YPG, PYD and PKK. Their co-chair said that. How can you build a peaceful environment in our country with them if these kinds of things are being said? So, here is the thing that needs to be done. Of course, the government and the security forces will do whatever they can. Our nation is assessing the ones insulting the President [himself]. Our nation saw who is the one that causes the blood to come out of the tap. They are being fed off the blood. Without the blood, they don’t have anything else to do. We’ve seen it all and are still seeing it. I wish that my nation will assess well and take the steps accordingly.” (Erdoğan, A Haber 2015)
- (4) “It is known which party is on the side of terrorism but others should come together and find a common attitude. A joint bloc should be constituted. Like this they will understand this business is harder. When they see another political party next to them they will understand that there is no consensus on the issue. No matter what, an election will be held. I wish that my nation elects the government that can make those decisions swiftly. Because unity, solidarity, togetherness and brotherhood is a must for the fight against terrorism. This can be solved with the national will and with the reflection of the national will in the polls.” (Erdoğan, A Haber 2015)

Erdoğan starts talking about the present and directly connects HDP, without saying its name during his interview (vagueness (semantic structure (S2)), to a “terrorist” organization. He talks implicitly about the present (semantic structure (S2)), about an issue he presents as facts, gathering votes via a ‘terrorist organisation’ thus asserting his judgement with his lexical style (L2). In addition, he adds a ‘negative’ word of “separatism” to emphasise HDP’s alleged relation to PKK’s separatist tendencies. In talking about the present, his semantic structure (S2) depends on the negativization while his lexical style (L2) targets HDP for not having a peaceful environment in Turkey. Words are chosen to reflect values or norms, and therefore used to express a judgement (Van Dijk, 2006, pp. 132-133).

Erdoğan’s discursive strategy is again distancing from the current negative outcomes of the process. He, then, turns to the positive connotation while addressing the future about the security forces’ efforts. Right after that, he switches back to the present (S2) with his vague style (S2) and asserts his judgement about HDP being responsible for the “blood” and insults against him. His assertion relies on ‘the nation and the people’ knowing who the responsible ones are, even though he has directly connected HDP with PKK earlier. With his lexical style “us vs. them” he positions “us” with ‘our nation’ while “them” is HDP and PKK altogether.

His rhetoric presents different elements. He dramatizes when he presents the things said by “them”, HDP representatives and the HDP co-chair, as an obstacle to build a peaceful environment as if he doesn’t have the governing power. His use of the metaphor, the blood to come out of the tap, connotes bloodshed. However, he exaggerates it with a style that implies the blood coming out the tap like water intending to visualize his words. He blames an imagined “them” for “feeding off” the blood thus using a dehumanizing rhetoric (see quoted Van Dijk, 1995 in excerpt 2). Overall, as a discursive strategy he keeps distancing himself from the incident while he continuously makes use of the past/present-future semantic structure with his negative rhetoric on HDP mainly without naming the political party.

- (5) “The ‘solution process’ is been taken advantage of with act of treachery by them. They used the [peace] process for ‘stockpiling weapons’ in the southeast and partially in the east. They stockpiled a serious number of weapons. During this process, our security forces said they didn’t want to go into a fight but later we understood they did this [stockpiling weapons] during this process. Why is the governorship declaring a 15-day curfew? For understanding what the situation is like in the houses. Who is there and who is not? The governorship will see to it. There is no other solution. We must do this and we will keep doing it.” (Erdoğan, A Haber 2015)

With his discursive strategy, Erdoğan is still distancing himself from the event and in addition to that, even distancing himself from the ‘solution process’, a negotiation process between the Turkish government and the PKK that has been initiated to end the 40-year-old armed conflict. His present/past semantic structure (S2) blames “them”, a repeating ambiguous entity in his political discourse – where with his discursive strategy HDP equals PKK – to turning the solution process into a “weapon stockpiling process”. His lexical “us vs. them” style goes on unloading negative aspects to an ambiguous “them” that goes in hand with his judgement. According to Wodak, politicians use the *strategy of calculated ambivalence* for satisfying the various actors involved because audiences might have different perceptions with respect to the responsibility or guilt of the actor (Wodak, 2015, p. 63). It is important to say that security forces are the actors Erdoğan wants to satisfy. The change in his semantic structure (S1) comes with the justification of the curfew imposed in the region. He explicitly explains that the curfew is imposed for understanding who is terrorist or who is not according to the populace present in the houses. His rhetoric exaggerates the counterpart’s wrongdoing as “treachery” along with dramatization.

- (6) “They started the attacks to keep the vote potential in the region. It is for consolidating the voting base. Yesterday, citizens organized a walk. This was a resistance. The walk was for that. People said leave your hands off me. My citizen in the southeast should expand and increase this. They must say ‘leave your hands off me and we don’t recognize you because you didn’t protect our rights, on the contrary you took our children to the death, kidnapped them to the mountains’. Who are the children that were kidnaped to the mountains? It’s all our Kurdish citizens’ children. I hope people see this reality and reflect their will in the polls.” (Erdoğan, A Haber 2015)

By the time, he reaches half of the interview his lexical style about “them” becomes vaguer (L2). He openly blames “them” for starting the attacks for political gain (see Literature review cited Wodak (2015) “us vs them” construction and the political gain). Shortly after implicitly mentioning the relations between the attacks and voting in the general elections with his semantic structure (S2), he starts explicitly talking about the future emphasizing what the Kurdish people should do and judges the actions supposedly done by an imaginary and vague “them” with his lexical style (L2). He asserts what an imaginary “they” were doing to Kurdish people and how they should react to this reality, which proposed by him consists of a resistance in the voting polls. His rhetoric is again dramatizing by narrating a story about the region which involves kidnappers, death and kidnapped children.

- (7) “This time will be very different now. Our security forces are working hard against ISIS, the separatist terrorist organization PKK and the DHKP-C. Serious numbers, regarding dead terrorists, have been reached. It is expressed with thousands. It will continue as the numbers grow.” (Erdoğan, A Haber 2015)

Erdoğan delivers a promise of change for the future with his semantic structure (S1). After that, his present remarks indicate a generalization of all the ‘terrorist’ organizations into one. He defines the success of the operation with the number of dead ‘terrorists’ without prioritizing any of them. His success implies strength signifying thousands of dead terrorists which presents his lexical style in this case.

4.1.2 Dramatization, Dehumanization and Metaphors

- (8) “Who is living in the police stations? They are the children of this nation. On the other hand, soldiers... And now, I am calling the martyrs. Among those martyrs, there are many of my Kurdish brothers. He [The Kurdish brother] is martyred. However, his father says he has 5 more children at home, he is ready to send all of them for this homeland. It won’t come to an end. But, while they are saying we are the Kurds’ representatives, on the other hand, they are martyring my Kurdish brothers and Kurdish citizens. They are in the middle of separatism.” (Erdoğan, A Haber 2015)

Erdoğan explicitly describes what kind of Kurdish citizen he wants in this part of the interview. Even though he is telling a story from the past it is connected to the implication that the conflict won't end with his remark: "It won't come to an end". With his discursive strategy he is still distancing himself from the event by telling a story from somebody else's perspective, who turns out to be a Kurdish father with five children.

His remarks present a different lexical style that consists of values like unity and solidarity (L1) until he starts to speak about an ambiguous "they". He switches to the negative lexical style (L2) when he talks about "they" and it is not clear who "they" are at his point – supposedly HDP and PKK is the same. His negativization strategy consists in speaking of the killing Erdoğan's Kurdish brothers and of being placed in the middle of separatism. He uses a dramatizing rhetoric of a story, which if not a fabricated one, is at least made up from conclusions with polarizing elements that assert the acceptable Kurds are the ones who are ready to "die for the homeland". Van Dijk suggests that ethnic relations are organized with the us-them binary pair of in groups and outgroups through victimization used together with dramatization (Van Dijk, 2016).

- (9) "They don't want a strong Turkey. Beştepe Kulliyeye (Islamic-Ottoman social complex) [The palace Erdoğan lives in] is a symbol of strong Turkey. They can't digest this. They don't even have a tree. We are laying the foundation for a stronger Turkey with the Kulliyeye. It will go on even though they don't like it. We will have martyrs along the way as the father said: I am ready to sacrifice myself and 5 more children of mine for this nation. On the one hand, there are those fathers and on the other hand, there are others with broken character traits. I am ready to give my life side by side with those fathers instead of others with broken character traits." (Erdoğan, A Haber 2015)

Erdoğan's semantic structure in this case is about the future (S1). Therefore, he is very explicit about the what his place means for Turkey. He represents his values with his lexical style (L1), which here is particularly strength. When he starts to talk about "them", it is again very vague who they are. He negatively refers to "them" and juxtaposes himself with the strong developed Turkey vs. the weak and undeveloped Turkey with his lexical style (L2).

He mentions the Kurdish father story (see excerpt 8) to also juxtapose the ones (Kurdish people) he prefers over the ones he doesn't by referring to "them" as the ones with "broken character traits". He completes his group formation definition by stating that he is ready to die with the

ones he prefers in his imagined group of “us”. His rhetoric is again dramatizing by bringing up prospective deaths and martyrs.

- (10) Because the result wasn't like I said before [asking 400 representatives for a new constitution, hence political stability], there has been chaos from 7th of June elections until today. The ones who bring that up and directly connect terrorism with my statement [asking for 400 representatives] are not human beings or are without character.” (Erdoğan, A Haber 2015)

Erdoğan brings back the 400-representative argument and directly connects the results of the elections with the current chaotic situation in Turkey. It is the continuation of the discursive strategy in which he is distancing himself from any kind of negative outcome. His rhetoric dehumanizes the ones who relate the current chaos to him. His lexical style (S2) is also vague and judgemental about an uncertain group of people who connect his statements with the chaos following the elections.

- (11) “After tonight's event, we have to know that we will make them pay a heavy price even though we might have martyrs. We killed almost two thousand terrorists so far. For our nation and people, we will keep doing this with our security forces. What is our duty? It is our nation's peace and happiness.” (Erdoğan, A Haber 2015)

Erdoğan's semantic structure is based on the future (S1) in this part of the interview. He chooses a point from the present, the Dağlica event and promises that “they” will pay a heavy price. His lexical style (L1) implies his values of strength in this statement. He explicitly provides the numbers of dead “terrorists” as well as what he considers as a ‘duty’ for the nation. His rhetoric consists of metaphors, paying a heavy price, as a dramatizing element for strengthening his message. According to Wodak, metaphors are strong categorization devices in the form of a part standing for the whole (pars pro toto) or a whole standing for the part (totum pro parte) (Wodak, 2009, p. 42).

4.1.3 Values

- (12) “In our religion [Islam] martyrs don't die. We don't call the ones dead who die in Allah's way. They are alive, but you can't know [quoting Quran surah Al-Baqara]. We will keep going with this belief and understanding. Soldiers aren't called Mehmetcik [little Mohammed] in any other county in the Islamic world. Ours [soldiers] are named after our beloved prophet, Mehmetcik. Our soldiers are doing their duty with this consciousness. As you might know, we hold a henna ceremony during two separate occasions. The first one

is the one before the marriage and the second one is before the military service. The children of a nation who see the military from this perspective will bring them to book sooner or later.” (Erdoğan, A Haber 2015)

Erdoğan dedicates the last part of the interview to the future of Turkey’s “war against terrorism”. He starts with a religious quotation hence reflecting his values with his lexical style (L1). In addition, his semantic structure is explicitly defining “the Turkish soldier” in the Turkish context from a religious perspective with a determined message about the future.

His rhetoric glorifies the death of soldiers by assigning to them a status of immortality. The dramatization aspect of his rhetoric elevates the martyrdom to a “divine” level. Therefore, he successfully merges patriotism with religion by mediating religious references to a national context that would resonate in his in-groups. Wodak argues that social groupings have specific values, that are expressed in systematic ways (Wodak & Weiss, 2003, p. 6). “Martyrdom” in this context relates to Islamic values.

Overall, the analysis of Erdoğan’s interview’s text outlined his semantic structures and strategy following the Dağlica event. As the analysis shows he distances himself from the event as much as possible while talking about the present and past, therefore successfully isolating himself from the event, which lays the groundwork for building his political message.

His semantic structure has four main pillars: the description of the events and happenings with implicit meanings, vagueness and negativity. Similar to the distancing his discourse takes place with different agents when he is talking about the past. However, he has a different semantic structure for talking about the future. His words have explicit meanings while delivering a promise for change and a determined message. As a summary, every negativity is distant to him and appears to be unclear, vague or irrelevant while a future with him represents a change for the better and determination. His semantic structure is harmonious with his lexical style when he is talking about his values. He emphasizes strength, unity and solidarity while using the “divinity” of martyrdom. When he talks about the present/past situation he creates an ambiguous “them”, an entity that is responsible for all the negative outcomes: destruction, separatism and terrorism. He implies that “us”, an entity he belongs to, is victimized by the wrongdoings of the ambiguous “them” and yet it is not because he or his ambiguous “us” don’t have the strength but because the ambiguous “them” is either simply “inhuman” or “inferior”.

His rhetoric is a powerful mechanism to deliver his message of superiority against his adversaries, not only to him as a person but also to the ones who support him. His rhetoric contains metaphors and wide exaggeration and dramatization of the occurring events. It is the first point made – Erdoğan distancing himself from the event – that gives “terrorism” its stand-alone position in the realm of politics. Him distancing himself from the event results in talking through “terrorism” than talking about “terrorism”. Therefore, “terrorism” becomes an intrinsic value to his political discourse but an extrinsic value to “terrorism” itself. Figure 1. summarizes Erdoğan’s semantic structure, lexical style and items and rhetoric. The micro-discourses’ reflection in the macro-discourse will be analysed in the next chapter to examine the text’s transition to discursive practice in the Turkish media ecology.

