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The EU's Common Security and Defense Policy The cases of Ukraine and the Baltic States

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Abstract

Russia's aggressive actions in Ukraine and annexation of the Crimean peninsula raised security concerns in the Baltic States as potential targets of invasion. This anxiety was strengthened after the EU launched a civilian Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine as a response to Russia's illegal actions. Such a soft response to Russia's foray into Ukraine has raised doubts about the EU's credibility as a significant security actor on the international stage. Even though the EU has capabilities to intervene militarily, it does not use these capabilities at its disposal. This thesis, through the two case studies, tries to find out why the EU is so soft in the Ukrainian crisis and if the EU is credible security actor in the Baltic States. The overarching questions addressed in this paper are why the EU has not intervened militarily in Ukraine and whether the EU's soft power model would be exercised in the Baltic States in case of Russia's intervention. In order to answer these questions the paper looks through the EU's previous deployments and the critique it received regarding those deployments. Moreover, the study is complemented by other researchers' work who carried out studies on this topic. The two case studies of this thesis- the Ukrainian crisis and the Baltic States- are analyzed through the lenses of realism and constructivism. Realism highlights the importance of national interests, meanwhile, constructivism brings attention to identity and meaning-making factors which may influence the EU's actions in international environment. The paper has also benefited from the survey results provided by the officials from the Baltic States. The results showed that the EU deployed a civilian mission because of identity and image related reasons, which can be translated as supranational responsibility for peace-keeping. However, any hard means were opposed by the member states because of economic and national interests with Russia. Meanwhile, the Baltic States perceive Russia as a real threat to their national security due to both identity related and national-political interests, and the risk of Russia's intervention is evaluated as very big. Howbeit, the analysis shows that the Baltic States run risk of experiencing the EU's soft response in case of Russia's intervention.

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Introduction

“The legacy of the Second World War with its tremendous destruction in Europe marked a past that the European leaders were determined not to repeat”.¹ Therefore, the old rivalries between Western European countries were replaced with diplomatic dialogue and compromise. Such intentions of a peaceful world order led to the establishment of Western European Union which later became the European Coal and Steel Community. The first attempt of the European countries to establish a security institution was the European Defense Community, which, however was not ratified by France due to its political opposition. With the abolition of the project, a more traditional military alliance was created- the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).² Even though NATO pooled military capabilities of its Member States, the implementation of the European foreign policy was not dead with the creation of NATO, on the contrary, the European Community was established with the aim to deepen security and stability in Western Europe.³ However, the first serious steps towards the formation of a European foreign policy were taken only in the 1970s with the establishment of the European Political Co-operation (EPC). The EPC was a channel for discussions between the Member States on their positions regarding foreign affairs.⁴ In 1992 the EPC was transformed into Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which enlarged debates on European security and its role in this context. With the increasing security challenges in its periphery such as Balkans and the South Caucasus, the debates regarding the EU’s military capabilities as a necessity to meet the security issues and as a necessity to complement the existing soft security tools were sparked.⁵ In this regard, the biggest attempt to develop such a capacity was the formation of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). From the beginning, the EU leaders insisted that the CSDP should have a military force in order to project power and become a significant security actor. Such a desire led to the creation of Rapid Reaction Forces and later the Battle Groups. However,

¹Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, *European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective* (Routledge, 2008), 9.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., 10.

⁵ Maria Raquel Freire and Lícinia Simão, "The Eu's Security Actorness: The Case of Eumm in Georgia," *European Security* 22, no. 4 (2013): 464.

the fact that the Battle Groups have never been deployed raises a question about the EU's ability to meet the security challenges with its hard instruments.⁶

Going back to the goal of the EU's founding countries, which was to prevent war and pursue peace in Europe, the military means were not welcome at that time. Due to this reason the EU's security actorness was mostly built on soft security means such as enlargement, stabilization and neighborhood policies. As a result most of the CSDP missions have been civilian and, even though the EU has capabilities to deploy military missions, it fosters civilian dimensions of its security actorness such as police training, border monitoring or rule of law missions.⁷ In general, the academic world provides with a particular description of the EU as an actor of its own kind, called "sui generis" due to several reasons. Firstly, seeing an institution as an actor contradicts with the traditional realist approach which declares that only a state can be an actor. Secondly, the EU of the very nature of the institution is neither a state nor a common institution.⁸ As Bretherton and Vogler stated, the EU's "sui generis" nature has challenged traditional notion of security where being an actor does not always mean being militarized.⁹ According to Tardy, being an actor is a goal of the EU and the EU's CSDP is supposed to make the EU more than just the sum of state policies. In this respect, the development of the CSDP and the EU- led operations have transformed the EU into a security actor which can not be associated just with its Member States.¹⁰ Furthermore, the CSDP is the EU's unique instrument to act and be visible. In other words, such an agency plays a role for its external image construct and self-identification. While analyzing the EU's actorness in the security field, the existence of a strategic culture or what the EU considers about security is a crucial factor in threat assessment and management, which leads or not to the decision to use force. According to Thierry Tardy, a senior analyst in the crisis management, such an approach is weak in the EU's foreign policy field due to diverging positions of the EU's Member States on the use of force.¹¹

⁶ Asle Toje, "The European Union as a Small Power," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 1 (2011): 49.

⁷ Freire and Simão, 466.

⁸ Thierry Tardy, *European Security in a Global Context: Internal and External Dynamics* (Routledge, 2008), 28.

⁹ John Vogler and Charlotte Bretherton, *European Union as a Global Actor* (Washington, DC : Routledge), Book Electronic document.

¹⁰ Tardy.

¹¹ Ibid., 29-30.

The EU as a security actor has undertaken many operations in different geographical zones- the Balkans, Africa, Asia, Middle Est, Europe while using civilian or military measures in the framework of the CSDP. Even Though the geographical spectrum of the missions is quite impressive, however, 80 percent of them refer to civilian missions. Such statistics complies with Duchene statement that the EU is fundamentally a civilian power.¹² According to Sven Biscop, a professor in political science at Ghent University, relatively small, unarmed civilian missions are supported and favored easier by the Member States as they are less expensive, less dangerous and less controversial than military ones¹³, which indicates that the EU is faithful to a “soft approach”¹⁴. In addition, the missions under the CSDP has received a lot of criticism for being small scale, risk averse, modest military, lacking security strategy, leadership and consensus between the Member States, based on cost benefit calculations and etc. As Katarina Engberg also pointed, the EU’s military missions can be considered as a quiet and modest success with small results.¹⁵ Such a critique does not play favorably to the EU’s security role on the international stage. On the other hand, despite a number of civilian missions, military missions have been on the EU’s agenda as well, which raises a question- under what circumstances the EU tends to deploy a military mission versus a civilian one? Katarina Engberg explains this pattern through inhibiting and driving factors which lead or not to the EU’s decision to deploy a military mission.

The EU went a long way to lay the foundation for the EU’s security architecture. However, Russia’s military intervention in eastern Ukraine, which have led to the annexation of the Crimean peninsula directly challenges the EU and its security construction.¹⁶ Such a challenge was a clear invitation for the EU to act and prove its actorness in the security field. However, the EU decided to act soft and launched a civilian mission in Kiev as a support to the Ukrainian government and people. Meanwhile, the only actions against Russia’s aggression was diplomatic and economic pressure. The events in Ukraine have demonstrated that the threat

¹² François Duchêne, "Europe's Role in World Peace," *Europe tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans look ahead* 43 (1972).

¹³ Sven Biscop and Richard G. Whitman, *The Routledge Handbook of European Security. [Elektronisk Resurs]*, Routledge Handbooks (London ; New York : Routledge, 2013., 2013), Non-fiction, 91.

¹⁴ Franck Petiteville, "Exporting 'Values'?", *Understanding the European Union's external relations* (2003): 135.

¹⁵ Katarina Engberg, "Ten Years of Eu Military Operations," *European Union Institute for Security Studies Brief*, no. 41 (2013).

¹⁶ R. O. Y. Allison, "Russian 'Deniable' Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules," *International Affairs* 90, no. 6 (2014): 1255.

coming from Russia is more than real to its neighbors, and in this respect, a special attention is drawn to the Baltic States as potential targets of invasion. In general, Russia's aggressiveness in this region is not new, but the events in Ukraine have weakened the sense of security there even more. Furthermore, the EU's reluctant and soft response to the crisis leaves an intriguing question- if the EU would be able to defend the Baltics under Russia's aggression or would it take a passive seat there as well?

While analyzing the EU's actorness and its capabilities in security issues, and identifying driving or inhibiting factors of the EU's intentions to operate, two case studies are chosen for the research analysis: the case of the Ukrainian crisis as an example of the EU's actions and response to the crisis, and the case of the Baltic States regarding their security and the EU's credibility to act in case of any possible threat coming from Russia. The thesis is trying to find out why the EU is so soft in responding to the Ukrainian crisis, and if the EU is credible and efficient security actor in the Baltic States. In order to tackle the research questions two IR theories- Realism and Constructivism- are chosen as a base for the analysis. In addition, the analysis is complemented with the survey results which was conducted among the officials from the Baltic States.

In order to answer the research questions, this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 introduces with security issues in the Baltic States. Chapter 2 describes security actorness, presents security architecture and agencies which interplay in the research analysis. Chapter 3 provides with theoretical background on the CSDP and introduces with two IR theories: realism and constructivism which will be used as basis for the analysis. Chapter 4 describes the research methodology, while chapter 5 represents the analysis of the EU's actions in the Ukrainian crisis and chapter 6 draws attention to the Baltic States regarding their security. Practical analysis of both cases is complemented with the results of the survey. Chapter 7 recapitulates major findings of the research.

1. The Baltics in threat

Russia's successful seizure of Ukrainian territory has damaged the European security order and left the three most vulnerable states- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania under threat of possible Russian subversion or surprise attack.¹⁷

Exactly a year ago, events started to unravel about a thousand kilometers south of us. Today the entire post-Cold War security structure of Europe has been destroyed...A war is underway in Ukraine. People are being killed there every day. Even now. This is a new type of war, in which one clearly proven combatant is openly using the newest weapons while denying everything...If Europe can learn anything at all from the past, it is that concessions only cause the aggressor's appetite for new demands to increase.¹⁸

Russia's actions against Ukraine raised questions regarding regional stability and security, moreover, it raised doubts about the European project as a whole and the idea of united Europe. The Russian invasion in Ukraine provoked the security concerns in countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Caspian basin. However, the biggest fears of intervention is mostly generated in the Baltic States, which hold a special place in the geopolitical arena of Moscow.¹⁹ Estonia and Latvia, like Ukraine, have quite sizable ethnic Russian populations, who could become a reason for separatists' movements, and both countries share borders with Russian territory. Lithuania has less Russian speakers than Estonia and Latvia, but it has a border with Kaliningrad, which is Russian enclave.²⁰ Russia's view of Ukraine's independence in 1991 is perceived as a historic accident²¹, while the Baltic States are treated as "historical Russian territory" in the Baltic region.²² The example of Ukraine gives a reasonable fear to the Baltic States that Russia may consider having some rights in its "historical territory". Moreover, from

¹⁷ Edward Lucas, "The Coming Storm. Baltic Sea Security Report," *Center for European Policy Analysis* (2015): 3.

¹⁸ The Estonian President speech on February 24, 2015 to mark the 97th anniversary of Estonian Independence: <http://news.err.ee/115259/independence-day-speech-of-estonian-president-ilves>

¹⁹ Marianna GLADYSH, "Security of the Baltic States: Effectiveness of the Eu Common Security and Defence Policy and Influence of the Ukrainian Crisis," 190.

²⁰ Jan Osburg, "Unconventional Options for the Defense of the Baltic States," (2016): 2.

²¹ Artis Pabriks and Andis Kudors, "The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe," (The Centre for East European Policy Studies. Riga: University of Latvia Press, 2015), 53.

²² GLADYSH, 191.

the point of view of Putin the collapse of the Soviet Union is the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century, which left tens of millions of Russian citizens out of their homeland- Russia.²³

Nowadays, the Baltic States are well established democracies, which have been members of the NATO and the EU since 2004. Those three small countries went through harsh historical events and timeless fights for independence. Russia finds it hard to accept its freedom as many years it was in the grip of Russia. Until 1918 the “the three brothers” were part of Tsarist Empire and later under the Russian occupation between 1940 and 1991.²⁴ The history of repression is very close to the Baltic States and the fear of a possible new intervention is more than realistic.

The Baltic States are a thin and a tiny fragment of under-populated land which has a border with Russia Federation along with Kaliningrad and Belarus and share only 103 km land border with Poland. The Baltic States are geographically cut off from most of NATO and the EU by the Baltic Sea and, in this respect, the countries appear quite indefensible and separated which was a strong argument against the three countries before they became members of NATO. Military defense is possible just with large- scale of troops deployed in the area in order to balance a potential Russian threat and power.²⁵ One of the serious security concerns for the Baltics are the strategic and military importance of the Kaliningrad enclave which is to be one of Europe’s most militarized places today.²⁶ Russia is deploying there thousands of troops, weapons, military aircraft, armored vehicles and naval infantries.²⁷ From 2012 Russia has been sending nuclear-capable Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad as a response to NATO’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) which Russia perceives as a threat to its national security.²⁸ Using those missiles with a range of 500 km, Russia could easily target not just the Baltic States, but also Poland, parts of Germany and Czech Republic.²⁹ In addition, the Baltics are threatened by countless and large

²³ NBC, "Putin: Soviet Collapse a Genuine Tragedy," Associated Press, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7632057/ns/world_news/t/putin-soviet-collapse-genuine-tragedy/#.WO8hPtLyjIU. Accessed February 3, 2017.

²⁴ Pabriks and Kudors, 59.

²⁵ Ibid., 57.

²⁶ Sandra Kaziukonyte, "The Baltics: Security Environment and Practical Responses to the Security Challenges from the Crisis in Ukraine," (2016): 3.

²⁷ Tony Wesolowsky, "Kaliningrad, Moscow's Military Trump Card," <https://www.rferl.org/a/kaliningrad-russia-nato-west-strategic/27079655.html>. Accessed February 13, 2017.

²⁸ BBC, "Kaliningrad: New Russian Missile Deployment Angers Nato," <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38070201>. Accessed February 15, 2017.

²⁹Kaziukonyte.

scale Russian military exercises including troops' presence and military aircrafts near the borders. In 2014 the Baltics faced Russian military aircrafts close to their borders around 250 times.³⁰ Military pressure including military aircraft, ships, submarines, troops and military exercises close to the Baltics' borders, airspace and maritime zones has been evident. Russia demonstrates a clear message of being ready to take any actions and shows the world that it is still a regional super-power.³¹ There are no doubts that Russia could attack the Baltics and overwhelm them quickly. Such attacks have already been rehearsed during exercise Zapad 2009 and Zapad 2013, while Zapad 2017 is also in the nearest future. Moreover, the Kaliningrad exclave has a direct border with Lithuania and can be reached just through the Polish territory or via Belarus through Lithuania and an illegal occupation of the Baltic States would open for Russia new and easier road to Kaliningrad. In addition, this Russian exclave can be used as an excuse to intervene. For example, Kaliningrad's dependency on electricity, gas and rail links across Lithuania creates potential vulnerabilities. If these links were disrupted for any reason, Russia would find an excuse to blame Lithuania and due to humanitarian reasons would intervene in order to restore services.³² Moreover, Russian land corridor to Kaliningrad would serve as an advantage for Russia in order to isolate the Baltic States from the support of the NATO and the EU.³³

Similarly, the Russian actions are also threatening for other Baltic Sea neighbors such as Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Poland (see Appendix 1). For example, Russia threatened Denmark for a nuclear strike if the country would contribute to the US-led missile defense system in 2015. Sweden were also warned not to use Baltic military airports during common Swedish-NATO military exercise in 2015.³⁴ In general, Finland is sharing a 1340 km border with Russia, while Sweden, even though does not have a common border with Russia, but has the strategically located island of Gotland. Both countries experienced many Russian flights close to their borders, which, by no doubt, served as testing tools of their reactions and readiness to defend themselves. Moreover, Russia have been sending a clear message of the

³⁰ Artis Pabriks, "How Should Europe React to Russia's Proposed 'New World Order'?", *The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe* (2015): 113.

