



LUNDS
UNIVERSITET

The Supply and Demand of Peace

- A critical perspective of the neoliberal hegemony and its expression in the peace building of Iraq

Anton Juggas Öberg

The purpose of this essay was to examine the structural composition of the global hegemony, and how it was expressed in peace building in Iraq. In order to examine this, the neoliberal hegemony was outlined with the help of Robert Cox's notions of structures and other critical scholars' notions of neoliberalism. The neoliberal hegemony was expressed in Iraq through an extensive marketization forcing the sovereign state of Iraq into an internationalized free-market state with limited possibilities to create a welfare-system of strong labour movements. Focus on free-markets also side-lined a democratic transition, and did also affect the manner in which state building and the Rule of Law was carried out. The study has a critical approach and aims to construct an initial theoretical framework of neoliberal peacebuilding. The material processed is mostly secondary material, but is mainly based on the promulgated orders of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) who was in charge of Iraq after the invasion by the coalition of the willing. The time scope of the study is the time in which the CPA had authority over Iraq.

Key words: Neoliberalism, hegemony, critical theory, marketization, peacebuilding.

Characters: 69 633

1	Introduction.....	1
1.1	Purpose	2
1.2	Research design & Disposition	2
2	Previous research	4
3	Methodology	6
3.1	Demarcation and authors remarks	6
3.2	Academic critical theory	8
3.2.1	Validity & Reliability	10
3.2.2	Revealing historical structures	10
3.3	Case selection	12
3.4	Case studies?	13
4	Hegemony	15
4.1	Ideas	16
4.2	Institutions	16
4.3	Material capabilities	17
4.4	Neoliberal hegemony	17
5	Neoliberal peacebuilding.....	21
5.1	Background & Operation Iraqi Freedom	22
5.1.1	Marketization	23
5.1.2	Labour and Welfare.....	25
5.1.3	State building & the Rule of Law.....	27
5.1.4	Democratization	31
6	Concluding remarks	32
7	Bibliography	35

1 Introduction

“There’s class warfare, all right, but it’s my class, the rich class, that’s making war, and we’re winning.” – Warren Buffet (Stein, 2006)

Indeed, recent trends in international politics do implicate the truth in Mr. Buffet’s words. The trends of diminishing public spending, international organizations promoting free trade, reckless expansion of capitalism post-soviet and rebuilding war-torn states with a focus on economics, are symptoms of this impending victory. Many of these are connected and can be traced to the neoliberal governments of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher and the spreading of their policies throughout the globe asymmetrically. (Harvey, 2007: 26) These ideas were present in the United States of America who dominated world politics at the time of a devastating war in the Middle East.

When thinking about US dominance in world politics, a logical question is: why, or how? While some would argue it is the military might which compels sub ordinance to US-interests, others would point to the economic interdependence; some might even point towards the normative power as the leaders of the free world. The power of the US might not derive from none, or all of these. The academic term for dominance (or leadership), hegemony, is often assigned an actor (a hegemon; a country). However, it might be so that hegemony is something fluid affecting all spheres of human activity; it might be that hegemony is a structure, not an actor.

After more than a decade of UN-sanctions following the Gulf-war, it was again time for an American military invasion in the Middle-east. This time accompanied not by UN-authorization, but a *coalition of the willing*. Much can be said about the legality, manner in which and the legitimacy of the US-led coalition’s invasion of Iraq in 2003. Regardless, a swift military victory was however achieved but the rebuilding of the country (peace building) has been, to be restrictive, fundamentally flawed with

an unstable region as a consequence. If hegemony is a structure, influencing all spheres of human activity, how is it expressed in peace building?

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this study is to create a theoretical framework with a critical onset in order to see how the contemporary hegemony influenced the peace building in Iraq. As hegemony is a term describing power relations, the inter-scientific purpose to develop an understanding of how global structures affect peace building. As such, it is largely a describing purpose and the study will examine how the neoliberal hegemony was expressed in peace building (as opposed to what consequences it led to) This will be done by using Robert Cox's theory of historical structures and hegemony, and using said hegemony in order to understand how the hegemony is expressed in liberal peace building. The theoretical framework will be constructed by combining Cox's thoughts of hegemony with that of contemporary scholars on peacebuilding and neoliberalism in order to answer to following research question:

- *What is the neoliberal hegemony and how was it expressed in Iraqi peace building?*

1.2 Research design & Disposition

The theoretical framework used in this essay is essentially a macro perspective, and is at the highest level of abstraction a study about the power relations and how this sipper through all of society. This structural relationship which historical materialists would call hegemony, influence all spheres of activity. Simultaneously, the study's purpose is to see how this is expressed in peacebuilding. Therefore, to bind the macro level perspective onto an empirical case, a theoretical framework is constructed with the assistance of contemporary scholars on the field liberal

peacebuilding. The framework is constructed with the use of Robert Cox's method of revealing historical structures.

This study's contribution to the field of peace- and conflict research is thus an attempt to frame contemporary peace building efforts into a theoretical framework based out of the global power structure of hegemony and how this structural power relationship is expressed in peacebuilding, which will be called *neoliberal* peacebuilding. The expression of the neoliberal hegemony in Iraq will only reveal a fraction of the complete story, but it's still a crucial fraction in order to scrutinize prevailing contemporary power relationship in the world.

The disposition of this study might appear somewhat confused. Parts of the methodology will be intertwined with the theory, and the analysis will be present in the presentation of the case Iraq. When using Robert Cox's notions of structures, as well as his and other scholars' remarks on the (neoliberal) world order it is easy to fall into a trap of simple reiterations. The reasoning behind this is to create a functioning flow of text; it is also affected by the theory used, as the gap between the global sphere and peace building (*on the ground*), can be rather large. And also, since there are many subsections in this study, a clear-cut disposition would result in a rather dull read.

2 Previous research

Liberal peacebuilding is a contemporary form of conflict management, seeking to build peace from within a conflict, by promoting liberal democracy and market economics. This is done in order to satisfy a post conflict society's need for stability by paying attention to array social, economic and institutional needs. (Newman, Paris, Richmond, 2013: 7) Detractors of the liberal peace, however unsurprisingly, argue this has failed repeatedly.

There is much contemporary research on the subject of peacebuilding, both praising the notions and brutally criticizing them. Ever since the fall of the Berlin wall, many scholars praised interdependence, democracy and liberalism as the warriors of peace. Simplistically put proponents of the liberal peace agenda argue that for a perpetual peace to take root, peacebuilding has to have the objective of introducing liberal democratic societies to war-torn countries. Given the apparent merits of the democratic peace, it is no surprise this was the agenda of some western developed states. It also serves as a possibility to include former authoritarian states into a global system of capitalism, if they weren't previously to the conflict. The liberal peacebuilding debate is arguably at a stalemate. Proponents of the liberal peacebuilding arc claim that despite its limitations, it is still the best route currently available: arguing the liberal peacebuilding dissolution might only resolve in leaving millions of people targets of fear, war and death (Selby, 2013: 58).

