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The Yemeni War-to-*Violence* transition

An explanatory case study of the Yemeni war-to-democracy
transition in connection to violence

Rasmus Bergander 19941020-9614

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Abstract

In November 2011, at the brink of state failure the United Nations and the Gulf Cooperation Council brokered a deal with the Yemeni government for the implementation of a democratic transition towards peace. The Yemeni people, tired of the authoritarian regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh greeted the initiative and the opportunity of finally getting to shape the Yemeni state in their favor. But even though the transition had a promising design and was regarded as one of the most inclusive processes of peacebuilding ever performed, the transition failed and during its implementation violence in Yemen increased rapidly. This thesis tries to explain this contradictory development by tracking implications for causal mechanism in three processes: the National Dialogue Conference, the Election and the Security Sector Reform. The analysis concludes that the process of the National Dialogue Conference failed in delivering results to the Yemeni people, creating a rift between transitional politics and the situation on the ground. Therefore, this process is viewed as the major causal mechanism for the increased violence. Overall the interaction of all three processes jointly contributed to the violent development making this study a proof on how hard it is to implement democracy on war-torn societies without risking making the situation even worse.

Key words: War-to-democracy transition, Violence, Process, Yemen, Political Space, Elections, Security Sector Reform, National Dialogue Conference, Mechanism, Process-tracing, Reforms, Democracy,

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1 Introduction

During the conflicts in the 1990s and early 2000s policymakers asked themselves: How could the international community assist societies tormented by war to transform towards sustainable peace through non-violent means? (Jarstad, Sisk, 2008:2-3). The most common answer was to bolster the different parties to negotiate a settlement and to make the society undergo a war-to-democracy transition (WDT) with democratic elections, institutions and human rights as the primary peacebuilding tools. This liberal way of peacebuilding has since then been encouraged by several scholars and dominated the methods on how to solve interstate conflicts. But its influence and sometimes lacking results has brought criticism concerning its effectiveness (Ibid:13). For example, Kristine Höglund who explores how WDT processes can produce conditions that changes and sometimes even amplify violence (Höglund, 2008:80-81).

WDT processes in connection to violence are the underlying theme of this thesis and will be analyzed through an explanatory case-study of the Yemeni WDT process 2011-2014. The conflict in Yemen has been labeled the “forgotten war” due to the low amount of insight and media interest, making this study a forerunner with a case that is relatively unexplored. (Lackner, 2014; Amnesty, 2016). The efforts of democratization during the transition period in Yemen did not bring peace and stability but instead violence increased (Paffenholz, Ross, 2016). This increase was a big failure for the transition and is argued by various researchers to be an essential factor leading up to the civil war that we can observe today. A war causing horrible living conditions for the Yemeni people with widespread famine and poverty (OCHA, 2017). This is making it easy to conclude that this development might have been avoidable through a better control of violence during the transition period (Paffenholz, Ross, 2016). Even though previous research finds the increase of violence essential there is no qualitative explanation on how the WDT process affected violence and what casual mechanisms that can be identified as connected to the violent development. This conveys a gap relevant to be analyzed further through evaluating three essential key steps in the transition process performed by the United Nations (UN), the Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) and the Yemeni transitional government (YTG), with emphasis on how their transitional measures affected violence.

As the theoretical framework will show, a transition period often consists of processes, both especially important for conducting a transition but also fragile in relation to violence. These are the *Political space*, the *Elections* and the *Security Sector Reform*. During the Yemeni WDT all those were present and therefore these will make up the analyzed processes.

Statistics from the Uppsala Conflict Database (UCDP) shows drastically increasing levels of violence during from 2011 and onwards, even though WDT was launched (see figure 1). This thesis aims to provide an explanation to how this happened and what role WTD played. This creates a broader understanding of how democratizing transition processes affects war-torn societies and by doing so contributing to the field of peacebuilding.




Figure 1. Displaying the number of deaths and types of violence in Yemen between 1990 and 2016 (UCDP, 2017). As observed the violence increased during the 2011 Arab-spring uprisings and continued to increase in 2011 at the time of the transition periods beginning. The only decrease was during 2012-2013, to be continued by increased violence after the conclusion of the National Dialogue and the last months of the transition period (UCDP, 2017).

1.1 Purpose & Research Question

The purpose of this thesis is to explain the development towards increased violence in the selected case, by identifying different causal mechanism and observe their explanatory strength (Esaiasson et al. 2007:42). This is conducted using a process-tracing design applied on the case's three selected processes of investigation: The *political space*, the *elections* and the *security sector reform*. The process-tracing is made possible with the help of an explanatory theory - "Violence in war-to-democracy transitions" - that states several causal mechanisms in which a transition process can increase violence. These mechanisms are to be identified and analyzed in this thesis to explain the development towards increased violence. In relation to the above stated purpose the following research question has been formulated:

How can the increase of violence in connection to the war-to-democracy transition in Yemen - be explained?

2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Previous Research

There is a growing literature addressing the problems of security and violence during war-to-democracy transition processes (Höglund, 2008:82). Some of the most-well known researchers in the field have concluded that violence during transitions have a special and extremely threatening effect on how the process of democratization and peacebuilding will be conducted as well as the outcome of it (Darby, 2001 ; Darby, Macginty, 2008 ; Call, 2007 ; Höglund, 2008) proving that even though a ceasefire, negotiations or a transition is reached, violence could reappear in new forms and even increase its areas of conduct (Macginty, 2001; Snyder 2000; Call, 2002). The studies show that some processes are extra vulnerable in connection to violence, such as the political space, elections, and the reforms of the security sector and the restructurings of institutions (Call, 2002; Snyder, 2000; Mansfield Snyder, 2007). The research also concludes that there exists a clear paradox in democratically built peace that makes the transition able to increase rather than decrease violence (Snyder, Mansfield, 2007).

Regarding the Yemeni WDT there is a lack of research conducted with emphasis on the transitions implementation and its effects (Lackner, 2014). The conflicts in Yemen range back to 1994 and have been labeled the “forgotten war”. Overshadowed by conflicts as Syria, Libya and Iraq the research interest for the conflict have been vague (Lackner, 2014: Amnesty, 2017; BBC, 2015).

Thania Paffenholz and Nick Ross are two researchers who have placed Yemen in focus. In their research project they examine the negotiation process, the Yemeni “National Dialogue Conference” (NDC) considered as one of the most inclusive and well managed of all times that paradoxically was a part of a failed transition (Paffenholz, Ross:208-209). According to their research the focus on a highly inclusive NDC was not complemented by attention to the dysfunctional and elite nature of ongoing government in Yemen, which cost the transition

process public support and increased violence (Ibid:209). The lost public support and the bad governance during this period is argued to have resulted in a unsuccessful handling of the increased violence, both by the government and the international actors (Al-Dawsari, Gaston, 2014:55) Violence is therefore what is discussed, in the few studies performed, to be one important factor responsible for the transitions failure in Yemen.

