Contents

1. Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to expose the incentives and disincentives of humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs in order to discover under what conditions the two types of actors are most likely to cooperate. Of particular interest to the thesis are the dynamics of cross-mandate cooperation within contexts of protracted crises. Existing literature explain dynamics of inter-organisational cooperation and inter-NGO cooperation through frameworks of collective action, behaviours of for-profit firms, and principles and values. Despite the fact that literature of inter-NGO cooperation reveal a range of incentives and disincentives specific to NGOs, previous work does not seem to distinguish between humanitarian and development NGOs, and the literature that does make this distinction tend to focus on cooperation within one of the sectors exclusively and not cross-mandate cooperation. Currently it is therefore unclear whether existing theory is relevant to cross-mandate cooperation, which leaves open an unexplored gap that this thesis will contribute to fill.

Given the apparent collision between humanitarian and development mandates respectively it is difficult to imagine successful cross-mandate cooperation among NGOs. One can hence wonder why cooperation should even be expected. Yet, examples of successful cross-mandate cooperation do exist; through a qualitative case study, four cases of cross-mandate cooperation will be examined with the purpose of uncovering under what conditions incentives to cooperate overweigh the disincentives. The evidence from the case studies will contribute to the collection of existing theory on inter-organisational and inter-NGO cooperation; that is, the intention of the thesis is not to verify or falsify existing theory but to contribute to theory building by potentially providing empirical leverage and exposing new dynamics of inter-NGO cooperation.

The significance of investigating cross-mandate cooperation in protracted crises specifically furthermore exceeds the world of academia, which is underpinned by recent global developments. Firstly, the introduction of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) framework implies that the lines between development and humanitarian action are no longer considered completely distinct. The 16 goals (concerned with everything from poverty, hunger, human rights, gender equality, protection of human beings and the planet) are according to the General Assembly (UNDESA 2015: 2) characterised by an integrated nature which implies that *"[a]ll countries and all stakeholders, acting in collaborative partnership, will implement this plan* (Ibid.: 1) in order for the new development agenda to be realised. This framework indicates a broad understanding of development action, which 'spills over' to other areas and blur the seemingly clear lines between

for instance humanitarian action and development action. In particular goals no. 2, 3, 6, and 16[1] (Ibid.: 17; 18; 20; 28) slightly overlap with the humanitarian goals to ensure life, health and human dignity.

Secondly, the landscape in which humanitarian action takes place has changed remarkably. Whereas humanitarian crises were initially considered temporary interruptions of normal and stable conditions that 'just' demanded quick relief, the landscape today is characterised by an increasing number of protracted crises worldwide. As a result, the benefits of the traditional 'quick relief' approach are currently questioned and a need for new humanitarian approaches have emerged (Mowjee et al. 2015: 12). A key response to this new climate is illustrated by the current global advocacy for a 'humanitarian-development nexus'. During the world Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul last year, global leaders and humanitarian actors were urged to endorse and act in alignment with five core principles. Principle four in particular is a direct manifestation of the aspiration to establish a successful humanitarian-development nexus:

> "The Agenda for Humanity calls on leaders to change people's lives by moving from delivering aid to ending need. This requires a different kind of collaboration among governments, international humanitarian and development actors and other actors. Partners need to work together across mandates, sectors and institutional boundaries and with a greater diversity of partners toward supporting local and national actors to end need and reduce risk and vulnerability in support of the 2030 Agenda." (Principle four: 'Working Differently to End Need', World Humanitarian Summit 2015,)

The international advocacy for this principle demonstrates why it is relevant to examine the conditions under which cross-mandate cooperation is most likely, since information on this area is an important prerequisite for realising the international objectives. Despite the fact that sound arguments for a humanitarian-development nexus flourish on the international advocacy level, there is currently no obvious consensus as to how such nexus should be implemented. Since NGOs, given their implementing function, will bear a heavy burden in terms of realising the humanitarian-development nexus, it is of great importance to both policy makers and implementing actors to learn under what conditions cross-mandate cooperation is most likely. Based on the academically

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[1] Goal 2: 'End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture'; Goal 3: 'Ensure healthy lives and promote well-beings for all targets'; Goal 6: 'Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all'; Goal 16: 'Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels'

unexplored nature of the topic as well as its practical relevance for international stakeholders, the aim of the thesis is to answer the following research question:

How do incentives and disincentives of humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs challenge cross-mandate cooperation in protracted crisis, and under what conditions can the incentives be aligned?

The thesis proceeds as follows. In chapter two the research approach (including method, case selection strategy, operationalisation and contribution), as well as its limitations will be presented; in chapter 3 existing theory of inter-organisational and inter-NGO cooperation will be reviewed; in chapter 4 the general principles of humanitarian and development action will be covered since the differences between them illustrate why a clash can be expected; chapter 5 contains the four case studies; chapter 6 will present and discuss the findings from the case studies; and finally chapter 7 will summarise the main insights in a general conclusion.

2. Research approach and limitations

The research question will be approached by a qualitative case study with a sample of four selected cases. The following will demonstrate how protracted crises have been identified, the case selection strategy, operationalisation, the nature of collected the data, as well as the academic and practical contribution of the thesis. Finally, limitations to the study will be presented.

2.1 Identifying protracted crises contexts

There is no common agreement on the definition of protracted crises. UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO 2010: 12) recognises protracted crises as:

> "[…] those environments in which a significant proportion of the population is acutely vulnerable to death, disease and disruption of livelihoods over a prolonged period of time. The governance of these environments is usually very weak, with the state having a limited capacity to respond to, and mitigate, the threats to the population, or provide adequate levels of protection."

FAO additionally adds conflict and breakdown of local institutions as frequent characteristics of protracted crises. Since there is no common definition, however, and since the purpose of this thesis is to examine the dynamics of cooperation between humanitarian *and* development NGOs, the author has identified protracted crises by mapping the financial flows of *humanitarian* assistance and *development* assistance respectively in 20 different countries. The 20 countries were selected on

the basis of general knowledge by the author informed by 3 years of IR studies, 2 years of development studies as well as a 6-month internship in the Somalia Team at the Danish Embassy in Nairobi. Based on the mapping of development flows and humanitarian flows from 2000 to 2016 it was possible to narrow down the pool of countries to 10 recipients of both types of aid over a substantial period of time[2]. The 10 selected countries were: Sudan; South Sudan; Jordan; Lebanon; Somalia; Ethiopia; Afghanistan; Democratic Republic of Congo; Pakistan; Myanmar.

Of those ten countries, the number of countries were once again narrowed down by identifying countries, where there seems to have been a relatively consistent flow in humanitarian aid over a long period of time (thereby ensuring the protracted crises context) in parallel with development aid (aiming at identifying the best possible contexts in which cooperation between humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs or attempts to do so might have taken place). During this phase countries like Ethiopia, Pakistan and Myanmar were excluded given the fact that development aid constitutes the largest share of assistance, and humanitarian support have mainly occurred in 'bulks' as a result of immediate and temporary crises. This identification led to the following countries within specific periods of time: Somalia 2000-2005; 2013-2015; Sudan 2006-2013; South Sudan 2012-2013; Democratic Republic of Congo 2006-2016

Following a preliminary and general research on the different countries it was nevertheless clear that many key evaluation reports, programme documents etc. concerning Democratic Republic of Congo were in French, which was estimated as an obstacle to the succeeding collection of data, hence DRC was opted out. The initial investigation of Sudan revealed that the programme Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) from 1989-1996 was an innovative approach at its time given its attempt to connect relief activities with development objectives. Cross-mandate cooperation among NGOs in this context (in the aftermath of OLS) therefore did not seem unlikely since cross-mandate cooperation was not completely unfamiliar in this context. Finally, I have gained substantial knowledge about the Somali context during my stay in Nairobi, hence knew that cross-mandate cooperation has been prioritised for some years. Therefore, the contexts selected for this thesis are: Somalia 2000-2005 and 2013-2015; Sudan 2006-2013; South Sudan 2012-2013.

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[2] See appendix 1

The periods of years functioned as a guideline in order to make the initial research phase more focused by providing an indication to the author about where to start the exploration of cases. The periods of years therefore do not serve as criteria for the case selection; the concrete selection criteria will instead be explained in the following.

2.2 Case study

A case study will allow for more flexibility in contrast to large scale cross-case analysis where definition of cases, variables and outcomes are more determinate and the empirical evidence is likely to be thinner (Gerring 2007: 41). Therefore the selection of a few cases will allow for the identification of potential variation in cooperation *within* the cases as well, which will provide more detailed information about dynamics of cross-mandate cooperation and reveal findings beyond the cost-benefit understanding of incentives and disincentives.

2.2.1 Case Selection

The selected cases for the thesis are:

- Northern Sudan International NGO Forum
- Southern Sudan NGO Forum
- Somalia NGO Consortium
- Somalia Resilience Programme (SomReP)

In order to ensure a certain level of comparability the cases above have been selected on the basis of the following criteria:

- Cooperation has taken place within a protracted crisis context
- The cooperation has been intentionally initiated
- The cooperative entails the involvement of both humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs.

2.2.2 Operationalisation

The investigation of the case studies will allow for distinguishing between 'successful' and 'unsuccessful' cross-mandate cooperation. Allowing this distinction will open up for discovering contrasts in incentives and disincentives and reveal under what conditions cooperation is most or least likely. Despite the fact that there will be both incentives and disincentives present in any constellation of cooperation, it is possible to make this distinction by estimating when disincentives

seem to overweigh incentives within the respective cases. The distinction between 'unsuccessful' and 'successful' will be made based on:

- The level of information sharing
- The level of coordination
- The level of trust among NGOs.

Finally, the thesis will operate with an understanding of incentives and disincentives beyond the traditional 'cost-benefit' perspective and allow for a framework that not only captures how tangible gains and losses influence NGO behaviour, but furthermore how e.g. the rather intangible concept of 'trust' or external conditions potentially enable or disable cross-mandate cooperation.

