The Power of Discourse

Analysing the Exclusion of Discourses Within the Field of Working Time Regulation

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Abstract

To the reader acquainted with academic discourses about working time reduction, the public discussion about such a policy seems incomplete. This raises the question of how and why certain academic discourses are taken up in the public debate, while others are excluded. This thesis aims at developing a theoretical framework to explore this question in the light of social power relations. It thereby draws on Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis, Bourdieu's field theory and Gramsci's political theory. How the theoretical considerations can fruitfully guide an empirical analysis is then shown through the example of working time reduction discourses in Austria. For this purpose frequently quoted academic publications are analysed. This is then complemented by an analysis of the manifesto of the Austrian Labour Union Federation and the party programme as well as the latest election programme of the Austrian Green Party. The analysis shows that while one can broadly distinguish between an economic, a sociological and an environmental academic discourse about working time reduction, only the former two are taken up by the political actors. The excluded environmental discourse thereby constitutes a potential resource in challenging existing power relations on a discursive level.

Key words: Critical Discourse Analysis, Working Time Reduction, Bourdieu, Fairclough, Gramsci
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1   Introduction

In 1930 John Maynard Keynes predicted that within a hundred years mankind would have solved the "economic problem", absolute needs would be fulfilled and the small amount of remaining work as widely shared as possible (Keynes 1930). Almost 90 years later Keynes predictions seem to be far from coming true.

While from the second half of the 19th century onwards, working time has continuously declined in Western Europe and North America, this changed in the 1980s. The decline slowed down and came in the majority of western countries to a complete halt, while it even started to increase in others. Today, despite having reached unprecedented levels of affluence, the majority of people within Europe work around 40 hours per week. Productivity gains are translated into profit maximization rather than a reduction of working time (Schor 2005: 44ff.). Since several academic studies indicate that working time reduction (WTR) could be a potential solution to several social and environmental problems the question arises why this is not reflected within the policy discourses of western countries.

To understand whether a social policy like WTR is perceived as politically viable and socially desirable, it appears one has to look into how it is discursively framed by those who are likely to have influence on dominant discourses, like academics. Additionally, it is of importance how those discourses are drawn upon by social actors whose interests seem to coincide with the potential gains of such a policy, like unions and the green parties.

However, Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) suggests, that an analysis of discourse has to be anchored in the wider social context through theoretical considerations about the non-discursive elements of the social, such as power relations. This was initially done by recourse to Bourdieu's field theory. Opening up a theoretical dialogue between Fairclough and Bourdieu, however, entailed a rather rigid theoretical framework leaving little room to account for agency. This is particularly problematic for a thesis theoretically rooted in critical realism that is interested in critically investigating power relations and therefore called for a broadening of the theoretical framework in a way that could compensate for this shortcoming. The inclusion of Gramsci's considerations about hegemony and agency seemed a promising choice for this undertaking. The pursuit of developing a theoretical framework that can contribute to a sound analysis of a discursive phenomenon in the light of social power relations finally developed into a thesis. It is this backdrop against which the resulting paper has to be read.

The aim of this thesis therefore lies in developing a theoretical framework that can guide an empirical analysis of how and why some academic discourses are taken up in the public policy debate, while others are excluded in the light of social power relations.

While this theoretical framework was developed in order to be applied to a thorough empirical analysis, this lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, on the basis of empirical material from the Austrian discourse over working time reduction, it is shown how this could be fruitfully done.

In chapter 2 the theoretical approach of this thesis is outlined. Fairclough's CDA hereby constitutes the point of departure. It is then discussed how Bourdieu's field theory and Gramsci's political theory can fruitfully complement Fairclough's theoretical considerations.

Chapter 3 then deals with some methodological considerations including the case and data selection as well as the limitations of the empirical analysis.

The main part of the thesis, chapter 4, is divided into two parts. While the first part, 4.1, is concerned with the role academics play in shaping orders of discourse, the second part, 4.2, deals with the issue of agency, and in particular with the question of how social actors can challenge existing power relations on a discursive level. Both parts consist of three theoretical sub-chapters, each focusing on one of the three theories used. The fourth sub-chapter then applies the theoretical framework developed in the previous three chapters to the empirical analysis of WTR discourses in Austria.

Lastly, chapter 5 discusses the results of the empirical analysis in the light of the theoretical considerations and provides some concluding remarks.

2   Theoretical Approach

The theoretical background of this thesis constitutes Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Bourdieu's Field Theory. Both are critical theories in the widest sense, adopting a realist ontology. As such they are concerned with the embeddedness of social practices within social relations of power and put a focus on uncovering the taken-for-granted in order to open up possibilities of transforming existing social reality. Additionally, both theories aim at overcoming the dualism of phenomenalism and structuralism through adopting a dialectic view between structure and agency. (Fairclough and Chouliaraki 1999: 89).

In this context CDA can be seen as taking the normative critique of discourses as an entry point for critiquing social reality, which can provide the bases for action to change it. It does so by establishing links between texts and social structures through entering dialogue with other social theories. Following Fairclough in the frame of this thesis this link is established through Bourdieu's field theory, giving a theoretical grounding to the social structuring of language – what Fairclough refers to as order of discourse. This allows to analyse discourses about working time reduction in the context of power relations, particularly through interdiscursive analysis, i.e. focusing on which discourses are combined in a concrete discursive event and from which orders of discourse they emanate (Fairclough 2015: 49f.).

Discourse as a Social Practice
As Wodak and Meyer (2009: 2) point out the notions of *text* and *discourse* have been subject to a great variety of usages within social sciences. As this thesis will follow Fairclough's use of terminology and concepts a few words of clarification are necessary.

In Fairclough's theory and methodology *text* refers to any instance of actual language use. This includes, of course, written and printed texts but extends also to transcripts of spoken and can in some instances even involve visuals images and sound effects. *Language*, in contrast, refers exclusively to verbal language, while *discourse* constitutes a particular view of language as an element of social life closely interconnected with other elements (Fairclough 2003: 3).

Like other CDA scholars Fairclough sees discourse as a form of *social practice* which implies a dialectic relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it (Fairclough & Wodak 1997: 258). The strength of the concept of practice is, as Fairclough (2000: 167) puts it: "that it allows analysis of social structures to be brought into connection with analysis of social (inter)action". Thus Fairclough assumes the view developed within critical realism that life is an open system. Accordingly, the various dimensions of life have their own distinctive structures

all having particular mechanisms through which they have generative effects on particular events. However, the operation of any mechanism is always mediated by the operation of others and thus not the simple effect of a mechanism. Hence, while life is determined by structures and its mechanisms it is so in a complex manner. Consequently, there are no straightforward ways for science to establish the nature of individual mechanisms by analysing events (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 19f.).

The point of connection between abstract structures and concrete events are then *practices* acting as intermediate organisational entities between them (Fairclough 2003: 23). Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 21) define practices as 'habitualised ways, tied to particular times and places in which people apply resources (material or symbolic) to act together in the world'. Consequently, while structures define a potential set of possibilities, practices are a way of controlling the selection of certain structural possibilities as well as the exclusion of others (Fairclough 2003: 23ff.). They thus involve configurations of diverse elements of life and therefore diverse mechanisms. Social science can be seen as investigating the specific interaction between different mechanisms within particular practices.

A particular practice brings together different elements of life in specific, local forms and relationships. Brought together to constitute a specific social practice, Fairclough refers to them as *moments* of this practice (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 21). The moments of a practice have a dialectical relationship to each other. Fairclough builds here on the concept of internalisation developed by Harvey. Accordingly, each moment internalizes the others without being reducible to them. This also allows to account for 'empty words' as an absence of such internalisation, a separation of the way in which people act and the way they construct their actions discursively (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 28).

Consequently, discourse too is just one moment amongst others constituting a social practice. While discourse is a central moment of a particular social practice internalizing all other moments, the social cannot be reduced to it. Rather it is just one amongst several moments of a social practice its relation to which being a matter of analysis This distinguishes Fairclough's approach from other discourse analytical approaches that either neglect language and the semiotic or see the social as nothing but discourse (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 28).

In order to describe how elements are brought together as moments as well as their relations of internalisation, Fairclough borrows the concept of *articulation* developed by Laclau and Mouffe. Accordingly, the elements of social life are initially in shifting relationships to each other. Through being articulated together as moments of a practice their relationships may be stabilised into relative permanencies but may also be disarticulated. As they are brought into new combinations with each other through being articulated together, elements are also transformed. The concept of articulation can also be applied to the internal structure of a particular moment, to specify the specific form it takes in a particular practice. Thus the discursive moment of any practice is a shifting articulation of symbolic/ discursive resources   (such as genres, discourses and styles) which themselves come to be articulated into relative permanences as

moments of discourse and transformed in that process (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 21).

Hence in investigating particular social practices it is not enough for social sciences to give a general account of the relationship between elements of life and their mechanisms. Rather, specific accounts of their dialectical relationship, always open to change, is necessary (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 21).

According to Fairclough, practices have three main characteristics:

First, they are *forms of production* of social life. This does not imply an economic reductionism but rather emphasises that people collaboratively produce their social world in all social practices and thus economic production is only one particular form of social production. Accordingly, all social practices can be characterised in terms of the materials they work on, the means of production available and the social relations within which they produce (Fairclough 2001: 168).

Second, all social practices involve *identification*, the construction of social identities – every practice is associated with particular positions for people in terms of which their identities and social relations are specified. However, there are different performances in these positions depending on the social memberships and life histories of those who occupy them and different identities attached to different performances (Fairclough 2000: 168).

Third, people *produce representations* of the social world, including representation of themselves and their productive activities – people never simply act, their representations of their actions and domains of actions are an inherent part of action, action is thus reflexive. Different representations tend to be produced from different positions (Fairclough 2000: 168).

Reflexivity is caught up in social struggle. Reflexively applied knowledges about a practice are positioned knowledges, knowledges generated from particular positions within a practice or outside of it and they are both resources for and stakes in struggle. The reflexivity of practices further entails that all practices have an irreducible discursive aspect, not only in the sense that all practices involve use of language to some degree but also in the sense that discursive constructions of practices are themselves part of practices (Fairclough 1999: 26).