One of the contemporary critics of the notions of the liberal peace is Roland Paris. His critique of the liberal peace agenda is built on the idea that liberalization is a destabilizing process, and that post-conflict societies does not need another such element. He argues that competition is an inherent factor of a liberal democracy and post war - political stability should be of higher priority. Therefore he puts forward a framework where institutions are the first cornerstone in achieving lasting peace, calling his method institutionalization before liberalization (Paris, 2004). This can be

seen as a pragmatic solution to the failures of liberal peacebuilding, whilst still aiming towards the goal of a liberal democracy. But Paris is critical towards the hyper-critical critique the liberal peace regime has been subject to in recent years. One of these hypercritical scholars is Mark Duffield (2007). He argues that there has been a revival of imperialism and its interests. With the use of the liberal language of *humanitarian intervention* and *peace intervention*, he argues the western world is trying to rehabilitate “its proclaimed role of protecting and bettering the world”. (Duffield, 2007: 7) While some would note the benevolent intentions of this bettering, one should ask oneself: did the imperialists of old not believe their intentions were benevolent as well? Other scholar writes on the subject of a need to include locals in peace building. The scholarly notions of hybridity argue for a mixed approach where local perceptions of peace are noted, while the politics of a top-down approach is still present. (Richmond, 2017: 150; Richmond, 2009: 324-336) Many of these scholars do note the global power structure which is present with the global capital and international financial institutions influence policy. However, they do not expand on the structural relationship, which this study argues forcing conforming to the global hegemony; neither do they outline how these structures are expressed in peace building more specifically. Robert Cox is one of the founders of modern critical studies, and in constructing a framework for the neoliberal hegemony in Iraq, it does seem reasonable to begin by *standing on the shoulders of a giant*.

3 Methodology

3.1 Demarcation and authors remarks

An initial demarcation is of the time-scope of the essay. Being an ongoing conflict, with several different substantial events, any time restriction will be problematic. However, in order to answer the purpose of the study, this essay will not stray further in its empirical examination than the resignation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The reasons for this delimitation are both work-economic and strategic. The conflict in Iraq is a messy subject, with insurgency, political unrest, destabilizing tendencies, antidemocratic governance, democratic (?) governance and many other factors which make any limitation on the scope of the essay problematic. The strategic reasoning is the same as for the case (see section 3.3), as the expectation is that the expression of neoliberalism is exaggerated in policymaking where the US is involved, which it has been during most of the conflict. However, the most radical involvement was during the occupation and under the authority by the CPA.

As the essay has a critical approach, there is a possibility that I appear sturdily negative towards the entire approach of (neo) liberal peace building. This is not the case; I believe most of the Human Rights to be innate for example; but as in most policies, there are good and bad; malign and benign approaches and intentions. But in constructing a theoretical framework for neoliberal peace building, it is my *intention* to remain neutral to these values. There is also a need to note differences between liberal and neoliberal agendas. They do overlap in many aspects, but neoliberalism is more connected with anti-labour and anti-labour with a large focus on the political economy (as opposed to empowerment of the people) (Herring, 2008: 47), and corporate involvement in policy.

The same principle attends to the usual critique of critical observations: Do *you* have a better solution? (Paris, 2010: 339) The consequences of the neoliberal peace building might not all be bad, but that does not disclaim a critical perspective. The structural effects need to be examined regardless of the consequences, in order for the good parts to be conserved, and the bad tossed into oblivion. This critique is one of the usages of arguments of rationality; rationale is always contemporary as it is a response to current power relations. Furthermore, some good effects might come at the cost of other issues emerging – e.g. exploiting fossil fuels might be good for the contemporary economic development, but are simultaneously bad for the environment. Ignorance might be bliss, but bliss does not justify ignorance.

Some critics might note that the outlining of hegemony and its effects is irrelevant since it is basically a flawed description of the evolution of the contemporary world order, which has both negative and positive effects. That potential critique is precisely the reason why this study exists. To accept structural composition (or power relations) as legitimate is the contemporary hegemony's victory, cementing the structures even further. An integral part of hegemony is that the power relationships are seen as legitimate. Power relations and their effects are crucial information in transforming society, especially in a post-conflict construction where local power relations are deformed by warfare and its consequences.

The outlining of the processes which created the contemporary hegemony will seem a bit reductionist and is as such subject to critique. I am aware of this, and the outlining is mostly based on Cox's reasoning behind hegemony with supplements where it has *evolved* since his primary writings on the subject. Though, since the purpose of the study is mainly to examine how the global hegemony is expressed in peacebuilding – combined with the scope of the essay, this is a necessary shortcoming. For a more in-depth description of the historical background of hegemony, I profoundly recommend a reading of '*Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory* and more contemporary works of Robert Cox and other scholars of critical theory. Most of the other material used in the essay is based on scholarly observations and the orders promulgated by the CPA.

3.2 Academic critical theory

Cox's critical theory assumes "theory is always for someone and for some purpose", Cox, 1981: 128) within a particular academic tradition or world view; theory is never exempt from the world outside and is subject to structures just as practice is. Problem solving theory is according to Cox a method which reinforces the status quo and solving problems. As such, one must examine what led up to the issue in the first place. The question is thus not why peacebuilding failed in Iraq, but *what underlying structures* (the neoliberal hegemony?) made peacebuilding fail in Iraq (if the argument that it failed is made). As theory is always limited by what Antonio Gramsci would call *spontaneous philosophy* (easy put: subjective philosophy originated in socialization shaping your perception of the world), so is this one. (Cox, 1983: 162-164; Cox 1981)

Neoliberalism is in large a term describing the political economy and its influences on other aspects of society, such as policymaking and institutionalization. Therefore, it is for the sake of transparency it might seem important to note some of the limits of this perspective as to not fall into the same traps as conventional theory. Though, using Cox's own reasoning, critical theory will also be chained and even in attempts to avoid it, one cannot. Critical theory need to explore alternative orders, and in reaching for those it might seem utopian. However, this is according to Cox counteracted by grounding theory in historical contexts and structures (Cox, 1981: 130). Yet, Cox seems to disregard that historical knowledge is also tainted by human faults and interpretations. History is also based on assumptions based on contemporary and historical interpretations of events passed; the popular: *the victors write and shape history*. This might lead to disregard critical theory on the same basis as problem solving theory.

But this abyss of Cartesian scepticism does not conclude in nought. Rather, I would argue the need for both critical and problem solving theory, in the name of knowledge. Problem solving theory does operate within the status quo, but is as such

not benign or malign and can contribute to society regardless, and the same can be said for critical theory. There are structures everywhere, it does influence action and as such it needs to be examined in order to find the best path currently available regardless if it is within a structure, rationale or an entirely alternative order. It's important to acknowledge, and give Cox's methodological reasoning some credit, that it's often easier to see patterns and structures as they come to pass. Especially if the then ruling power relations have fallen, e.g.: It is easier to study the churches power in medieval Europe when that power has deteriorated or diminished and doesn't influence the study with its gospel and claim of truth. (Cox, 1981; Edkins & Zehfuss, 2014) Cox's critical theory is the one best suited for this study, as it aims to reveal the global structure of hegemony and its expression in peacebuilding. As such the academic tradition of the study is one of critical materialism, but it does note and appreciate other academic traditions and all contributions to the scientific cumulative. The academic tradition of materialism and critical theory does make claims of mechanical functions predicting behaviour and outcomes. A prerequisite of critical theory is an awareness of theory being restrained by structures, just as action is. (Cox, 1981)

Critical theory stands conversely to problem solving theory as it is opposed to the positivistic language of conventional academic perspectives, as social science-positivism premises are based on the status quo. (Cox, 1981; Edkins & Zehfuss, 2014) With this academic standpoint what constitutes as truth is somewhat irrelevant as truth can be volatile and subjective. To study with the premise that truth is achievable does only work if the premises are in fact true; studying with a critical academic perspective disregard truth as contextual, trying to reach *why* we believe truth to be truth, what premises led us to this conclusion or trying to understand the underlying assumptions about society with the *contextual knowledge* as its premises. (Cox, 1981; Pin-Fat, 2014) Critical theory must observe reality from the outside and have a dialectal world view in order to not take power relations and other structural processes for granted and also to open a possibility for societal transformation by making structures and power relations visible, and questioning the status quo. (Cox, 1981)