³¹ Pabriks and Kudors, 59.

³² Lucas, 10-11.

³³ Pabriks and Kudors.

³⁴ Pabriks, 114.

consequences if the countries decide to join NATO. Norway and Denmark is in slightly better position due to the distance. However, Norway borders Russia in the far North and Denmark has Bornholm Island in the Baltic Sea, which was Soviet camp in 1945.³⁵ In June 2014 Russia simulated there an attack, while many of the Danish politicians, journalists and many guests were holding a meeting there.³⁶ March 2015 marked a new chapter in Russia's geopolitical manner in the Baltic Region. Russian forces rehearsed the invasion of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Russian troops practiced to take over the area of the North of Norway, Gotland island of Sweden, Åland island of Finland and Bornholm island of Denmark. While capturing these islands Russia would be able to close the Baltic Sea and dominate in the whole region. Moreover, while doing so, Russia would be able isolate the Baltic States and, in this respect, NATO or the EU would stand helpless.³⁷ The current examples show that Russia is threatening not just the Baltic States, but also the whole Baltic Sea Region as it has strategic interests there too. Putin sees the Baltic region as the only region where Russia has a direct contact with the West. Moreover, the Baltic Sea, before the annexation of Crimea, was the only ice free European port. However, all countries of the region have already become members of the EU and/ or NATO, which makes it more complicated for Russia to dominate or influence the region.³⁸ As Stoicescu remarked, there are many reasons why Putin would attempt to reinstate its domination. Firstly, Russia can not influence economically and politically over any other countries around the Baltic Sea. Secondly, Russia was left with a very small part of the Baltic Sea coastline. Thirdly, the Kaliningrad enclave is over-militarized, costly and hardly reachable.³⁹ While having the Baltic States, Russia would "solve" many problems and would regain its influence in the region as a super power.

The Baltic States, as being members of NATO and the EU, and therefore part of the CSDP, should feel safe and secure, however, in case of Russia's intervention, the NATO's response might arrive too late, meanwhile, their own military capabilities are asymmetric and would not

³⁵ Kalev Stoicescu, "Russian Threat to Security in the Baltic Sea Region," *RKK ICDS. October* (2015): 5-6.

³⁶ "Russia Simulated an Attack on Denmark," <https://www.thelocal.dk/20141031/russia-simulated-a-military-attack-on-denmark>. Accessed April 17, 2017.

³⁷ David Blair, "Russian Forces 'Practised Invasion of Norway, Finland, Denmark and Sweden'," *The Telegraph*, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11702328/Russian-forces-practised-invasion-of-Norway-Finland-Denmark-and-Sweden.html>. Accessed April 17, 2017.

³⁸ Stoicescu.

³⁹ Ibid.

hold up against Russia's, which makes the Baltics to rely on the EU.⁴⁰ In this respect, a closer look at the EU as a security actor and its Common Security and Defense Policy is needed in order to find out if it is a credible and reliable security partner for the Baltic States.

2. Security actorness and security architecture

2.1. Security actorness

The EU through its integration process have increased its capabilities to influence the external world, and in that sense, acquired some form of actorness in the international arena.⁴¹ Bretherton and Vogler define an actor as “an entity that exhibits a degree of autonomy from its external environment, and indeed from its internal constituents, and which is capable of volition or purpose”⁴². Sjöstedt was one of the first scholars who explained that the EU’s existence in the international system and its relationship with external environment defines it as an international actor. He introduced the notion of actorness as a capability to act consciously and actively in relation to other actors in the external world.⁴³ In his words, an international actor contains features of delimitation from other actors, autonomy to make its own rules and laws, and possession of capabilities to act on the international arena.⁴⁴ Similarly, Christopher Hill, a professor in international relations, defines criteria of actorness as a clear identity, autonomous decision making system, and competent and effective policies.⁴⁵

In the broad security field, such criteria as political autonomy, efficient policy, resources and operational activities, and the impact on the international security environment are major indicators of the EU’s actorness.⁴⁶ According to Tardy, the development of the common security and defense policy and the EU’s- led operations under CSDP transformed the EU into a security

⁴⁰ GLADYSH, 191.

⁴¹ Anastasia Chebakova, "Theorizing the Eu as a Global Actor: A Constructivist Approach" (paper presented at the The Maturing European Union–ECSA-Canada Biennial Conference Paper, 2008), 5.

⁴² Vogler and Bretherton.

⁴³ Gunnar Sjöstedt, *The External Role of the European Community*, Swedish Studies in International Relations: 7 (Farnborough [Hants.] : Saxon house, 1977, 1977), Non-fiction, 16.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Christopher Hill, *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*, vol. Taylor & Francis e-Library ed (London: Routledge, 2002), Book.

⁴⁶ Tardy, 28.

actor.⁴⁷ On the other hand, other scholars argue that apart from the EU- led operations, the EU through its process of integration and representation of its liberal values, can still be defined as a security actor. Going back to the creation of the European Community, the main rationale behind it was to prevent any conflicts between France and Germany, which later became security community.⁴⁸ The EU served as a stabilizing power after the Cold- War, later introduced enlargement policy which worked as a conflict prevention in a bigger area.⁴⁹ According to Duchene, the EU's role in the world is civilian power and he argued that the EU in its nature is a civilian actor.⁵⁰ On the other hand, the creation of CSDP made the EU to move beyond the civilian power to a more dimensional actorness. Nonetheless, despite the creation of its military capabilities, Hill argues that the EU is promising too much while its capabilities are very limited. He referred it as "capability- expectation gap".⁵¹ Due to this reason the EU's influence as a security actor is weak, and in the eyes of other actors the EU is not recognized as equal or potential actor.

From the point of view of realists, states are the dominant actors and they define security in "self- interested" terms.⁵² It is the states, especially the powerful ones, which set the rules for the other states based on their interests and cost- benefits calculations. The EU is not a sovereign actor, but it serves as a channel for the states to achieve their interests.⁵³ Realists share the view that the CSDP is more an arena for gaining more power than making the EU a security actor.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, constructivism does not concentrate on material factors, but it concentrates on perceptions and meanings the relevant actors give to specific events and according to those meanings the actors decide to act or not. The EU is shaping events inside and outside its borders based on its own will or in response to the external actors' expectations and demands.⁵⁵

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities*, vol. 62 (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁴⁹ Tardy, 29.

⁵⁰ Duchêne.

⁵¹ Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 3 (1993): 309.

⁵² Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," 1992, 392.

⁵³ Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer, *Explaining the Eu's Common Security and Defence Policy. [Elektronisk Resurs] : Theory in Action*, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 2012), Non-fiction, 19.

⁵⁴ Sten Rynning, "Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 1 (2011): 36.

⁵⁵ Chebakova, 5.

According to Bretherton and Vogler, the concept of “actorness” can be divided into three areas: Presence, Opportunity and Capability. The Presence of the EU conceptualizes internal developments and external expectations. In other words, the EU’s presence in the international arena shapes perceptions and expectations of the third parties. The existence of the EU, its success or failures increase or decrease expectations of the third parties towards the EU’s actorness and significance.⁵⁶ In general, the EU’s presence depends on internal solidarity and unity which leads to the concept of Capability- a capacity to respond effectively to the external opportunities and expectations of the third parties. Effectivity of such response depends on the states’ political willingness, shared priorities and solidarity to act collectively. Opportunity encapsulates ideas or interpretations of the events which can work as driving or inhibiting factors for the actions in the external environment.⁵⁷ Mainly, the concept of capability is the result of presence and opportunity which refer to the EU’s ability to react to the specific situations which are brought forward by Presence and Opportunity.⁵⁸

Katarina Engberg, a practitioner who conceptualized the EU’s collective use of force, stated that the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy has provided the EU with a unique tool which is combined of military and civilian means. Through the CSDP the EU is able to face security challenges, to retain its power and influence in global system, to promote democratic peace and defend certain political interests.⁵⁹

2.2. Security architecture

The notion of European security is quite controversial and unclear. As Tardy states, the discussion about the concept of European Security is built around questions of what is to be secured: states, regions, institutions or individuals, by whom: NATO, UN, the EU or Member States, from what kind of threats and through what kind of instruments: military, diplomacy or civilian. Moreover, the big question is if European security encapsulates a geographic space or entity. The EU’s aspirations to become a security actor in the 1990s made it an object of security, in this respect, European security became referent to the security of the EU and its Member

⁵⁶ Vogler and Bretherton, 24.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 29.

⁵⁹ Engberg, 1.

States rather than geographical space.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, in parallel with the development of the EU's security actorness, European security also embodied developments in regional security. Such developments are built around actors, threats, sources of threat and policy responses. Beyond the security of the EU as an entity and its Member States, issues like Russian foreign policy and its emerging threats, the roles of security institutions such as NATO or the UN belong to the European security spectrum.⁶¹

The EU through CSDP has become a security actor in crisis management and it develops relations with other security institutions such as the UN and NATO. The EU within its security policy has become an option for crisis management operations as much as NATO or the UN. Such an interconnectivity between the security institutions forms EU- NATO- UN security triangle (see figure 1). As Xymena Kurowska, an IR theorist in policy analysis, explains, the development of the CSDP has triggered a reformulation of the roles regarding crisis management within the tringle of NATO- EU – UN.⁶² According to Tardy, the idea behind EU's CSDP is about autonomy of decision and action in security matters. However, the EU's dependency on the NATO's assets brings the EU's autonomy on question and makes any operation which requires significant military means almost impossible.⁶³ The EU's relationship with the UN is built on collaboration where the EU is helping in peacekeeping when the UN capabilities are stretched and also assisting with the implementation of the UN activities. As a reward for such an assistance the UN provides the EU with legitimacy of goodness and significance as a security actor.⁶⁴ Most of the EU's missions have been done under the security umbrella of NATO or under mandate of the UN which makes the interconnectivity within this security triangle even stronger, and in that sense, less autonomous. The other security triangle which may be called a strategic security triangle is internal of the EU itself and consists of its major Member States: Germany, UK and France. These three Member States regarding their interests and culture shape the EU's external policy and influence other Member States while setting new rules and new responsibilities. The EU's operations through the CSDP have taken

⁶⁰ Tardy, 1.

⁶¹ Ibid., 2.

⁶² Kurowska and Breuer, 96.

⁶³ Tardy, 23.

⁶⁴ Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, "Esdp Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges [Article]," (2005), 97.

form of a coalition between “the big three” and groups of smaller countries which found the EU to be a good channel for pursuing their own interests.⁶⁵ Most of the EU’s missions could not be deployed without the support of these major Member States which proves that the EU’s dependency on such a strategic triangle is significant in making any decisions regarding deployments. Apart from their strategical interests, the “the big three” also helps to spread the EU’s values and enhance its visibility in the international environment which can be summed up in the context of Europeaness.




Figure 1 The Security tringles, source: Author's own figure.

Russia’s foreign policy and a current example of the Ukrainian crisis referring to Russian aggression and illegal intervention in the country highlighted one more inter related triangle regarding security issues: Russia- the Baltic States- and the Baltic Sea region. Moscow’s foreign policy discloses its strategic interests and historical identity in the Baltic Sea region and the Baltic States. The Baltic Sea region which encapsulates Sweden, Finland, The Baltic States, Poland, Denmark and Norway is geopolitically important to Putin as a strategic area for political and economic influence over the countries around the Baltic Sea. Russia sees the whole Baltic Sea region through the lens of physical control and political power. For Russia control of physical territory is a source of power which gives some kind of legitimate place in security-political constellation.⁶⁶ Moreover, Russia still holds the bitter loss of previously occupied nations, the Baltic States, and their successful development in the region and membership of

⁶⁵ Engberg, 1.

⁶⁶ Katri Pynnöniemi and Charly Saloni Pasternak, "Security in the Baltic Sea Region," (2016): 3.

NATO and the EU.⁶⁷ Such a disappointment of loss is based on historical identity which projects an image of Russia as a major power, and which Russia intends to get back. In addition, Russia has fears that Sweden and Finland will join NATO which is perceived as a threat to the whole nation of Russia. Russia's internal politics is based on confrontational logic which is built of enemy images. The image of aggressive West actions in Ukraine is used as an excuse for Russia's activity in the country of Ukraine.⁶⁸ Such an image of enemies makes Moscow resentful and openly hostile towards the Baltic Sea region. Russia's aggressive actions as a message of its power was already there before the Ukrainian crisis. It has violated the air and maritime space of Sweden, Finland and the Baltic States many times. For example, in October 1981, the Soviet submarine hit an underwater rock close to Karlskrona in Sweden. As an explanation the Soviet navy issued doubtful statements saying that the submarine appeared in the Swedish waters due to some accident, however, the ship had not sent any distress signal.⁶⁹ Moreover, Russia's military exercise in the region threatens all countries around the Sea. The latest military exercise included practice of invasion of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. Such a violation of air and maritime and Russia's military operation in Crimea demonstrates its willingness to use military means in order to pursue its interests and regain its power. In this respect, the question is: what will be next?




Figure 2 The triangle of security issue, source: Author's own figure.

⁶⁷ Stoicescu, 9.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Joris Nieuwint, "Whiskey on the Rocks – When Sweden Woke up to Find a Russian Submarine Stuck on a Rock," <https://www.warhistoryonline.com/war-articles/whiskey-on-the-rocks-when-sweden-woke-up-to-find-a-russian-submarine-stuck-on-a-rock.html>. Accessed April 17, 2017

In recent years, tensions between Russia and the Baltic States have been triggered by historical events and symbols. One of the tensions started in 2007 when the Estonian government intended to relocate Soviet monument to the outskirts of the city of Tallinn. Such an intention evoked riots which involved Russian minorities, supported by the government of Russia. In addition, apart from riots, a three week wave of cyber-attacks hit Estonia. The similar story was found in Lithuania as well, when Lithuanian Parliament banned the display of Soviet Symbols. The Baltic States' sense of security was weakened even more after the Russian- Georgian war in 2008 which was based on Russia's intentions to defend its citizens beyond its borders.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, the current situation of Ukraine is one more signal that Russia is stretching its muscles even further and step by step it is destroying the peaceful European security architecture.

