

MOTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR RIGHT-WING TERROR AND VIOLENCE

A STRUCTURED, FOCUSED COMPARISON OF SWEDEN AND DENMARK 1990-2015



LUND
UNIVERSITY

SEBASTIAN HELLBERG

Word count: 19 722
Date of submission: May 19th 2017

Faculty of Social Sciences
Department of Political Science

ABSTRACT

Why is Sweden plagued the most of right-wing terror and violence in comparison to its Nordic neighbors? This thesis explores the possible *motive* and *opportunity* for right-wing terror and violence between 1990 and 2015, by using new empirical data provided from the Center for Research and Extremism (C-REX). The cases of Sweden and Denmark are scrutinized through the lens of their respective economic opportunity structure in a focused comparison. The idea for explanation is that if immigration increases and the economy declines, a window for linking influx of immigrants to the financial context for political actors arises. This creates an opening for the immigration influx to become a salient issue. As a result of this, we should expect right-wing terror and violence to occur. This idea is both developed and tested for its strength in this paper. The finding is that there are profound differences between Sweden and Denmark's political organizations when researching relevant parties' manifestos. Furthermore, this paper finds that when accentuation for immigration as a salient issue begins to appear by plenty in a political context, right-wing terror and violence seems to decline.

Key words: Right-wing terror and violence, economic opportunity structure, issue salience, extreme-right, far right, Sweden, Denmark.

Words: 19 722

Thanks to,

My Supervisor, Fellow peers – especially *Søren Smidt Bonnesen* and *Peder Valind* – the Center for Research on Extremism in Oslo (C-REX) – and in particular *Jacob Ravndal* for providing open access to new empirical data on right-wing terror and violence in Western Europe.

If you would like to critically assess the coding of certain incidents, used for this thesis, or help to expand the RTV-Dataset by providing information regarding old or new cases, please visit C-REX online scheme for feedback at:

<https://nettskjema.uio.no/answer/73784.html>

CONTENTS

1	INTRODUCTION	3
1.1	Research Questions.....	6
1.2	Previous Research.....	7
2	THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	11
2.1	Conceptualizing Economic Opportunity Structure.....	11
2.2	Conceptualizing the Extreme-Right.....	13
2.3	Conceptualizing Right-Wing Terror and Violence.....	17
2.4	Argument and Causal Mechanism.....	20
3	METHODS AND DATA.....	24
3.1	Structured, Focused Comparison.....	24
3.2	Case Selection.....	24
3.3	Operationalization and Analytical Questions	28
3.4.1	Operationalizing the Independent Variable	28
3.4.2	Analytical Questions.....	32
3.4.2	Operationalizing the Dependent Variable.....	32
3.4.3	Analytical Questions for the Dependent Variable	32
3.4	Demarcations	33
4	SWEDEN 1990-2015.....	34
4.1	Immigration	34
4.2	Economic Conditions and Unemployment Rate.....	36
4.3	Far Right Parties' Parliamentary Representation.....	39
4.4	Parties' Positions: Elections 1990-2010	41
4.5	Dependent Variable: Right-Wing Terror and Violence.....	42
4.6	Summary: Indicators.....	43
5	DENMARK 1990-2015.....	46
5.1	Immigration	46
5.2	Economic Conditions and Unemployment Rate.....	48
5.3	Far Right Parties' Parliamentary Representation.....	51
5.4	Parties' Positions: Elections 1990-2011	53
5.5	Dependent Variable: Right-Wing Terror and Violence.....	56
5.6	Summary: Indicators.....	57
6	COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS.....	59
6.1	Potential Results	60

7 THEORETICAL TIEBACK AND CRITICAL DISCUSSION	63
7.1 Concluding Remarks.....	64
8 REFERENCES.....	65
APPENDIX A.....	72

ABLES, CHARTS AND FIGURES

Table 1: Conceptualizing Economic Opportunity Structure	14
Table 2: Conceptualizing The Extreme-Right	19
Table 3: Conceptualizing Right-Wing Terror and Violence	21
Table 4: Score of Deadly RTV-Incidents 1990-2015	27
Table 5: Case-Selection	29
Table 6: Operationalizing Economic Opportunity Structure	30
Table 7: Sweden: Unemployment and Economic Evaluation	40
Table 8: Summary Denmark: Unemployment and Economic Evaluation	52
Figure 1: Causal-Mechanism	22
Figure 2: Causal-Mechanism Working as Raising Incentives for RTV	23
Figure 3: Causal-mechanism working as lowering the incentives for RTV	24
Chart 1: Inflow of Asylum Seekers in Sweden 1990-2005	36
Chart 2: Unemployment Rate Sweden 1990-2015	38
Chart 3: Radical Right Parties Sweden 1990-2015	41
Chart 4: Parties' Positions Sweden, _per608-variable	43
Chart 5: Right-Wing Terror and Violence in Sweden 1990-2015	44
Chart 6: Inflow of Asylum Seekers in Denmark 1990-2015	48
Chart 7: Unemployment Rate Denmark 1990-2015	50
Chart 8: Radical Right Parties Denmark	54
Chart 9: Parties' Positions Denmark	56
Chart 10: Right-Wing Terror and Violence in Denmark 1990-2015	59

1 INTRODUCTION

The current limelight for security-based research has due to obvious reasons been placed on threats stemming from for e.g., *religious violence, the radicalized European youth, or foreign fighters returning to Western Europe from war zones like Syria or Iraq*. With an outweighed majority of expertise using its resources towards analyzing these stressing themes – naturally, less research have been done recently on other forms of possible rising- or declining security threats. One example of such is the terror and violence produced by actors claiming a belonging to the so-called ‘extreme-right.’ However, less scientific attention to one type of terror, compared to another, does not mean that it stops existing empirically:

In July 2011, the two coordinated attacks by lone wolf and extreme-right activist Anders Breivik, in Oslo, Norway – resulted in 77 fatalities and left the country in a national trauma (CNN, 2017). The following year in 2012, a 22-year-old man was stabbed to death in the Swedish municipality of Vallentuna, by perpetrators whom have been confirmed as affiliated members of the aggressive extreme-right organization the ‘Nordic Resistance Movement’ (SVT, 2014). Two striking similar attacks happened 2013 in France, and 2016 in the United Kingdom. In Paris, skinheads in the suburb of Argenteuil, attacked a young Muslim woman because she was wearing a veil – after they cut her hair and ripped her clothing apart, she screamed she was pregnant; the activists then starting kicking her violently in the stomach, which subsequently led to that she miscarried her baby (The New York Times, 2013). In the town of Milton Keys, a similar racial-motivated attack took place when a skinhead followed a 34-year old woman out from a super-market, and kicked her in the torso so severely that she was knocked to the ground, and according to the newspaper *The Guardian*, she too miscarried as a result (The Guardian, 2016).

Greece is another corner of Europe who is experiencing a forceful wave of extreme-right terror and violence. The examples are plentiful: Two are those when over a hundred youth-activists harassed, and chased immigrants living in a community with a dense Asian and African population – or when activists single-attacked an Egyptian hair-dresser, leaving him blinded as a result (Counter Extremism Project, 2017). According to the latter source, in both cases this large and vast group of perpetrators is claimed to belong to the extreme-right party of *Golden Dawn*, and both men and women have been seen marching in these type of rallies in immigrant communities I exemplified above (Ibid).

Contemporary examples of right-wing terror and violence urges us too investigate on a higher level what can explain the *motivation*, and possible *opportunity*, for such activity. The fact is that we know far too little regarding environmental and structural conditions that seem to have an impact on this phenomenon (Garcia 2015: 2). This thesis therefore decides to reach out to that theme, and wishes to make – if just a small contribution – to a research *lacuna* that might deepen when our resources for unfolding this type of terror and violence are prioritized elsewhere.

Empirical review

Departing with the question – *What do we know about the record of right wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe?* Until recently, the interest in mapping out this specific phenomenon, and providing empirical data for cross-national comparisons, has been to say the least, lukewarm.

Making a clear distinction from other forms of violent attacks has not been in focus. One example of this is the yearly Terrorism Trend and Situation Report (TE-SAT) that Europol publishes annually¹. In their 2016-report, only 9 extreme-right episodes were recorded, in contrast to “2,111 ethno-nationalist and separatist terror episodes” within the same time frame (Europol.europa.eu 2016; Ravndal 2016: 1). There are two arguments to why we witness such a discrepancy: first, that it might reflect “EU member states’ interest in reporting certain types of terrorism and not others” (Ravndal 2016: 3), and second, that “many right wing attacks remain below these governments’ radars” (Ibid). Why they manage to bypass the radar for reporting could be because they are either recorded as ‘hate crimes,’ or worst-case scenario, never reported at all (Ibid).

A puzzling tension seems to emerge when we instead receive alarming reports on the rise of a European extreme-right from actors working outside ordinary governmental institutions. Actors like anti-racist organizations, policy oriented think tanks, journalists, and other interest groups – seem to instead exaggerate a re-born security threat in terms of right-wing terror violence (Ibid). One example of how that is voiced from this end of the spectrum, is a report written by the director of the German Institute on Radicalization and De-radicalization Studies (GIRDS). His analysis was endorsed recently by the US Department of Defense and their *center for complex operations*, and further brought into their highly regarded publication ‘PRISM’ in 2016. Looking at a quote from the report below, he clearly does not share Europol’s low risk assessment for e.g. regarding the extreme right:

Europe has experienced a revival of militant right-wing extremist groups, networks, and incidents in recent years, with a surge of anti-immigration and Islamophobic violence, as

¹ The *TE-SAT Report* has been published annually since 2006.

well as anti-government attacks and assaults on political opponents, ethnic minorities, and homosexuals (Koehler 2016: 85).

According to Jacob Ravndal, a Scandinavian expert and researcher focusing on right-wing terror and violence; the issue at hand seems to be that risk assessments conducted by previous mentioned actors ground their analysis in “anecdotal evidence rather than through a systematic incident analysis’ (2016: 3). The director for GIRDS, as well as others should however not be judged. To do a ‘systematic incident analysis,’ you need an answer to the question I departed with, and as Ravndal further points out: “Unlike the United States and Russia, systematic incident data has not been available for Europe as a whole”² (ibid).

Reviewing more deeply what existing incident data that has been available for usage to investigate Europe’s cross-national variations, one does not become surprised that the picture gets skewed one way or another: Two of the most commonly known databases (both based in the U.S); Global Terrorism Database (GDT), and the RAND Worldwide Database of Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI); does not code for the ‘political profile’ of an attack’s perpetrator. It is argued that this would make it hard, if not impossible to understand if it is a reported ‘RTV-event’ we are looking at (Ibid: 3). In addition, the events included apparently often lack open-sources that can be followed – or necessary contextual descriptions.

According to Ravndal’s mapping of the field: “Among the top 20 terrorism databases that are reviewed by Alex Schmid’s *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research*, only four databases allow isolating right-wing attacks in Western Europe from other attacks” (ibid). Furthermore, two of them – the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) and the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) have recently been put to rest and are no more accessible for the general public. This left us interested in the field with two banks for information: First, the already critically discussed T-SAT reports³ – and second, the database Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED). There is although an immediate problem with TWEED. The database is outdated. TWEED’s range for covering RTV-events stops in 2004, and cannot help us to understand the full contemporary landscape that I addressed in the beginning of this introduction. One last resort could therefore have been the ‘Domestic Terrorism Victims Dataset’ (DTV), but that too stops shortly after TWEED’s coding range in 2005.

With databases and reports containing information being either *unavailable*, *outdated*, or *skewed* in their reporting – very little could be done in regards to

² According to Ravndal (2016: 9): “One notable exception is Koopmans’ study of right wing violence in Western Europe (Koopmans 1996). However, to establish cross-national and temporal variation of his dependent variable (right-wing violence), Koopmans compares incident data from different datasets that are ultimately incomparable” (2016: 9).

³ Ravndal argues: “if we were to interpret the reported attack frequencies literally’ they are ‘close to non-existent in Western Europe” (2016: 3).

validate, or question the quotes and statements like the one cited in PRISM. Fortunate for students and scholars interested in this conflict dimension, this did not translate to that all research were put on hold. There is still an active livelihood in regards to explaining when, where, and, how these insurgents have acted – and *how we can understand this type of activities possible emergence or decline*. Some of these relevant studies will be presented under the next headline presenting previous research.

In 2016, the newborn Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), released access to their newly created (*small but fruitful*) terrorist database (UiO: C-REX 2016). The dataset; *Right Wing Terrorism in Western Europe: the RTV Dataset* – comprises a total of 578 events in 17 Western European countries. 190 of these RTV-events have resulted in a fatal outcome, causing a total of 303 deaths between the years 1990 to 2015 (Ravndal 2016). By building on chronologies from case studies, data from previous mentioned institutes, as well as a valid and comprehensive coding schedule for including new cases through open sources – they have managed to provide a product that can be used when exploring *new* and *old* explanatory theories for right wing terror and violence (Ibid).

This of course immediately raises a follow-up question; *what were their key findings from mapping out the field?* After carefully following their discussion of the results, studying the dataset and their coding – I argue that three key findings out of several are of interest: Firstly, we can see large cross-national variations between these 17 Western European countries that do not immediately explain themselves; as those between the Nordic countries in particular, who so often share similarities in patterns- and scores in other areas of study. Secondly, not only does *Sweden* differ substantially from the rest of the Nordic group, it tops the whole list of 17 countries when counting deadly RTV-incidents controlled for by population. Thirdly, explaining these findings might mean that the standard ‘go-to perspectives,’ sometimes referred to as the “four usual suspects” (*Islamist terrorism; youth unemployment; immigration; and enhanced support to radical-right parties*), might need to be both re-visited and re-shaped for study. This introduces my research questions

1.1 Research Questions

What can explain that Sweden earns the highest score of deadly RTV-incidents between 1990 and 2015 – and why are the cross-national variations of right-wing terror and violence when comparing Sweden to its Nordic neighbors so prominently different?

1.2 Previous Research

In regards to previous research investigating from a ‘higher level’ what seems to *raise* or *lower* incentives for extreme-right violence, I briefly mentioned four “usual suspects” (Ravndal 2016). These ‘conditions’ are theoretical macro-enablers, which should be thoroughly reviewed and discussed before presenting the gathered theoretical framework I intend to use for answering my research questions. Some aspects from these (mostly single-case studies) I decide to keep and re-shape accordingly, and some other aspects are put aside for the study at hand.

Islamist Terrorism

In previous studies, as the one by Roger Eatwell (2006), emphasis have been put on linking activity for extreme-right violence to the rise of Islamic radicalization. In his case study *Community Cohesion and Cumulative Extremism in Contemporary Britain* (Ibid.) – the logic of his ‘cause-and-effect’ argument is that a rise, or decline in one form of extremism, indicates effect on another (Ibid). “Communal division” in contrast to “community cohesion”, he further argues, seems to create a context for *cumulative* “ethnic-extremism” (Ibid). It is investigated through concepts such as *social separation* and *identity change*, over a period of time (Ibid). The assumption is that it could have a plausible effect on the rise of extreme-right actors, in his case, *the British National Party* (BNP). The BNP very shortly presented, is an extreme-right party with a white supremacy ideology in the UK (Ibid). I argue that the socio-economic angle of this research is interesting, but the case study referred to here allows little room to generalize to a larger population of European cases. I further argue that Islamist Terrorism- and Islamist radicalization has only been on the agenda in recent times in the Nordic countries in general. It cannot explain a twenty-five year long time-span of fluctuations in activity. The linkage Eatwell (2006) does to *immigration* as a motive for mobilizing and turning to violence however, I choose to keep for this thesis.