3.2.1 Validity & Reliability

The ability to be consistent in the interpretation of the material in a systematic way, in such a way that other scholars would be able to repeat it is rather difficult in this sort of study. However, in using a method for how structures function, it can function as an initial guideline in how the material is supposed to be interpreted. In using a method for understanding functions, the operationalization of the theory is central. Since the material in this study is almost exclusive second-hand material (with a few exceptions), the sources are controlled by each other in order to make sure the differences in the description of the empirical case do not diverge from each other in a radical fashion. However, in the epistemological tradition of critical materialism, the logic of validity- and reliability is rather weak. When acknowledging that theory and practice is always biased towards the spontaneous philosophy and the shortage of context-independent knowledge, the best way to ensure external and internal validity is to be transparent in how the study was performed, under what premises the study was carried out and why the former two was done in such a way; why was the case(s) selected and how is one to understand the theory. If that is done properly, the readers can by themselves judge the quality of the study according to their own spontaneous philosophy. This approach also limits the perception of scholars in ivory towers as it does not tell the reader what how *good* or *bad* this particular approach is as such assessments might be subjective.

3.2.2 Revealing historical structures

Robert Cox emphasizes the need of understanding historical structures, realizing that an action is never free of its structural chains. In a structure, individuals and groups can move along with the current, resist the current – but they cannot ignore the current (current being the flow of society or structure). As such, structures are not to be understood as actors but as constraints on action (Cox, 1981).

Thus the global hegemony in this study is considered a structure. Within the triangular figure, the connection between the spheres is assumed to be reciprocal.

This heuristic device is to be understood as simplified representation of reality, which is complex. For example, while examining the global structure of hegemony, it will not include the political pressure from US-constituents to limits the use of the country’s military which might be a factor for the initial short-sighted approach to Iraq’s rebuilding. (Tansey, 2013: 23) Thus, structures are not the sole force influencing human activity, but are nevertheless crucial to *understanding* reality. Thus, this model does not claim to be a “fully realized development”, but is a complement to the vast scientific cumulative. (Cox, 1981: 137) Regardless though, a premise of the study is nonetheless that structures function and are reproduced as figure 1 describes.

Cox developed a framework for revealing structures by examining the reciprocal relationship of ideas, institutions and material capabilities.




Figure 1

The study will be using this framework as a method in order to present the contemporary global hegemony and examine how it is expressed in peace building.

Disregarding the personal preferences of Robert Cox’s theory on structures, the choice was also strategic. Whilst another definition of structures or hegemony could be used (a neorealist one for example), it would have difficulty framing the latent power of hegemony (the ideas) and how it is (re)produced. Likewise, a constructivist approach risk devaluating the material aspects of force. Cox’s perception of structures frame both of these shortcomings and links them with institutions as the pillar of structures. One might criticize the lack of focus on agents in Cox’s theory and reducing human life to passive actors within a structure. (Wendt, 1987: 344-346) However, the purpose of structural thinking is not to predict actions (they are constrains on action, according to Cox), but rather to understand how social life is

always dependent on contemporary society; in order to distance oneself from the structures, the only viable analytical unit must be the entire system as to limit the influences of contemporary intra-paradigm thinking.

Another critique of structural thinking is that it seems to fall into historical determinism. (Wendt, 1987: 348) Although this critique is viable, one might question the reasoning for diverge into possible alternative outcomes; shouldn't theory, by using history as its grounding element, search for alternative paths forward rather than explore possible outcomes that have long since come to pass? The use of a critical materialistic perspective will also synergize rather well with a study about the hegemony of neoliberalism, as neoliberalism does focus on the political economy as the road to success.

3.3 Case selection

The selection of Iraq as the case in this study is highly strategic. As case selection is an integral part of the research project, it cannot be based on interest or availability of data, but on how relevant said case is to the entirety of the study. (George & Bennet, 2005: 83) The choice of Iraq as the object of this study is based on several factors. As the theoretical framework of the study is one of hegemony, the US being the most powerful actor, a military invasion is expected to be fertile soil to construct a theoretical framework on. With a US-led military occupation, the traces of the neoliberal hegemony is expected to be somewhat exaggerated compared to peace building without occupation. Recognizing the importance of the United States in the current world order, a conflict where the US has been highly involved is principally interesting; and being one of the proponents of the global liberal notions, US involvement and strategies in the rebuilding of state following the invasion, and/or the occupation should create an exaggerated result. This strategic choice of Iraq can be interpreted as a critical case for the developing of this theory of hegemonic expression in neoliberal peace building. If it's proven false, or weak in a favourable case, it should also be false in cases with less favourability. (Flyvberg, 2006: 225-226) Acknowledging this as a single-case study, it is crucial to not overstate the

ability to generalize the results of the study. (George & Bennet, 2005: 84) However, with the academic tradition of this study, the ability to generalize is always low since knowledge is contextual.

As several scholars have noted, small case studies do not automatically contain selection bias. To repeat the notions of those scholars, authors of small case studies might have good reasons for not selecting a greater number of cases. (George & Bennet: 84). In constructing a framework of how the neoliberal hegemony is expressed in peace building with a critical outset, it is preferable to be able to probe the outcome of the peace building more deeply within a single case rather than choosing a larger quantity resulting in more shallow observations or a simple checklist of requirements. That is not the objective of critical studies. However when a framework has been constructed in a somewhat structured manner, there might be good reasons to test it on a larger scale to examine how widespread certain aspects of neoliberalism is present in peace building.

3.4 Case studies?

The use of case studies is often criticized on several aspects. Bent Flyvberg's (2006) article: *Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research*, does respond to some of that criticism. One misunderstanding about case studies is that context independent knowledge is somehow more relevant than context dependent knowledge. (Flyvberg, 2006: 221-224) Flyvberg argues of the importance of both context dependent, and context independent knowledge. He also notes that there is yet none, and will probably not ever be true context-independent knowledge in the social sciences; when probing deeper into a case it is probable nothing will exist but context-dependent knowledge (Flyvberg, 2006: 221-224). To this first misunderstanding, I would like to remind of the epistemology of the study. A premise of the study is in fact that structures affect all human spheres of activity; thus context-independent knowledge cannot be said to exist, as a structure is always context-dependent to contemporary society; although it can remain the same over a longer period of time. Therefore, a single case study is the best choice for the critical outset of this study as it makes it possible to scrutinize the expression of a structural

hegemony in a certain time and space, rather than comparing different peace building efforts in different times and spaces.

