

# Feminist Entrepreneurship within the UNSC

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# 1. Abstract

This thesis seeks to answer the question of how Sweden acts as a norm entrepreneur with regards to its feminist foreign policy. Sweden's membership within the United Nations Security Council presents an opportunity to analyse the country's norm entrepreneurship within the UN's most powerful organ. Constructivist norm theory combined with small state theory provides a theoretical framework for analysis. By using qualitative content analysis the author applies a model based on the action plan for the feminist foreign policy on weekly reports from the Swedish delegation to the UNSC. The Author finds that Sweden acts as a norm entrepreneur by keeping gender on the agenda within the Council, but also finds that Sweden's small size sometimes constrains its entrepreneurship when issues of high politics are discussed.

Keywords: *Norms, norm entrepreneur, small state, UNSC, feminist foreign policy*

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## 2. Introduction

“(...)the dominant exact what they can and the weak concede what they must” (Thucydides cited in Hammond 2009:302). Small states are at a general disadvantage within an international system that often favours the large and military powerful. Realists often claim that small states are but players that dance to the tunes of the powerful. This is an oversimplification and an underestimate of the power of small states, for there are several methods small states can use in order to increase their international influence. One of them is by acting as a norm entrepreneur (Björkdahl 2007:539). The possibility for a small state to act as a norm entrepreneur is very much dependent on the current international system. International governmental organisations (IGOs) such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) have lessened the power asymmetries between small and large states. Whereas before, small states often had to rely on bilateral agreements where they could sometimes not possibly reap absolute, or even, relative gains, IGOs have provided small states with an arena where they can be part of systems where one state gets one vote. Although power asymmetries still exists, small states benefit a great deal from these kind of voting systems (Panke 2012:389). They also get the opportunity to participate in councils where the fate of the world is decided. The most prominent council in this regard is United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It has the power to decide when military intervention is justified and when it is not. By becoming a member of the UNSC, a small state is suddenly at the epicentre of power. It has a powerful voice on the international stage and its opinions are scrutinised by the world (Vreeland & Dreher 2014:1-3).

It is within these forums that small states can act as norm entrepreneurs. Sweden's membership within these organisations, and its prevalent norm entrepreneurship within them, shows

that norm entrepreneurship is a real and potentially effective foreign policy approach that allows small states to punch above their weight (Björkdahl 2007:538). Sweden has since the second world war established an identity as a human rights pioneer, a soft power strategy adopted in recognition of its incapacity to influence through military power. Using its small size to act as a moral power balancer, Sweden openly criticised the Vietnam war, much to United State's outrage. Sweden was also a staunch supporter of the ANC in South Africa, and a vocal critic of the Apartheid regime, resulting in Sweden becoming the first country graced with a state visit from Nelson Mandela. It has been engaged in international politics to a larger extent than many countries of the same size. Officials like Dag Hammarsköld, who was the Secretary-General in the 1950s, shaped the United Nations itself (Ingebriksen 2006:3,30). The Nordic states also provided 25% of the peacekeeping personnel during the Cold War and are recognised as frontrunners when it comes to women's rights (Thorhallson & Bailes 2016:301).

Sweden has continued this tradition. In 2014 the new left-green government declared that it was feminist and that it would include a feminist foreign policy (FFP). Within the action plan for FFP it states that women should have the same power to decide the fate of their lives as men. Currently, this is not the case in any sphere of the world. Women still earn less, women are less likely to be political leaders and women often suffer unproportionally in the event of conflict and natural disaster. By including a gender perspective in all aspects of their foreign policy, Sweden wants to increase its effort to fight these injustices at the same time as it believes that including more women in peace processes overall, will increase the probability of establishing a sustainable peace. With FFP, Sweden means to achieve concrete results and be seen as the world leader in the promotion of gender equality (Regeringskansliet 2017s:3).

But how does one act as a norm entrepreneur? Within constructivist literature there has been extensive research done concerning the spread of norms within the international system (see e.g Finnemore & Skikkink 1998;Florini 1996;Payne 2001;Finnemore 1996;Finnemore 2004). Finnemore and Skikkink established a theoretical model for how norms are spread composed of three different steps, the first of which is norm emergence where a norm entrepreneur constructs a powerful frame in order to spread the norm. However, Sweden as a small state has to contend with having less resources than its large state counterparts, like the United States, and will thus have to use different methods to promote its norm. Therefore, I will combine norm theory with small state theory in order to answer the question:

*How does Sweden act as a norm entrepreneur with regard to its feminist foreign policy?*

To answer this question, however, it must be clarified what a feminist foreign policy entails in order to deduce what its goals with the policy are and how it is to apply them in order to achieve concrete change.

“To achieve change demands bravery, perseverance and political will” (Regeringskansliet 2016:3). This is truer than ever as Sweden has embarked upon a UNSC membership where political tensions and upheaval has potential to disrupt or make Sweden's entrepreneurship in regard to its

FFP. I intend to study how Sweden works within the UNSC to promote its FFP as an organisational platform is often essential for a norm to spread (Finnemore & Skikkink 1998).

### 3. Previous Research

Work concerning small state entrepreneurship has been done before. Björkdahl has studied how Sweden acted as a norm entrepreneur with regards to conflict prevention within the UN (2007) and within the EU (2008). Vreeland and Dreher (2014) have written about small states within, and the economy of, the UNSC. Thorhallson (2006) has written about how to establish the size of a country, along with a collaborative chapter with Bailes (2016) about small state diplomacy. Panke (2012) has written about small states in multilateral negotiations. Aggestam and Bergman-Rosamund (2016) and Egnell (2016) have written about Sweden's feminist foreign policy, what it entails and its prospects. No one has as of yet written about how exactly Sweden acts as a norm entrepreneur with regard to its FFP within the UNSC. With this in mind I hope to make a cumulative contribution to the study of norm entrepreneurship and small state studies as well as fulfilling a social criteria of furthering the understanding of what an alternative norm for foreign policies could look like, one that seeks to empower women and prevent conflict instead of instigating it (Teorell & Svensson 2017:18-9). Furthermore, the originality of FFP makes it a highly interesting subject to study within the field of International Relations as it is a new and potentially short lived concept, but one that opens up new discussions within the field (Bjereld et.al 2009:81-2).