4.2 Erdoğan’s Interview 2: How to Produce an “Erdoğanism” discourse with the Hybrid Discourse of Turkish Nationalism?

In this chapter, the research takes a turn to macro-discourses to examine how political communication and media power relations function in the discursive field. Nacos’ (2002) triangulation of political communication is the key to examine macro-discourses from a media perspective. Nacos suggests that whether they attack, threaten with violence, or communicate their demands, terrorists need access to mass media and to what it is called the interconnectedness of the media, public officials, and the general public (2002). Nacos et al. also add that the political leaders in targeted societies market their overblown threat assessments to enlist support for their counterterrorism policies (2011, p. 14). What the counterterrorism policies are, however, is another story. As micro-analysis showed the counter terrorism policies are not about terrorism per se but rather about Erdoğan’s power and strength. How Erdoğan’s discourse works depends on the contextual knowledge and his text’s conceptualization and ideological interpretation. Therefore, Fairclough’s three-dimensional model (1992) is suitable for further analysis. The research draws on Fairclough’s (1995) order of discourse concept, which consists of the configuration of all the discourse types that are used within a social institution or a social field, to locate discourses in president Erdoğan’s interview which are related to Turkish nationalism.

Following Fairclough (1995) Erdoğan’s interview can be a communicative event, an instance of language use such as a newspaper article, a film, a video, an interview or a political speech (Fairclough, 1995), that starts the actual [political] communication about the event. Macro-

discourse analysis aims to contextualize the political communication following the Dağlica event in Turkish media ecology. Therefore, Fairclough’s three-dimensional model (1992, p. 73) consisting of text, discursive practice and social practice will be applied to understand power relations between the political realm and the media and these power relations’ implications on society. The order of discourse in Erdoğan’s interview consists of different features of various nationalist discourses in Turkey. According to Altheide the critical point is how an event is defined for the politics of fear (2006, p. 17). The basic process of defining the situation and justifying politics of fear involves propaganda or the manipulation of information for a specific purpose (ibid.).

M A C R O	Official Nationalism	Liberal Neo-Nationalism	Islamism in Nationalism
	Military/Development	Development	Religion/Development
	Ethnicity	Economy	Community (ummah)
	Anti-imperialism (later anti-globalization)	Globalization	Regional-Islamic World

Figure 2

The text Erdoğan produces during the interview is a starting point for the definition of the event along with the propaganda or the manipulation of information for a specific purpose. Erdoğan’s security discourse articulated from the very beginning is part of the social control that has existed in Turkey for a long time. As Özkırımlı and Sofos suggest that ‘survival’ and ‘fear of extinction’ remained a central element in the motivation of the Turkish nation builders (2008). It had profound impact on the nation and translated itself into a perception of being trapped, or of being surrounded by enemies, as the often-quoted slogan ‘The Turk has no friend but the Turk’ illustrates (Özkırımlı & Sofos, 2008, p. 189). Eventually, this led to an emphasis on ‘unity and togetherness’ that demonstrated itself to create a homogeneous society, a society without any cleavages (ibid.). From this point of departure what Altheide defines as politics of fear (2006), by which he means decision makers’ promotion and use assumptions about danger, risk, and fear in order to achieve certain goals (Altheide, 2006, p. 15) is one of the constitutive elements of the modern ‘nation-state-society’ in Turkey. It is hard to think of a nation to be built without nationalism. As Özkırımlı suggests Turkish nationalism evolved to become the constitutive ideology of a secular and modern ‘nation-state-society’ in the second quarter of the twentieth century, having been a popular ideology in the last decade (2002, p. 716). However,

Turkish nationalism's relation to the Kurdish Question is complex because it has evolved through its omnipresent relationship with the Kurdish Question (Yeğen, 2007).

For contextualizing the politics of fear (Altheide 2006), it is necessary for this research to go through the changes overtime to locate the *order of discourse* and *intertextuality*, since all communicative events in Erdoğan's text are drawing on earlier events' texts (Fairclough 1992, 1995). According to Altheide (2006), tracking expanded control efforts over time can illustrate how the politics of fear has evolved in any social order. The tracking of control efforts in history is out of this research's scope. However, the scope can be narrowed down by relating different nationalist discourses to the Kurdish Question and to locate the intertextuality in Erdoğan's text for understanding the discursive practice.

Erdoğan's excerpt 1 shows that he starts the interview with the security aspect by providing many details regarding the military. Tanıl Bora (2003, p. 437) defines the founding ideology's discourse as Atatürk Nationalism (Official Nationalism) and suggests that Turkish Armed Forces' "state-founding military" character is consequential for the official constitution of nationalism. The army, as the crystallized evidence of the existence, power, and manifestations of the nation-state, takes a central role in the regeneration of official nationalism (ibid). Erdoğan takes the role of an already existing power and manifestations of the nation-state as he replaces the army's and Atatürk's central role with himself within the same order of discourse. The research located the use of a security discourse, containing words such soldiers, police and security forces, also in excerpts 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10. In addition, Bora (2003, p. 437) suggests that official nationalism, whose core is the army, has a mental perspective focused on the state itself and on populist attributions of heroism (ibid.). Erdoğan utilizes the heroism aspect of the official nationalist discourse in excerpt 4, 8, 10 and 11 with his emphasis of "martyrdom". According to Yeğen (2007, p. 129) "the banditry and/or backwardness" of the Kurds is how official Turkish nationalism perceived the Kurdish question during the foundation of the republic. Yeğen suggests that Turkish nationalism considered the Kurdish unrest of the time as the resistance of premodern social structures and adherences (ibid). Erdoğan draws on the discursive element of official nationalism in in excerpt 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 when he relates an ambiguous "they", the PKK and/or the HDP, to destruction. Thus, he positions himself as the changing and the developing factor that will create a "New Turkey" in excerpt 2. Hence, he presents the ambiguous "they", the PKK and/or the HDP, against that development which consequently equals the HDP and the PKK as an obstacle to the country and its development.

So, the backwardness element of official nationalism is in use in Erdoğan's interview and yet he embraces the existence of the Kurds unlike official nationalisms did in the past (Yeğen, 2007). However, he conditions this existence to his power position by defining "the ideal Kurd" in excerpt 4 and 9 as the father who is ready to sacrifice his other five children for the homeland. Even though Erdoğan's discourse uses the roots of official nationalist discourse for the development element it is ideologically more connected to two different strands developed from the official nationalist discourse: liberal neo-nationalism and Islamism in nationalism as Bora (2003) defines. However, Erdoğan's discourse has two different dimensions for two different discourses: culture (as fixed values) and economics. As the micro-analysis shows he presents his values. The values he presented in the interview are unity, martyrdom, strength and solidarity of the nation. These values are all presented with religious references in excerpt 1, 9 and 12. As Bora (2003) suggests the specific point of Islamism is that it assumes religious identity to be the differentiating element, the backbone of the nation and of "being national" (millilik) (Bora, 2003, p. 449). Erdoğan's political discourse has intense elements of martyrdom. Martyrdom is a concept that exists in the official nationalist discourse. However, it also exists in the Islamist strand of Turkish nationalism. The use of martyrdom with the Kurdish brothers in the Islamic community (ummah) implies features of the Islamist nationalist discourse. In addition, the values of strength, unity and solidarity are related to neo-Ottomanism, an ideology articulated by Davutoğlu in his book "Strategic Depth" (2000), which contains the ideology of a nationalism that envisages Turkey as the potential leader within the union of the Islamic world. Within this context, the nostalgia for the Ottoman past can become a modern and nationalistic imperial (or irredentist) fantasy (Bora, 2003, p. 449). However, the strength doesn't only belong to the Islamist discourse, it is also articulated through a change in the semantic structure.

As the micro-analysis shows it is one of the main elements in Erdoğan's discourse by depicting "the ambiguous them", the HDP or the PKK as destructive and undeveloped. According to Bora (2003) the development is a feature of the radical variation of liberal nationalism. It is interfused with an ideology of economics that adheres to the neoliberal chauvinism of prosperity (Bora, 2003, p. 441). This attitude, which violates the idea of social solidarity by its reluctance to share with "underdeveloped" regions or communities the wealth it produces itself, is analogous to "class racism" which excludes lower classes by viewing them as backward and branding them as a different race (Bora, 2003, p. 441). It is important to mention at this point that the HDP represents the working class according to its website (HDP, 2015).

Overall, Erdoğan is addressing the “other”, the Kurds who don’t follow the central power structure in Turkey – the undesirable Kurds – that have existed in Turkish official nationalist discourse since the foundation of the country. However, he fuses different discourses together in which his power role becomes central. Erdoğan uses the handicap of the language of liberal nationalism and overcomes the challenge Bora (2003) mentions. According to Bora the liberal nationalism’s handicap lies in its appeal to the “winners” of this process, and that it is not likely that it can convince the “underclasses” in difficult economic situations (2003, p. 450). Erdoğan appeals to the underclasses by using the Islamist discourse, considering that ‘they’, traditional Islamist-Welfare Party, Virtue Party, were underclasses after the foundation of the modern secular republic (Özkırımlı & Sofos, 2008). Erdoğan becomes the winner of the process by converging different nationalistic languages. The phenomenon has been described as Erdoğanism (Weise, 2016), the New Atatürk or Green Kemalism (Tol & Taspınar, 2016) a mixture of official Kemalist ideology and elements of Islamism, at its ideological base.

This chapter summarized Erdoğan’s political communication during the communicative event. Ideology is “meaning in the service of power” and constructions of meaning that contribute to the production, reproduction and transformation of relations of domination (Fairclough 1995 p. 13, Fairclough 1992 p. 87, Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999, p. 26). The meaning produced by Erdoğan has an important role in maintaining social order in Turkey. However, his ideological practice is not a totalising entity because the audience is not a passive subject. The text produced by the hegemonic order, in this case Erdoğan, has *meaning potentials* (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 76) that can have several different interpretations. The text Erdoğan produced rather goes through the *negotiations of meanings* (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 77) in which his hegemony is not dominance but a consensus concerning the meaning, a “contradictory and unstable equilibrium” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 9). Fairclough suggests that the concept of hegemony gives us the means to analyse how discursive practice is part of a larger social practice involving power relations (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 76). Therefore, the research will examine Erdoğan’s text’s discursive practices in three different Turkish news channels after the Dağlica event to understand the meaning of negotiation during a “terrorist” attack in Turkey. Figure 2 summarizes the macro discourses that are in conjuncture with Bora’s definitions of Turkish nationalist discourses (Bora, 2003) in Erdoğan’s interview.

4.3 A Haber Analysis: Erdoğan's TV




Figure 3: (Y axis represents the number of the subjects' appearances)

The data collected consist of the following 24 hours after Erdoğan's interview. The material is examined for locating various discourses derived from Erdoğan's political discourse about the Dağlıca event. During the analysis of the video footage, the discursive practice following the communicative event unveiled various elements of the power relations. The results aim to present evidence of the extent to which significant parts of the media, if not the media system as a whole worked to support the views of the political elite against alternative and perhaps critical perspectives (Corner, 2011, p. 24). Therefore, the data analysis from A Haber focused the reproduction and/repetition of Erdoğan's political discourse that was presented in the micro and macro analysis. The analysis provides *interpellation*¹ mechanisms of Erdoğan's ideology in A Haber, a media institution where Erdoğan's power is reinforced. If tendencies and orientations in the political and economic system are in broad harmony, the expectation of a strong 'power reinforcement' role by the media seems justified (Corner, 2011, p. 20). Data analysis during the research indicated that A Haber is an important starting point to understand

¹The individual becomes an ideological subject through a process of interpellation whereby discourses appeal to the individual as a subject" (2002, p. 15)

tendencies and orientations in the Turkish political system. The analysis of A Haber along with three other television channels will give a glimpse of understanding of the Turkish media system.

According to the data analysed during the coverage, the first two hours after the communicative event consist mostly of media elites' opinions. The news coverage starts at 23:20 with the banner "ERDOĞAN: We will make them pay the price" (Appendix 1). As the micro-analysis of excerpt 11 shows, Erdoğan's political discourse asserts strength and dramatization of the events. His dramatization is picked up by A Haber and continues with the victimization of the nation with subsequent media elites' comments. After brief introduction of the Dağlıca event, the comments of the first media elite representatives – who join the news show via phone – affirm this promoted narrative in the discourse. Avni Özgürel, a veteran journalist from Yeni Birlik Daily, starts with reproducing Erdoğan's dehumanising political rhetoric. He continues with the victimization of the nation, Turkey, and points the finger at "outer" forces.