4 Hegemony

Hegemony is a term describing a dominating power relationship. Scholars of other scientific traditions, such as realists, used this term describing the function of a stabilizing force in the anarchic world order, primarily through military or economic might. (Keohene, 2005: 31) Cox's, and thus also this essay, examines the structure of the hegemony on the basis that the hegemony is more than merely material power. Within any material power structure, there is possibility for the strong to bully the weak, but; "Dominance of a powerful state might be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for hegemony." (Cox, 1981: 193) Force, similarly does not need to be used if the hegemon is willing to make concession to the benefit of both the hegemon and the dominated; the core of hegemony is that the prevailing power relationship is seen as legitimate by the dominated parties. The hegemony outlined here; the contemporary global hegemony, is a western, mainly US one. It is important to note that the US is not to be understood as a malign demagogue, all powerful and controlling. Rather, we should think of the US as the (dominant) core of the hegemony, which with transnational institutions and underlying enforcement potential exercises its latent power on the (dependent) periphery. (Cox, 1981: 143) Structures are to be understood as constraints on action, not actors. Thus hegemony does not predict mechanical functions as $X \rightarrow Y$, though it is more likely that actors would follow the easier road ahead. The hegemon is a misleading concept as even though the hegemon is easily understood as an actor, it is not meant to be perceived in such a way – the hegemon is the actor(s) at the core of the hegemony (the structure of power). Conversely, the further one steps from the core – the weaker the hegemony is. Thus when approaching the periphery, the element of explicit force is more likely or apparent. The areas where force is used to subjugate is also where a counter-structure or opposition to the core is more probable. (Cox, 1981)

4.1 Ideas

There are two different kinds of ideas according to Cox. The first is shared notions of social relations which create habits and an expected behaviour; these are intersubjective. The use of states as the primary unit of organisation is a prime example of an idea based on shared notions of social relations which create habits and an expected behaviour about how the state should act. The second kinds of ideas are the collective images of social order, the nature of power relations and questions of public good; what justice constitutes for example. (Cox, 1981)

4.2 Institutions

Institutions are understood as the means to which the prevailing order is stabilized. As such, they reflect the relations of power at their point of origin and encourage the collective images consistent with them. With time, institutions can evolve and oppose other emerging tendencies, or stimulate the evolution of rivaling institutions to reflect a different emerging order. Institutions are amalgams of the other two spheres of a structure. (Cox, 1981: 136) Institutions thus work as anchors of the hegemony, working to consolidate power relations. Institutions are key to understanding hegemony, and can often resemble the hegemony – but they may be “out of phase” and can therefore not be taken as interchangeable with it. Institutions provide an arena for solving internal conflict within the hegemony with minimalizing the use of force which is always a latent threat within the hegemony.

4.3 Material capabilities

Cox defines material capabilities as productive and destructive potentials. The embodiments of these are technological and organizational capabilities, meaning industries, weapons, natural resources and the technology to transform these – and the wealth to command the previous. This is a rather loose definition, albeit the spirit of the term is the capacity to enforce the prevailing order (in much a realist definition of hegemony), be it through economic pressure or military might. During the British Empire, their vast power at sea made sure they could enforce action according to the expected behaviour at that time.

4.4 Neoliberal hegemony

The current neoliberal ideas were implemented during a regime shift in the US and Britain during the late 1970s followed by several other western countries as a way to manage the crisis of the Atlantic Fordism. The fall of the Soviet Unions, and the rebuilding of post socialist countries into the capitalist sphere was done so in an enthusiastic snowball, sometimes interpreted as the triumph of neoliberalism. (Jessop, 2002: 457-458) The basic principles (ideas) of the contemporary neoliberal hegemony are “[...] the relatively free movement of goods, capital and technology and a reasonable degree of predictability in exchange rates.” (Cox, 1981: 144-145) This was driven by the concept of economic growth and higher levels of production to be a moderating force. These are concepts of what constitutes public good. The perception of trade, goods and capital being free and equal is beneficial in a hegemonic world order, though as Marx noted “Where equal rights exists, force divides”. (Jessop, 2002: 453)

Moving away from protectionist economic systems of the interwar period, and Atlantic Fordism, policies of harmonization became increasingly important, recognizing the effects one’s economic policies have on other countries. Mutual adjustment consolidated hegemonic dominance as they were perceived to be

adjustments to the needs of the system. The harmonization became the foundation of the internationalized policy processes in which state agencies with key functions in the adjustment between domestic and international policies became increasingly important. Labour ministries, ministries of industries and similar positions of power evolved in a context of national corporatism, and were thus depowered as states became internationalized. (Cox, 1981)

A trend in contemporary society that has since then developed even further in world politics where state policy moves away from welfare, to competition economies. (Herring, 2008: 49) Central aspects of the configuration of the prevailing world order are states and their capacity of military and economic coercion. (Cox, 2004: 309) There are expected behaviour of states today as they are the as the primary unit of organisation. Expected behaviour of states is, amongst others, the upholding of the Rule of Law and inter-country relations, primarily through diplomatic agents. The role of the state, however, has diminished gradually as neoliberal ideas began to surge.

In the internationalized states, transnational corporations have the ability to influence domestic politics and policymaking. The influence of the transnational corporations also ties together the local business elite with the transnational sphere. (Cox, 2004: 309) The internationalization of policy functions under the aegis of institutions promoted by the Washington consensus. (Jessop, 2002: 454) Joseph Stiglitz notes that these recommendations for the structural adjustment of macro-economic reform in order to achieve a trickle-down effect were abandoned by the World Bank and leading states. (Duffield, 2007: 98) However, this was in development theory – the ideas influencing the Washington consensus are still present in the enunciation of financial and transnational interests, influencing domestic policymaking and the local business elites. (Jessop, 2002: 454; Cox, 2004: 309)

Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank work to stabilize the system of the “free movement of goods, capital and technology and a reasonable degree of predictability in exchange rates”. Along with the UN and others, these international institutions can be understood as a mechanism of

surveillance which also gives financial assistance on the condition of evidence for conforming to the norms which the institutions were founded upon. (Cox, 1981) The allure of the neoliberal fold is also exacerbated by the fact that membership in the International Monetary fund or World Trade Organization is conditioned upon the opening of domestic markets. This is significant as the rules of international trade are defined by institutionalized agreements. (Harvey, 2005: 92)

The US Government and international financial institutions is trailblazing a path for the world market to operate more effectively (freely). (Jessop, 2002: 454) A global free market benefits the US as dollar being the principal currency of the world market, the supremacy of American financial markets “[...] and US control of the International Monetary Fund and its predominant influence in the other international economic institutions, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization”. (Cox, 2004: 312) Being the debtor of the primary world currency gives the US an opportunity to borrow money using its own currency which both increases the competitiveness of its exports and, de facto, reduces the US debt. (Cox, 2004: 312) Susan Strange called this the US structural power in the sphere of global finance.

The principal ideas of neoliberalism, those which advocate private property rights (uphold by the state), individual liberty and free markets have affected policymaking profoundly. IMF, governing international finance and the World trade organisation, governing international trade cement the discursive power of neoliberalism, perceiving it as ideas of public good. (Harvey, 2007: 23-25) This is done under the military and economic coercive power of US, with the enforcement potential to subjugate divergent tendencies. The relative structural power of US in global finance reinforces its dominant role, which is further strengthened by international financial institutions propagating for inclusion into the sphere of the world financial market, on the premise of conforming to the norms and ideas said institutions were founded upon. (Harvey, 2007: 23-24) This process, depowering labour movements and their political embodiment when the matrix of neoliberalism subject political power to transnational corporations, partly through the economic ties said corporations have with local businesses.

The neoliberal hegemony is thus the latent (and/or expressed) power structure steering the neoliberal ship, with everything from deregulation of market to the internationalized state and US military and economic coercive power. It influences all spheres of human activity, but does not force action. It does so by the reproduction of collective views of the social world and what constitutes public good, and justice; it does so by the reproduction of financial institutions which in turn influence ideas and the material capabilities to enforce those ideas and thereby reproduce them. It is a reciprocal relationship reinforcing itself.