## 4. Theory

### *4.1 Norm Theory*

The importance of norms in international society depends on the theoretical approach used. Within neorealism, norms reflect the power dynamic within international society and only a power change would change norms within it (Florini 1996:363). But power does not come of its own, it is based on moral assumptions of right and wrong. Furthermore, norms are not necessarily first established by powerful or hegemonic states, as the universal suffrage for women shows, considering the fact that small states like New Zealand and Finland were the first to grant women the vote, (even if the US and the UK inhabited some of the original and famous suffragettes) (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:889,896). However, although norm entrepreneurs do not have to be big states to succeed, there are some disadvantages with being small, such as having a smaller administration to promote the norm. Thus communication aspects could potentially affect the probability of a norm spreading (Florini 1996:375). Constructivists believe that norms are essential in order to understand and explain the workings of international relations. Norms can explain change within the international system. They explain why states act as they do and shape how they view the world. They are behind

the assumptions of “rationality” that theories such as realism and liberalism abide by (ibid:363-6). Rationality and norms are thus connected. Shared ideas and beliefs give the world structure. These ideas change over time, as can be observed through normative changes in regard to slavery, gender equality and the environment (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 887-890,894).

But what is a norm? A general definition is that it is “(...) a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Ibid:891). Another way to phrase it is that they “(...)constitute a community’s shared understandings and intentions; they are “social facts” and reflect legitimate social purpose” (Payne 2001:38). What sets norms apart from other rules and regulations are their sense of “oughtness”. If someone adheres to the norm they receive praise, if someone breaks the norm, they are stigmatised and face disapproval from other actors. Norms are not necessarily universal, many are regional and they often vary in strength. Furthermore, there are no good or bad norms. Norms are promoted because the actor believes in them, which explains the changes over time and space in regard to, for example, gender equality. Another important consideration when speaking about norms is how to spot one; how do we know that a norm is a norm? Since norms are built on moral assumptions of what we ought to do, norms can be spotted by following the communications surrounding political actions, as they need to be legitimised (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:892). This is aptly illustrated by the US motivation for the invasion of Iraq 2003 where they argued that they would emancipate the local population by inserting democracy, all in order to justify an intervention without a UN-mandate. Without the norm of non-intervention there would be no reason to justify the war at all (Finnemore 2004). Moreover, it is imperative that a norm is seen as a legitimate behavioural claim. Norms are not always enforced, especially within the international system where there is no consistent police force to enforce rules, they are instead obeyed because they are seen as legitimate (Florini 1996:364-5).

Norms are both domestic and international, and the two are intimately linked. In fact, domestic norms are often exported to the international arena by a norm entrepreneur. This can be reversed, as international norms can be adopted domestically. These international norms become filtered through already existing domestic norms and thus variations between states occurs, which could explain why abortion is regarded as an essential right for women in some countries and as a crime in others. Domestic influence on international norms are strongest early on in a norms life cycle and it becomes much harder to influence it once it has become institutionalised internationally. Finnemore and Sikkink mean that there is a life cycle of norms that determines whether a norm will become international and how it reaches that status. They developed a model of three stages through which one could analyse the spread of international norms: (1) Norm emergence; (2) norm acceptance; and (3) norm internalisation. There are different processes and logistics behind each stage in a norms life cycle. Between the first two, for example, there exists a tipping point at which stage more states start to adopt the norm and a norm cascade is started. Behind each stage there are different actors operating and there are different motives and strategies used (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:893-5).

The first stage, norm emergence, is characterised by a norm entrepreneur who promotes the norm, (also known as norm leader), by attempting to persuade other states to adopt it. At the second

stage, norm acceptance, states try to socialise other states into adopting the norm, which many of them will do as they feel the pressure to conform along with a wish to be seen as a legitimate international actor, which starts a norm cascade. At the third stage, norm internalisation, a critical mass has adopted the norm and it has become so institutionalised it is no longer remarked upon. This model is not a foolproof prediction of all norms, many norms fail to enter the second stage as they are too controversial, or not promoted enough, to be adopted by a critical mass of states (ibid: 895).

Since the first stage in the norm cycle is the most relevant one for this paper, as the concept of FFP is newly devised and has not progressed long enough to enter the second stage, it is imperative that I define what constitutes a norm entrepreneur. Finnemore and Sikkink define norm entrepreneurs; “(...) as agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community” (ibid:896). Norm entrepreneurs are important because they call attention to certain issues by using language in order to dramatise them, something that is also known as framing. The construction of these frames are vital to a norm entrepreneur as, if it is done correctly, they will motivate the public (in this case states) to adopt the norm (Ibid:897). Framing is a very important tool for persuasion, a successfully constructed frame can potentially be an effective power tool without the need for excessive material resources (Payne 2001:39). These frames are contested by already existing ones that compete for attention and make it harder for new frames to take hold (Florini 1996:367). Since the norm entrepreneur has to challenge current notions of what is considered to be appropriate they might have to act in an “inappropriate” manner in order to provoke reaction and call attention to the frame (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:897-8).

Norm entrepreneurs need an organisational platform from which they can export their norms, like the UN or the EU. There are several reasons for this. One of the reasons is that it is a venue that many states frequent under the same (for the most part) conditions, and thus a norm exported to this arena is more likely to influence a greater amount of states. Different organisational platforms have different abilities to promote the norms (Ibid:899). The UN, for example, possesses a lot of resources and can in some severe cases coerce states to adopt norms, although this is not always very efficient, as coercion lacks legitimacy (Payne 2001:42). NGOs and IGOs, however, do not have such power and must thus persuade actors to adopt the norm. An organisational platform is also important because the norm can benefit from being institutionalised within it, through rules or regulations, in order for a norm cascade to start. However, norms can cascade before becoming institutionalised too (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:899-900).

In order to reach the tipping point about a third of the world's states would have to adopt the norm. All states are not equal, however, as some states are more powerful and important in order to start the cascade. What states are deemed to be critical will vary from case to case (Ibid:901). It is thus of major importance for states to get the norms they advocate for on the agenda along with managing to convince major states to adopt the norms by arguing for their moral superiority or persuade them that it is within their interests to adopt them (Elgström 2000:460)

Another important aspect to consider is what norms are likely to spread. Florini claims that the norms that fit the current norm pool and are better suited to the current normative climate have a

better chance of spreading, as no norm exists in a vacuum. Since existing international norms are often codified in law, through different declarations and resolutions, new norms need to be advocated as logical extensions, or improvements, of those laws (Florini 1996:368,375-7).

Ole Elgström claims that there are norms that are unobjectionable in a certain time and geographical space. These norms possess such a moral superiority, or are so internalised, that they cannot be opposed openly or directly. Instead opponents to certain proposals shaped by these unobjectionable norms have to take more discrete and indirect paths. This discrete opposition could potentially explain why norms that seem to be taken as a given does not become internalised within certain organisations, such as the EU. Unobjectionable norms are usually quite broad moral positions. When they are to be institutionalised within organisations, however, they need to be specified and negotiated. This last aspect can be problematic as norms are notoriously hard to compromise on. Since norms are prioritised differently in different cultures, within the EU for example, there will be countries that are quicker to internalise a norm, (vanguards), and countries that are reluctant to do so, (laggards) (Elgström 2005:29-31,33).