2.2 Violence in War-to-Democracy Transitions

The theoretical framework that will guide this study has the core idea that democracy transitions in war-torn societies can produce conditions that encourage or enable polarization and violence (Höglund, 2008:80; Höglund, Kovacs, 2010; Höglund 2009). The theory is divided into four areas with crucial impact on peace processes and violence: The political space, the elections, the media reform and the security sector reform. The processes of change in these areas are initiated to promote democracy – but according to previous in-depth studies, the processes might also have the unintended consequence of producing violence (Norris 2012; Cavatorta, Kraetzschmar 2010; Höglund, Kovacs, 2010; Snyder, 2000; Call, 2012).

Kristine Höglund has focused on in the inter-linkages between conflict resolution and violence and carriage expertise in the causes of peace, dynamics of peace processes and transitional justice (Uppsala, University; 2017). Building on similar studies she has formed the theory “Violence in war to democracy transitions” (VWDT) (Höglund, 2008:80). In her theory she operationalizes the areas of political space, electoral violence, media reform and security sector reform with her interpretation of the areas special relationship to violence. The specialty is the democratic processes capability of changing the setting of the areas to the extent that different ways of using/relapse to violence are opened up (Ibid).

This thesis will use the political space; the elections and the security sector reform as examined processes for explaining how the WDT affected violence. The framework is set up by defining the operationalized areas in which these processes occur, concluded by Höglund. The definitions of the processes to be used in this study read as follows:

The political space is defined as a phenomenon where political changes through democratic reforms or other reforms conducted by the transition are the factor in opening up new political space. The term “political space” is too massive and inclusive and hence the peacebuilding process of the National Dialogue Conference will be the analyzed area regarding political space. The way in which the ND was conducted, the included actors and outcome of the reforms put forward is closely related to the theoretical definition of the term and will therefore be appropriate while applying the framework. According to the theory, democratization efforts could open up political space and hence create new opportunities and motives for violence makers. This is usually depending on the democratizations way of (1) generating implications for new motives by threatening the interest of elites; (2) leaving grievances unsolved; and (3) breeding dissatisfaction with the reforms and political changes conducted in the transition process (Höglund, 2008:83-84).

The elections are often a fragile process that opens up for political competition and political changes, that creates new opportunities and motives to organize violence (Höglund, 2008:80). The ways in which an election could trigger violence is operationalized by examining if the election: (1) aggravate existing conflicts and societal cleavages; (2) threaten the position of groups and elites in the society; (3) bring violence in its aftermath when the outcome is needed to be accepted by all groups who otherwise could resort to violence (Ibid; Höglund, 2010).

The security sector reform is usually initiated to establish civilian control over the military forces and the police as a step towards more democratic governance. (Höglund, 2008:89-90). But also for needed restructuring in all security sectors, often from corrupt systems towards more open and democratic (Ibid). This could lead towards different ways in which violence increase. The following operationalizing’s claims that changes in the security sector reform during a transition could: (1) reduce the power and size of the security institutions while new threats emerge. This often bolsters an increase of violent crimes such as armed robbery, looting, hijackings and domestic violence; (2) weaken the judiciary system by the changes while fewer crimes are dealt with and investigated; (3) transform the groups that acted as guerrillas or rebels during the conflict into networks of organized crime, taking advantage of the power vacuum that the reforms brings. Overall the security sector reform is extremely hard to accomplish short term, during a transition or a settlement, which often leads towards a collapse in security institutions and increased rates of violent crimes (Ibid).

3 Methodological Framework

This thesis is a case of a war-to-democracy transition process that implies on broadening the knowledge regarding the relationship between violence and transitions of democracy. To explain the studied case I have chosen to do an explanatory case-study due to the ability of an explaining study to highlight the causal mechanisms of the case. The study is using an explanatory theory which means that a specific case is examined and explained by an already established theory. As research design, a process-tracing method is selected to trace mechanisms and events during the transition period due to the thesis ambition of explaining the increase of violence in connection to the war-to-democracy in Yemen 2011-2014.

3.1 Process Tracing

In order to examine the causal mechanisms behind the increase of violence I have chosen to incorporate the methods of process-tracing (PT) in the case-study (Teorell & Svensson, 2007:82; Gerring:347). Process tracing is widely used to track mechanisms in a historical episode between cause and effect (Teorell, Svensson, 2007:247) and to explore and analyze data on processes, events, actions, expectations and other variables that could have an effect on this episode (Bennett, George, 1997:1-5).

Process tracing is a method under the umbrella of different within-case methods of analysis (Bennet, 2004:22) made possible through the support from an explanatory-theory. The explanatory-theory needs to address the central causal mechanism by pointing out observable implications on the mechanism that makes X to cause Y. In other words, the ambition of the PT is to examine whether the intervening variables between an assumed cause and a (on beforehand) observed effect move as predicted by the theory under investigation. By doing this the method looks at implications for hypothetical casual mechanisms that operate in the selected case, just as a detective looks for clues while linking a suspect to a crime (Ibid:22-23). Only descriptive links is used to support the linkages between the independent and

dependent variable and by tracking mechanisms the amount of observable implications for this linkage are increased (Teorell, Svensson, 2007:249-250). The search for mechanisms is often used to find an explanation of different motives by observing implications for how people in a historical episode has understood their environment and acted according to this environment. Individual actions and collective actions then have effects on the developments in the examined episode (Ibid:250).

This design fits the study of the Yemeni transition process due to the prior knowledge that violence (the effect) increased in Yemen during and after the transition period – and the studies ambition to explore the causal mechanisms in the WDT process (the cause) according to the explanatory-theory of the VWDT. The following model shows how the PT will be used:




Figure 2. Model viewing the research design using Process Tracing.

In this sense the War-to-democracy transition process is the independent variable and the violence the dependent variable, and the PT's role is to explore the causal mechanism between the both (George, Bennet, 2005: 206; Esaiasson et al. 2012:51). Hence the PT lays the groundwork for how to examine the potential mechanism inside the WDT process: political space, the election and the security sector reform. With this method, it enables the study of using a single unit case in explaining these casual mechanisms in relation to the case. This derives from the methods characteristic style of evidence-gathering over time and within unit variation which is likely to provide clues into what connects the independent and the

dependent variable (Gerring:349). A fundamental part of the tracing is to choose a specific time period in which the process occurs but also key steps in this time period is essential for good analysis of change (Collier:824). This is also fulfilled by the thesis selected processes that makes up for the theory's choice of elementary key parts of a transition period.

As mentioned the design looks for the *implications* for hypothetical casual mechanisms that operate inside the studied case. In this thesis research design the implications will be examined through analyzing the three processes and asking question of analysis connected to the VWDT-theory - to each of them. The questions are tied to the theoretical framework of this study and therefore apply well to explore if there are implications and evidence for causal mechanisms to be found according to the theory's assumptions on how violence can increase during a WDT.