Practice can refer to a particular social action occurring at a particular time and place or to a habitual way of acting. This ambiguity points to the intermediate positioning of practices between structures and events, structures and agency – practices have partly the character of both. (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 21). This points to the fourth characteristic of practices. They are organised in more or less stable networks held in place by social relations of power (Fairclough 2000: 170). Practices themselves become moments of these networks in ways, which transform them and as such are overdetermined. Shifting articulations of practices within and across networks are linked to the shifting dynamics of power and struggles over relations of domination. However, power in the sense of domination also figures at the level of a particular practice where subjects are positioned in relation to others in such a way that some are able to incorporate the agency of others into their own actions, thereby reducing the autonomous agentive

capacity of the latter. These internal power relations are an effect of the external power relations within networks of practices.

These systemic imbalances are expressed and contested in social struggles over both the constitution of particular practices and relations between practices. As Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 24) put it: "In this sense we agree with the post-structuralist view that all social practice is embedded in networks of power relations, and potentially subordinates the social subjects that engage in it, even those with 'internal' power. At the same time, we believe that the view of modern power as invisible, self-regulating and inevitably subjecting […] needs to be complemented with a view of power as domination, i.e., a view of power that acknowledges the overdetermination between 'internal' and 'external' practices, and establishes casual links between institutional social practices and the position of subjects in the wider social field. Otherwise, it can collapse into structural determinism and anti-humanism which leaves no space for agency in social practices". Fairclough's conception of power will be further elaborated below. For now, I will focus on what this means for Fairclough's understanding of the relationship between the overall structure of society and social action.

The Order of Discourse – A Field Theoretical Perspective

As pointed out a central concern in Fairclough's work is to apply a dialectic theory that overcomes the dualism between structure and agency. For this purpose he opens up CDA to a theoretical dialogue with someone who's work is based on similar considerations, Pierre Bourdieu. In particular he adopts Bourdieu's concept of 'field' to theoretically grasp that practices are networked together within particular areas of social life, which have a relative internal coherence and are relatively demarcated from others (Fairclough 2000: 170).

According to Bourdieu modern societies are characterised through a differentiation of power into relative autonomous fields. A field is a network of objective relations between positions resulting from the distribution of the relevant forms of resources the actors within a field compete over; Bourdieu refers to them as capital (König & Berli 2012: 318f.).

There are two ways in which fields constrain social practice:

Firstly, all social actors within a field agree to and follow a specific set of rules, which determine which actions are perceived as possible and/ or legitimate and which are not. These rules are historically contingent and thus changeable. However, while they are not codified, social actors cannot escape these rules without leaving the field. In as far as they constitute and define different fields they are what makes the field possible and thus also have an enabling role. Additionally they do not predetermine individual actions, which rather lay in the strategic assessments of the actors (Schwingel 1995: 82ff.).

The second form of constrain a field poses to the social practices results from the limitedness of resources, the capital social actors compete about within the field. The different analytically and conceptually distinguishable forms of capital constitute the theoretical criteria for the differentiation of specific fields. The effective disposal over the respective sort of capital determines the chances of action and profit of an actor within a specific social field.

If one determines the capital in terms of its genesis, capital can be characterised as accumulated work. Due to the reciprocal definition of capital and field, there is as many forms of work as fields that are directed towards the preservation or increase of capital.

The most important forms of capitals are economic, social and cultural capital. The as legitimate recognised form of these forms of capital and further all recognition that can be established in different social realms is referred to as *symbolic capital*. Symbolic capital has an important function in the context of the common sense legitimation of power relations (Schwingel 1995: 85ff.). As Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 101) point out linguistic capital "is the power conferred upon a particular linguistic form, style or dialect associated with the legitimacy or prestige of a particular social position – it is crucial in the conversion of other forms of capital into symbolic capital"

The structure of each field is determined by the structure of distribution of its respective capital. The social actors in their virtue as capital owners constitute structural elements the relations between which systematically influence social practices. Within the different fields thereby develop centres of power around the actors and groups with the most capital. However, a field is subjected to continuous change at both of its aspects of constraint and therefore can always be characterized as fields of struggle in which there is always a struggle over the preservation or transformation of power relations (Schwingel 1995: 95f.).

Consequently social actors adopt one of two types of strategies according to their position in the field: While the actors occupying a dominant position adopt strategies aimed at preserving the state of affairs and their dominance within the field, those aspiring to better there position, adopt subversive strategies aimed at drawing the established order into question (König & Berli 2012: 318f.). Strategies are neither rationally calculated nor determined by rules but rather products of the *sens practique* for the game and its stakes.

These struggles are the bases for historic change within fields. While opponents are unified through their shared believe in the rules and the legitimate stakes within a field, there is constant social struggle over power and prestige, i.e. the accumulation of specific capital forms, the (de)legitimation of rules, the symbolic surplus value of prestige and as a consequence over the position of the actors within the field of social classes (Schwingel 1995: 98f.).

The structure of the field thus represents the state of power relations and therefore the state of distribution of the field specific capital accumulated through earlier struggles and determining the course of later struggles. The structure – the origin of the strategies aimed at changing it – is itself always at stake since the object of struggle is always the monopoly on the legitimate power (or authority) characteristic for a field and thus ultimately the upholding or transformation of the distributional structure of the specific capital form (Bourdieu 1993: 108).

Field theory thus paints a plural picture of a social world differentiated into specific fields within which there exist permanent struggles over the appropriation and preservation of capital resources and the definition of the stake and profit possibilities relevant to the social struggle (Schwingel 1995: 102). In the course of

struggle fields can be restructured and the boundaries separating them redefined, strengthened or weakened (Chouliaraki & Faiclough 1999: 101).

Habitus

The second central concept Bourdieu develops to bridge the theoretical dualism of structure and subject, is the habitus. Accordingly, every agent acting within a field is endowed with a set of structuring dispositions that are constitutive for their practices as well as their representations of them. The habitus constitutes the base of what Bourdieu calls *le sense practique*, which helps the social actors to orient themselves in the social world in general and specific fields of practice in particular. It is determined through the specific position a social actor occupies within the social structure as it forms through the internalisation of the external material and cultural conditions of existence (every individual habitus form is thus always also determined through class specific factors) as they manifests themselves in the experiences of a social actor and thus is influenced and continuously changes through the particular social trajectory of a social actor. Through this internalization of external conditions of existence into a habitual system of dispositions historically and social contingent, socio-cultural relations turn into something natural. Therefore the acknowledgement of existing power relations manifests itself in the habitus. However the habitus rather defines the boundaries of the possible than particular social actions, leaving some room of manoeuvre to the individual social actor (Schwingel 1995: 65ff.).

Bourdieu shares with Fairclough a dialectic view of the social. Accordingly, the internalized habitus structures are in a dialectic relation with the objective external structures of social fields. While the dispositions of the habitus develop through the internalisation of external social structures, these external structures are constituted through the carrying out of social practice, which is generated primarily through the externalization of the habitual dispositions. The habitus therefore works as a mediator between structure and social practice. Consequently, social structures only exist or persist in the material reality as individual or social practices. As Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 101f.) put it: "The concept of habitus displaces two opposed but equally unacceptable conceptions of action – a structuralist conception of action as merely an epiphenomenal effect of positions in structure, and a rationalist conception of it as rational choice – while maintaining both a sense of structural determination of action and a sense of agency."

If the habitus works under the same social conditions under which it was produced, habitual dispositions contribute to reproduce it. However, there is a tendency of the habitus to be well adjusted to the social structures of a field. Since for the social actor practicability of thought and knowledge is more important than objectivity or "truth" there is no reason for them to question their perception and thought patterns as long as they are not drawn into question through new experiences. It is this congruence of objective and internalized structures that causes the historically contingent social world to come to be seen as natural. However, rapid social change and situations of crisis may lead social actors to

critically question and consciously change their habitual dispositions and thus act in a reflexive, rational way (Schwingel 1995: 80f.).

CDA And Field Theory – A Theoretical Dialogue

Bourdieu's field theory can provide CDA with a theory of the structuring of social space. Accordingly, a field can be described as a social order in which social practices, discursive and non-discursive are networked together. The discursive aspect of a field can be referred to as 'order of discourse' (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 103). In his earlier work Fairclough applied the concept of 'order of discourse' as the socially structured set of genres and discourses to specific institutions. However, as Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 73) point out the reconceptualization of 'order of discourse' as a potentially conflictual configuration of discourses within a given social field sharpens the concept as an analytical tool. Bourdieu's account suggests that the relevant structural frame for CDA is not the individual order of discourse but the structured configuration of orders of discourse within a field and across fields (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 103). In this sense the analysis of an order of discourse can be seen as part of the social analysis of a field. The gain for CDA in internalising the concept of field lies in elaborating the concept of 'order of discourse' in the light of relations between and within fields and against the backdrop of social relations as framed through Bourdieu's concepts of field, habitus and capital thus embedding discursive struggles in the context of social struggles (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 114f.).

Central to both the concept of 'field' and the concept of 'order of discourse' are the struggles, which shift their boundaries. It is in this respect that field theory too can gain from internalizing the concept of 'order of discourse'. Particularly, in CDA the link between discursive practises, on the one hand, and social structures and processes, on the other, is seen as being mediated through the way in which orders of discourse are drawn upon and it thus provides the analytical tool to investigate this link through interdiscursive analysis. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 116) therefore suggest that "interdiscursive analysis is a key dimension of analysis of field relations which can foreground the potential for social change in the complexity and hybridity of late modern forms of practice, something that Bourdieu has been accused of neglecting."

Power

According to Bourdieu's field theory social actors gain power within a field through the accumulation of relevant capital. Their social position is thus always relative to the positions other social actors occupy within the field. The structure of the field can therefore be said to represent the current state of power relations. Since the habitus of a social actor is usually well adjusted to the structure of the field it tends to reproduce existing power relations. Thus for Bourdieu power lies in the social mechanisms establishing the field structure as well as in the minds of the social actors, always tempted through their habitual dispositions to mistake the arbitrariness of the social world as natural and therefore collaborate with the coercions that dominate them (König & Berli 2012: 303).