While analyzing the EU as a security actor and its capabilities regarding crisis management, the case of the Ukrainian crisis and the EU's response to it uncovers the EU's willingness to prioritize soft power over hard power during tough and challenging times. Moreover, it reveals the importance of the strategic triangle of Germany, France and the UK which plays quite a role in the EU's response. The EU's soft response makes the Baltic States to worry even more because a possible threat to the Baltic States is just behind the wall and the question is if these states can trust the EU as a credible security actor in case of Russia's aggressive actions towards the Baltic States.

3. Theoretical framework

3.1. The CSDP: historical background

Prehistoric roots of the EU's security and defense dimension go back to 1948 when after two devastating continental wars collective defense became the concern of Europe. In 1948 the Treaty of Brussels was signed by the UK, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium. The Treaty obliged the five signatories to collective self- defense.⁷¹ On the other hand, other scholars declare that the beginning of common security matter started even earlier, in 1947 with a Treat of Dunkirk or the Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed by France and the

⁷⁰ Kaziukonyte, 3.

⁷¹ CardiffEDC, "Information Guide Security and Defence," (2013).

UK, which laid the foundation for the collective security and obligated the two countries to collaborate against any renewal threat of Germany.⁷² Next year the Treaty was expanded and became the Treaty of Brussels. However, after the creation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, as a main and significant defense organization, the Treaty of Brussels was set aside.⁷³ In 1950 the idea of the European Defense Community (EDC) emerged as an initiative to build a supranational security body, as an ambitious political project to create a Common European Army. The EDC was proposed by the French Prime Minister Rene Pleven and was based on the “Pleven Plan” as a response to the USA proposal to access West Germany to NATO and, in this respect, increase the influence and defense capabilities in Europe and counterbalance the USSR. Due to this reason, the main idea and goal of the Pleven Plan was to create European Defense Community which would incorporate Common European Army and which would increase security in Europe against the USSR. The EDC had to serve for the same purposes as NATO, moreover, France was also seeking to keep an eye on Germany. However, the Treaty on European Defense Community was signed in 1952 by France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, but, paradoxically, at the end was not ratified by France, which stated that this would negatively affect countries’ national sovereignty in the field of security and defense.⁷⁴ On the other hand, after Germany and Italy joined NATO in 1955, the will to cooperate on defense continued and resulted with the arose of the Western European Union, which was designed to coordinate the defense policies of the seven countries- UK, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and Italy. The idea behind the Western European Union was to group members of the EU which were also members of NATO and serve as European organization responsible for collective defense.⁷⁵ However, the WEU prevailed passive and mostly operated in the shadow of NATO and the NATO played a dominated role in supervising the defense and security of Europe and assured its collective functionality.⁷⁶ Later its activities were transferred to the EU and it was declared defunct in 2011, June.⁷⁷ Most of Europe’s attempts to increase its security and defense capabilities

⁷² Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Dunkirk, March 4, (1947):188.

⁷³ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union / Jolyon Howorth*, European Union Series (Palgrave Macmillan (Firm)) (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 4.

⁷⁴ Biscop and Whitman, 7.

⁷⁵ Howorth, 4.

⁷⁶ CardiffEDC.

⁷⁷ Howorth, 4.

struggled over time and one of the most significant reason for this was the positions of France and the UK. For 50 years, the UK and France delayed any European attempt for cooperation on security issues due to their perceptions of security and relations to NATO. The UK argued that if Europe portrayed an ability to self -security, then it would affect the relations with Washington which could lead to isolation. Moreover, the UK believed that Europe was not capable in building its autonomous defense system. On the other hand, France assumed that the US would take Europe even more seriously, if it took itself more seriously, which could lead to a better cooperation. However, these aspirations of France and the UK were mostly based on speculation rather than strategic analysis.⁷⁸

1970s can be called one of the first serious steps towards European foreign policy with the establishment of the European Political Co-operation (EPC) which had to serve as a channel for member states to discuss and adjust their positions and act accordingly. In general, EPC worked as a consultative body and brought member states to a closer cooperation. What is more, the EPC highlighted and defined a common identity and its role as an active actor on the world stage.⁷⁹

In the late 1980s the architecture and consideration of the security matters gained a completely different picture. The breakdown of Communism and the end of the Cold War between two different poles evoked the need for a wider and clearer concept of security.⁸⁰ In this respect, the Treaty on European Union in 1992 marked one of the first serious attempts to illuminate the concept of security. The Treaty transformed the EPC into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).⁸¹ This new project of the CFSP was mostly driven by France and Germany in the background. France as a ruler of European politics and Germany as an accountable body for economic and monetary policies. After the new project was put on work, the greater leadership over both policy areas was improved.⁸² It seemed that the birth of the CFSP marked a new page

⁷⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁷⁹ *European Security and Defence Policy : An Implementation Perspective / Edited by Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite*, ed. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, Routledge Advances in European Politics (New York, NY: by Routledge, 2008), 10.

⁸⁰ CardiffEDC.

⁸¹ *European Security and Defence Policy : An Implementation Perspective / Edited by Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite*, 10.

⁸² Howorth, 4.

of peace and democracy.⁸³ However, the creation of CFSP was being initiated at almost the same time when Yugoslavia was falling apart, and war, which seemed was over and the peace took over the world order, did not disappear with the fall of the Berlin Wall.⁸⁴ With the end of the Cold War Europe's place in the security environment changed essentially. Throughout the Cold War, Europe was divided by two dominated poles- the United States and the Soviet Union. At that time the US was seeking security and stability in Western Europe, while the Soviet Union was aiming to have a compliant Eastern and Central Europe. In this matter, there existed two security superpowers that mattered at that time- NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Due to this reason, it is believed that the plan of the European Defense Community was not ratified because there was no need to develop hard security means as it was a duty of alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.⁸⁵ However, with the end of the Cold War, this bipolarity of security providers disappeared and Europe changed its status from security consumer to security provider.⁸⁶ In this respect, with the shift of the status of security, Brussels desired to play a peacemaker role in the Balkans and increase its presence and activity as a security actor. However, violence in former Yugoslavia and Brussels' failure to stop slaughter in Croatia and Bosnia was already a triggering message of the EU's capabilities and efficiency as a security provider. In addition, the actions taken in the Balkans were lacking professional armed forces, had no common strategic culture and had no abilities to deploy sufficient forces abroad.⁸⁷ The wars in the Balkans was a challenge to Europe as it was too big, too soon to handle and it exceeded European political and diplomatic capabilities.⁸⁸

Another step in strengthening the CFSP was Petersberg Tasks, containing a list of military and security priorities, which included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and peacemaking, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management which lead to a more coherent security policy with clearer Common Strategies of the Union.⁸⁹ After Amsterdam Treaty

⁸³ Ibid., 5.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Frédéric Charillon, "The Eu as a Security Regime," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10, no. 4 (2005): 519.

⁸⁶ *European Security in a Global Context : Internal and External Dynamics / Edited by Thierry Tardy*, ed. Thierry Tardy, Contemporary Security Studies (London: Routledge, 2009), 6.

⁸⁷ *European Security and Defence Policy : An Implementation Perspective / Edited by Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite*, 11.

⁸⁸ Charillon,521.

⁸⁹ *European Security and Defence Policy : An Implementation Perspective / Edited by Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite*.

adopted Petersberg Tasks in 1997, theoretically, the EU became a military actor.⁹⁰ In general, many of the Union's elites were collectively already agreeing on developing and improving their role in the new post- cold war security arena by building up their military capacity and moving towards more autonomous European security system⁹¹. In this respect, the European Security and Defense Identity was born, which had to allow European forces to use American military assets via NATO, but just in those situations where the US had very little or no interest at all. ESDI had to serve in situations like the Bosnian war, then the EU intended to deploy military assets, but had no possibilities in doing this because the US did not show any interest and need to be involved. However, as Howorth stated, that this arrangement was nothing else as "separable but not separate".⁹² Member States did not find themselves in a military response after the Cold War and Union's contribution to the European security environment was mostly symbolic and driven by democratization and the liberalization of the market rather than military operations. The Union's power was constructed in promoting non- military aspects of security instead of military ones.⁹³

A dramatic change was initiated by the French and British government in 1998- The Saint- Malo declaration, which gave a totally new start for a more efficient European Security and Defense Policy.⁹⁴ One of the main reasons for the declaration was a new crisis in Kosovo, which triggered Franco- British concerns about the need for the EU military capacity.⁹⁵ The declaration stated that the EU should have more autonomous space in its security and defense matters, independently forming its own policy without intervention of the USA which would lead to the development of the EU as a security actor. Moreover, the Declaration called for new institutions which would allow to develop and implement the policy and demanded credible military forces which could be deployed then is decided. These new approaches towards security and defense was named the Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP), which was separated from ESDI due to its new capabilities of decision- making and autonomy. However, due to the long acronymic abbreviation, CESDP became the European Security and Defense Policy

⁹⁰ Adrian Treacher, "From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The Eu's Resistable Transformation [Article]," (2004).

⁹¹ Ibid., 51.

⁹² Howorth, 6.

⁹³ Treacher, 52.

⁹⁴ Charillon, 522.

⁹⁵ Howorth, 145.

(ESDP), which after 2009 Lisbon Treaty became the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).⁹⁶

The next step towards a military and civilian capabilities of the EU as a security actor was made at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, which also marked the continuation of Europe's collective thinking. It was agreed to establish a rapid reaction force (RRF) which would be able to deploy 60 000 troops within 60 days for at least one year by the year of 2003. However, even after Helsinki summit, the EU desire to develop its military capabilities were controversial as countries like Sweden and Finland were more in favor of civilian instruments over militarization and intended the EU to play a more constructive role in peacebuilding.⁹⁷ In 2004 the initiative by Germany, France and the UK to set up small and mobile fighting units which would engage in military crisis prevention was also a step towards the implementation of the EU's CSDP. The Battlegroups consist of multinational units of about 1500 soldiers that can be deployed within 5 days and stay in operations up to 120 days. A battle group is accounted to be the smallest military body which could be deployed for operations and missions. As the Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, once said that the purpose of the EU Battle Groups is to be in the war and we should not think about the EU as a soft power and the NATO as a hard power.⁹⁸

However, the EU's Battle Groups were declared in 2007, none of them have ever been deployed.⁹⁹ Apart from military aspect, the civilian crisis management concept was introduced in 1999 at the Helsinki European Council meeting. At that time, it was seen as a complement to the military capacities of the EU. The aim was to prove that Europe is ready and credible to work within civilian crisis as well. The introduction of civilian instruments which were very welcomed by less military inclined countries resulted in a mixture of civilian and military aspects of the CSDP.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Ibid., 8.

⁹⁷ *European Security and Defence Policy : An Implementation Perspective / Edited by Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite*, 12.

⁹⁸ Roger Cole, "The Eu Battle Groups," <http://www.eukritik.se/index.php?vu=wblk&nuid=4294965165>. Accessed March 9, 2017.

⁹⁹ Muriel Asseburg et al., "The Eu as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of Esdp Missions and Operations," (2009): 12.

¹⁰⁰ Howorth, 98.

A long way has already been taken to enhance the Union's capacity of autonomous security or something that is close to it. This way was marked with a number of factors contributing to the Union's security architecture: the rebirth of Europe after the Cold World, the changes of geopolitical order which witnessed a diminished American will to be a security provider for Europe and lowered interests in Europe as a continent than it was during the Cold War. In addition, many Member States of the Union were seeking to declare the EU's capabilities to become a complete security actor on a world stage.¹⁰¹ Moreover, new conflicts were emerging and Europe needed new tools and new strategies to combat these issues: "the era when European security was synonymous with NATO had gone".¹⁰²

3.2. The CSDP in crisis management

Dwight D. Eisenhower, a former American politician and soldier, said: "What counts is not necessarily the size of the dog in the fight- it's the size of the fight in the dog." This could be applied for the analysis of the CSDP, as the best way to understand it, is not through the examination of its capacity and institutions, but through the analysis of what it does and how.¹⁰³

The EU through the CSDP executes military and civilian operations which are the means for crisis management and conflict prevention. Those military and civilian operations which are deployed, can be called the core features of the CSDP. While executing military or civilian deployments, the EU channels its commitment to the treaty, turns its vision into action, reflects its identity and culture. Moreover, the operations represent the EU's inquire to find a place on the world stage.¹⁰⁴ In this respect, a closer look to other scholars' analysis of some of the CSDP operations is more revealing than just analysis of its capabilities *per se*.¹⁰⁵

The EU has already deployed the missions in different geographical zones- the Balkans, Africa, Asia, Middle Est, Europe. Those missions and operations include civil or military measures in the framework of the CSDP. Some of those missions are already completed, some of them are

¹⁰¹ *European Security and Defence Policy : An Implementation Perspective / Edited by Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite.*

¹⁰² Charillon, 521.

¹⁰³ Howorth, 144Howorth.

¹⁰⁴ *European Security and Defence Policy : An Implementation Perspective / Edited by Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite*, 26.

¹⁰⁵ Asseburg et al., 13.

still ongoing, some of them incorporating executive mandate or some of them providing monitoring, mentoring or advising frameworks.¹⁰⁶ Up until now, the EU launched 34 missions, where 19 out of 34 missions are completed and 15 are still ongoing.¹⁰⁷ At the very beginning, the first missions were military missions, which gave an impression that the EU was becoming a military actor. Moreover, in 2004 the EU launched its biggest ever military mission- EUFOR-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, it was argued that the militarily active operations in the very beginning were launched in order to enhance visibility and significance of the CSDP.¹⁰⁸ However, after a decade of civilian missions, security experts, Korski and Gowan, assumed that the civilian missions under the CSDP is largely illusionary and worthless due to the EU's disability to find civilians who would participate in the missions. Moreover, they stated that most of the EU's missions are irrelevant, remain small and lacking ambition.¹⁰⁹

In 2003 the EU deployed its first military operation in Macedonia, named Concordia. The main aim of the mission was to help to keep the secure environment and keep the peace. The EU deployed 137 troops from all member states except Ireland and Denmark. However, as Jolyon Howorth, a professor of European politics at the University of Bath, states, that the mission was "high in political symbolism and modest in terms of military", which was mostly used for the EU to test its abilities and practical implementation of the military mission. Moreover, the NATO remained in the background of the mission, as the mission was based on the Berlin Plus agreement, which means that the EU relied on NATO assets.¹¹⁰ The same year the EU launched the second military operation, which was fully autonomous and outside Europe- EUFOR Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The mission was launched after the call of UN which could not provide sufficient security in the area. The mission's intention was to stabilize security in the area, develop humanitarian environment, and protect UN personnel and airports. EUFOR Artemis was mostly driven by France, which managed to deploy 500 troops in Bunia the next day after the decision to launch the mission was made. This proves a good preparation, but also reveals French interests to restore its influence in its former colony. In general, the

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 15.

¹⁰⁷ EEAS, "Military and Civilian Missions and Operations," https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_nl. Accessed March 21st, 2017.

¹⁰⁸ Howorth, 145.

¹⁰⁹ Jacques Richardson, "Can the Eu Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe's Civilian Capacities," *Foresight* 12, no. 3 (2010): 11.