5 Neoliberal peacebuilding

The theoretical framework presented is based on the notions of Robert Cox's model of historical structures. The content of the theoretical framework is based on contemporary scholars on liberal peacebuilding and their observations of the practice. Though there is much critique to the claim, it is generally assumed that the liberal peace is acceptable to all; the liberal peace being a combination of peace, democracy and free markets. The main components of achieving this reputable objective are democratization, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalized markets. (Richmond, 2006: 292)

These objectives echo of the neoliberalism David Harvey described: (2007: 22)

Neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade.

Neoliberal ideas are produced and reproduced into a global hegemony of neoliberalism which is expressed in almost all spheres of human activity. One such sphere is peacebuilding, where the expression of neoliberalism will be constructed into a theoretical framework of neoliberal peacebuilding. The sections of empirical study are marketization, labour & welfare, state building & the Rule of Law and democratization. These were selected strategic with the use of the theoretical framework. Marketization, as the ideas of marketization (and economic growth) are some of the most prevalent in the world today; labour and welfare as they can be conversely to marketization (as they are mutually exclusive); state building & the Rule of Law as these are the foundations of today's nation state and therefore also in peace building; democratization as it is a rather ambiguous subject when discussing neoliberalism. Note also that neoliberalism is much about the political economy. In the epistemology of materialism, material is crucial to power. Therefore, the section

about marketization is the most significant one, and the others are to be understood as secondary, or rather as consequences of the marketization.

5.1 Background & Operation Iraqi Freedom

Thirteen years after the US military involvement in the Gulf war, and thirteen years of harsh UN-sanctions had put the Iraqi state on the brink of collapse. (Dodge, 2006: 187-189) In 2002, US president George Bush gave a threefold argument for another armed invasion of Iraq: the possessions of Weapons of Mass Destruction and therefore a defiance of UN security-council resolutions, violations of human rights and an involvement in international terrorism by the regime of Saddam Hussein. The United States and the United Kingdom did not manage to get the authorization for a military attack from the United Nations Security Council as Russia and France exercised their veto-powers. (Gregory, 2004: 181-192) In March 2003, the US engaged in the second invasion of Iraq supported by “the coalition of the willing”. Some 40-50 countries expressed their willingness, and three countries supported with troops: The United Kingdom, Australia and Poland. What became operation Iraqi Freedom was a swift military operation. Within shortly after the invasion, Saddam Hussein, head of the Ba’athist party, was deposed and replaced with a US occupation of the Middle Eastern country. In the invasion, Iraqi state institutions collapsed and the coalition was left with a country in pieces, in need of rebuilding. (Dodge, 2006: 188) In the rebuilding of Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was given mandate to rule of Iraq by Washington and the head of the CPA Paul Bremer was charged with the job of disposing Iraqi government officials and state assets. The United Nations recognized the occupation of Iraq by the US and UK in resolution 1493, however somewhat reluctant to do so. (Dobbins et al, 2009: 12)

5.1.1 Marketization

In the Iraqi peacebuilding, the market was prescribed a frontal position. The neoliberal idea of relatively free movement of goods, capital and technology was embodied by the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) General Order 39 which opened the Iraqi market for foreign investment in all domestic sectors except banking or the primary extraction of natural resources. (Dodge, 2013: 198) The idea of marketization was largely propagated by the Washington consensus institutions as the best way to rebuild the economy of developing countries. The belief that economic growth moderates conflict was expressed by Paul Bremer, head of the CPA: "If we don't get the economy right, no matter how fancy our political transformation, it won't work" (Dodge, 2013: 198) Markets as a response to rebuilding a country does seem misplaced as markets have a hard time correcting injustices and it seems "dangerous to rely exclusively on the market to allocate resources, set prices and fix factor incomes" (Pugh, 2005: 25)

As seen in the theoretical framework, US finance's structural power derives partly from the global currency being the US dollar. Post the Iraq invasion, US appropriations, Iraqi revenues and international funds were handled through institutions as the World Bank. In the marketization of Iraq, the United Nations Security Council resolution 1483 decided all economic sanctions of Iraq to cease, also acknowledging the Authority of the US and UK over the sovereign state of Iraq. (S/RES/1483) The same resolution established a development fund with funds from the country's oil-for-food programme to be disbursed in the direction headed by the Authority, and the programme itself to be phased out. These institutions does seem to work in accordance with the theoretical framework as they cement the power relations of the global hegemony in accepting the Authority and simultaneously expressing an implicit belief in the economic reforms as the means of building domestic peace. The UN did not consult the Iraqi population but rather invested power in the US and UK, in what Dereck Gregory (2004: 230) called a colonial project like many others before it. With the employment of funds, and the

conforming to the ideas of the Authority, the UN did indeed reproduce the contemporary hegemony. The conception of the legitimacy of US/UK authority in the sovereign state of Iraq is also an identification of the world power relations, and the social order of the world.

CPA order 39 was accompanied by three other orders which together ensured (Harvey, 2007: 25)

“The full privatization of public enterprises, full ownership rights by foreign firms of Iraqi U.S. businesses, full repatriation of foreign profits [...] the opening of Iraq’s banks to foreign control, national treatment for foreign companies and [...] the elimination of nearly all trade barriers.”

Appropriations by the US, 18.4 billion in US dollars, gave the US a pole position in shaping Iraq’s globalisation to benefit the US and US-led capital. In this internationalisation of Iraq by marketization is internalising and consolidating norms conforming to US and neoliberal hegemony. (Herring & Rangwala, 2005: 672) The productive potential of the US material capabilities is vast. A myriad of transnational, multinational corporations are based in the US with the productive potential to rebuild Iraq after the invasion, everything from communications to security; the wealth to command this potential is represented by the 18.3 billion dollars of American tax dollars in appropriations as a “gift” to the people of Iraq and can be interpreted as material capabilities to enforce the ideas of marketization in Iraq. Transnational corporations were given contracts on the rebuilding and marketization of Iraq; E.g. Parsons Delaware of California were contractors for buildings, education, health, security and justice, and was awarded US appropriations for it, as a result of General order 39 of the CPA. (Herring & Rangwala, 2005: 673)

In Iraq, the military occupation was accompanied by an economic one, where many people had difficulty engaging in everyday life when political and economic instability was everywhere around them. (Gregory, 2004: 245) This seems ironic, seeing how Donald Rumsfeld argued “They’re [people] are also free to live their lives and do wonderful things. And that’s what’s going to happen here”. (Dodge, 2013: 197) Admittedly, marketization can be a destabilizing process. Roland Paris

(2004) argues that swift liberalization (introducing free markets & liberal democracy) is a destabilizing process which, if implemented too rapidly, will undermine peace building. Instead, he propagates a different approach where institutions must be in place in a “more gradual” approach to peace building. (Paris, 2004: 7) However, institutionalization does according to the theoretical framework of neoliberal hegemony cement the contemporary order and power relations. Institutionalizing Iraq during an episode of neo-liberal shock therapy, might cement the corporatist interests and the neoliberal ideas of the hegemonic order imposed in Iraq post-invasion.

Iraqi governmental institutions collapsed during the invasion of Iraq. In such environments, Salil Tripathi (2008: 89) notes that there is an asymmetry between weak states and large corporations as the latter is more probable to influence the former than vice-versa. Large corporations’ involvement in state affairs is a marker of the neoliberal hegemony, as seen in the theoretical framework of the hegemony of neoliberalism. (Jessop, 2002: 454) Thus, in opening Iraq for foreign investment and the complete marketization of the states might open the gates for transnational interests limiting the possibility for strong labour and welfare policy in post-conflict Iraq.