Youth Unemployment

A second previous explanation for right-wing terror and violence is a ‘booming’ youth unemployment (Ravndal 2016: 10). This idea has been put forward in research by Armin Falk, Andreas Kuhn and Josef Zweimüller (2011: 260-286). They tested a hypothesis based on the idea that the occurrence of right-wing terror and violence should “occur more frequently when unemployment is high” (Ibid). They argue substance to their finding, which is that there are profound differences of the phenomenon’s appearance in German states where unemployment is high versus low. I choose to argue in line with this socio-economic aspect for the impact of an economic condition that could *raise* or *lower* incentives for extreme-right activists. However, I do not believe that it *solely* can explain the cross-

national variations I wish to scrutinize. The correlation the authors found for a “systematic and strong relationship” (Ibid.), is further kept in mind though, since they based it on a *comparative* analysis, rather than a single case observation (Ibid: 282).

Increased Immigration

There is a wide field of scholars who have researched the different angles and possible impact that solely *immigration* might have had on right-wing terror and violence. Overall, the synthesized conclusion from this explanatory-cluster of frameworks seems to be that immigration matters if not the most, but to a very large extent. Some founding work on framing migrations as the causal-mechanism was done by Quilian Lincoln (1995) in his *Prejudice as a Response to perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe* (586-611). This “individual-level” and middle-range theoretical study claims that immigration-density in countries and communities, do conceptualize a threat and further possibly activate incentives for xenophobic behaviour which could turn to violence (Ibid). More recent research focusing on immigration is one targeting the empirical events of Greece I highlighted in the introduction, and specifically the far-right party of *Golden Dawn*. It is scrutinized by Gabriella Lazaridis and Dimitris Skleparis in their article *Securitization of migration and the far right: the case of Greek security professionals* (2016: 176-192). Their conclusion is that such an aggressive promotor as *Golden Dawn* and their ‘success,’ is dependent “on the effectiveness of the government to regulate immigration” (Ibid). The argument is, that by controlling for the influx of immigrants, in parallel with mainstreaming policy that fights racism in way so that it pervades the political culture of society, is imperative and crucial for curbing the on-going rise of right-wing terror and violence in the country (Ibid). Immigration remains a strong key-suspect, but more recent research; as well as the empirical data I intend to use, shows that there is more going on beneath the surface.

Radical Right Parties

Is right-wing terror and violence the result of a well-organized radical right? The last usual suspect that has been the focal point of investigating reasons for extreme-right violence, is the *presence; agenda; and rising support* of radical right parties. Paul Wilkinson’s extensive work regarding the effect of radical right parties on right-wing terror and violence has been the most substantial regarded publication for this idea. In his article *Violence and Terror and the Extreme Right* (1995; re-published 2007: 82-93) – Wilkinson finds that there “is no clear correlation between the electoral success of extreme-right mass parties and the level of terrorism and political violence from small extreme-right groups” (Ibid.) – However, he further re-claims the *connection* that there is “the evident ambivalence of mass parties of the far right towards violence, and intensification of the propaganda of violence, racism and xenophobia are clearly conducive to

violence and terrorism and political violence” (Ibid). Summarized briefly, this argument translates to that a rise, or decline, of radical right parties, most likely push smaller cells for turning to violent behaviour. This aspect, I argue, is of course highly inter-linked to the ones previously treated such as *immigration*, the *socio-economic dimension* as well as the possible presence of *radical Islam*. The overall-aching idea is that the success or failure of radical right parties would affect right-wing terror and violence, but linking this phenomenon directly to a violent dimension however needs to be re-shaped, but should be included since I believe they have a part to play in the larger process.

Combining Old and New explanations

Turning towards new possible explanations, the creator of the RTV dataset himself, also highlights some possible ideas for the findings stemming from the empirical data that will be used (Ravndal 2016: 10-12). Most of his (so far untested) hypotheses however, focus more on *explaining the general decline* – rather than the *cross-national variations over time* – and it is the latter that is the focal point here. Out of his six new- and untested ideas⁴ however, I singled out one to be useful; which is the possible impact of a country’s *political opportunity structure* (Ibid: 11-12). The discursive approach of an opportunity structure-perspective defines as a framework that “emphasizes the role of political elites and institutions in mobilizing the extreme right by heightening the perceived differences between the native population and foreign ethnic groups” (Garcia 2015: 19; Kitschfelt 1986; Tarrow 2011). This theoretical concept — originally derived from social movement theory (See for e.g. Tilly and Tarrow 2007; McAdam et al., 2007) – have been tried in research previously by Marie Demker, when she specifically compared the Nordic countries (Demker 2012: 239-253). Demker studied Scandinavian far right parties, and whether there was *diversity* more than a *convergence* between these actors as well as their contextual possibilities of reaching a *profitable* ‘political opportunity structure’ for mobilization and parliamentary success (Ibid). This research however, did not aim to neither conceptualize, nor explain right-wing terror and violence, and therefore little of her theoretical framework can be used here when forming a causal-mechanism to trace. But the idea of a ‘structure-agency’ perspective that puts emphasis on *opportunities* towards action is seen as highly useful. Some of the arguments and analytical points from Demker’s study regarding *how* the different radical right parties have been treated and progressed in some of the Nordic countries, will be kept and later re-used and referred to in the coming analysis.

The idea of explaining through a ‘political opportunity structure,’ is a foundation for theoretical departure, but I argue it needs to be complemented in a two-folded manner: it needs to include the macro-enablers I decided to keep from previous

⁴ The other five possible explaining variables Ravndal puts forward are: 1) Less Activism, 2) More internet activism, 3) Less Crime, 4) New Subcultural Trends and Action Repertoires, and; 5) Multicultural acceptance (2016: 10-12).

findings and schools, such as economic conditions and unemployment; and allow for a conceptualization for right-wing terror and violence to be linked to a causal-mechanism. I further argue importance of including parts of an economic perspective since research done on the Nordic countries also states that extreme-right violence seems to be affected by recessions and economic crises over time (Askanius and Mylonas, 2015). Relying solely on the political power elements would not allow those contextual aspects to prove their point.

Theoretical framing that combines these older and newer properties I argue as important, have been done by Blake Evan Garcia (2015). In his dissertation *International Migration and Extreme-Right Terrorism*, the fruitful schools he combines into a coherent framework, provides a synthesized approach combining all of the explaining variables that were kept in mind from this previous research-review. He refers to the theory as an *economic opportunity structure* (Ibid,) and the logic resembles the political approach I just mentioned. Garcia argues that a so-called *domestic* economic opportunity structure comes to live “when both the economy is declining and when immigration becomes a salient issue” (Ibid: 21). Further emphasizing that these aspects derived from his theory embodies “both a motive and opportunity combine to serve as conditions for predicting the likelihood of carrying out an attack in general” (Ibid).

Garcia finds substantial evidence for this argument and the hypothesis he framed prior to his study which reads: “*positive influxes of net migration will lead to a greater likelihood of extreme-right terrorism as unemployment and immigration issue salience is rising*” (Ibid: 40). It was tested by utilizing a “time-series cross-national data structure covering 18 Western European countries from 1970 to 2004” (Ibid: 48). For empirical data he used material from TWEED that I presented in the empirical review. I choose to motivate my framework through the finding-correlation Garcia managed to prove for – and will use his idea of a domestic economic opportunity structure.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

I now turn to the specific theoretical arguments I choose to put an elucidative light on in order to answer my research question. I begin with conceptualizing this thesis explanatory framework: *The economic opportunity structure perspective*.

2.1 Conceptualizing Economic Opportunity Structure

Two theoretical components make up the framing of the explanatory framework for this thesis, which is the domestic economic opportunity structure perspective. First is the presence of a *motive*, the reason to turn to violence. Second is the opening for an *opportunity*, the trigger to turn to violence (Garcia 2015). The key-argument is that when this “motive” and “opportunity” co-exist, the *economic opportunity structure* becomes activated. When it does so – the further argument is that it empowers the necessary gathered conditions for a justified incentive to materialize a violent attack.

Empirically, this motive for action is measured in a one-dimensional manner. It is understood as the influx of foreigners and immigrants into one’s host state (Garcia 2015; Engene 2011). The dynamics behind this reasoning responds well to when looking later at for e.g., the extreme right movements collective claims and political agendas. The “opportunity” in the economic opportunity structure, should be understood as two-folded: First, there needs to be a declining economy to which immigration can be linked (Garcia 2015). This can *inter alia* be a substantial and long-term unemployment rate, a national or global financial crisis, or other economic conditions whose costs seem to affect the standard of living for the vast group of common citizens. Second, after the motive of immigration has been linked to an existing economic *problématique*, immigration further needs to materialize itself as a *salient* political- and societal issue for the causal circle to be complete (Ibid). Political actors, such as organized political parties aiming for electoral gain, are active in doing this. Although I refer to this deconstruction as an economic opportunity *structure*, the theory is best explained as empirically taking the shape of a large *process*. This helps to us to understand that it contains, like I previously emphasized, *components*, whose indicators sometimes arrive bit-by-bit rather than a sort of “package” lowered to us from above. The word “structure” tends sometimes to radiate such a connotation, and for the further understanding of my theoretical arguments, I wish for that to be avoided.

Two theoretical sub-components inflicts in our motive, and two theoretical sub-components are argued as included in the opportunity (Ibid). For the motive to be empowered, there should be a substantial ‘threat to ideology’ as well as the threat of ‘significant group loss’ (Ibid: 25-34). For both of these, a high influx of immigration serves the purpose (Ibid). For the opportunity, there needs to be a ‘perceived legitimacy for action’ as well as an ‘opportunity for significance gain’ (Ibid). The legitimacy arises when the economy is declining and immigration (the motive) is seen as competition for scarce resources. The opportunity for significance gain is opened when the political establishment accentuates this linkage by letting immigration become a salient issue in the context of an unhealthy national economy. However, I argue, this causality should be brought down further and can work in two-ways. I will illustrate and develop this after I presented the definitions for the extreme right and right-wing terror and violence. For now it suffices to say that this framework, which borrows analytical ideas and arguments from both economic competition models, as well as discursive power elements, is a generalizable theory which is not isolated to extreme-right violence (Garcia 2015). It could, if shaped accordingly, be adequately applied to any form of similar violent phenomenon (Ibid), and therefore I argue that it is one of few ideas we currently have to be applicable for cross-national comparisons such as mine.

To summarize the rationale here, it can be said that an ‘activated’ economic opportunity structure therefore does not have only one “on-button” for power, but rather three. The first is always the motive, and therefore I argue that the motive is the one that can slow down the process to a minimum. I will elaborate why immigration as a motive receives this type of *veto-power* further in this chapter when conceptualizing the extreme-right. The second two are more like generators for the process – they determine whether our actor under scrutiny only stays “inspired” for violent action with the motive present – or if buttons two and three gets turned on – we can expect right wing extremists to be pushed to the streets. When that happens, right-wing activist will act out their frustration to an extent that they could become life threatening to encounter if you belong to what they see as a target-group. And as the empirical data clearly shows, most of these belong to minority groups such as immigrants. This is because the result of this process *does not frame economic concerns* as the main enemy for right wing extremists. Instead, *it reinforces an already established motive*, which is mostly ‘based on cultural and nationalist sentiments’ (Garcia 2015: 35). Economic concerns instead serve the main purpose as an opportunity-promoter for right-wing terror and violence. To conclude this idea that I decide to share with the strong evidence Garcia found in his recent study; is that the motive for violence from right-wing extremists between 1990 and 2015, ‘is thought to have resulted from the subsequent fear of *economic competition* [emphasis added] and deteriorating *national identities* [emphasis added]’ (Engene 2011). But together

with that, we need to add for this “economic competition” to be framed as a salient issue and linked to immigration.

With any kind of ‘opportunity structure’-theory, whether it is an economic infused- or politically focused one – the shared critic that can be pointed out is pretty much the same – that the theory is conceptualized *widely* and operationalized *narrowly* (Meyer 2004: 125-145). I do not see that as an obstacle here but rather as an asset, as long as one think of it as a *cluster of intersectional processes* who when working side by side, might create a climate affecting the particular outcome, and as long as one does not point to heavily on only the explanatory power for the causal mechanism one decides to frames for study.

I will present this thesis causal mechanism, as well as what I decide to add to it after conceptualizing how I define the ‘extreme-right’, and ‘extreme-right violence’ under the next headline.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE		
+MOTIVE (Reason)	+ OPPORTUNITY (Trigger)	(=) <i>Greatest Likelihood of Attack</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat to ideology • Threat of group significant loss 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceived legitimacy for action • Opportunity for significance gain 	

Table 1: Conceptualizing Economic Opportunity Structure (Based on Garcia 2015)

2.2 Conceptualizing the Extreme-Right

Many known names exist for describing what this thesis calls the ‘extreme-right.’ Empirically, we come across several references, which seem to target much the same category at large. Some of these are *inter alia*, the “far-right”, “radical-right”, “neo-fascist,” “right-wing populist,” and “neo-Nazis.” Since they seem to be used interchangeably. Therefore, as Garcia among many others so accurately points out, conceptualizing the extreme-right political movement has been a challenge for all those wishing to research it (Garcia 2015; Hainsworth 1992, 2000; Mudde 2007).

However, in order to progress and perform the study at hand, a clear and accepted definition is needed. I choose to follow recent research relating to this thesis by using the terms “extreme-right” and “far-right” – referring to a set of actors

defined in four different sub-categories, driven by a shared motivation. I also use these two names to differentiate from what we call the “mainstream-right.” I choose to line with previous authors in two ways. Firstly, by using Hainsworth (2000) and Mudde (2007) who argue that although some political scientists regard the specific term “extreme-right” to exclusively refer to an agenda that reject representative democracy (for e.g. Betz and Immerfall 1998), I bring forward the same argument as Garcia, that in order to provide the right connotations for this vast and diverse group of organizations, movements, and individuals – we cannot be restricted to such a narrow ideology.

Defining Motivation

Motivation means uncovering the political agenda. A political agenda is in turn based on its *political ideology*, which is defines as the “beliefs, values, principles, and objectives—however ill defined or tenuous—by which a group defines its political identity and aims” (Drake 1998). Some of these values and beliefs are *shared* across and between groups within the extreme-right, such as anti-immigration sentiments (Garcia 2015). Others are *exclusive* to certain – for e.g. the rejection towards representative democracy that I presented above. A claim in that category we should have a larger likelihood in finding with neo-fascists networks, rather than with established political organizations, since the latter have an agenda that is to use traditional institutions, rather than to challenge their existence. This they do in order to gain power and political influence to materialize their respective ideological beliefs and values (Garcia 2015).

Further describing the extreme-right through values and beliefs brings us to the concept of *nativism* (Ibid). Nativism is in itself an ideology, seen as “the outright rejection of those who do not exhibit the ethnic or cultural characteristics associated with a particular nation” (Ibid). Acts of Xenophobia, or what we daily refer to as outspoken *racism*, is argued to be the profound expression of a nativist ideology (Ibid). The central principles of nativism, further leads to *national sentiments*, as naturally would follow an embraced Xenophobic-value-frame. The most commonly shared national sentiment, following this logic of reasoning, is the fierce and consolidated opposition to immigration (Pettigrew 1998: 55). This shapes a political agenda working hard and deep to implement the counter-measure of making sure it is kept at a *minimum*. In the realm of politics, it is usually visible as the promotion for a “closed-border policy” (Garcia 2015).