¹¹⁰ Howorth, 154.

mission uncovers two strategic preferences of France: to bring its influence back in Africa and put the flesh on European military dimension as an autonomous actor. However, the other major actor, Germany, did not have very strong strategic interests in the region, but its involvement in the mission was driven by its foreign policy goals: demonstration of European togetherness, support for UN and spread humanitarian values.¹¹¹ The operation Artemis can reveal European Security Culture. The commitments to St. Malo declaration made it impossible for the MS not to support the mission or to “adopt a no action position”. Moreover, the mission Artemis was about building and shaping the EU’s global image and strengthening the security and defense policy.¹¹² However, Peter Schmidt, argues that not all member states accepted taking part in the operation even though they did not oppose it, there existed different understandings between the MS of situations where to intervene militarily. In this respect, the author draws the conclusion that the EU is lacking common security strategy and most of the decisions are influenced by countries’ national security cultures and norms. The mission Artemis was mostly based on French interests and country’s security strategic culture rather than it was based on a common European strategic culture and countries agreement to support the mission but do not contribute to it, does not reveal the European Security Culture.¹¹³ What is more, the critics argued that the mission was too limited in time and space and not sufficient. The mission could be defined as an experiment and as a politico- military collaboration in the EU from which lessons could be learnt and used for broader CSDP (ESDP at that time).¹¹⁴

The third military operation, which took place in Bosnia – Herzegovina in December 2004 (EUFOR Althea), is defined as the most ambitious military operation. The operation was transferred from NATO to the EU and had to contribute to a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. From the perspective of the EU, the operation was a channel for a broader EU policy towards Balkans, which had to serve for the future membership. However, the mission was criticized for being more civilian than militaristic and consisted of four

¹¹¹ Peter Schmidt, "The Eu's Military Involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Security Culture, Interests and Games," *Contemporary Security Policy* 32, no. 3 (2011): 568-69.

¹¹² Simon Duke, "Consensus Building in Esdp: The Lessons of Operation Artemis," *International Politics* 46, no. 4 (2009): 407.

¹¹³ Schmidt, 570.

¹¹⁴ Howorth, 156.

elements: economy, rule of law, police and defense reform. As Howorth states, a mission which started as a military mission was transformed into a mix of civil- military operation.¹¹⁵

In June 2006, the fourth military mission was launched in Congo, named EUFOR RD and lasted until November 2006. The EU was asked by the UN to deploy a military operation to the DRC and assist the UN mission (MONUC) and if needed deploy a quick and immediate reaction forces during the process of the presidential elections in the country. Even though the UN asked for assistance in 2005 December, but just in 2006 March the EU agreed to support and deploy troops. Apart from being lengthy in a decision making, the EU struggled in finding troops, as the only member states who had the military capabilities and were able to execute military operation in Africa were Germany, the UK and France. However, the UK was not keen on taking a role because it was already busy with Iraq and Afghanistan. France was leading the operation Artemis and insisted on the other country to lead this time. Even though Germany was very reluctant to take a lead, but eventually accepted the lead role.¹¹⁶ However, the mission received a lot of criticism. First, the size of the force was symbolic comparing to the size of the country and that the elections were nationwide. Second, the troops were deployed in a city which was the least risky- Kinshasa, while the most of troubles were likely to occur in other cities (mostly in the Eastern part). Third, the length of the mission was just four months and had to end at the time, when the troubles might occur and the need of the troops might be needed the most. Howorth in his book states that the mission was described as “cut and run”.¹¹⁷ On the other hand, the elections took place without any serious incidents and the mission was marked as a success story and had to serve as a good image for the EU.

2014 April, the EU launched a military operation EUFOR RCA which had to support the UN in providing safe and secure environment in Bangui (Central African Republic) and was launched until the March 2015. This mission revealed some kind of a paradox between the Member States. On one hand, the Member States agreed on the military deployment, but on the other hand, most of the Member States were unwilling to contribute to the operation. This paradox was called intentions- reality gap. Due to the emergency in the country and the need for the EU to intervene

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 157-58.

¹¹⁶ European Security and Defence Policy : An Implementation Perspective / Edited by Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, 122.

¹¹⁷ Howorth, 159.

and assist the UN, the Member States approved the deployment due to a sense of collective obligation because deployment was considered as the right thing to do. However, most of the Member States had no interests in the region and were more concentrated on other issues, like Ukraine, they were unwilling to make contributions to the mission. In this case, those Member States contributed very symbolically and left the operation to be led by France, which had an interest in the region.¹¹⁸ The actions which are made by the Member States are influenced by sense of obligations and roles, but also by various historical backgrounds, political and economic factors, identity and cultural aspects and in different crisis countries may have different interests and different ways of acting or influencing.

Apart from deploying military missions, the EU under CSDP can deploy non-military missions as well. These mission can include police missions in post- conflict or crisis management situation, monitoring and assistance missions and rule of law missions.

One of the police missions which is referred as is one of the most important and challenging missions is EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina which was launched in 2003 and completed in 2012. The goal of the mission was to establish a sustainable and publicly accountable police service which would operate according to European standards and which had to help to fight organized crime in the country.¹¹⁹ The mission has some credits in the development of CSDP, as the mission was long it served as an experiment with the outcome of learning by doing. Moreover, the mission worked as a channel for introducing European norms and values.¹²⁰ The mission was criticized for the lack of political will to address the problems and the EU struggle to understand the role of the mission in post- conflict situations. Moreover, the police mission was used to channel the EU's values which had to be embraced by the country. In this respect, the police lost its functionality.¹²¹

Another experimental mission was rule of law mission in Georgia between 2004 and 2005. The mission was named EUJUST Themis and was the first rule of law mission. The aim of the

¹¹⁸ Niklas I. M. NovÁky, "From Eufor to Eumam: The European Union in the Central African Republic," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 21, no. 1 (2016): 95-96.

¹¹⁹ Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, "Esdp Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges [Article]," 225.

¹²⁰ Howorth, 169.

¹²¹ Kari Osland, "The Eu Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *International Peacekeeping* (13533312) 11, no. 3 (2004).

mission was to reform Georgian criminal legislation. Notwithstanding the success of the mission, the EU demonstrated unwillingness to be involved too much in the Georgian legislation system due to several reasons. First, the EU was frightened of the reaction of Russia and second, intended to remote a possible Georgian membership into the EU.¹²²

A short analysis of some of the missions above revealed problematic and challenging factors under the missions of the CSDP. Most of the missions were criticized for being too small, lacking of consensus between member states, too short, insufficient, lengthy in decision making, driven by countries' interests and different cultures. Moreover, the most of the missions served as a learning ground and was an instrument to channel the EU's norms and values and was driven due to obligations to do good and right.

3.3. Explaining the EU under CSDP

An impressive number of CSDP missions and operations has been launched, however the achievements are weak and most of the missions were relatively of a small scale and unambitious.¹²³ Moreover, the amount of the CSDP's operations consists mostly of civilian operations and most of the missions did not involve the force deployments or if there were any military deployments they were small and for very limited period of time.¹²⁴ While following the critical evaluations of the missions, quite a bulk of the studies confirm that the operations under CSDP did not contribute in solving serious defense issues. On top of that, the CSDP remains quite passive, while serious crises show a clear threat to European values and interests.¹²⁵ As Howorth states: "even after twenty years of preparation, the EU's capacity to mount a significant military mission in its own backyard is grossly inadequate."¹²⁶

¹²² Howorth, 177.

¹²³ Haesebrouck Tim, "Explaining the Pattern of Csdp-Operations: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis," *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, Vol 15, Iss 2, Pp 5-21 (2015), no. 2 (2015): 5.

¹²⁴ Alyson J. K. Bailes, "The Eu and a 'Better World': What Role for the European Security and Defence Policy?," 2008, 123.

¹²⁵ Tim, 8.

¹²⁶ Jolyon Howorth, "Csdp and Nato Post-Libya: Towards the Rubicon? Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 35, July 2012," (2012), 3.

One important observation was made by Hills, who argued that the EU projects capability-expectations gap while giving big expectations about its actions towards security and defense, but its capabilities to fulfill these promises stay insufficient.¹²⁷ Despite of good intentions, new strategies, new tools which were introduced after almost every European Council, the capability expectations gap were increasing and was leading to a questions “why are not we able to intervene?”¹²⁸ As Frederic Charillon, a professor of International Relations, remarked: “the capability expectations gap remains as an important lacuna in the approach to European security”.¹²⁹

An important study is made by Katarina Engberg who attempts to answer the question under what conditions the EU decides to intervene militarily. The author came up with few conclusions. First, the CSDP missions will be more likely launched in those situations then the agreement with local influential actors can be reached (EUFOR RDC). In other cases, if this factor can not be achieved, the missions is less likely to be launched (Lebanon). Second, the EU will undertake military mission in the cases which can provide an opportunity rather than a challenge. In other words, if the situation contains high risk, the mission will be less likely launched. Moreover, the author also concluded that the missions are more likely to be launched in former colonies of the main EU Member States or if the other security organizations are involved. The EU tends to be involved in those missions where it can play a complementary role with other security organizations (NATO or UN). Engberg summarizes that the EU military missions are reluctant, small scale, very conditional on reaching a positive outcome and opportunity.¹³⁰

There is a story written by Donald Puchala about blind men and an elephant. Some blind men were exploring an elephant and each of them touched the elephant in order to find out how the beast looked like. All men came up with different conclusions how the animal looked like, because every man touched different part of the elephant and made different assumptions according to the part they touched. The result was that none of the man got a clear picture of

¹²⁷ Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role."

¹²⁸ Charillon, 527.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Tim Haesebrouck, "The Eu and Military Operations: A Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Contemporary European Research* 9, no. 5 (2013).

how the animal looked like, but each men believed their own experience which made them disbelieve the experience of others which led to a discussion about the nature of the beast.¹³¹

The same can be seen in the case of the EU. “There is a contradiction between the EU presenting itself as a force for good- including the universal good- and endowing itself with a military capacity”.¹³² The EU seeks to be good and do what it considers to be appropriate and right to do, on the other hand, still desires to be a military power. However, the EU applies diplomatic and civilian means to far more countries in trouble than it has used military means. The EU missions through the CSDP can be called small do good adventures, as the EU chooses the operations which are low at risks, require little force and small amount of professional military component.¹³³ As Alyson Bailes, a British diplomat, political scientist, academic and polyglot, noted, the EU is a nice cop which is made up of friendly and safe characteristics. The rationale behind the choices of the missions lies not in the situations which require the most of humanitarian aid or which would provide the biggest benefit to more actors, but it lies in the calculations of low risk and costs, learning value, an easily reachable consensus between the Member States and the possibility to “show up” on a stage.¹³⁴ Moreover, the author makes some remarks which are complementary to Engberg’s conclusions. The EU favors the missions which are close to home or which are based in former colonial areas (Congo). On top of that, the support from the locals is also a critical factor.¹³⁵ However, there are no clear guidelines which would define what sort of force should be used under what kind of circumstances. In this respect, different countries’ attitudes or cultures start to play a role. As some countries do not support missions which are high risk or missions that includes peace enforcement, while others support the missions that are urgent, but brings some advantages. In general, not all Member States has the same perception about the missions. Moreover, each country’s troops have different training experience which may lead to an incident which would infringe the image of the EU, norms and solidarity. The EU functions under the strategy of “doing good” through active, visible

¹³¹ Donald J. Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 10, no. 3 (1972).

¹³² Bailes, 116.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 119-23.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 123-24.

interventions and through “being good” which is the nature of the EU, the foundation of peace and generosity, diffusing existential value to the world.¹³⁶

Sven Biscop concluded that the EU’s Common Foreign and Security policy exists to do “good” in the world. “The EU as Snow White, pure, innocent- and helpless”.¹³⁷ The separation of what is good and bad is one of the burdens towards the strength of the EU. Foreign policy is about the promotion of interests which, in general, is neither good nor bad. And the EU should understand, that sometimes “good” requires the use of force. In hard situations, like war crimes, genocide or ethnic cleansing, civilian power is powerless. If the Union is reluctant to use force under its own flag, then there are no chances for a credible collective action, especially in the eyes of those member states which have a strong strategic culture.¹³⁸ The EU struggles with setting its clear objectives and evaluation of effectiveness of the missions. In contrary, the EU allocates more money without reassessing the instruments and expects different results, as Biscop calls it as “handing out free apples” and being good and generous. The desire to be good to everyone and being liked by everyone- that is the model of Snow White. On top of that, the Member States are too much focused on their interests and are not willing to let the EU play its full role. Biscop admits with Bailes’s statement, that the opinion of the Member States how to deal with the threat differs essentially which leads to three cases: arming, supporting or taking a safe seat. However, London and Paris have the most to say and influence the actions of the EU, while the other Member States can decide whether to join or not.¹³⁹ In addition to Biscop notes, other scholars agrees on the divergence of the Member States understandings about the means and ends of security policy. The lack of consensus portrays the lack of security culture or reflects the extent of different national security cultures which influence the outcome of the EU security and defense policy.¹⁴⁰ On the other hand, most Member States agree that military component is a need for the EU in order to increase its influence on a stage. However, the Member States are aware of the contradiction between the military power and the image of the

¹³⁶ Ibid., 124-25.

¹³⁷ Sven Biscop, "Europe and the World or Snow White and the Seven Fallacies. Egmont Paper No. 61, October 2013," (2013), 7.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 9-14.

¹⁴⁰ Alessia Biava, Margriet Drent, and Graeme P. Herd, "Characterizing the European Union's Strategic Culture: An Analytical Framework," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 6 (2011): 1231.

EU, its ideas, norms and values.¹⁴¹ Through the CSDP, the EU portrays an image of itself that is an altruistic, ethical, civil power and force for good.¹⁴² On the other hand, the military missions which were discussed above, proves, that the EU has, though small scale, military means, however, the EU tends to close its eyes then it comes to deploy those means. Like in the famous story “Silver Blaze” by Sherlock Holmes about the dog that didn’t bark during the night when the crime occurred, the EU is likely to embrace soft and low profile in dealing with the crisis.¹⁴³

3.4. Realism and Constructivism as explanatory frameworks

In the following subchapter the IR theories of Realism and Constructivism is going to be described and examined in order to be applied as an explanatory approach for the raised questions in this thesis. Despite the fact that, according to other scholars, the operations under the CSDP are small scale, lack of ambition and low intensity, it has incited quite a bulk of theoretical literature which tries to explain the nature, factors, the scope and ambitions of the CSDP. The two IR theories, Realism and Constructivism, are chosen because they supplement and validate the arguments which were stated above and help in explaining the rationale behind the missions of the CSDP. Moreover, the material and ideational factors are interrelated in the realm of Security and Defense Policy.¹⁴⁴

3.4.1. Realism

Realism is a state centric approach which assumes that world politics consists of an international nexus of states, which concentrate on their own sovereignty and security. Realists draw attention to the national interests and the importance of the states’ survival. Realism is built around the core concepts “egoism” and “power centrism”. Moreover, realists states that everything in the world is measurable and material.¹⁴⁵ The realists analyses the EU not as autonomous actor, but

¹⁴¹ Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, "Eu Strategic Culture: When the Means Becomes the End," *Contemporary Security Policy* 32, no. 3 (2011): 526.

¹⁴² Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre, "Minding the Gap between Words and Deeds: Towards a New Eu Strategy on Security," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 20, no. 1 (2015): 6.

¹⁴³ Irem Askar Karakir and Nilufer Karacasulu, "The Dog That Didn't Bark? Eu Crisis Management and the Syrian Crisis," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 28, no. 4 (2016): 525.