#### *4.2 Small State Theory*

Within constructivist literature there have been different minds to whether state size, or power, affects the possibility of success for a norm entrepreneur. Payne argues that no norm entrepreneur can successfully export a norm without significant political wrangling. According to him, factors such as material wealth and other power resources can have potential effect on the success of a frame. Powerful states can also manipulate and try to influence frames to suit themselves. Frames must thus be understood in relation to power distribution (Payne 2001:44-5,54). Florini also talks about the potential of power having an effect on which norms win the battle to become institutionalised; bringing up logistical aspects such as administrative size (Florini 1996:375). Finnemore suggests that coercive power affects the possibility of being heard in the first place (Finnemore 2004:143). However, small states have succeeded in being norm entrepreneurs. Sweden managed to institutionalise conflict prevention within the EU (Björkdahl 2008), and made similar, less successful, attempts within the UN (Björkdahl 2007). This thus brings to the fore the question of how Sweden's small size can affect its potential to act as a norm entrepreneur.

Population size has classically been the most popular measurement when establishing a state's size. A large population is often more able to support a large military; both through personnel and funding, as a larger population usually means larger tax revenues. A large economy also makes goods cheaper to produce as it has a larger internal market. However, multilateral organisations such as the EU have changed the rules; small states in Europe are now included in the world's largest free market (Alesina & Spolaore 2003:3).

Thorhallsson has expanded the definition of a small state from the classic domains such as military capacity, GDP, territory and population size and included aspects such as perceptual and preference size. The former refers to how states see themselves and how it's seen by others; such as



other states, businesses, NGOs etc. In this regard, Sweden can be considered quite successful as the country often enters the diplomatic field as a unified front and considers itself, and is often considered by others, as a moral and humanitarian “superpower”. Preference size refers to how large a state wants to be. Sweden, who was a large superpower within Europe a few hundred years ago, often wants to be bigger and more powerful than it is, as it believes in its own capabilities. This could lead to a stronger commitment to international organisations and a large participation within them. Furthermore, it’s important to consider a state’s administrative capacity. A small state has less human resources to draw upon which could result in a lessened ability to actively take part in some international discussions within the EU and the UN. This means that states have to prioritise in regard to which issues they would like to invest the capacity they do possess (Thorhallsson 2006:7,14,20-21,24-6).

Since international society has become more characterised by multilateral organisations, with norms and rules against military intervention as well as relatively equal terms per state, military prowess, or lack thereof, has lessened in importance (Thorhallsson & Wivel 2006:655). Just because a state is small does not necessarily mean it is weak. There are plenty of other strengths that are not military, like a strong cohesion, being well organised and considered just (Neumann & Gstöhl 2006:8). Size can depend on the situation as a state can be small in one aspect and powerful in another (Thorhallsson & Wivel 2006:654). Joseph S. Nye Jr created the concept of soft power with which he means “(...)the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.” (Nye 2004:x). By focusing on soft power, small states can potentially circumvent the need for military prowess to access some influence.

Being a small state means that Sweden will have to contend with having less political weight than other states, and less economic and financial resources with which to promote their issues and arguments. This also means that even within multilateral organisations where all states are formally equal, some states will be more capable to get their point across than others. However, small size is what states make of it, according to Panke, as small states usually engage fully with issues that are close to their hearts. There are several methods with which small states can go about this business. Firstly, they can engage in capacity-building, which can entail coalition building with like minded states, close cooperation with specialised agencies, or through contact with NGOs. Secondly, small states need to use persuasion methods, in line with soft-power, rather than bargaining, as small states have more limited bargaining power. Small states also benefit from influencing policies in the early stages, as it is hard for a small state to achieve change when many decisions have already been made. If small states prioritise, make use of capacity building, build coalitions and make sure that the arguments they make match the current frame, whether it is normative or technical, they can achieve some influence (Panke 2012:387-90,92-4).

The way small states and large states engage in diplomacy is different. Since small states are much weaker in bilateral negotiations, membership in organisations such as the UN and the EU is beneficial, as it gives them a means to influence the international system. However, not all small

states have the same opportunity to achieve international influence. Being seen as a country that is stable and credible with good governance will further a state's chance to influence and enable it to become a norm entrepreneur. It is precisely with norm entrepreneurship that small states have a chance of influencing, along with innovative and clever ideas. The benign image of the Nordic states along with their impartiality make them credible actors who are often asked to participate in mediations and investigative commissions. Small administrations can be limiting, however, they also have advantages. They are more flexible and less hierarchical and officials have a larger freedom of manoeuvre. If a small state prepares well for a certain issue, like Sweden did with conflict prevention within the EU, they can succeed (Bailes & Thorhallsson 2016:297-301).

Acting as norm entrepreneurs fits small states since they are not always hindered by large power politics and can act as moral power balancers by criticising large powers (Ingebritsen 2006:290). Björkdahl elaborates on how a small state can effectively use norm advocacy to increase its influence within the EU. By using framing, diplomatic tactics, utilising its presidency term and by setting the agenda Sweden managed to institutionalise conflict prevention within the EU; and thus managed to influence the security domain, showing that it is not necessarily impossible for a small state to do so. Although it is essential that it practice what it preaches (Björkdahl 2008:135-7,139-40).

## 5. What does a Feminist Foreign Policy entail?

When the left-green coalition came to power in 2014, they declared that they would be the first official feminist government in Sweden, and that it would include a feminist foreign policy. Margot Wallström, the Foreign Minister, who has previously been the UN-representative for sexual violence in conflict, was the main brain behind the policy. She has stated that FFP centres around the three Rs; representation, rights and reallocation (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamund 2016:325). With representation, Sweden wants to emphasise the need to include women in all stages of decision-making along with representation in different fields. They also want to increase dialogue with the women who are already represented, including within civil society. With rights, they want to work for women and girls to receive full access to human rights, along with fighting all forms of violence and discrimination that limit their agency. With Reallocation, Sweden wants to reallocate resources in order to enable women and girls' full enjoyment of human rights, they will also apply specific focuses toward different age groups. In the action plan for 2017 another R has been added, which stands for reality and analysis, upon which the work for gender equality will be based. This is especially important, they deem, as there in some instances have been regressions on the rights of women, girls' and LGBTQ people in some places of the world. By providing comparable statistics and a subsequent analysis of them, Sweden hopes to be able to revert this trend (Regeringskansliet 2017s:10,15).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has come up with six main focus points for 2017 intended to help them reach their long term goals. These points are broad in order to cover the