Power relations become naturalised through symbolic power. Bourdieu refers to the legitimate recognised form of all other capitals as well as any other form of social recognition as symbolic capital. Symbolic power therefore is the power to legitimize a certain version of the social world and thus make it seem natural and unchangeable (Schwingel 1995: 93f.). A central form of symbolic capital is linguistic capital. This is, as Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 103) stress, to a big part due to the fact that social struggles are enacted in the course of communicative interaction. Linguistic capital therefore plays a central role in the construction, reproduction and transformation of the social through concrete discursive practices. This includes the structuring of fields as well as the constitution of boundaries between fields.

While relations of power play a central role in CDA and field theory, neither Fairclough nor Bourdieu develop their own concrete conception of power. However, they both share an understanding of power that emphasises the element of consensus and can thus be well conceptualized through Gramsci's concept of "hegemony". According to Gramsci, a social group can only become hegemonic if it manages to generalise its mode of life thereby securing the consensus of the dominated classes to share and respect the very worldview used to dominate them. Social practices and relations are thus naturalized as matters of common sense (Demirovic 2012: 140).

This attributes a central role to what Fairclough refers to as ideologies, i.e. common sense assumptions contributing to the upholding of unequal power relations (Fairclough 1989: 33). Laclau and Mouffe use the concept of articulation to theorise hegemony in the context of discourse analysis (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 25). Accordingly, elements of the social are initially in shifting relations to each other. Through being articulated together within the same discursive practice they can be more or less permanently stabilised. Combining these elements in different ways simultaneously transforms them (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 21). Hegemony, then, is a bid for closure of practices and networks of practices that due to the openness of the social can never fully succeed: "The simultaneous operation of diverse mechanisms within any practice, and the fact that any practice is overdetermined (simultaneously determined by others), mean that outcomes are never entirely predictable and that resources for resistance are always likely to be generated" (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 25). In the context of field theory, the struggle over symbolic power can thus be seen as the hegemonic struggle over the fixation of meaning through articulation.

Gramsci's hegemony concept, I would argue, can be used to not only sharpen the concept of power Bourdieu and Fairclough apply but also to contribute in analysing power relations by widening their theoretical 'dialogue' through opening up room for agency. However, viewing power as including a moment of consent does not neglect that it also contains a moment of coercion. Rather Gramsci's theoretical contribution to the conceptualisation of power can be seen in broadening it through including a moment of consent in a concept that has historically been seen as characterised through repression (Demirovic 2012: 140) thus coining the famous equation "State = political society + civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion" (Gramsci, 1971: 263).

3   Methodological Considerations

As mentioned in chapter 2 all social practices have three main characteristics: They are forms of productions of social life through action, identification and representation (Fairclough 2001: 168). In the particular social practise of discourse these characteristics manifest themselves as genres, styles and discourses respectively, which can consequently said to be resources of communication (Fairclough 2003: 26). Accordingly, an order of discourse can be operationalized as a potentially conflictual configuration of all genres, styles and discourses used in a particular field (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002).

As this thesis focuses on Gramsci's conceptualization of power as hegemony and thus on the exercise of power through consent based on a universally shared worldview, the relevant aspect of discourse as a social practice is how it figures in creating representations of the world. Genres and styles will therefore be neglected.

While Fairclough suggests a variety of linguistic features CDA can focus on, the most important in this context are the ones concerning the delineation of discourses and order of discourses. As Jørgensen & Phillips (2002: 144f.) suggest this is a problem that remains theoretically unresolved in the literature and thus should be treated as an analytical process. The empirical analysis will therefore focus on linguistic features relevant in creating representations of the social world that are specific to a certain discourse and therefore also contribute to its delineation. Besides discourse specific vocabulary and logic this includes assumptions and value systems underlying particular discourses (Fairclough 2003: 123ff.). The relation between discourses can thereby be explored through the concepts of intertextuality, referring to the presence of elements of other texts within a text, and dialogicality, referring to the extent to which the voices of other authors are represented and responded to (Fairclough 2003: 39ff.).

The theoretical considerations of chapter 4 will be applied to two empirical analyses in the frame of which discourses over WTR in Austria are analysed. This choice was made because while WTR used to be a very common policy in Austria before the 1980s and despite the fact that the academic discourse points towards many potential social and environmental benefits of such a policy, it has in the last decades almost completely disappeared from the policy discourse. Instead discussions over working time regulations have recently resurfaced in a discourse advocating for a loosening of regulations to allow for longer, more flexible working hours. Austria can thus be considered an interesting example to investigate which academic discourses are taken up by policy makers and which are excluded from the order of discourse of working time regulation. However this provides a clear limitation of my empirical analysis as the theoretical

framework developed within this thesis could have potentially been applied to any other policy in any other country.

The first empirical analysis (4.1.4) focuses on which WTR discourses are produced within the academic field and therefore constitute a potential resource for the order of discourse within the field of working regulation policies in Austria. For this purpose academic publications that are frequently quoted within the Austrian academic WTR debate were chosen. This too constitutes a limitation of my study as, due to time constrains, only a very limited number of articles could be analysed.

The second empirical analysis (4.2.4) focuses on which WTR discourses produced within the academic field are drawn upon by the Austrian Labour Union Federation (ÖGB) and the Austrian Green Party respectively. These two political actors were chosen as the discourses distinguished through the first empirical analysis can be expected to resonate with their goals. This will be further elaborated on below. For this purpose the manifesto of the ÖGB as well as the party programme and the latest election programme of the Green Party were chosen for analysis. This represents another limitation of my empirical study as different political actors as well as different texts could have been chosen.

The empirical analysis of my thesis can therefore not raise the claim of being complete. A thorough and systematic discourse analysis of the Austrian WTR discourse is beyond the scope of this thesis. The emphasis was instead put on developing a theoretical framework that can guide an empirical analysis of how and why some academic discourses are taken up in the public policy debate, while others are excluded, against the backdrop of power relations. The empirical study conducted serves as an illustration of how this theoretical framework could be applied.

4   Analysis

As CDA takes the normative critique of discourse as point of entry for an explanatory critique of social relations between discourse and other social elements of the existing social reality, it is inherently trans-disciplinary (Fairclough 2015: 48f.). While Fairclough seeks the theoretical dialogue with Bourdieu, I believe there is an argument to be made that he does not exhaust its full analytical potential. This is true in at least two ways:

First, if one is to investigate hegemonial relations it is at a *structural level* not enough to examine how the boundaries between orders of discourses change over time and how they constrain social interactions. Additionally, it is important to analyse which discourses these orders of discourses include or exclude and therefore which discourses can be considered potential resources for it. I suggest that Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital and the decisive role Gramsci attributes to intellectuals in creating naturalized representations of the world can fruitfully contribute to filling this gap.

Second, on the *level of agency* I argue that while Fairclough puts much focus on social interaction he does so mostly by analysing powerful social actors (e.g. by analysing the discourse of Thatcherism or New Labour) thus attributing little attention to how dominated social groups position themselves within the order of discourse and how they can draw upon certain discourses as tools of resistance in the struggle of power (which should be a central aspect in critical theory). This would also help to answer the question of how discourses of resistance can arise (without severe crisis) and why they do or fail to do so. I argue that this can be explored through Gramsci's theoretical work explicitly shifting the focus on the agency of dominated classes and thereby emphasising the need of what he calls "organic intellectuals"

The analytical contribution of conducting a more extensive trans-disciplinary dialogue between Fairclough' and Bourdieu's theories especially through bringing in Gramsci's concept of hegemony is then empirically shown through the WTR discourse in Austria.

4.1 Shaping the Order of Discourse: The Role of Intellectuals (Structure)

4.1.1 Symbolic Capital and Academics

In Gramsci's conception of the state, the element of consent is of particular importance because of its primacy over the coercion that can be exerted through the state's repressive apparatuses. It provides the base on which coercion can be exerted in the first place (Demirovic 2012: 140).

An important moment in fostering such consent is through implementation of a seemingly impartial worldview that becomes universally shared and thus naturalizes relations of power (Demirovic 2012: 149). Bourdieu calls such a worldview, built on shared interpretations and classifications, the arbitrariness of which is misjudged by the social actors and perceived as natural, "doxa". The doxa is in place as long as the objective structure of a field and the subjective habitual dispositions of the social actors within the field coincide (König & Berli 2012: 304). In such a situation the habitus tends to reproduce existing structures (Schwingel 1995: 79), while subaltern[1] groups tend to seek out fields and social actions that reproduce their habitual dispositions and are thus in accordance with their social positions; the dominant groups just have to follow their sense of the game to gain recognition, occupy prestigious positions and increase their symbolic capital (König & Berli 2012:323). Because of the doxa subaltern groups do not question their social position, but rather do voluntarily submit to existing power relations and dominant groups can rule by consent. It is thus in the interest of those who occupy dominant positions within these structures to uphold that worldview (König & Berli 2012: 307). This can be achieved by what Bourdieu calls symbolic power: "[a] power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained

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[1] Gramsci refers to the dominated social groups, i.e. the social groups with little field relevant capital as 'subaltern groups' or 'classes' this is not to be taken synonymous with 'working class' but rather gives the opportunity to focus on a variety of unequal power relations (Barfuss & Jehle 2014: 101).

through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of mobilisation – is a power that can be exercised only if it is recognized, that is, misrecognized as arbitrary" (Bourdieu 1991: 170). Symbolic capital bestows symbolic power on social actor, since Bourdieu explains "[w]hat creates the power of words and slogans, a power capable of maintaining or subverting the social order, is the belief in the legitimacy of words and of those who utter them" (Bourdieu 1991: 170). Accordingly, the social struggle over relevant capital forms always implies a struggle over symbolic capital and thus the symbolic power over the implementation of one's own worldview as the only legitimate (König & Berli: 323).