Another exogenous factors we can trace to nativism is the lust for a “strong-state,” (Ibid). This is usually a result of countering economic integration or globalization (Ibid). Globalization and economic integration is a threat to the ideological value-frame since it usually translates *increased liberalism*, with the consequence of opening borders for migration. To prevent societal change leading towards this, these actors tend to look inwards, re-tracing its nativist roots by rallying for the strong wish to “preserve cultural traditions and racial homogeneity” (Ibid).

From a holistic perspective, immigration and resistance towards immigration, I argue is the shared key-mechanism between this diversity of expressions for various values and beliefs, and also, the main policy area the extreme-right *en masse* sees as a materialized motive. The tightening of focal points helps when including Perliger's argument for contrasting the extreme-right in Europe, with the extreme-right in the United States: "In Europe it appears that the role of religion is more marginal, and immigration and integrations policies are the hallmark of far-right rhetoric" (2013: 3).

Defining the Actors

Like previous studies using the economy structure perspective (Garcia 2015), I use Goodwin (2012a) and his *four* broad categories for theorizing and defining the actors within the extreme-right, and I do so without any immediate changes.

1. Organized Political Parties

The most commonly encountered meeting we have with the extreme right-wing ideology is that manifested through organized political parties seeking electoral gain (Garcia 2015; Goodwin 2012a). I mentioned these actors and their way of conduct shortly in the beginning. The underlying logic with their motive is that they do not wish to overthrow the whole polity- or legal apparatus that is the state – but rather infiltrate and influence it in a manner that makes them able to materialize their extreme ideology. What we have witnessed lately regarding these seemingly growing force in Europe is that they instead push heavily on being anti-Elite, and against the mainstream political establishment in general. Garcia pinpoints these rhetoric-implications well by stating their rhetoric-method below:

They align themselves in direct opposition to the dominant social and political values that permeate the system and side with "ordinary citizens" against a system with elites who promote these dominant values (2015).

Interconnected to this mission of fighting the political elite, they consistently accentuate immigration and cultural differences as a *threat* to society, both financially and traditionally (Ibid). Empirical examples from the Scandinavian context are the Progress Party in Norway (*Fremskrittspartiet*), Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti), and the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna). These three share to a large extent these characteristics of being anti-establishment, or anti-systematic parties. They are also well known for consistently putting the immigration "issue" on the political agenda and supporting each other through political statements and speeches.

2. Grassroots Social Movement

The grassroots social movement differs from organized political parties in the way that they seek political influence, but not necessarily political electoral gain

(Garcia 2015). This sub-type see their political ideology as their collective identity, acting it out in demonstrations, rallies, media etc., – but are typically more fragmented than political parties (Ibid). A more horizontal hierarchy characterizes their collective identity with “core members who are highly active in the movement and peripheral members who are less participatory” (Garcia 2015). It is the peripheral members who tend to exhibit the more extreme views (Goodwin and Evans 2012), and members also seem to be dynamic in their engagement within these types of organization, meaning they move from active to passive engagement regularly. The grassroots movements are therefore slightly a more complex actor since they can move freely within two sub-types of organizations (Garcia 2015).

3. *Small Group Networks*

The most complex sub-type of organization is what Goodwin (2012a) and Garcia (2015) refer to as ‘group networks.’ These are profoundly smaller clusters than the ordinary social movement and individuals’ membership to them are seen as “highly fluid” (Ibid). Unlike political parties and social movements they do not seem to be as interested to “mass-recruit,” but rather to engage in extreme-violence, and as Garcia decides to classify them, they have somewhat different and specific characteristics to which I lean on his description below:

These smaller groups tend to be labeled terrorist organizations because they are more prone to engaging in violence and justify the violence with more extreme political views, which more clearly fits the definition of terrorism than perhaps other types of violence.

One could argue that for an example in the Nordic countries, the revolutionary violent organization called ‘Blood & Honour’ who were founded in Sweden, but also has an affiliated link in Denmark, could be an example of this sub-type. They mainly perform through contentious repertoires, which they call “national concerts,” producing white power music and events.

4. *Lone Wolves*

Easier to define, but most complex to understand are those actors the literature refers to as ‘lone wolfs.’ These individuals have a motivation *in lieu* with the definition previously presented, but they are not “formally linked to organized groups” (Garcia 2015). I gave an example of a lone wolf individual in the introduction when mentioning Anders Breivik’s two attacks in Oslo 22nd of July, 2011.

To summarize, immigration function as the prominent motive since “it embodies an inherent threat to the ideological imperative of the political movement” (Garcia 2015). I argue, that within all of these four sub-types: organized political parties,

social movements, group-networks, and lone wolves – they share an understanding of belonging to this political movement, as well as this threat perception.

Towards these arguments, the definition of the extreme-right will be the following: *A diverse and vast group of actors, classified into four sub-types; whose political ideology stems from nativism, and who all at a minimum share ideas such as nationalist values but mainly, a fierce anti-immigrant sentiment and negative view for multiculturalism.*

THE EXTREME-RIGHT		
MOTIVATION		ACTORS
<i>Political Ideology</i>	<i>Issue areas</i>	<i>Organizational Sub-types</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nativism • Anti-immigrant sentiment • Nationalist values • Racial homogeneity • Anti-economic integration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immigration • Integration • Open borders • Societal change • “Islamification” • Globalization 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political parties 2. Grassroots social movement 3. Smaller group networks 4. Lone wolves

Table 2: Conceptualizing The Extreme-Right

2.3 Conceptualizing Right-Wing Terror and Violence

Conceptualizing right-wing terror and violence faces the same problem we encounter when trying to conceptualize any kind of violence, since we assume that we can separate various forms of violence from each other (Steenkamp 2009: 20-23). Adding further complexity, we have the concept of ‘terrorism’ inflicted here. To aid clearance for this, I lean on both the theoretical tie-ups from previous research, as well as empirical definitions from institutions such as Europol in order to make a distinction from other forms of violence such as hate crimes for e.g.

We should however start by deciding whether right-wing terror is classified as a domestic, or transnational, form of terrorism. This since “the motivations for attacking one’s own government or population are likely to be systematically different from the motivations for attacking the government or population outside one’s country” Garcia 2015). I concur with this argument since the independent variable is also classified as ‘domestic’. Domestic terrorism is defined in *Section 2332b of Title 18 of the United States Code* as including the following:

Violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a

government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.” (18 U.S.C § 2332b 2014, in Garcia 2015: 12).

Subsequently, not all forms of domestic terrorism is the same (Garcia 2015), and as the definition above only hints that these events are national rather than transnational, therefore we need further “tie-up” in theory. Goodwin (2012a), suggest that the focus should be on “individuals, groups or networks that are (i) inspired by right-wing extremist ideology and (ii) employ violence and/or terrorism as a tactic through which they pursue various goals” This means according to Garcia (2015) that we should understand extreme-right terrorism as not only *a type of domestic terrorism* “perpetrated exclusively within a country’s territorial jurisdiction, it must also be motivated by an underlying far-right political ideology.” The working definition from Europol summarizes these assumptions below:

Seeing themselves in a supreme position, the particular group considers it is their natural right to rule over the rest of the population. Racist behaviour, authoritarianism, xenophobia and hostility to immigration are commonly found attitudes in right-wing extremists. Right-wing terrorism refers to the use of terrorist violence by right-wing groups (TE-SAT 2016).

By including this definition, I am able to justify my argument that the type of terrorism and violence these perpetrators carry out is based on their political ideology, which ties back to my earlier reasoning in previous sections that the target will be those opposing a threat towards those values and beliefs.

Separating right-wing terrorism from other forms of terrorism leads to the next imperative distinction: separating it from what we refer to as ‘hate crimes.’ It is argued that they should be understood as ‘close cousins’ (Garcia 2015) but I promote the idea that they differ in *two* distinct manners:

Firstly, emphasis should be put on that their motivation towards action is different: “perpetrators of hate crimes are not driven by a political affiliation while perpetrators of terrorism are” (Ibid). Hate crimes, are instead argued to be motivated by preconceptions and biases towards individuals and they “are rarely observed as having strong political affiliations and are not typically associated with organizations that espouse a particular ideology (Larys and Mares 2011).

Secondly, research shows a socio-economic distinction with lines well with what has been treated so far in this paper. This distinction entails that hate crimes are mostly carried out by “members of majority mainstream and high-status population, while acts of terrorism tend to be committed by groups of lower status” (Ibid).

To emphasis this division of acts further, we can therefore sub-class right-wing terror and violence as an “upward crime” seeking political change (Deloughery et al. 2012), and racially motivated hate crimes as a “downward offense” (Ibid.) –

which are usually instead “unplanned, spontaneous acts of aggression that are not intended to necessarily broadcast a political message” (Garcia 2015).

To summarize, conceptualizing right-wing terror and violence in the manner I have done above, which is: separating it from other forms of terrorism by linking to *ideological motivation* based on *nationalist sentiments*, and; making a distinction of it as an upward crime manifesting and broadcasting a political message.

Finally, an empirical understanding of whom they target is also important. Three large categories can be used. These are here defined as: *minority groups*, *political adversaries*, and *government* (Ravndal 2016). In a testosterone-fueled business like the extreme-right, everyone in opposition to the extreme-right ideology could be a victim of course, but turning to the data, “two groups stand out since these are by far most frequently targeted: immigrants– 249 deadly incidents, and leftists – 138 incidents” (Ibid.) This confirms the assumptions made in this thesis so far regarding our motive for right-wing terror and violence, which is argued to be the influx of immigrants into one’s host state (Garcia 2015). Ravndal also states that:

Jews seem to have been less frequently targeted (7 incidents), while Muslims appear to be increasingly targeted. This observation resonates well with a general ideological reorientation by many extreme-right groups, who no longer consider their main enemies to be Communists or Zionists, but rather Islam and Muslims (Ravndal 2016:8; Taylor 2013).

Having established that immigration is our motive – linking back to the discussion earlier with the findings that our perpetrators often come from less profitable socio-economic backgrounds also strengthens the reasoning for the plausible impact of the domestic economic opportunity structure.

Leaning on these previous analytical categorizations, as well as empirically derived typologies and legal definitions, this thesis uses the following definition of right-wing terror and violence: *A domestic form of terrorism and ‘upward-crimes’, usually carried out by members from a less favorable socio-economic background; inspired by an extreme right-wing agenda and motivated by exogenous factors such as immigration, a broader political signal to influence for policy change through either violent acts, or acts dangerous to human life and whose target selection – minority groups, political adversaries, or the government – is based on extreme-right values and beliefs.*

RIGHT-WING TERROR AND VIOLENCE			
Category	Manifestation	Perpetrators	Target Selection
Domestic terrorism <i>'Upward' crime</i>	Hostility to immigration through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acts dangerous to human life that violate national law • Acts of intimidation • Violence of terroristic quality • Assassination • Kidnapping • Mass destruction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Citizens of a lower socio-economic status • Networks • Smaller groups • Individuals 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minority Groups <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Immigrants ○ LGBT ○ Jews • Political Adversaries <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Left-wing ○ Pro-immigration activists • Government <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Politicians ○ Police

Table 3: Conceptualizing Right-Wing Terror and Violence

2.4 Argument and Causal Mechanism

I now turn to conclude the theoretical arguments and conceptualizations presented so far, and further present how they are developed for empirical applicability. I end this chapter with the hypothesis that will be tested deriving as a result from this.

This thesis embraces the idea for cause-and-effect to be linked as: When there is a high influx of immigration, and a declining economy, they function as a *motive*, and *opportunity*. They do so through a *causal-mechanism* of being linked by political actors through an accentuation of immigration as a *salient issue*. This is the over-all aching idea of the economic opportunity structure, and it is what has been brought forward in previous studies. For an illustration of this assumption – see the figure based on Garcia’s previous research below.




Figure 1: Causal-Mechanism, (Based on Garcia 2015: 41)

However, this logic was framed for a *quantitative* study – looking into no less than eighteen different cases, while mine will focus on two, chosen from the Nordic countries. I therefore choose to theoretically develop this causal-mechanism of “issue salience” into a further model for my study. I argue it should be understood with a dual function, which can work in two distinct ways.

I theorize and further argue that, *who* creates issue salience for immigration in times of economic trouble, matters – as well *how many* political actors that are involved in this process, also matters. I ground this assumption I make, stemming from indications received from several recent reports⁵ that were read for pre-understanding, regarding the differences of far-right political parties in the Nordic countries, and these reports implies assumptions in line with mine.

These reports have however, not looked further into if it matters specifically for right-wing terror and violence, which keeps my puzzle intact. I bring them to surface here only to help motivate the approach I wish to proceed for this thesis, and for transparency regarding my theoretical understanding. Thus, the logic I present next is not created in a vacuum, but the result from a cumulative ‘build-up’.

The argument for causality I add is the following two-folded model: If a majority of established political parties, *accentuate* immigration as a *non-salient* issue – and a *minority* of parties accentuate immigration as a salient issue, we find our selves in what I decide to call: *A ‘David versus Goliath’-scenario*.

This translates to that the extreme-right would find it necessary, if not imperative, to ‘act on the behalf’ of the weaker part, since they are carrying their voice- and tare trying to take ‘protective measures’ for the *threat to their ideology*. Adding to this, if the weaker political actor also is an anti-establishment party or a far-right party with an enhanced support, it should speed up the process and work as an escalating factor, raising frustration in general, and the incentives for right-wing terror and violence in particular (For how this is assumed to work, see: Figure 2, and Figure 3 below).

⁵ For example of such reports pointing to how different political actors frame the immigration issue in Scandinavian parliaments, see: [”The political influence of anti-immigration parties in Europe”](#) published by Swedish Migration Studies Delegation, *Delmi* (Dahlström and Thyrberg 2017:1); or [“Migration, political parties and the media in the Nordic countries”](#) (Hellström and Lodenius 2016:6), also published by *Delmi*.




Figure 2: Causal-Mechanism Working as Raising Incentives for RTV

On the contrary, I assume the *same* process also works in *reverse*: For this, I argue that if a majority of established political parties, are accentuating *immigration as a salient issue* over time, and a minority of parties are *accentuating it as non-salient* – we should be able to expect *less* right-wing terror and violence. The logic for the reversed argument I base on my theory that when the extreme-right witness that ‘protective measures’ are being taken by the political elite, the threat for *significant group loss* as well as the *threat towards their ideology*, is perceived as ‘being taken care of’. I do not argue that it pacifies the whole lot of this vast group of actors, but it should according to this, lower the incentives for violent attacks.




Figure 3: Causal-mechanism working as lowering the incentives for RTV

Deriving from these arguments leads me to the hypothesis I wish to test in this study: *Right-wing terror and violence, should be higher in Nordic countries where high immigration influx, in the context of a declining economy, reaches issue salience by promotion of a weak political actor – and lower in countries when the same process is enhanced by plenty or strong political actors.*

Finally, it should be emphasized and clearly understood, that this theory I argue as valuable for testing and explanation, is not interpreted here as the only game in town to why we see variations of extreme-right violence in between the Nordic countries. The assumption is that the impact it might have, and can produce with this particular outcome – is seen as one of *several aspects* painting a larger portrait. A first step is to try the strength of this theoretical framework through comparison, and test the hypothesis I have presented above.