5.1.2 Labour and Welfare

In welfare states, the state promotes the workers’ acceptance of the capital by encouraging consumptions and providing welfare. The marketization of Iraq, with a flat tax of 5 percent on foreign corporations did have significant effects on the possibility of a functioning welfare system and strong labour force in Iraq. For example, the right to strike was outlawed and unions banned in key sectors. (Harvey, 2007: 25; Herring, 2008: 48) The belief in economic growth moderating conflict, might be misguided. International organisations (institutions; the UN, World Bank, etc.) seem to expect the private sector to build the foundation of the political economy of post-conflict societies. (Tripathi, 2008: 88-90) In a neoliberal state, focus lies on innovation, productivity and flexibility rather than regulating businesses, market failure and planning. The perceived idea of social welfare being

the correct path is ever decreasing as ideas of market competition and marketization get promoted (Herring, 2008: 49). As seen in the previous sections, the ideas of marketization are upheld by material capabilities and international institutions. Despite formal regulations guaranteeing almost universal provision of health, education, employment protection and pensions, there has been a decline in most of these sectors since the invasion, and even though there was a preference of a welfare-oriented (large public spending) model in Iraq, this was ignored in favour of marketization (Herring, 2008: 54).

In the emergence of the welfare state, it was supposed to moderate the market by means of deploying minimum wage, reducing economic insecurity and providing key services. (Briggs, 1961) The role of welfare in peacebuilding is debatable. Proponents of welfare have prescribed it a major formula of peace, key to providing social justice and economic stability. During the cold war, it was an integral part of the liberal peacebuilding projects; however it was put on hold in favour of economic growth and development, (Richmond, 2017: 154) as seen in the case of Iraq. In welfare economies, full employment is an aim which is reached towards by use of governmental spending. (Herring, 2008: 49) As a result of the disbanding of the army, privatisation of state enterprises has increased unemployment in Iraq, across all of Iraqi society and a perceived lack of economic opportunity emerged (Barakat, 2005: 584) When a countries youth is unemployed, and lacks economic opportunity, there seems to be increased risk for political violence. (Urdal, 2006) When markets get prevalence before welfare in the political philosophy, it might create a reciprocal negative spiral as the lack of economic opportunities force the population to conform to the reality before them and with the material capabilities and institutions preaching said spiral as something benevolent. Without the right to strike, for example, how is the Iraqi workforce to achieve agency in the political process of creating a welfare-oriented model as preferred by the Iraqi people? (Herring, 2008: 54; Harvey, 2007: 25)

In the marketization of Iraq, the rebuilding of the country was given to in large to foreign corporations. Many of the multinational companies did employ several thousand Iraqi workers in the fulfilment of the rebuilding contracts of Iraq, with a critical perspective one might question the reason for doing so. US-based company

Bechtel outsourced 160 of 230 subcontracts to Iraqi companies which in turn employed several tens of thousands Iraqi workers. Transnational corporations (indeed all corporations) are invested in protecting and extending profit margins. (Herring & Rangwala, 2005: 674) As such, one could question the reasons for not awarding the Iraqi companies the contracts directly in areas where it was possible in order to keep more of the capital within the country instead of making it a part of the transnational capital. However, the Iraqi subcontractors were given documents “[...] waiving insurance requirements, advancing interest-free capital, providing banking services and professional training” (Herring & Rangwala, 2005: 674) David Harvey argues that in the face of declining demand, access to cheap labour (cheaper raw materials and other factors of production as well) is central to a smooth-functioning capitalism. (Harvey, 2003: 139-140) With that in mind, it is no surprise that the fulfilment of the contracts by the contractors was made with the use of cheap labour to create larger profit margins for the transnational companies. Though, some would note, that it is better to employ Iraqis than non-Iraqis and while this might be true, this is not the prevailing discourse; rather the companies are supposed to be celebrated for their selfless contribution to society while ignoring the blatant self-interest of profits. Sultan Barakat (2005: 586) argues that a swift introduction into a free market economy (marketization) while a large part of the citizens are excluded (by unemployment & poverty) will conclude in that “Most will simply not have the capacity to take advantage of the market economy and the winners will inevitably be the war entrepreneurs and foreign (regional and global) enterprises.”

5.1.3 State building & the Rule of Law

The Iraqi state had not conformed to the ideas (and expected behaviour) which make sovereign states the principal unit of organisation in the international system. However, there are many divergent states in the international system not conforming to the core of the hegemony. What can be said about the Hussein regime is nonetheless that it did not go along with the hegemonic current of neoliberal ideas and conforming to international institutions. Following the Gulf-war, the United Nations imposed the toughest economic sanctions it had ever done on the country.

This economic coercion by the UN, strained the possibilities of the regime to successfully oppose the neoliberal structural currents, as a rivalling structure. However, the regime was resilient even with economic coercion, international institutions counteracting it and with repressive ideas non-confirmative with the hegemony. The sanctions would only be lifted if Iraq conformed to a series of demands about how the country was ruled, war reparations and disarmament. (Dodge, 2013: 194; Gregory, 2004: 180-184)

The military invasion and the following occupation of Iraq can be seen as the expression of the hegemony's enforcement potential as the regime didn't comply with the hegemonic order. Former President George Bush's rationale for the invasion was the supposed connection of the regime to al-Qaeda, liberating Iraq from the grip of a tyrant dictator and an argument of the regime's possession of weapons of mass destruction. A year previously, Bush had declared Iraq, amongst others, as a rogue state and a threat to peace. (Henriksen, 2007: 169-171) The US occupation of Iraq did initially have much resemblance to Roland Paris's Institutionalization to Liberalization (IBL). The US army were meant to seize control of the country with the Iraqi state intact, and then use its institutions to coerce a structural adjustment. (Dodge, 2013: 196) Thirteen years of UN sanctions onto the regime had put its strain on the country and with the fall of the regime, government institutions also collapsed. Condoleezza Rice, national security advisor said: "The concept was that we would defeat the army, but the institutions would hold everything from ministries to police forces" (Dodge, 2006: 188-199). With the implosion of domestic institutions, the involvement of US-originated ideas and institutions risk institutionalising the reciprocal relationship of hegemony in the sovereign state of Iraq.