2.2.3 Contribution

The evidence from this thesis will provide both a theoretical as well as a practical contribution. Firstly, since existing literature on inter-NGO cooperation does not seem to provide explanations for when cooperation (or failure of cooperation) occurs between humanitarian and development NGOs, the evidence from the case studies will be related to the broader literature on inter-NGO cooperation, and hence contribute to theory building. The aim of the case studies is therefore not explicitly to contest, verify and/or falsify existing theoretical explanations, which case studies are indeed suitable for (Flyvbjerg 2006: 227; Gerring 2007: 89-90; Levy 2008) but merely to build on existing theory and discover its potential relevance for cross-mandate cooperation among NGOs. Secondly, the evidence from the case studies will disclose unexplored dynamics among NGOs that might contribute to better understand and come up with potential suggestions to the implementation of the somewhat intangible concept of the 'humanitarian-development nexus'.

2.2.4 Data

- External evaluations and review reports of the consortia and the resilience programme respectively (evaluation reports mainly based on interviews with NGO representatives are favoured when possible to obtain)
- Programme descriptions and 'lessons learnt' reports

- Two semi-structured interviews; one with a Somalia NGO Consortium representative and one with a SomReP member[3]. Since the thesis is concerned with a relatively specific issue, semi-structured interviews have been favoured since it will ensure that the issues of interest are addressed, while at the same time not restricting the answers of the interviewee (Bryman 2012: 472). More specifically, the interview will be guided by a few overall topics and questions, which will make room for departing from the interview guide and encourage the given interviewee to 'ramble' or 'go off at tangents' as put forward by Bryman (2012: 470). This structure will allow for unexpected themes to arise, and potentially illuminate new and more nuanced insights into the incentives and disincentives of humanitarian and development NGOs that have not been covered in the literature review and programme evaluations. In order to encourage honest and open answers, names and working titles of the interviewees are anonymous and will be treated confidentially throughout the entire research process. Moreover all the involved interviewees have been informed about the purpose of recording the interview as well as their right to withdraw consent at any time.

2.3 Limitations

An important limitation to the thesis is the relatively closed information systems within larger NGOs, UN and donors. The majority of reviews and reports are kept internally unless there is an explicit demand for publication. Enquiries to respective relevant staff have of course been made, but only with limited outcomes. Furthermore, few of the available evaluations are external; therefore the majority of the available data is internal reviews that focus on one NGOs achievements and lessons learned, and not on their cooperation with others (most evaluations of the SomReP activities for instance seem to be incorporated into the individual NGOs' country programme reviews and hence reviewed according to overall streamlined *individual* organisational objectives). Finally, a few 'pragmatic issues' (inspired by Gerring 2007: 148) should be noticed as well. In regards to the interviews, responses were only received from Somali representatives. Since I worked in that environment for 6 months I have more detailed knowledge about the Somali context and can refer

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[3] for interview guides and transcripts see appendices 2 and 3

to specific internal events that I attended etc., which might have made Somali representatives more likely to participate in interviews.

Despite these limitations, however, it will still be possible to provide evidence for the incentives and disincentives of NGOs, and detect the conditions under which they are more or least likely to cooperate. As highlighted in the introduction, the evidence from the thesis will contribute to existing literature on inter-organisational and inter-NGO cooperation.

3. Literature review

The literature on inter-organisational and inter-NGO cooperation can broadly be categorised into theoretical arguments of collective action; arguments based on behaviours of for-profit firms (cost-benefit); and finally cooperation as determined by values and principles, which the following will demonstrate.

3.1 General Inter-organisational cooperation

According to Mancur Olson Jr. (1965: 5-7) the purpose of most organisations is to further the interests of its members. In cases where common interests and common objectives exist there is a window for collective action. The incentives for collective action and 'membership' in a collective constellation are nevertheless not based on 'feelings of belonging' but rather the incentives are motivated by the possibility to pursue and advance one's individual objectives through collective benefits. That is, collective action provides an opportunity for the individual organisations to more efficiently reach their objectives (profit, reputation, impact etc.); hence in collective action both common and individual interests will always be present, which, according to Olson (1965: 9) implies a 'competitive market'. As the following will show, some of the literature on inter-organisational and inter-NGO cooperation seems to be inspired by the general thoughts of Olson. To mention two that operates with the same conceptual framework but focus on the non-profit sector, Jang & Feiock (2007: 8) for instance argue that the benefits of collective action are shared by the collaborating organisations, while on the other hand the costs of collaboration are individual to the respective organisations. Since benefits within the non-profit sector are often intangible and difficult to measure, the authors argue that non-profit organisations are confronted with a collective action problem.

Michael F. Harsch (2015) explains the willingness and degree of inter-organisational cooperation by the Resource Dependence Approach; i.e. cooperation among organisations depends on the *perceived* mutual resource dependence. Harsch (2015: 158) explains how cooperation firstly becomes meaningful to organisations only when resources are essential for attaining their individual organisational goals and in the end for organisational survival. In line with Harsch, Christine Oliver (1990) suggests that cooperation among organisations happens only when such constellation benefits the actors involved. The incentive for cooperating is particularly amplified when internal resources are scarce and the organisation is unable to produce the needed resources for survival (Oliver 1990: 250). In almost complete agreement with Oliver, but with a different conceptualisation, is Jens Steffek's (2013) theoretical contribution to a framework on institutionalised forms of inter-organisational cooperation. The framework is based on 'push factors' and 'pull factors' as determinants of inter-organisational cooperation (Steffek 2013: 994-5). He argues that organisations are self-interested actors who are in constant fight for economic survival – survival thus becomes a 'push factor' (Steffek 2013: 1007) or in other words an incentive to cooperate. In particular he explains how organisations that are not able to internally generate all the resources or functions they need in order to maintain themselves will engage with other organisations (or components of them) that can supply the required resources (Ibid.: 1002). A second element to his framework is the recognition of different and distinct phases of policy processes (agenda setting; research and analysis; formulation; decision; implementation; evaluation.); in each of the different phases the incentives, and hence the power of push/pull factors differ (i.e. he recognises that incentive for cooperation might change over time). Finally, the general thoughts of inter-organisational cooperation therefore seem to agree that resources and in particular lack thereof generate strong incentives for cooperation.

3.2 Inter-NGO cooperation

3.2.1 For-profit inspired

Much of the literature on inter-NGO cooperation specifically is inspired by the behaviours and dynamics of for-profit firms, since some dynamics of cooperation among for-profit firms are not completely distinct from dynamics of cooperation among NGOs. This is backed by scholars within the field of international cooperation, who argue that NGOs today are similar to firms in their behaviours and motivations (Cooley & Ron 2002: 13-4; Prakash & Gugerty 2010: 1; Marwil 2012; Murdie 2013: 311). For instance, Marwil (2012) explains how for-profit firms engage in short-term

partnerships as a strategy to provide products or services that would not be possible had the firms worked in isolation. He advocates for a similar pattern within the field of development; if NGOs cooperate they would, according to the author, be able to utilise each other's expertise and thereby strengthen their own projects and consequently enhance their impact. In agreement and also inspired by strategies of for-profit firms, Prakash & Gugerty (2010: 7) argue that non-profit actors *"[...] pursue collective action because they believe that by pooling resources and coordinating strategies with like-minded actors they can achieve certain goals more efficiently"*. Based on this quote, it is firstly clear that the alleged enhanced impact plays an important role in terms of motivating cooperation with others. Secondly, the authors indirectly suggest that collective action is more likely insofar the organisations are 'likeminded'. The latter is supported by Ngamassi et al. (2010:7) who firstly conclude that NGOs are more likely to cooperate if they work in the same geographical area, and secondly if they operate within the same structural network. For instance the authors explain that if two or more NGOs work within the framework of UNDP (i.e. a structural network) and have relational characteristics (e.g. similar size and behaviour) inter-NGO cooperation is more likely.

Another incentive for inter-NGO cooperation highlighted in the literature is the enhancement of resources and impact. For instance, Ngamassi et al. (2010: 7) suggest that cooperation happens when NGOs perceive mutual benefits or individual gains from cooperating, which corresponds to the general thoughts on inter-organisational cooperation, as well as the behaviours of for-profit firms. Within the framework of inter-NGO cooperation, resources and benefits take both material and non-material forms; e.g. money, cost-sharing, staff, information, innovation, increased 'market' exposure and establishment against potential competition (Steffek 2013: 1001; Oliver 1990: 250). In addition Ngamassi et al. (2010: 10) argue that cooperation is more likely to happen if one of the organisations has a history of securing funding. Furthermore, despite the fact that one incentive of inter-NGO cooperation is the chance to bring in additional services, some studies suggest that NGOs with an already stable resource base are more likely to engage in cooperatives (Murdie & Davis 2012; Murdie 2013).

3.2.2 Funding systems and donor' priorities encourage competition

A recurring theme in the literature on inter-NGO cooperation seems to be that the structure of the funding system influences NGO behaviour and hence dynamics of cooperation. Firstly, based on his research on the humanitarian response to the 2010 Haitian earthquake, Oliver Cunningham (2012:

120) suggests that the humanitarian regime is essentially designed according to donor restrictions, which complicates NGO cooperation; i.e. since funds are limited and often allocated to a variety of actors from the same group of donors, competition for funds is reinforced and cooperation hence hampered. In agreement, Cooley & Ron (2002: 13) explain how the foreign aid system is characterised by a 'market based structure' created by short-term contracts between donors and NGOs. Furthermore, the system is characterised by scarce resources, which stimulates competition among NGOs. As a result of this structure, NGOs have therefore become self-interested actors, whose main function has become to secure new funding, which consequently challenges cooperation (Ibid.: 14; 16). This tendency is exemplified by the findings of Buzard's (2000) study of NGO cooperation in two refugee camps in Tanzania, where the author found that 'stressful competition for resources' emerged among NGOs, which reduced transparency and therefore restricted the coordination of refugee services (Buzard 2000: 3-4). Hoffman & Weiss (2006: 133-5) reiterate these arguments by suggesting that due to competition NGOs are mainly motivated by material incentives. Furthermore the authors suggest that fear of marginalisation provides a disincentive to cooperate; i.e. if NGOs are not able to be present and perform according to their reputation (which might be at stake or altered if they cooperate with other NGOs) they will receive less or no funding, which can cause NGOs to diverge from collective action. Equally, Murdie (2013: 312) explains how donors within the aid system demand visible results from implementing partners (often NGOs) and hence NGOs fear that the recognition they can receive from individual action will decrease insofar they engage in cooperation with others. Similarly, Cunningham (2006: 106) suggests that the current system (including donors) demands large projects and identifiable results, which becomes the prioritised objective on behalf of harmonising programming with other organisations (i.e. cooperation). The result is therefore that each actor in isolation seeks recognition for individual achievements in order to maintain and potentially scale up continuous influx of donor investment. DeMars (2005: 44-5) takes these arguments a step further by arguing that NGOs are not only dependent on their (donor) partners but instead constituted by them and their 'latent agendas'. That is, donors attach their hidden motives to NGO operations, and subsequently the field in which cooperation among NGOs should take place is characterised by a range of official and latent interests, which might either conflict or mesh with each other.