¹⁴⁴ Christoph O. Meyer and E. V. A. Strickmann, "Solidifying Constructivism: How Material and Ideational Factors Interact in European Defence," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 1 (2011): 77.

¹⁴⁵ Tim, 15.

as a body where separate member states interact and the EU acts as a vehicle for the collective interests of the Member States.¹⁴⁶ The theory explains that the material interests are the driving forces under the emergence of the CSDP and the decisions are based on cost- benefit calculations where the strongest states will carry the costs only in those cases which can strengthen their influence. In this respect, the strongest countries can shape and influence the external environment according to their interests.¹⁴⁷ Realism states that the CSDP is a power project but a very fragile one as it projects nation- state power more than it reflects Europe's power into the world.¹⁴⁸ The CSDP is "shaped and moulded by European people responding to their own desires and ambitions".¹⁴⁹ According to Hoffmann, domestic differences, pluralist history and culture and diverging world views result in diverging foreign policy priorities.¹⁵⁰ Due to this complexity, the CSDP is about domestic European affairs and the biggest Member States support the EU as they would be likely worse off without it.¹⁵¹ In terms of cooperation between the Member States, Realism argues that cooperation will occur only if there is an interest of the states to cooperate.¹⁵² However, the EU cooperation on milieu- shaping is primarily driven by the EU's largest powers.¹⁵³

There are two sub- schools of realism- minimal and maximal realists, which can explain different positions on when a state should intervene in a conflict.¹⁵⁴ According to Catherine Gegout, a Professor in International Relations, the labelling depends on the extent the State is willing to intervene. The Minimal Realists theory expects the EU not to intervene in the Third World, it should act as "neo- isolationists" and any intervention would lead to creating more enemies. On the other hand, maximal realists states that the EU would intervene if this intervention would enhance their power and leadership and if limited risks are at stake. Gegout made a conclusion that the EU during its first military mission was more likely to adopt maximal

¹⁴⁶ Kurowska and Breuer, 19.

¹⁴⁷ Czaputowicz Jacek, "European Cooperation in the Field of Security and Defence. International Relation Theories Perspective," *Securitologia, Vol 19, Iss 1 (2014)*, no. 1 (2014): 105-06.

¹⁴⁸ Rynning, 25.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 33.

¹⁵⁰ Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," *Daedalus* 95, no. 3 (1966): 864.

¹⁵¹ Rynning, 31-32.

¹⁵² Catherine Gegout, "Cause and Consequences of the Eu's Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realist Explanation," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 10, no. 3 (2005): 429.

¹⁵³ Kurowska and Breuer, 22.

¹⁵⁴ Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," 1996.

realists approach. Maximal Realists argue that there are five possible conditions which can influence a possible intervention in a third country: the host country is small and militarily weak, the intervention is supported by the population, the costs of the intervention is low and the possibility of success is high.¹⁵⁵ In addition to this, Gegout argues that the EU is more likely to intervene then the warring area is of strategic and economic importance, and at a low cost of military means. However, the EU does not have the capacity to intervene in a large scale operations and if there is such a decision, then it comes not as a reaction to a crisis but it mostly originates from a will to promote the EU's own image.¹⁵⁶

However, as Sten Rynning, a professor of International Relations, states that realism is quite a diverse approach. Another school of realism is structural realism which distinguishes two sub groups of realism: offensive and defensive realism. Offensive realism is about maximization of power. In order to be safe, the states will seek to maximize their power relative to others, which may include a degree of aggressiveness towards the Great Powers. Domination and hegemony is the best strategy according to offensive realists. On the other hand, Defensive realism advice the states to prepare for war in order to avoid it. In contrast to Offensive realism, Defensive realism states that domination is a dangerous strategy and emphasize the balance of power. The nation states are perceived as security maximizers and power is just a mean of security.¹⁵⁷ The main difference between offensive and defensive realists is that, in case of defensive realism, the states seek to accumulate adequate amount of power in order to ensure their own security. However, in case of offensive realism the States seek to accumulate more power to become a global power.¹⁵⁸ On the other hand, for long periods, states tend to apply more a defensive approach rather than power maximization, the latter would be applied if the benefits outweigh the costs.¹⁵⁹

On the other hand, every sub school of realists agree that egoism, self- interest and states priorities to self- security are key drivers. In this respect, the EU member states will tend to safe guard their sovereignty and to pursue their foreign security policy priorities and, in this respect,

¹⁵⁵ Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War," 1991, 43.

¹⁵⁶ Gegout, 429-43.

¹⁵⁷ Rynning.

¹⁵⁸ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York : Norton, 2001, 2001), Non-fiction.

¹⁵⁹ Kurowska and Breuer, 21.

the CSDP will be driven by the biggest Member States and will remain as an intergovernmental body.¹⁶⁰

3.4.2. Constructivism

Constructivism rose in 1980s as a contrast to the traditional rational-based theories and draws the attention to “norms, identities and cultures”.¹⁶¹ In general, the idea of constructivism is embedded in norms and identities, social construction of reality which influence the way the states act. According to Martha Finnemore, a constructivist scholar of international relations: “beliefs about legitimate intervention constitute certain behavioral possibilities, and, in that sense, cause them”. In this respect, constructivism seeks to answer the question “how” instead of “why”.¹⁶² In addition, Wendt stated: “a fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them”. The author concludes that the States act differently towards an enemy and towards a friend because the understanding of an enemy is threatening, which is the opposite of a friend.¹⁶³ Which refers to the explanation why the same events have different meanings to different actors. As author exemplifies, that the military power of the USA has different meanings to Canada and to Cuba or British missiles have a different significance to the USA than do Soviet missiles.¹⁶⁴

In contrast to realist thinking, constructivism declare that different interacting actors do not perceive one goal which is about gaining more power, but the actors make choices based on their identities, norms and cultures which bring realities into being. The theory underlines the importance of ideas and identities and how these factors influence and shape the understanding and response of the states to the specific events. According to Wendt, actors acquire identities which is socially constructed, stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self. Therefore, social construction of identities lead to roles and responsibilities of the actors.¹⁶⁵ As

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 34.

¹⁶¹ Tim, 11.

¹⁶² Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention. [Elektronisk Resurs] : Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 2003, 2003), Book.

¹⁶³ Wendt, 396-97.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 398.

Christoph Meyer, a Professor of European and International politics, states, then the problem or opportunity occur, the actors do not start with a blank sheet, but decide on appropriate behavior towards the problem or opportunity based on pre-existing beliefs, ideas and norms.¹⁶⁶ In general, Constructivists consider the actors or agents as role players who behave in a situation according to their understandings of what is appropriate to do. States or actors follow the norms which leads to the “logic of appropriateness” considering any given situation.¹⁶⁷

Taking into account the characteristics of constructivism and referring it to security matters, constructivism is concerned about the impacts of norms, identities, images, roles and strategic cultures in international security. “Norms within the concept of strategic culture can be conceptualized as beliefs about what is appropriate, legitimate, or just regarding the goals and modalities concerning the use of force”. As Meyer noted, the norms or “logic of appropriateness” is not just about doing right, but also thinking what works in security and defense affairs.¹⁶⁸ Constructivism as a theory was widely used in explaining CSDP, because roles, rules, identities and ideas are perceived as tools which can provide with a wider and deeper insights of the EU’s drama in CSDP.¹⁶⁹ Henrik Larsen in his study analyzes why the EU made so little use of its military means. The author bases his arguments on constructivism and explains that the EU constructs itself as a civilian power based on political and economic interests and its regional interests in its policies downplayed the use of military means. Even though after the St. Malo declaration, the Member States believed that the EU’s acquisition of military means was a crucial factor in shaping and strengthening the EU’s image and power, the military means is still perceived as a part of its civilian means, just one of the Union’s tools. Military power is understood as a value added mean to the EU’s image which together strengthens the EU’s identity and the EU’s military access is a central factor for its prestige and the EU’s definition of itself as an important international actor. Moreover, the ability to use military tools demonstrates the EU’s ability to solve international conflicts and take more responsibility. However, apart from being just an integral part of civilian means, military means are presented

¹⁶⁶ Christoph O. Meyer, "The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from Strategic Culture Research for the European Union's Evolution as a Military Power," *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 3 (2011): 527.

¹⁶⁷ Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 1998, 897.

¹⁶⁸ Meyer, 677.

¹⁶⁹ Ben Tonra, "Constructing the Cfsp: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41, no. 4 (2003): 738.

as means of last resort and civilian power as a dominant power. The author in his discourse analysis argues, that the EU's possibility to draw military means as an integral part of a broader range of tools, makes it a unique actor in the international stage and enhance its image not just as a normal great power but as a unique one. The EU's increasing actorness influence world affairs and promote its own values. Areas around Europe regarding security concerns are priorities of the EU. In those areas the EU has special priorities and responsibility in furthering the European values (The Balkans).¹⁷⁰ According to constructivists approach the EU place its external image as a very important factor in the international arena, as well as its roles and responsibilities in a given situation influence the way other actors views the EU and perceives its importance as an actor. The missions under the CSDP gives an opportunity for the EU to increase its scope of actions, spread the EU's values and enhance the EU's visibility on the world stage.¹⁷¹

In addition to roles, responsibilities and images at the EU level, constructivists draw attention to differences between the Member States. Those differences in terms of their foreign policy traditions, identities and cultures shapes the preferences towards the use of force which together influence the outcome and development of the EU's security and defense framework.¹⁷² According to Meyer, the preferences towards the use of force are encapsulated in the strategic culture which may differ between the Member States. Strategic culture consists of "the socially transmitted, identity derived norms, ideas, and habits that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a given political community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community's pursuit of security and defense goals".¹⁷³ Strategic culture can be characterized by four dimensions. First dimension considers the goals for the use of force. For example, countries like Finland or Ireland consider the use of force in a very urgent situations and just in cases of the attacks on the home territory, but not for securing and defensing foreign people against threats abroad and not for promoting and securing the EU's values and beliefs. On the other hand, countries like France and Britain are quite supportive of using force to defend the EU's values and norms. The other dimension considers the way in which force is used. For

¹⁷⁰ Henrik Larsen, "The Eu: A Global Military Actor?," *Cooperation & Conflict* 37, no. 3 (2002): 283-99.

¹⁷¹ Basil Germond and Michael E. Smith, "Re-Thinking European Security Interests and the Esdp: Explaining the Eu's Anti-Piracy Operation," *Contemporary Security Policy* 30, no. 3 (2009).

¹⁷² Meyer and Strickmann, 64.

¹⁷³ Meyer, 677.

example, some states like Austria, tends to avoid force and use it as a last resort, which leads to minimizing the risk of causing death among foreign and own citizens. The third dimension is conditioned by beliefs about how the state should survive, whether it should join alliances and supranational organizations or this step would cause a danger for the state. Lastly, the dimension under which national governments require domestic or supranational organizations authorization of the use of force. On one side of the spectrum is Germany, which requires a high degree of authorization and on the other side of the spectrum is France, which do not demand such a high degree of authorization.¹⁷⁴ Christoph Meyer stated that one of the biggest drawbacks of the CSDP is the lack of consensus between the Member States on the use of force, which impedes the CSDP to use its full potential and to act in high intensity operations.¹⁷⁵ According to Howorth, there exists differences between the Member States which favor power projection and military means over civilian instruments and territorial defense, and those differences are the biggest burdens towards a common approach.¹⁷⁶ On the other hand, other authors argue that there is a common agreement between the Member States to use civilian over military instruments which can be an indicator of an increasing convergence of the cultures amongst the Member States.¹⁷⁷

In general, Constructivists, while explaining the small scale, modest and lack of ambition CSDP operations, would indicate the diverging norms of the Member States on the use of force as one of the main factors which affects the accountability and effectiveness of the CSDP. In other words, constructivists would point to the absence of a common European security culture.¹⁷⁸

The important characteristics of roles, responsibilities and images of the EU and differences between the strategic cultures of the Member States will be used in the analysis of this research.

4. Methodology

¹⁷⁴ "Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 4 (2005): 529-30.

¹⁷⁵ C. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2006), 680.

¹⁷⁶ Jolyon Howorth, "The CESDP and the forging of a european security culture ", *Politique européenne* 4/2002 (n° 8) , p. 88-109.

¹⁷⁷ Tim, 12.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 14.

4.1. A case study

This chapter presents the methodological approach which is applied to answer the research question. The overall framework of the research is based on the analysis of the Ukrainian crisis and possible threats to the Baltic States from the side of Russia. In this respect, two case studies stands as a foundation for a deeper analysis of the research. A case study is a research strategy which is based on the analysis of one, or a small number, of phenomena. The word “case” derived from the Latin word *casus*, which means incidence, occurrence, happening, usually with unfavorable implications like an accident or misfortune.¹⁷⁹ A case study gives some freedom, because it is not spatially delimited and it does not have to be contemporary, it can also be from the past. Moreover, the data for the case study may be collected in various ways, it can be both qualitative and quantitative. A case study can also serve in different ways. It can serve as a channel to develop and evaluate theories, formulate hypothesis or explain a particular phenomenon.¹⁸⁰

In the case of this thesis, the research will be conducted while analyzing the EU’s CSDP soft actorness and influence in the case of Ukraine and its capabilities in helping the Baltic States regarding a possible threat from Russia. Both case studies will be based on theoretical framework which will provide the explanations of problematics regarding the CSDP. A case study based on theoretical framework which seeks to provide an explanation for the phenomenon, is named as interpretative case study.¹⁸¹ However, one of the main challenges the case study can face is theory based. A case study is based on theoretical framework which has to serve for the study as a guide, but, according to Pascal Vennesson, a professor of political science, there is a danger that the author chooses unsuited theory for the research.¹⁸² In order to avoid this issue, the theoretical framework which is chosen for the empirical analysis is based on the previous literature and other scholars’ analysis of the prospects of the CSDP. What is more, the research is analyzed through the lenses of two different theories- Realism and Constructivism- in order to get a clearer and deeper picture of the problematical question. In

¹⁷⁹ Pascal Vennesson, "12 Case Studies and Process Tracing: Theories and Practices," *Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences* (2008): 226.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 227.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid., 236-37.

addition, apart from theoretical challenge, the other challenge has to do with cognitive biases, like confirmation biases then the research might seek information, which confirm the his or her beliefs, while information which contradicts with those beliefs is missed out.¹⁸³ Due to this reason the research will also be based on the survey which will provide the analysis with a wider range of opinions.

4.2. Survey

A case study of possible Russia's threat to the Baltics and the EU's actorness in the region is a case which is based on current events, historical experiences, academic arguments and discussions which especially sparked after the Ukrainian crisis. While evaluating the situation, it is necessary to analyze how the Baltic States evaluate such a problematic issue. In this respect the survey is conducted as a research tool to reveal and investigate opinions and thoughts about this issue. Moreover, the survey is capable to collect unbiased data from which reliable conclusions can be made. The target group of the survey is high officials, diplomats, politicians, professors or lecturers from the Baltic States who have specific and authoritative knowledge about the subject and are able to evaluate the situation in an objective way (later in the text the whole sample is simply named as "officials"). The sample includes 50 officials who are working at the embassies, ministries or defense forces and professors and lecturers from the Baltic Defense College. Such a sample is chosen due to the complexity of the topic which requires more knowledge and understanding. Moreover, as the selected sample is nationals from the Baltic States, it will provide with the opinion which is based on real facts and may differ from those who are not from this region.