Symbolic capital is the recognized form of all other capital forms (Schwingel 1995: 92) and a "form of meta-capital" – a term coined by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 313) –, into which all other forms of capital can be converted. While symbolic capital also includes all other forms of social recognition, which can be established in different social realms and is in its constitutive logic independent from other capital forms, it does mostly occur in connection with other forms of capital, heightening their specific efficacy. While economic and cultural capital both follow the logic of limitedness, symbolic capital follows the logic of emphasis and recognition. Social acts of recognition bestow a credit of acknowledgement and thereby prestige on certain social actors or groups. An important form of symbolic capital in modern societies is cultural capital legitimised by titles (Schwingel 1995: 92ff.) acquired in the field of academia. This kind of symbolic capital is vital because this kind of cultural capital needs to be acquired by educational work. Titles therefore represent an incorporated form of cultural capital, which is bound to a particular actor and consequently becoming part of his or her habitus. This implies that both cultural capital in general and its particular symbolic forms can be inherited. The acquisition of cultural capital is thus facilitated by being brought up in a family, which already possesses cultural capital. One reason for this is that, cultural capital – like all other incorporated dispositions of the habitus – is always coined by the circumstances of its first acquisition (Schwingel 1995: 90). Another explanation lies in the necessary time investment for a successful acquisition of cultural capital and thus those social actors who already enjoy cultural education in their early childhood from their family have a clear advantage (König & Berli 2012: 310). As cultural capital is legitimised by titles, its transformation into symbolic capital is institutionalised in society via the educational system (Schwingel 1995: 90). The educational system thus reproduces – and legitimises in the form of titles – objective social structures through the habitual dispositions of the social actors, as Bourdieu shows in his analysis of the French educational system (cf. Bourdieu, Pierre & Passeron, Jean-Claude (1977). Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture. London: SAGE Publications).

As holders of academic titles, one of the highest forms of symbolic cultural capital, academics therefore occupy a central role in connection with social power relations. On the one hand, this is due to the   symbolic power bestowed on them by the symbolic capital, shaping perceptions of the world, which have come to be universally shared.

On the other hand, because of their symbolic capital academics get to share certain interests with dominant groups across fields despite the fact that symbolic power is always specific to a certain subject. This is possible as holders of symbolic power share a certain solidarity across fields due to the homology of their objective positions (König & Berli 2012: 325). In Bourdieu's theory the important role of academics shaping the doxa remains implicit, while Gramsci calls them "traditional intellectuals", a deceiving social function in this regard.

4.1.2 Traditional Intellectuals

Corresponding to the division of power into two distinctive modes, namely hegemony and coercion, Gramsci introduces a division of the state into a "civil society", encompassing institutions traditionally understood as private, and "political society", encompassing what is traditionally understood as "the state". Hence, hegemony is exercised by the hegemonial apparatuses of civil society, while direct domination is exerted by the government and the repressive apparatuses of the state. However, both of these functions require organisational work done by intellectuals, who thereby become the "deputies" of the dominant groups according to Gramsci. In respect to hegemony, this means they assist the ruling classes by means of organising "The 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production" (Gramsci 1971: 12).

Two important consequences arise from this argument: firstly, a broadening of the concept of intellectuals; secondly, the need for every group, which either is hegemonic or peruses hegemony, to ensure the assistance of intellectuals. I will discuss both aspects with regard to the hegemonial aspect of power.

Gramsci bases his use of the term "intellectual" on the division of labour into mental and physical labour. "All men are intellectuals, one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals." (Gramsci, 1971: 10). Social actors are thus in so far intellectuals as they do the mental, conceptive work representatively for an entire social group. They develop the hegemonic apparatuses of civil society from which social consensus is organised as well as certain concepts, beliefs, and modes of life that ideally come to be shared universally (Demirovic 2012: 144) or in short: what Bourdieu would term "doxa". Because of their important function in creating certain perceptions of the world, intellectuals also play a decisive role in how (and if) social actors become aware of the basic social conflicts (Demirovic 2012: 145) or how these conflicts are internalized by the habitus according to Bourdieu. Somewhat similar to the concept of habitus, Gramsci develops the concept of common sense, which is shaped by the shared worldview – that itself was created by hegemonic

apparatuses – and organised by the intellectuals. Common sense fosters a moment of active consent and thus also submission to the dominant groups and intellectuals (Demirovic 2012: 145).

Gramsci distinguishes between two types of intellectuals: *traditional* and *organic* intellectuals, *Traditional* intellectuals are considered to be intellectuals because of their profession, while *organic* intellectuals perform an organising function within a certain social group. Organic intellectuals are thus not considered intellectuals because of their profession but their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong (Hoare & Smith 1971: 3). Traditional intellectuals are organic in respect to the dominant group. They are traditional in so far as they claim to be above the classes and act independently of the dominant social group. However, this cannot be true as they themselves are part of the dominant social group, i.e. organic to it. feel committed only to the ideas, the objectivity and they value freedom of science without recognising how the academic field is intertwined with the dominant class (Barfuss & Jehle 2014: 73). This can be explained with recourse to Bourdieu's field theory as their academic title bestows a significant amount of symbolic capital on them. This is, after all, the source of their symbolic power to shape certain perceptions of the world and thus they occupy dominant positions within social structures, which put them in a solidary relationship to other dominant groups.

Gramsci acknowledges the importance of traditional intellectuals: he stresses the necessity for subaltern groups to produce their own organic intellectuals, also recognizing that traditional intellectuals need to be assimilated in order to establish a worldview that is to radiate among other groups: "One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer "ideologically" the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals" (Gramsci 1971: 11).

While the term "traditional intellectuals" does not exclusively mean academics – Gramsci also uses the term to refer to the Catholic Church – due to the symbolic capital attributed to them in modern western societies, academics represent at least the most influential part of the traditional intelligentsia. For additional to fulfilling the social function Gramsci attributes to traditional intellectuals, they possess through their academic titles one of the most important forms of symbolic capital. Academics therefore play a key role in shaping the doxa and thus in fostering active consent of subaltern groups to dominant power structures. CDA can provide the analytical tools to operationalize these theoretical considerations especially by introducing the concept of "order of discourse". Accordingly, the struggle over a universally shared perception of the world can be seen as struggle over orders of discourses, which can consequently be analysed in regards to the role academics play in shaping them.

4.1.3 The Order of Discourse

Discourse plays a key role in regards to power relations in general and the constitution of the doxa in particular. Its importance is due to the dialectic relationship between the concrete discursive event and the social structures in which it is imbedded (Fairclough 2015: 68). This dialectic relationship has particularly two consequences for the analysis of hegemonic relations:

Firstly, power struggles in general and struggles over the imposition of a universally shared worldview in particular take place through communicative interaction and thus through discursive practices (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 104). This also means that linguistic capital plays an important role in converting various capital forms into symbolic capital. According to Bourdieu, the linguistic field in modern societies has been unified leading all dialects to be structured together within a single field in which they are subordinated to the legitimate standard language. Consequently, the linguistic capital of social actors depends upon their position within the linguistic field, particularly in relation to the legitimate language. In a specific field, this linguistic capital manifests itself as access to more or less powerful styles, which according to Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999:102) implies two important linguistic aspects of symbolic capital: the capacity to constitute the given and the capacity to do so in a legitimate style, giving credibility to that vision of the world. They criticise Bourdieu for understanding symbolic struggle as struggle for access to legitimated (linguistic) capital and thereby neglecting that "linguistic capital *per se*, in the form of discourses as representations of social processes and relations, is part of the struggle for the constitutions and classification of social (field) relations" (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 104) as struggles are enacted through discursive practices: "Acknowledging the social significance of linguistic capital as discourse, constitutive social representations, relationships and identities, can broaden the concept of practice in Bourdieu's theory. The specifically discursive dimension of practice allows for conceptualising local interactions as sites of struggle of competing and contradictory representations with a potential to change dominant classifications" (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 105). This connotes that an analysis of field relations, especially in terms of symbolic power, has to include an analysis of discourse.

The second consequence of that dialectic relationship between discourse and social structures is that discourse, like all social practices, is constrained within (and enabled by) field structures. To conceptualise the semiotic structuring of a field, Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 58) introduce the term "order of discourse": "An order of discourse is the socially ordered set of genres and discourses associated with a particular field, characterised in terms of the shifting boundaries and flows between them". The network of orders of discourse thus constitutes the discursive resources available to social actors, on which they can draw upon more or less creatively depending on their position within a field and which they thereby rework dialectically (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 58). Consequently, the content of orders of discourses and the way in which they are networked together determine how the world can be perceived and represented by

social actors and are therefore constitutive of the doxa. This means that the struggle over symbolic power is also a struggle over the contents and networks of orders of discourses.

In the terminology of Fairclough, a field can be described in the particular way in which social practices of production are networked together and the order of discourse then represents the way in which the discourse moments of these practices are networked together. (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 58). In order to analyse the connection between discursive and non-discursive elements of the social, Chouliaraki & Fairclough (1999: 105) draw on Laclau and Mouffe's concept of 'articulation' referring to any practice establishing a relation between elements and thereby modifying them. This implies that all elements of the social continuously enter into shifting relations with each other, whereby discourse plays a key role in constituting this relationship. While they point out that this stresses the constitutive character of discourse which Bourdieu neglects, they do not connect it to a point they make elsewhere in the same book, namely that Laclau and Mouffe's use "articulation" to conceptualise power, by seeing hegemony as a bit for closure through articulation which can never be total and therefore opens up space for resistance through de- and rearticulation. (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 25). The analysis of orders of discourse can thus be seen as the necessarily structure oriented side of an analysis of hegemonic field relations complementing an analysis of how they influence and are influenced by certain discourses. The concept of "order of discourse" thereby allows to operationalize the struggle over symbolic power to shape a perception of the world that becomes to be universally shared as struggle over orders of discourse.