The perception of individual liberty and freedom as idea threatening forms of state intervention (Harvey, 2007: 22-23) was also expressed in the state building process and re-establishing of the Rule of Law in Iraq. As such, the neoliberal idea of marketization penetrated not only the labour and welfare composition and possibilities in Iraq, but also the establishment of the rule of law. Contradictory to Condoleezza Rice's statement, General order 2 issued by the CPA disbanded the Iraqi military, security and intelligence services as a part of the deBa'athification of Iraq. Disregarding the differences in dialogue and practice, the disbanding of state

institutions meant to uphold the Rule of Law is problematic. (Dodge, 2006: 189) The Rule of Law is intertwined with good governance and limits sudden outbursts of violence and arbitrary exercising of force by the authorities. It mediates and creates an arena for relations between citizens and the state. (Thakur, 2006: 190)

The order to disband the security services of Iraq was accompanied by the fact of US ground troops being significantly plagued by shortage. As the National security strategy of the United States was implemented in Iraq, the Iraqi people were supposed to enjoy political and economic freedom, and a free market democracy. The second order of the CPA showed a profound distrust of Iraqi security services, or if you will: state intervention on the individual liberty and economic freedom of the people. Additionally, it was estimated that the coalition needed 400 000-500 000 security personnel to impose order in Iraq; at the invasion 116 000 soldiers were employed and 310 000 personnel in total. (Dodge, 2013: 197; Dodge, 2006: 191-193; Harvey, 2007: 22-23) The Rule of Law is often seen crucial to the possibility of a free market. However, when the private sector plays a leading role in post-conflict societies, companies are sometimes expected to fulfil state services in rural communities, such as upholding the Rule of Law. And as companies are rarely neutral, it might hinder the building of peace. (Tripathi, 2008: 89)

As General Order 2 disbanded all Iraqi security services, a widespread use of private security personnel was employed in Iraq. The purpose of these personnel was to train the Iraqi police force and army; to use in military prisons and protect oil fields. (Avant & Sigelman, 2010: 232-233) As such, the upholding of the Rule of Law also became marketized as private security became an increasingly present feature in Iraqi peace building. Private security obscures the monopoly on force as it changes who controls the use of force and how it is carried out. Private security companies are more prone to opportunism as they are flexible in nature, but they can also be crucial to introducing the Rule of Law in post-conflict societies. (Avant, 2009: 106) The use of private security got even more interesting when Paul Bremer (head of the CPA) issued General order 17 which gave immunity to Iraqi Legal processes to the CPA, foreign missions and contractors including their personnel. (Whyte, 2007: 184-185)

The CPA tried to build an internationalized state in Iraq, ripe for the onslaught of neoliberalism. The idea of an internationalized state is reinforced by many international institutions, in much embodied by general order 39 opening for foreign investment; transnational corporations employing Iraqi's, awarded US appropriations and Iraqi oil-funds for their selfless investment. However, internationalized states are a part of globalization, though the relationship between globalization and peace building seems to be ambiguous. While some would argue, globalization exports conflict, domination and hegemonic expression (in a classical, not critical sense) others would argue it exports human rights, neoliberal economics and development. (Richmond, 2004: 130) One might note that any argument that globalization inevitably leads to peace, or war, is simplistic. It is not a pacifying process, nor does it incite conflict. (Clark, 2001: 140-141) It does seem likely however, that depending on where in the hegemony one finds oneself, at the periphery or the core, one or the other is more *probable* (assuming power relations and the use of force function according to the premises of the study). Much research on this subject is needed to make any conclusions and much is dependent on the conceptual definition of globalization.

In the quest to pursue peace, state building has been intimately intertwined with the peace building project, and many scholars have been adamant in the need to include locals in this process. Thus, the need to “[...] create and promote a vibrant civil society” in order to denote the indigenous nature of peace within the local context is widely accepted. This approach, however, has come to represent a western view of civil society; and as the spectre of *realpolitik* shows, it becomes secondary; almost rhetorical, to security and political right – which favours individualism, economic freedom and independence. (Richmond, 2017: 150; Richmond, 2009: 324-336) However, the involvement of civil society in Iraq was second to none. The United Nations or the CPA did not consult the Iraqi people of what *they* wanted, and as a result how *their* peace would look like (Gregory, 2004: 229:230). The imposition of a state into the global arena in peace building is based on the adoption of free markets, and other international norms are often made by a third party. Disputants who do not, or cannot accept this shift tend to suffer from political and economic asymmetries. (Richmond, 2004: 84) In Iraq the peace was being built by the same actors who the Iraqis engaged in warfare with. Oliver Richmond (2004: 94) notes

that: “The more difficult it is to get local actors to cooperate, the more governance functions are taken on by external actors.” But when governance functions are taken on by external actors, without the inclusion of local actors, what does then transpire? Without a local inclusion in the building of peace, western rationality and their ideas may take prevalence. (MacGinty & Richmond, 2013: 763) In focusing on the political economy when building peace, there seem to be a securitization of welfare and local incorporation; gender and employment becomes neglected as there are power asymmetries in liberal peacebuilding. The involvement of civil society (local actors in this context) seems disregarded as a threat of resistance, instead of being viewed as local incorporation. (Pugh, Cooper & Turner, 2013: 390)

5.1.4 Democratization

The role of democratization is vague when it comes to neoliberal peacebuilding. Eric Herring (2008: 47) argues that there is a need to further differentiate between liberalism and neoliberalism, where the latter is more related to anti-labour, anti-welfare and *anti-democratic* – even though they often overlap and resemble each other. In Iraq, democratization was put on hold in the name of stability. The implosion of state institutions called for the democratization process to be put on hold. Arguably, this was in order for the Rule of Law and marketization to be prioritized. Though, is democratization still an integral part of the (neo) liberal peace? The United Nation did in resolution 1483 encourage the Iraqi people to form a representative government. One might note the need to not be too harsh towards the CPA’s sidelining of democracy as it is (as Paris, 2004: noted) as destabilizing process. With collapsed state institutions, how was a safe election to be held? But with a critical approach, one might argue that it was side-lined for the sake of neoliberal reform. Oliver Richmond (2009: 329-330) does note that the imagined practice of top-down peace building resulting in a bottom-up democratic process has repeatedly failed in the last 20 years. This failure, according to Richmond, results in a neglect, and a failure to engage with “[...] identity, with hybridity, with jobs, with welfare, and other vital social, cultural or economic dynamics. If free markets are indeed to path to individual freedom, shouldn’t the top-down perspective with a sidelining of democracy result in the inclusion of these, or is free capitalism the ultimate freedom and everything else secondary?

6 Concluding remarks

There is an expression of the neoliberal hegemony in Iraqi peace building. The perception of marketization as a moderating force, and economic development being the road to prosperity was time, and time again expressed during the CPA's authority over Iraq. The ideas of neoliberalism, with marketization being the leading one, influenced the sectors of welfare and labour; state building and the Rule of Law. Neoliberal hegemony can be seen as a structure as the material capabilities and institutions reinforces these ideas with the language of legitimacy. The hegemonic genius of liberalism (the perception of free markets, the perception of freedom) seems to be central to the legitimacy of the prevailing power relations. When foreign contractors are given free rein to extract monetary gains, they open a door where the corporation who owned those contracts can influence domestic policies even after, as was observed in the emergence of neoliberalism in western countries. (Jessop, 2002) Seeing as how a central component of a hegemonic structure is that said power relationship is legitimate; language of free markets implies the markets are free, even though they might not be. Ideas of an internationalized state, with need to adjust to the international system by means of economic and military coercion are given legitimacy through institutions which are by themselves a symptom of the prevailing world order of internationalized state with a large focus on the political economy. Even though the hegemony wasn't expressed solely in latent power, it would seem foolish to disregard the actions of the CPA to the language of *realpolitik*. Instead we should note the structural power of neoliberalism which emerges from the core of the current world order: Washington. From the white house, and Capitol Hill, the perceived idea of marketization being the road to world success can be interpreted as a deliberate strategy to increase US-influence in the world; or it can simply be seen as overconfidence in the ideas or marketization. However the structural coercion is still ever present, from the global sphere all the way down to the peace building in Iraq.