Other obstacles to inter-NGO cooperation posed by the current aid structure are identified by Tshouakeau et al. (2011 in Murdie 2013: 316). According to the authors, funding structures do hamper cooperation among NGOs but not because of clashing interests or competition. Instead a

lack of leadership and bureaucratic obstacles within the current funding system are identified as the components that challenge inter-NGO cooperation in the field. Other studies conclude that the short-term nature of NGO funding hinders cooperation since it precludes the establishment of a good information-sharing system (Buzard 2000). This challenge of short term funding is confirmed by OCHA et al. (2016: 8) who illuminate how *"[…] multi-year plans and programmes on the humanitarian side are still the exception rather than the rule"*.

3.3 Principles and values

Others explain the likelihood of inter-NGO cooperation as well as drivers of competition with reference to contrasting principles and values (in contrast to resources and mutual benefit). DeMars (2005: 52; 54) for instance suggests that norms have the power to create partnerships and that normative frames provide NGOs an opportunity to frame their work to appeal to a larger audience and hence enjoy larger support (and admittedly potentially funding). In relative agreement, based on interviews with NGO representatives who were present during the 2010 Haitian earthquake, De Kloe (2011) concludes that the essential precondition for inter-NGO cooperation is the development of a shared vision among the actors involved. For instance she concludes (based on the Haitian context) that religion can contribute to or constitute the starting point for a shared vision and hence stimulate inter NGO-cooperation. On the other hand, she also highlights how dissimilarities within religious groups can have the opposite effect (2011: 24). In somewhat agreement, DeMars (2005: 53) argues that mutual benefits and cooperation can only be achieved insofar the NGOs involved share common long-term goals. Also based on research on the humanitarian response to the 2010 Haitian earthquake, Cunningham (2012) refers to an essentially ineffective humanitarian regime, in which some characteristics hinder inter-NGO cooperation. For instance he accentuates that the humanitarian principle of 'independence' reinforces the lack of inter-organisational coordination, since it motivates each NGO to preserve its own distinctive culture and processes, which consequently discourages inter-NGO cooperation (Ghani 2005 in Cunningham 2012: 107). Similarly, Hoffman & Weiss (2006: 127) explain how the traditional humanitarian principles limit humanitarian action from being integrated into broader systems of e.g. international political action because of the potential threat to the principles of 'neutrality', 'impartiality' and 'independence'. The authors nevertheless do not reject inter-NGO cooperation completely since they do accentuate that every NGO in principle is for cooperation insofar it does not imply a loss of autonomy of the

individual organisation, since this autonomy is what ensures the needed flexibility and rapid response needed in e.g. prolonged crises (Ibid.: 123:131).

Amanda Murdie (2013) has undertaken a study of inter-NGO cooperation in non-western countries, where she attempts to establish determinants of cooperation; her main hypothesis is that 'trust' and 'opportunity' are the key requirements in order for NGOs to cooperate. In particular she explains how "[…] *trust in other organizations is highly dependent on governance structures within the state; when organizations trust that the quality of governance will stop corruption and provide them with the bureaucratic structures to communicate to each other, the likelihood of inter-NGO cooperation should increase*" (Murdie 2013: 311). Finally, she concludes that cooperation among NGOs in e.g. humanitarian disaster contexts is hampered by security concerns as well as lack of a coordinating leadership (Ibid.: 312).

3.4 Humanitarian-Development cooperation

The theoretical arguments above disclose interesting incentives and disincentives for inter-organisational- as well as inter-NGO cooperation. Few of these, however, seem to distinguish between NGOs with humanitarian and development mandates respectively. The ones that acknowledge the distinction do so by focusing on one field only, which is the case with De Kloe (2011) and Cunningham (2012) who are concerned with cooperation among humanitarian NGOs solely. Despite the fact that it has not been possible to identify research on cooperation among development- and humanitarian NGOs explicitly, a DANIDA-commissioned study from 2015 (Mowjee, Garrasi & Poole) might reveal incentives specific to this type of cooperation. The study investigates opportunities for and obstacles to cooperation among humanitarian and development systems (i.e. entire systems comprised of donors, International Organisation, NGOs etc). Despite the broad focus on systems, the findings from this study, in combination with the theoretical arguments concerned with inter-NGO cooperation, might reveal incentives and disincentives that are specific to humanitarian-development cooperation.

Firstly, Moowje et al. (2015: 18) argue that development responses are not fast enough to approach the underlying causes of protracted crises, which one can interpret as a disincentive for humanitarian actors to cooperate with development actors. Paradoxically, however, the findings of the study likewise suggest that humanitarian actors continue to focus on short-term objectives, even in settings where they have been present for decades, which becomes a disincentive for development actors to cooperate with humanitarian actors (Ibid.: 19).

The remaining findings by Mowjee et al. (2015) correspond to some of the theoretical arguments of inter-organisational cooperation. Firstly, the authors suggest that geographical dispersal of humanitarian actors and development actors hampers cross-field cooperation (humanitarian actors often work in conflict affected or non-state controlled areas whereas development actors often work in state-controlled and stable areas). Secondly, they suggest that programmatic development decisions influenced by or based on political priorities challenges humanitarian-development cooperation, since humanitarian actors in particular are hesitant to engage insofar adherence to the humanitarian principles is at risk (Ibid.: 31). Thirdly, and also in agreement with the remaining theoretical arguments, the authors found that disincentives for cooperation across the fields included that such cooperation is politically challenging, costly and time-consuming (Ibid.). Fourthly, the findings suggest that practicalities also hamper cooperation across fields; i.e. Mowjee et al. (2015: 29-30) concludes that planning- as well as funding structures are different and separate, which makes it difficult and even more demanding to develop shared visions and plans. Finally, it is concluded that different working cultures and terminologies exist within the two respective fields. Interestingly it is additionally put forward that pre-conceived ideas about one another across the fields of development and humanitarian action impedes cooperation (Ibid.: 39), which indicates that levels of mutual trust or lack hereof influences the willingness of actors to cooperate.

Table 1 on the following page provides an overview of the incentives and disincentives identified in the literature review. Apparently, majority of both incentives and disincentives seem to be equally significant for humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs. Of particular interest, however, is the physically visible overweight of disincentives to cooperate across mandates for both humanitarian actors and development actors. This indicates that there are specific challenges to aligning the incentives of these actors in particular; these differences will be explored further in the following chapter.

Table 1: Incentives and disincentives of inter-NGO cooperation based on existing literature		
INTER-NGO COOPERATION		
	Incentives	Disincentives
Common for inter-NGO cooperation in general	• Advance individual organisational objectives (strengthen projects and impact) • Cost-sharing (economic incentive) • Resource sharing (reputation, staff, information, innovation) • Organisational survival • Geographical proximity • Relational characteristics • Shared vision and common long-term goals • Mutual trust	• Costly • Time consuming • Internal competition for scarce funding within both fields; NGOs are self-interested actors • Large projects and identifiable results are the prioritised objectives on behalf of harmonising efforts • Bureaucratic obstacles: separate funding structures • Different working cultures and terminologies
Specific to humanitarian actors		• Risk that development cooperation will influence humanitarian presence and reputation; risk of marginalisation • Humanitarian principles are in jeopardy • Loss of autonomy that threatens organisational flexibility • Development responses are not fast enough
Specific to development actors		• Short-term nature of humanitarian programming • Short-term humanitarian funding cycles are difficult to integrate into development planning

4. Principles of humanitarian action and development action

In relation to the indications of the literature review, it is furthermore of relevance to the investigation of incentives for cross-mandate cooperation to uncover the principles of humanitarian action and development action, where apparent differences seem to exist. Given the fact that very limited literature on cross-mandate cooperation among NGOs specifically seem to exist, these differences are important to expose since they might provide supplementary explanations to the potential limits and possibilities of cross-mandate cooperation.

4.1 Humanitarian action

Humanitarian action is generally guided by principles of 'Humanity', 'Impartiality', 'Neutrality', and 'Independence' (FAO 2010: 17; OCHA 2012: 1; ICRC 2016). The principles in particular rest on Geneva Conventions of 1949 and 1977 as well as General Assembly Resolutions 46/182 and 58/114 respectively. The principles are likewise reflected in the Code of Conduct for International Red Cross (IRC) and non-governmental organisations in disaster relief, which have been officially recognised by 492 organisations (ICRC 2016), and finally the principles have informed the

Humanitarian Charter and the Minimum standards in Humanitarian Response (The Sphere Project 2017). There therefore seems to be rather broad agreement, both over time and across different levels and actors, on the importance of these principles in humanitarian action. In OCHA's reference folder for UN staff (2012: 2) it is explained how the principal of humanity entails protecting life of and ensure respect for human beings; neutrality implies that humanitarian engagements must not 'take sides' or in other words reflect any political, ethnic, religious or ideological nature; impartiality involves humanitarian actions based exclusively on needs-based assessments in order to ensure priority to the most urgent cases; independence entails that humanitarian actors must be independent from political, economic or military objectives in the context where humanitarian assistance is provided. Since humanitarian action often takes place in complex and violent contexts, adherence to the humanitarian principles is central for the security of staff and beneficiaries.