global spectrum. The six focus points for 2017 are; (1) increased human rights for women and girls fleeing war or who are migrating; (2) to fight violence against women and girls within close relationships; (3) Increased participation for women and girls within conflict prevention and prevention of violent extremism; (4) increased agency for women and girls as a strategy against the shrinking democratic space, political violence and women and girls double vulnerability; (5) Increased economic agency and influence by working for nondiscriminatory laws; and lastly, (6) by intensifying its work in regard to sexual reproductive rights for all (ibid:1-2). There are several different sub-points to all of these which specify what the MFA is to do to further them. A lot of these are vaguely phrased. For example, they mention that the MFA should work to highlight the possibility of gender-based sexual violence for women and girls fleeing war but they do not give any specifics to how it should be fought and prevented. Under the second focus point they mention that the MFA is to fight norms connecting masculinity with violence, indicating that Sweden sees itself as a norm-changer. Point three is especially relevant when it comes to UNSC as it relates to resolution 1325 which focuses on women's participation in peace-processes and peacebuilding. Under both point four and five there is special mention of guidelines that the EU have already established and how they, and other aspects such as the EU's internal market can be used to further gender equality and increased agency for women. Sweden also wants to pressure other member states to uphold the reproductive rights of its citizens under point six (ibid:5-7). This might indicate that Sweden is more comfortable to push for these subjects within the EU than within the UNSC.

The data gathered and the subsequent analysis of it is done through an intersectional lens in order to acknowledge that women are not a homogenous group. The work will also include men and boys, as all members of society have to change in order to dismantle the patriarchy. Sweden will push for this intersectional lens within multilateral organisations (ibid:3).

When it comes to the question of how Sweden will go about implementing these policies, they put emphasis on promoting FFP through multilateral organisations and through bilateral relationships. Their membership in the UNSC is specifically mentioned as an opportunity to practise FFP in regard to peace and security. The EU is also mentioned as a vital organisation for the implementation of FFP. The EU has extensive gender legislation already, which Sweden wants to ensure that the member states fully comply to. Within these they will push for the creation and implementation of legislation promoting gender equality and emancipation. Sweden also wants to make sure that they use data on gender, and segregate it in order to get a full insight to current equality discrepancies. They will act both normatively and operatively by fully using their resources, such as membership, partial ownership, partnership in different organisations in order to achieve this. Building coalitions and partnerships will be essential to this work. They will also cooperate and discuss these questions with women's rights organisations. The MFA will communicate externally by arguing for why gender equality is a logical and effective measure for increased stability and a positive contribution to society. This last point can be said to be essential for Sweden's framing of FFP. By using statistics Sweden hopes to convey the message that gender equality and female emancipation benefit the whole of society. To communicate this the MFA will create a special communicative platform where statistics supporting the benefits of gender equality

will be portrayed along with general information about Sweden's work with FFP. The platform for this will be adapted for regional and organisational differences (Ibid:11,14-15,17).

One can question the claim that they truly have incorporated gender through the whole Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Egnell claims that one gets the impression, from the 2016 plan, that the whole feminist action plan stands outside of the rest of the MFA's guidelines, as a separate part, which is problematic because it is precisely such distinction that have lessened the effect of gender policies before. There are several other aspects of the action plan, however, that are promising and have shown results. For example, Sweden created a network of women mediators in order to increase female participation according to resolution 1325. They also supported women, and helped to include them, in the Colombian peace deal. When it comes to practising what you preach, Sweden has not only created a network of female mediators but its army has integrated gender policies into their work for ten years, with several measures taken, such as inserting Gender Field Advisors (Egnell 2016:575-7).

## 6. Methodology

Considering that norm entrepreneurs need to have an organisational platform where they can export their norm it seemed logical to look at how Sweden acts as a norm entrepreneur within the UN. It is also a multilateral setting which benefits small states. However, it would be beyond the scope of this essay to look at every single aspect of Sweden's work within the organisation. Sweden's membership in the UNSC presented an opportunity to analyse how Sweden acts as a norm entrepreneur in the most powerful UN-organ (Gould & Rablen 2016:20). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs releases a weekly report of their actions and the decisions made within the UNSC, along with speeches and official statements from Margot Wallström. Considering repeated statements within the action plan for the FFP of the possibilities for it within the UNSC it seemed a logical point of analysis (Regeringskansliet 2017s). The UNSC is fraught with political dissent and it can be difficult for small states to hold sway. It has fifteen members, but five of them have veto-rights and it is plagued by large-power rivalries (Gould & Rablen 2016:20). This makes it an interesting forum to analyse through a small state perspective.

The importance of the EU was also emphasised. The EU's common foreign policy, through the EEAS and the Council of Foreign Affairs is an effective way for Sweden's policies to reach out (Regeringskansliet 2017s). However, to analyse both the EU and the UNSC would be beyond the scope of this essay. The closed format of the Council of Foreign Affairs also made it difficult to find concrete evidence of the entrepreneurship. I will thus only analyse Sweden's entrepreneurship within the UNSC.

In order to see what Sweden actually does and not what words or phrases they use to frame the issue applying a discourse analysis would not work (Bergström & Boréus 2013:23). A qualitative method seemed most appropriate and better suited to the chosen theories. A qualitative

method captures more nuances, as qualitative research is more concerned with a phenomenon's meaning or reason, whereas quantitative research is more concerned with counting the occurrence or frequency of something (Widerberg 2002:15,35). It is important that there is some logic and consistency to the research and analysis in order to reach validity and reliability. A framework for analysis of the texts would ensure this (Teorell & Svensson 2007:59).

Content analysis is classically a quantitative method but its ability to find actual content, how Sweden does act as a norm entrepreneur, made it interesting to see how it could be adapted to a qualitative version. The method's very purpose is to find explicit expressions of something's occurrence. Within quantitative content analysis it is common to systematically count how frequent certain terms or words are. This can be done either by computer or manually. The latter is more useful if one wishes to capture subtle nuances and changes, making it relevant for qualitative analysis. Qualitative content analysis also analyses a text systematically but without resorting to actual counting. Information about the method is hard to come by. However, according to Bergström and Boréus the method can easily be adapted as long as one is careful to motivate why one makes the adaptation. It is also important to be aware of the discourse in which the texts were produced (Bergström & Boréus 2013:49-52,55). At the same time as Sweden prides itself as being forerunner in regard to human rights and gender equality a rise of nationalism within some of the large powers, with a President bragging about sexual assault in one (West 2016) and a country where LGBTQ people are reportedly fearing for their lives (The Economist 2017:5), might make it difficult for Sweden to achieve these goals.