In this theoretical framework for neoliberal peacebuilding, marketization is the most central one. It is the engine that, with the help of institutions and material capabilities of the hegemonic order, influences state building, and the Rule of Law; labour and welfare. It does so by many different means. By promulgating a free market, state assets are liquidated - limiting the possibility for a functioning welfare system; it outsources the Rule of Law by using private security; it invites corporatist interests in policymaking; it side-lines a democratic process and much else in the belief that the market will solve all issues arising. In that belief, private security gets to play a prominent role in upholding the Rule of Law, civil society is neglected as an arena for peace, the use of welfare as a mediating policy between labour and the capital is unheeded and corporate interests outclass the needs of individuals. Meanwhile the structural power of US finance gives the invaders a new arena to extract profit from, a new country to introduce into global capitalism, a new people to exploit. These consequences by focusing on the political economy of neoliberalism in peacebuilding are done so with the discursive power of freedom, trying to force the Iraqi people into believing the course of neoliberal globalism as the true and only path to peace.

However, it is still important to note that economic prosperity is crucial to a decent living for individuals in today's world; but is it worth disregarding a myriad of other aspects of human living, especially when it is no secret who the current world order benefits the most? Though there is need to be a bit cautious. The simplistic way this study was carried out does leave many aspects of neoliberal peacebuilding unanswered, and though there seems to be evidence for a neoliberal hegemonic expression in Iraq, this was a single-case study with limited space and time. One could also claim US interest in Iraq was benign, and the outcome unfortunate; and maybe, the US is simply also blinded by the structural power of the neoliberal hegemony, the one they themselves are enforcing.

As the concluding remark, I would like to propose further studies on the subject of neoliberal peace building, and Iraq. Since this was a case study, and in much a probe to see how the neoliberal hegemony was expressed in Iraq it does only scour the surface. In order to examine what this neoliberal expression led to, a process tracing method could give further contextual knowledge about Iraq. In a process tracing

method, with a critical approach, one could also search for the emergence of a rivalling structure. If one is more interested in generalized knowledge about the world, or if one has a more positivistic approach, an analytical schedule can be made and see if the same neoliberal expression is/has been present in other peace building efforts around the globe.

7 Bibliography

Avant, Deborah. 2009. "Making peacemakers out of spoilers: international organizations, private military training and statebuilding". Paris, Roland & Sisk, Timothy D (red). *The Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*. New York. Routledge

Avant, Deborah & Sigelman, Lee (2010). "Private Security and Democracy: Lessons from the US in Iraq. *Security Studies*. Vol 19 No 2.

Barakat, Sultan (2005). "Post-Saddam Iraq: deconstructing a regime, reconstructing a nation". *Third World Quarterly*. Vol 26 No 4-5.

Briggs, Åsa (1961). "The Welfare State in a Historical Perspective." *European Journal of Sociology*. Vol 2 No 2

Clark, Ian (2001). *The Post-Cold War Order*. New York. Oxford University Press.

Cox, Robert (2004). Beyond Empire and Terror: Critical Reflections on the Political Economy of World Order. *New political Economy*, Vol 9 No 3.

Cox, Robert (1983). Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method. *Journal of International Studies*. Vol 12 No 2.

Cox, Robert W. (1981) Social forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory. Millennium: *journal of International Studies*, Vol 10 No 2.

Dobbins, James - Jones, Seth - Runkle, Benjamin – Siddarth, Mohandas (2009). *Occupying Iraq. A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority*. National Security Research Division, New York.

Dodge, Toby. 2013. "Back to the future: the failure to reform the post-war political economy of Iraq". Berdal, Mats & Zaum, Dominik (red). *Political Economy of Statebuilding*. Routledge. London & New York.

Dodge, Toby. (2006) "Iraq: The contradictions of exogenous state-building in historical perspective" *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 27 no 1.

Dodge, Toby (2005) "Iraqi transitions: from regime change to state collapse". *Third World Quarterly*. Vol 26 No 4

Duffield, Mark. (2007) *Development, Security and Unending War*. Cambridge, Polity Press.

Edkins, Jenny & Zehfuss, Maja. 2014. "Introduction". Edkins, Jenny & Zehfuss, Maja (Red). *Global Politics. A New Introduction*. London & New York. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Eric Herring & Glen Rangwala (2005) "Iraq, Imperialism and Global Governance" *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 26.

Flyvberg, Bent (2006). "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research". *Qualitative Inquiry*, Vol 12 No 2

George, Alexander & Bennet, Andrew (2005). *Case studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MIT Press.

Gregory, Dereck. (2004) *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan. Palestine. Iraq*. Blackwell Publishing.

Harvey, David. (2005) *A brief history of neoliberalism*. New York, Oxford University press.

Harvey, David (2003) *The New Imperialism*. New York, Oxford University press.

Harvey, David. (2007) "Neoliberalism as creative destruction." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol 610

Henriksen, Thomas. (2007) *American Power After the Berlin Wall*. London. Palgrave Macmillian.

Herring, Eric. 2008. "Neoliberalism Versus Peacebuilding in Iraq". Pugh, Michael – Cooper, Neil, Turner Mandy (Red), *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding*. London. Palgrave Macmillian.

Jessop, Bob (2002) "Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Urban Governance: A State–Theoretical Perspective." *Antipode*, Vol 34 No 3.

Keohane, Robert, 2005. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Mac Ginty, Roger & Richmond, Oliver. (2007) "Myth or Reality: Opposing Views on the Liberal Peace and Post-war Reconstruction". *Journal of Global Society*. Vol 21, 2007.

Newman, Edward. (2013) "The violence of statebuilding in historical perspective: implications for peacebuilding" *Peacebuilding*, Vol 1 No 1.

Paris, Roland (2004) *At Wars End*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Paris, Roland. (2010). "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding". *Review of International Studies*. Vol 36

Pin-Fat, Véronique. 2014. "How do we begin to think about the world". Jenny & Zehfuss, Maja (Red). *Global Politics. A New Introduction*. London & New York. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Pugh, Michael (2005) "The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Theory Perspective". *International Journal of Peace Studies*. Vol. 10 No. 2

Thakur, Ramesh, 2006. *The United Nations, Peace and Security*. Cambridge University Press

Richmond, Oliver P. (2009). "Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-Local Hybridity via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding" *Journal of Intervention and State building*, Vol 3 No 3.

Richmond, Oliver (2004). "The Globalization of Responses to Conflict and the Peacebuilding Consensus". *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*. Vol 39 No 2.

Richmond, Oliver (2009). "The Romanticisation of the Local: Welfare, Culture and Peacebuilding", *The International Spectator*, Vol 44 No 1.

Richmond, Oliver (2006). "The problem of peace: understanding the 'liberal peace'". *Conflict, Security & Development*. Vol 6 No 3.

Security Council resolution 1493 (2003) [on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait]

Selby, Jan. (2013) "The myth of liberal peace-building" *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol 13 No 1

Stein, Ben. "In Class War, Guess Which Class Is Winning" *New York Times*. 26-11-2006. [Elektronisk]
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/business/yourmoney/26every.html>, retrieved: 2017-05-23.

Tansey, Oisín. 2013. "State building and the limits of constitutional design". Berdal, Mats & Zaum, Dominik (red). *Political Economy of Statebuilding*. Routledge. London & New York.

Tripathi, Salil. 2008. "Corporate Social Responsibility" Pugh, Michael – Cooper, Neil, Turner Mandy (Red), *Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding*. London. Palgrave Macmillan.

Urdal, Henrik. (2006) "A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence". *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol 50 No 3.

Wendt, Alexander (1987) "The agent-structure problem in international relations theory". *International Organisation*. Vol 41 No 3.

Whyte, Dave (2007). "The Crimes of Neoliberal Rule in Occupied Iraq" *The British Journal of Criminology* Vol. 47 No. 2