In turn, as Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999: 114) point out, internalising Bourdieu's field concept can provide CDA with the necessary link between the normative critique of discourse and the explanatory critique of the relations between other elements of the social reality by elaborating the concept of 'order of discourse' in the light of relations between and within fields and against the backdrop of social relations (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999: 114f.). However, I claim there are other gains for CDA in entering a theoretical dialogue with Bourdieu. Firstly, the concept of order of discourse can be theoretically strengthened by connecting it to the creation of the doxa, which plays a fundamental role in the establishment of hegemony. Secondly, by bringing the key role social actors with symbolic power play in shaping orders of discourses into focus, the normative critique of orders of discourse can – on a structural level – not only provide a point of entry for the explanatory critique of power relations but also shed light on what discourses particular holders of symbolic power produce. This is particularly interesting as not all potentially available discourses become part of the doxa but rather provide subaltern social groups with resources for resistance through discourse. With recourse to Gramsci and his elaborations on the social functions of intellectuals, the role academics play in shaping orders of discourse is particularly interesting. This is because one can assume that due to their important social function as traditional intellectuals and their access to symbolic cultural as well as linguistic capital, they play a central role in constituting the doxa.

I am therefore positive that an empirical analysis of the academic discourse over a specific field can contribute to mapping out relevant discourses. Thereby not only the relationship of a particular field to other fields would be further explored, but also the discursive resources potentially available to subaltern groups within the field but concealed through the doxa as manifested in dominant orders of discourse. In a next step, an analysis of the academic discourse over working time reduction (WTR) in Austria will further elaborate on this subject.

4.1.4 The Academic Discourse: Shaping the Order of Discourse of Working Time Reduction

Fields and thus their order of discourses exist on different levels of abstraction (Fairclough 2003: 124). Accordingly while the debate over WTR takes place within the field of academia, the discourses concerning WTR produced within and thus constituting the academic order of discourse can be further differentiated according to the order of discourse they belong to on a more abstract level.

Through the habitus a certain representation of the world becomes internalized and thus turns into the doxa, common sense assumptions and values shared within a field. As Fairclough (2015: 58) puts it: "Seeking hegemony is a matter of seeking to universalize particular meanings in the service of achieving and maintaining dominance". With recourse to Laclau and Mouffe's concept of articulation an order of discourse can be seen as the part of a social field in which different discourses compete over the establishment of a certain representation of the social through the articulation of elements in a certain way an thus the fixation of meaning (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 141). Accordingly, hegemony can be said to have been established where this conflict is dissolved in favour of a particular discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 56). In the context of the doxa this by extension always implies a competition over the value systems on which these representations are based as well as their manifestations as common sense assumptions. A discourse can thus be said to be hegemonic as far as the common sense assumption and values it embodies become universally shared. The more all potential discourses an order of discourse includes are build on the same common-sense assumptions and values that originally emanated from the dominant discourse, the more stable it is (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 142).

Besides a specific vocabulary certain discourses can thus be delineated along the assumptions and values they presuppose (c.f. Fairclough 2015: 55f., Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 143f.). Additionally, discourses that do not contradict assumptions and values existing within a certain order of discourse are more likely to become part of the order of discourse whereas discourses build on contradictory assumptions and values are more likely to be excluded. Explicating these assumptions and values that have become common sensual and thus part of the habitus can furthermore be seen as a contribution to critical research.

The empiric analysis found that within the academic field three broad discourses distinguished according to their representation of WTR and the

underlying assumptions and values these entail: an economic discourse discussing WTR as a employment generating policy, a sociological discourse discussing WTR in terms of its potential welfare benefits and an environmental discourse discussing WTR in terms of its effect on the environment. I will analyse each discourse in turn.

The Economic Discourse

In the economic discourse WTR is mainly discussed in terms of how it would affect employment rates with different conclusions depending on which factors were taken into account and which theoretical models applied (Bosch & Lehndorff 2001: 210).

Unsurprisingly, the economic discourse is based on the existential assumption of a capitalist economy and the value assumption that it is desirable to keep this economy growing and create as much employment as possible. Accordingly, this is the measurement against which a policy has to be judged. This becomes apparent when the discussion of WTR is introduced with sentences like: "From an economic perspective the greater part of the discussion is about the not trivial question, whether WTR has the capability to increase employment or redistribute a certain volume of work amongst multiple people" (Schwendinger 2015: 1). This sentence only makes sense if it is applied to a capitalist economy and if it is desirable to create employment. The authors do not have to explicitly state such an assumption or justify it as they can assume it is shared amongst most of their readers. This is particularly interesting as the goal of creating employment is seen as valuable in itself and not in need of further justification while there is no or only little reference to how this would affect human wellbeing. The strength of these assumptions is amplified by the fact that while the analysed journal articles open up to dialogue with other economists and are thus very dialogical in terms of intertextuality, they avoid dialogue with other discourses completely which can according to Fairclough (2015: 42) be a sign of "consensus, a normalization and acceptance of differences of power which brackets or suppresses differences of meaning and norms" and thus point towards a hegemonial position of the economic discourse towards other discourses.

Within the economic discourse one can however distinguish between a more Neoliberal and a more Keynesian discourse, while sharing the assumptions and values pointed out above, openly debating the usefulness of WTR as an employment generating policy and differing in regards to the value they attach to other potential gains of WTR. The Keynesian discourse usually refers to the potential positive effects of WTR to human welfare and thereby somewhat resembles the sociological discourse. However, these references do not constitute the main concern and are made through vocabulary and logic specific to the economic discourse. Walker, for example, comments on the negative effects of overly long working hours as followed: "Ultimately, unemployment, underemployment and overwork themselves add to the cost of social supports and medical services thus contributing to an upward spiral of the fixed component of employment costs" (Walker 2000: 22). While this implies that welfare gains remain subordinated to the potential benefit of increased employment, there is

nevertheless value attributed to such claims. This is were the Keynesian discourse differs from the Neoliberal discourse, which does not refer to the social consequences of a WTR at all or places them explicitly outside the discourse as Kapteyn et al. (2004: 308) do: "Obviously, all these considerations do not preclude one to prefer shorter hours as a means of attaining additional leisure by sacrificing income. To facilitate such possibilities at an individual level may be welfare enhancing, just as it may be welfare enhancing to create possibilities for people to work longer hours and earn more, if they wish to do so". Firstly, there is the propositional assumption that "attaining additional leisure" necessarily has to be connected to "sacrificing income", whereas secondly, the regulation of working time is placed at an individual level thus outside of the realm of policy. This is a very common way of discussing social problems within Neoliberal discourse (Fairclough 2015: 107), which attributes less value to the potential social benefits of WTR.

However, the conflict between Keynesian and Neoliberal discourse is most strongly expressed in the debate over the "lump-of-labour fallacy" referring to the assumption that there is a fixed volume of work, which can be easily redistributed (c.f., Gleißner 2015, Kapteyn et al. 2003 and for a critical discussion Schwendinger 2015 and Walker 2000). While in the Neoliberal discourse the existence of such an argument is taken for granted. Kapteyn et al. (2003: 292) introduce the potential benefits of a WTR as "usually based on the simple notion that in a given period a fixed amount of labour input required to produce a fixed amount volume of goods and services can be shared between persons who are already employed and those who are unemployed". This statement is not attributed to any particular text, which implies the others assume this is an assumption commonly shared among their readers. While in the Keynesian discourse the very existence of such an argument is denied: "The dismissive phrase has become an article of faith among many in the economics profession, despite the fact that advocates for reduced work time have, for more than a century, repeatedly disavowed the alleged belief in a fixed amount of work" (Walker 2000: 1).

This is an example of open struggle about the representation of WTR and marks an almost political dividing line between these two strands of the economic discourse, which is in this overt form unusual within the academic field. This might point towards a certain awareness within the economic discourse about the potential consequences of WTR in terms of power relations between employers and employees. This is further emphasised through Walker's (2001: 22f.) concluding remarks: "Strange as it may seem, the reduction of work time is a labour-saving device, albeit a uniquely worker-friendly one. […] Unlike other labor saving devices, though, limiting the hours of work can also create jobs in the short term by redressing current imbalances in the distribution of work. Also unlike other labor saving devices, progressively reducing hours of work makes a priceless good, free time, directly available to workers in ever greater abundance." (Walker 2000: 22f.)."

The Sociological Discourse

Within the sociological discourse WTR is mainly discussed in terms of its potential contributions to human welfare, the most common of which are: reduction of unemployment, facilitating the compatibility of job and family, reduction of gender inequalities, improvement of health, enabling lifelong learning, making time for activities outside of the realm of economy like engagement in civil society and participation in democracy and equality.

In contrast to the economic discourse, it does not only intertextually refer to other publications within the same discourse, but also to the discussion of WTR in both the economic and the environmental discourse. Most notably, the economic discourse is taken as point of departure for further elaborations. Fleck and Altreiter (2014: 17), for example, start their discussion of potential gains of a WTR policy as followed: "With limited economic growth and simultaneous continuing increase of productivity, the volume of work is not enough to ensure enough jobs for the likewise increased labour supply". This is remarkable, as the sociological discourse shares the basic assumptions of the economic discourse: a capitalist economy is taken for granted and an increase in employment seen as desirable. Together with the vocabulary and line of arguing borrowed from the economic discourse, this sentence might as well occur within the economic discourse. What differentiates the sociological discourse from the economic discourse, however, is a shift in the underlying value system. Thus, while an increase in employment is seen as an important goal, it is not seen as the only goal but as one amongst many potential benefits of WTR contributing to human welfare. Some of the social goals are framed through an economist vocabulary and justified through an economic logic, for example when Fleck and Altreiter (2014: 15) refer to the importance of securing the living standards of workers as followed: "A weakening of the purchasing power through income loss should be avoided also because it would contradict the employment generating effect of the working time reduction". However, most potential contributions of WTR are framed through vocabulary and logic that cannot be attributed to the economic discourse: "To spend less time at the work place, means more time for activities that are not subjected to thoughts of economic utilisation". This sentence attributes value to activities outside the realm of economy. Additionally, the sociological discourse draws some assumptions into question, that the economic discourse takes as given. For example, when Fleck and Altreiter critically discuss the definition of "work" as "paid work" and conclude: "The increasing integration of women into the labour market has barely changed the traditional division of unpaid work between the genders". Thus while the sociological discourse at times resembles the Keynesian economic discourse, it can be seen as its own distinct discourse. However, the frequent recourse to as well as the use of vocabulary of the economic discourse, suggests that a certain domination of the economic discourse is assumed which leads to the economic discourse colonising parts of the sociological discourse. This is emphasised through the fact that while there are references made to the environmental discourse as well, these are not intertwined with the sociological discourse, but rather placed explicitly outside of it:

"Questions about working time reduction can also be attributed to a contemporary discourse that draws the logic of economic growth within capitalist societies into question and criticises in particular the associated escalating consumption of resources" (Fleck & Altreiter: 2014: 25). The fact that not only the critique of the "escalating consumption of resources" but also the drawing into question of "the logic of economic growth" is placed outside the sociological discourse, stresses additionally again that the sociological discourse is build on the existential assumption of economic growth.