A common method of content analysis is to create a model of questions which one then applies to the text one wishes to analyse. These questions should be well formulated in order to encompass what one wishes to receive answers for. When one has made the model of analysis one should test it on the selected texts and modify it if needed (Bergström & Boréus 2013:55-6). I debated on whether to make an analytical model based on theory or the content of the action plan. I devised a model of each and tried them on the first four weekly reports from the UNSC. Due to the complexity of the theoretical model and the difficulties in assessing or finding aspects of them within the reports, I had to concede that the theoretical model, although highly interesting, would be difficult to use in such limited time and with limited material. The action plan model was easier to implement as I was able to find aspects in the material as well as telling absences, as content analysis can also be used to find what is not explicitly said (ibid:51,81).

1. How has Sweden pushed for work surrounding the four Rs: representation, rights, reallocation and reality-based analysis?
2. How has Sweden worked for the implementation of their six focus points for 2017?
3. Is there any argumentation for why gender equality is a logical step toward a more stable and profitable society?
4. Are different strategies used in certain circumstances, for example toward different actors or depending on regional differences?
5. Has Sweden expressed the use of alliances and coalitions in order to further their agenda?

6. Is there any difference in how much Sweden pushes for FFP when they inhabit the presidency and when they do not?

I based the questions on what I believe to be the main points of the action plan and on aspects that were constantly brought up. The most important questions are one and two as they capture the main goals of FFP both overall and the specific 2017 focus points. Question number three is interesting as it is vital to their framing of FFP (Regeringskansliet 2017s:15-7). Several of the members within the UNSC are aware of feminist issues, the question is how much it will be used within that particular forum. I also have a small hypothesis that Sweden might be more willing to push for gender issues in regard to less politically fraught situations. If certain conflicts are discussed, like Syria or Yemen where the majority of the permanent members are involved and are considered to be high security politics; feminist considerations might be neglected, as they have long been within security studies (Sjoberg 2010:1-2), especially when it is hard to get the subject on the table in the first place. Question number six is interesting because they mention the presidency as an opportunity for influence, it would thus be relevant to see if there are any specific differences when they inhabit it and when they do not. I have modified the analytical model a few times by removing questions that did not contribute much to the analysis and fell flat. I removed one concerning the rights of LGBTQ-people as I deemed that they would be difficult to find within UNSC as they are mainly concerned with peace and security, not to mention resistance among some members, like Russia, against these rights (Human Rights Watch 2014). In order to reach reliability it is imperative that I apply the model consistently to every report or speech that I use (Bergström & Boréus 2013:56).

Having said this, I am aware of several difficulties with this method. Firstly, the material I am to use, the weekly reports from the UNSC, can be problematic in some aspects. Since the reports are written by representatives of the Swedish government, there is a slight possibility that they might choose not to mention aspects that are not in their favour. The secretive nature of the UNSC can also present problems as meetings are often closed and some things that are discussed might not be relayed after the meeting, even if you can see who voted what (Vreeland & Dreher 2014:6). This also makes it difficult to see exactly what Sweden says within them. The only information I can gather about it is from the source that they themselves control, unless the meeting is open in which case it is filmed. However, many decisions taken within the UNSC are also done by shadow bargaining (Panke 2012) which makes it extra difficult to see how Sweden is actually operating. Despite this, I have still decided to use the source; what Sweden itself reports to be doing within the UNSC in order to reach its goals with FFP is interesting to analyse. It is also an efficient way to see how it does act as a norm entrepreneur as it is within its interest to convey that it is actually implementing the policy, even if there will be several difficulties for Sweden to do so due to its small size and large power politics (ibid:392-3). Furthermore, due to the fact that Sweden has only been a member for five months it will be hard to draw any definite conclusions. It will mostly be a guide to how Sweden has acted as a norm entrepreneur so far.

Other material will be used, such as previous research and articles that are relevant to the subject, along with the action plan and other relevant policy documents. It is important to state that I

approach this study with a hermeneutical perspective. My analysis and understanding of this research is coloured by a predetermined view of the nature of the world, as are the articles upon which I base large parts of this paper on. There is no such thing as complete objectivity, only methods one can use to get a little closer to it (Widerberg 2002:26). By clearly stating methods and approaches I hope to reach some level of intersubjectivity (Teorell & Svensson 2007:54). Within classic content analysis it is common to use a double coding, which means that you apply the model twice in order to reach intersubjectivity and reliability (Bergström & Boréus 2013:57). However, this being a qualitative study with limited time, double coding of the whole model is superfluous, but the amount of times issues related to FFP has been mentioned has been double coded in order to prevent miscalculation. The same model is used for every text but it cannot be guaranteed that every person would interpret the text exactly the same, it can only be hoped that it would at least be largely similar, good reliability will be achieved by clearly stating intentions, methods and positions (Teorell & Svensson 2007:59).

## 7. Analysis

Within the UN, the UNSC is the most powerful organ (Vreeland & Dreher 2014:1). It decides whether it is legitimate to use force in a situation or whether it is not. States care about this because they are aware that there can be political costs to disobeying and it is preferable to comply, although some large states are unlikely to face repercussions. The US can, and have many times, ignored consulting the organ. Due to complex power politics the UNSC has often been at a deadlock. This has sometimes been circumvented by extensive side payments by one or several of the veto states in order to persuade others to grant a UNSC-approval. This is something only powerful states can afford (Voeten 2005:529,531-2). Because the UNSC functions as the world's informational focal point, and because people tend to view approvals by the UNSC normatively, it is very much an actor that performs symbolic legitimacy (Vreeland & Dreher 2014:1-2). With this in consideration, it would matter very much if the UNSC would increase its implementation of feminist policies. Considering the complexity of the UNSC it can be difficult for Sweden to have actual affect on hot topics as the large powers engage in frequent shadow bargaining and arrive at meetings with the result pretty much predetermined. Especially since Sweden would be hard pressed to match larger states economic bribes.

Within the UNSC the presidency rotates monthly. The president sets the agenda for the month and consults the representative from each other member state, the president then resides over the meetings. A total of nine of the fifteen members must approve of a resolution for it to pass. An elected state is thus only pivotal if it is the "ninth vote" needed, which as of 2014 has only happened three times. 98% of voting power belongs to the permanent five. Small states' votes are still recruited by permanent members though, because they may inhabit legitimacy that the permanent members do not. So an approval of a small state could be considered important (Vreeland & Dreher 2014:6-7,10).