The primary aim of humanitarian assistance is to prevent human casualties and ensure access to the basics of survival (Branczik 2004). In agreement O'Keefe & Rose (2011: 722) define humanitarian action as *"[…]assistance given to people in distress by individuals, organisations or governments with the core purpose of preventing and alleviating human suffering"*. Furthermore, the authors highlight the short-term dimension of humanitarian assistance since humanitarian emergencies are considered 'temporary interruptions of normal processes' (O'Keefe & Rose 2011: 724). A more nuanced account is, however, provided by Middleton & O'Keefe (2006: 544-5) who present two types of humanitarian assistance, which challenge the assumption of a clear and common agreement on the definition and aims of humanitarian aid. First, they point to the 'Dunantist' account of humanitarian assistance, which is essentially a matter of human justice and relief of suffering for all those who need it regardless of affiliation, which corresponds very well to the account above. Interestingly, however, they also introduce the 'Wilsonian' account of humanitarian assistance, where support is considered a necessary component of foreign policy; in particular humanitarian assistance (and all other negotiation on state level for that matter) is in principle guided by the political objective of advancing foreign interests of the 'donor' state (Ibid. 544). Importantly it is emphasised by the authors that "*[t]he distinction between the two approaches to assistance can be blurred, since the language of the Red Cross/Crescent movement (impartiality, neutrality and independence) has also been adapted for use by many donor states whose position is that assistance is to do with, if not dictated by, foreign policy*" (Middleton & O'Keefe 2006: 544). This is an interesting observation that illustrates a

potential dilemma within the humanitarian field, and furthermore indicates that the apparent agreement on the humanitarian principles might not be as expansive as first anticipated.

4.2 Development action

Development action on the other hand is guided by a different set of principles: i.e. 'Empowerment', 'Participation', 'Sustainability', 'Equity', 'Capacity building' and 'Transparency/accountability' (FAO 2010: 17). It is nevertheless important to emphasise that less clarity and agreement exist within the development field (compared to the seemingly clear principles of humanitarian action). This is at least true on a principal level since the very definition of development is continuously disputed and has changed over time concurrently with changing development paradigms (Sumner & Tribe 2004: 11). Common for the various overlapping definitions and thoughts is nonetheless that *"[...] 'development' encompasses continuous 'change' in a variety of aspects of human society"* (Ibid.: 11). During the 1950s and 1960s the dominant approach to development was characterised by a vision of large long-term societal and structural changes (for instance the change from a rural society to an urban industrialised society). This vision is nevertheless rarely encountered today. Instead the current paradigm approaches development according to short- to medium term (4-5 year cycle) outcomes of desirable targets and in more technocratic manners since it is concerned with performance indicators and outcomes (Ibid.: 13). In this connection it is worth to accentuate that 'short-term' within the field of development is clearly not equivalent to the rapid and immediate relief characterised by the humanitarian field (which nonetheless indicates that conceptual differences between the two fields might exist).

At the heart of the current development paradigm are the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reflect the current principles and overall ideas of development. Furthermore the SDGs do to certain extent reflect a somewhat instrumental and technocratic approach to development, since the goals are concerned with indicators and outcomes (UNDESA 2015). Development action is according to the framework of the SDGs guided by principles of Human Rights; according to resolution 70/1 the goals in particular *"[…] seek to realize the human rights of all and to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls. They are integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental."* (UNDESA 2015: preamble). In addition, Kindornay & Carpenter (2012: 474) argue that this focus is likewise reflected within the NGO community, where there is a growing tendency to frame the concept of development as a human right. This claim is

indirectly verified by the beliefs of Alonso & Glennie (2015: 1) who suggest that one of the major tasks of development cooperation today is to "[…] *support developing countries to guarantee the provision of universal social basic standards to their citizens*". This belief in universal rights and the existence of 'basic standards' does reflect a certain alignment with the core principles of Human Rights.

The aim of development from the perspective of the current paradigm is in general terms the eradication of poverty and the reduction of inequalities and exclusion (UNDESA 2015: principle 13; UNDP 2016) (which, in contrast to humanitarian action, indicates a need for longer-term and 'deeper' engagement). In more practical terms, UNDP (2016) emphasises how its role as an international development organisation is to assist countries to develop policies, leadership skills, and institutional capacities in order to uphold development results. UNDP operates with concepts such as 'inclusive growth', 'environmental sustainability' and 'good governance'. Similarly, OECD (2017: para. 4) emphasises that *"[t]he common thread of* [their] *work is a shared commitment to market economies backed by democratic institutions and focused on the wellbeing of all citizens"*. In particular OECD advocates strong governance mechanisms as a prerequisite for delivering public services.

4.3 Reflection on the principles of humanitarian and development action

Despite the international recognition of a need for an innovative approach to protracted crises and sound arguments for merging activities across the two fields, one can wonder, based on the apparent distinction and contrasting principles of the humanitarian and development fields, if such cross-mandate cooperation is actually possible in practice. Mowjee et al. (2015: 12-13) for instance argue that humanitarian and development approaches are rooted in different principles; programmes are designed and implemented based on different evidence; humanitarian and development actors work according to different planning and budgeting cycles; and finally it is argued that humanitarian and development assistance do not pursue mutually reinforcing goals. These findings by Mowjee et al. paint a somewhat pessimistic picture of the operationalisation of cross-mandate cooperation.

Within agenda-setting arenas such as the UN it is currently recognised that there is a need for flexible funding mechanisms in order to stimulate and enhance concerted planning and action between development actors and humanitarian actors (InterAction 2017). Cooperation between humanitarian and development NGOs in protracted conflict contexts might nevertheless be impeded for several reasons beyond the issues of separate funding structures. As a starting point, three

challenges to cooperation are highlighted by International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). First of all, it is put forward that in prolonged conflicts few humanitarian NGOs have the resources to plan over the medium to-long term, which might challenge cooperation with the usually longer-term approach of development action. Secondly, ICRC emphasises how a lack of funding visibility makes it difficult to complement each other's activities and programming (ICRC 2016: 34). Thirdly, it is emphasised how humanitarian presence is dependent on the acceptance of all the complex actors involved in humanitarian crises. One way to ensure this acceptance is to strictly adhere to the humanitarian principles (neutrality, impartiality, neutrality, independence), which might be challenged by cooperation with development actors, since they are not obliged to adhere to these principles to the same extent (development aid is often more political and in line with foreign policy interests of donors). Furthermore, Mowjee et al. (2015: 17) argue that development funding in protracted crises continues to be the 'main vehicle for supporting peace-building and state-building initiatives'. Insofar such activities are not aligned with the principles of humanitarian action it might pose operational problems in terms of restricted access to humanitarian needs areas, and furthermore, if the activities of humanitarian actors are not considered neutral by all the complex actors, it might pose a security risk to the staff and potentially the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance (Ibid.: 31; Hoffman & Weiss 2006: 132). An example from the field that illustrates the importance of maintaining neutrality as a humanitarian NGO is provided by Peter Maurer, President of ICRC, who explains how such dilemma was encountered during a humanitarian operation in Nigeria. Given ICRC's status as humanitarian, access to a Boko Haram[4]-controlled area with 500.000 internally displaced people was granted. Maurer and his team identified that there were no educational facilities in the camps. However, given the fact that Boko Haram essentially translates into 'western education is forbidden' ICRC would risk future access to the area as well as the security for staff and the children in the area had they compromised their neutrality (Jones 2015).

This short presentation of and reflection on the principles of humanitarian action and development action illustrates that cross-mandate cooperation might encounter a range of obstacles. Furthermore, given this apparent distinction between the two fields one can wonder whether cross-

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[4] Islamic extremist militia founded in Nigeria in 2002

mandate cooperation is possible in practice. With reference to table 1 in which the incentives and disincentives for inter-NGO cooperation were summarised, it is striking and physically visible that for cross-mandate cooperation specifically, mainly disincentives seem to be present. Based on these discoveries one can wonder why cooperation between NGOs from the two fields is even to be expected, since one can feel tempted to disregard the realisation of such priority. Despite these discoveries, however, examples of cooperation among humanitarian and development NGOs do exist, which the following cases will illustrate. By identifying incentives and disincentives in the case studies the aim is to discover under what conditions cross-mandate cooperation among NGOs is most likely. The evidence from the case studies will contribute to existing literature on inter-NGO cooperation. As previously put forward the selected cases for the thesis are Northern Sudan International NGO Forum; Southern Sudan NGO Forum; Somalia NGO Consortium; and SomReP.

5. Case Studies

5.1 Northern Sudan International NGO Forum
Where: Sudan
When: 1999-2010

Since 1999 a NGO coordination structure, The Northern Sudan International NGO Forum [hereafter Northern Forum], has been maintained in Sudan. The forum was particularly active from 2005 to 2009 and constituted by development NGOs as well as humanitarian NGOs (Currion 2010a: 1-2). In 2005 every NGO in the consortium was divided into smaller subgroups across mandates with the aim of meeting, discussing and exploring possibilities for moving forward. This constellation demanded more time and effort by each NGO, but ensured that the Forum was kept together and had a relatively stable shared understanding of the situation and issues in northern Sudan. The subgroups enjoyed particularly strong commitment from 2005 to 2009 during which there was a high visibility of the Dafur crisis. During this period Sudan became a priority programme for many donors and organisations, and more staff was deployed in the field. Interestingly, however, the commitment and attendance in the smaller sub-groups decreased as the situation in northern Sudan normalised. This decline indicates that the incentives for NGOs to cooperate across mandates are stronger during particularly dire times. One explanation for this tendency is that increased attention of the international community most often goes hand in hand with supplementary funding. This is confirmed by the mapping of aid flows (annex 1) where a remarkable increase in the influx of

assistance to Sudan from 2005 to 2010 can be identified. In 2004 the total ODA was 994M$ whereas an increase to 1.8BN$ was experienced in 2005; in the following years up until 2011 (where the influx began to decline) the assistance amounted to approximately 2.5BN$ annually. Based on this it seems that a particularly strong incentive for cross-mandate cooperation is economic; i.e. at times where cooperation can provide an increased access to funding, the willingness of NGOs to cooperate appears to increase.