3.2 Questions of Analysis

The National Dialogue Conference Process

- What implications are found that the process of the WDT's National Dialogue increased violence by generating:
 - New *motives* by: (1) threatening the interest of elites; (2) leaving grievances unsolved; and (3) breeding dissatisfaction with the reforms and political changes conducted in the transition process?

The Presidential Election Process

- What implications are found that the process of the WDT Presidential election 2012 increased violence by:
 - (1) Aggravating existing and societal cleavages?
 - (2) Threatening position of groups and elites?
 - (3) Generating dissatisfaction with the outcome?

The Security Sector Reform Process

- What implications are found that the process of the WDT Security Sector Reform increased violence by:
 - (1) Reducing the power and size of the security institutions while new threats emerge?
 - (2) Weakening the judiciary system while fewer crimes are dealt with and investigated?
 - (3) Transforming the groups that acted as guerillas or rebels during the conflict into networks of organized crime, taking advantage of the power vacuum that the reforms brings?

3.3 Research Procedure & Material

As mentioned, the study will build on exploring and tracking causal mechanisms from a descriptive and explanatory case-study design. Therefore the result part of this thesis will provide descriptions in accordance to what the theoretical framework states as implications for increases in violence. To achieve this, the result of this thesis will be divided in two parts.

The first part will give empirical facts on how the war-to-democracy implementers initiated and founded the roadmap for the transition in Yemen. The implementers were first and foremost the UN and the Gulf Cooperation Council, but also the Yemeni Government that had to sign and agree upon the transition plan. The different stages of this implementation provide essential facts that are needed to address in order to understand the transition process with its purpose and especially its directions on how to act and implement the democratic reforms and measures. This part will build upon material in primal sources; The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) official resolutions in regard to the Yemeni situation and transition, the GCC agreement and the National Dialogue Conference Final Communiqué document.

The Second part will focus on how the transition process three key processes was performed in connection to the reforms and initiatives from the first part, and with its general effects on the rule of Yemen, the major groups and the population. These insights will be provided through secondary sources and primal sources found in various reports conducted in accordance to the transition. The reports originate from different researchers that in many

cases have performed studies, surveys and field work in Yemen. The two sources most used are the “Yemen Polling Center” (YPC) which is an independent think-tank in Sanaa that have issued around 20 reports on the Yemeni society, democracy and the security sector (Yemen polling center, 2017). Together with United States institute for peace” (USIP) an independent organization that works to prevent, mitigate, and resolve violent conflict around the world (USIP, 2017). USIP does this by engaging directly in conflict zones and by providing analysis, to those working for peace (Ibid).

With the two parts of the result recognized, a chapter of analysis will be executed by using the questions of analysis, which enables an investigation regarding implications for causal mechanisms, aiming to provide explanations. Further on, the answer on the research question of this thesis which will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

3.4 Limitations

The transitional period began at the signing of the GCC agreement in December 2011 and ended immediate when the Houthi insurgents occupied Saana in September 2014. Hence this is the time spectrum for my selected case. No conclusions are drawn in accordance to the history of Yemeni conflicts raging back to 1994 and no material regarding today’s civil war are evaluated. Regarding the theoretical framework the *media reform* as a key element of the process, is excluded due to lack in material and previous research not stating the media reform as a potential mechanism for increased violence. In accordance to the *political space*, the term and its significance are exceptionally broad and in need to be narrowed down. Due to the background research the NDC is chosen for its overarching effects and aspirations of change on the political climate in Yemen and examined when tracking mechanism for political space.

4 Result

4.1 Background

The transition process was a result of a troublesome development of violent events and clashes between different groups inside Yemen that enlarged as a result of the “Arabic spring”, youth demonstrations and terrorist groups trying to gain power (Themner, Wallensten, 2012:566; Al-Dawsari, Gaston, 2013:1). These events made the UCDP upgrade the situation from “minor armed conflict” to the intensity of “war” in 2011 (Ibid). In particular there was fighting between AQAP (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) versus the Yemeni government supported by local tribes and USA which continued throughout the year. But the most significant difficulties came out of the Arab Spring demonstrations that added fuel to an already worrying situation, encouraged through years of dissatisfaction with the regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

In early 2011 protests broke out in large numbers all over the country often led by youth activists and civil society that was tired of lacking basic services such as water, a declining economic situation and terrorist groups (Al-Dawsari, Gaston, 2014:3-5). The situation worsened even more by intensified dissatisfaction from the major political movements in the south and the north part of Yemen. In the south the political group (sometimes using violent methods) named “al –Hirak” (The Southern Movement) raised their voices for a separate state of South Yemen (Al-Dawsari, Gaston, 2013) Their dissatisfaction began much earlier but had been growing since 2009 with demanding equitable employment, access to services, greater autonomy, and resolution of other grievances for the region. In the north the Houthi rebels (The Houthis), a Zaydi Shia group strongly opposed to the Saleh government also intensified their complaints. The group had been active in fighting with the government for six long and costly campaigns leading to extensive instability and destruction of north Yemen and now they weren’t slow in trying to promote changes of the situation to their advantage (Barret Holzapfel, 2014:5-7, 10).

Finally the Yemeni central government itself had been cracking for too long and the tactics of using state resources to exclude, manipulate, and undermine potential political rivals had reached its limits (Al-Dawsari, Gaston, 2014:2-3).

These destabilizing events and groups bursting of frustration made Yemen move towards the brink of reaching a failed state. This demanded change and out of this the transition towards democracy came, starting in November 2011 with the political parties signing the GCC agreement, which established a two-year period for political transition (Ibid; McAuley, 2011:2).

4.2 The Transition Roadmap

In the first part of the result the Yemeni Transition process structure and roadmap will be empirically described. The different stages of this implementation provide essential facts that are needed to address in order to understand the transition process with its purpose, elements and especially its directions on how to act and implement the democratic reforms and measures. This part will build upon the UNSC resolutions in regard to the Yemeni situation and transition, the GCC agreement of the transition and the National Dialogue Conference Final Communiqué document. This part will be especially important in examining the process of Political space and the NDC.



Figure 3. Model on the first and last step of the transition, together with the three examined processes inbetween.

The first evidence on how the international community addressed the situation in Yemen was the UNSC's "Resolution 2014" adopted on the 21st of October 2011. The resolution expressed a grave concern regarding the situation in Yemen and welcomed the commitment of the GCC, confirming the support of the UNSC for the GCC's efforts to resolve the political crisis in Yemen (UNSC 2014, 2011). The aspirations of change for the Yemeni people are stressed through the resolution stating that the best way of achieving this is an inclusive political process of transition. In this transition, they call on all parties to commit themselves to the implementation of a political settlement based upon the GCC initiative (Ibid).