With this, and previous, information in mind it is time to begin my analysis of UNSC weekly reports. I have looked at 18 weeks and have received various results. It is important to keep in mind that for Sweden to act as a norm entrepreneur it is vital that it pushes for feminist policies more than other states, if Sweden does not stand out as a pusher for gender-based questions it will not have fulfilled its goal in being the world leader in gender policies. I will answer each question in turn and will then conclude the paper with a discussion of the findings.

*How has Sweden pushed for work surrounding the four Rs: representation, rights, reallocation and reality based analysis?*

During the first month of Sweden's membership it inhabited the presidency. The main focus points were women, peace and security along with, and as a part of, conflict prevention (Regeringskansliet 2017a). This resulted in Sweden inviting two women from civil society groups to brief the Council. One was Fatima Askira, a representative of Borno Women Development Initiative in North Eastern Nigeria, who urged the UNSC to work for more long-term goals in the region (Regeringskansliet 2017b). During its last week as president it invited Asha Gelle who briefed the Council on the political situation in Somalia and her goal of reaching 30% female representation within parliament (Regeringskansliet 2017d). These invites fitted the goal of increased representation. Including civil society groups brings women's situation to attention, at the same time the invite of Gelle also brings up the importance of female representation in parliament.

There were also several mentions of sexual violence in conflict. Concerns were raised about it in the Central African Republic (CAR). Sweden managed, together with a couple of other members, to include a new passage regarding sexual violence in the new and updated resolution (ibid). CAR came up at several meetings as there had been reports of sexual abuse and exploitation by UN-staff (Regeringskansliet 2017g). Sweden's minister for Children, Elderly and Equality, Åsa Regner, was present at a meeting where they discussed trafficking related to conflict and she emphasised the importance of applying a gender perspective when discussing the subject. She also expressed concern over the abuse in CAR and wanted more focus on rehabilitation of the victims along with taking the responsible to account (Regeringskansliet 2017k). Sexual violence in South Sudan was also discussed, but no measures beyond condemnation were taken (Regeringskansliet 2017f). All of these fitted into rights, as in right to be free from violence and abuse. In general, sexual violence was often brought up and often something the council could agree to do something about.

Instances of reality-based analysis was harder to deduce. There was one instance where Sweden managed to convince the Council prior to the renewal of the UN-mandate in Guinea-Bissau, to strengthen its gender perspective (Regeringskansliet 2017h). An Arria meeting, a meeting that is not held within the Council's chamber and is more informal in character, was held about the importance of female participation within conflict prevention and mediation. Sweden also stressed for more reporting on the area, thus a part of reality-based analysis as well as representation (Regeringskansliet 2017m). Regner's mention of the need for a gender perspective also fits reality-



based analysis. Reallocation of resources was least frequent within the reports, no reference toward it was found. Perhaps it is more apparent in other UN-organs that have more to do with economy. However, one could expect there to be some discrepancies regarding allocation of resources within the UNSC as to where and how they direct their attention. Overall, Sweden was the country that most frequently brought questions related to FFP to attention, even if it was not the only country to do so, a total of 18 against the other members 6 times. Regarding the new passage about sexual violence in CAR, it could be the case that Sweden managed to argue, in line with Florini, that it was a logical extension of the resolutions within the UN that address sexual violence in conflict.

### *How has Sweden worked for the implementation of their six focus points for 2017?*

Three of the six focus points for 2017 were brought up within the weekly reports and three were not. The three included were point two, three and four; which is logical as they all relate to women, peace and security. Point two, however, was more focused on the main headline of the focus point-freedom from physical, psychological and sexual violence. There were several mentions of sexual and gender based violence and Sweden managed to push for paragraphs of it within new resolutions, such as in CAR (Regeringskansliet 2017d).

Regarding point three, the close relationship between conflict prevention and women, peace and security was emphasised (Regeringskansliet 2017e), along with more concrete proposals such as a strengthening of women's role in the Syrian peace process (Regeringskansliet 2017j) as well as discussions within the working group for women, peace and security in regard to the conflict in Yemen (Regeringskansliet 2017l). The Council also discussed the importance of women participating in conflict prevention and mediation and brought up the Nordic initiative for women mediators as an example of how this can be achieved (Regeringskansliet 2017m).

Point four was also present several times within the reports. Two different women representing women's civil society organisations were invited to speak during Sweden's presidency (Regeringskansliet 2017b, 2017d). The council also met with women's society organisations during their visit in Colombia, although it is unclear if this was Sweden's initiative (Regeringskansliet 2017r). Moreover, Sweden brought attention to the importance of women's inclusion in the political process in Afghanistan (Regeringskansliet 2017j). It also managed to create a new passage about women's participation in West Saharan politics in a renewed resolution (Regeringskansliet 2017q).

It is interesting that no mention of point one was found as migration and refugee flows are very intimately linked with conflict. The conflict in Syria has resulted in vast refugee flows at the same time as a conflict and climate induced famine is threatening millions of people in Yemen and Eastern Africa (Sveriges Radio 29/04/2017). This might be related to the fact that UNHCR is the organ mostly responsible for refugees and migration. Point five was less surprising as other UN organs deal with economic issues. Point six is also less relevant within the UNSC, especially considering differing opinions on questions such as abortion and LGBTQ-rights. It is a topic that would encounter a lot of headwind in many places of the world, including Europe (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamund 2016:328). There is also a question of whether it fits the current norm pool.

The US is currently governed by the Republicans who have reinstated the so called “Global Gag Rule” prohibiting NGOs who receive funding from the US to perform abortion or provide advice regarding them (Redden 2017). There is evidence that Sweden is working with point six in other arenas. A woman was granted asylum in Sweden this year because she was accused of committing an abortion in El Salvador, the first such case ever (Halkjaer 2017).

*Is there any argumentation for why gender equality is a logical step toward a more stable and profitable society?*

Asha Gelle, the guest Sweden invited to brief the Council, mentioned how increased female representation in Somalia’s parliament would help stabilise the land that it had regained (Regeringskansliet 2017d). Wallström also mentioned in her speech regarding conflict prevention that women are essential when building sustainable peace (Regeringskansliet 2017t). However, this main frame of FFP was not emphasised much. Considering that the norm of gender mainstreaming is already prevalent within the UN, and even the UNSC through resolution 1325 among others, Sweden might not have felt the need to constantly emphasise it. At the same time, the lack of emphasis on the frame also diminishes the probability of it spreading, as well constructed frames are essential for that to happen.