In order to conduct the survey, the online- based method is chosen which encompasses effectivity in terms of time and functionality, and which is useful in reaching a wider range of audience. The survey was conducted using the "survey monkey" online platform and was reached through the URL link which was sent to the emails of respondents. Before the link of the survey had been distributed, the social interaction with some of the officials was performed in order to represent the topic of the research and the need of their responses and thoughts about the issue. The other officials were contacted by emails in order to get their agreement to

¹⁸³ Ibid., 237-38.

participate in the research. Before sending the survey to the entire sample, the final version of the survey was tested on a small group of the officials in order to get their opinions about the survey, its quality, clarity of the questions and research purpose. The pilot procedure was performed with the diplomats from the embassy of Lithuania in the Netherlands. After the pilot procedure was completed, the link of the survey together with the additional information regarding the topic of the research and its problematic aspects was sent to the entire sample. Moreover, the letter contained a request to share the link of the survey with their colleagues who have an authoritative knowledge in the topic. In this respect, a bigger number of respondents was reached and such a “snowball” sampling was applied due to the difficulties to reach a wider range of the officials via personal email requests. In this respect, the survey received answers from 83 officials.

The survey seeks to find out the opinion regarding the drawbacks of the EU’s CSDP and the EU’s actorness in the Ukrainian crisis. The survey pursues to reveal the main factors which influenced the EU to deploy a civilian instead of a military mission in Ukraine. In other words, the survey seeks to provide with the answers why the EU is so soft in the case of the Ukrainian crisis. In addition, the officials are asked to evaluate the risk coming from Russia to the Baltic region and their confidence in the EU’s CSDP. The questions of the survey is based on the characteristics of realists and constructivists theories and other scholars’ research in the area of the EU’s CSDP. While analyzing the Ukrainian crisis and the EU’s actorness in this case, meaning, the EU’s intentions to deploy a civilian versus military mission in the area, the research is also based on Engberg’s research on the EU’s military interventions. Engberg analyzes the factors or driving/inhibiting forces which influence the EU to deploy or not to deploy a military operation. In this thesis just the factors which are relevant for this study will be applied and used in the analysis of the EU’s actions regarding Ukraine. In this respect, Engberg’s analytical tool will not be applied in its integrity but as a complementary tool for enriching the analysis and the main arguments of the thesis. Due to the complexity of the CSDP drawbacks and rationale behind the EU’s decision to deploy a civilian mission, the survey incorporates matrix questions which allow to capture responses to multiple arguments. Such a construction of the questions allows to see with what arguments the respondents tend to agree the most and which are less important in explaining the EU’s actorness through the CSDP. In addition, the survey also

includes open- ended questions and every question has an option to comment and add personal insights regarding the issue.

In general, apart from being based on two case studies, the research is also based on primary and secondary sources. Primary sources which are used and analyzed in this thesis is mainly the EU's official documents regarding the case of Ukraine and secondary sources consists of published articles, books and working papers. A survey conducted amongst the officials of the Baltic States serves as a complementing channel for the previous research findings and provides the thesis with the insights of the high officials from the Baltic States.

5. The Case of Ukraine- why Snow White?

5.1. A short background

The origins of the Ukrainian crisis started in November 2013 with the announcement that Ukraine suspends preparations for signing an association agreement with the EU.¹⁸⁴ Instead of a partnership with the EU, the former President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, turned towards Russia, which offered a package of 15 billion dollar aid for Ukraine.¹⁸⁵ In addition to the aid, Russia pressured the president of Ukraine to join the Eurasian Union, which would become relevant just if Ukraine, the second largest former Soviet republic, would sign up as well. Any possible partnership between Ukraine and the EU would have seriously affected the Russian economy and influence in the region. Due to this reason, Russia has taken actions to stop further partnership between Ukraine and the EU. For example, a trade blockade which was carried out by Russia in August had to serve as a demonstration of consequences to Ukraine if it continues the integration process with the EU.¹⁸⁶ The decision to suspend the association agreement between the EU and Ukraine was met with demonstrations of the Ukrainian people who protested against the regime. The protest which started as a result of the suspended association

¹⁸⁴ Niklas I. M. Nováky, "Why So Soft? The European Union in Ukraine," *Contemporary Security Policy* 36, no. 2 (2015): 249.

¹⁸⁵ Michael Averko, "Blame Game over Ukraine and Crimea's Status," Globalresearch, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/blame-game-over-ukraine-and-crimeas-status/5373743>. Accessed March 31, 2017.

¹⁸⁶ Stefan Meister, "After Vilnius: Why the Eu Needs to Rethink Its Eastern Partnership," ECFR, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_after_vilnius_why_the_eu_needs_to_rethink_234. Accessed March 31, 2017.

agreement, shifted to the protests against government's corruption. Violence escalated on the 18th of February in 2014 in Kyiv when the government of Ukraine used force against the protestors. A few days later President Yanukovych fled Kyiv and a new interim- government was installed. However, the Ukrainian crisis was just about to begin. The tensions had increased after the Russian Parliament approved Putin's request to use force in Ukraine in order to protect Russian speaking population in eastern and southern parts of Ukraine because, according to Moscow, the newly announced interim- government was threatening the rights of Russian minorities living in Ukraine.¹⁸⁷ Moreover, President Putin declared that Russia would have all rights to use any means to save and protect Russian population living in that area, especially those who lived on the Crimean peninsula.¹⁸⁸ Due to this reason, Russia occupied Crimea on the 14th of March, 2014. The occupation was based on the results of referendum initiated by the Crimea's parliament with the results of 1.5 million voters who agreed on the union with Russia. After the results of referendum Moscow abolished Ukrainian laws and put into force Russian legislation.¹⁸⁹

5.2. Why Snow White?

The Ukrainian crisis linked to Russia's aggressive military intervention in Ukraine and an illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula was a message about the collapse of the post- Cold War European Security architecture. These events sent shock waves to the EU as a security actor and revealed a challenge for the EU's relationship with its powerful neighbor, Russia.¹⁹⁰ Moreover, the crisis uncovered the opposite roles of the two major actors, Russia and the EU, in their close neighborhood. On the one hand, the EU strengthening its political and economic partnership with eastern countries and spreading its values and interests in the area, and ensuring its security and stability close to its borders. On the other hand, Russia seeking to get back its influence in post- Soviet countries and portraying itself as a peace broker in Ukraine.¹⁹¹ The annexation of the Crimean peninsula is the first territorial annexation by Russia since World War II, which is

¹⁸⁷ Robert McMahon, "Ukraine in Crisis," *Council on Foreign Relations* 5 (2014).

¹⁸⁸ Nováky, 249.

¹⁸⁹ McMahon, 5.

¹⁹⁰ Derek Averre, "The Eu and Russia: Managing the New Security Environment in the Wider Europe," *European Policy Analysis*, no. 5 (2016): 1.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 5.

considered legal and acceptable in the eyes of Russia.¹⁹² As Francois Heisbourg in his article stated:

Russia emerges as a largely unpredictable player, which no longer gives prime importance to abiding (even in appearance) by international law, with a neo-imperial vision in the form of the Eurasian project and an across-the-board enmity for Western institutions in Europe and Western values in the world. This is a country with a tradition of seriousness of purpose when it comes to military affairs, and the ability to integrate the various tools of power and influence, from information operations to direct military intervention.¹⁹³

German Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasized that: “Russia is violating the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Ukraine. It regards one of its neighbors, Ukraine, as part of a sphere of influence. After the horrors of two world wars and the end of the Cold War, this calls the entire European peaceful order into question”.¹⁹⁴ The first political- military response to Russia’s actions came from NATO, which already in April undertook practical measures against Russia. The UN had also deployed a human rights monitoring mission in March, but having in mind that Russia has veto power in the UN Security Council, the UN actions were constrained.¹⁹⁵ However, The EU’s response came just on the 1st of December in 2014. Following the Ukrainian government requests and invitation, the EU launched a civilian EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) under its Common Security and Defense Policy in Kyiv. The mission’s aim is to advise Ukrainian officials on the country’s civilian security reform (SSR- security sector reform) based on EU standards and principles of good governance and human rights. A team of the mission with a slogan “advising for trust” is made of over 200 Ukrainian and international staff which is based in Kyiv.¹⁹⁶ Despite the fact that the EU has taken measures to support the Ukrainian government and incorporated sanctions against Russia, the events in eastern Ukraine showed that the European security system was helpless and ineffective, which puts into question the

¹⁹² Kaziukonyte.

¹⁹³ François Heisbourg, "Preserving Post-Cold War Europe," *Survival* 57, no. 1 (2015): 34.

¹⁹⁴ "Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Lowy Institute for International Policy," The Federal Government, https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Reden/2014/2014-11-17-merkel-lowy-institute-sydney_en.html. Accessed April 2nd, 2017.

¹⁹⁵ Nováky, 250.

¹⁹⁶ EEAS, "Euam Mission," <http://www.euam-ukraine.eu/en/what-we-do/our-mission>. Accessed March 11th, 2017.

future of the regional stability and security.¹⁹⁷ The case study of the Ukrainian crisis will be analyzed and explained through the lenses of realism and constructivism and supported by the results of the conducted survey and other scholars' work.

5.2.1. A Realists point of view

According to realists' point of view, the missions of CSDP will be deployed in low- intensity and risk averse conflicts if its biggest member states- France, Germany and the UK- can get any gain out of it.¹⁹⁸ Here Member States' interests play a crucial role which brings problematic circumstances for decision making and coordination of the policy. The EU applied very symbolic- diplomatic and economic- sanctions as a respond to Russia's aggression towards Ukraine.¹⁹⁹ Those sanctions included political sanctions such as freezing the assets, bank accounts of the Russian officials, suspended talks with Russia on visa matters, introduced travel bans and economic sanctions which had to affect Russia's economic negatively.²⁰⁰ In other words, the EU has initiated a soft respond to Russia's aggressiveness and even though it issued more robust sanctions after Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot, the EU was portraying those sanctions as a "positive incentive" which meant to lead to a diplomatic solution of the conflict, but not to punish Russia. As Novoky states, the EU chose soft balancing Russia.²⁰¹ According to soft balancing theory, it includes diplomatic and/ or economic measures of a weaker state which seeks to undermine a stronger state. Soft balancing is an option for states which have common interests in balancing a stronger state but do not seek to confront it directly.²⁰² In the case of Ukraine, the mission EUAM reflects the EU Member States' positions towards Russia, which is soft balance and minimization of any direct risk to confront Russia directly. Moreover, different Member States have different interests and policy priorities regarding Russia which influence actions the EU undertakes. The situation goes hand in hand with Realists point of view that the interests and priorities of the Member States play a crucial

¹⁹⁷ GLADYSH, 190.

¹⁹⁸ Gegout.

¹⁹⁹ Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer, *Conflict in Ukraine the Unwinding of the Post--Cold War Order* (MIT Press, 2015), 120.

²⁰⁰ Roman Dobrokhотов, "Sanctions against Russia: Economic and Political Consequences," *The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe* (2015): 67.

²⁰¹ Nováky, 246.

²⁰² "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," *International Security*, no. 1 (2005): 73.

role in making decisions and they are the key drivers of the EU's common security strategy. Regarding the Ukrainian crisis, the situation was perceived as a very sensitive and it brought a division between the Member States. One group of the Member States were seeking the EU to act decisively and support Ukraine. In this respect, the EU should clearly take the side of Ukraine. Novoky in his article named that group of Member States as "hawks" which included countries like Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and the UK. Those countries reflected their broader policy towards Russia. "Hawkish" member states wanted that the scope of the mission would be broad, the duration to be long and the size to be large. On the other hand, the other group of the Member States were seeking to introduce softer actions towards Russia and were quite reluctant in taking sides in the conflict. As Novoky declared, this group was consisted of the EU's "doves" and it included countries such as Finland, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. However, there were more Member States who were unwilling to do anything that would cause a direct confrontation with Russia.²⁰³ For example, Germany was concerned about the problematic closure of the mission if the situation in Ukraine did not get better by the end of the mission and which could follow the pattern of the previous mission in Bosnia (EUFOR Althea) which marked its 10th anniversary in 2014. In this respect, those Member States which were particularly concerned about this outcome wanted the mission to be short.²⁰⁴ In addition, Novaky also indicates that there were a contradiction amongst the Member States regarding the size of the mission. Some member states, like Poland, wanted that the mission to include personnel of around 200, while Germany and Italy were intended to deploy 100 personnel. Furthermore, Poland and Lithuania wanted the mission to outreach the entire territory of Ukraine, meanwhile Germany and Finland wanted the mission to operate just in Kiev.²⁰⁵ Moreover, most of the Member States have different interests towards Russia and there exists also the bilateral relations between the Member States and Russia, which would be compounded if the EU would undertook harder security means. Since the end of the Cold War, most of the EU's Member States have developed close economic and political ties with Russia which resulted in heavy economic interdependence. For example, many countries are dependent on Russian natural gas imports, for other Member States, such as Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,

²⁰³ Nováky, 249-50.

²⁰⁴ Ibid, 256-57.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, 257.

Russia is an important partner for agricultural exports. Moreover, at the beginning of the crisis France was about to sell two military ships to Russia, placing its relations with Russia over the Ukrainian crisis.²⁰⁶ Meanwhile, Germany exports around 38 billion of euros in goods and services to Russia.²⁰⁷ These close ties with Russia disclose costs for most of the Member States while confronting Moscow, which for some of them are too high, and those countries seek very robust and soft instruments against illegal Russia's actions.²⁰⁸ Furthermore, there are already some announcements from the Member States that even the sanctions towards Russia should be eased as it affects countries' economies due to their bilateral relations with Russia. Statements like this proves the core concepts of Realism like "egoism" and "self-interest". According to Engberg, political interests are one of the internal factors which may be driving or inhibiting in deploying a military operation. In the case of Ukraine, different interests of the Member States worked as inhibiting factor in deploying a military mission and the EU's goal to avoid any direct confrontation with Russia in order to protect Member States' relationships with Russia, can be perceived as an external inhibiting factor. According to the survey results, 53 percent of the respondents totally agree on the statement that the EU tends to avoid direct confrontation with Russia and, in this respect, deploys the civilian mission instead of a military. Other 40 percent of the respondents tend to support this statement as well, while just 7 percent was likely not to agree with this argument. Such results support Novoky's argument of soft balancing as a reason not to confront Russia directly.

On the other hand, even though the EU has chosen to soft balance Russia while deploying the civilian mission in Ukraine, it is still a strong signal to Russia that the EU supports the government of Ukraine and its people.²⁰⁹ However, the Member States' priorities and diverging views to the use of force make the CSDP more complicated.²¹⁰ According to the survey, the reason that the EU did not deploy military mission because of the opposition of the Member States was supported by 71 percent of the respondents while the rest was more likely to agree

²⁰⁶ Helene Sjursen and Guri Rosén, "Arguing Sanctions. On the Eu's Response to the Crisis in Ukraine," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 55, no. 1 (2017): 21.

²⁰⁷ Ewald König, "Brok: 'Economic Sanctions Are Much More Costly for Europe Than for America,'" EURACTIV, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/brok-economic-sanctions-are-much-more-costly-for-europe-than-for-america/>. Accessed April 6th, 2017.