Resolution 2014 was followed by the UN and the GCC agreement offered to the political parties in Yemen. The parties, facing destabilization on all fronts agreed on the terms and in December 2011 the "Agreement on the implementation mechanism for the transition process in Yemen in accordance with the initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council" was signed (McAuley, 2011). The document states in detail how the transition period should be executed and that the transition should consist of two phases and a settlement of disputes. In the first phase, it is made clear that the President will irrevocably delegate all his presidential power to the Vice-President, the opposition party shall nominate a candidate to become Prime-minister and the Vice-President shall issue a presidential decree requesting that person to form a government of national unity. Saleh was decided to receive immunity from persecution through this decision. In this phase, the Vice-President should lay the foundation for the NDC in accordance to this order:

"Vice-President and government of national unity shall exercise executive authority encompassing all matters pertaining to this Agreement, including the following, acting in conjunction with Parliament where appropriate [...] Taking the necessary legislative and administrative steps to ensure that presidential elections are held within 90 days of the entry into force of this Mechanism; Establishing the following institutions as provided for by this Mechanism:

- (1) Committee on Military Affairs for Achieving Security and Stability;
- (2) Conference for National Dialogue.

The government of national unity and the Vice-President shall immediately establish a liaison committee to engage effectively with youth movements from all parties in the squares and elsewhere in Yemen, to disseminate and explain the terms of this Agreement; initiate an open conversation about the future of the country, which will be continued through the comprehensive Conference for National Dialogue; and involve youth in determining the future of political life" (McAuley, 2011: 5-6).

In the Agreement, the NDC members of the conference are described:” [...] national unity shall convene a comprehensive Conference for National Dialogue for all forces and political actors, including youth, the Southern Movement, the Houthis, other political parties, civil society representatives and women [...]”. It is followed with a part in which the conferences subjects are stated, the most prominent are:

“ [...] (c) The dialogue shall address the issue of the South in a manner conducive to a just national solution that preserves the unity, stability and security of Yemen; (d) Examination of the various issues with a national dimension, including the causes of tension in Saada; (e) Taking steps towards building a comprehensive democratic system, including reform of the civil service, the judiciary and local governance; (f) Taking steps aimed at achieving national reconciliation and transitional justice, and measures to ensure that violations of human rights and humanitarian law do not occur in future” (Ibid).

The 12 June 2012 resolution 2051 was adopted by the Security Council addressing some of the issues and implementations regarding the transition process in accordance to the GCC initiative (UNSC 2051, 2012). At this point the UNSC is stressing the importance of the NDC and expresses concerns regarding the first phase of the transition: “[...] concern at the recent deterioration of cooperation among some political actors and actions that could adversely affect or delay the political transition process”. Regarding this concern, the UNSC demands a cessation of the actions undermining the transitional government and the political transition, and meddling with decisions connected to the reforms of the security sector in accordance to the Presidential Decrees of 6 April 2012. To drive the process, the UNSC express their support for the efforts of President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and the transitional government process for the launch of the preparatory process for convening the NDC and the restructuring through the security sector reform (Ibid).

The NDC final communiqué document sums up the negotiation process that lasted between March 2013 and January 2014 (NDC, 2014). The document displays the structure of the process and describes the historical accomplishment of the dialogue as a great testament of the capabilities of the Yemeni People proving that they managed to bring about a peaceful political transition in the practice of democracy. The biggest prof on this is claimed by the fact that the transition was a dialogue, not between authority and opposition, but instead a conference among representatives of all communities. This was conducted according to Presidential Decree No. 13 by establishing a liaison committee build bridges with all political

parties, the youth, civil society and women to mobilize support and ensure everyone's participation in the dialogue (Ibid).

Organization /Group	Number of allocated seats
GPC and its allies	112
Islah Party	50
Socialist Party	37
Nasserite Party	30
Youth	40
Women	40
Civil society organizations	40
Houthis	35
Southern Movement	85
Rashad Party	7
Justice and development Party	7
President Hadi	62
The remaining parties in the JMP	20
Total	565

Figure 4. The Number of allocated seats in the NDC in accordance to each group and entity included (Alwazir, 2013: 4).

4.3 The Presidential Election Process

The Presidential election is one of the most dominant parts of both the GCC initiative, and the UNSC resolutions. The GCC agreement states that an election must be held within 90 days of the entry of the agreement expressing the importance of the election as the corner stone and final mechanism of the transitions first phase (McAuley, 2011:3). For this election to take place, as Saleh resigned his power, one condition expressed from Saleh was that both parties (GPC and JPM) would make former vice-President Hadi the consensus candidate for the presidential elections (Ibid; Al-Eryani et al. 2014). The condition, making Hadi the single candidate for ruling Yemen during the two year transition made the Houthi express dissatisfaction, and their spokesman saying: "Since the elections has only a sole candidate why then wasting the public funds and hold elections, whose outcome is already known". Overall the Houthi group perceived the election as a mockery of Yemeni People mentality, calling on their followers and the Yemeni people to refrain from voting (Yemen Post, 2012).

Also the Southern movement reported to be dissatisfied with the election and the one-man candidate of Hadi. Surveys conducted by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) observed this very clear (IFES Briefing Report, 2012). The surveys, stratified in over 91% of the Yemeni regions and with over 2000 respondents showed that the general attitude was that the election was free and fair especially those who participated in the election had a higher opinion of the process than those who did not. But in the in the southern governorates of Aden, Ad-Dali, Abyan and Lahij people were more likely to report problems at the polling center, such as stolen ballot boxes and attempts of closing of the polling center by force. Most of them reported concerns over the presence of only one candidate (IFES Briefing Report, 2012:5). This did not just result in problems for the voting procedure but violence broke out in these regions in the weeks of the voting procedure killing and injuring several people (Cochrane Sullivan, Zimmerman, 2012). Their main argument was reported to be that the election tied and legitimized the Northern Government of Saleh to even more power and influence, also over the time of the transition (Ibid).

According to reports by the UN Development Programme in Yemen the overall positive attitude could be explained by the fact that many Yemenis may looked at the election as a peace making instrument rather than a than an election of a President (UNDP Report Yemen, 2013:18). This would explain the surprisingly high voter turnout, around 65%. The reports correspondingly claims one of the main purposes of having an election with only one candidate was that a competitive election would have been too uncertain and dangerous before the worst part of the conflict had been surmounted. Hence, claiming the election a success through its way of being an exit from a grave political crisis, with armed conflict included. But also a first step in a long process of a democratic transition towards new (competitive, free and fair) elections after the conclusion of the transition process (Ibid:18-19).