3 METHODS AND DATA

3.1 Structured, Focused Comparison

For testing my hypothesis, I choose to apply the methodological framework of a structured, focused comparison, as crafted out by George and Bennett (2005: 67-73). The logic and method can be claimed to be simple and straightforward, therefore, it is an approach with benefits I find valuable for this thesis purpose and goal (Ibid: 67) My analysis will be *structured* in the sense that I ask the same specific- and independently constructed research questions for the variables in both my cases. This is done to both guide and standardize the data collection, which enables a *systematic comparison* as well as gathering possible empirical evidence (Ibid). By thus saying that it will be *focused*, the analysis only treat those certain specific aspects within- and between the cases that is theoretically relevant (Ibid). Furthermore, the comparison within-cases and between cases, needs to be strict in a manner, which means that it is applied *equally* in the units of analysis. This is to ensure orderly accumulation so that the individual cases I strategically select could be joined by additional cases in the future (Ibid). The main advantages are hereby summarized as three-fold: Collection of data will be comparable; which translates to that the analysis allows a comparative interpretation, and the possibility to accumulate empirical proof.

The disadvantages and critic for the method relates to its advantages. One argument is that it is extremely difficult to find two cases that are similar in every aspect except for one (Ibid: 152). To overcome this I conduct a strategic case selection – ‘Most Similar Systems Design’, based on the logic of Mill’s *method of difference* (Newton and Van Deth 2010: 407).

3.2 Case Selection

Choosing the case of Denmark to compare with Sweden is not the result of a capricious decision. Firstly, there are four main principles to guide a case selection (Teorell and Svensson 2013: 222). To choose either an *extreme* case, cases that *varies*, cases that can help us *generalize*, or cases to *complete* quantitative research findings (Ibid). I have already picked an ‘extreme case’ by choosing Sweden. The second case for selection to complete with Sweden is based on principle number two, which is explaining variation in a dependent

variable. In addition, one could argue that it connects partly to principle three as well, since the theoretical framework that has been conceptualized previously has only been tried to explain right-wing terror and violence through a quantitative approach (Garcia 2015). However, it is the variation that is of key interest here, based on the argument that the cases under scrutiny share many similar characteristics except for one.

Choosing Denmark to be paired with Sweden is the result of the following process: There were originally 17 cases in RTV-Dataset from C-REX I presented in my empirical review of existing incident-data – including Sweden – which showed European countries' different scores of right-wing terror and violence.

Two of these countries did not contain any data at all, *Luxembourg* and *Iceland* were guilty of this, most likely since there is a lack of reports to code events from, or simply because the phenomenon is non-existing in these small Western European nations.

This left 14 potential partners for a structured, focused comparison. I chose to look at the group of Nordic countries in line with the methodological doctrine that is the Most Similar Systems Design and Mill's method of difference. Accordingly with the requirements of 'similarities in all other aspects but one' I use *proximity* as my argument for this. By that I mean that these countries are well known to be close *historically, geographically, politically, financially* and not least, *culturally*. The extensive variation of right-wing terror and violence between them is argued to be of high interest to highlight further.

There are two distinct categories within the RTV-dataset I used. Severe RTV-incidents and deadly RTV-incidents (attacks with a deadly outcome). The creator of the dataset, Jacob Ravndal, strongly advice students and researchers to use incidents with a deadly outcome for selecting cases for comparison. He motivates this by saying that "killing incidents represent the most definitive and reliable measure of RTV" (Ravndal 2016: 9). This advice was taken at face value, but also motivated by the distinction between hate-crimes and right-wing terror and violence that I accounted for when conceptualizing the latter in my theory section. Controlling the amount of these attacks for population gives the following result of remaining cases from the Nordic group (Sweden included to show the difference):

THE NORDIC COUNTRIES SCORE OF DEADLY RTV-INCIDENTS 1990-2015				
COUNTRY	Sweden	Denmark	Norway	Finland
Number of deadly RTV-incidents	17	1	3	0
Number when controlled for by population ⁶	0,17348937	0,0176	0,0577	0
Value when coded as a binary formula (High vs. low score of Deadly RTV-incidents)	High Score of deadly RTV-incidents	Low Score of deadly RTV-incidents	High Score of deadly RTV-incidents	Low Score of deadly RTV-incidents

Table 4: Score of Deadly RTV-Incidents 1990-2015, The Nordic Countries

Since *variation* in the dependent variable is of interest, Norway was ruled out as a potential case to compare.

In order to reach the first case-selection requirement, meaning that the comparative partner to line with the extreme-case of Sweden also needs to belong to the same population of cases (Collier and Mahoney 1996: 72), Finland is not a good option towards two arguments. First of all, they have no existence of deadly attacks between 1990 to 2015 at all, and very few events registered in total from the RTV-Dataset (8 in total, 7 by the same actor, Swedish affiliated grassroots movement the *Nordic Resistance Movement*). Finland also have a huge lack of what this thesis claims as the *motive* for extreme-violence, which is immigration. One striking example from the data is that Finland only registered 3 530 asylum seekers, compared to Sweden's 75 090 in 2014, leaving us with neither motive nor outcome to explore (OECD, 2016a). If Finland would to be chosen, the forthcoming comparison could have lead to what the literature on scientific methods calls a 'confirmation bias'— and such a biased selection of studying two extreme cases could also make me overestimate the potential 'power' of my explanatory variables that I so carefully conceptualized (Collier and Mahoney 1996: 57, 60, 70).

With Denmark remaining as a plausible option, I strategically, framed further selection criteria for testing; such as requirements and questions that had to be met and answered.

1. Economic conditions and unemployment

Firstly, since one of the variables in the economic opportunity structure for which I derive indicators for is *unemployment rate*, and a healthy or unhealthy *national economy*, it was important to check if there is somewhat similar access in Sweden and Denmark to welfare benefits for example. This procedure I followed from

⁶ Results from this calculation has been multiplied times 100 000, to decrease the number of decimals.

Garcia’s suggestion in which he critically discussed the same for his large-*n* study (2015). According to the Nordic Council’s statistical yearbook, “in *all Nordic countries* [emphasis added], social assistance is granted if all other options have been exhausted” (2014: 60). We therefore have low risk that there is an intervening variable (welfare benefits) affecting impact.

2. Immigration influx

Secondly, immigration is claimed as the *motive for action* toward extreme-right violence. Therefore, I decided there needs to be some dynamics regarding influx of immigrants, and a somewhat closeness between Sweden and Denmark within the chosen timeframe. Returning to the data, Denmark has within the time-range even a higher influx of immigrants than Sweden controlled for by population certain years, and much lower in others. This validates the country as good case for comparison since previous research emphasizes that immigration is important for explanation, but empirical data also confirms that it interplays with something further, which is what will be investigated.

3. Radical right parties

Finally, I looked at whether there is existence of far right parties within both cases and within the time frame. This was also done in order to limit confirmation bias, or ‘pointing to the obvious’, which is every study’s main obstacle for avoidance. I further motivate Sweden and Denmark below by claiming what was underlined previously for the Nordic group as a whole – that proximity is presence. The variation of right-wing terror and violence between Sweden and Denmark motivates for exploration.

MOST SIMILAR SYSTEMS DESIGN			
<i>Method of difference</i>			
Variables	Country	Sweden	Denmark
Similar welfare systems and access to welfare benefits?		✓	✓
Relative closeness of influx immigration at some points within chosen time frame?		✓	✓
Enhanced support for radical right parties within time frame?		✓	✓
Proximity: Geographically, financially, and culturally?		✓	✓
Deadly RTV-incidents between 1990-2015		<i>High score</i>	<i>Low score</i>

Table 5: Case-Selection, Method of difference, and ‘Most Similar Systems Design’ (Source: RTV-Dataset)

3.3 Operationalization and Analytical Questions

The structured focused, comparison, borrows from statistical approaches as well as survey-methods, the idea of *asking a set of theoretically derived research questions*, even in single case studies (George and Bennett 2005: 69). These analytical questions connected to the variables, needs comprehensive and careful operationalization in order to be measurable. This is an important step for a possible replicability of my study as I mentioned – so that my cases could be added with more cases for future and further comparisons (Ibid). It is also an important presentation for reliability and transparency, so that the coming arguments I put forward may be shared with others.

3.4.1 Operationalizing the Independent Variable

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE (Independent Variable)			
	<i>MOTIVE</i>	<i>OPPORTUNITY</i>	
	<i>A. Immigration</i>	<i>B. Declining Economy</i>	<i>C. Issue Salience</i>
<i>INDICATOR</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Influx of refugees and asylum seekers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Unemployment rates ▪ Economic evaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support for far right Parties ▪ Relevant parties' position

Table 6: Operationalizing Economic Opportunity Structure

A. Immigration

Indicator: *Refugee- and Asylum Seekers*

As already mentioned in the theoretical conceptualization of the *motive* for extreme-right violence, immigration is measured in a one-dimensional manner: the influx of immigrants into the host state. For this I decide to not look at net-migration⁷ as done in previous research (Garcia 2015). As a more potential indicator for a possible motive, I chose to look instead at the influx of refugees and asylum seekers. I argue that this is a better measurement for a possible

⁷ Net-Migration is defined as the gathered sum of immigrants minus emigrants within a specified time frame.

motive, since this is also the category used for coding victim-groups in the RTV-dataset (Codebook, RTV-Dataset 2016, variable: 12: 6). The statistics that will be presented for both cases treat individuals seeking refugee status and asylum *already being in the country*. For the time frame 1990-2014, I have extracted data from the OECD Migration Database (OECD 2016a). To compliment with the year 2015, I used data from the Swedish Migration Agency regarding both Sweden and Denmark. It should though be mentioned that these numbers for 2015 are still a bit unstable due to all time high influx that year, but I expect no dramatic future changes in value here according to their statements (Swedish Migration Agency 2016a)

B. Declining Economy

Indicator: *Unemployment Rates + Economic Evaluation*

Unemployment Rates

To investigate the *economic aspect*, I followed the conclusions and ideas from previous research I have accounted so far in this thesis (Garcia 2015; Falk et al. 2011), and included the indicator of *unemployment rates*. For unemployment rates a collection of sources had to be used – and it should be noted that the charts and data that I aggregated for this study uses for some years the respective *national* measurement of unemployment, and for other years the *standardized* international measurement such as the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and their database for short-term labor statistics (OECD 2016b).

As far as it was possible, I have tried to use the OECD-Statistics for both cases consistently, but for a 25 year long time-span, this was not always possible. I therefore had to scrutinize every annual economic report published by the OECD iLibrary. Some of these only contain visualized charts without exact decimals (Examples are the economic surveys from the 1990's), leaving it up to me to establish how values have changed over time. Which years this applies to and what source that has been used, is immediately presented underneath each cases' respective chart, and I emphasize that these are very small differences for seeing the larger twenty-five year long trend of an unemployment rate's fluctuations. The difference between *national measurements* of unemployment in contrast to the *standardized* ones are that the national measurements tend to be lower in numbers (OECD 2016b). Most likely since this is a very sensitive political issue for many countries. However, since the idea is to capture *a threat to group significant loss* by a possible competition of resources, I motivate that the data I gathered for both indicators are valid to do so.

Economic Evaluation

The indicator is amplified by also reviewing relevant annual financial-evaluation surveys for an overview of the economic health of each case and year's respective economic conditions. This in order to trace possible national recessions, or other

dramatic politico-economic events, which could indicate a *declining economy* where the unemployment rate does not. I used the OECD's Economic Surveys for both cases. These comprehensible- and extensive economic evaluations are published every second year with a few exceptions of less and more between 1990-2015.

C. Issue Salience

Indicator: *Support for Far Right parties + Parties' Positions*

Far Right Parties

To measure possible salience for the *immigration issue*, I looked first at the evolving support for national far right parties like done in quantitative and previous studies similar to mine (Garcia 2015). I have used my conceptualization from my theoretical framework as well as previous research to classify which party should belong to this category to avoid controversies. I have used national election authorities as well as the European Election and Referendum Database (2016a) for numbers and descriptive content, as well as relevant case studies to aid the analysis.

Relevant Parties' Positions

To compliment and go deeper into the possible causal-mechanism of issue salience; I further decided to operationalize it to how much *accentuation* a political party decides to put on the present influx of immigration in their political manifestos. Investigating parties' positions, I argue it is a good way to capture the concept empirically, since manifestos promoted for electoral gain are powerful instruments aimed for the general public in order to gain threshold for parliamentary representation. If a political actor tries to link immigration to a declining economy, it should be visible here according to my reasoning. Trying to capture issue salience in this manner was done through independent interpretation of pre-coded manifestos from relevant political parties. 'Relevant' political parties, refers to political parties that have put a manifesto forward, and reached the percentage for threshold for parliamentary representation within the same election year (Manifesto Project: Codebook 2016b).

I have used the Manifesto Project's 2016 Dataset in order to search for these. The Manifesto Project measures policy preferences by classifying statements into categories and variables, they do so by asking the basic and central question: "What message is the party trying to convey to the voters?" (Werner et al. 2015) Since I had limited time and resources I decided not to code the manifestos for both cases between 1990-2015 myself (44 entries were available for Sweden and 60 entries for Denmark), instead I had to choose from the Dataset's categorical-variables that could function as an indicator for 'issue salience'. There were several plausible options, but I decided the *_per608-variable* [Multiculturalism: Negative] was the most reliable indicator for issue salience that could link immigration to a declining economy. This variable measures negative statements

regarding immigrants already in the country, which fits with my measurement of immigration through registered refugee- and asylum applications.

The *_per608-variable* [Multiculturalism: Negative] is comprised of three sub-variables for measure:

_per608.1 General: The encouragement of cultural integration and appeals for cultural homogeneity in society

_per608.2 Immigrant Integration and Assimilation: Calls for immigrants that are in the country to adopt the manifesto

_per608.3 Indigenous rights: Negative; Rejection of special protection for indigenous people

All the *_per-variables* in the dataset are able to retain a percentage-based score, that according to the institute's codebook: "constitute the relative share of statements for each category in relation to all statements in the manifesto. A "0.35" means that 0.35 percent of the manifesto was devoted to that category. Since this is a relative share, the scale can run between zero (no statement at all) and 100 (the whole manifesto is about this category)" (Manifesto Project 2017a). Naturally, *we should not expect* any manifesto from relevant political parties in liberal democracies to receive a 100 % score in any issue area. It indicates *emphasis* rather than a *full focus* for a political party, since a manifesto's purpose is to cover a whole spectrum of policy-areas. After these manifestos were searched for and gathered, I then ranked these percentage-based scores according to the following categorical schedule:

1. (0 %) = **Indicates No accentuation** for immigration as a salient issue
2. (0.1-5%) = **Indicates Vague accentuation** for immigration as a salient issue
3. (2.1-5 %) = **Indicates Accentuation** for immigration as a salient issue
4. (5.1-8%) = **Indicates Strong Accentuation** for immigration as a salient issue
5. (8.1-17%) = **Indicates Very Strong Accentuation for** immigration as a salient issue

This was done in order to easier trace how much emphasis that had been put on the immigration issue in each manifesto, by interpreting accentuation for 'multiculturalism' generally as something *negative*,

It should be added here before presenting the data gathered – that it does not include manifestos or scores from the most recent elections in Sweden (2014) and Denmark (2015). This is a weakness for explaining variations in the dependent variable and I am aware of this. Further, Denmark has one more election within the timeframe that was available, which gives more manifestos to receive scores from than the case of Sweden. Of course even further methodological critic- and limitations exists for my choices of approaching the causal-mechanism this way, but there is also a prominent strength for it, since it avoids potential bias by me potentially creating reality when looking at the manifestos rather than interpreting it. With the operationalizing being presented – below are the analytical questions I asked the indicators and my data presented in this section:

3.4.2 Analytical Questions

1. Are there stable indications for **immigration** as a profound motive?
 - What is the overview for influx of refugees and asylum seekers?
 - Are there years that are strikingly different than others?
 - Which years have the highest versus lowest influx of refugees and asylum seekers?
2. Are there indications for a **declining economy** to which immigration can be linked?
 - Has unemployment fluctuated profoundly within the time range?
 - Which years have the highest versus lowest unemployment rates?
 - What is the overall economic evaluation throughout the years?
 - Have there been profound recessions, financial crises, or other dramatic financially-related events?
3. To what extent has **far right Parties** been represented in parliament between 1990-2015?
 - Is there more than one far right party who gained electoral success?
 - What are the trends for the enhanced support to these parties?
 - What is the political character and background of these parties?
4. Do relevant parties' manifestos give indications for possible **issue salience**?
 - Which parties score a high versus low rate of the _per608-variable?
 - Are the mainstream parties represented or only Far Right parties?