*Are there different strategies used in certain circumstances, for example toward different actors or depending on regional differences?*

When reading the reports I saw some discrepancies regarding when issues related to gender were brought up. If more acute or immediate high-politics were discussed it was slightly less likely that Sweden mentioned or brought to attention, gender issues. For example, during turbulent weeks, or specifically when certain conflicts were discussed, gender was not mentioned at all, in fact, Sweden had difficulty to get a word in edgewise. When North Korea was discussed the main players were China and United States (Regeringskansliet 2017q). During week 16 and 15 and week 9 (Regeringskansliet 2017p, 2017o, 2017i) the battle over a resolution condemning the chemical attack in Syria was in full swing, as well as discussions on sanctions on Yemen, gender was not brought up at all and the ball was in the court of the permanent five. Some conflicts were more prone to be discussed in regard to gender, especially conflicts in Africa (Regeringskansliet 2017a, 2017b, 2017d, 2017e, 2017f, 2017g, 2017h, 2017j, 2017k, 2017m, 2017n, 2017q). However, when discussing South Sudan, where there has been some tensions within the Council (Regeringskansliet 2017b), there were only vague mentions of sexual violence occurring and no actual measures on how to tackle it. Sweden expressed relief that the permanent members came to the table at all when discussing sensitive conflicts like Syria (Regeringskansliet 2017c), implicating that Sweden, as a small state, might feel less inclined to bring up a “soft” issue like gender when the big players all had sore tooth's. When the news of the chemical attack appeared the tension within the council was palpable and the permanent five were more dominant, making it harder for the non-permanent

members to get heard. When some states have vetoes it will be difficult to reach an agreement and it is more likely to be a lowest common denominator outcome. Moreover, small states are disadvantaged in hard-bargaining situations (Panke 2012:392-3). Furthermore, this is an example of when competing frames make it harder for FFP to break through. FFP very much centres around building a sustainable and inclusive positive peace. When power politics come to the fore and the stakes are high, enabling such an approach can be difficult. The lowest common denominator is more likely to end in a negative peace, if an agreement is reached at all. There is also a common argument that soft policies like FFP are ineffective when it comes to dealing with hard-power issues such as that within Syria (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamund 2016:330).

However, Sweden did bring up women in regard to Syria and Yemen, the first when the peace process in Geneva was discussed and the environment was less hostile, and the latter in a working group where issues can be discussed more freely due to its informality (regeringskansliet 2017j, 2017l).

*Has Sweden expressed the use of alliances and coalitions in order to further their agenda?*

Sweden has worked in coalitions within the UNSC, although not always regarding gender issues. When the president refused to leave his post in Gambia, Sweden cooperated with Senegal in order to secure resolution 2337's pass (Regeringskansliet 2017c). Sweden also joined up with a couple of other states, the report does not state which, to ensure the inclusion of a paragraph concerning sexual violence in CAR in the updated resolution (Regeringskansliet 2017d). It also held a meeting for twenty different civil society groups about their presidency of UNSC (Regeringskansliet 2017e). Furthermore, Sweden was a penholder in regard to humanitarian issues in Syria together with Egypt and Japan (Regeringskansliet 2017h). A classic example of coalition building or cooperation was brought up in week 13 when the Nordic Initiative for female mediators was discussed. The Nordic states ability to speak with one voice gives them unproportionally large power within the UN (Björkdahl 2007:538). Sweden also led a coalition between the non-permanent members when the news of the severe chemical attack in Syria was broached and the permanent five engaged in shadow bargaining and excluded the other members (Regeringskansliet 2017n). Coalition building within a small setting such as the UNSC can also be difficult. Small states often have to rely on them in order to get enough votes or backing to implement their policies. The problem is that all small states do not have the same opinions. Just because they are small does not mean they wish to cooperate. It is only if there are many small states, and states that unite around a specific agenda, that they can gain leverage as it increases the group's bargaining capacity (Panke 2012:391). Thus, since no other Nordic states, whom they often cooperate with regarding feminist issues, are members of the UNSC at this time, it could be difficult to find the coalition partners it needs.

*Is there any difference in how much Sweden pushes for FFP when they inhabit the presidency and when they do not?*

Sweden had more opportunity to control the agenda during its presidency than when it did not inhabit it. It invited several guests who were clearly there in order to implement some aspects of FFP. However, the increased agency the presidency awarded Sweden was not solely used to promote FFP. For example, Sweden hosted a special meeting concerning conflict prevention (Regeringskansliet 2017b). Although Sweden mentions conflict prevention as integrated and connected to women, peace and security, it was nonetheless a slightly competing frame during their presidency. When the crisis in Gambia ensued and was peacefully resolved, Sweden prided itself and the other members of UNSC along with regional organisations for preventing a potential conflict, yet not a single mention was made in regard to women and gender (Regeringskansliet 2017c). Sweden brought up issues related to FFP six times during its presidency, and twelve times after it, and during one of the four week periods it was brought up by Sweden nine times, showing that the presidency did not entail more focus on FFP. Sweden was granted other powers which could potentially lead to increased opportunity to integrate gender in the UNSC, like its penholdership, although no such thing could be deduced as yet (Regeringskansliet 2017d). Sweden also planted a few seeds before it left the presidency which later surfaced, such as the political situation in Myanmar, which Ukraine brought up on Sweden's behalf (Regeringskansliet 2017f). It did not hesitate to raise gender issues regarding conflicts in Africa and took initiative on several occasions to see it done, even after its presidency (Regeringskansliet 2017h, 2017n).

One way to increase the power of a small state is to use whatever advantages that come its way. One such is to use the presidency which a small state can utilise to set the agenda, for example, by inviting people to speak or to hand out certain policy documents (Panke 2012:396). However, one should bear in mind that the presidency is very short, four weeks is a limited time in which to promote a norm. When Sweden was a member of the UNSC in 1997-98, its main goal was to promote conflict prevention. It held meetings and handed out an action plan on the subject to the UNSC and the General Assembly. Although it had some effect, it lay the groundwork for the Secretary-General's later adoption of the strategy, it met resistance among the permanent five at the time. Sweden thus found that four weeks was too short a time in which to promote the policy (Björkdahl 2007:544-5). With this in mind, Sweden's split focus when setting the agenda, might not matter much in the end. The fact that Sweden managed to influence the agenda anyway, for example in regard to Myanmar or inclusions of paragraphs relating to gender issues, might imply that there are other variables that control when Sweden can act as a norm entrepreneur and when it cannot, such as the previously mentioned power competition between the permanent five. One must keep in mind that Sweden, as a small state, is disadvantaged in situations outside unanimity (Panke 2012:393). Like Vreeland and Dreher said, the veto-countries possess 98% of the voting power. This shows that it is more important than ever for Sweden to utilise the tools of soft power by trying to attract the permanent five through inventive and normatively convincing ideas.