The previous elections in Yemen had been troubled by large amounts of electoral violence and therefore the election of 2012 was a key issue for the transition process implementers to tackle (Abdelkarim, Hodachok, Monaco, 2013). From the election in 2003 the election process had been handled by a Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum (SCER) responsible for the election administration, electoral security, boundary delimitation and maintenance of the voter registry (Ibid:6-7). This institution had been de facto been involved, to a large extent, in controversies related to the violence during the elections and therefore the

GCC agreement addressed both the role and structure of the commission in its outline of the two-phase transitional period. But in practice, because of a lack of time, the composition of the SCER kept its composition of members that was responsible to manage and oversee the 2012 election (Ibid:15-16). During the election process this was observable due to the fact that the SCER did not undertake extensive preparation in order to prevent election violence ahead of the election. The major flaws was the lack of a comprehensive security plan, no variation of strategy on a region-by-region basis despite different security environments and no clear chain of command or processes for contingency or emergency situations. As mentioned, the result was therefore several instances of violence before Election Day, and violence at Election Day caused at least 10 deaths, including the deaths of three soldiers (Ibid; Cochrane Sullivan, Zimmerman, 2012). Both the government and the GCC signatories recognized the lack of functioning and stressed the restructuring of the SCER. However, after the presidential election, SCER commissioners did not approve on taking the necessary steps of restructuring and given the many challenges and time consuming NDC process, the parliament and the government did not change the SCER until October 2012. At that time only some of the SCER commissioners were changed (Abdelkarim, Hodachok, Monaco, 2013:7-8).

4.4 The Security Sector Reform Process

Military-security restructuring is hugely critical to a successful transition, but it is also difficult, since it directly threatens an array of vested interests. This was particularly true in two ways during the Yemeni military-security reform process (International Crisis Group, 2013:i). These difficulties were mostly due to two factors: Firstly how the GCC agreement was perceived by the military groups with influence over the largest military forces, involved fighting during the 2011 and in possession of huge power over the military establishment. Secondly, the GCC agreement only offered vague guidelines on military restructuring in an environment of political vacuum (Ibid:34). In the executive summary of the ICC's report they sum up the goal of the SSR accordingly:

Military-security reform is, in part, about loosening the grip of the now-bifurcated old regime and, in so doing, opening political space for meaningful and effective

change through the national dialogue, the cornerstone of the transition process. (International Crisis group, 2013: i).

This is pointed out in the GCC agreement saying that a Committee on Military Affairs for Achieving Security and Stability should be established as a fundamental mechanism to ensure the formation of the transition process (McAuley, 2011:5). Therefore, in December 2012 Hadi issued the presidential decree with the aim of reforming the security sector and the military establishment, including a call for a restructuring committee. The major tasks of the committee was to dissolve the autonomous militias and special military units while strengthening the forces in their chain-of-command and corporate and increase loyalty among officers and soldiers. To boost this, the committee was called upon to collect intelligence on previously existing resources across the country and to form another sub-committee responsible for training of forces and legal revision. The reports on the effectiveness of these measures and reforms conclude that president Hadi and the reforms were insufficient (International Crisis Group, 2013; Albrecht, 2013; Al-Dawsari, Gaston 2013).

Throughout 2012 Hadi focused on replacing high-ranking personnel with his own men. For example the new minister of defense, Mohammed Nasr Ahmed, from the same Southern region as Hadi and known to be a close supporter of the president. The reports estimates that around 80 percent of the new appointments were recruited from this region making it easy to conclude that Hadi wanted to consolidate his position in the current security establishment. In the end of 2012 this development showed that the Security sector reforms so far had been mainly deliberated to increase the security of the president, rather than the Yemeni citizens (Albrecht, 2013:4).

As mentioned, this was also a result of how power was divided during and after the 2011 uprisings. Especially important in this divide was an event in March 2011 when pro-Saleh gunmen killed over 50 unarmed protesters in Sanaa. (International Crisis Group, 2013:13). This led to dozens of high-level military and civilian defections and Ali Moshen, the Firqa and north-west military region commander, swapped sides and his troops joined the protesters side. The announcement split the military in two parts. The GCC agreement directives on the SSR were a solution to this military divide but as stated, the agreement did not satisfy the two sides.

When President Hadi came into power and gained UN support to conduct the SSR changes this dissatisfaction made the conflict switch battleground to the transitional politics (Ibid: 14). The GCC agreement did not take the conflicting interests into account and failed to address both the faith of Ali Moshen's influence over the decisions of the SSR and the role that the NDC should have over the process. Due to the NDC the efforts of Hadi was mostly unrestrained and he was left with a dilemma. Both, to ensure his own political survival by taking on the issues regarding Ali Moshen vs. Saleh and at the same time demonstrate restructuring result to seal his status as the candidate responsible implementation of the transition process. The dilemma was also caused by the lack of an overarching SSR strategy from the GCC implementers, mostly focusing on the NDC issues (Ibid:17).

In January 2013 the Yemen Polling Center issued a report on the public perception on the development of the security sector using over 1990 respondents (Albrecht, 2013; Souidas, Transfeld, 2014). The report showed that Yemenis perceived the security establishment as extremely ineffective and in some cases as totally absent. The interviews also showed that most respondents urged that the establishment was as bad as or worse than before the transitions beginning. But there were also big differences between regions regarding the views on the success of transitional reforms. In regions where quality and stability of life were higher, basic law enforcement was present and the local security situation was under control – the perception of change and whether the government was “on the right track” was much more common. This overall perception of diverse but still insufficient reforms was not reflected in the Yemeni people's perception of personal security. Both in the urban, rural and in those regions with respondents viewing the security sector as absent, the Yemenis did not necessarily feel insecure. This was reportedly mostly because of the populations way using insurances of security outside the formal court system. This could be local councils, elders but also neighborhood leaders and armed groups (Ibid).

The reforms made, also showed to have little effect on the SSR in terms of removal of officials in the police, juridical sector (Al-Dawsari, Gaston, 2013:25-26). This could also be attributed to the GCC initiative, and the initial first phase of the transition, not specifically mentioning the police or judicial sector, which should be integral parts of comprehensive security sector reform. Instead, the agreement had its major focus on the army – the central stage of hard power and inter-elite competition (International Crisis group, 2013:14-15). The few removals made by Hadi and the government were often perceived as superficial and

insufficient, and a common observation was that any changes were improperly influenced by different shifts in the political balance of power (Ibid).

4.5 The National Dialogue Conference Process

The process of the NDC was a huge project in itself but also needed a lot of preparing work for setting up the different working groups and to ensure the high standards of inclusion from the whole Yemeni society (Al-Dawsari, Gaston, 2013; Paffenholz, Ross, 2016). This was directed by the “Technical Preparatory Committee (TPC) for the Comprehensive National Dialogue Conference” and lasted from August until December 2012. Before that, as previously mentioned, on May 6, 2012 the liaison committee was established to build bridges between political parties (NDC, 2014). All this made the process 32 months long with preparation and talks demanding a lot of political attention and work. According to the reports on the NDC this long-stretched process took away an essential focus needed to address the transition process first steps of democratization and reforms (Al-Dawsari, Gaston, 2013:7-8; Paffenholz, Ross, 2016:207-208). This processes were ongoing throughout 2012 and 2013 before the NDC commenced and included presidential decrees that removed prior actors of the old regime from key positions, a restructuring of the military and security institutions and several strategic arrangements within different ministries (Ibid: 11). These measures were de facto put on hold due to the NDC that addressed so many critical issues that other work would have been pointless to develop until the NDC was finished (Ibid:8).