3.4.2 Operationalizing the Dependent Variable

To measure right-wing terror and violence, I have introduced the RTV-Dataset that will be used. The RTV-dataset uses the inclusion criteria of only including "incidents whose target selection – minority groups, political adversaries, or the government – is based on right-wing beliefs" (Ravndal 2016: 5). It also only includes incidents of either a "certain severity" or of "terroristic quality" (Ibid). The strengths can be summarized to be that it has been assembled through a multiple use of sources, and it contains contextual descriptions as well as organizational affiliation of the perpetrators. For case selection I used the amount of deadly incidents to calculate cross-national variations, however, for a cross-national comparison with few cases, I follow the advice of including all RTV-events for description. I discuss briefly the perpetrator types, organizational affiliation as well as target groups in the analysis.

3.4.3 Analytical Questions for the Dependent Variable

- What is the score of severe RTV-incidents between 1990-2015?
- What is the score of deadly RTV-incidents between 1990-2015?
- Does there seem to be an immediate incline or decline of RTV-incidents within certain time frames?
- Which years have the highest amount of right-wing terror and violence?

3.4 Demarcations

The structure of the analysis will be the following: I will begin with the case of Sweden, systematically scrutinized. The exact same choreographed procedure will then be done with the case of Denmark. The following chapter will focus strictly on a short comparative analysis, in which I discuss differences and similarities and then synthesize the possibilities for validating or questioning the hypothesis I presented in the previous chapter.

4 SWEDEN 1990-2015

4.1 Immigration




Chart 1: Inflow of Asylum Seekers in Sweden 1990-2005 (Source: OECD, 2016a; Swedish Migration Agency, 2016)

The indicator for a possible motive regarding the case of Sweden begins with some immediate and dramatic fluctuations according to the OECD data (2016a). In the beginning of our time frame, the influx of asylum seekers, were roughly around 30 000 cases per year in 1990 and 1991. This equals to about 353 refugees per 100 000 inhabitants controlled for by those years population (Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2013: 36). In 1992 however, the influx dramatically increased to 84 000 refugees seeking asylum which instead gives the estimated number of 988 refugees and asylum seekers per 100 000 inhabitants. This was mainly a result from the war on the Balkan Peninsula, but also a result from previous closed states, such as Hungary and former Czechoslovakia, opening up previously strictly closed borders.

In 1993, the number declined to 37 583 refugees which is roughly the half of the previous years influx, but still, a much higher influx than what had present

previously. Therefore, the first three years of the decade indicates a possible analysis for a reason towards intolerance to emerge. When a country is ‘choked’ with new and unexpected challenges, there should be some kind of perception for threat to an ideology, which un-favors this kind of humanitarian crises-assistance in one’s host state.

In 1995 however, the situation seems to be controlled for with numbers lowering to their lowest level throughout the whole time-range. This year, only 9 047 asylum applications are registered – followed by 5 753 in 1996, and a double increase again in 1997 with 9 662 asylum cases. 1996 marks the lowest influx of refugees and asylum seekers throughout the whole period, and indicates the year when a plausible reason for right-wing terror and violence, should be the least motivated.

Between 1998 and 2000, a fluctuation towards an increase begins. These three years had an intake of an average of 13 500 individuals, but that increases all the way to 2003 ending on the double value of 31 348 registered cases according to the OECD-data. The following years 2004 to 2009, the numbers move from 17 530, as the lowest in 2005, to 36 370 in 2007 – estimating an average influx of 25 000 refugees per year. The population in Sweden had also grown during these years, which gives us an estimation of about 277 refugees and asylum seekers per 100 000 inhabitants. These climbing numbers could have been perceived as provoking for extreme-right activists, in comparison with the somewhat stable and lower influx that had been maintained between 1995 and 2000.

Between 2010 and 2015 the numbers keep rising except for a very small decrease in 2011 (29 648 registered asylum applications). From 2012 to 2014, the influx of refugees rose from 43 876 – to 75 090 only to end on the to date, all time high influx of 162 877 refugees and asylum applications from individuals entering the country.

To summarize the time period: the most dramatic fluctuations, 1992 and the climb upwards until 2015 are what the media refers to as a ‘refugee-crisis’ (source). These two extreme-points, together with an in-between period of steadily increasing intake (except for a time-period of relaxation between 1995-2000) indicates that a *motive* for turning to violence, has most likely been perceived as a continuum by extreme-right actors. Three years of relative low intake, as that between 1995-1997, is a short period I argue, for aggressive dynamics to cool off.

The analysis I choose to conduct is that there are indications for a profound motive throughout most of the time period, except for a short period of relaxation, however, I also make the interpretation that turning down influx from previous very high rates, needs a longer time frame for trigger-dynamics to vanish, and therefore the motive most likely remained intact even during that period. Most likely the ‘threat’ of group significant loss and threat of ideology for an extreme-right group took place during the top scoring years in the 90’s – but the stable

increase after the short period of rest, should also have had some effect since levels were kept on a high number only to start a high ascend all the way up to 2015.

4.2 Economic Conditions and Unemployment Rate




Chart 2: Unemployment Rate Sweden 1990-2015 (Sources: OECD Economic Survey: Sweden, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998; SCB, 2005; OECD 2016b)

As the chart shows, 1990 marks Sweden’s lowest unemployment rate in this time frame, and the country has not been scored such a low value since. However, as the chart also clearly shows, there is a steep rise up to next record – which is the highest score visible score of 8,8 % of the total labor force unemployed that year. The numbers remained on a high level for a long period of time, until a somewhat more noticeable decrease in around 1996/1997. In 2001 the unemployment is kept on a low level in comparison to previous years, (around 5 %), but start ascending shortly after that. In 2005 the unemployment is once again high and culminates in 2010 with over 8 % unemployment rate with a slow decrease that follows until 2015. The OECD Economic Survey Reports for Sweden target the extreme rise of unemployment in the beginning of the 1990’s. In their first review of Sweden’s financial health scrutinizing the situation, they conclude that the country is going from a “boom to slowdown” in economic terms (OECD Economic Survey Sweden: 1990: 11). They project, very accurately “a cooling down of the economy” in the coming years, and report on growing inflation (Ibid).

This is very much what happened, and what the unemployment rate's steep rise is a result. The beginning of the post-cold war era can therefore be argued to be a rocky climb towards worse times. In their following review released in 1992, Sweden is in a *deep* and *profound* recession. The national financial crisis that hit Sweden is described in this report as “the longest and deepest in post-war history” (Ibid: 1992: 11). The following financial review, released in 1994, continues to report of an economy in *crisis* (OECD Economic Survey: Sweden 1994: 9). The stubborn recession is even argued to be as desperate as that of the 1930's. The survey also comment on the high unemployment rates: “Labor-market conditions have deteriorated dramatically over recent years: including participants in various labour-market schemes, total unemployment is now equivalent to the average of continental Europe” (Ibid). In Scandinavian historical measures, this is a severe evaluation of the situation. However, the economic conditions seems to have changed for the better when one look at the following OECD Economic Survey in 1996:

Economic developments since the last EDRC review have been relatively *favourable* [emphasis added] insofar as the recovery is progressing at a moderate pace, the unemployment rate has edged down and inflation is now below the average for OECD Europe (1996: 1).

Although the beginning of the second half of the 1990's seemed brighter in Sweden in terms of economic conditions, the economy was still very unstable according to the same source, the following year in 1997 it is claimed that unemployment is still too high (OECD Economic Survey: Sweden: 1997: 2). In 1998, eight years after the recession started to surface, the financial situation is far better than earlier years (OECD Economic Survey: Sweden: 1998: 1) – and as the chart presenting the unemployment rate shows; the levels are going down. In 1999, the economic conditions are finally considered to be the best in the decade, (OECD Economic Survey Sweden 1999: 9) making a possible opening for an *opportunity* low during this period. Furthermore, economic conditions are reported as strikingly good from 1999 continuing to 2001 (OECD Economic Survey Sweden: 2001). In 2002, there is however according to the OECD reviews a “sharp slowdown” (OECD Economic Survey Sweden: 2002) that is also visible with an increasing unemployment rate in chart above. The following two reports indicate neither any strong emphasis for a declining- nor booming economy (OECD Economic Survey: Sweden 2004; 2005) – other than economic recommendations that young people needs to enter the labour force earlier as well as a significant underrepresentation of immigrants being represented in the latter. The shrinking population is also seen as a problem for maintaining the welfare model. In 2007, Sweden receives an excellent annual review with high macro-economic performance, high rate of growth and low unemployment (OECD Economic Survey: Sweden 2007). The Survey from 2008 estimates Sweden's capability to counter the coming global financial crisis as good – and the follow up report in 2011 confirms this “Sweden has weathered the recent global financial and economic crisis well very much due, not least a ‘sound fiscal position’ the

global crisis showed that the ‘financial framework is sound’ (OECD Economic Survey: Sweden: 2008; 2011: 8). The capability to recover quickly is accentuated further in the subsequently coming report in 2012, and it concludes that the stable economic conditions might be a result of the ‘lessons learned’ from the profound national recession in the 1990’s (OECD Economic Survey Sweden 2012: 9). The review published in 2015 follows the trend of the previous ones – underlining the resilience of the economy but with a lack of policy support (OECD Economic Survey: Sweden: 2015). The overall evaluation is although very positive: “Sweden is among the few countries where output is now well above its level before the 2008 global financial and economic crisis” (Ibid: 10). However, the previous emphasized structural labor market problems with integrating youth and immigrants seems to be stubbornly stable, in particular individuals with low qualifications (Ibid).

The overall analysis I make from the employment rate, as well as the financial evaluations covered here, is that there are indications for a strong decline of the economy to which immigration could be linked. Particularly the first years of the 1990’s with a profound, and aggressive recession- which seems to have had a long-term effect in many years following. This could be interpreted as an opportunity for significance gain, and a trigger for extreme-right groups to mobilize within Sweden during this time frame. The continuous reporting, and accentuation for a socio-economic division in the labor market; such as uneducated youth being unable to obtain occupations – and immigrants segregated for the labor market – could further indicate a competition between the both for what is seen as scarce resources, and further create a perception for legitimacy towards ‘action’ for extreme-right actors.

4.3 Far Right Parties' Parliamentary Representation




Chart 3: Radical Right Parties Sweden 1990-2015, (Sources: European Election and Referendum Database, 2016a; Swedish Election Authority, 2016a)

In order to reach parliamentary representation in Sweden, the electoral threshold is put at four percent of the popular vote in elections. There are two organized political parties that can be classified as “far-right parties”, and that have gained electoral threshold for parliamentary representation in Sweden between 1990-2015. These are New Democracy (*Ny Demokrati*), and the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*). As the chart above illustrates – they were not represented in the Swedish parliament during the same time-period. The political character as well as their electoral supports varies greatly.

In 1991, the very recent-established party, New Democracy gained over six percent of the popular vote in the election, and therefore reached parliament. They were not originally an anti-immigrant party but rather a “tax-reduction” party (Demker 2012: 242) but they did have a profound critical view on the current immigration policy continuously on their agenda. They are included into the category of a far right party towards this, as well as their political characteristics of anti-Elite and anti-establishment, which is view I share with many (Demker 2012). The political character of the party was their strong belief and motivation of trying to run the country like a ‘business’ – using economic and financial arguments at all times (Ibid). One of these examples is the one from their manifesto the same year as when they reached parliamentary success, where they through a ‘cost-efficiency’ argument claim that more refugees can be helped in

their home countries through foreign aid – than opening Swedish borders as humanitarian assistance (New Democracy, manifesto: 1991). Some political scientists refer to this type of characteristic as that of New Democracy as “flash party organization” (Demker 2012: 242).

The Sweden Democrats who entered parliament in 2010, but had gained enhanced support already in the previous election instead did the picking up of the torch. This organized far-right political party, differs substantially from that of New Democracy. Unlike the previous actor who had more of a neo-liberal agenda – It is directly sprung out of right-wing extremism (Ibid). They were established in the late 1980’s by neo-Nazis and have ever since tried to wash of that label. For some this seems to have worked since they over *doubled* their electoral success in the 2014 election. The political agenda they promote can be said to be classic anti-immigration, anti-establishment and far right (Demker 2012: 243).

4.4 Parties' Positions: Elections 1990-2010




Chart 4: Parties' Positions Sweden, _per608-variable (Source: Manifesto Project Dataset, Version: MPDS2016b, 2016)

When turning to the possible issue salience scored from manifestos, little result other than the high value of the Sweden Democrat's manifesto of 2010 (7,353 %) was captured. What is surprising with the chart above – is that New Democracy was not caught in the search. Most likely since they did use a very specific and rhetoric language which I mentioned previously. Only two other manifestos from established mainstream parties were caught in the search, with both very low values for accentuating immigration as a salient issue according to my definition. The mainstream political party 'Moderate Coalition' who gained 0.233 percent, and the 'Social Democratic Labour Party' with 0.254 percent.

These values are so low that I dismiss them as potential indicators for a possible linkage between immigration and a declining economy to work as presented in the Theory Chapter. However, this does not entail that immigration cannot have reached issue salience. Like I mentioned regarding New Democracy’s rhetoric of framing political issues through a business-related perspective, it is possible that the causality of a weak party accentuating this, making a linkage between high influx of refugees and an economy in decline, did in fact happen.

Furthermore, the high score received by the Sweden Democrats in 2010 – and the *vague accentuation* from other established parties – indicates that there is a weaker party this year that is trying to emphasize immigration as a salient issue when others are not.

4.5 Dependent Variable: Right-Wing Terror and Violence




Chart 5: Right-Wing Terror and Violence in Sweden 1990-2015 (Source: RTV-Dataset⁸)

It is not the purpose to disentangle the specifics of the RTV-incidents *per se* in this section – or the conflict dynamics within them. What right-wing terror violence is regarded as was also conceptualized in the Theory Chapter. The

⁸ For Sweden, all cases available in the dataset were included (Variable 5: Country; 25 – Sweden). Click [here](#) for immediate access.

purpose is to briefly present the categories of target groups and some further features for gathering an understanding over the contextual field that is the right-wing terror and violence in Sweden. I argue this is necessary to understand the investigation being made in this paper.