Regarding the competing frame, Sweden's focus on conflict prevention has a history and thus the current membership is a good opportunity in which to continue their work. They have tried to integrate FFP with conflict prevention by arguing that the inclusion of women in peace processes is essential for sustainable peace (Regeringskansliet 2017s:1). The question is how well they have done this considering their exclusion, at least within the reports, of a gender perspective when preventing a conflict in Gambia. During the second week, Wallström visited to hold a speech about conflict prevention, and although she mentioned women as a vital ingredient, FFP was not the main focus of the visit (Regeringskansliet 2017t). It might be so that Sweden felt the need to prioritise one issue over the other, as small states tend to do, and conflict prevention won as the groundwork had already been laid. One must also remember that Sweden's political administration is considerably smaller than those of the permanent five, which could also be a potential explanation for why FFP could not be emphasised to the same degree, as Florini claims that that smaller administrations mean less manpower to promote the norm. One can also relate this to Thorhallsson and Bailes as it is imperative that a small state has prepared well to promote an issue. Considering the fact that Sweden had to prepare for two issues it could have a detrimental effect on FFPs spread.

## 8. Concluding discussion

Sweden has so far been the main instigator for feminist issues within the UNSC simply because they were the one's who frequently either pushed for new passages within the resolutions or brought to attention certain gender issues. Of the 18 weeks analysed Sweden mentioned issues related to FFP a total of 18 times, the other members brought it up a total of 6 times. There have been some discrepancies as to where and how Sweden has worked for the policy, with politically sensitive issues more difficult to approach.

There are some things that bare to be discussed, however, that have not been mentioned within the reports due to it having happened before Sweden's membership. One such thing is Sweden's spat with Saudi Arabia soon after having declared its FFP. It is a prime example of Sweden acting outside of what some would deem reasonable behaviour in order to draw attention to a frame. Sweden criticised the country for its abhorrent treatment of a blogger critical to the regime. This resulted in Saudi Arabia bringing its ambassador home and suspending all business visas awarded to Swedish nationals. After this, Sweden ended its controversial military cooperation agreement with the country. Egnell claims, that although this is a bad example for FFP as the basic reasons for the conflict had to do with other issues, it is an example of what can happen when you practise a normative political agenda. Sweden is bound to provoke someone who stands to lose from such policies (Egnell 2016:579-80). Another example of how Sweden draws attention to the frame is by calling it feminist in the first place, a controversial term, that challenges the less provoking labeling "gender mainstreaming" by being more out there (Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamund 2016:328). This also fits the role of a norm entrepreneur as they use language to

dramatise a frame. Another issue related to this is Björkdahl's point of practising what you preach. Selling weapons to authoritarian regimes (Egnell 2016:580)(Aggestam & Bergman-Rosamund 2016:327) with dismal records of human and women's rights is a dubious way to achieve legitimacy as a norm entrepreneur. This can be a hinderance for Sweden's entrepreneurship in regard to FFP.

Other aspects were mentioned within the Action Plan that were not very prominent within the UNSC. For example, no mention was made on the importance of having an intersectional perspective within their analysis. Furthermore, there was little emphasis on including men and boys in working for gender equality. The only sign of such an approach was the establishment of an action plan regarding sexual abuse and exploitation in CAR, which was not Sweden's initiative, although it was condoned by it (Regeringskansliet 2017g).

No norm exists in a vacuum. Promoting feminist policies is nothing new for Sweden. The only new thing with FFP is the use of the actual term and a specific action plan for how to implement the policies on a broader scale (Egnell 2016:583). Moreover, gender mainstreaming has become more and more common since the 1990s in many of the world's organisations. However, norm institutionalisation does not mean norm internalisation (Elgström 2000:472). The question remains how susceptible the permanent members are to soft power strategies. The current military tensions between some of them can be a hinderance to FFPs implementation if they make it hard for Sweden to voice feminist issues. This also applies to the need to recruit a vital state to its cause. Considering the current government within the US it might be more suitable if the UK or France adopted the norm as they are members of both the EU and the UNSC, although considering Brexit, the latter would be best.

It is imperative that Sweden keeps gender on the agenda within all multilateral organisations in which it takes part by acting as a vanguard within them. The strong commitment Sweden has shown toward these organisations might be an inclination that Sweden wishes to move toward its preference size. By acting as a norm entrepreneur through FFP it provokes reaction and receives worldwide attention, which will help promote the norm. The UNSC membership gives Sweden the opportunity to act as a moral power balancer as it has the opportunity to criticise the large powers, if of course, it dares to do so. Perhaps it is vital for states like Sweden to set the norm and agenda for greater gender equality as larger states do not have the same mobility or social cohesion to make such commitments. At the same time, Sweden's perceptual size is quite large since it is often called a humanitarian "superpower", if one relates to that particular "power" then Sweden might be well off in its distribution. However, since coercive power affects the probability of being heard, it is not likely to be enough. Nonetheless, by using soft power, Sweden should try to persuade laggards within these organisations to adopt more gender friendly policies, even when discussing matters of high security.

For future research, it would be interesting to study how Sweden acts as a norm entrepreneur within the EU. Extensive interviews with both Swedish and foreign officials would be ideal as this would give a clearer picture of the entrepreneurship. The EU could also be interesting as gender equality and the need to improve it has become an unobjectionable norm within it (Elgstöm 2005). Perhaps FFP is more likely to reach the second stage, norm acceptance, within the Union. The same

method could be used within the UN in order to get both a more detailed picture of the work within the UNSC, but also how they work within the General Assembly and other UN organs. We do not yet know how long FFP will last, when it is finished, one will be able to give a more detailed analysis of what it actually achieved. This paper has but given a slight insight into Sweden's norm entrepreneurship within the UNSC.

To conclude, Sweden acts as a norm entrepreneur with regards to FFP by keeping gender on the agenda within the UNSC and by explicitly calling it feminist. It promotes some aspects of FFP more than others, the focus points regarding women, peace and security are easier to press for within the setting. Sweden's small size, along with its lack of veto, seems to be a slight hinderance when issues of high politics are discussed within it, making entrepreneurship difficult. Furthermore, the slightly competing frames of conflict prevention and negative peace, lessens the impact and reach of FFP. Yet, it is possible that Sweden, which is considered to be stable, cohesive and relatively successful, is precisely the type of country who is the ideal norm entrepreneur as it is less plagued by internal divisions, and who, for the most part, practises what it preaches. It is commendable that a state tries to break the norm that security studies is best done without the involvement of feminism. For Sweden to export the norm of its FFP it needs to use its soft power to persuade other states to adopt it, the success of the policy will partly be determined by its spread, as more actors means more results.

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