²⁰⁸ Sjursen and Rosén, 21.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 247.

²¹⁰ Nicole Koenig, "Libya: A Wakeup Call for Csdp," *TEPSA BRIEF* 15 (2012): 4.

with the statement. Very similar results are found regarding different Member States interests vis a vis Russia which played a role in the EU's response to the Ukrainian crisis. The priorities of the EU concerning the intentions to use civilian over military means was supported by more than a half of the respondents. Looking to the trend of the results stated above, the reasons for deploying the civilian mission is found in the interests of the Member States, which approve Realists point of view that the Member States tend to intervene if there is any political gain which serves their interests, however the countries did not find any political gain in the situation of Ukraine. According to Engberg, military intervention is more likely to happen in former colonies of the main Member States or where the EU have already intervened before, however, this fact can not be applied in the case of Ukraine. In addition, Engberg states that the EU decides to intervene military in the cases which can provide an opportunity rather than a challenge. On the other hand, the answers of the survey revealed quite dispersed opinions- 45 percent of the respondents did not agree that the Ukrainian crisis was too challenging for the EU, however, over 50 percent of the officials were more likely to agree with the challenging nature of the Ukrainian crisis. Paradoxically, the most majority of the respondents were of the opinion that the Ukrainian crisis includes high risks which supports the argument that the EU deploys military mission if the situation is risk averse and less challenging. Moreover, Engberg also argues that the missions is more likely to happen if there is an agreement with local actors. In the case of Ukraine, there was an invitation of the Ukrainian government for the CSDP mission. However, the Member States of the EU restrained Ukraine from asking for a military intervention while helping to write a draft letter of request for a civilian CSDP mission. Such an initiative supports the argument that the EU was highly trying to avoid any direct confrontation with Russia.

The results of the survey supported the ideas of Realists. The main factors inhibiting the use of any hard force are the interests of the Member States which influence the response of the EU in security and defense matters. In the case of Ukraine, there were more Member States which were seeking to keep good bilateral relations with Russia than to use any power against illegal actions of Russia.

5.2.2. A Constructivists point of view

Despite diverging perspectives and interests, the EU managed to reach a common decision between the Member States to respond to Russia's actions in Ukraine. Can it be that norms and responsibilities outweighed the interests and rational calculations?²¹¹ In contrast to Realists material thinking, Constructivists concentrate on the identities, norms and cultures of the actors which shape their actions and choices in a given situation. As Constructivist theory has been widely used in analyzing the CSDP, the EU's actions in Ukraine will be explored through the prism of constructivism as well. The EU's images, roles, responsibilities, values, visibility and the differences of the Member States' cultures interplay as important features in the framework of the CSDP. According to constructivists approach, the EU place its external image as a very important factor in the international arena, as well as its roles and responsibilities in a given situation influence the way other actors view the EU and perceives its importance as an actor. The missions under the CSDP gives an opportunity for the EU to increase its scope of actions, spread the EU's values and enhance the EU's visibility on the world stage. In addition, the differences between the Member States regarding their foreign policy traditions, identities and cultures shapes the preferences towards the use of force which together influence the outcome and development of the EU's security and defense framework. In connection with the Ukrainian crisis, the EU's presence in its eastern neighborhood was perceived as its duty and responsibility and, in this respect, taking no action position was not acceptable for such an actor as the EU. The Member States felt a particular responsibility for Ukraine due to the EU's relationships with Ukraine and the fact that Ukraine is close geographically to the Union.²¹² Moreover, the European Council in March 2014 stated that the EU acquire a special responsibility for peace and stability in Europe.²¹³ It was broadly agreed that the crisis in Ukraine is a direct responsibility of the EU to act and show discontent with Russia. In addition, as Manuel Barroso said, the EU had a duty and responsibility to act as a community, but also the actions of the EU were triggered by the expectations of protestors at Maidan, that the EU as an ally of peace would stand their side.

²¹¹ Sjursen and Rosén.

²¹² Ibid., 31.

²¹³ European Council, 20/21 March, 2014 Conclusions, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/141749.pdf. Accessed March 4th, 2017.

A common agreement for response was also reached because the USA from the very beginning was warning about its desire to play a minor role in the crisis, which meant that the EU had no alternatives just to act itself in the crisis. According to Engberg, the views of other relevant actors is an important factor in the decision to intervene militarily. If other security providers support the operation, then it is more likely for an intervention. However, the USA in the beginning showed its reluctance to be involved in the crisis and the UN's abilities was constrained by Russia's veto. Once could say that a weak support of the relevant actors influenced the EU's soft actions in Ukraine. The EU was left to act itself and following its responsibility to do something it deployed a civilian mission in Ukraine. According to the survey results, the biggest majority of the respondents supported the argument that the EU deployed a civilian mission instead of a military because it felt responsibility to do something regarding the Ukrainian crisis and the civilian mission was more acceptable and easier reachable than a military mission. Moreover, the EU's presence influences the perception of other actors and elites towards the EU, which means that expectations of other security actors towards the EU is an important factor for the EU's image construct and meaning making. In addition, while "doing something", having in mind the civilian mission, the EU as a security actor can keep its visibility, spread its values and promote its norms. According to Bretherton and Vogler, the Ukrainian crisis is also an opportunity for the EU to act and show itself to the external world. Such an opportunity allows the EU to prove that it is capable to respond as well as implement its norms and values as a security provider.²¹⁴ In Novaky's words, the CSDP missions under the EU's flag allow to channel its visibility and values as well. The EUAM mission allowed the EU to mark its territory and to be visible on the world stage.²¹⁵ As the survey results revealed, more than a half of the respondents agreed that the Ukrainian crisis is an opportunity for the EU to spread its identity, values and increase visibility, however, 36 percent of the respondents do not see this as a reason to deploy a civilian mission versus a military one. Moreover, quite diverse opinions are found regarding the EU's rationale to deploy a civilian mission far from the centrum of the crisis in order to avoid high risks and still be visible.

As Bailes noted in her article, there exists a contradiction between two different poles of self-perception- the EU's nature of representing itself as an ally of good and peace and the other

²¹⁴ Vogler and Bretherton.

²¹⁵ Nováky, 258.

one endowing that ally with the military force and capabilities. The image and identity of ‘a good cop’ does not match with military means.²¹⁶ Even though the military power was perceived as an important factor in shaping the EU’s image in the international arena, the civilian power is identified as the main EU’s mean of power while military instruments plays just a role of prestige. The EU’s presence in its eastern neighborhood state channels its identity which encapsulates shared understandings, its values and norms in terms of what is appropriate or not to do in a given situation.²¹⁷ According to Telo, the EU perceives itself as a civilian power, which uses soft and smart power instead of hard or military power. The respondents of the survey is of the opinion that the EU prioritizes soft power versus military one. Telo states that from the EU’s values and its historical experiences or historical memories derives from international or historical responsibility to show the third parties that the EU itself went from war to a community identified with solidarity, peace and prosperity. This narrative can also be found in the EU’s historical memory pattern which leads to the learning process of two World Wars which influenced the EU to choose soft power to military power.²¹⁸ In this respect, the EU might prioritize civilian over military power due to its image as a good and peaceful ally. In the case of Ukraine, the results of the Survey showed that the majority of the respondents agree with the EU’s image as a good cop as a reason for soft power.

One of the accomplishments of Constructivism arises from its concentration on the differences between the Member States in terms of their foreign policies’ traditions and cultures which influence the CSDP and the decision to use force.²¹⁹ The example of the Ukrainian crisis and the EU’s response to it can be an illustration of the common agreement amongst the Member States and once could say that the Member States have developed similar understandings, a sense of community, belonging and a sense of common purpose.²²⁰ According to Bretherton and Vogler, that is the EU’s internal capacity or capability to make a decision and decide on the instruments of the policy. However, this capability depends on the Member States willingness

²¹⁶ Bailes.

²¹⁷ Vogler and Bretherton, 38.

²¹⁸ Mario Telò, *Europe : A Civilian Power? : European Union, Global Governance, World Order* (Basingstoke ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 2006), Bibliographies Non-fiction.

²¹⁹ Meyer and Strickmann, 64.

²²⁰ Helene Sjursen and Guri Rosén, "Arguing Sanctions. On the Eu's Response to the Crisis in Ukraine," *ibid.*55 (2017): 22.

and shared priorities in a given situation to act collectively.²²¹ In the case of Ukraine, even if there was an agreement for common response to Russia's aggression, that response was quite soft and revealed some disagreements between the Member States. The reasons for this dispute can be found in different historical experiences with Russian power between the Member States which affect their views on the situation and ways of responding to it. The most initiative to respond to Russia's aggression was taken by its close neighbors and former member states of the Warsaw Pact like Poland and the Baltic States and, according to those countries, a harder policy towards Russia was appropriate way to respond to the crisis. In addition, the UK and Sweden raised their concerns about the situation in Ukraine and the need for a collective response. The UK and Sweden mostly driven by a sense of solidarity and the desire to show the world the EU's values and norms under which Russia's actions in Ukraine are not acceptable and there was a need to act appropriately.²²² In addition Sweden might also be driven by its historical experience with Russia in 1981. On the other spectrum of the common agreement there were countries which did not live through a harsh historical experiences with Russia, felt no historical similarity with Ukraine and intended for more robust actions as a response to the illegal actions of Russia. Such rationale and importance of the divergent security strategies in the decision making was supported by the majority of the respondents.

However, in reality, apart from robust and soft economic and political sanctions against Russia and a package of financial aid to Ukraine, there was nothing much the EU as a community had done. The Ukrainian crisis is one more example which highlighted the EU's "expectations gap" in its CSDP.²²³ As Menon and Rumer addressed, that the EU's ability and willingness to sustain its assistance and interest in Ukraine under the civilian mission (EUAM) should not be taken for granted in the future.²²⁴

6. The Baltics in an upcoming storm

²²¹ Vogler and Bretherton, 24.

²²² Sjursen and Rosén, 27.

²²³ Rihards Bambals, "European Security, Defence, and Global Role: A Year after Crimea," *The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe* (2015): 22.

²²⁴ Rajan Menon and Eugene B Rumer, *Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post--Cold War Order* (MIT Press, 2015), 154.

The events in Ukraine in 2014 are one of the most shocking affairs in the 21st century which created a sense of insecurity and instability in Central and Eastern countries. The annexation of Crimea made Russia the biggest threat in the region, and no other countries than the Baltic States are more threatened and more vulnerable having this actor in their close neighborhood.²²⁵ These three countries are threatened more due to their historical experiences which formed a special security culture. Memories of the past formed an identity of antagonism towards Russia which explains why the Baltics support more harsh actions regarding the Russian illegal annexation of Crimea.²²⁶ According to the survey results, 63 percent of the officials from the Baltic States stated that the actions of the EU regarding its sanctions towards Russia are not sufficient, while 32 percent said they are not sufficient at all. Which allows to make a conclusion that the Baltic States support more rigid actions towards Russia.

The worrying signs of Russian aggressive actions were already in Georgia in 2008.²²⁷ Following this war the EU deployed an unarmed civilian mission (EUMM) and for Russia the war served as a way of learning and checking the limits. Moscow discovered that “if surprised with military action outside the EU or NATO, the West would likely retreat fearing political or even military escalation”²²⁸. The question here stands as follow: what if the aggressor targets not outside but inside of the EU, would the West stay in the same manner as a “snow white”? Moreover, Russia had seen political divisions in the EU over Russian politics, lack of unity and political will to stop or to take any serious actions against the aggressor. The war in Georgia should have shaken the world and it had to be a clear message that Russia is going to flex its muscles.²²⁹ However, the West collectively hit the snooze button with a hope that they will never need to wake up. Then the Ukrainian crisis hit and the West found themselves unprepared again.²³⁰ After the Ukrainian war had started, the EU showed its weakness to respond and it also revealed that

²²⁵ Dovile Jakniunaite, "Changes in Security Policy and Perceptions of the Baltic States 2014–2016," *Journal on Baltic Security* 2, no. 2 (2016): 6-7.

²²⁶ Linas Kojala and Vytautas Keršanskas, "The Impact of the Conflict in Ukraine on Lithuanian Security Development," *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review* 13, no. 1 (2015): 173.

²²⁷ Jakniunaite, 17.

²²⁸ Pabriks, 113.

²²⁹ Ronald Asmus, *A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West* (Macmillan, 2010).

²³⁰ Pabriks and Kudors, 57.

Europeans are left with very weak and almost vanishing military capabilities. Such a reaction of the West and small capabilities to act may determine the world order in the nearest future.²³¹

There is no doubt that such a geopolitical situation gives the biggest reasons for fears in the Baltic States. Those fears are supported by Russia's leader highlighted priorities which is to bring the ex- USSR into a single geopolitical unit, which would reestablish the greatness of Russia. The examples of Georgia and Ukraine show that Putin is following his priorities while combining skillful diplomatic moves with military activity.²³² In this respect, being very vulnerable, the Baltic States required for permanent NATO troops to be deployed in the Baltics. However, Angela Merkel rejected such a request, because stationing permanent troops in the Baltic area would violate a 1997 NATO- Russian agreement on troop deployment in Europe. Instead, she supported a rapid response force which would be able to operate within few days in case of a danger from Russia in the Baltic States.²³³ Such European response to the requests of the Baltic States shows its weakness and fears to confront Russia. The argument that stationing permanent troops would violate the agreement is a very questionable as Russia is already in full violation of it.²³⁴ The best what NATO has done so far is deployment of rotating forces in Eastern Europe. Estonia is hosting 800 troops, Latvia and Lithuania each are hosting 1200 troops. The Baltic States together with Poland are hosting 7200 troops from across 28 NATO Member States.²³⁵ However, the numbers are not big comparing to the capabilities of Russia which owns the most militarized place in the world just behind the border. Such NATO acts is obviously not enough for the Baltic States to be secured. Furthermore, commander of the US army in Europe, Gen Hodges, warned, that Russia could capture the capitals of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in as little as 36 hours, much quicker than NATO could get there to defend them.²³⁶ But what about the EU? Would it take any serious actions? Would it deploy a military mission under the CSDP as a response to possible Russia's aggression in the Baltic States? Such

²³¹ Pabriks, 116.

²³² Ibid., 118.

²³³ Andrew Rettman, Euroobserver, <https://euobserver.com/foreign/125291>. Accessed May 1st, 2017.

²³⁴ Pabriks, 122.

²³⁵ Tom Batchelor, "The Map That Shows How Many Nato Troops Are Deployed Along Russia's Border," Independent, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-nato-border-forces-map-where-are-they-positioned-a7562391.html>. Accessed April 24th, 2017.