In regards to the dependent variable, Sweden had some very active years between 1990-1992, only to follow with no recorded incidents in 1993. Focusing specifically on deadly RTV-incidents, the number was highest in 1995 – whilst the number with the outmost severe RTV-incidents is captured in 2010. The sixty-nine severe RTV incidents as well as the twenty deadly RTV-incidents are spread out, showing phases of activity, and some years of unexplainable pacification.

The right-wing terror and violence is also spread out over the whole country according to the cases from dataset – with some concentrations to larger cities such as Stockholm; Gothenburg and Malmö, but also smaller cities are represented. The phenomenon is therefore not seen as exclusive to any specific regions.


Turning to target groups, the category ‘Asylum seeker/refugee’ is by far the most represented with 43 RTV-attacks between 1990-2015. The second largest target-group are individuals categorized as ‘left-wing’ with 22 attacks, followed by the third most targeted individuals categorized as ‘LGBT’ (Lesbian, Gay, Bi-Sexual, Transgender) with 7 cases reported.

Furthermore but with lower representation, has three attacks been coded as directed towards ‘Government’ and five as ‘other’. Four incidents from the dataset are classified as ‘unknown’. Other categories that appear are two recorded as ‘Pro Immigration activists’ and one attack each in the category ‘Police’ and ‘Homeless’ categories. Furthermore, one incident is coded specifically as ‘Muslim’. In terms of perpetrators, there is a various representation of extreme-right groups and actors I have given example of earlier in this paper. There are both actors belonging to smaller networks, such as *Blood and Honour Scandinavia*, but also grassroots social movements such as the *Nordic Resistance Movement*, and members of organized political parties such as the *Sweden Democrats*. Actors engaging in right-wing extremism on several levels therefore represent the violent records for these statistics. What can be concluded from the data is that the numbers show no immediate trends by themselves. They fluctuate, and that the phenomenon has an on-going presence leading up to 2015. In order to see how it interplays with the indicators from the previously treated sections in this chapter, I summarize this in the next section.

4.6 Summary: Indicators

To see how the variables that have been presented in this chapter might correspond to each other, I listed the charts in the order they were presented in this chapter for visualization; this is followed by a brief discussion on possible correspondence to the RTV-incidents. The possible findings however, will be kept

for further critical and theoretical evaluation after the case of Denmark has been presented in order for them to be compared. Three frames are highlighted which are described on the following page.



1. Influx of Refugee and asylum seekers in Sweden 1990-2015

2. Unemployment Rate in Sweden 1990-2015

3a. Issue Salience as enhanced support to far right parties

3b. Issue Salience as scored from manifestos of relevant parties in Sweden 1990-2010

4. Right-Wing Terror and Violence in Sweden 1990-2015

Frame 1

Frame 2

Frame 3

Counting from the left on the previous page:

Frame 1.

The first frame represents what could be a potential a correspondence between both immigration influx, and an economy in decline. These two also seem to occur in line with the enhanced support for a radical right party– and a higher activity in regards right wing terror and violence.

Frame 2.

The second framing shows lower values in both immigration influx, and unemployment rate, than the first one. It does not present any indication for issue salience from any of the two measurements. It shows somewhat lower intensity in the years that contain right-wing terror and violence.

Frame 3.

The third framing, illustrates a potential correspondence between a declining economy, a stable influx of immigrants, as well as issue salience; both in terms of electoral support and manifesto score. It also shows that these years seem to be in line with a sudden escalation of RTV-incidents in, 2010.

Summary

One should be cautious to make conclusions of possible patterns at this stage, and I will critically return to these findings in the chapter for comparison – they should however not go uncommented: It does seem as the causal-mechanism, as it was framed in theory, corresponds to some degree with the empirical data, at least in regards to the left frame which had both a profound recession, a high influx of immigrants, and radical right party entering the political arena. I will contrast this summary after I have presented the same outlook for Denmark.

5 DENMARK 1990-2015

5.1 Immigration




Chart 6: Influx of Asylum Seekers in Denmark 1990-2015 (Source: OECD, 2016a; Swedish Migration Agency, 2016)

Denmark begins their time period with the highest influx of asylum seekers and refugees they have had so far in the post-cold war era. Between 1990 and 1993, Denmark too was affected of the influence from the conflict-dynamics stemming from the sending countries on the Balkan Peninsula. In 1990, they registered 18 994 asylum applications from individuals already in the country. A short decrease took place the year after in 1991 with 12 912 applications, but then steadily rose to their top score in 1992 with 20 071 individuals seeking refugee. For Denmark, this top score equals an estimated number of about 389 refugees and asylum seekers per 100 000 inhabitants. This is a somewhat higher number than Sweden scored in 1990 and 1991, but far from what the latter scored during the same year. However, the time-period of 1990-1993 acts as the strongest indicator for a

possible motive that could facilitate a reason for right-wing terror and violence by the Danish extreme-right.

In 1994, they however decline to an influx of 7 992 of asylum seekers, which is close to their average number of 8 169 until the start of the millennium. The lowest influx they accept until 2000 is 5 569 refugees. The average number of 8 169 refugees during this period estimates a number of about 153 foreign-minority individuals per 100 000 inhabitants. Serving as an indicator for a possible motive, I do not interpret these numbers as a particular strong reason to turn to violence, but as long as there is an influx there is of course always a motive.

From 2001 and onwards, there is a further steady decline of influx. The numbers go down from 10 269 in that year to the lowest they have had in 2007, which is 1 852 registered asylum- and refugee-applications of individuals present in the country. This I argue, is close to a minimum, even counted for population and that the country in land-size is far smaller than its Scandinavian neighbors.

The numbers remain on a very low level (2 236 refugees seeking asylum in 2008, and 3 819 in 2009) until 2012. This is when they start climbing to levels similar to those in the last years of the 1990's. In 2013, Denmark received 6 186-registered asylum applications, roughly counted; this is a doubled number in 2014. In 2015 however, they registered over 18 000 applications which puts them close to their high values in the beginning of the 25 year long time frame. Therefore, 2012 and onwards, is a possible indications for an empowered motive in regards to activate right-wing terror and violence.

The analysis for a possible motive in Denmark is that it should have been empowered in the beginning of the 1990's – due to the fact that those numbers are the highest. However, the possible threat to an ideology should be decreased since although there are fluctuations, there is a general decrease of influx and the numbers, and in comparison to for example neighboring countries' per capita-influx the same years, such as Germany or Sweden, Denmark's influx of refugees are kept at a stable low level. However, I argue that it is still possible that the large fluctuations between certain years activates some kind of threat for group significant loss – and the influx does also start to increase in 2012, only to climb to the second highest score in 2015 – which indicates that a possible motive should not be out ruled here as completely pacified for extreme-right actors.

5.2 Economic Conditions and Unemployment Rate




Chart 7: Unemployment Rate Denmark 1990-2015 (Sources: OECD Economic Survey: Denmark, 1993, 1996; OECD 2016b)

Denmark begins the first five years of the time period with high unemployment rates, and they keep climbing in a sounding manner from 10 % unemployed of the total labor force in 1990 to top scores in 1993 (12 %) and in 1994 (11,8 %). The country does however seem to target this due to a steep decline in 1995, following with lower numbers all they until 2001 with a subsequently small fluctuation following. In 2007 it reaches below 4 % and in 2009 it is as low as 3,4 %. After that follows a rise towards higher values moving between 7,5 % in 2010 with a fall to 6,2 % in 2015.

The OECD-reviews for Denmark, explain their high unemployment rate when entering the 1990's as a result from a strong recession far back in 1986, to which the country had slowly started recovering from (OECD Economic Survey: Denmark: 1990: 9). Although the unemployment rate was very high the first years, the economic evaluation for national conditions is that the financial health of the country is turning out much better than expected (OECD Economic Survey: Denmark: 1991: 9). The government in this time-period had decided to refrain from taking any major demand-supporting measures regarding unemployment but focused solely on stabilizing the macro-economic policy through other mechanisms hoping employment would rise as a result (Ibid).

In the review published in 1993, the performance is seen as remarkable and the impact of good economic conditions their major trading partners are in recessions is seen as an impressive observation according to reports (OECD Economic Survey Denmark: 1993; 1994: 9). Unemployment is still considered to be an issue, but less focus is put on that since the factors to why is complex and not fully clear as to why (Ibid). The OECD Economic Survey for Denmark in 1996 claims the economic conditions to be healthy. Unemployment is finally beginning to fall and is now the main focal point for recommendations regarding possible measures.

The 1997-review emphasized a still increased improvement of economic conditions, and structural measures are taken for targeting the so profound and long-term unemployment rate that had plagued the country for some time (OECD Economic Survey: Denmark: 1997). The follow-up that was released in 1999 however reports on a challenge for maintaining the effects of these structural measures (OECD Economic Survey: Denmark 1999: 9) but that evaluation prove to be wrong. In 2000 the pace for financial growth and other economic evaluation factors have slowed down – but Denmark managed to achieve what the OECD Report refers to as a “soft landing” in terms of keeping the economy intact and targeting the unemployment rate (OECD Economic Survey: Denmark: 2000: 9). The OECD project with the past trends in mind, which is Denmark’s ability to use macro-enablers in a long term manner for economic improvement, is most likely to continue further due to the parallel process of also constraining welfare benefits in parallel to these policy implementations – so that decline in unemployment, is not relied on state-based grants instead for example (Ibid). But Denmark becomes somewhat disturbed by both external factors, such as the international downturn that follows although unemployment is interpreted at this time as manageable (OECD Economic Survey: Denmark: 2002). The country also had massive expensive earlier years due to a force major incident with a hurricane hitting the country – causing heavy and profound expenses for the state (Ibid) – but the overall economic evaluation of the beginning of the millennium is rated as neither seemingly improved, nor as a prognosis for further financial worries.

From 2003 to 2005, the financial reporting regarding the economic conditions mostly treat smaller problems that could affect the financial health of the country. Denmark receives an evaluation of an economy that is “sound” and policies remain robust (OECD Economic Survey: Denmark: 2003). The challenge they have is an ageing population, which is also favored through high welfare benefits to either retire early, or receive a financial bonus to retire late that is assumed as an exaggerated instrument that affects the economy in a negative manner according to the OECD (Ibid). A short paraphrase in the review mentions that immigrants should be integrated better into the labor force, but the main problem for Denmark is their late-bloomed students; many Danish citizens are still enrolled in education in their late 20’s according to the same report. They assume that the government’s package “more people in work” program will be effective if implemented.

2005 follows as financially boosting year, and Denmark has now topped the list for a long period of time comparing to other OECD members (OECD Economic Survey: Denmark: 2005). Again, the ageing population is the main problem and that Denmark sustains with welfare benefits that according to the OECD should be abolished. Some of these are for e.g. the one year “paid holiday” students receive, and incentives should be made where students receive more pay early and less pay later in order to improve unemployment rates. There is no mentioning of immigrants or uneducated youth struggling to enter the labor force. The 2006-review states that the Danish economy is, once again, “impressive” and that the flexible labour market that Denmark has seems to be working well – the revenue Denmark has managed to present as a result from oil, could have contributed to these strong empowered policy-effects (OECD Economic Survey: 2006). Ageing is seen as the main plausible threat that could turn things around. In 2008 the OECD reports on the record-low unemployment rate but Denmark is affected in rough manner by the following global financial crisis (OECD Economic Survey Denmark: 2009). It is not until 2012 that the economy seems to be enduring substantial regain but at this point the early retirement scheme has been abolished and seem to affect the unemployment rate (OECD Economic Survey: Denmark 2012). The reports for 2013 and 2014 shows that the country is still recovering from the global financial crisis but no extreme signs of a declining economy or a profound recession (OECD Economic Survey: Denmark 2014). The final report covering the time frame judges the economy as healthy, innovative although fragile for external structures. The overall judgment is however that Denmark is enjoying a very well-being in many politico-economic dimensions, and no internal major problems (OECD Economic Survey: 2016).

After this overview of the unemployment rate from 1990-2015, as well as Denmark’s financial health, there are some indecisive indications for a declining economy to which immigration could be linked. The unemployment rate was very high until 1995, which could possibly function as an opportunity. However, the economic reporting still marks the overall conditions as manageable, rather recovering from a crisis than being in one. Accentuation seems mostly be put on overwhelming welfare benefits for natives that could be cut to improve an already healthy financial situation, rather than segregation in the labor market such as socio-economic divisions of an uneducated youth struggling to find work, or an out-group of immigrants being outside society. I found no such voice in these overviews, which means that a trigger for violent groups seems to be kept at a very low. Of all the reports scrutinized, only one sentence in one report encourages further integration in the labor market. The rest mostly reports on impressive or successful policy that prove to have long term affect for the purpose they were implemented.

5.3 Far Right Parties' Parliamentary Representation




Chart 8: Radical Right Parties Denmark, 1990-2015, (Sources: European Election and Referendum Database, 2016a; Danmarks Statistik, 2016)

Like the case of Sweden, Denmark has had two far right parties represented in Parliament within the time frame, and the enhanced support for these type of parties has been stable and increasing. The first is the *Progress Party* (Fremskridtspartiet), and the second is *Danish People's Party* (Dansk Folkeparti). Unlike Sweden there has been representation from the far right in the Danish Parliament within every election from 1990 to 2015 without any breaks. The latter actor, the Danish People's party, was the second biggest party in the 2015 election. Again, like the case of Sweden, these actors have some different characteristics and background, but share more similarities than the previous two players presented for Sweden.

The Progress Party which gained enhanced support in 1990 and 1994 – was founded already in 1972 by *Mogens Glistrup* and was like New Democracy in Sweden, more of a neo-liberal and tax-critical political party (Demker 2012: 241). The party leader Mogens Glistrup was controversial in his statements. Among many policy-suggestions, the party for example suggested replacing the Danish military with an answering machine (Ibid). Immigration however eventually became more and more of a core issue with the main focus on rhetorically attacking the Danish Muslims (Ibid.) – which puts them in place here as a far right party, promoting an extreme-right ideology. The party maintained their enhanced support until their party leader Glistrup went to prison, and the organization was

instead handed over to *Pia Kjærsgaard* – who reformed the party into what today is the Danish People’s Party (ibid). The goal with the re-birth was to make the party more mainstream and respectable, but too keep immigration-issue on the agenda at all times (Ibid).

The continuous and enhanced support to far right parties in Denmark between 1990 and 2015, in contrast to Sweden is profound. It indicates an attempt for these actors to promote the immigration as a salient issue, even when immigration influx is not on high levels, and their ideology seems to have reached the general public in a consolidated manner when looking at the numbers presented here. However, it needs to be put in comparison to the other indicators for a valuable assessment, which will be done after reviewing parties’ positions and their respective manifesto scores.

5.4 Parties' Positions: Elections 1990-2011




Chart 9: Parties' Positions Denmark, _per608-variable (Source: Manifesto Project Dataset, Version: MPDS2016b, 2016)

As the chart above illustrates – the result of searching for manifestos, capturing *multiculturalism seen as something negative*, translated here to indicating immigration as a salient issue – was to say the least, plentiful. It was so particularly in contrast to the parties' position of Sweden presented previously, where only *one* party gathered a score that could be interpreted to be an attempt of accentuating the same.