"As the President Erdoğan stated earlier this organization's act happened during the cleansing of the organization from the region while the pursuit [of terrorists] and scan process was taking place." (Avni Özgürel, A Haber, 2015)

"It is good to know that the bombs [to PKK] are coming from Germany and that the mines are coming from Italy to a great extent. Turkey have been following this. (Avni Özgürel, A Haber, 2015)

"USA chose PKK's Syria wing, PYD as their army in the region. They are air-supplying weapons and aerielly bombing against ISIS according to the coordination given by PYD. We don't know which coordinates they are giving to the US." (Avni Özgürel, A Haber, 2015)

Avni Özgürel relays elements of the politics of fear with messages that are repetitious and stereotypical during his talk. Altheide suggests that messages about fear that are repetitious and stereotypical often connote outside "threats" and especially suspect "evil others" (Altheide, 2006, p. 123). His statement is also in line with the macro analysis of Erdoğan's discourse and its relation to official nationalism that makes it stereotypical considering the Turkish context. Because Erdoğan's discourse draws on the contours of an ideology that is based on the saying "The Turk has no friend but the Turk" (Özkırmılı & Sofos, 2008). The politics of fear refers to decision makers' promotion and use of assumptions about danger, risk, and fear in order to achieve certain goals (Altheide, 2006, p. 123). However, in this case politics of fear are reiterated by a media elite representative, Özgürel, in the discursive practice of Erdoğan's text. More media elite representatives, such as Ismail Kapan (Türkiye Daily), Kurtuluş Tayız

(Akşam Daily), Cem Kucuk (Star Daily), Ekrem Kızıltaş (Takvim Daily), Emin Pazarcı (Akşam Daily), Fatih Atık (ATV) repeat Özgürel’s remarks about the “enemy” in the later news shows (Appendix 1). It is important to mention here that Türkiye Daily, Akşam Daily, Star Daily, Takvim Daily are owned by the holdings that have construction contracts issued by the government (Arikan, 2015) According to Burak Arikan’s mapping of “Media Owners and their other investments” all the newspapers these elites work for have connections to government business circles. This also overlaps with Corner’s point of media reinforcement when the political system and the economic system are in broad harmony for the ‘power’ (Corner, 2011). Two more points of reproduction in Erdoğan’s political discourse can be located when the media elites are commenting on the event. First, media elites collectively accuse HDP and target the political party for supporting terrorism.

“Unless HDP does not condemn PKK clearly tomorrow it will become illegal. It is not a legal political party anymore. It is officially the partner of terrorism. There will occur any kind of legal consequences.” (Cem Kucuk, A Haber, 2015)

“The HDP leader supports PKK. He gave statements supporting PKK before the attack. We know he said something like PKK will beat the Turkish army.” (Emin Pazarcı, A Haber, 2015)

“We don’t fight with ghosts or magical creatures from middle earth or a dream world. PKK martyred our 16 soldiers. Besides, this organisation’s political extension [HDP], Hürriyet group, White Turks and Neo-Kemalists gathered votes from this for a long time. Who martyred our soldiers? The political organization you voted martyred our soldiers. Can’t they comprehend this?” (Kurtuluş Tayiz, A Haber, 2015)

The media elites reproduce Erdoğan’s allegations from his text (excerpts 2, 3, 4, 5) and turn it to a common discursive practice in A Haber. As the fear of terrorism requires a target, media elites provide one to the public *through* the media claiming that targeting the political party, HDP, might solve the problem. The politics of fear promotes attacking a target (e.g., terrorism), anticipates further victimization and stifles dissent as being unresponsive to citizen needs or even “unpatriotic” (Altheide, 2006, p.129). The second point is weather conditions. Erdoğan’s text provides an excuse (excerpt 1) for distancing himself. Media elites reproduce “the bad weather” element as discursive practice on A Haber.

“A big operation is going on. The PM interrupted his schedule and returned to Ankara for a security meeting. Apparently, the weather in the region is stormy.” (Ekrem Kızıltaş, A Haber, 2015)

“The weather was bad during the attack. As seen in the past, the attacks take place when the weather is bad.” (Emin Pazarcı, A Haber, 2015)

“The weather in the region is very bad. The helicopters couldn’t fly, so it wasn’t easy to dispatch reinforcements.” (Fatih Atik, A Haber, 2015)

The media elite dominance continues following Erdoğan’s political communication of the event. The analysis of 24 hours of the video footage showed that media elite representatives appeared 27 times following Erdoğan’s political communication (Figure 3). Therefore, A Haber as a medium has two structural deficits: *elite dominance and lack of diversity* (Corner, 2011 p. 24, 27).

The coverage of the Dağlıca event has another dimension to be examined for discursive practice purposes. A Haber provides a narrative via visual form to their viewers. Their narrative has Erdoğan’s political discourse as the core. As Figure 3 shows he appeared 72 times following the 24 hours of his interview. However, the narrative doesn’t appear from the start. The analysis showed that only excerpt 1 appears until 3.00 am. After 3 a.m., the narrative starts to and expand by including more of Erdoğan’s interview to A Haber’s narrative. During 3 a.m. news bulletin excerpt 1 and 3 and 5 start to run. However, the news bulletin does not present a narrated version of his interview until 6 a.m. The anchor-man starts the bulletin with the details of the event and presents Erdoğan’s interview:

“President Erdoğan got the news of the treacherous attack in Dağlıca just before the A Haber broadcast. He said: ‘We have great pain and this treacherous attack will be revenged.’ (Anchorman, A Haber, 2015)

Following the presenter’s introduction Erdoğan’s text (excerpt 1) starts to air. A narrator starts to fill Erdoğan’s quote thus telling the story to the viewers:

“President Erdoğan explained the treacherous attack in Dağlıca with these words. He said, ‘my condolences our nation’. He also commented on recently increasing terrorist attacks and emphasized that some people are profiting from terrorism.” (Narrator, A Haber, 2015)

The story goes on with more of Erdoğan’s text (excerpt 3.), concerning his remark about connecting the HDP and terrorism. At this point an important visualisation takes place. HDP co-chair Demirtaş’s tweet from one day earlier is displayed while Erdoğan is speaking in the background saying, “They are reaping profit of this by means of terrorism.” That’s what they always do” (excerpt 2). Demirtaş’s tweet is:

“All the armies are powerless against the people and so is Tayyip Erdoğan’s palace, army and police. They are lost, they will lose again.” (Demirtaş, HDP Twitter, 2015)

Demirtaş's tweet stays on the display while the narrator goes on with the next part. The narrative continues with Erdoğan's text (excerpt 3, 5, 6 and 12).

“Erdoğan strongly criticized the HDP that supports PKK in every chance it gets. He said, we can't talk about a parliamentary democracy in a country where those things are happening.” (Narrator, A Haber, 2015)

“President Erdoğan talked about the Dağlica event and addressed the terrorist organisation: ‘They will pay a heavy price.’” (Narrator, A Haber, 2015)

“Erdoğan commented on the recently increasing terrorist attacks. He said the HDP, who is a subcontractor of PKK, is trying to gather votes with blood and violence. He emphasised the people in the region are tired of terrorism.” (Narrator, A Haber, 2015)

Another structural deficit of the media *deception* (Corner, 2013) can be detected in the media narrative. A clear deception of the events is created when the Dağlica event is connected to HDP, a political party. The A Haber narrative presents Demirtaş's tweet as if it was tweeted after the event and provides the information within the wrong context. A Haber *withholds the information* that Demirtaş's tweet was before the event while *strategically selecting* pieces of Erdoğan's interview that match the tweets. The analysis showed furthermore that A Haber has all the prerequisites for being in the position of the “bad media power” as Corner (2011) puts it. A Haber has all the elements of propaganda, Corner (2011) summarizes. The A Haber narrative produces a new word, “subcontractor”, that doesn't exist in Erdoğan's text which is *deception* as Galasiński defines (a) the deceiver transmitting a false message (while hiding true information) and (b) the act being intentional (2000). The “sub-contractor” attribution to HDP directly connects the PKK, as a larger group, to HDP. The narrative generally *exaggerates* the HDP-PKK connection while Erdoğan is more ambiguous with his “them” connotation. Finally, the overall narrative is *explicit about fear* and its overall *rhetoric* has a *logical* flow for the viewer. Along with the combination of the media elites' presentations the hourly repetition until 9 p.m. constitutes the *systemic power* of the media.

Another aspect of A Haber's narrative that has been examined during the research is victimization. Starting from 6 a.m. A Haber broadcasts a news piece about “Citizen walks against the terrorism”. The presenter starts with:

“The news of the Dağlica attack was received with reactions all over the country. Reaction walks were arranged in many cities and terrorism was cursed.”

Following the introduction, a video appears with a narrator's voice in the background while using the citizens' chants as a background sound. In the visuals people appear with Turkish flags either walking or in their cars while different individuals are chanting: "Martyrs don't die, the homeland won't be divided." The narrator concludes:

"The dark news coming from Hakkari Dağlıca are accompanied with protests in many cities of the country. Tekirdağ was one of them. The reaction turned into a convoy of 150 vehicles. A group of 1500 people walked in Erdemli, Mersin. During the protest, the crowd blocked the road. The tension rose high in Gaziantep. People of Zonguldak read the Quran for the martyrs. Similar reactions to the attack filled the streets in many cities." (Narrator, A Haber, 2015)

Macro-analysis showed how Erdoğan's political discourse makes use of the long history of the politics of fear for sustaining the social order in a way that he can have a political gain. A Haber turns it into a discursive practice and hence becomes a vehicle to influence social practice, the future election. However, Erdoğan's target is unclear in his discourse with the widely ambiguous use of "them" as well as words such as "New Turkey" and "new constitution". The absence of a clear target for reprisals contributed to the construction of broad symbolic enemies and goals (Altheide, 2006, p. 11). Nevertheless, it is A Haber's explicit discursive practice that clarifies the target. News reporting about terrorism are linked with "victimization" narratives that make danger and fear relevant to everyday life experiences (Altheide, 2006, p. 130) that are to be translated into social practice at the polls on the 1st of November.

It is important to say that what was expressed here is not a necessary causality but rather a relevance between discursive and social practice, the voting that took place in 1st of November and incited political violence. How media covers terrorism is relevant. The relevance matters because according the analysis Erdoğan generalizes the enemy, the ambiguous "them" in his discourse, with a language that draws on historical macro-discourses in which terrorism stands alone. Later, when A Haber reproduces the text as a discursive practice terrorism still stands alone but with more focus on the enemy and the victimization of the nation. It is crucial to add that there are other subjects such as Davutoğlu, the Turkish Army, AKP officials and security experts that take a part in the discursive practice as it is shown in Appendix 1. Interestingly, Davutoğlu and the Turkish Army have different power positions in the discursive field that are articulated in other TV channels, NTV and CNNTürk. Figure 3 shows that the number of other actors that took part in A Haber's coverage is comparatively smaller than Erdoğan's and media elite representatives' appearance who reproduced his political discourse.

4.4 Normative Try-Outs

In this chapter, the research analyses the coverage of the Dağlica event in two different news channels: CNN Türk and NTV. These two channels are the first two thematic news channels in Turkey and were both established in 1999 (Dogus Yayin Grubu, 2013), (Dogan Media Group, 2014). Both channels are more established than A Haber since A Haber started broadcasting in 2011. Data from the two channels contains 24 hours of video footage following the Dağlica event. The information about the Dağlica event is communicated at different times in both channels.

Even though both channels make a “last minute” announcement with a subtitle, according to which Davutoğlu interrupted his Konya schedule and is returning to Ankara for a security meeting at 21:13, the provided information lacks any information about the Dağlica event. Therefore, the data analysis starts when both channels interrupt their broadcast streaming. However, it is important to note that both channels’ first information relates to Davutoğlu’s schedule rather than a “terrorist” attack as A Haber stated at 21.03. More importantly, when A Haber (Appendix 1) first communicates the information of the Dağlica event, it quotes Doğan News Agency, an agency within the same media group as CNN Türk in addition to sharing same building (Dogan Media Group, 2014).

The analysis of NTV and CNN Türk aims to locate the reproduction of Erdoğan’s text and the changes it undergoes during the process of its reproduction. The analysis sheds light on the discursive practices derived from Erdoğan’s text while identifying the kind of discourses these discursive practices draw on, that is *interdiscursivity* (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). The analysis of the discursive practice shows the different kinds of power relations between both TV channels and Erdoğan and the realm of the politics in Turkey. The A Haber analysis showed that there are also different actors during the communication of the Dağlica event. However, those different actors are not different political parties but other power holders such as Prime Minister Davutoğlu and the Turkish Army. As Corner suggests where there is some distance, and even tension or conflict between two power centres, the possibility of a more complicated pattern, one in which a degree of ‘power-questioning’ occurs, is likely to emerge (2011, p.20). The tension between different power centres takes place within the framework of the politics of fear after the Dağlica event.