The Environmental Discourse

Within the environmental discourse WTR is discussed as one amongst many policies to create environmental sustainability. Like the sociological discourse it is not only characterised through a high degree of dialogicality with the economic discourse, but positions its elaborations about WTR in relation to it. However, while the sociological discourse mainly refers to the economic discourse as a source of legitimisation, the environmental discourse explicates and opposes its basic assumption, namely that the logic of capitalist economies as given and desirable. Schor (2005: 38), for example, introduces her article with the sentence: "An accumulation of evidence suggests that current and projected patterns of production and consumption are destroying the planetary ecology" and continues with respect to the economic discourse: "Strikingly, economists have mostly ignored this warning […] I believe that this stance is founded on unwarranted assumptions and rooted in over-reliance on longstanding, but untenable orthodoxies, such as the ideas that the path of consumption reflects workers' preferences, that continued increase in GDP per capita in rich countries will yield gains in wellbeing that outweigh ecological costs, and that the market can solve ecological problems" (Schor 2005: 38). This is an open challenge to the basic assumption of the economic discourse – indeed an antagonistic relationship is set up – that the logic of capitalist economy is desirable and thus entails a shift in the underlying value system away from economic goals such as an increase in employment towards the goal of sustainability. However this sentence also implies that value is attributed to human welfare. There is one more basic assumption the green discourse is build on as becomes evident in this sentence: "A strong global equity principle requires a commitment to allowing all people to consume natural resources at a common rate." (Schor 2005: 48). This does not only imply the existence of a "strong global equity principle" but also that there is a connection between a sustainable environment, human welfare and equity. Despite the open challenge this discourse poses to the economic discourse, like the sociological discourse it frequently draws on logic and vocabulary emanating form the economic discourse, for example when Schor (2005: 43) refers to overly long working hours as a "market failure". Just as the sociological discourse refers to potential environmental benefits of a WTR policy but places them explicitly outside the own discourse, the environmental discourse mentions potential social benefits in the same manner, implicitly subordinating it to the goal of creating sustainability: "In the current period, however, the adverse consequences are not

merely overworked employees (stress and burnout have become important problems), but also ecological degradation" (Schor 2005: 43). That this is placed outside the environmental discourse becomes clear in Schor's (2005: 48) conclusion: "[I]nhabitants of the global North can and should opt for a new economic and social vision based on quality of life, rather than quantity of stuff, with reduced work time and ecological sustainability at its core". This statement implies further that there has to be a "global" solution, that inhabitants of the global North have an obligation towards the rest of the world and that such a solution cannot be achieved within the current "economic and social vision". It further implies that this current vision is built on "quantity of stuff" which is not necessarily connected to "quality of life". Here, the choice of vocabulary is remarkable as it breaks with the use of economic vocabulary and replaces it with the colloquial term "stuff" that not only bears a negative connotation, but is further contrasted with the term "quality of life" implying that this is not part of the current economic vision. Thus the conclusion of Schor's article is used to emphasise that it challenges the assumptions of the economic discourse and to stress the different underlying value systems.

4.2   Discourses of Resistance (Agency)

This chapter shifts the focus from how consent to power relations is fostered by the shaping of the doxa by the dominant social groups using their symbolic power, to how these power relations as manifested in the doxa constrain (subaltern) social actors and how potential rooms for resistance to and change of the doxa and consequently the power relations it upholds can be opened.

4.2.1   Habitus

Bourdieu's concept of the *habitus* explains how a worldview can become universally shared by the social actors within a field even – and particularly – by those, to whose domination it contributes.

According to Bourdieu, every social actor within a field is endowed with a habitus, a set of structuring dispositions, intertwined and unconscious patterns that structure the perception of and interpretation about the social world. These dispositions are thus constitutive for social practices and their representation. The habitus constitutes the base of what Bourdieu calls *le sense practique*, which helps social actors to orient themselves within the social world in general and within specific fields of practice in particular (Schwingel 1995: 63ff.). The habitus thus determines how social actors perceive the social world. Regarding the doxa two aspects of the habitus are of particular importance: How it comes into being and how social actors can become critically aware of their habitual dispositions and thus potentially change them.

According to Bourdieu, the habitus is acquired through the experiences a social actor makes, occupying a particular position within a field structure. "This means that inevitably inscribed within the dispositions of the habitus is the whole structure of the system of conditions, as it presents itself in the experience of a life-condition occupying a particular position within the structure." (Bourdieu 1984: 172). It is formed through the internalization of the external societal conditions of existence as they manifest themselves in the experiences of a social actor. Consequently, while the habitus is the subject of constant change as it is modified by new experiences – though Bourdieu maintains that the original, the earliest experiences coin the habitus more fundamentally than later ones – these experiences are always constrained by the position a social actor occupies within the social structure of a field and thus cannot radically change the habitual dispositions (Schwingel 1995: 66.). The genesis of the doxa lies precisely in this internalization of contingent sociocultural (power) relations. Through becoming part of the habitual dispositions through which social actors perceive and make sense of the world they become seen as natural: "The most fundamental oppositions in the structure (high/low, rich/poor etc.) tend to establish themselves

as the fundamental structuring principles of practices and the perception of practices. As a system of practice-generating schemes expressing systematically the necessity and freedom inherent in its class condition and the difference constituting this position, the habitus apprehends differences between conditions, which it grasps in the form of differences between classified, classifying practices (products of the habitus), in accordance with principles of differentiation which, being themselves the product of these differences are objectively attuned to them and therefore tend to perceive them as natural" (Bourdieu 1984: 172).

The dialectic understanding of the relationship between social structures and agency characterising Bourdieu's theory is also reflected in his habitus concept. Accordingly, the social cannot be understood with reference to the habitus alone. Rather the theoretical focus always needs to be on the complex dialectic relation in which internalized structures of the habitus are with the objective, external structures of social fields. This means that while the dispositions of the habitus develop through the internalisation of external social structures, these external structures are constituted by social practices, which in turn are generated primarily through the externalization of the habitual dispositions. In this dialectic the habitus functions as a mediator between structure and social practice. Social structures therefore only exist by means of the execution of individual or collective practices, while it simultaneously is only because social actors in particular relations to each other produce practices structured by the habitus that social structures can be less or more permanent (Schwingel 1995: 74ff.). This suggests a tendency of habitual dispositions to contribute to the reproduction of the social structures they are a product of and thus leads to the question raised above of how much room this leaves for social actors to question the doxa and consequently change existing power relations.

According to Bourdieu as long as the habitual dispositions meet the same field structures that constitute them, there is no reason for social actors to question them. Further, it is precisely because of the tendency of habitual dispositions to be well adjusted to field structures that is the origin of the doxa and thus the consent of subaltern classes to hegemonic relations (Schwingel 1995: 78f.). This is because for the social actor practicability of thought and knowledge is more important than objectivity or "truth" there is no reason for them to question their perception and thought patterns as long as they are not drawn into question through new experiences. It is consequently only in the field of academia in which social actors are relieved from the economic as well as social constraints and aims of social practice, that reflexive, theoretical knowledge can be produced. However, this knowledge cannot claim immediate relevance for social practice (Schwingel 1995: 56).

It is only in situations of crisis or rapid change in which the habitual structures of anticipation remain systematically unfulfilled and the schemata of perception and thought are drawn into question, potentially leading to a failure of the habitus as principle of practice production, that the potential for social actors arises to critically assess their habitual dispositions and consciously change them and thus the doxa and the power structures it represents (Schwingel 1995: 80).

Under "modern" circumstances of the differentiation of relative autonomous fields, the disparity of social classes and the associated dynamic of social change the statistical probability grew that the habitus and the conditions under which it is operating are very different of the ones of its original formation. However even in modern societies it is not unusual that habitus forms match the social relations of fields since the habitus tends to protect itself from critical questioning through creating a milieu that is as well pre-adjusted as possible.

So while Bourdieu stresses that the habitus rather defines the boundaries of the possible rather than particular social actions, thus leaving some room of manoeuvre to the individual social actor, this freedom for innovation is always constrained by the social structures the social actor is a part of (Schwingel 1995: 70). Accordingly, the concept of habitus leaves only very limited room for the social actor to become self-reflexive and question the doxa.

4.2.2 Common Sense: Opening Room for Agency

The room of manoeuvre for social actors can be broadened with recourse of Gramsci's concept of *common sense.* In many ways Gramsci's concept of common sense resembles Bourdieu's habitus concept. It refers to the uncritical and mostly unconscious way of perceiving and understanding the world (Hoare & Smith 1971: 323). Like the habitus for Bourdieu, the common sense is "initially imposed by the external environment i.e. by one of the many social groups in which everyone is automatically involved from the moment of his entry into the conscious world" (Gramsci 1972: 324). Like the habitus, it continuously changes as "a response to certain specific problems posed by reality" (Gramsci 1972: 325). However, to Bourdieu this means that there is no need for social actors to question their habitus and thus the doxa as long as these problems can be perceived and successfully overcome through the habitual dispositions. By being internalized by the habitus, the conditions of existences of subaltern actors and groups thus contribute to the upholding of the doxa (Schwingel 1995: 79).