As pointed out the NDC made important developments of the first phase lose its power of navigation and support. The Yemeni population would have needed this transition steps to advance, much due to their expectations after the 2011 uprisings that the new transition government would take charge to address the many daily challenges facing them (Al-Dawsari, Gaston, 2013: 11-12; Barrett Holzapfel, 2014:18). These were challenges such as poor economic opportunities, insufficiencies in education and health institutions and widespread food shortages. Overall the lack of a functional government at least trying to change the circumstances on the ground made the NDC perceived as a process that couldn't deliver any clear results (Ibid; Paffenholz, Ross, 2016:208). In many regions this forced people to turn towards regional groups providing alternative governing structures (Ibid). This

was a phenomenon common throughout the country that could have been avoided if the government had delivered the services of a functioning state. Instead many of these groups could use the power vacuum for building up their own systems and in many cases this led to competition between groups acting the same regions. Such a group was the Houthis that used the situation to gain power (Ibid: 208-209). This shows how the inclusive negotiation process of the NDC wasn't present in the everyday experience for the Yemeni people, but rather what they saw was a state unable to provide basic services for a period of three years (Al-Dawsari, Gaston, 2013; Paffenholz, Ross, 2016, Barrett Holzapfel, 2014).

This loss of public support and insight wasn't just a result of the NDC's way of taking important attention away from the streets but also a consequence of how the NDC made the transitional government take form (Paffenholz, Ross, 2016: 207-208). During the three years between Saleh's resignation and the conclusion of the NDC the highest political positions in Yemen continued to be divided between the former elites. This was a result of how the GCC agreement was designed but also a consequence of how the NDC made the transition government untouched. The GCC agreement made the former vice-President Hadi, the leader of the government creating a government almost unchanged in practice compared to the former one, excluding all non-elite political factions (the Houthis, the Southern movement, etc.) and the independent constituencies. Overall Hadi's transitional government was reportedly more corrupt and dysfunctional than even that of the Saleh regime (Ibid: 208) A contradictory development in comparison to the NDC concluding documents claiming the need for President Hadi to "exercise his constitutional rights to make changes to the government in such a way as to ensure the realization of efficiency, integrity and national participation" (Barrett Holzapfel, 2014:18).

Also in the NDC and in its outcome two of the most stressed questions were left without solutions, namely the Houthi and Southern movement's demands for change which was not met or settled (Paffenholz, Ross, 2016:202-204). In the NDC the questions were not marginalized, but did not get the amount of dedication needed. After the conclusion of the NDC a special committee was set up to tackle this flaw, but the election of commissioners was put on Hadi who did not chose to include any Southern representatives and only a few Houthis into the group mandated to solve the issues. In sum this failure made both groups express great dissatisfaction and a change of the stalemate was never at reach (Ibid).

The parliament of Yemen was also changed in the course of the GCC initiative and reportedly affected by the NDC process. In reports studying the parliamentary discussion during the transition period it is made clear that the parliament were almost completely insufficient (Al-Eryani, et al. 2014; Al-Taj et al. 2014). As described in the first part of the result, the GCC document suspended the constitution and legalized the composition of the parliament from the one elected in 2003 (Abdelkarim, Hodachok, Monaco, 2013:5; McAuley, 2011). A composition not legitimate from the people's perspective due to the uprisings in 2011 that wanted the Members of the parliament changed (Abdelkarim, Hodachok, Monaco, 2013). The most controversial step by the parliament was to pass a law that impacted the perception of the process fundamentally (Ibid). The law frustrated many groups by granting immunity to former President Saleh together with partial immunity for many of Saleh's top aids from prosecution for "politically motivated" crimes (Al-Eryani et al. 2014). This made the whole process start off with a decision marginalizing the scopes of the transitional justice. Making it clear that whatever measures to be implemented, the GCC and the UN initiative had agreed on letting the ruling elites, responsible for a gross of human rights abuses at various times of Yemen's history, free from charge (Ibid: 15-16; Amnesty International, 2011). Also when the first transitional justice law was being drafted by the government in January 2013, President Hadi amended the law. The amendment and the whole law was hence seen by activists, civil society actors and even politicians, as a tool to once again protect those who had committed violations, most of whom belonged to the political parties signing the GCC initiative (Ibid).

Another major modification affecting the parliament was GCC article 8, mandating that all decisions had to be taken by consensus instead of by majority vote (Al-Eryani et al. 2014:13). If consensus could not be reached the parliament must refer the matter for decision by the Vice President in the first phase, or the President in the second phase. This led to a parliamentary situation where almost no decisions were taken, during a time when the country needed major transformations and decisions regarding social services, water and food initiatives (Al-Eryani et al. 2014:15-16). As one of the reports concludes, "Throughout the reporting period Parliament did not make many concrete decisions. The only decisions that were made were those regarding the transition, such as the approval of the Vice President as the sole candidate of the presidential elections." (Al-Taj et al. 2014:14-16). The discussions in the parliament were also a proof on how the people of Yemen and the important questions were marginalized as essential subjects. For example the Southern question was only discussed two times and the Houthi question twice as well, even though the Houthi movement grew in

strength after the 2011 uprising and represented an urgent threat. Regarding the debates on the economic situation the parliament focused on public service provisions and particularly power supply issues (mostly on fuel prices and opportunities of gas sale to South Korea). Worth no note is that out of these debates only three clear decisions were made (Ibid).

Subject	No.
Power supply	17
Education	7
Water supply	2
Health	0
Transportation	3
Total	29

Figure 5. Number of Parliamentary debates on public services (Al-Taj, 2014:15).

All in all the NDC and GCC changes of political space created a grand contrast between its rhetoric, including hope and a new beginning for Yemen, and the harsh reality on the ground. A contrast, as described, that contributed to an even greater trust gap between the transitional government, the parliament and the Yemeni population. The NDC process also made the real important changes of the political sphere put on hold due to the decision that the drafting of the new constitution, a referendum on the constitution, and elections leading to a new national government would take place only after the NDC (Al-Dawsari, Gaston, 2014:3; Al-Taj et al, 2014; Al-Eryani et al. 2014).

5 Analysis

With the two parts of the result recognized a chapter of analysis will be executed by using the questions of analysis, answered by identifying implications for violence and thereby enable future discussion and conclusions regarding the processes role as causal mechanisms.

5.1 Analysis of the Presidential Election Process

The following analysis will explore implications in regard to Presidential Process questions of analysis (see section 3.2).