Despite the fact that the engagement in the smaller working groups dropped, the overall Forum was nonetheless still active and managed to become well-established and considered 'resilient' even in times of setbacks (Currion 2010a: 3), on which basis one must assume that the incentives for member NGOs to cooperate generally overweighed the disincentives. It is therefore interesting to identify these incentives in order to examine under what conditions cooperation happened in the Northern Forum. Firstly, The Forum provided a possibility to share responsibilities (and risks), which one can interpret as an important incentive to cooperate given previous experiences of NGOs in Sudan: the NGOs in northern Sudan had to carefully balance their efforts to build helpful relations with the government (all operating NGOs had to work through the Sudanese government's Humanitarian Assistance Committee) against remaining politically independent. In 2009 that balance failed and 13 NGOs were expelled from the country (Ibid.: 1; 3). The collective approach by the consortium members ensured that individual NGOs could not be identified or held responsible for specific initiatives and activities, which one can argue, provided a strong incentive to cooperate with other NGOs. Secondly, the Forum was successful in establishing a 'coherent NGO voice' and reach consensus on a range of areas because of collective issues experienced by all the members; i.e. all the NGOs, both humanitarian and development, struggled in balancing their relations with the government of Sudan, had common security concerns given the domestic circumstances in the country and finally the majority struggled to secure enough funding (Ibid.: 4). Hence the Northern Forum provided an arena for solidarity and mutual support among the NGOs that operated in the difficult environment of northern Sudan. This indicates that cross-mandate among NGOs can be motivated by collective experiences and challenges. Finally, the Northern Forum managed to establish itself as an important and credible actor, which for that reason participated in high-level meetings (Ibid.: 5). Through the commitment to cooperate in the Northern Forum, the member NGOs therefore gained increased access to placing issues on the wider agenda (i.e. better access to UN stakeholders and donors), which demonstrates that increased influence and

access to donor support are undoubtedly strong incentives for cooperating with other NGOs despite differences in mandates.

Importantly, however, the forum was mainly for international NGOs (INGOs) in the field, and national NGOs were usually excluded from meetings and coordination activities (Ibid.: 4). The rationale behind this decision was that most members of the Northern Forum had concerns about the neutrality of local NGOs and referred to previous incidents where national NGOs had tended to be politicised. In order to ensure that *'issues could be discussed confidentially'* (Currion 2010a: 4) local NGOs were therefore excluded. In conclusion, this decision indicates that mutual trust among NGOs as well as relational characteristics are important incentives for cooperation (or on the contrary a disincentive where there is a lack of trust). Due to its strong and resilient collective voice as well as the high level of trust and mutual support among the member NGOs, the Northern Forum has been classified by the author as 'successful' cross-mandate cooperation.

5.2 South Sudan NGO Forum

Where: South Sudan
When: 1996-2010

In 1996 the South Sudan NGO Forum [hereafter Southern Forum] was established as a coordinating mechanism in order to bring together INGOs involved in Operation Lifeline Sudan (humanitarian and development) with the aim of discussing joint programming (South Sudan NGO Forum 2017; Currion 2010b: 2). The Southern Forum was characterised by a high level of information sharing among the member NGOs (Helton & Morgan 2013: 33), which indicates a high level of trust within the forum. Additionally, the Southern Forum was also recognised for efficiently sharing information with external actors on a regular basis (Ibid.), which demonstrates its ability to agree on collective objectives. In line with the findings of the Northern Forum, this indicates that mutual trust fosters cooperation across mandates. An additional similarity between the two forums includes that the commitment to the Southern Forum was likewise generated by incentives of better access to institutional funding as well as easier access to decision making due to the forum's 'strength in numbers' versus NGOs operating in isolation (Ibid.: 3). Secondly, and in contrast to the north, the Southern Forum introduced membership fees for all participating NGOs since external support would no longer be provided insofar fees were not introduced. Initially the membership fees were therefore introduced for economic reasons, but turned out to encourage inter-NGO cooperation, hence functioning as a (provoked) incentive. Because the members were now partly financing the

Southern Forum, a responsibility for the wellbeing of the forum was indirectly imposed; the NGO representatives subsequently set aside more time and efforts and paid more attention to the effectiveness of the cooperation within the forum. This tendency indicates that potential economic losses can stimulate inter-NGO cooperation across mandates.

Finally, the Southern Forum included the incorporation of the principle of 'silent members' which enabled "[…] *organisations that choose not to participate formally in coordination to attend meetings with the same rights and responsibilities as other members (paying the same subscription), while their names* [were] *withheld from all public documents*" (Ibid.: 7). It thus seems that the opportunity to share responsibilities and risks enhances the willingness of NGOs to cooperate. In addition one can presume that such incentive might be stronger for humanitarian NGOs given the importance of preserving neutrality and impartiality (assuming of course that a 'silent member' arrangement is not misused as an instrument to hide specific affiliations or interests but that it mitigates the risk for humanitarian NGOs to be *falsely* accused and attacked, which enhances their willingness to engage with development NGOs).

Similar to the forum in the north, the Southern Forum seemed successful in establishing a good framework for cooperation among INGOs, but with few and weak ties to national NGOs, which reveals a few disincentives for cooperating. Specifically it was argued by INGOs that civil society [NGOs and social movements] in South Sudan was most often centred around faith groups, which was perceived *'an uneasy fit with the secular orientation of many INGOs'* (Ibid.: 4). This explanation indicates the importance of shared values and relational characteristics as disincentives for cooperating. Furthermore, INGO representatives voiced that national and international NGOs had 'different interests' that they deemed difficult to negotiate (possibly due to the insecurity about their affiliation in line with the arguments by the Northern Forum and their issues with trusting local NGOs). Interestingly, the trust issues are not generated by differences between humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs specifically. Instead, these differences are overweighed by a common mistrust among international NGOs in local NGOs. Based on its high level of systematised information sharing; the high level of trust within the forum, as well as its efficiency to share relevant information to external stakeholders on a regular basis, the Southern Forum has been classified as a case of 'successful' cooperation

5.3 Somalia NGO consortium

Where: Somalia
When: 2011-2012; 2012-2014; 2017

The Somalia NGO Consortium is a membership organization of national and international NGOs that work together for an enabling environment for the efficient and effective delivery of *humanitarian and development assistance* for all Somali people (Somalia NGO Consortium 2017). The Consortium was established in 1999 and to date the consortium consists of 83 NGOs; some developmental, others humanitarian and others with dual mandates (i.e. doing both development activities and humanitarian assistance) (Ibid.; Samuel Hall 2014: 1)

In 2013 Elie Kemp conducted interviews with a range of consortium members and concluded that the consortium struggled to cooperate on collective analysis of problems. An interpretation of Kemp's findings of the study allows for the identification of incentives and disincentives for cooperation across the fields of development and humanitarian assistance. Firstly, Kemp (2013: 10-11) identified that information sharing and open communication were hampered and discouraged due to competition and distrust among the NGOs, which furthermore obstructed technical coordination at the implementing level. One manager in the field for instance explained how it took him three months to obtain basic information on programme locations in Mogadishu from a small number of membership NGOs. Another consortium member mentioned that the established forums for information sharing and collective agency were for some merely *"[…] a place where some NGOs steal ideas from others, and people focus on taking credit rather than co-ordination"* (Ibid.: 11).

Secondly, and in relation to the above, Kemp's evaluation suggests that the level of mutual trust among NGOs is an important determinant of the willingness of individual NGOs to engage in cooperative activities. Due to the rise in numbers of NGOs in Somalia after the 2011 famine, it became increasingly difficult to identify 'bogus NGOs' who are usually motivated by financial rather than humanitarian or development concerns, and whose adherence to the humanitarian principles, willingness to treat information confidentially and affiliations with other actors (e.g. political and armed actors) were unknown (Ibid.: 11-13). Combined with a gloomy history of attacks on NGO staff by former employees and abductions of NGO staff with the involvement of NGO insiders, members were reluctant to share information, engage in important discussion, raise issues openly and finally to put sensitive issues into writing (Ibid.: 11). The issue of trust within the consortia is reflected in the statement by one interviewee who explained that: *"[…] We* [member

NGOs] *are all very protective of our space, […] we don't want to be seen together with agencies we know are not really doing what they say"* (Kemp 2013: 14), which indicates that the reputation of other NGOs as potential partners plays a role in terms of generating trust. Given the fact that 2011 was a humanitarian crisis (famine), it is likely that majority of the 'new' NGOs were humanitarian; hence the disincentive above might be particularly strong for development NGOs.

Thirdly, Kemp (2013: 11-12) discloses additional costs in the form of time and effort as a disincentive for cooperating across mandates. As explained by one NGO employee, time and resources are rarely officially allocated to cooperating activities by the head quarters of the respective NGOs. Thus, already overworked field staff engages in the consortium on a voluntary basis. Especially for smaller NGOs with few resources the additional time and costs required provides a strong disincentive for participating in consortium activities (Ibid.: 12). This finding is given some credit by the experience of one of the consortium coordinators (Consortium Interview 2017: 85-6) who explains how the NGOs are motivated to take part in collective activities with economic incentives. This conviction is based on the coordinator's experience that commitment to collective consortium activities (e.g. cross-mandate trainings and workshops) have been strongest in cases where the NGOs have not been charged for participation and in cases where their costs have been covered (e.g. flight tickets and accommodation).

The NGO representatives interviewed by Kemp (2013) suggested that the obstacles to cooperation could possibly be overcome by the establishment of a forum for discussing actual plan responses (and not 'just' coordination and information sharing). However, as put forward by Kemp, a forum with exactly that purpose was established in 2011; the Forum was established by UN and attendees invited included both development and humanitarian NGOs. The extended forum was particularly well attended and active during the 2011 famine but since late 2012 that forum has not been summoned (Kemp 2013: 10). The declining interest in the forum following the food crises indicates that incentives for NGOs to cooperate across mandates are stronger in times of crises.