4.4.1 The Old Guard's CNN Türk

CNN Türk starts the communication of the Dağlıca event at 21.33. The analysis showed that CNN Türk coverage of the event doesn't depend on different media elites, contrary to the A Haber data. CNN Türk's coverage depends only on one media elite representative and a reporter from Davutoğlu's security meeting. The reporter repeats the basic information about the security meeting that took place in Ankara. The media elite representative is Hande Fırat from Doğan TV, a television channel which has the same owner as CNN Türk (Dogan Media Group, 2014). It is important to note here that CNN Türk's owner Aydın Doğan shares CNN Türk's ownership with Turner Broadcasting Europe, a subsidiary of Time Warner Inc., the owner of CNN in the US. Doğan TV is solely owned by Aydın Doğan (Dogan Media Group, 2014). Another important note here is that Hande Fırat has become an important figure during the 15th of July 2016 coup attempt as she broadcasted Erdoğan's speech via Facetime to the whole nation (CNN Türk, 2016). However, the event took place after the Dağlıca event and is therefore out of the scope of this research. Hande Fırat starts the communication with giving details about the event:

“A security summit about PKK terrorists' attack against soldiers is convened. We have the information that there are many martyrs and wounded. A detailed statement from the Commander of the armed forces will follow.” (Hande Fırat, CNN Türk, 2015)

“Two armoured cars were attacked with mines. Yes, there isn't any official statement. Why? Many of our viewers are asking us this question. The Turkish Army is sending a psychologist to the families who have martyrs and will notify them. Therefore, they don't make an official statement before that.” (Hande Fırat, CNN Türk, 2015)

Her statement consists only of militaristic details on the account of the event. She provides an explanation for the Turkish army about the expected statement. She appears repeatedly until 01.00 am and her as well as CNN Türk's narrative develops as Davutoğlu's security meeting ends. CNN Türk starts displaying a banner during the reporting that says: “Tracherous Ambush” starting from 22.00. In addition, CNN Türk starts to broadcast a short part from Erdoğan's interview (excerpt 1) shortly after changing their banner to the treacherous ambush. CNN Türk broadcasts the part in which Erdoğan mentions the security details of the events and the determined and different approach towards the issue (excerpt 1). Furthermore, in a broader context, Erdoğan's text doesn't contain the word “treacherous” but “treachery” (excerpt 5). However, A Haber continuously uses the term during the coverage to reproduce the dramatization within Erdoğan's political discourse. The “Tracherous Attack” banner on CNN

Türk is different from Erdoğan's text even though it has similar roots, that is official nationalism and politics of fear as a social order in Turkey. As the macro-discourse suggested, the official discourse of Turkish nationalism contains a victimization element since the foundation of the republic. The core of official Turkish nationalism is "the state founding military" as Bora (2003) suggests. Hande Fırat's presentation of the event continues with more militaristic details and presents a negotiation position for the army:

"Two armoured cars were attacked with mines. President Erdoğan also made it public." (Hande Fırat, CNN Türk, 2015)

"The army has some demands. They are pointing out the necessity of an extended operation against 1400 terrorists in the country. In addition, they request legal protection. The commander of the armed forces stated that many times." (Hande Fırat, CNN Türk, 2015)

"F-4s and F-16s took off but the weather condition is rough in the region. So, the operation is going on under hard conditions." (Hande Fırat, CNN Türk, 2015)

In comparison to the A Haber data, Hande Fırat's discourse contains almost nothing of Erdoğan's discourse. In addition, she adds "the weather conditions" excuse, also a distancing strategy used by Erdoğan (see chapter 4.1), after the security meeting ends at 00.15. An important note is that Davutoğlu's security meeting consists of the Head of National Intelligence, the Chief of Staff, and of Commanders of the Army and the Air Force. The research examined the Turkish Army's statement that was released at 03.11 for providing further information.

"Our people's means of transportation were restricted because of the destruction of the bridges and culverts through the planted bombs on the roads by a separatist terrorist organisation. The operation continues to provide our people with safe transportation opportunities since the 4th of September." (NTV, 2015)

"Two armoured vehicles were heavily damaged by an improvised explosive device. Our fellow soldiers were martyred and injured due to the explosion. Two F-4s and two F-16 hit 13 separatist terrorist organization targets during intense air raid in the region. Despite bad weather conditions, the operation determinedly continues." (NTV, 2015)

The data shows that the Turkish army's statement is almost identical with Hande Fırat's earlier statements. In his research about terrorism and politics of fear, Altheide suggests the source of the problem to be the elite news sources. News reports reflected the mass media's use of routine "elite" news sources to "get the story" of attacks and to promote entertaining reports (Altheide, 2006, p. 110). There difference here is the "Turkey Strikes Back" attitude. In addition, the "military demands" articulated by Hande Fırat bring up another element of the politics of fear. When journalists rely heavily on government and military officials not only to discuss an

immediate war or military campaign but also for information about the security of the country, for more surveillance of citizens and comments about related domestic and international issues, then the body politic is symbolically cultivated to plant more reports and symbols about the politics of fear (Altheide, 2006, p. 127).

The coverage of the Dağlıca event is interrupted during the night because 200 hundred people who gathered in front of CNN Türk tried to break into the building because of the online coverage of Erdoğan's interview by Hürriyet, a newspaper that is also owned by the Doğan group (Hürriyet, 2015). The crowd which was accompanied by an elected AKP representative, Adnan Boynukara managed to break the doors while the editor in chief, Sedat Ergin, was on air (Hürriyet, 2015). The crowd was allegedly fuelled by a wrong presentation of Erdoğan's comments during the interview (excerpt 2) in A Haber by the Hürriyet website (A Haber, 2015). Even though this event is out of the scope of this research any change of CNN Türk's discursive practice is relevant for further social practices analysis. CNN Türk's coverage of the event goes on with the morning news bulletin at 6 a.m. CNN Türk's coverage continues the security discourse with more emphasis on Davutoğlu's security meeting and the Turkish Army's statement. Hande Fırat makes another appearance at 10.00 a.m.

"I talked to many sources including the government. People in social media are talking about very high numbers. This is not confirmed. Is there a hostage speculation? This is not confirmed as well. Clashes are going on. Why isn't there any statement so far? Because search operations are still ongoing. The incident took place in Dağlıca. The clashes were taking place since yesterday morning. Afterwards, the mine ambush was executed by PKK terrorists. Dağlıca is surrounded by mountains with lots of canyons and valleys. There is a thick fog in the region. The fog has been there for a while. Visibility is only one meter. Operations are still going on. The search operation is taking place under tough conditions. That is the reason why an official statement is not released." (Hande Fırat, CNN Türk, 2015)

She directly quotes her sources about the event with explicit details about the terrain and the weather. As she acquires the information she directly relays it. Fırat completes her narrative with a "balanced" view both in line with Erdoğan's discourse and the Turkish Army's discourse including elements of dramatization and victimization. According to Altheide, journalistic accounts about terrorism reflect news organizations' dependence on official news sources to present entertaining reports compatible with long established symbols of fear and victimization about threats to individuals (Altheide, 2006, p. 114). CNN Türk's narrative takes a "balanced" position after Hande Fırat's statement. During the news bulletin Demirtaş's statement (HDP's co-chairman) about the event is broadcasted. It is important to say here that CNN Türk's

presentation is not as deceptive as A Haber's data. CNN Türk's one minute piece about Demirtaş says:

“Demirtaş cancelled his Germany trip. The HDP released a statement: Our co-chair Demirtaş cancelled his whole schedule abroad and is returning to Turkey due to the sad events that happened in Turkey. Demirtaş has made a statement on Twitter. There is no excuse for killing. Leading our people to death and upsetting news of death coming every day is not our destiny. My condolences to our brothers who died in Dağlıca yesterday and to our children who died in Cizre.” (CNN Türk, 2015)

Demirtaş is the co-chair of the party that is targeted by Erdoğan's political discourse with an ambiguous “them”. Even though, CNN Türk covers Demirtaş's response to the event, it is the least covered news item (7 times in 24 hours) following the event while the contrary comment, Erdoğan's interview is covered 23 times. In addition, political elites are invited to the ongoing news coverage. Prof. Mehmet Özcan, the President of the Ankara Strategy Institute, reproduces Erdoğan's political discourse when he was given time to talk about the Dağlıca event:

“HDP is the political wing of KCK and PKK. There isn't any chance that the link between the two will be broken. Yes, HDP is a political party that is controversially increasing its votes. Some representatives are aiding and abetting the terrorists. Demirtaş can't leave the PKK's tutelage. As a political organization that is supported by the KCK and the HDP it can't break up with PKK suddenly. They can't just say “leave the guns”. Even though, some of them are sincere about it, this can't take place because PKK won't allow it.” (CNN Türk, 2015)

CNN Türk's coverage has one more important element. As in A Haber's coverage, CNN Türk also covers “citizen protest against the terrorism”. The coverage of this subject has two different narratives. The first one starts at 06.10 am with a summarised narrative:

“The terrorist attack in Dağlıca was protested all over Turkey. A 500-vehicle convoy, formed by the calls via social media, protested PKK terrorism in Eskişehir. In Bursa, a group of citizens organized a sit-in. The protest in Mersin was tense. During the protest, a bus on which was written Diyarbakir [Kurdish city in southeast Turkey] was stoned by the protesters.” (CNN Türk, 2015)

The first narrative provides basic information about the protest that is relatively objective. However, the second part has more details with a more nationalistic and yet inclusive (in terms of representation of different identities) rhetoric. The presenter starts with the anger in the nation and goes on how the anger in the nation is articulated on the streets:

“After the terrorists' treacherous attack, hundreds of people around Turkey poured into the streets. They walked with flags and chants saying enough to PKK. Here is the anger from last night.” (Anchor-woman, CNN Türk, 2015)

“There was no call from a specific place. The ones who got the bad news went out to the streets and joined the crowds.” (Narrator, CNN Türk, 2015)

“‘Martyrs don’t die, the homeland won’t be divided.’ Hundreds of people walked with flags and chants. The anger was big. The same voices from all around Turkey raised to protest the terrorist attack in Dağlıca. The reaction from the group, young and old people with different opinions, was common. Everyone poured into the streets for saying ‘stop terrorism’.” (Narrator, CNN Türk, 2015)

This is the point where terrorism and fear joined through victimization (Altheide, 2006, p. 127) as discursive practice in CNN Türk’s coverage of the Dağlıca event. The first version is broadcasted five times and the second version six times within 24 hours following the event. It makes a total number of eleven times of “citizen protest” that is three times more than A Haber’s coverage of the “citizen” protests. It is a proposition of “national identity” represented as a common reaction from a group of young and old people with different opinions.

“News reports and advertisements suggest that popular-culture and mass-media depictions of fear, patriotism, consumption and victimization contributed to the emergence of ‘national identity’ and collective action that was fostered by elite decision makers’ propaganda. Initial declarations about recovery and retaliation to promote patriotism became a ‘war on terrorism’ with no end in sight” (Altheide, 2006, p. 102).

It is an element of liberal neo-nationalism as Bora (2003) suggests that major exponents of nationalist discourse, that have nothing to do with the ethno-essentialist line, support terminologies such as “constitutional citizenship” or “Turkish nationalism”. However, while doing so, they take care to not depart from the aura of sacredness that is part and parcel of traditional nationalism (Bora, 2003, p. 444). Following the construction of the piece explains the rationale behind this discursive practice. The footage starts with the visuals of the people walking or driving with flags and chanting: “Martyrs don’t die, the homeland won’t be divided”. The narrator continues with a long description of the protests which occupies most of the piece after one protestor has been interviewed (Appendix 1).

“We give a clear answer to the ones who want the children of this mighty nation to annihilate each other. We are not going to be deceived by you.” (Protestor 1, CNN Türk, 2015)

Then the piece follows shortly with the other protestors’ interviews.

“We will organise these sit-ins until terrorism ends. Sometimes the biggest resistance is silence and listening. Sometimes the biggest resistance is sitting. We hope that our silent screams will spread all over Turkey.” (Protestor 2, CNN Türk, 2015)

“We condemn all sorts of terrorism. When a life is taken, there can’t be any excuse. People can’t be killed for any reason at all. Life can’t be touched. (Protestor 3, CNN Türk, 2015)

After this interview, the narrator goes on emphasising the nationalistic nature of the citizens and the piece goes on with an interview with a business owner:

“There is no meaning of keeping our businesses open if our police and soldiers are martyred. We declared mourning tonight.” (Protestor 4, CNN Türk, 2015)

“Something that happened far away has an impact on what is happening here. I am Kurdish. We are being perceived differently. [The reporter asks: ‘Did you get sad about the news?'] Of course, I am. It is ultimately a loss of life, whoever he/she is. Wherever it is, in Germany or in Europe or anywhere in the world, it is a loss of life and a destruction of a family. It doesn’t matter where it happens.” (Protestor 5, CNN Türk, 2015)

The piece finishes with a Kurdish citizens’ interview. As the quote shows he has been asked if he is sad about the event thus being directed by the reporter to provide comments about the latter. He provides an answer in a generalising way by referring to the sadness of the loss of life. Even though the Kurdish person is represented as a protestor in the piece, the visual element is the footage shows that he is working. It is an attempt to report the news “objectively” while being inclusive within the framework of liberal neo-nationalism. This is particularly an issue where a national political system includes different political parties competing for publicity and power by pursuing distinctive economic and social programmes. Such a situation involves a degree of inter-elite conflict, most obviously during election periods, in relation to which the media can align itself with varying degrees of partisanship or proclaimed ‘objectivity’ (Corner, 2011, p. 24).




Figure 4: (Y axis represents the number of the subjects’ appearances)

Overall, CNN Türk’s coverage of the event is different from that of A Haber. It promotes politics of fear for its own position that represents Turkish official nationalism and liberal neo-nationalism. The data analysis showed that together with Hande Fırat’s statements the Turkish army hence the security discourse occupies the second place, with a total of 20 times after Erdoğan’s text, that appeared 23 times (Figure 4). Yet only one short part of Erdoğan’s interview, the one, in which he uses the security discourse, appears during the coverage. CNN Türk’s discursive practice including Davutoğlu (20 Times (Figure 4)) and Demirtaş (seven times (Figure 4)) takes a position which appears to be objective and yet promotes Turkish nationalism in a complex way from a state-founding Turkish army perspective.