In contrast, Gramsci attributes a certain ambiguity to the common sense which is lacking in the concept of the habitus. The fact that the common sense is continuously modified consequently means to Gramsci that social actors are always confronted with oppression by dominant groups through their everyday practices and this experience too becomes part of the common sense. This entails a certain ambiguity of the common sense which must be ironed out by the dominant groups through the imposition of their worldview on subaltern groups, through the implementation of a doxa that thereby becomes the foundation of hegemony (Schaffer 1995: 32f.). As Gramsci puts it: "This contrast between thought and action, i.e. the co-existence of two conceptions of the world, one affirmed in words and the other displayed in effective action, is not simply a product of self-deception […] In these cases the contrast between thought and action cannot but be the expression of profounder contrasts of a social historical

order. It signifies that the social group in question may indeed have its own conception of the world, even if only embryonic; a conception which manifests itself in action, but occasionally and in flashes — when, that is, the group is acting as an organic totality. But this same group has, for reasons of submission and intellectual subordination, adopted a conception which is not its own but is borrowed from another group; and it affirms this conception verbally and believes itself to be following it, because this is the conception which it follows in "normal times" — that is when its conduct is not independent and autonomous, but submissive and subordinate" (Gramsci 1971: 326-327).

Gramsci thus opens up room for agency on the part of social actors. This holds true for dominant groups, having to impose their world view on subordinate groups as this does not happen through a mechanic process of internalisation as Bourdieu' accounts of the habitus suggest. More importantly, however, Gramsci attributes the potential for agency and thus for the resistance to power relations to subaltern groups. Since the common sense of subaltern groups is always contradictory as it includes not only the doxa but also always a moment of the conditions of their existence, they can potentially become critically aware of this contradiction and form a common sense that is coherent with their live experiences. Gramsci here introduces the term *buon senso*, "good sense" referring to the moment of critical reflexion, which is always part of the common sense and can become the seed of resistance.

In this sense it can be said that a social group is hegemonic if the doxa is the expression of their own lived experiences and it thus possesses a coherent common sense (Barfuss & Jehle: 2014: 56). And it is only possible for dominant groups to remain hegemonic and rule through the consent of the subaltern groups because they manage to impose a worldview that stems from their lived experiences that in the common sense of the subalterns groups overpowers their own. Accordingly, for a social group to become capable of agency, to change power relations they must become aware of how their common sense reflects their own lived experiences and generalise this worldview so it becomes to be shared by all social groups and thus becomes the new doxa (Schaffer 1995: 34).

This *philosophy of praxis*, as Gramsci calls it, must be a criticism of the common sense, thereby building on the already existing moment of good sense in order to show "that 'everyone' is a philosopher and that it is not a question of introducing from scratch a scientific form of thought into everyone's individual life, but of renovating and making 'critical' an already existing activity" (Gramsci 1971: 332). It has to explicate the lived experiences of subaltern groups and translate the social relations that determine their lives from the naïve and contradictory form of the popular common sense into a critical and coherent language of theory in which the subaltern groups can become aware of their capacity to act in the first place (Barfuss & Jehle: 2014: 55). Practical problems have to be translated into critical concepts and this can only be done through the help of organic intellectuals. To develop such a theory of praxis they must necessarily share the lived experiences of subaltern groups and therefore come out of them. To use this philosophy to create a new common sense they must stay connected to them: "It is a matter therefore of starting with a philosophy which

already enjoys, or could enjoy, a certain diffusion, because it is connected to and implicit in practical life, and elaborating it so that it becomes a renewed common sense possessing the coherence and the sinew of individual philosophies. But this can only happen if the demands of cultural contact with the 'simple' are continually felt" (Gramsci 1971: 332).

It is in this sense that organic intellectuals in their social function of organising hegemony as discussed in chapter 4.1.2 become important. It is not enough to create a coherent common sense based on the lived experiences of subaltern groups or classes and therefore help them to gain a critical self-understanding. But in order for a group to become hegemonic, their worldviews must spread (within the subaltern groups and) to other social groups, they must become part of the doxa (Barfuss & Jehle 2014: 65). The spreading of the new doxa thereby has to be organised within a political party and through the hegemonic apparatuses of civil society as well as through the assimilation of the traditional intellectuals of the ruling class (Demirovic 2012: 144f.):

"The working class, like the bourgeoisie before it, is capable of developing from within its ranks its own organic intellectuals, and the function of the political party, whether mass or vanguard, is that of channelling the activity of these organic intellectuals and providing a link between the class and certain sections of the traditional intelligentsia. The organic intellectuals of the working class are defined on the one hand by their role in production and in the organisation of work and on the other by their "directive" political role, focused on the Party. It is through this assumption of conscious responsibility, aided by absorption of ideas and personnel from the more advanced bourgeois intellectual strata, that the proletariat can escape from defensive corporatism and economism and advance towards hegemony" (Gramsci 1971: 6).

However, the struggle over the shared worldview, to implement a counter hegemony always happens through a struggle of position with the existing hegemony.

4.2.3 Interdiscursivity: A Tool for Resistance

It is through this theoretical articulation of the contradiction between the common sense consciousness that is bound to the lived experience of the subaltern classes and the overpowering hegemonic ideas that are foreign to the popular groups that a counter-hegemony can be formed. However, in advanced Western societies with a thoroughly developed civil society this cannot be done through a "war of manoeuvre", a revolution, but has to be done through a "war of position" at the level of civil society, through a multitude of small struggles the subaltern groups must fight against the existing hegemonic order: "The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics as it were the "trenches" and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position: they

render merely "partial" the element of movement which before used to be "the whole" of war" (Gramsci 1971: 244).

According to Gramsci this war of position takes place to an important part within the realm of language in which subaltern groups have the opportunity to expose inconsistencies within the hegemonic order and critically organising their own counterhegemonic consciousness (Schaffer 1995: 35). Such a war of position in the realm of language can be operationalized through Fairclough's concept of *interdiscursivity*. The order of discourse in which the doxa is manifested is constituted through a network of discourses each representing the field in a different way. Which discourses are included in the order of discourse of a field and in what relation they are to each other is determined by the field structure and thus the relations of power within a field. Discourses can thus be seen as resources, which social actors can draw upon more or less creatively in a concrete discursive practice. While the order of discourse constrains the availability of different discourses, social actors reproduce or transform the order of discourse and thus the doxa through combining these discourses more or less creatively within social interaction. (Fairclough 2015: 60ff.). Interdiscursivity, then, means the articulation of different discourses within the same communicative event. It is through such creative articulations the boundaries of discourses within the order of discourse as well as the boundaries between different orders of discourse change. (Jøregnsen & Phillips 2002: 73). Orders of discourses in which power relations are relatively stable and the doxa and thus all or most common sense assumptions are universally shared are less open to change than orders of discourse in which several discourses struggle to fix meaning in competing ways (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 144).

Interdiscursive resistance to dominant discourses can thus be interpreted as small struggles over meaning within a war of positions. This is particularly true if social actors draw on discourses, which are originally part of a different order of discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 142). Since these discourses are initially excluded from their order of discourse, they first must be made available to the social actors as resources. It is here that academics as organic intellectuals can play a significant role in making discourses available to subaltern groups, which they can use as resources to destabilize the doxa and implement a counterhegemony in a war of positions. Through empirically analysing on which discourses relevant social actors within a specific field draw, one can thus investigate which discourses are included in its order of discourse. The analysis conducted in chapter 4.1.4 can additionally shed light on the discourses, which are not included in the order of discourse and thus constitute the most valuable resources for subaltern social actors in the war of position against the doxa. A focus on interdiscursivity can thereby shed light on if and how social actors are engaged in such a resistance thereby transforming the order of discourse and by extension relations of power or if they are reproducing it through drawing exclusively on discourses already existing within their order of discourse in conventional ways.

4.2.4 Labour and Green Discourses: Arguing for a Reduction of Working Time

In chapter 4.1.4 I outlined the three most important discourses produced within the academic field in regards to WTR: an economic discourse, a sociological discourse and an environmental discourse. These discourses merely constitute resources on which the social actors within the field of working time regulation policy can potentially draw. Which of these discourses actually constitute the order of discourse of this field can be investigated by empirically analysing on which discourses relevant social actors draw. The analysis of the discourses over WTR produced within the academic field indicated hegemony of the economic discourse. It can thus be assumed that this discourse will be drawn on by relevant social actors. Therefore, I chose to focus on social actors that are likely to draw on the sociological and environmental discourse respectively as the representations these embody are likely to be beneficial to the position of the actors within the field of working time regulation policy. I will first analyse the manifesto of the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) as representatives of workers assuming that they are likely to draw on the sociological discourse with its focus on potential gains of a WTR policy for workers. Secondly I will analyse the latest election programme as well as the party programme of the Austrian Green Party assuming that it is likely to draw on the environmental discourse with its focus on sustainability.

The Discourse of Labour
The ÖGB advocates WTR. In its manifesto a whole section is dedicated to the topic of working time. Their demand regarding WTR is summed up under as followed: "The ÖGB demands a better distribution of working time through a shortening of the actual working time, sufficient recovery phases and a better compatibility of work- and private life, so people can be healthy within their jobs and so work does not create sickness" (ÖGB 2013: 17). This takes up many of the potential benefits of a WTR outlined by the sociological discourse. While implicit to this quote is the existential assumption of a capitalist economy that is not drawn into question and the assumption that work refers to paid work as implicit in the demand of a "better compatibility of work- and private life" which can also be attributed to the economic discourse, emphasis is clearly put on the potential contributions of a WTR to human welfare. This is amplified through the fact that in this initial statement no reference is made to the relation between WTR and employment. Thus underlying this statement is clearly the same value system that underlies the sociological discourse emphasising social objectives. A reference to possible employment effects is made elsewhere in the manifesto under the subheading "Distributing work and income equally": "The shortening of working time also does not destroy employment as economy and industry try to make believe [sic!], the opposite is true: Ten per cent less working creates 90.000 more jobs, unemployment would decrease" (ÖGB 2013: 15). While this statement expresses some intertextuality as it implies that "economy and industry" argue

elsewhere that a shortening of working time would "destroy employment" the fact that there is no source for this quote signifies a low degree of dialogicality. Further there is implicitly an antagonistic relationship set up between "economy and industry" and the reader. Here, it is of particular interest that the German expression "glauben machen wollen" which literally translates into "trying to make believe" has no object thus it obfuscates who they want to make believe that WTR would destroy employment. The second statement portrays a strong commitment to the truth as the creation of jobs is phrased through an assertive statement even though, again, there is no source mentioned that would justify such certainty.