The independent think tank Samuel Hall has likewise conducted a review of the Consortium's performance from 2012-2014. Based on the think tank's findings it is evident that the commitment to monthly consortium meetings has not been astonishing during the consortium's lifetime, which reflects a low level of commitment by the member NGOs; from 2009 to 2011 only 35 percent of the total membership participated, and a decline in the number was experienced from 2012-2014 where merely 25 percent of the total membership participated (Samuel Hall 2014: 3). Samuel Hall (2014: 2; 4) furthermore reiterates some of the findings by Kemp by concluding that the level of

information sharing within the consortium is decreasing due to competition for funding and security concerns. Additional findings that contribute to explain the low level of cooperation are nonetheless also presented. Firstly, it is concluded that the consortium struggles to agree on common goals after the consortium has opened up to development NGOs. When the consortium was established in 2009 it was mainly for the purpose of humanitarian coordination but along with changing global priorities development NGOs have joined the consortium. The obstacle to finding common ground after the involvement of development NGOs indicates that there are fundamental differences in the objectives of humanitarian and development NGOs that (up until 2014 at least) have not been possible to align. The fragmentation and the consortium's struggle to find a common voice is likewise highlighted by donors who experience that the consortium is not able to bring concrete issues and comments to the table (Ibid.: 5). For the purpose of this thesis it is interesting to find out *why*. One indication is revealed in the interviews with consortium members conducted by Samuel Hall, where some representatives expressed concern over the advocacy efforts; in their experience the advocacy outline was characterised by humanitarian objectives and short-term issues, and in response some NGOs advocated for a more long-term strategic agenda. These efforts nevertheless did not seem to be fruitful since declining interests and participation by some development NGOs prevailed (Ibid.). The reaction in the form of a more passive approach by the development NGOs either indicates that the objectives and values of humanitarian and development NGOs respectively cannot be aligned in practice, or that there was not enough willingness from the leadership of the consortium to acknowledge and act on the concerns of development NGOs. Secondly, some members explained that other coordination meetings [outside of the Somalia NGO Consortium structure] provided better access to funding and these were therefore prioritised over the consortium meetings Samuel Hall (2014: 3-4), which illuminates the strength of economic incentives of NGOs. Furthermore, the think tank concluded that the lack of interest in consortium activities also comes down to a 'lack of perceived added value'; again, because the consortium does not provide direct access to funding but furthermore also added value in terms of information and impact on the ground. Finally, and as a supplement to the findings by Samuel Hall, the consortium coordinator explains the lack of commitment in the past with reference to a perception of lack of representation. I.e. some member NGOs felt that the consortium was only for international NGOs, which influenced the commitment by some NGOs (Consortium Interview 2017: 77-9)

It should nevertheless be emphasised that some members experience that the consortium provides a stronger voice than that of the individual NGO (Samuel Hall 2014: 5), which is an

incentive to cooperate for both humanitarian and development NGOs. In the interview conducted with one of the consortium coordinators this argument is reiterated; here the coordinator explained how the member NGOs will have better access to authorities if they cooperate. I.e. in the form of the interviewee's position, meetings with local, federal and national authorities are held on a regular basis, where the collective concerns and views of the NGOs are shared. According to the interviewee, the consortium hence provides a stronger voice for the member NGOs (Consortium Interview 2017: 57-9) which is an incentive to cooperate across mandates. With the findings by Samuel Hall in mind one can, however, query whether this is primarily an incentive for humanitarian NGO members given the seemingly 'humanitarian friendly' agenda.

A few important final findings are provided by the interview conducted with a representative from the consortium with a coordinating function; i.e. the interviewee is not affiliated with a particular NGO but is instead in daily contact with the member NGOs. Interestingly, it became clear during the interview that the mindset of the interviewee at least (and potentially the rest of the directorate of the consortium) is not concerned with promoting cooperation *between* development NGOs and humanitarian NGOs. Instead the interviewee emphasised that he believes *"[…] it would be better if every NGO, instead of specialising in one area, can have many two-fold programmes in parallel, one in emergency and one is a developmental programme, and that way the programmes can support each other"* (Consortium Interview 2017: 34-6). When confronted with the potential issue of separate funding structures for humanitarian assistance and development assistance respectively in such constellation, the interviewee argued that such challenge is not difficult to overcome; i.e. with the example of a large international NGO it was explained how it is possible to establish two departments (humanitarian and development) under the same country director. Emergency support and development activities can therefore continuously be funded from separate pools but managed by an overall director. Such constellation will ensure synergy between humanitarian and development activities and that the same groups of people are targeted with both types of support according to need (Ibid.: 37). Furthermore, this confidence in individual parallel programmes indicates that different mandates and trade-offs of the humanitarian principles are not considered immediate barriers to merging the two fields.

The mindset identified through the interview also provides some explanation to Samuel Hall's (2014: 5) identification of the declining participation in the consortium by development NGOs. That is, the leadership does not seem to motivate or advocate inter-NGO cooperation which most likely also influences the motivation of the NGOs to do so. In other words, the incentives to cooperate are

there but do not seem to be strong enough to spur 'voluntary' cross-mandate cooperation; hence the incentives might have to be facilitated and reinforced by a strong leadership. The mindset of the coordinator does not necessarily reflect a lack of willingness to motivate inter-NGO cooperation, but potentially that the incentives of the two types of NGOs are too challenging to align, and that preservation of the autonomy of the individual NGO is a powerful disincentive that overweighs the benefits of cross-mandate cooperation. Based on the poor access to and exchange of information, lack of effective coordination and low levels of trust among the member NGOs, Somalia NGO Consortium has been classified as a case of 'unsuccessful' cross-mandate cooperation

5.4 Somalia Resilience Programme (SomReP)

Where: Somalia
When: 2013-2016

SomReP was a multi-year and multi-sector response programme developed by a consortium of seven NGOs to tackle the challenge of recurrent droughts in Somalia. The NGOs involved were Danish Refugee Council (humanitarian[5]), Oxfam (development), Adventist Development and Relief Agency (dual objectives), Action Contre la Faim/Action Against Hunger (humanitarian), World Vision Somalia (dual objectives), CARE (development) and Cooperazione Internazionale (humanitarian).

According to World Vision (2014: 16) the consortium became a success because the NGOs organised and established themselves prior to the beginning of the funding cycle in order to avoid competition. The early establishment as well as a high level of honest information sharing moreover ensured common dedication and hence stimulated a strong *joint* leadership for cross-mandate programming (Ibid.). Similarly a final review of SomReP concluded that there was agreement among the involved NGOs on the supplementary value of working in a consortium; members mentioned the opportunities to work at larger scale; that cooperation is better for procurement; cost reduction; tighter management; and that cooperation would ensure a better outreach to beneficiaries (Samuel Hall 2016: 31). In agreement, World Vision (2014: executive summary) independently explains how SomReP "[…] *demonstrates that the costs of consortia are outweighed by the multiple benefits of working together, not least in terms of resource mobilisation"*. Moreover, in an

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[5] See appendix 4 for justification of the classifications of humanitarian and development NGOs respectively

interview conducted with one of the SomReP members[6] in April 2017, a range of incentives for NGOs to engage in cross-mandate cooperation were revealed. Firstly, the consortium allegedly provided a chance to utilise expertise from a range of actors that [interviewed NGO] did not usually work with. Secondly, and in agreement with World Vision, the interviewee explained how the decision to cooperate in the consortium was also a decision not to compete with each other for funds. Thirdly, and interlinked with the previous, the interviewee referred to the general donor fatigue in the humanitarian response to Somalia. Due to this fatigue resources were scarce and cautiously prioritised, and the donors therefore demanded 'something different' (SomReP Interview 2017: 97); i.e. they did not want to release funding for another 'standard' humanitarian response. According to the interviewee SomReP offered just that alternative, and for that reason they 'sold through' (Ibid.). These experienced benefits underpin that incentives to cooperate across mandates are deeply driven by economic gains. In fact it seems that the cooperation in the consortium might have been initiated with the purpose of securing funding (since donors at this time demanded innovative approaches); the utilization of expertise and enhanced impact to beneficiaries might serve as additional benefits but not the main incentives for cross-mandate cooperation.

A final incentive for cross-mandate cooperation among the involved NGOs moreover seems to be the well-built coordination structure of the consortium. The consortium had a chief of party who was very strong in advocating for cooperation and systematic update reports. All the technical units in charge of the implementation of SomReP reported directly to the chief of party, and the chief of party accordingly reported to the steering committee (drawn from the 7 country directors of the different NGOs) (Ibid.: 157-160). This structure ensured a strong coordination and coherence of the consortium activities, which indicates that a strong leadership can stimulate conditions for cross-mandate cooperation.

Despite these benefits and agreement among the NGOs, obstacles and hence disincentives to cross-mandate cooperation can, however also identified within SomReP. Firstly, in World Vision's experience, the cross-mandate nature of the programme created a need for more front line staff. This is likewise supported by the findings of Samuel Hall (2016: 36) who concluded that SomReP

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[6] The NGO representative was involved in SomReP from its beginning to 2016 and has many years of experience in both humanitarian and development work in Somalia. SomReP was the representative's first experience with a consortium approach to resilience.

allocated more resources to salaries in the inception phase and hence had higher start-up costs compared to other resilience programmes in similar contexts. It should nonetheless be emphasised that because of the consortium constellation, expertise was most often utilised from within the programme, and funds where therefore not allocated to e.g. external advisors from other budget lines, which explains the higher non-programmatic cost of SomReP. Additionally there was preliminary evidence for remarkable cost-reductions one year after the inception of SomReP (Ibid.). Regardless, these findings demonstrate how cross-mandate cooperation is resource demanding in the inception phase at least, which is a potential disincentive for both humanitarian and development NGOs to cooperate.