²³⁶ Justin Huggler, "Nato Can't Protect Baltics from Russia, Says Us General," The Telegraph, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/23/nato-cant-protect-baltics-from-russia-says-us-general/>. Accessed April 24th, 2017.

a scenario is very doubtful, as Moscow's provocations and aggressive surprise military exercises with the scenario of occupation or isolation have already been performed many times, and, unfortunately, those episodes have gone unnoticed by Western Europe which seems to be living within an image of a region with zero risk.²³⁷ Moreover, looking at Engbergs' driving factors for the EU's military mission, the Baltic States do not meet that many of them. For the EU it would be too risky, too challenging, the Baltics are not former colonies of the main Member States, but peripheries of Russian empire. Moreover, taking the example of Ukraine, even if the mission was supported by local governments, it did not influence the deployment of the military mission. In addition, the EU's Member States do not have any interests in the Baltic States and there is a risk that the Baltic States will be sacrificed over the Member States' interests and relations with Russia. The two major protagonists on the Baltic States security are Germany and France which participate quite actively in joint exercises and support NATO's collective defense. However, they are not expected to take the lead or to deploy significant forces in an emergency situation in the Baltic States. Germany and France are more likely to take political role vis-à-vis Russia than to be active in defending the Baltics.²³⁸ One may argue that the Baltics can rely on the NATO, however, already with the start of the Georgian war in 2008, then Barack Obama demanded from NATO to set up serious plans to defend the Baltics, the NATO did not make any serious proposals how the alliance would defend the Baltic States. Moreover, Russia's military exercises (Zapad 2009) received a response from the NATO just in 2013 with a conduction of military exercise where it rehearsed the defense of the Baltics and Poland. However, Germany expressed its strong opposition to the exercise, as it may annoy Russia.²³⁹ Such an opposition has been seen in Ukraine as well, where any hard or serious actions were rejected in order to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. Paradoxically, Ukraine which is not the member of the NATO contributed more soldiers to the exercise than most of the big Western countries.²⁴⁰ Such an example leads to constructivist's ideas, that countries have different understandings about the use of force and such understandings might be influenced by historical experiences or different security cultures. In Eastern Europe Russia is perceived as a real threat and those countries tend to support more harsh means to compel this threat. However, countries

²³⁷ Lucas, 2.

²³⁸ Nr.8, 7-8 p.

²³⁹ Lucas, 8.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., 9.

who do not have the same experiences tend to look through the fingers and express unwillingness to act or act softly as it is easier and less expensive.

According to Gladysch, the Baltic States, being members of both NATO and the EU, and therefore part of the CSDP is still more likely to think that NATO is the main guarantor of their security and stability, meanwhile, Russia is the main source of instability.²⁴¹ In line with the results of the survey, 66 percent of the survey respondents totally agreed and 25 percent tend to agree with the argument that Russia is a real threat to the Baltic States. The risk of Russian intervention in the Baltic States was evaluated by 60 percent of the officials as a big risk and by 31 percent as a very big risk. However, the priority regarding NATO as a main security provider lays in the lack of confidence in the CSDP and its ability to confront serious threats.²⁴² As the results of the survey showed, 82 percent of the officials are not confident about the EU's capacity to confront Russia in case of intervention in the Baltic States. The Baltic States know that their military capabilities will not be able to stand against Russia's aggression, however, if the NATO response might arrive too late and the EU would play its soft power game, the Baltics might be left to fight the invaders alone.²⁴³

It is apparent that the EU meets the aggression of Russia with its soft instruments. European Russian dialogue over Ukrainian crisis revealed two different political cultures: "where the West was trying to apply rules of polite common sense searching for accommodation, while the Russian side was ready to use any tools available, including military threats"²⁴⁴. Simultaneously, the EU within its CSDP shows its hesitation in being more active, demonstrates lack of unity, decisiveness, decreased influence and almost disappearing hard military tools which leads to stagnation and diminishing actorness on the international stage. The EU's diplomatic tools regarding Ukraine crisis, such as sanctions, gave some kind of relief in the EU, which hesitates to take any serious actions but still wants to play a role in security matters. Unfortunately, such kindness does not solve the problems and does not stop the Russian aggression. Contrarily, as Estonian President remarked, it causes an increased appetite for new demands.

²⁴¹ GLADYSCH, 191-92.

²⁴² Ibid.

²⁴³ Pabriks, 114.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 113.

7. Conclusions

The EU has revealed a certain capacity as a crisis management actor in the framework of CSDP. Until now the EU has conducted 34 missions in Europe and beyond. These operations are considered to be the most tangible contributions made by the EU on the international stage regarding security.²⁴⁵ It was already in 1998 then France and the United Kingdom agreed that “the Union must have a capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so” and such an agreement had to make the EU a significant security and defense actor.²⁴⁶ However, a lot of disappointment came with the EU’s CSDP and many of the EU’s conducted missions highlighted difficulties and frustration which do not play favorably to the EU’s image as a security actor.²⁴⁷

The record of the EU’s missions is impressive, however, most of the missions have been criticized for being limited in size and scope, unambitious, modest militarily and barely made any serious actions in difficult security issues. One of the limits the CSDP missions revealed is member states unwillingness to act and contribute to the missions. According to Realists, the Member States tend to cooperate only if there is an interest to do so and usually that interest is based on the costs and benefits calculations. The lack of consensus between the Member States as one of the EU’s CSDP drawbacks was totally supported by over 75 percent of the survey respondents. Moreover, in a decision making procedure the Member States tend to prioritize their own benefits, and in this respect, the strongest countries can shape and influence the EU’s actions in security issues. The majority of the respondents are of the opinion that such a drawback burdens the EU’s actions under its CSDP. Meanwhile, constructivists point to the Member States’ diverging norms on the use of force which results in the absence of a common European strategic culture. Such an obstacle is supported by more than a half of the respondents, while 31 percent of the officials was unlikely to agree with absence of a common European security culture. The results go in line with some of other scholars who state that there is a consensus between the Member States on non-military instruments which proves that the EU’s

²⁴⁵ Thierry Tardy, *Csdp in Action: What Contribution to International Security?* (EU institute for security studies, 2015), 7.

²⁴⁶ JY Haine, "Csdp Is Dead. Long Live Csdp!," *The bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security* 19, no. 1 (2011).

²⁴⁷ Tardy, *Csdp in Action: What Contribution to International Security?*, 7.

security culture has evolved. However, one of the biggest disappointments come from the EU's priorities of soft means over military ones, which makes the EU a soft security provider. Even though the EU possesses a unique tool which encompasses civilian and military means, it does not use of the capabilities at its disposal.

The thesis analyzes the EU's actions regarding the Ukrainian crisis and its capabilities in the Baltic States. In other words, the thesis tries to find out why the EU's actions in Ukraine and its response to Russia's aggressiveness is so soft and weak, and if the EU is a credible security actor in the Baltic States. As the study revealed, the EU's actions in Ukraine were evaluated as not sufficient by almost all respondents of the survey. Such a discontent with the EU's response can be explained by historical experiences which led to the formation of antagonism towards Russia, and in this respect, the Baltics support more harsh actions regarding Russia's policy. One of the biggest reasons for the EU's soft response in Ukraine was a division between the Member States. One group of the Member States such as Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and the UK were seeking the EU to act decisively and support Ukraine, while other Member States such as Finland, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands were unwilling to do anything that would cause a direct confrontation with Russia. Such a division between the Member States appear due to the Member Stats' divergent interests and bilateral relations vis a vis Russia, which would be compounded if the EU undertook harder security means. The results of the survey support the ideas of Realists- the Member States interests and cost benefit calculations influence the response of the EU in security and defense matters. In the case of Ukraine, there were more Member States which were seeking to keep good bilateral relations with Russia than to use any power against illegal actions of Russia. In addition, the results of the survey revealed that the Ukrainian crisis contained high risks and no opportunity, which, according to Engberg, are one of the inhibiting factors for the EU to deploy a military mission. Moreover, Engberg also argues that the missions is more likely to happen if there is an agreement with local actors. However, there was an invitation of the Ukrainian government for the CSDP mission, but the Member States restrained Ukraine from asking for a military intervention while helping to write a draft letter of request for a civilian CSDP mission. Engberg also argues that military intervention is more likely to happen in former colonies of the main Member States, however, this factor can not be applied in the case of Ukraine.

The missions under the CSDP gives an opportunity for the EU to increase its scope of actions, spread the EU's values and enhance the EU's visibility on the world stage. More than a half of the respondent were of the opinion that the EU's presence in its eastern neighborhood was perceived as its duty and responsibility which is driven by identity related and self-imposed image construction and, in this respect, taking no action position was not acceptable for such an actor as the EU. In addition, while "doing something", the EU as a security actor is more likely to keep its visibility, spread its values and promote its norms. Furthermore, according to Engberg, the views of other relevant actors is an important factor in the decision to intervene militarily. However, the USA in the beginning showed its reluctance to be involved in the crisis and the UN's abilities was constrained by Russia's veto. Once could say that a weak support of the relevant actors influenced the EU's soft actions in Ukraine. In addition, there are scholars who state, that the EU's image as "good cop" does not match with military means, which means that the EU is more likely to use soft power. As the results of the survey showed, over half of the respondents are of the opinion that the EU prioritizes civilian over military instruments in crisis management and that is the case in Ukraine as well. The crisis also revealed the differences between the Member States in terms of their foreign policies' traditions and cultures which influence the CSDP and the decision to use force which worked as an inhibiting factor in the Ukrainian crisis. The reasons for this division can be found in different historical experiences with Russian power between the Member States which affect their views on the situation and ways of responding to it. The most initiative to respond to Russia's aggression was taken by its close neighbors and former member states of the Warsaw Pact like Poland and the Baltic States. Meanwhile, countries which did not live through a harsh historical experiences with Russia, felt no historical similarity with Ukraine and intended for more robust actions as a response to the illegal actions of Russia.

"The aggression of Russia against Ukraine is a litmus test for the CSDP concerning the national security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania."²⁴⁸ The example of Ukraine and the EU's soft and reluctant response raises a question if the EU would be willing to deploy a military mission as a response to Russia's aggression in the Baltic States or the scenario of Ukraine would be repeated there as well. However, looking at the case of Ukraine and the results of the analysis,

²⁴⁸ GLADYS, 195.

The Baltics seem to be in a very similar situation. In case of Russia's invasion, such a case for the EU would be too risky, too challenging, moreover, the Baltic States are peripheries of the Russian empire and even if there is a support from the local government for a military mission, it does not mean that the military mission would be deployed, as the example of Ukraine showed. In addition, the EU's Member States do not have interests in the Baltic States and there is a risk that the Baltic States would be sacrificed over the Member States' interests and relations with Russia. Furthermore, as the study has showed, the divergent cultural aspects, identities and historical experiences of the Member States influence the decision on the use of force, however, such a factor may not work favorably to the Baltic States. In this respect, there is no surprise that the Baltics are not confident about the EU's capabilities in their security environment. Once could say that the Baltics can rely on NATO or UN. However, the NATO can not deploy permanent forces in the region and in case of emergency the NATO may arrive too late, meanwhile, the UN is not a fully credible actor as well because Russia has veto power in the UN Security Council. In this respect, if the NATO response might arrive too late and the EU would play its soft power game, the Baltics might be left to fight the invaders alone.

Putin's Russia offers the EU a challenge to act and also re-evaluate its principles and priorities regarding the CSDP. However, the EU chooses unwillingness to act and offers divisive, easy solutions at the expense of its unity, cooperation and security. Such "laziness", which is a result of historical factors and meaning making, unfortunately, attacks the core liberal values and political principles on which the EU stands. As a consequence, the EU becomes a smaller and softer power in international arena. The EU as Snow White: pure, innocent, helpless and naïve, chose to bite the poisoned apple, which sent her into the Sleeping Death.

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Apendix1



Figure 1 The Baltic Sea Region, source: NATO review magazine, retrieved from:
<http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/security-baltic-defense-nato/EN/index.htm>

Apendix2

1. What is your country of origin?

Lithuania	38.55% 32
Latvia	31.33% 26
Estonia	30.12% 25

2. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following drawbacks of the EU's CSDP:

	Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
The EU's CSDP is a soft security provider	51.81% 43	38.55% 32	9.64% 8	0.00% 0	100.00% 83
The EU's CSDP is lacking common security strategy	37.35% 31	30.12% 25	31.33% 26	1.20% 1	100.00% 83
The Member States prioritize their own benefits in the decision making process of the EU's CSDP	77.11% 64	18.07% 15	4.82% 4	0.00% 0	100.00% 83
The EU's CSDP is lacking consensus between the Member States	75.90% 63	12.05% 10	3.61% 3	8.43% 7	100.00% 83
The missions under the CSDP are small scale, modest military and risk averse	48.19% 40	37.35% 31	14.46% 12	0.00% 0	100.00% 83

3. Evaluate if the EU's response to the Ukrainian crisis while deploying a civilian mission (EUAM) is:

Insufficient at all	46.99% 39
Insufficient	49.40% 41
Adequate	3.61% 3
Sufficient	0.00% 0
Excessive	0.00% 0

4. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following reasons of the EU's intentions to deploy a civilian mission instead of a military mission in Ukraine:

	Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	Total
The EU prioritizes civilian over military instruments	50.00% 42	18.00% 15	32.00% 27	0.00% 0	100.00% 83
The EU intends to avoid direct confrontation with Russia	53.00% 44	40.00% 33	7.00% 6	0.00% 0	100.00% 83
The Ukrainian crisis includes high political and operational risk	36.00% 30	60.00% 50	4.00% 3	0.00% 0	100.00% 83
The opposition of the Member States to deploy a military mission	71.00% 59	29.00% 24	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	100.00% 83
The Ukrainian crisis is too challenging	21.00% 17	34.00% 28	45.00% 37	0.00% 0	100.00% 83
The Member States have divergent interests vis a vis Russia	77.31% 64	22.69% 19	0.00% 0	0.00% 0	100.00% 83
Military means contradict with the EU's image as a "good cop"	19.82% 16	36.38% 30	36.40% 30	7.40% 6	100.00% 83
The civilian mission works as an opportunity to increase the EU's visibility and spread the EU's values	9.09% 8	54.55% 45	36.36% 30	0.00% 0	100.00% 83
The Member States have different security cultures which influence the decision to use force	6.02% 5	67.47% 56	26.51% 22	0.00% 0	100.00% 83
The civilian mission was held because the EU felt responsibility to do "something"	52.03% 43	33.96% 28	14.01% 12	0.00% 0	100.00% 83
The civilian mission allows the EU to maintain its role without taking too much risks	15.83% 13	35.72% 30	48.45% 40	7.16% 6	100.00% 83

5. Evaluate if the EU's diplomatic and economic measures towards Russia are:

Insufficient at all	32.34% 27
Insufficient	63% 52
Adequate	5.04% 4
Sufficient	0.00% 0
Excessive	0.00% 0

6. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that Russia is a real threat to the Baltic States?

Totally agree	66.26% 55
Tend to agree	24.65% 20
Tend to disagree	9.09% 8
Totally disagree	0.00% 0

7. In your opinion, how big is a risk of Russia's intervention into the Baltic States?

Very low risk	0.00% 0
Low risk	5.65% 5
Medium	3.12% 3
Big risk	60.15% 50
Very big risk	31.08% 26

8. Are you confident about the EU's capacity in assisting and supporting the Baltic States in case of Russia's intervention?

Not confident	82.15% 68
Confident	14.84% 12
Very confident	3.01% 2

9. Do you have any personal reflections? (Optional)

"First of all, the biggest EU members are looking for their national interests and do not care about newcomers, Eastern EU members. Second, EU Military / Security forces are significantly degraded in the last 10 years and need to be rebuild their capabilities in order to be capable to respond to current challenges (Russia, Refugees, Terrorism). However, EU without US is not capable to deal with such challenges."