The presidential election in February 2012 was a process of some successes but even more failures which gave the transition process a bad-start and long-term troubles. The most crucial part of the election was the GCC and UN decisions regarding the timing and the candidature. According to the GCC agreement the election had to be held in 90 days due to the urgency, of the international actors, of deploying a transitional government that could rule during the transitional period (McAuley, 2013; Al-Eryani et al. 2014). With this decision came the condition from the Saleh regime that vice-president Hadi would be the sole candidate for the presidency. A condition that was hard to refuse due to the vital need for a signed transitional agreement and a long-time aspired change of the regime, from the youth and most of the Yemeni population etc. Unfortunately the election wasn't welcomed by the strongest and most anti-regime groups, being the Southern movement and the Northern Houthi insurgents. They had taken advantage of the 2011 uprising to get an end to the three decades long regime of Saleh that had marginalized their wills and demands for influence and independence. But with the agreement stating that the new transitional government would consist of Hadi and elites closely bound to the former regime they uttered grave dissatisfaction. During the election this was observable in forms of violence in regions connected to the groups. Also violence by youth demonstrators and other frustrated Yemenis was reported during and after the election (Ibid; Cochrane Sullivan, Zimmerman, 2012).

This proves that in connection to the VWDT theory the election led to increased violence in accordance to all three implications. The societal cleavages already stretched before the election process was even more deepened during the process in which the wills of the groups was overseen once again. The groups also felt a threat of being marginalized even longer and they expressed severe critic and dissatisfaction with the government that ruled throughout the transition process. And the outcome which was certain on beforehand was not something they had hoped for after years of conflicts and longings for change.

From a UN and GCC perspective the sole candidate seems to have been conscious choice and not just a submissive act. This interpretation is founded on their discussions on the electoral measures implemented (UNDP Report Yemen, 2013). Throughout other UN initiated transitions, competitive elections where several parties and candidates compete for power have increased both electoral violence and social segregation. Therefore the condition of having one candidate could avoid this development and even though it doesn't change things in a very democratic way, be the best option. This is shown to have had some effect on the majority of the Yemeni people who perceived the election as a move in the right direction and as a peacebuilding tool rather than a democratic measure (UNDP Report Yemen, 2013:18). But even though, the democratic measures were missing in some important parts of the process, and most decisive in the SCER.

First of all the SCER, wasn't reformed from the 2003 structure accountable for corruption and the electoral violence in previous elections (Abdelkarim, Hodachok, Monaco, 2013:15-16). The restructure was too hard to accomplish within 90 days and the timing of the GCC and UN initiative is therefore partly guilty for this. Also the overall UN measures and directions focused on the SCER were few and this played a role in the violence and troubles reported in connection to the election. The fact that the commissioners weren't replaced and the SCER institution wasn't reformed after the election when the deficiencies of the institutions were known, was also a failure.

Overall the theoretically founded implications are shown to be present and vital in the election process of the WDT. From the result and this analysis the implications proves to have had significant effects on the initial part of the transition with both electoral violence, but even more crucial, long-standing dissatisfaction that have been proved to have had consequences further in the transition.

5.2 Analysis of the Security Sector Reform Process

The following analysis will explore implications in regard to Security Sector Reform questions of analysis (see section 3.2).

As described in the result, the SSR process was marginalized throughout the whole transition period and had primarily the single effect of switching the platform of conflicts and power-clashes between elites (International Crisis Group, 2013:34). The unresolved power disputes were a factor already rooted and hard to tackle for the implementers but still, very little was made to change or resolve the power balance and the effect this had on the SSR. The GCC agreement made the power over the SSR fall on Hadi and his transitional government who couldn't do much for change. The result was a middle-way where few accountable and real changes of both personal and structure were made, and through reforms, Hadi took the opportunity of installing own allies into the ranks to secure his own power. The way in which he could enable this corrupt method was made possible due to two factors. Firstly the GCC and the UN, was over-focused on the NDC and did not take charge in pressing Hadi or explore the width and failure of his actions. Secondly the GCC agreement and the NDC did not state/or implement any concrete guidelines on how to restructure the military sector, and did not make any implications for restructuring the police and the judiciary systems. These systems that could have had a real impact on the Yemeni people and make them receive trust in the Yemeni security functions. Instead, as reported many Yemenis took matters into their own hands or decided to ally up with a local group or elder to gain security (Albrecht, 2013; Souidas, Transfeld, 2014). This surely made these local "institutions" stronger and in case of the Houthi and Southern movement they profoundly gained even more followers. This is a development not so hard to understand when looking at the surveys, showing that many individuals (in several regions) expressed doubt regarding the pure existence of a police force.

In accordance to the questions of analysis there are implications showing that the security institutions were reduced in power and size through the changes of the SSR providing implications for (1). The fact that the military elites was provided with strong influence over the SSR and the military structure made the SSR almost powerless to offer transformations. This situation did reduce the security sector to act against violence and, as stated in the question of analysis, indirectly made violent groups (new threats) able to emerge in recruiting followers and to act in a sphere without state control. This can be interpreted as a direct

linkage that could be said to have given opportunities for increased violence, not subsequently causing a large increase of violence during the SSR, but giving the opportunity for an increase and the fuel for dissatisfied citizens and groups to expand their power. Due to this analysis on (1) there is reservation for the “new” in threats deduced as a weak link thus many of the groups taking to violence were established and rather strong before the SSR.

This development goes hand in hand with the few changes made in the judiciary and police structures that gave the already flawed systems a push backwards. Reports show that the overall crime rates and violence was decreased in comparison to the time of the uprising but never reached the numbers reported in 2010, instead during the transition they increased rapidly while several regional judiciary and police systems collapsed (Al-dawsari, Gaston, 2014:3). The connection to the transitional government’s inability to act is clear and the report states: “The overall political uncertainty and the frailty of the divided transitional government have eroded state control and weakened rule of law in all areas. As a result, justice institutions have struggled to provide services at even the modest levels that existed in 2010” (Ibid). This shows that there are implications in regard to (2) and the SSR Process implied conditions and direct measures related to an increase of violence.

Regarding (3) the transformation of groups from guerillas or rebels into networks of organized crimes, there are few implications to support a clear linking. The reports don’t show that groups often referred to as rebels or guerillas did change their way of acting, towards organized crime. Instead they were left to act in their original forms, due to the description above, that the security sector in many cases was too weak to handle their threats to the Yemeni state and people. Even though there is no reports stating that the groups transformed, the analyzed material in regard to the SSR concludes that the possibility of such changes were possible. But in regard to the lack of implications strictly bound to what is asked in (3) this relationship between the SSR and violence is not regarded to be connected.

5.3 Analysis of the National Dialogue Conference Process

The following analysis will explore implications in regard to National Dialogue Conference questions of analysis (see section 3.2).