For Denmark, the whole political spectrum is covered, with parties represented from both the left, to the far right on the political scale. There are some trends and values that should be presented; I present the scores for each election below. I

have categorized the scores as presented in the methods and data chapter, with each manifesto's level of accentuation for multiculturalism as something negative, translated to immigration as a salient issue, as one of out of four labels below:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| [1] <i>Vague accentuation</i> | [2] <i>Accentuation</i> |
| [3] <i>Strong accentuation</i> | [4] <i>Very strong accentuation</i> |

Election Year 1990

- 1) **Progress Party** *Vague Accentuation* (1.282 %)

Election Year 1994

- 1) **Conservative People's Party** *Vague accentuation* (0.885 %)
 2) **Progress Party** *Vague accentuation* (0.619 %)

Election Year 1998

- 1) **Danish People's Party** *Very strong accentuation* (15.278 %)
 2) **Liberals** *Very strong accentuation* (12.857 %)
 3) **Progress Party** *Very strong accentuation* (8 %)
 4) **Conservative People's Party** *Strong accentuation* (6.224 %)
 5) **Social Democratic Party** *Accentuation* (4.688 %)
 6) **Danish Social Liberal party** *Accentuation* (2.434 %)
 7) **Centre Democrats** *Accentuation* (1.869 %)
 8) **Red-Green Unity List** *Accentuation* (1.709 %)

Election Year 2001

- 1) **Danish People's Party** *Very strong accentuation* (15 %)
 2) **Conservative People's Party** *Very strong accentuation* (13.889 %)
 3) **Liberals** *Very strong accentuation* (10.145 %)
 4) **Christian People's Party** *Strong accentuation* (5.195 %)
 5) **Red-Green Unity List** *Accentuation* (3.145 %)
 6) **Social Democratic Party** *Accentuation* (3.022 %)

Election Year 2005

- 1) **Social Democratic Party** *Strong accentuation* (9.343 %)
 2) **Liberals** *Accentuation* (5.534 %)
 3) **Christian People's Party** *Accentuation* (4.369 %)
 4) **Danish People's Party** *Accentuation* (2 %)
 5) **Socialist People's Party** *Vague accentuation* (0.189 %)

Election year 2007

- 1) **Danish People's Party** *Very strong accentuation* (14.894 %)
 2) **Liberals** *Very strong accentuation* (10.853 %)
 3) **New Alliance** *Accentuation* (4.167 %)
 4) **Social Democratic Party** *Accentuation* (3.419 %)
 5) **Conservative People's Party** *Accentuation* (2.479 %)

Election year 2011

- | | | |
|----|--------------------------------|--|
| 1) | Danish People's Party | <i>Very strong accentuation</i> (16.138 %) |
| 2) | Liberals | <i>Very strong accentuation</i> (9.692) |
| 3) | Social Democratic Party | <i>Vague accentuation</i> (0.0595) |

Manifestos receiving score: 31

Number of elections covered: 7

Highest Score: 16.138 received by *Danish People's Party*, 2011

Source: (Manifesto Project Dataset, Version: MPDS2016b, 2016)

Summary indicator for Parties' Positions

With the data presented and classified above, it is noticeable that some statements (for e.g. Social Democratic Party in 2011) are beneath 1 % – which makes it questionable if the manifesto contains even what I decided to call a *vague accentuation*. For Sweden I dismissed two manifestos that were captured for trying to promote immigration as a salient issue – when they reached those low results, but the gathered picture for this indicator remains – and that is that not only far right party accentuate for salience of immigration as something negative – but also a majority from the mainstream spectrum.

Some years, as that of 2005, Danish People's Party scored an even *lower* value than for example the Social Democratic Party or the Liberals. Another finding is that the last election year covered (2011) only three parties scored a value. Those were the Danish People's Party; Liberals; and the Social Democratic Party. Furthermore, the overall analysis is that the manifesto scores could point towards an indication that right-wing terror and violence should be lower in Denmark due to the embracing of anti-immigration policies as an accepted mainstream approach – It could also possibly indicate that Danish People's Party have managed to do what they aimed for, which was to become not only 'tight' with the mainstream-group of parties, but to be included among them – however, this is not the spotlight here but it is a possible indication also for this I argue.

Under the next headline, I move on to review what the fluctuations are in the dependent variable for Denmark. I do so in the same systematic manner that was done previously for Sweden, before putting a summarized chart together of all indicators and variables for possible visible patterns that will be used for comparison.

5.5 Dependent Variable: Right-Wing Terror and Violence




Chart 10: Right-Wing Terror and Violence in Denmark 1990-2015 (Source: RTV-Dataset⁹)

There are a total of 19 RTV-incidents in dataset for Denmark, like the case with Sweden – the phenomenon is not particularly concentrated to a specific region but the few recorded events are represented all over the country. One year marks somewhat of a concentration, in 1993, when three severe incidents took place and one deadly. Only three target groups are represented in the statistics for Denmark. Asylum seeker/refugee is also here the most frequently targeted with 12 reported incidents. 5 attacks are reported as directed towards ‘government’ and 2 are unknown. In terms of perpetrators for these events, naturally the extreme-right scene is not as well represented, as that of Sweden, but there are still strong organizational sub-types present. The extreme-right group-network of *Blood and Honour Denmark* are responsible for one attack in 1994 together with some similar neo-Nazi networks. Otherwise, the organizational affiliation is unknown according to the coding. What is most strikingly with the dependent variables variation for Denmark is that there are no incidents from the year 2006 and onwards. This of course, does not immediately translate to that we should expect

⁹ For Denmark, all cases available in the dataset were included (Variable 5: Country; 12 – Denmark). Click [here](#) for immediate access.

it to have diminished completely, but it is a profound result without explanation on its own. I therefore turn to my summary of the indicators and variables presented in this chapter as was done previously for Sweden to see if any visible fluctuations seem to correspond with the chart above.

5.6 Summary: Indicators

The summary for Denmark is presented in the same manner as it was done for Sweden, with the indicators falling in the same order their data has been presented. For this visualization, I also identify three “frames” which could be possible indications for a correspondence

Counting from the left on the next page:

Frame 1.

The first frame represents what could be a potential a correspondence between a 1) relative high influx of immigrants 2) high unemployment rate and 3) an enhanced support to a far right party alone ushering issue salience for immigration issue, which could correlate with the framing of RTV-incidents within the same frame.

Frame 2.


The second framing shows fluctuations in regards to immigration but declining unemployment. It also includes the introduction of a high score of issue salience from manifestos but no immediate correspondence to a substantial lower rate of right wing terror and violence.

Frame 3.

The third framing, illustrates more substance for a potential correspondence of the independent variables possible impact on the phenomenon under scrutiny. With a high level of issue salience from the whole political spectrum that has been established through previous and present years as well as following years from economic improvement and low influx of immigrants, although that latter trend is pointing upwards.

Summary

The illustrations on the next page do indicate that issue salience has appeared strong, when right wing terror and violence has not. It has – in fact stopped within the time frame. I discuss this further in the next chapter following the presentation – which is the comparative analysis.



1. Influx of Refugee and asylum seekers in Denmark 1990-2015

2. Unemployment Rate in Denmark 1990-2015

3a. Issue Saliency as enhanced support to far right parties

3b. Issue Saliency as scored from manifestos of relevant parties in Denmark 1990-2011

4. Right-Wing Terror and Violence in Denmark 1990-2015

Frame 1

Frame 2

Frame 3

6 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In this part of the thesis I compare Sweden and Denmark through the previous summaries and findings from the presented data. I end this chapter with a discussion of the possible results from this study. The following chapter will critically tieback to theory as well as research design and elaborate on possible findings from this study. The aim below is to see whether the hypothesis that was shaped from the theory I developed can be given substance.

Comparing the motive

The indication for a possible threat to ideology, which is what the motive theoretically represents, has been higher in Sweden but seems to have been materialized to larger extent by Denmark in regards to the political establishment and their measures for 1) curbing immigration and 2) actively accentuating immigration as a salient issue over the whole political spectrum.

In the two cases it was measured in a one-dimensional manner however, but Denmark has still had an influx of immigration, and it has fluctuated and not been kept at a constant minimum. As mentioned in the chapter investigating this, if there is an influx there is always a motive for an extreme-right to act, this translates to that the motive alone cannot explain the variations of Sweden's higher rate of RTV-incidents between 1990-2015. I also interpret the empirical data that has been presented, as there are other more important variables that possibly in collaboration with immigration has empowered the violent branch of the extreme right in Sweden. It has most likely done so in a way that has not happened in Denmark, but it is not solely the influx of refugees and asylum seekers. By saying that, I still wish to emphasize that a large influx of immigration still matters to a large degree to why we see these cross-national variations, and it is in no way dismissed.

Comparing the opportunity

The opportunity, which is linking an economy in decline to the immigration issue, has been profoundly stronger in Sweden due to a segregated job-market with socio-economic divisions and economic imbalance. The country entered a deep and profound recession in the beginning of the time frame with an increasing unemployment rate. Denmark was instead recovering, gaining further excellent remarks in financial reviews more or less throughout the whole time-period – which mean that a perceived legitimacy for action in Denmark is indicated as low while in Sweden I found substance to a strong indication for what the extreme-right could have interpreted as a competition for scarce resources. This fact, together with the extreme influx of refugees and asylum seekers in 1992 could

possible have started an escalation effect for these years result of following high scores of RTV-incidents in Sweden. These years are also the ones when Denmark had some noticeable (small) phase of the same phenomenon, but as the data show, right wing terror and violence was not recorded after 2005.

Enhanced Support for Radical Right Parties

The ‘pop-up’ of the flash-party New Democracy, resembles in character the neo-liberal and anti-taxation Progress Party in Denmark, with the exception that the latter had been established in the political system before the time frame 1990-2015, whilst New Democracy was a complete new actor only to disappear for the next election. I argue that with what was mentioned under the previous two headlines: the very high influx in Sweden with immigrants from the Balkan Peninsula, in combination with the deep financial crisis – this party activated a process that could possibly explain Sweden’s high rates of right-wing terror and violence those years. It is possible that the party of New Democracy had no intention of such or that their ideology feels unfamiliar to that of an extreme right, but by framing everything through an economic lens using financial and business-terms at all times, as was exemplified in the analysis, could have closed the circle of linking immigration to a declining economy.


Issue salience by accentuating multiculturalism as something negative

The high result from the search regarding this in Denmark, in comparison to the very low of Sweden is somewhat surprising. As always in a cross-national comparison, one expect differences to emerge, but this I argue indicates a large difference of the two countries. A theory for this could be that the Sweden Democrats were the only one captured when searching for the case of Sweden. Famously sprung out of an extreme right movement, it is possible that mainstream parties actively make sure their language is substantially different – whilst in Denmark, the Danish People’s Party have a much cleaner background and therefore language resemblance between this party and other parties on the political spectrum might not be interpreted as dangerous to be in line with as that for Swedish mainstream parties.


6.1 Potential Results

For discussing further the two-folded causal-mechanism I discussed in the theory chapter and whether it could be applicable, I put the summarized charts of indicators of both cases on the next page for further comparison and discuss possible results. I also discuss the framings of possible correspondence that was raised under the headline for the summaries of the indicators in every case.

SWEDEN



DENMARK



Regarding the first time frame for Sweden, this is what I argue there is most substance to in terms of empirical proof, although it needs to be investigated further. The idea of the extreme point of immigration, the profound recession, the issue salience possibly created by a far right party could have worked to raise the incentives to turn to violence for extreme right groups during this time. I base this reasoning on that when there are no other political parties framing immigration as an issue, one party only receives the exclusive right to this issue, and that is New Democracy. This could possibly indicate strength to the causal mechanism

that I developed previously in this thesis, that if the *minority of political spectrum* is accentuating immigration as a salient issue when the influx of refugee and asylum seekers is high – and a majority of political parties are accentuating it as a non-salient issue – it should lead to an increase of right-wing terror and violence.

The second frame for Sweden where there is no enhanced support to a radical right party in the way that they gained Parliamentary representation, together with lower levels of conditions empowering motive and opportunity, could explain why the rates are lower these in-between years, but that too of course needs further research.

The third framing with an escalation of RTV-incidents that year, as well as blooming support for the Sweden Democrat's shows correspondence also with the employment rate, but there are no profound changes in the motive. The manifesto search showed though that there were no one else to bring the voice forward for frustration, which could possibly have activated the 'David versus Goliath'-scenario I mentioned in the Theory Chapter – when the extreme-right only sees a weak political part protecting their interests, they feel the need to act out frustration. This is also something that should be looked into further. The frames in the charts for Denmark however somewhat help to confirm this reasoning, with the first frame for Denmark to have the motive and opportunity somewhat indicated in the empirical data and enhanced support for a radical right party with no issue salience raised by any other actor, Denmark scores some RTV-incidents these years, in contrast to their coming pacified years in the last frame. Where issue salience is strong both by representation in Parliament but also substantially in the manifestos for Denmark.

Although Denmark has experienced an increasing influx the later years of the time-span, it is possible that the very strong accentuation for immigration as a salient issue by legitimate political actors in collaboration with a far right party, could help to keep violent extreme-right activists from turning to violence pacified since their the agenda is represented.

The next chapter evaluates the possible strength of the hypothesis I derived from theory for this study, and continues to critically discuss what can be said from comparing these two cases as it has been done here before ending with some concluding remarks,

7 THEORETICAL TIEBACK AND CRITICAL DISCUSSION

This paper has some limitations that need to be treated in order to shed light on the possible findings it actually has produced. I begin with re-visiting my hypothesis, which was:

- *Right-wing terror and violence, should be higher in Nordic countries where high immigration influx, in the context of a declining economy, reaches issue salience by promotion of a weak political actor – and lower in countries when the same process is enhanced by plenty or strong political actors.*

I wish to argue, that the data that has been thoroughly reviewed for both cases, as well as careful consideration for variable selection, and the reasoning in the previous chapters, brings at least some substance to the hypothesis accuracy. But it is not enough to fully confirm it. That was although never the main goal when it was derived from the theory that was also developed from previous research. It was to test the hypothesis and the possible strength of the theoretical framework through a systematic data collection and investigation through the methodological framework of a structured, focused comparison.

Now when we see that *issue salience*, as it was accentuated by political parties in Denmark for e.g., seem to appear in times when right-wing terror and violence does not, further studies could go deeper to investigate this.

Some further critic for the research design should be discussed. One weakness of this study for claiming value to the potential results is that I have not looked into how the far right parties in Sweden and Denmark are treated in the national media. Previous research and reports claim that there is a difference here and how these actors are framed towards the general public could have an effect on my causal mechanism of issue salience. It could instead be complemented in a future study when comparing solely the process of framing the immigration issue in a deeper and more focused framework targeting specifically my emphasized time-periods for when I observed correspondence between my indicators and the dependent variable within my cases.

Another potential pit-fall for the research design I chose and the material used is the accuracy of the data I gathered. I have not coded neither the RTV-incidents nor have I coded the manifestos. I took these assumptions for indicators at face

value, and that could be prone to subjectivity in the way that I choose the variable to measure whether immigration was accentuated as a salient issue or not. I tried to counter this by being as transparent as possible in the methods and data chapter in order for others to be able to compliment- or conduct a similar study to mine. The ability to generalize from the study done here is of course also constrained heavily due to the low number of cases and the level of analysis.

7.1 Concluding Remarks

Finally, a short discussion on the purpose and research questions, which were framed for this thesis. The purpose was to explore and make a small contribution to a research *lacuna* that might deepen in times of more striking security threats. I have tried to do so here by the usage of new empirical data as well as the usage of a theory that allows important aspects to play their part. Furthermore I have tried to capture the essence in differences of two otherwise similar political systems but who are not experiencing the same amount of right wing terror and violence. I did so by carefully investigating the motive and opportunity between 1990 and 2015 in Sweden and Denmark, disentangling the contextual conditions that might interplay as well as testing the strength of my theoretical framework.