4.4.2 Davutoğlu’s NTV




Figure 5: (Y axis represents the number of the subjects’ appearances)

NTV’s coverage of the Dağlica event starts at 21:23, earlier than CNN Türk’s. NTV announces the event with the banner “Terrorist Attack in Dağlica”. The coverage of the event has similarities with both A Haber and CNN Türk. The coverage emphasises Davutoğlu’s security meeting similar to CNN Türk’s coverage. Furthermore, NTV uses the same part of Erdoğan’s interview as CNN Türk (excerpt 1) – the text about the being determined and different about the conflict. In addition, as A Haber, NTV depends on media elite representatives during the

initial coverage of the event. Different media elite representatives, Atilla Sandıklı (Bilgesam-The Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies), Nihat Ali Özcan (Milliyet Daily), Mustafa Karaalioglu (Star Daily), present their opinion about the event during the first two hours of the coverage of the event.

“We are talking about a very rough terrain. PKK has a concept from the beginning. PKK is allegedly fighting for the national liberation struggle. The core of the struggle is who are the people siding with? They are either with the state or the organization. They are with the organization either voluntarily or because of fear. If you want to understand this, you must check the latest election results. It is understood that PKK constituted a serious hegemony in the region. Maybe some of them voted for them voluntarily but some voted out of fear” (Nihat Ali Özcan, NTV, 2015)

“It is impossible to leave the election safety out of the context of the recent developments. Because it is also a part of the elections. The election is also a political rivalry. The rivalry between different parties that will be represented in the parliament. One of the parties illegally keeps violating the election security for taking people’s wills as hostage for a political cause. Using violence for a political cause is the classic definition of terrorism. There is an armed group following this definition and there is a political party that supports and sympathises with this group. On the other hand, there are naive political parties that will only compete in the polls. The current conflicts present the biggest problems for citizens’ capacity to vote freely. It is not a security that should only be provided for 24 hours during the election. People will eventually think that security will stay for 24 hours and later will disappear. So, the people will eventually be forced to behave as the organization wants. It is not only the problem about the political parties in the parliament but also the citizen’s problem.” (Nihat Ali Özcan, NTV, 2015)

Nihat Ali Özcan presents his opinion similarly to Erdoğan’s political discourse. In addition, as in the case of the elites in A Haber, Özcan materializes Erdoğan’s “ambiguous they” and targets HDP by suggesting the party supports PKK and even relating the attack directly to the elections because of the “political rivalry”. Meanwhile, he follows the same discourse as other media elite representatives in A Haber victimizing the nation and other political parties apart from HDP by calling them “naive”. However, he has a more normative and official rhetoric than A Haber elites. Özcan doesn’t give details about “what is supposed to done” to HDP directly. He prefers a definitive approach. According to Altheide, symbolic constructions of victims and terrorism by mass-media can contribute to a “national experience” aligned towards common values and reaffirmation of cultural narratives (Altheide, 2006, p. 111). During his definition, Özcan presents a “national experience”. The victim here is the nation and naive political parties or the state, that turned a blind eye to the armament of PKK during the peace process. In this national experience, the people should support the victim, the state, against PKK or against HDP in the elections. Kurdish people in the south-eastern region of Turkey are invited to join this national experience, that is similar to the liberal neo-nationalist discourse Erdoğan uses in his political discourse. Mustafa Karaalioglu has a similar approach:

“There are two options. One of them is the fact that Turkish Armed Forces should answer terrorism with more advanced techniques. This is necessary under all circumstances. Secondly, politically and sociologically, the people of the southeast, Kurds, should send a strong message: ‘Don’t kill for me.’ Turkey is not the same country as 7-10-20-100 years ago. We came from the years denying Kurdish culture, language and identity to completely removing restrictions against Kurdish identity and language, hence there is no means for an armed struggle. For living together Turks fulfil their responsibilities to Kurds even though it was late after painful years. Kurds should also do this by saying ‘Don’t kill for me’ to the organization that claims to kill in the name of the Kurds.” (Mustafa Karaalioglu, NTV, 2015)

He explains how the situation is different than the other processes and how Kurds now have the cultural rights even though Kurdish is neither recognised as a language in Turkish courts nor in the official educational system (TBMM, 2011). He presents a Turkey where all the problems regarding Kurdish identity are solved by comparing it to a certain point of the past when the Kurdish identity’s existence was denied. A time that according to Yeğen ended in the end of 1990s from the nationalist discourse’s perspective (2007). That makes the statement’s first part true but regarding the complete remove of restrictions it is an overstatement as the current situation in Turkey and data analysis suggests. Exaggerations and highly selective information are designed to mislead the public about what is happening, often ‘in their name’ (Corner, 2011: 31). Corner categorizes this action as *deception* by the media elite. As for this analysis, it is another reproduction of Erdoğan’s text (excerpt 4), here with less emphasis on security. Another media elite representative, Avni Özgürel (Yeni Birlik Daily), who joined the news show during the coverage of A Haber also joins the NTV coverage via phone. He repeats the same points he made for A Haber:

“How did this happen? The USA got in touch with the Syrian arm of PKK, PYD. PKK declared itself as armed force of the USA in Syria.” (Avni Özgürel, NTV, 2015)

“Mines are coming from Italy. Ammunition is coming from Germany. Turkey is under a multi-dimensional attack.” (Avni Özgürel, NTV, 2015)

He continues with the victimization of the nation, Turkey, and points the finger at “outer” forces as he did in A Haber. All media elite representatives who join the news coverage of the event work for media companies that have government related businesses according to Burak Arikan’s mapping (2017). In addition, according to a phone leak reported by Diken, President Erdoğan, back then Prime Minister, called the owner of Nihat Özcan’s newspaper (Milliyet Daily) and demanded the Editor in-Chief to be fired (Diken, 2014). The leaked phone call is still available online (Anonymous, 2014). The owner is heard crying in the end of the phone conversation

after talking to Erdoğan about a leak related to the peace process that was published in the newspaper (Anonymous, 2014).

The morning coverage of NTV is different than the evening coverage. Although the emphasis on Davutoğlu continues, six different parts from Erdoğan's interview enter the broadcasting stream (1, 2, 4, 6, 10, 11). The NTV coverage draws on the security aspect and the election comments of Erdoğan's interview. Thus, the coverage contributes to the politics of fear derived from Erdoğan's text. The politics of fear results when social control is perceived to have broken down and/or a higher level of control is called for resulting from a situation or events, such as a "terrorist attack" (Altheide, 2006, p. 16). The analysis showed that NTV's narrative didn't have an element that directly targets HDP. However, after the morning coverage started, media elites who are directly blaming HDP joined the programmes. Okan Muderrisoğlu, a journalist for Sabah Daily, a newspaper that has the same owner as A Haber, joins the coverage.

"For some time, there is a campaign by HDP, therefore PKK, in the southeast and east of Turkey. It alleges that the operations started because AKP lost the one-party rule. This gets a positive reaction from the voting base until a certain extent. In the west, there is the belief that operations started allegedly because of the upcoming election, hence AKP will have a political gain for the operations. The two of them, the belief in the west and the east, are connected and they support each other. Any life isn't important than any politics. I haven't seen anything like that in Ankara" (Okan Muderrisoğlu, NTV, 2015)

"As long as HDP passes the election threshold, they are using a language ready to manipulate society about election security." (Okan Muderrisoğlu, NTV, 2015)

He connects the HDP and PKK directly through "terrorism" and reproduces Erdoğan's text as an example of the discursive proactive in NTV. He tries to nullify what is presented as "certain beliefs" thus partly offering the same "ambiguous they" as Erdoğan did in his interview. The HDP is named but who is meant in the west is not articulated. NTV has one segment about HDP, the broadcast of Demirtaş's statement (HDP co-chairman) where he is expressing his condolences. Identical to A Haber this segment is broadcasted five times (Figure 5). NTV also covers the "protests against the Dağlica attack" for seven times. NTV's narrative differs from both, CNN Türk and A Haber. The nationalist discourse is not the major element in the narrative. Instead the narrative focuses two different aspects of the "protest". First, the normative information about the protests such as city, number of the people without providing any chants or nationalistic symbols, except the Turkish flag. Second, NTV brings up that people tried to attack HDP buildings and were stopped by the police. It was an element in CNN Türk's narrative too but it occupied only half of the space it did in NTV's narrative. However, the

number is still relatively small, seven times (Figure 5). NTV's emphasis on Davutoğlu becomes more visible after Prime Minister Davutoğlu organizes a press conference about the Dağlıca event. While all three channels, A Haber, CNN Türk and NTV, broadcast his press conference live, NTV also carries his remarks to the beginning of the Dağlıca event segments in its broadcast following his press conference. In addition to the descriptive accounts of the events from Davutoğlu's conference NTV picks the following quotes:

“Those mountains will be cleansed from those terrorists. They will be cleansed no matter what. This country's mountains, valleys and cities won't be left to the terrorists.” (Davutoğlu, NTV, 2015)

“Many numbers and stories are fabricated just to break our armed forces' determination to fight. Whatever you do, you can't make us to step back from our determination in the war against terrorism.” (Davutoğlu, NTV, 2015)

Crisis provides opportunities for heads of state to present themselves as leaders and to dramatically define the situation as tragic but hopeful and to bring out the “determination” of the national character (Altheide, 2006, p. 89). Davutoğlu seizes the opportunity and gives a stronger message than Erdoğan with a clearer dehumanizing rhetoric in the first quote where Davutoğlu argues that the country is infested and therefore requires cleansing. A statement which is dramatically efficient. He repeats and spells “cleansing” during the statement as “It-will-be-cleansed”. He uses the strong and inhuman language of official nationalism (Bora, 2003) to articulate his power position. He repeats the “war against terrorism” from his earlier statement (NTV, 2015). While using *transitivity* – the passive voice – (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) for stating the actions, fabricating numbers, done by an unknown enemy, his discourse stronger emphasizes determination than Erdoğan's text. Symbolic interaction theory suggests that identity and meaning are socially constructed by applying familiar experiences and routines to specific situations (Altheide 2000; Cerulo 1997; Cerulo et al. 1992; Holstein and Gubrium 2000; Perinbanayagam 1974 cited in Altheide 2006, p. 89). Davutoğlu here revives the “Turk has no friend but the Turk” element along with strength that will resonate in Turkish society.

Therefore, official nationalism also constitutes NTV's discursive practice of the Dağlıca event. However, it is more emphasized through Davutoğlu than through Erdoğan. Overall, NTV qualitatively speaking has a more “balanced” perspective, regarding the extent of the content that was broadcasted. Yet quantitatively the coverage following the Dağlıca event is very

unbalanced. Balanced or not, the discursive practice of Erdoğan's text is evident. It is important to say that both CNN Türk and NTV have a "balanced" theme even though it is articulated differently. CNN Türk quantitatively tries to balance its coverage by spreading the content equally even though its discourse contains a more "radical" version of nationalisms, while NTV is trying to do the same qualitatively, having a more "balanced" narrative where "radical" nationalism is not articulated. Bora suggests that liberal neo-nationalism has different strands within and that it continuously develops and is not completely formed yet (Bora, 2003). He adds that the most influential advocate of this discourse is the media, which is intertwined with big capital. Economics hold a privileged position in liberal nationalism (Bora, 2003, p. 441). Burak Arıkan's (2015) media ownership mapping shows that the owner of NTV has government contracts with construction business. From this point of departure, CNN Türk reproduces Erdoğan's text with a liberal neo-nationalist discourse practice that is more radicalized, in the sense of secular elites – with the Kemalist military as a core – who are not in power anymore. That narrative is inclusive in the sense of conceiving Turkish identity as having a superior cultural position while not being part of the big capital anymore. NTV on the other hand reproduces Erdoğan's text with the "softer" discourse of liberal neo-nationalism with an inclusive but not superior Turkish cultural identity along with being part of the big capital. #

Finally, data analysis showed that "terrorism" is intertwined with different discourses within a political communication triangle (Nacos, 2002) with Erdoğan's political discourse in the centre.

Whether they attack, threaten violence, or communicate their demands, terrorists need access to mass media and to what we call the political communication triangle, that is, the interconnectedness of the media, public officials, and the general public (Nacos, 2002). "Terrorism" gains access to the media in Turkey but the public is exposed to different discourses loaded with nationalism and political gains. The TV audience did not get a chance to see the video footage that shows locals, Kurdish people carrying injured dead soldiers or what locals think about the event until hours after the events (Dicle Haber, 2015). Only the Turkish side of the event along with many security details is represented. However, the accounts of the event don't match with the video footage filmed by a local Kurdish agency and a separate video that was filmed by PKK (Anonymous, 2015). Keeping in mind that PKK's footage is produced for propaganda, neither video shows signs of the bad weather, which is presented as an excuse for the late communication of the event. In addition, the weather history website (Weather Underground, 2017) doesn't show any account of the bad weather conditions as well

and confirms the footage. Although this projects' aim is not to conduct an investigative journalism practice the research shows that there isn't any "alternative" narrative of the events in Turkish television. Furthermore, the discursive practice in three channels amplifies Erdoğan's text which is strongly related to the social practice, the upcoming elections. Within this political communication triangle, the act of "terrorism" in the Dağlica event goes through a negotiation of meaning process in the discursive field that stands alone in the symbolic narrative of two channels. The conclusion will present this stand-alone position in relation to social practice.

5. Conclusion

"Always historicize!" is the slogan of Jameson's *The Political Unconscious* (1982). He successfully emphasizes the importance of the "transhistorical" imperative of dialectical thought (Jameson, 1982). With respect to Jameson, this research considers the relationship between the Kurdish Question and Turkish nationalism to be dialectical. Turkish nationalist discourses constitute and are being constituted by the Kurdish Question and terrorism narratives. From this point of departure, this research historicized the Dağlica event with respect to discourses on terrorism narratives in the political communication and the media coverage after the event. The aim was to understand the mechanisms of politics of fear and nationalism and its relation to the media in Turkey. Therefore, this research sets out to answer the following questions at this intersection: How does the terrorism narrative in the mainstream media 'stand-alone' as a socially symbolic act? In what ways do the politics of fear interact with the civic subject through the media?