Secondly, in order to ensure that all the involved NGOs had access to the best approaches available, a 'detailed guidance package for operational decisions-making' (World Vision 2014: 17) had to be developed. According to World Vision, drawing together this package resulted in some delays because training manuals had to be completed before the programme could start. Similarly the interviewed SomReP member emphasises that establishing a useful form of cooperation within the consortium was time-consuming because of hierarchy and bureaucracy, and explains that some members of the consortium did not always meet the deadlines in terms of submitting and sharing reports and data, which caused a lengthy process (SomReP Interview 2017: 118-121). Additional reasons for the extended process were that each NGO had their own individual procurement procedures and identities and the alignment of these 'requires some time, as [they have] been 'cultivated' for many years' (Extract from interview, Samuel Hall 2016: 32). These results indicate that cooperation between humanitarian and development NGOs requires additional time and might require a longer inception face than compartmentalised programmes, where decision making does not have to be renegotiated or agreed upon by a range of actors. Additional time investment is of course a disincentive for both types of NGOs, but for humanitarian NGOs in particular this is most likely a stronger disincentive given their reliance on being able to provide rapid responses. In response to this issue of a slow process, however, the interviewee expressed that *"you cannot push them* [some member NGOs] *the way you want, they have their own liberty and sometimes they can frustrate you"* (SomReP Interview 2017: 121-2). This additionally reveals that cross-mandate cooperation is not only time-consuming but also that such cooperation entails engaging in a new set of power structures that can potentially be unequal; engaging with such new dynamics might therefore be a disincentive for some NGOs given the potential risk of autonomy loss. Moreover, inequality in money distribution due to different expertise of the involved NGOs spurred some envy

among the consortium members; as explained by the interviewee [this NGO] is an organisation with many years of experience in Somalia, experience with implementation of programmes in areas where few other organisations have access and finally they have a good reputation. Therefore [this NGO] received more funding than the remaining SomReP members, which hampered cooperation at certain times (Ibid.: 123-32).

Thirdly, Samuel Hall (2016: 32) concluded that some of the member NGOs lacked the mindset to actually develop and manage multi-year programmes. This finding is interesting since it indicates that incentives of cost-reduction and enhanced impact might not be enough to stimulate inter-organisational cooperation. Instead, a fundamental change of "organisational mindset" is required. This change is most likely of particular importance to humanitarian NGOs who, with reference to chapter 4, usually plan over the short-term. In that case, this lack of a 'multi-year mindset' becomes a disincentive for development NGOs to engage in cooperation with humanitarian NGOs.

Finally, it was emphasised by one SomReP member that *'donors dictate what we* [the NGOs] *are supposed to do in practice'* (Samuel Hall 2016: 32), which underpins the 'power' of donor demands in terms of creating or obstructing conditions for cross-mandate cooperation. The conducted interview revealed how donors can create fruitful conditions for cross-mandate cooperation. Despite the fact that SomReP was constituted by both development NGOs and humanitarian NGOs, the programme was mainly funded by the core donors for emergency. The humanitarian donors nonetheless agreed to convert their support into support for resilience after SomReP had 'really sold' (SomReP Interview 2017: 114) the importance of developing households (which is usually not included in humanitarian activities). The experience by the interviewee therefore illustrates that donor flexibility (in terms of refraining from demanding 'standard' humanitarian or development planning and objectives as criteria for funding) can motivate cross-mandate cooperation. On the contrary, donor objectives can therefore also obstruct the conditions for cross-mandate cooperation; as explained by a SomReP member *'[…] stabilization objectives are very present (explicitly or not)'* in today's development activities in the current context [protracted crises in Somalia] (Samuel Hall 2016: 32). The challenge of such tendency is explained by Mowjee et al. (2015: 17) who establish that humanitarian action and stabilisation action used to be separate (with few exceptions stabilisation activities used to be confined to the military); today, however, stabilisation activities are increasingly becoming a priority for donors of development assistance. Since resilience is an area that can be used as 'an umbrella for stabilisation projects', this tendency

might give rise to political and ethical dilemmas on the ground (Samuel Hall 2016: 29; 55). As argued by a SomReP member, donors wrongly believe that humanitarian and development donors have the capacity to implement stabilisation projects. More importantly, Samuel Hall emphasises, with Afghanistan as an example, how attempts to incorporate stabilisation activities into resilience programmes blur the lines between politicised and neutral types of assistance. This warning by Samuel Hall reveals how donor's priorities can complicate matters on the ground, and in the end create conditions that hamper cross-mandate cooperation. In particular, incentives of humanitarian NGOs to engage in cross-mandate cooperation might deteriorate in these contexts insofar there is a perceived risk of surpassing the mandates of 'neutrality' and 'independence'.

Despite the warning of this pitfall, the interviewed SomReP representative did not experience any trade-offs with the humanitarian principles, and furthermore did not experience that the difference in mandates challenged cooperation within the consortium. The reason why such issue was not encountered was that SomReP intentionally operated only in areas liberated by the government. The interviewee explained how SomReP was responsible for the delivery of social services that the absent central government was not able to provide, hence filling this gap with resilience so to speak, and not interfering with government structures and policies per se. The SomReP member recognises that the humanitarian principles can be in jeopardy in cross-mandate cooperation indeed. With Kenya as an example, the interviewee explained how in middle income countries, many development activities are directed towards capacity building civil society and "[…] *telling them about human rights and democracy issues*" (SomReP Interview 2017: 102). In such context it would, according to the SomReP member, be perfectly legitimate to question the neutrality of the involved NGOs given their direct interference with the government system. However, during SomReP, all of the programme areas had been liberated by the government, so none of the involved NGOs realigned themselves with the government, the opposition or with criminals [i.e. Al-Shabaab]. Restricting implementation of cross-mandate programmes to 'neutral' areas therefore enables cooperation, since the humanitarian principles are not jeopardised. This highlights the importance of recognising the continued importance of the different mandates as well as the limits of cross-mandate cooperation among NGOs; i.e. that some contexts might just not allow for the alignment of humanitarian-development action. Another example of a limitation was brought forward by the interviewed SomReP member's critique of Samuel Hall. Specifically the interviewee argued that Samuel Hall's review of SomReP did not acknowledge the broader events surrounding the programme; i.e. "[…] *the challenge* [to incorporate both development and

humanitarian activities] *is that drought and climate change are affecting the resilience, so you cannot do a lot of development activity"* (SomReP Interview 2017: 148-9). Therefore external circumstances (and not the disincentives of the NGOs exclusively) can also create conditions that obstruct the possibility for humanitarian and development incentives to be aligned. Given its high level of information sharing, an effective and well-established structure for coordination of activities, and a shared vision and understanding of the resilience programme from the beginning, which have ensured a certain level of trust among the consortium members, SomReP has been classified as a 'successful' case of cross-mandate cooperation.

6. Case Study Findings

As the following will demonstrate some results from the case studies correspond to arguments in the literature review and confirm their relevance to contexts of cross-mandate cooperation. The case studies nevertheless also reveal trends that are not approached in existing literature. A particularly important and strong incentive for both humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs appears to be economic gains and significant disincentives seem to be rooted in the difference between the humanitarian and development principles. Based on the parameters for the distinction between 'successful' and 'unsuccessful' cooperation presented in chapter 2, the case studies establish three of the cases as 'successful', namely SomReP, The Northern Forum and the Southern Forum, and one as 'unsuccessful', i.e. Somalia NGO Consortium. By identifying similarities between the successful cases, as well as similarities that contrast the 'unsuccessful' case of Somalia NGO Consortium, incentives and disincentives for cross-mandate cooperation can be identified. The nature of these as well as the conditions under which they can be aligned will be proposed in the following.

6.1 Time consuming
A disincentive that influences cross-mandate cooperation among NGOs seems to be the time-consuming nature of such constellations. The time-consuming dimension is not a substantial focus in existing literature, but was identified in three of the cases and therefore seems to be of distinct importance for cross-mandate cooperation. To recall the findings from the cases, SomReP provided evidence of a longer inception phase, and its members mentioned alignment of procedures as well as exceeded deadlines as reasons for this; in the Northern Forum the small cross-mandate sub-

groups required more time; and finally from the Somalia NGO Consortium it was mentioned that because additional time is not allocated to cooperating activities, some NGOs, especially the smaller ones with few recourses, chose not to participate in cross-mandate activities. Despite the fact that additional investment of time is a disincentive for any NGO, whether humanitarian or development-oriented, it might be a particularly strong disincentive for humanitarian NGOs given their mandate which demands rapid responses. In most instances it will most likely be faster for humanitarian NGOs to work in isolation. Despite these commonly experienced disincentives, the most influential for NGO behaviour nonetheless seems to be economic incentives

6.2 Economic incentives

Based on the findings from all four cases it becomes clear that economic losses and gains are particularly influential on the decisions and behaviours of both humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs. This is for instance illustrated by Somalia NGO Consortiums discovery that covering the costs of its members enhances participation in cross-mandate activities, and by the Southern Forum where additional time and effort was invested in establishing a well-functioning cooperation when individual economic losses were a risk. These are isolated examples that illustrate the strength of economic incentives on NGO behaviours, but as the following will illustrate it is also possible to identify common tendencies within and across the case studies.

Funding scarcity in general seems to produce a competitive environment among NGOs where individual praise and credit overweigh collective benefits. In the case of Somalia NGO Consortium it became clear that competition over funding hampers cross-mandate cooperation, as predicted by earlier covered theory (see for instance Cunningham 2012; Coley & Ron 2002; Buzard 2000). Since humanitarian NGOs are most often dependent on delivering identifiable and rapid results to ensure continuous funding (as emphasised by Murdie 2013 and Cunningham 2012), it is reasonable to suggest that this competition over funding is a disincentive for humanitarian NGOs in particular; that is, since development NGOs focus on underlying dynamics which implies that their impact is difficult to detect in the short-term (as presented in chapter 4), cross-mandate cooperation with development NGOs might obscure the humanitarian results and hence reduce humanitarian NGOs' chances of receiving funding in the subsequent cycle. Hence, despite the fact that humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs do not necessarily compete over funding per se (since they are traditionally funded by separate pools), internal competition among humanitarian NGOs influence their willingness to cooperate with development actors, since ensuring funding becomes prioritised over harmonising efforts with others as also suggested by Cunningham (2012: 106).