The departure was that *who* and *how many* that choose to accentuate immigration as a salient issue – and what their support might be – could play a role. This thesis concludes that the economic opportunity structure in Sweden is different than that of Denmark within the time for analysis, and varies in several important aspects. It does find potential substance for this idea – however, to claim that it is responsible for explanation in regards to that Sweden's amount of right-wing terror and violence is profoundly higher than its neighbors – needs further support. This could serve as a focal point for future research.

8 REFERENCES

- Askanius, Tina and Mylonas, Yiannis, 2015. "Extreme-right Responses to the European Economic Crisis in Denmark and Sweden: The Discursive Construction of Scapegoats and Lodestars" *The Discursive Construction of Scapegoats and Lodestars*, *Javnost - The Public*, 22:1, 55-72, DOI: 10.1080/13183222.2015.1017249.
- Betz, Hans-Georg and S. Immerfall, eds. 1998. *The New Politics of the Right: Neo-Populist Parties and Movements in Established Democracies*. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.
- Blake Evan Garcia, 2015. "International Migration and Extreme-Right Terrorism" (Doctoral Dissertation, Texas A&M University, 2015); URL: <http://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/handle/1969.1/155240> (Accessed 2017-05-15).
- C-REX 2017, 06/09/2016, "RTV Dataset and Right-Wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe" [Digital Source] URL; <http://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/news/2016/rtv-dataset.html> (Accessed 2017-05-19).
- CNN, 2017. "Norway Terror Attacks Fast Facts", CNN Library – 04/03/2017. [WWW Document] URL: <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/26/world/europe/norway-terror-attacks/> (Accessed 2017-05-14).
- Codebook for The Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence (RTV) dataset, 1990–2015. [WWW Document] *C-REX – Center for Research on Extremism, University of Oslo*. URL: <http://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/rtv-dataset/rtv-dataset-first-version/rtv-codebook-v1.pdf> (Accessed: 2017-02-15).
- Collier, David, and James Mahoney. 1996. "Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research." *World Politics* 49 (1): 56–91.
- Counter Extremism Project, 2017. "Greece: Extremism & Counter-Extremism", *Report* [WWW Document] URL: https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country_pdf/GR-04212016.pdf (Accessed: 2017-05-15).
- Danmarks Statistik 2016. "FOLKETINGSVALG TORSDAG 18 JUNI. 2005". [Digital Source] URL: <http://www.dst.dk/valg/Valg1487635/valgopg/valgopgHL.htm> (Accessed: 2017-05-13)
- Deloughery, Kathleen, Ryan D. King and Victor Asal. 2012. "Close Cousins or Distant Relatives? The Relationship Between Terrorism and Hate Crime." *Crime & Delinquency* 58(5):663–688.
- Demker, Marie, 2012. "Scandinavian right-wing parties: diversity more than convergence?" Chapter in: *Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe – From local to transnational*, pages: 239-254 (ed.) Mammone, Andrea, Godin, Emmanuel and Jenkins, Brian. Routledge: London.
- Drake, C. J. M. 1998. "The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 10(2):53–85.

- Eatwell, Roger, 2006. "Community Cohesion and Cumulative Extremism in Contemporary Britain" *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 77, No. 2, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-923X.2006.00763.x.
- Engene, Jan Oskar. 2011. "The Extreme Right in Western European Terrorism." Paper presented at the Conference on the Extreme Right in Norway, Aarhus University.
- European Election and Referendum Database¹⁰, 2016a. Norsk Senter For Forskningsdata, NSD: [Digital Source], URL: <http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?mode=documentation&submode=default&top=yes> (Accessed: 2017-05-13).
- Europol.europa.eu 2016. Europol. "European Union Terrorism and Situation Trend Report (TE-SAT)" 2016 [WWW Document] URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/europol_tesat_2016.pdf (Accessed 2017-05-14).
- Falk, Armin, Kuhn, Andreas & Zweimüller, Josef, 2011. "Unemployment and Right-wing Extremist Crime*", *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 113(2), 260–285, 2011 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01648.x, available at: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01648.x/pdf> (Accessed 2017-05-15).
- Falk, Armin, Kuhn, Andreas and Zweimüller Josef, 2011. "Unemployment and Right-Wing Extremist Crime", *Scand. J. of Economics* 113(2), 260–285, 2011 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01648.x
- George, Alexander L & Bennet, Andrew, 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 331 p.
- Goodwin, Matthew and Jocelyn Evans. 2012. "From Voting to Violence: Far Right Ex- tremism in Britain." Hope not Hate Report.
- Goodwin, Matthew. 2012a. *The New Radical Right: Violent and Non-Violent Movements in Europe*. Technical report Institute for Strategic Dialogue.
- Goodwin, Matthew. 2012b. United Kingdom. In *Preventing and Countering Far-Right Ex- tremism: European Cooperation*, ed. Vidhya Ramalingam Sabastien Feve, Alex Glen- nie. Swedish Ministry of Justice and Institute for Strategic Dialogue Country Reports.
- Hainsworth, Paul, ed. 1992. *The Extreme Right in Post-War Europe and the USA*. London: Pinter.
- Hainsworth, Paul, ed. 2000. *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream*. London: Pinter.
- Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1986. "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti- Nuclear Movements in Four Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 16:57– 85.
- Koehler, Daniel. "Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe Current Developments and Issues for the Future", *European Security in the 21st Century*, PRISM Vol 6, no 2., Center for Complex Operations, U.S

¹⁰ The following statement needs to be emphasized according to NSD when referring to their data: "(Some of the data applied in the analysis in this publication are based on material from the 'European Election Database'. The data are collected from original sources, prepared and made available by the NSD - Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). NSD are not responsible for the analyses/interpretation of the data presented here" (NSD 2016, http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/about/about_data.html).

- Department of Defense. [WWW Document] URL: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_6-2/Koehler.pdf?ver=2016-07-05-104619-213 (Accessed 2017-05-14).
- Koopmans, Ruud, 1996. "Explaining the Rise of Racist and Extreme Right Violence in Western Europe: Grievances or Opportunities?", *European Journal of Political Research* 30, no. 2 (1996): 185–216.
- Lazaridis, Gabriella and Skleparis, Dimitris, 2016. "Securitization of migration and the far right: the case of Greek security professionals" *International Migration Office*, Vol. 54 (2) 2016 . doi: 10.1111/imig.12219
- Manifesto Project Dataset 2016, Codebook, Volkens, Andrea / Lehmann, Pola / Matthieß, Theres / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven / Werner, Annika (2016): The Manifesto Project Dataset - Codebook. Manifesto Project (MRG / CMP / MARPOR). Version 2016b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).
- Manifesto Project Dataset version MPDS2016b, 2016. Volkens, Andrea / Lehmann, Pola / Matthieß, Theres / Merz, Nicolas / Regel, Sven (2016): The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2016b. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), [Digital Source: https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/ (Accessed 2017-05-16).
- Martin Laryš and Miroslav Mareš, Right-Wing Extremist Violence in the Russian Federation," *Europe-Asia Studies* 63, no. 1 (2011): 129–54; Johannes Due Enstad, "Glory to Breivik!": e Russian Far Right and the 2011 Norway Attacks," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, advance online publication, 19 March 2015; URL: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2015.1008629>.
- McAdam, Doug, Tarrow, Sidney, and Tilly, Charles, 2007. "Comparative Perspectives on Contentious Politics", chapter for revised edition of Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman (eds.), *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure: Advancing Theory in Comparative Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Meyer, S., David, 2004. "Protest and Political Opportunities", *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 30: 125-145.
- Mudde, Cas. 2007. *Populist Radical Right Parties*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- New Democracy, manifesto:1991. "Ny Demorkati: Partiprogram", 1991. Svensk Nationell Datatjänst [WWW Document] URL: <https://snd.gu.se/sv/vivill/party/nyd/manifesto/1991> (Accessed: 2017-05-19)
- Newton, Kenneth and W. Van Deth, Jan, 2010. *Foundations of Comparative Politics*. 2nd Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- OECD (1990), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 1990*, OECD Publishing, Paris.DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-1990-en
- OECD (1990), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 1990*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-1990-en
- OECD (1991), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 1991*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-1991-en

OECD (1992), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 1992*, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-1992-en

OECD (1993), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 1993*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-1993-en

OECD (1994), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 1994*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-1994-en

OECD (1994), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 1994*, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-1994-en

OECD (1995), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 1995*, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-1995-en

OECD (1996), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 1996*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-1996-en

OECD (1996), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 1997*, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-1997-en

OECD (1997), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 1997*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-1997-en

OECD (1998), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 1998*, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-1998-en

OECD (1999), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 1999*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-1999-en

OECD (1999), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 1999*, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-1999-en

OECD (2000), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 2000*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-2000-en

OECD (2001), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2001*, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-2001-en

OECD (2002), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 2002*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-2002-en

OECD (2002), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2002*, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-2002-en

OECD (2003), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 2003*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-2003-en

OECD (2004), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2004*, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-2004-en

OECD (2005), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 2005*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-2005-en

OECD (2005), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2005*, OECD Publishing, Paris.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-2005-en

OECD (2006), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 2006*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-2006-en

- OECD (2007), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2007*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-2007-en
- OECD (2008), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 2008*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-2008-en
- OECD (2008), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2008*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-2008-en
- OECD (2009), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 2009*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-2009-en
- OECD (2012), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 2012*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-2012-en
- OECD (2012), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2012*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-2012-en
- OECD (2014), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 2013*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-2013-en
- OECD (2015), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2015*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-2015-en
- OECD (2015), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2015*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-2015-en
- OECD (2016), *OECD Economic Surveys: Denmark 2016*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-dnk-2016-en
- OECD (2017), *OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden 2017*, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org.ludwig.lub.lu.se/10.1787/eco_surveys-swe-2017-en
- OECD, 2016a. Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development Statistics [Digital Source]. *International Migration Database*. Data extracted on 10 May 2017 21:09 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat, URL: <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG>
- OECD, 2016b. Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development Statistics [Digital Source]. *Short-Term Labour Market Statistics*. Data extracted on 10 May 2017 21:09 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat, URL: <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=STLABOUR#>
- Pettigrew, Thomas F. 1998. "Reactions Toward the New Minorities of Western Europe." *American Review of Sociology* 24:77–103.
- Quilian, Lincoln, 1995. "Prejudice as a Response to Percieved Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Aug., 1995), pp. 586-611.
- Ravndal, Aasland, Jacob, 2016. "Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing the RTV Dataset", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol. 10, issue 3, p. 1-14, ISSN 2334-3745.
- RTV-Dataset, First version June 2016. Created by Ravndal, Assland, Jacob, 2016. C-REX – Center for Research on Extremism. Faculty of Social Science, University of Oslo. Accesible at: <http://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/rtv-dataset/rtv-dataset-first-version/rtv-dataset-v2.xlsx>
- SCB, 2005. Statistiska Centralbyrån: Avdelningen för arbetsmarknads- och utbildningstatistik. [WWW Document], "Sysselsättning och arbetslöshet 1976-2004". URL:

- http://www.scb.se/Statistik/AM/AM0401/Sysselsattning_och_arbetsloshet_1975-2004.pdf (Accessed: 2017-05-13).
- Schmid, Alex, P., and Bowie, G., Neil, 2011. "Databases on Terrorism," in Alex P. Schmid (Ed.) *e Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 294–340.
- Spaaij, Ramon. 2010. "The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 33:854–870.
- Steenkamp, Christina (2009): *Violence and Post-War Reconstruction: Managing Insecurity in the Aftermath of Peace Accords*, London: Tauris.
- Sveriges Radio, 2015, Carlqvist, Bosse. "Sverige har flest högerextrema mordhändelser", *Sveriges Radio* 03/11/2015. [WWW Document] <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=6293581> (Accessed 2017-05-14)
- SVT 2014. Josefsson and Rensfeldt, 22/04/2014, "Kärntorpsnazister knyts till våld och mord", Sveriges Television. [WWW Document] URL: <https://www.svt.se/nyheter/granskning/ug/karntorpsnazister> (Accessed 2017-05-14).
- Swedish Election Authority, 2016a. [WWW Document], URL: <http://www.val.se/val/val2014/slutresultat/R/rike/index.html> (Accessed: 2017-05-13).
- Swedish Migration Agency, 2016. "Nästan 163 000 människor sökte asyl i Sverige 2015" [WWW Document] <https://www.migrationsverket.se/Om-Migrationsverket/Nyhetsarkiv/Nyhetsarkiv-2016/2016-01-01-Nastan-163-000-manniskor-sokte-asyl-i-Sverige-2015.html> (Accessed: 2017-05-10).
- Tarrow, Sidney G. 2011. *Power in Movement*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, Max Donald Holbrook, and P. M. Currie, *Extreme Right-Wing Political Violence and Terrorism* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).
- TE-SAT 2016, Europol: "European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report" DOI: 10.2813/525171
- Teorell, Jan och Svensson, Torsten, 2007. *Att fråga och att svara*. Uppl. 1:3, Malmö: Liber AB.
- The New York Times, 2013, Erlanger, Steven. "Muslim Woman Suffers Miscarriage After Attack in France", 18/06/2013. NY Times, [WWW Document] URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/world/europe/muslim-woman-suffers-miscarriage-after-attack-in-france.html> (Accessed 2017-05-14).
- Tilly, Charles and Sidney, Tarrow, 2007. *Contentious Politics*. Boulder, Colo: Paradigm, cop. 2007
- UiO: C-REX 2016. "RTV Dataset on Right-wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe" News and Events: Center for Research on Extremism, Faculty of Social Sciences, [WWW Document] URL: <http://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/news/2016/rtv-dataset.html> (Accessed 2017-05-14).
- Werner, Annika, Onawa Lacewell and Andrea Volkens, 2015. Manifesto Coding Instructions: 5th fully revised version, [WWW Document] URL: https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/download/papers/handbook_2014_version_5.pdf (accessed 2017-05-19).
- Wilkinson, Paul, 1995. "Violence and terror and the extreme right" re-published in 2007; *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 7, Issue: 4.

World Bank Data, 2016. Country Profile [Digital Source] URL:
<http://data.worldbank.org/country> (Accessed 2017-05-14).

APPENDIX A

RTV-INCIDENTS WITH DEADLY OUTCOME 1990-2015 <i>CONTROLLED FOR BY POPULATION</i> (Sources: World Bank Data 2016: RTV-Dataset, C-REX 2016)			
Country	Number of deadly RTV-events between 1990-2015:	Scored value when controlled for population (per 100 000):	High/low score – deadly RTV-events when controlled for population:
Sweden	17	0,17348937	Highest score
Germany	82	0,0859812	High score
Ireland	3	0,06464538	High score
Norway	3	0,0577376	High score
United Kingdom	31	0,0475911	High score
Spain	22	0,04739513	High score
Greece	6	0,03695583	High score
Portugal	3	0,02898929	Low score
Belgium	3	0,02658226	Low score
Denmark	1	0,0176	Low score
Switzerland	1	0,01206713	Low score
France	9	0,01197454	Low score
Netherlands	3	0,0118088	Low score
Austria	1	0,01161293	Low score
Italy	5	0,0082234	Low score
Finland	0	0	Lowest score
Iceland	n/a	n/a	n/a
Luxemburg	n/a	n/a	n/a
Grand total:	N=190	Casualties:	(303)