Regarding the first question, stand-alone means that 'the meaning of terrorism' is a vanishing mediator, which varies according to the way it is represented. It acts as a regulating medium for the dynamism of the social system and it ultimately vanishes leaving no trace of its presence inside or outside of the system. The system is a symbolic one which takes place in the world of ideas not in the material one. However, the symbolic system is predetermined by already existing power structures that are articulated via different discourses (discourse of official nationalism, discourse of liberal neo-nationalism, discourse of Islamist nationalism). Those discourses are not only constituted by the language but also by non-discursive elements, such as already existing institutions in Turkey (Turkish Army, state, etc.). Ultimately, the process takes place as a symbolic act in and through the media in the Dağlica event. The analysis shows that Erdoğan perpetually distanced himself from the event during the interview. For this he uses

a natural phenomenon, the weather conditions, implying it was simply an act of God. He talked about his political goals, such as “New Turkey” and a new constitution with an “us vs. them” rhetoric. He continuously targeted a political party, the HDP, via using the “us vs. them” rhetoric in an ambiguous way, always in the context of terrorism. How audiences interpreted his interview aside, he uses his power and current power structures in Turkey to define an event in his terms. Consequently, he is rather talking through ‘terrorism’ than talking about ‘terrorism’ in his political communication. A politician talking about her/his political goals is a common thing. However, the importance of Dağlıca event derives from its proximity. The snap elections that were going to take place the 1st of November were officially announced on the 25th of August 2015 (Hurriyet, 2015). The communicative event has the position of being the official launch of the election campaign. Erdoğan appears to define the Dağlıca event in relation to the upcoming elections. In the process, he uses a language constituted by a hybrid of Turkish discourses of nationalism that eventually form his own discourse, which entails populist right-wing elements. The discursive practices of Erdoğan’s interview resonate differently in three television channels. The analysis showed that A Haber, the channel that also broadcasted Erdoğan’s interview, reproduces his text in various ways. A Haber relies heavily on the media elite for the coverage of the event following Erdoğan’s interview. Media elite representatives not only reproduce Erdoğan’s text but also narrow down (or expand depending on the point of view) his discourse by relating the event more directly to the HDP and to the elections. In addition, A Haber uses *deception* to target the HDP leader by using his tweets in the wrong context (tweeted before the event but presented as tweeted after the event in A Haber). The targeting of HDP increases with the opinions of media elite representatives and selected parts from Erdoğan’s interview. Overall, the analysis shows that A Haber practices propaganda. It is important to say that the propaganda resonates with the public. During the night, a newspaper building was attacked (Hürriyet, 2015). In addition, following that night Kurdish shops in different cities and HDP headquarters were attacked (Saymaz, 2015). According to the same report, perpetrators weren’t taken to the courts and even the shop owners that requested to file a court case were denied. The thesis considers occurred events as the appearance of the relation between discursive practice, social practice, and political violence. CNN Türk’s and NTV’s coverage of the event is different from A Haber, which can be considered as ‘the normative try-outs’ because of their attempt to provide ‘balanced’ news. However, their coverage was also dominated by Erdoğan’s text that was continuously reproduced. Their discursive practice has a more ‘balanced’ way in the sense that they are positioned according to other power holders such as the Turkish Army and Davutoğlu. Their coverage is more focused on the election angle

rather than targeting the HDP directly. However, the ‘balance’ they have doesn’t mean that they give a voice to HDP representatives to explain their accounts about the event. Media elite representatives targeting HDP are taking a considerable amount time in their coverage in addition to Erdoğan’s text. Furthermore, both channels, don’t give any coverage to PKK to explain why the event took place in first place. Questions like why did the PKK attack and what the purpose of that attack remain unanswered. The lack of the account about the PKK’s side is caused by predetermined structures, following the official narrative as the media logic, that eventually leaves out the act of terrorism itself and instead directs the narrative to construct Dağlica according to the snap elections, which is another social practice. Both channels follow the existing nationalist discourses, which are communicated by Erdoğan who ‘sets the tone’ for the media coverage. As a result, it is another appearance of the relations between discursive practice and social practice in which the terrorism narrative stands alone as a socially symbolic act.

Regarding the second question, politics of fear is the key element in Erdoğan’s interview. His past/future discursive strategy implies that the ‘bad’ features of the past are not related to him and that the future will be better if the people vote for AKP. In voting for AKP they don’t have to be afraid since Erdoğan is still in power. In addition, Erdoğan uses already existing nationalist discourses mostly with security and development aspects. Within this regard, it is the perfect opportunity for the media to make use of his interview as well as of government sources. As it was mentioned in the literature review, nationalist discourses relied on the element of fear from the beginning of the foundation of the Republic. Current media institutions feed from this fear and simply sell it as a product. Within the existing nationalist discourses *outside incitement* is a key factor in defining the Kurdish Question and related issues. Media elites in A Haber repeatedly use *outside incitement* factors giving the impression that ‘Turkey is under attack’. Outside incitement has another dimension to consider. The outside factor also depicts ‘the nation’ as the victim of an attack that has many ‘known or unknown forces’ – mostly foreign – behind itself. The victimization through ‘outside incitement’ entails a ‘unification’ and a call for ‘patriotism’ which was seen in the ‘Millions of Souls United Against Terrorism’ rallies. Thousands of people gathered in the rallies, that were led by Erdoğan and Davutoğlu (Bianet, 2015). This research considers it is another appearance of discursive practice and social practice. NTV and CNN Türk also use victimization while promoting fear via their discursive practices. However, NTV and CNN Türk are different in the sense that they represent different power positions. NTV’s discursive practice emphasises the role of Davutoğlu while CNN Türk

emphasises the Turkish army's role as the 'stability' factor along with the rule by Erdoğan. The media elite representatives in CNN Türk rely on the military sources to communicate the information about the event while Davutoğlu appears on NTV after his press conference. It is important to say that in the current media ecology all three channels are taking advantage of the event and waiting to be supplied with the information provided by the officials, government and military sources. Consequently, the information all channels acquire from the official sources amplify the various nationalist discourses and make them mediators of the politics of fear, an institutional problem of the media in Turkey.

Overall, the research has shown different mechanisms during the Dağlica event in three mainstream news channels in Turkey. This project aims to contribute the future coverage of a such an event. The research shows that there isn't any PKK perspective represented in Turkish TV. The audience is not informed about the why this event happened. Instead, they are only being offered one narrative that is officially produced by the realm of the politics. A narrative that is used to construct the politics of fear and to promote political agendas. Therefore, in the case of such an event the 'other side's perspective should be communicated without sensationalizing. For doing so, the media institution's reliance on official government sources should be reduced. In addition, local sources should be used for broadening the coverage of the event. Finally, and most importantly journalists should ask more questions. As the research shows, none of the journalists question the account of the events and accept the information they are given without questioning. It has been the media logic in Turkey that mainstream channels positioned themselves close with the ruling power. However, the same attitude took the media institutions where they are today. A place, where they have a very limited freedom to broadcast outside of the frame of dominant discourses of Turkish nationalism. If the situation needs to be developed it requires journalists to keep asking questions.

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7. Appendix

Appendix 1: Transcription of A-Haber Footage – Erdoğan Interview News Footage

21:02 – First Banner –during the Diyarbakır Sur news

Conflict sounds are echoed in the district [Sur] “Martyr fire fell into Kayseri and Adana”

21:22 –

23:20 – News Coverage:

Banner: Erdoğan: “We will make them pay the price”

“As soon as PM (Prime Minister) Davutoğlu got the news in Konya he interrupted his schedule and immediately returned to Ankara. He conveyed a special security meeting.” – anchor-woman

“When the bad news arrived PM Davutoğlu was in Konya. He interrupted his schedule and urgently returned to Ankara. He was in the PM’s residence at 22:36. He is currently leading the security summit.” – Reporter

“As you know this is a treacherous attack. We’re all very sorry. Condolences to all of us.” – anchor-woman

Avni Özgürel- journalist:

“I wish god's mercy and grace to our martyrs. The terrorist organization designated the Dağlica region as a target. It is a triangular region, on one side Iran, Iraq on the other side and Turkey on one side. The organization has been using the Valley of Kazan as a base all along. The state met a lot of difficulties until it cleansed this region. We had a lot of losses and martyrs. This organization sometimes escapes from Iran to Iraq sometimes from Iran to Iraq.”

“As President Erdoğan stated earlier this organization’s act happened during the cleansing of the organization from the region while the pursuit and scan process was taking place.”

“It’s good to know that the bombs are coming from Germany and the mines are coming from Italy to a great extent. Turkey has been following this.”

“USA choose PKK’s Syria wing, PYD as their army in the region. They are air-supplying weapons and aerielly bombing against ISIS according to the coordination given by PYD. We don’t which coordinates they are giving to the US. “

“The reason this insolent organization is targeting Turkey is pertness derived from international support. As you know interviews of PYD’s female militants are published in the western media. The French president accepted those women with a PYD uniform. Italy’s head of the international relations committee accepted them as well. What are they going to do by having the peace process with Turkey? Like this they are being pampered.”

Ekrem Kızıltaş – journalist – Takvim Daily

“Mines exploded while armoured vehicles were passing by during a cleansing operation.”

“A big operation is going on. The PM interrupted his schedule and returned to Ankara for a security meeting. Apparently, the weather in the region is stormy. Tonight’s situation indicates that there will be a genuine sweeping operation to their camps and lair or whatever they have starting tomorrow.”

“Most of the people might have expected that the terror acts somehow would decrease when it what decided to have snap elections in 1st of November after the 7th of June election because of HDP’s presence in the parliament. Apparently, this organization and its political wing (HDP) omitted that any armed groups, except those that belong to the state, won’t be tolerated.”

“PKK is trying to continue its terrorist activities with interior and exterior support.”

Reporter (X2)

“When the bad news arrived PM Davutoğlu was in Konya. He interrupted his schedule and urgently returned to Ankara. He is currently leading the security summit” - Reporter (2)

Repeat

Cem Kucuk – journalist – Star daily

“Dağlica is one of the regions where the treacherous terrorist organisation, PKK, martyrs our soldiers.”

“After this day, anyone who speaks out loud about the peace process should be considered as either committing a crime or sinning. It is a huge act of disrespect for our martyrs. The peace process shouldn’t even talked about even one PKK member is left“

“An other issue is the HDP. Unless the HDP doesn’t condemn the PKK clearly tomorrow it will become illegal. It is not a legal political party anymore. It is officially the partner of terrorism. There will have to be every kind of legal consequence.”

“This terrorist organisation is supported by the mainstream media, by business circles and foreign powers. It is very hard to deal with a terrorist organization in a hilly tarrain. However, we are dealing with those dirty people in the mainstream who praise and present them as legal.”

Erdoğan’s Interview (1)

“As the PM returns to Ankara now, he will have a security meeting. He will obtain the results before that. After obtaining the results, he will give a statement. The weather conditions over there have been very bad. The fight goes on there under bad weather conditions. This incident took place as result of a cleansing in Dağlica. As far as it is stated this incident took place against armoured vehicles caused by

mine traps. So far, the briefing about the incident from the Chief of Staff is really sad. My wish is that the fight following the statement will be very different and determined. My condolences to our nation. May god give patience [to us].”

Reporter X3

“When the bad news arrived PM Davutoğlu was in Konya. He interrupted his schedule and urgently returned to Ankara. He is currently leading the security summit.”- Reporter (3)

Erdoğan interview (X2)

“As my PM returns to Ankara he is going to have a security meeting. He will have the exact results before that. He will declare the results later. The weather conditions have been very very bad. There is a fight there under those bad weather conditions. And, as result of a cleansing in Dağlıca, this kind of incident takes place. As far as it is stated an incident takes place (consequently) against the armoured vehicles as a result of mine traps. So far, the briefing [about the incident] from the Chief of Staff is really sad. My wish is that the statement and the fight following that statement will be very different and determined. My condolences our nation. May god give us patience.”

Ismail Kapan – journalist- Turkiye Daily

“Our heart is bleeding. Those treacherous attacks continue repeatedly. These bad days are not new. It is something going on for many years. We can go back as far as World War I.”

“This nation vigorously fought wars against the great powers even though it didn’t have an army. Today, the Republic of Turkey is more powerful than it was in those days, hence it has the power and ability for defeating her enemies.”

“This struggle will go on, no matter whichever the hidden power groups supports them. It will be shown to the world that this looter (çapulcu) group doesn’t have the power to divide this country.”

“The reaction from the public against terrorism is not enough. People should gather and protest terrorism. The political parties should condemn terrorism including the HDP.”

“The HPD said, of course for getting votes, their focus is not ethnicity, they are working for the human rights they are a political party of Turkey before the 7th of June election. They gave messages with a softer attitude. However, it wasn’t sincere, instead more opportunists move. They are racing for helping the terrorists.”

Reporter X4

“When the bad news arrived PM Davutoğlu was in Konya. He interrupted his schedule and urgently returned to Ankara. He is currently leading the security summit” - Reporter (4)

Ziya Sözen – Head of village guard confederation**Reporter X5****Erdoğan’s Interview (X2) – different part on Gülen and Doğan****Emin Pazarcı – journalist – Akşam Daily**

“The weather was bad during the attack. As seen in the past, the attacks take place when the weather is bad.”