Taken together, an antagonistic relationship between an implied alliance of "economy and industry" and the potential reader is set up, insinuating that "economy and industry" against better knowledge, try to make others believe a WTR is harmful. This points towards the awareness that the representation of WTR is in someway connected to power relations. The economy is treated as a subject to which agency is ascribed, suggesting that it actively works against the wellbeing of people. This also implies an open challenge to the economic discourse.

However, as the sociological discourse about WTR within academia the ÖGB frequently draws on vocabulary and logic emanating form the economic discourse. For example when the ÖGB stresses the importance to secure the "purchasing power" of the workers (ÖGB 2013: 17) or when it refers to the benefits of shorter working hours as "increasing the efficiency of the workers" (ÖGB 2013: 21).

As expected this shows that the ÖGB draws on the sociological as well as economic discourse.

The Green Discourse
Within their party programme the Green Party mentions: "The capitalist market economy leads to the exploitation of natural and human resources and assumes physical expansion and infinite material growth […] This point of view neglects social as economic relevant areas that (as of now) cannot be handled through the market" (Die Grünen 2001 18). Further down the same page it stresses: "The Green Party acknowledges that the market is the most efficient steering instrument for economic activity so far known, not less but also not more" (Die Grünen 2001: 18). While this implies a strong commitment to the capitalist economy – in particular the expression "as of now" suggests that the market could be capable of handling these areas in the future – it also explicates and problematizes some of the assumptions underlying the capitalist economy. This ambivalent attitude towards the capitalist economy is also expressed when the party problematizes the conception of unpaid work: "Work is not only paid work but also unpaid work. Unpaid work (e.g. care work) is an indispensable contribution to the national economic income, nevertheless it is not socially recognized as equivalent. This mostly affects women." (Die Grünen: 2001: 29). While the assumption that "work" exclusively refers to "paid work" is

problematized this is only done through referring to the economic contribution it makes while its social value is neglected.

This ambivalence is also reflected in the arguing for WTR: "The productivity of paid labour is increasing continuously. In contrast neither working time has decreased, nor incomes increased accordingly" (Die Grünen 2001: 38). Accordingly, while the party favours WTR they justify this neither through recourse to the sociological discourse, nor through recourse to the environmental discourse but entirely through recourse to economic vocabulary and logic. By doing so they insinuate the economy a certain fairness.

In their latest electoral programme they argue in a similar way advocating WTR on bases of an "unfair distribution of working time and income" (Die Grünen 2013: 92). However, the main emphasis is not on WTR but on a "model of working lifetime that should further a flexibilisation in the favour of workers" and thus should provide room for a "temporary exit of the labour market" in the frame of sabbaticals, educational or care leave. "This does not only help the people concerned to stay healthy and active longer but also enables additional people to enter the labour market and relieves the pension funds" (Die Grünen 2013: 92f.).

While, in as far as social benefits are stressed the Green Party can be said to draw on the economic and sociological discourse, WTR is mentioned only briefly and without any recourse to the environmental discourse. This points towards an exclusion of the environmental discourse from the order of discourse of working time regulation policies.

5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks

While CDA usually focuses on studying how orders of discourse change over time and how this relates to shifts in power relations, it cannot study how a certain order of discourse relates to power relations at a given moment in time. This is because it has no analytical tools to investigate which discourses are potentially relevant but currently excluded from a certain order of discourse. I think this weakness can be counteracted through mapping out the discourses produced within the field of academia and their relation to each other. As I have argued, because of the symbolic and linguistic capital bestowed upon academics as well as their important social function as traditional intellectuals, it can be assumed that the discourses academics produce about a particular field constitute an important part of the discursive resources available to the social actors within the respective field. I have shown how this can be done in chapter 4.1.4 through an empirical analysis of the discourses produced over WTR within the field of academia.

The empirical analysis in 4.1.4 has shown that within the field of academia one can distinguish between three broad discourses in respect to WTR: an economic, a sociological and an environmental discourse, whereby the economic discourse can be further differentiated into a more Keynesian and a more Neoliberal discourse. Each of these discourses can be seen as belonging to a wider order of discourse regarding the economy, human welfare and the environment respectively.

The analysis has further shown that there are indications that the economic discourse is dominant. This is for several reasons: First, the economic discourse displays a low degree of dialogicality which indicates that it does not have to compete over meaning with either of the other two discourses but rather can assume that all readers share its basic assumptions, namely the natural existence and desirability of a capitalist economy and the creation of employment as the measurement against which WTR has to be judged. Secondly, the sociological discourse and the environmental discourse are characterised through a high degree of dialogicality. This is particularly so in regards to the economic discourse which they use as a reference point, positioning themselves in relation to it. They thereby show awareness that the basic assumptions and underlying values of the economic discourse are widely shared and that the representation of the world they contain are thus part of the doxa, which creates the need for other discourses to refer to them. This is also reflected in the fact that both the sociological and the environmental discourse at times use logic and vocabulary that emanates from the economic discourses. However, while both the sociological and the environmental discourse use the economic discourse as a point of reference they position themselves differently in relation to it.

The sociological discourse shares the basic assumptions of the economic discourse, namely the existence and desirability of a capitalist society and the need for WTR to create employment neither of which is critically assessed. There is a different value system underlying the sociological discourse, which puts more emphasis on the potential gains for human welfare WTR could entail. It is thus closely related to the Keynesian economic discourse, the boundaries of the two blurring at times. The environmental discourse, on the other hand, challenges the basic assumptions of the economic discourse, most importantly the desirability of a capitalist economy and consequently replaces the representation of WTR in terms of its capability of creating employment with a representation in terms of contributing to stabilising or de-growing the economy and thus contributing to a sustainable society. While the sociological discourse builds on the assumption of the economic discourse, only shifting its underlying value system and thus broadening the representation of WTR as a policy potentially creating employment to include its potential to further human welfare in other ways, the environmental discourse challenges the assumptions and values underlying the economic discourse and hence its representation of WTR.

An analysis of the discourses produced within academia about a certain field has to be necessarily complemented by an analysis of how these discourses are related within the order of discourse of that field. This is interesting in so far as the discourses included in the order of discourse are necessarily part of the doxa while the discourses excluded from it constitute potential discursive resources for subaltern social actors in challenging the order of discourse in what Gramsci refers to as war of position. This is important as it contributes to resolving a central problem of both Bourdieu's and Fairclough's theories namely the limited room for agency their theories entail. To illustrate these considerations such an analysis focusing on the order of discourse of working time regulation was done in chapter 4.2.4 through the example of WTR discourses within the field of working time regulation policies in Austria.

Since the analysis in chapter 4.1.4 indicates a hegemony of the economic discourse the analysis was done with a focus on social actors that can be expected to draw on the sociological and environmental discourse respectively as they embody representations of WTR that could be beneficial to their position within the field of working time regulations. Accordingly, the Austrian Labour Union Federation (ÖGB) was assumed to be likely to draw on the sociological discourse while the Green Party was assumed to be likely to draw on the environmental discourse. The analysis showed that both social actors are, as expected, drawing on the economic discourse further strengthening the indication that this discourse is firmly integrated in the doxa. Additionally, the ÖGB is drawing on the sociological discourse. As both the economic and the sociological discourse are part of the order of discourse of working time regulation the interdiscursivity in the articulations of the ÖGB might only contribute to change within the order of discourse. It could for example contribute to a strengthening of the Keynesian strand within the economic discourse towards the Neoliberal strand. The boundaries of the order of discourse and thus the content of the doxa would,

however, remain intact and even be reproduced. While the Green Party is also combining elements of the economic and the sociological discourse, it does not draw on the environmental discourse in regards to WTR at all. This indicates that the environmental discourse is excluded from the order of discourse of working time regulation policies. A likely reason for this is that the environmental discourse openly challenges the assumptions and values underlying the economic discourse. As there are indications that the economic discourse is hegemonic, the inclusion of the environmental discourse – in contrast to the sociological discourse – would therefore contribute to a destabilisation of the doxa.

There can be two important conclusions drawn from this analysis. First, through only drawing on discourses within the existing order of discourse the ÖGB and The Green party are contributing to the reproduction of the doxa as manifested in the order of discourse and thus existing power relations. In order to challenge the doxa social actors would have to import discourses from different orders of discourse through the interdiscursive articulation of such discourses together with discourses from their own order of discourse. This, secondly, implies that the environmental discourse could be a valuable resource for subaltern social actors in the formation of a counter hegemony in a war of position at the discursive level.

Gramsci points towards the importance of organic intellectuals in formulating a philosophy of praxis through which subaltern social actors can be enabled to overcome the ambiguity of their common sense. I would argue that such a philosophy of praxis necessarily relies on the import of discourses from other orders of discourse as it is only through these the doxa can be destabilized. One could say these discourses need to be made available to subaltern social actors through the help of organic intellectuals. It is important here that in order to enable subaltern groups to overcome their subalternity organic intellectuals must by definition not only develop out of these subaltern groups but also remain part of them. They have to avoid becoming traditional intellectuals whose philosophy only spreads within the field of academia.

Fairclough (2015: 48) defines CDA as a "*normative critique* of discourse, leading to *explanatory critique* of relations between discourse and other social elements of existing social reality, as a basis for *action* to change reality for the better." I would argue if CDA wants to uphold this claim of doing research in order to achieve change within a certain field, CDA scholars must regain a self-understanding of themselves as organic intellectuals measuring the value of their contributions not merely along scientific standards but first and foremost by whether or not they are made available to subaltern groups outside the field of academia.

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