The NDC was the most prominent element of the transition period and in the beginning, it was embraced with huge amount of hope and positivizes from both the international community, the implementers and Yemeni people all wishing for a successful dialogue that finally could end their sufferings and conflicts (NDC, 2014). The project was a success regarding the huge inclusion and its debates fruitfully resulting in numerous discussions between former enemies and several solutions on important questions. But in practice and in accordance to the mechanisms of its effect on the political space, there are implications that the process did affect the increase of violence in connection to the transition. As described in the result, the biggest effect was the NDC's time consuming. Al in all the process from the initial phase and preparing to the end, the process took 32 months. During this time, as described in the two analyses above, the Yemeni society and institutions failed to deliver basic services and security to the people. This made a crack evolve between the NDC and the Yemeni people, who had to deal with the harsh conditions on the streets. The reports show how the initial phase of reforms and restructure was left without real navigation due to the focus on how to perform and to perform the NDC. Many of these reforms were on hold in the wait for the NDC conclusion, but should have been stressed and realized during and before the NDC. The NDC is therefore regarded as indirectly responsible for some of the failures of the SSR and the ability for violent groups to act and gain followers to a large extent.

Another consequence of the NDC was the way, in which the parliament was left to act, making it more corrupt and lacking in decisions than before the transition. In this the NDC and the GCC played a role in making it harder to take decisions, and harder to have insight on their ruling, due to the time needed to complete the NDC. The reports show this well through measuring the subject discussed and the few decisions made. This was a parliamentary involvement made the Yemeni people mistrust the political transition even more.

As Paffenholz and Ross state in their examination of the NDC, the public support for the WDT transition process was the biggest loss, and most severe consequence of the dialogue

(Paffenholz, Ross). A statement proved to be correct according to this thesis. With regard to the overall effects on the Yemeni society this makes the NDC indirectly responsible for generating motives for violence through both leaving grievances unsolved and by “breeding dissatisfaction with the reforms and political changes conducted in the transition process. The motives are fundamentally generated to be changed in major parts of the Yemeni society, adding even more motives to their list, such as how the Yemeni state had disappointed them and even how the democratic way of accomplish peace and stability had failed to deliver. With the width of these new motives, influencing millions of Yemenis, there are several implications proving that the NDC in regard to (2) and (3) generated new motives for violence.

In accordance (1) the NDC did threaten interests of elite through the NDC’s way of legitimizing the parliament and the transitional government, very similar and with many representatives from Saleh’s regime. This made other elite interests threatened trough the continued political conflicts hard to resolve in an environment in which the old regime interests still were ensured. Also, the NDC did not conclude any real agreements on how to solve the Houthi and Southern questions, making these powerful groups without any concrete decision and solution to their demands. The dissatisfaction was most observable during the set-up of the Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) for solving these questions, a committee with no Houthi members and almost no southern representatives. Overall the NDC did not solve these issues and was therefore not only threatening to the elites of the Houthi and Southern movements but was a huge motivating factor providing reasons for continuing their resistance against the government. Thus the NDC did generate implications for new motives through threatening the interests of elites in accordance to (3).

The following model describes the interaction between the implications of each analyzed area together with the most relevant and strongest evidence on their existence. The X means that evidence is found to prof the existence of that implication for violence, 0 means not.

The presidential Election

Implications for Mechanism:	Evidence:
<p>Societal cleavages aggravated X</p> <p>Dissatisfaction with the outcome X</p> <p>Elites threatened X</p>	<p>SCER not reformed</p> <p>Immunity for Saleh & one candidate election</p> <p>Cementations of former Elites in the Transitional government</p> <p>Grave dissatisfaction from the Houthis and the Southern Movement with the outcome</p>

Security Sector Reform

Implications for Mechanism:	Evidence:
<p>Reduced power and size of security sector X</p> <p>Weakened Judiciary system X</p> <p>Transformation of groups 0</p>	<p>Lost State Control & increased local control over security</p> <p>The elite power game switched to transitional politics</p> <p>No police and judiciary reforms</p> <p>President Hadi strengthens his own security</p> <p>Few changes and attempts for restructuring</p>

The National Dialogue Conference

Implications for Mechanism:	Evidence:
<p>New motives by:</p> <p>Threatening the interest of elites X</p> <p>Leaving grievances unsolved X</p> <p>Breeding dissatisfaction with the reforms and political changes X</p>	<p>Time and attention – consuming while not addressing the situation on the ground</p> <p>A cleavage of mistrust between the NDC and the Yemeni people</p> <p>No solutions reached on important questions of conflict</p>

Figure 6. Model concluding the evidence for implications on causal mechanisms in the analyzed processes.

6 Discussion & Concluding Remarks

As the model shows, out of nine implications eight are identified with large and direct prof. The process tracking has therefore been successful in identifying implications for different mechanism that can increase violence. In accordance to my analysis I have found many linkages between the implications for violence concluding that all three processes jointly affected the violent increase. The NDC had strong influence on the other two processes, marginalizing both the SSR and the Election. The interaction of these processes made the transition lose its public support and without backing from the citizen's, violence could more easily be exaggerated. Also the support from the elites, youth, and groups that had perceived the 2011 uprisings as a possibility for change was lost due to several factors. In sum, creating a rift between the transitional politics and Yemeni People that proved to be essential in how violence developed.

In regard to this, the elections way of fortifying the former elites in the power sphere and give immunity to Saleh was a mistake that proved to affect how the institutions operated causing ineffectiveness and a parliament not addressing the many challenges of the Yemeni people. This resulted in an intensified frustration from the Houthi and Southern movements which were essential to include for the success of the transition. Their issues weren't solved through the NDC and left the two most hostile and armed groups without any reasons for not taking the matter into their own hands.

The SSR was the factor that could have made it possible to overturn the loss of public support and give the Yemeni people security institutions implying trust and accountability. But this sector was mostly lacking due to the non-existing reforms of the police and judiciary systems. A surprising absence of reforms that was essentially urgent, and left many Yemenis forced to find their own solutions for security.

With the reasoning above in mind, I conclude that all three of the analyzed processes are proved as causal mechanisms that can explain the increase of violence in connection to the war-to-democracy transition in Yemen. All three are part of the overall transition process and in accordance to my analysis they often interact and have effect on each other. Most effect on the other two had the NDC and its implications of violence in relation to political space,

which concludes that this is the major causal mechanism for explaining the Yemeni WDT in connection to the development towards increased violence. The election is also an important causal mechanism with responsibility for many implications for violence through its cementation of former elites in power, as the major implication. Correspondingly the SSR changes were lacking and should have been carried out and controlled better making this a causal mechanism as well.

Without drawing conclusions with generalizing ambitions, I'm confident that this study provided a more in-depth explanation to the increase of violence as well as the failed transition. I also hope that the study provide clues on how a transition process can affect violence and what mechanisms that should be regarded as important when evaluating transition processes. To future studies on the Yemeni transition I recommend looking deeper into the history of the Yemeni people and groups. Especially the tribal system and narratives regarding exclusion and human right abuses during the Saleh regime should be examined. These studies could explore explanations on how some groups decided - will decide to act, what their motives are and especially what their perception of democracy and state power is. I also hope that more attention and studies on Yemen overall will be executed due to the civil war that is ongoing in Yemen as I write. This is a war overshadowed by others but it needs to be addressed since millions of Yemenis are in acute need for help.

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