“There is serious fight against terrorism. They really got wild. It is not like in the past, we are taking serious results, we’re killing thousands. We all have to shoulder the responsibility.”

“The HDP leader supports the PKK. He gave statements supporting PKK before the attack. We know he said something like PKK will beat the Turkish army. We’re facing a total insurgency. Some of HDP representatives are provoking the people.”

“The Turkish nation is seriously under attack. It is an insurgency against the Turkish nation’s unity and integrity.”

Fatih Atik - A Haber News Coordinator

“The information about the attack arrived at Ankara around 19:00 p.m. .”

“The weather in the region is very bad. The helicopters couldn’t fly. So it wasn’t easy to dispatch reinforcements.”

Reporter X6 – End of security meeting – No statement**Fatih Atik – A Haber News Coordinator**

“Many of the PKK leaders are appreciated in different European countries. Some of them live in Germany and the Netherlands. We recently see praising comments from those countries. The US government is supplying PYD, the Syrian arm of PKK.”

“These attacks will go on. President Erdoğan said the fight will go on. As he said, Turkey is under attack from many different fronts.”

Reporter X7**Erdoğan’s Interview (X3)**

“As the PM returns to Ankara now, he will have a security meeting. He will obtain the results before that. After obtaining the results, he will give a statement. The weather conditions over there have been very bad. The fight goes on there under bad weather conditions. This incident took place as result of a cleansing in Dağlıca. As far as it is stated this incident took place against armoured vehicles caused by mine traps. So far, the briefing about the incident from the Chief of Staff is really sad. My wish is that the fight following the statement will be very different and determined. My condolences to our nation. May god give patience [to us].”

Rerun

Martyr News

Reporter X8

More Martyr News

3 a.m. – Chief of Staff statement

News Coverage

“President Erdoğan got the news of a treacherous attack in Dağlıca just before the A HaberA Haber broadcast. He said: ‘We have great pain and this treacherous attack will be revenged’”

Erdoğan bite-1

“This incident took place as result of a cleansing in Dağlıca. As far as it is stated this incident took place against armoured vehicles caused by mine traps. So far, the briefing about the incident from the Chief of Staff is really sad. My wish is that the fight following the statement will be very different and determined. My condolences to our nation. May god give patience [to us].”

Narrator: President Erdoğan explained the treacherous attack in Dağlıca with these words: He said “My condolences our nation.” He also commented on recently increasing terrorist attacks and emphasized that there are people who are profiting from terrorism.”

Erdoğan bite-2

“They are reaping profit of this by means of terrorism. That’s what they always do.”

VISUAL: HDP co-chair Demirtaş’s statement via theHDP twitter account:

“All the armies are powerless against the people, so is Tayyip Erdoğan’s palace, army and police. They lost, they will lose again.” (Tweeted before the event)

Narrator:

“Erdoğan strongly criticized the HDP which supports PKK in every chance it gets. He said, ‘We can’t talk about a parliamentary democracy in a country where those things are happening.’”

Erdoğan bite-3

“Here, it is necessary to openly express something. A known political party is already gathering votes by being backed by a separatist terrorist organisation. They are openly saying this. They are saying we

are backed by YPG, PYD and PKK. Their co-chair said that. How can you build a peaceful environment in our country with them if these kinds of things are being said? “

Erdoğan bite-4

“Who is living in the police stations? They are the children of this nation. On the other hand, soldiers... And now, I am calling the martyrs. Among those martyrs, there are many of my Kurdish brothers. He [The Kurdish brother] is martyred. However, his father says he has 5 more children at home, he is ready to send all of them for this homeland. It won't come to an end. But, while they are saying we are the Kurds' representatives, on the other hand they are martyring my Kurdish brothers and Kurdish citizens. They are in the middle of separatism”

Narrator:

“Erdoğan commented on recently increasing terrorist attacks. He said ‘HDP, who is subcontractor of PKK, is trying to gather votes with blood and violence.’ He emphasised that the people in the region are tired of terrorism.”

Erdoğan bite-5

“They started the attacks to keep the vote potential in the region. It is for consolidating the voting base. Yesterday, citizens organized a walk. This was a resistance. The walk was for that. People said leave your hands off me. My citizen in the southeast should expand and increase this. They must say ‘leave your hands off me and we don't recognize you because you didn't protect our rights, on the contrary you took our children to the death, kidnapped them to the mountains’. Who are the children that were kidnaped to the mountains? It's all our Kurdish citizens' children. I hope people see this reality and reflect their will in the polls”

Erdoğan bite-6

Narrator: “President Erdoğan talked about the Dağlıca event and addressed the terrorist organisation: ‘They will pay a heavy price.

“After tonight's event, we have to know that we will make them pay a heavy price even though we might have martyrs. We killed almost two thousand terrorists so far.”

“In our religion [Islam] martyrs don't die. We don't call the ones dead who die in Allah's way. They are alive, but you can't know [quoting Quran, the Al-Baqara Surah]. We will keep going with this belief and understanding.”

News

“When the bad news arrived PM Davutoğlu was in Konya. He interrupted his schedule and returned to Ankara. He summoned a security summit. During a two-hour meeting all of the details of the treacherous attack were discussed.”

Security meeting details

News

The news of the Dağlıca attack were received with a reaction all over the country. Reaction walks were arranged in many cities and terrorism was cursed.

VISUAL: MARTYRS DON'T DIE, THE COUNTRY (HOMELAND) WON'T BE DIVIDED. (A MAN WITH A TURKISH FLAG IN THE CAR)

Narrator: VISUALS: FLAGS AND PEOPLE

“The dark news coming from Hakkari, Dağlıca is protested in many cities of the country. Tekirdağ was one of them. The reaction turned into a convoy of 150 vehicles. A group of 1500 people walked in Erdemli, Mersin. During the protest, the crowd blocked the road. The tension rose high in Gaziantep. People of Zonguldak read the Quran for the martyrs. Similar reactions to the attack filled the streets in many cities.”

Emin Pazarıcı Rerun

News – Hikmet Öztürk

“We will talk about this treacherous attack.”

Murat Gener – A Haber Editor

News – Hikmet Öztürk: The Soliders' health situation

News – Ahmet Çelik (Reporter): The Soliders' health situation

“Even though the weather in the region was bad our planes bombed the targets. An operation has been started. 13 Separatist terrorist organization targets are bombed. Many terrorists are annihilated.”

ERDOĞAN-1 PACK

ERDOĞAN 2 PACK

ERDOĞAN 4 PACK

ERDOĞAN 5 PACK

ERDOĞAN 6 PACK

ERDOĞAN-1 PACK

ERDOĞAN 2 PACK

ERDOĞAN 4 PACK

ERDOĞAN 5 PACK

ERDOĞAN 6 PACK

Cem Kucuk – journalist – Star daily

“After this day, anyone who speaks out loud about the peace process should be considered as either committing a crime or sinning. It is a huge act of disrespect for our martyrs. The peace process shouldn't even be talked about even one PKK member is left“

“An other issue is the HDP. Unless the HDP doesn't condemn the PKK clearly tomorrow it will become illegal. It is not a legal political party anymore. It is officially the partner of terrorism. There will have to be every kind of legal consequence.”

News: Hikmet Öztürk

“Dağlica a familiar place in Turkey. The military zone where many infiltration and attack attempts were prevented. The worst case was recorded in 2007, when twelve soldiers were martyred and 16 soldiers were injured.“

EKREM KIZILTAŞ RERUN

“A big operation is going on. The PM interrupted his schedule and returned to Ankara for a security meeting. Apparently, the weather in the region is stormy. Tonight's situation indicates that there will be a genuine sweeping operation to their camps and lair or whatever they have starting tomorrow.”

“Most of the people might have expected that the terror acts somehow would decrease when it what decided to have snap elections in 1st of November after the 7th of June election because of HDP's presence in the parliament. Apparently, this organization and its political wing (HDP) omitted that any armed groups, except those that belong to the state, won't be tolerated.”

News - Haktan Uysal

“Turkey started the week with painful news.”

News – Ahmet Çelik (Reporter) Latest

“Our planes bombed the targets An operation has started. 13 separatist terrorist organization targets are bombed. Many terrorists were annihilated.”

ERDOĞAN-1 PACK

ERDOĞAN 2 PACK

ERDOĞAN 4 PACK

ERDOĞAN 5 PACK

ERDOĞAN 6 PACK

Kurtuluş Tayiz – journalist

“From time to time, the country has been tried to be manipulated with attacks in Dağlica. In 2007, twelve soldiers were martyred. Today, it is a similar process. They are trying to manipulate this country with terrorism. The biggest problem here is the interior (inside of the country) and standing together and united. But, we can not do it.”

“We don’t fight with ghosts or magical creatures from Middle Earth or a dream world. PKK martyred our 16 soldiers. Besides, this organisation’s political extension [HDP], Hurriyet group, White Turks, Neo-Kemalists, they gathered votes from this since yesterday. Who martyred our soldiers? The political organization you voted martyred our soldiers. Can’t they comprehend this?”

Kerim Ulak- A HaberA Haber journalist

“Demirtaş said the Turkish Army will lose and PKK will win.”

PKK radio talk

“They left us like a mouse. We felt the state’s power on our neck. We are completely defeated. Don’t trust the people much. They will be shaken by violence and fear. Don’t mind the ones who you are shooting at, for showing our power it is necessary. They have to return to us.”

Reporter – Gökhan Kurt –

“Despite bad weather conditions, 13 targets were annihilated by F-4s and F-16s.”

Reaction walk

Reporter – Gökhan Kurt –

“Despite bad weather conditions, 13 targets were annihilated by F-4s and F-16s”

ERDOĞAN-1 PACK

ERDOĞAN 2 PACK

ERDOĞAN 4 PACK

ERDOĞAN 5 PACK

ERDOĞAN 6 PACK

“Terrorists are encircled.”

“Were they carrying food to PKK?”

Davutoğlu Presser

Erdoğan-Davutoğlu Security Meeting

Media Elites discussing

A HaberA Haber says it is weather

Appendix 2: Transcription of CNN Türk Footage

Militaristic-Nationalist-“Balanced”

LAST MINUTE -21:33

SECURITY SUMMIT

“PM Davutoğlu interrupted his schedule for convening a security summit” – anchor-woman

Hande Fırat – DOĞAN TV ANKARA REPORTER

“A security summit is convened about the PKK terrorists’ attack against soldiers. We have the information that there are many martyrs and wounded. A detailed statement from the Commander of the armed forces will follow.”

“Dağlica is remembered as a very bloody region in Turkey’s memory after the attack in which twelve soldiers were martyred” – anchor-woman

“PM Davutoğlu was in Konya for watching the national football game. He interrupted his schedule for convening security summit” – anchor-woman

TREACHEROUS AMBUSH

“Erdoğan said: ‘What the commander of the armed forces told me is sad.’ There is not any official statement.” anchor-woman

Hande Fırat - DOĞAN TV ANKARA REPORTER

“Two armoured cars were attacked with mines. Yes, there isn’t any official statement. Why? Many of our audience is asking us this. The Turkish army is sending a psychologist to the families who have martyrs and will notify them. Therefore, they don’t make an official statement before that.”

“Two armoured cars were attacked with mines. President Erdoğan also made it public.”

“Everybody is cursing this treacherous ambush but an ember burns where it falls (it hurts the families of the martyrs most) [Turkish proverb] - Anchor-woman

“PM Davutoğlu was in Konya for watching the national football game. He interrupted his schedule for convening security summit in Ankara. President Erdoğan said from now on the fight will continue differently and determined – anchor-woman

“PM Davutoğlu was in Konya for watching the national football game. He interrupted his schedule for convening security summit in Ankara after the news arrived” - Gulsen Coşkun – Ankara reporter

ERDOĞAN-1

(ERDOĞAN TALKED TO CNN)

Hande Fırat- DOĞAN TV ANKARA REPORTER

“Drones are in the air. As they detect terrorists the operation goes onç”

“The army has some demands. They are pointing out the necessity of an extended operation against 1400 terrorists in the country. In addition, they request legal protection. The commander of the armed forces stated that many times.”

“F-4s and F-16s took off but the weather condition is rough in the region. As a result, the operation is going on under hard conditions.”

03:11 Army statement bad weather conditions- for serving the citizens

Morning 6:00

TREACHEROUS ATTACK IN DAĞLICA

“We are starting the bulletin with sad news, the attack in Dağlıca, a treacherous PKK attack. A mine was exploded while two armoured cars were passing by. Operations are still going on.” - anchor man

“The terrorist attack in Dağlıca was protested all around Turkey. A 500-vehicle convoy protested PKK terrorism in Eskişehir. In Bursa, a group of citizens organized a sit-in. Protest in Mersin was tense. During the protest, a bus written Diyarbakır [Kurdish city in southeast Turkey] was stoned by the protesters.”

Kenan Sener- Turkish army statement

“Our people’s means of transportation were restricted because of the destruction of bridges and culverts and planted bombs to the roads by the separatist terrorist organisation. The operation continues to provide our people with safe transportation opportunities since the 4th of September.”

“Two armoured vehicles were heavily damaged by an improvised explosive device. Our fellow soldiers were martyred and injured due to the explosion. Two F-4s and two F-16 hit 13 separatist terrorist organization targets during intense air raid in the region. Despite bad weather conditions, the operation determinedly continues.”

DEMIRTAŞ

“Demirtaş cancelled his Germany trip. The HDP released a statement: ‘Our co-chair Demirtaş canceled his whole schedule abroad and is returning to Turkey due to the sad events that happened in Turkey. Demirtaş made a statement on Twitter. There is no excuse for killing. Leading our people to death and the upsetting news of death coming every day is not our destiny. My condolences to our brothers who died in Dağlıca yesterday and our children who died in Cizre.’”

Hande Fırat –

“I talked many sources including the government. People in social media are talking in very high numbers. This is not confirmed. There is hostage speculation. This is not confirmed as well. Clashes are going on. Why isn’t there any statement so far? Because the search operation is still going on. The incident took place in Dağlıca. The clashes were taking place since yesterday morning. Afterwards, the mine ambush was executed by a PKK terrorist. Dağlıca is surrounded by mountains with lots of canyons and valleys. There is a thick fog in the region. The fog has been there for a while. Visibility is only one meter. Operations are still going on. Search operation are taking place under tough conditions. That is the reason why an official statement is not released.”

Prof. Mehmet Özcan – President of Ankara strategy Institute

“As Erdoğan said things will change in the region after such a big attack. Not changing is

very hard. PKK perceived the peace process as while we are talking on the table on the one hand, we fill the cities with bombs and guns and distribute guns to every house for controlling the region. What PKK made of peace process is very different from what the government and the state made of it.”

“The PKK is threatening the people in the region.”

“What is PKK gaining in Syria? Are the weapons given to PYD by the USA and Germany passing to Turkey? Are they being used in Turkey? What is the difference between PYD and PKK?”

“As long as PYD and PKK are organically connected and as long as PYD gains strength the weapons will enter Turkey.”

“HDP is the political wing of KCK and PKK. There isn’t any chance that the link between the two will be broken. Yes, the HDP is a political party that controversially is increasing its votes. Some representatives are aiding and abetting the terrorists. Demirtaş can’t leave PKK’s tutelage. As a political organization HDP, that is supported by the KCK, can’t break up with the PKK suddenly. They can’t just say “leave the guns”. Even though, some of them are sincere about it, this can’t take place because PKK won’t allow it.”

14.00 MAIN PACK

ERDOĞAN-1 –

ERDOĞAN 2-

ERDOĞAN 3-

ERDOĞAN 4

ERDOĞAN 5 – “During this [peace] process our security forces didn’t want any conflict. Later, we realised the peace process was betrayed by them. They took advantage of the peace process by stockpiling weapons in the process. They stockpiled a serious number of weapons.”

“They say there might not be an election. Look at this approach! You will believe in democracy and then your approach will be that the elections won’t be held. This is non-sense. The only way out is the polls. Elections will definitely be held whatever happens.”

ERDOĞAN 6 – Security meeting

DAVUTĞOLU

TSK

ERDOĞAN WRITTEN STATEMENT

DAVUTOĞLU STATEMENT

“My condolences to our heroic brothers who fought for our country’s honour heroically and bled for this country.”

“After the 7th of January elections were held democratically and as a result this election the national will was manifested, we entered a new era. Our country faced a simultaneous terrorist attacks supported by inner and outer powers. We never hesitated to keep our nation’s unity and solidarity against those terrorist attacks.”

“We had the will against terrorism, launched simultaneously by Daesh in 20th of June and later followed by DHPKC and PKK starting from 24th of July. Since then, we gave the order to all security forces to clear up all terrorist organization, whoever they are supported by.”

“Since the 2nd of September the operation is going on against the terrorists that nested around the region. The target is clear; restoring the public order and the control of the security forces everywhere in the country. The security forces aimed to clear the roads and to provide safe transportation for the citizens.”

“Since last night, a dark propaganda is taking place especially via social media. A treacherous, manipulative, psychological operation is going on. The ones who want to disturb our nation’s unity and solidarity gained strength from those operations. The ones who can’t criticise the PKK, the separatist terrorist organization – that committed this ferocity, gave credit to this separatist terrorist organization via dark propaganda and dared to question our soldiers, police and government. People’s belonging to their nations becomes evident during the dark times.”

“Those mountains will be cleansed from those terrorists. It will be cleansed no matter what. This country’s mountains, valley and cities won’t be left to the terrorists.”

“If the forces behind Daesh, PKK and DHPC want to push Turkey into circle of fire in the region, our biggest strength is our security forces and our democracy.”

Media elite coverage

Erdoğan 23
Davutoğlu 19
Citizen protest 11
Turkish army 10
Hande Fırat 10
Demirtaş 7

Protestors:

“We give a clear answer to the ones who want the Children of this mighty nation to annihilate each other. We are not going to be deceived by you.”

“There was no call from a specific place. The ones who got the bad news went out to the streets and joined the crowds. 50 vehicles in Düzce, 250 in Kayseri and 500 vehicles in Eskişehir were decorated with Turkish flags. Convoys protested terrorism while they were touring the city. The police didn’t allow the group to walk to the HDP building in Eskişehir. In Mersin, Erdemli, 1500 people blocked the Antalya-Mersin highway for two hours. When the protester threw stones to the bus Diyarbakır to Antalya, the tension escalated. Here in Sivas, the Grey Wolves and Fighter (Alperen) groups unfurled massive Turkish flags in the streets. There were similar scenes in Gaziantep and Afyon. The Grey Wolves and Fighter (Alperen) groups gathered and cursed terrorism.” (Allhuekber)

“We will organise these sit-ins until the terrorism ends. Sometimes the biggest resistance is silence and listening. Sometimes the biggest resistance is sitting. We hope that our silent scream will spread to whole Turkey.”

“No to war, peace yes and right no.”

“We condemn all sorts of terrorism. When a life is taken there can’t be any excuse. People can’t be killed with any reason. Life can’t be touched.”

In Fethiye entertainment, business owners

“There is no meaning of keeping our business open if our police and soldiers are martyred. We declared mourning tonight.”

“Something that happened far away is eventually effecting here. I am Kurdish. We are being perceived differently. (Did you get sad about the news? reporter asks) Of course, I am. It is ultimately a loss of life, whoever he/she is. Wherever it is, in Germany or in Europe or anywhere in the world, it is a loss of life and a destruction of a family. It doesn’t matter where it happens.”

Appendix 3: Transcription of NTV Footage

TERRORIST ATTACK IN DAĞLICA

“A terrorist attack took place in Dağlica, Hakkari. PM Davutoğlu was in Konya. He was watching the national game but he left early. He is returning to the capital. A security summit will be convened.” – anchor-woman

Özden Erkuş – NTV Reporter

“We expect the emergency security summit to start in a few minutes. Bad news came from Dağlica, Hakkari in the evening. Around 19:30, an IED was exploded while two armoured cars were passing by. After that, we have the information that a big gunfight started with RPGs and automatic rifles weapons. We also have the information that there are martyrs and wounded. There isn't any official statement about the number of the martyrs. The office of commander in chief is on alert. We expect a detailed statement from the office of commander in chief about the number of the martyrs and wounded. As soon this news arrived in Ankara, Ahmet Davutoğlu was informed. He was in Konya for the Turkey-Netherlands national game but he decided to return to Ankara for convening the emergency security summit.”

Nihat Ali Özcan – journalist – Milliyet Daily

“We are talking about a very rough terrain. PKK has a concept from the beginning. PKK is allegedly fighting for the national liberation struggle. The core of the struggle is who the people side with? They either with the state or the organization. They are with organization either voluntarily or because of the fear. If you want to understand this, you must check the latest election results. It is understood that PKK constituted a serious hegemony in the region. Maybe some of them voted for them voluntarily but some voted out of fear.

Erdoğan footage

Mustafa Karaalioglu – Journalist – Star daily

“There are two options. One of them is the fact that Turkish Armed Forces should answer terrorism with more advanced techniques. It is necessary under every condition. Second, politically and sociologically, the people of southeast, Kurds, are giving a strong message: “Don't kill for me”. Turkey is not the same country as 7-10-20-100 years ago. We came from the years denying the Kurdish culture, language and identity to completely removing restriction against Kurdish identity and language, hence there is no means for armed struggle. For living together, Turks fulfil their responsibilities to Kurds even though it was late after painful years. Kurds should also do this by saying “don't kill for me” to the organization that claims to kill in the name of Kurds.”

Avni Özgürel - Journalist

“The Hakkari region is an important region. It is a triangle. Dağlica is one of the most strategic locations in the region. It is between Iraq, Iran and Turkey. PKK was cleansed from the region in 2013. During the peace process, we were hoping to reach to peace, they turned the region to a weapon warehouse.”

“How did this happen? The USA got in touch with the Syrian arm of PKK, PYD. PKK declared itself as armed force of the USA in Syria.”

“Mines are coming from Italy. Ammunition is coming from Germany. Turkey is under a multi-dimensional attack.”

MORNING

“There was an ambush to the soldiers in Dağlica, Hakkari. The explosives planted on the road were detonated by the terrorists. There are martyrs and wounded. The Office of the Commander in Chief made a statement but didn't provide any numbers. After the attack, fighter jets hit the terrorist targets.” – anchor woman

TURKISH ARMED FORCES (Weather)

Davutoğlu

ERDOĞAN-1 – determined

ERDOĞAN-2 – Will pay; 2000 killings

ERDOĞAN-3 – Peace process

ERDOĞAN-4 – 400 representatives

ERDOĞAN-5 – Resistance

ERDOĞAN-6 – Martyrs

Reaction against Terrorism

“The terrorist attack in Hakkari was protested almost everywhere in the country. Some cities were tense.” anchor-woman

“A group in Mersin blocked the highway. Protestors stoned some busses. The police removed some of the vehicles from the area. The road was opened after two hours. Gaziantep was also tense. There is a small brawl between the police and the protestors. In Tekirdağ, a walk and a convoy were organised with Turkish flags. In Sivas, protestors walked to the central square and sang the national anthem. In Zonguldak, 500 people who organized via social media protested.”

TSK (Weather)

Davutoğlu

ERDOĞAN PACK

Reaction against Terrorism

10-Erdoğan goes first

11:30 Davutoğlu

13:10 Demirtaş

“Demirtaş repeated his cease-fire call. We don’t give in to the war politics, that only brings death to people’s poor children and spills blood to mother’s dream of peace.”

Okan Müderrisoğlu - Journalist – Sabah Daily – Erdoğan

“Not having an official statement is manipulated via social media. There is serious rain and fog on the field. There are many traps in the region as well. Therefore, a serious fight goes on for not having more casualties and for naturalizing the elements in the region.”

“When you send armoured vehicles, the organization is using stronger explosives that takes down those vehicles to cause more casualties and martyrs with the information acquired from international intelligence services that supports that organization [PKK]. It is an effort to send a message saying, “We didn’t collapse and we stand.” after taking heavy casualties in Qandil and Northern Iraq.”

“For some time, there is a campaign by HDP, therefore PKK, in the southeast and east of Turkey. It alleges that the operations started because AKP lost the majority to rule. This gets positive reaction from the voting base until a certain extent. In the west, there is the belief the operations started allegedly because of the upcoming election, hence AKP will have a political gain from the operations. The two of them are connected and they support each other. That any life isn’t more important than politics. I haven’t seen anything like that in Ankara.”

“As long as the HDP is over the election threshold, they are using a language ready to manipulate society about election security.”

Davutoğlu statement

More Davutoğlu statement

Dağlica summit in Beştepe

Yakin plan

Davutoğlu 22 (shorter pieces)

Erdoğan 19 (longer)

Turkish Army (10)

Reaction 7

Demirtaş 5

“My condolences to our heroic brothers who fought for our country’s honour heroically and bled for this country.”

“We had the will against terrorism launched simultaneously by Daesh in 20th of June and later followed by DHPKC and PKK starting from 24th of July. Since then, we gave the order to all security forces to clear up all terrorist organizations, whoever they are supported by.”

“Since the 2nd of September the operation is going on against the terrorist nested around the region. The target is clear: restoring the public order and control of the security forces everywhere in the country. Security forces aimed to clear the roads and provide safe transportation for the citizens.”

“Since last night, a dark propaganda is taking place especially via social media. A treacherous, manipulative, psychological operation is going on. The ones who want to disturb our nation’s unity and solidarity gained strength from those operations. The ones who can’t criticise the PKK, the separatist terrorist organization – that committed this ferocity, gave credit to this separatist terrorist organization via dark propaganda and dared to question our soldiers, police and government. People’s belonging to their nations become evident during the dark times.”

“Those mountains will be cleansed from those terrorists. It will be cleansed no matter what. This country’s mountains, valley and cities won’t be left to the terrorists.”

Appendix 4: Receipt

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Fatura Tipi:	SATIS
Sıra No:	INED0170E0000728
Güncelleme Tarihi:	17-03-2017
Güncelleme Saati:	16:43:17

Sıra No	Mal Hizmet	Miktar	Birim Fiyat	KDV Oranı	KDV Tutarı	Mal Hizmet Tutarı
1	TV KAYIT BEDELİ	1 Adet	1.500,00 TL	%18,00	270,00 TL	1.500,00 TL

Mal Hizmet Toplam Tutarı	1.500,00 TL
Toplam İskontolu	0,00 TL
KDV Matrahı	1.500,00 TL
Hesaplanan KDV(%18)	270,00 TL
Vergiler Dahil Toplam Tutar	1.770,00 TL
Ödenecek Tutar	1.770,00 TL

Fatura Tarihi : 24.03.2017 16:43:17
YAZI_BELGE:Elektronik/Verimlilik - 6

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