The general funding scarcity was likewise highlighted by the interviewed SomReP member who repeatedly referred to the existing 'donor fatigue' in Somalia. In contrast to Somalia NGO Consortium, however, the competitive environment has motivated cross-mandate cooperation within SomReP and not hampered it. To be precise the cross-mandate cooperation within SomReP was established with the aim of avoiding competition (to recall, SomReP was funded by humanitarian donors), reducing costs during a period of 'donor fatigue' and finally to increase the chances of gaining funding. These findings from SomReP correspond to the previously presented theoretical assumptions of inter-organisational cooperation, which suggest that cooperation is most likely in times of limited resources, and when cooperation offers a chance to sustain a given organisation and ensure its survival (see Harsh 2015; Steffek 2013; Oliver 1990; Hoffman & Weiss 2006).

Another incentive of both humanitarian and development NGOs identified in all four case studies is the increased access to larger agendas and donors. I.e. in both the Northern and the Southern Forums the arguments for cooperating were that only through cooperation could individual NGOs develop the necessary 'louder voice', which facilitated access to influential international stakeholders like the UN and importantly to donors. In SomReP the potential to access to funding as a strong incentive is likewise clear, since the programme was established with the aim of providing donors with the much sought after innovative approach to resilience and hence attract funding. Finally, both the coordinator and the NGO-members of the Somalia NGO Consortium reiterated these arguments. Despite this similar line of arguments, the evidence from the case study nonetheless establishes that the consortium was not successful in creating this 'loud' collective voice. These results from the 'unsuccessful' case of Somalia NGO Consortium nevertheless reinforce the findings above. That is, one reason for the decline in commitment and participation was the perceived lack of added value, since some members felt that better access to funding was provided elsewhere. Somalia NGO Consortium was consequently de-prioritised, which illustrates that the additional time and effort demanded by cooperating activities (as established in the beginning of this chapter) is only reserved provided that it enhances the chances of economic gains.

Additional findings, which reveal a certain level of variation in the incentives, reinforce access to funding as a strong incentive for development NGOs in particular. Specifically it seems that the incentives for NGOs to cooperate across mandates are stronger in times of particularly dire crises, which was illustrated by the strong commitment to the UN-established discussion- and response Forum during the 2011 famine as well as during the high visibility of the Dafur crisis in

Sudan from 2005 to 2009. One explanation for this tendency is the increased international focus and hence (mainly humanitarian) funding influx in times of crisis; in the case of Sudan in particular there was clear evidence that the willingness of NGOs to cooperate across mandates enhanced concurrently with the increase in funding. Therefore cooperation during particular dire crises also seem motivated by the potential access to additional funding. This might be a strong incentive for development NGOs in particular since cross-mandate cooperation will provide access to otherwise unavailable *humanitarian* funding. The discovery of these dynamics firstly underpins the power of economic gains to align the activities of humanitarian and development NGOs, and secondly it demonstrates that the strength of incentives might change over time, which confirms the relevance of Steffek's (2013) framework and recognition of dynamic push and pull factors for cross-mandate cooperation. Despite the fact that the case studies seem to provide evidence of the somewhat cynical incentive of maximising funding in times of crisis, it should of course be emphasised that increased levels of cooperation during these particular periods are most likely also driven by the number of people living under severe conditions and hence in critical need of assistance. Support to this is provided by the interviewed SomReP member as well as World Vision, who both argue that the utilisation of expertise across mandates will enhance the impact and in the end improve the lives of beneficiaries, which demonstrates that the willingness of NGOs to cooperate across mandates are also needs-driven and not economically motivated exclusively. The findings from SomReP in particular grants some importance to the earlier presented theoretical arguments concerned with efficiency enhancement as incentives of for-profit firms as well as the strength of the *perceived* added value of cooperating (See for instance Prakash & Gugerty 2010; Marwil 2012; Oliver 1990; Murdie 2013; Ngmassi et al. 2010)

6.3 Donors' influence on the conditions for cross-mandate cooperation
Given the strength of economic incentives for the behaviours of both humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs it is not surprising that donors have significant influence in terms of either strengthening or weakening the incentives of humanitarian and development NGOs to cooperate across mandates. Firstly, traditional compartmentalised thinking and demands of donors will hamper cross-mandate cooperation, since increased access to funding will then be facilitated by working in isolation according to traditional understandings of the humanitarian and developmental mandates. On the other hand, however, insofar donors allow for programmatic flexibility and designs that recognise the need to accommodate both 'state-centric' and 'state-avoiding' behaviours and if they do not strictly maintain and separate short term and long term objectives, conditions for

cross-mandate cooperation are created. With the cross-cutting programmatic focus on resilience, the success of SomReP illustrates that flexible donors can reinforce the incentives for cooperation across mandates; i.e. SomReP was funded by humanitarian donors but allowed for long-term planning (as recalled from chapter 4, humanitarian planning is usually short-term) without compromising the humanitarian principles. In support of flexible donors as an incentive, the declining commitment in Somalia and Sudan after the particularly dire crisis had subsided indicates that cross-mandate cooperatives are difficult to sustain for longer periods of time when operating with the traditional understandings of humanitarian and development action. Therefore, flexible and innovative donors who are willing to stretch the traditional compartmentalised thinking have the influence to create conditions under which humanitarian and development activities can be aligned. This evidence grants some recognition to the observations by Cunningham (2012: 120) who suggests that the humanitarian regime is designed according to donor restrictions. Furthermore, even though DeMars' view is admittedly fairly controversial when suggesting that NGOs are not only dependent on donors but even constituted by them, it is an interesting claim which in any case emphasise the great influence of donor objectives in line with the evidence detected in the case studies.

6.4 Humanitarian and development principles

The findings above also indicate that the differences between humanitarian and development principles can challenge cross-mandate cooperation, which additional evidence from the case studies confirms. In the Somalia NGO consortium for instance it has been a challenge for the consortium to agree on common objectives following the entry of development NGOs. One explanation includes the dissatisfaction voiced by development NGOs concerning the mainly short-term agenda in the consortium, which illustrates that the contrasting planning- and implementation cycles of humanitarian and development NGOs respectively become disincentives for cross-mandate cooperation. Similarly, one of the few identified challenges during SomReP was that some member NGOs struggled to manage multi-year programming (Samuel Hall 2016). Therefore, for development NGOs at least, a disincentive to cooperate is the short-term nature of humanitarian planning. Furthermore, the importance of the 'silent member' arrangements for cooperation within both the Northern Forum and the Southern Forum (the chance to avoid false accusations of specific affiliations) as well as the warnings by Samuel Hall concerning development activities' inclination to blur the lines between neutral and political assistance underpin that cross-mandate cooperation is most likely under conditions where the humanitarian principles are acknowledged and respected.

These findings indirectly grant some relevance to the arguments by Cunningham (2012) and Hoffman & Weiss (2006: 127), who accentuate how the humanitarian principles of 'independence' and 'impartiality' motivates each NGO to work in silos and complicates the integration of humanitarian action into larger systems. SomReP nonetheless proves that it is possible to integrate the 'state-centred' and long-term vs. 'state-avoiding' and short-term oriented behaviours of development and humanitarian NGOs respectively. That is, two strong indications for how SomReP managed to ensure this strong buy-in from both types of actors is firstly its long-term commitment and funding (4 years) as well as implementation only in 'neutral' areas

Based on the evidence from the conducted interview it is likely that a protracted crisis context offers fruitful conditions for cross-mandate cooperation. I.e. as previously stated there is usually a low level or complete lack of governance as well as breakdown of local institutions (FAO 2010: 12); in such context development activities are not necessarily state-centric in its traditional sense, since the activities merely cover the gaps that the state is not able to temporarily, hence not interfering with government affairs and threatening the humanitarian principles per se.

The results from the case studies establish the preservation of humanitarian principles as an important incentive for humanitarian NGOs. Furthermore it is illustrated that a stubborn traditional assessment of the mandates is likely to hamper cross-mandate cooperation. In line with Hoffman & Weiss (2006: 127) who suggest that every humanitarian NGO is principally *for* cooperation insofar it does not imply a loss of autonomy, flexibility and some compromise is instead demanded from all the involved NGOs; as SomReP has illustrated, humanitarian NGOs can accept activities that provide governmental services and long-term planning against development NGOs' accept of implementing only in liberated and neutral areas.

6.5 Shared visions and mutual trust

Common for the three successful cases furthermore seems to be the establishment of a certain level of mutual trust and shared visions among the member NGOs. In the Northern Forum mutual trust and solidarity emerged among the member NGOs across mandates due to a shared understanding of the Sudanese conditions and collectively experienced issues. In the Southern Forum there seems to have been shared values among the international NGOs, which encouraged cooperation across mandates. Finally, common dedication and a shared vision seemed to characterise SomReP from the beginning of the programme due to agreement among the member NGOs on the benefits of the consortium. In contrast, however, the Somalia NGO Consortium is afflicted by lack of trust among the NGOs, which has resulted in fragmented visions and difficulties to cooperate within the

consortium. Interestingly, the three 'successful' cases mainly involve international NGOs, whereas Somalia NGO Consortium includes local and international NGOs. In agreement with Murdie (2013), these tendencies firstly underpin mutual trust among NGOs as an incentive for cooperation for both humanitarian and development NGOs. Interestingly, however, the levels of trust are higher within constellations of INGOs only, which suggest that relational characteristics in terms of size, culture and common experiences exclusive to international actors overweigh the disincentives to cooperate across mandates. Relational characteristics as incentives to cooperate were also highlighted by Ngamassi et al. (2007), which grants some importance to their observations for cross-mandate cooperation as well. Finally, arguments and concerns about affiliations and religious beliefs of national NGOs are repeated in both the Southern Forum, the Northern Forum, and in Somalia NGO Consortium; these concerns are most likely stimulated by the general lack of governance in the respective countries (as suggested by Murdie 2013) and the negative experiences in the past caused by this lack. I.e. these conditions have caused insecurity and hence distrust in local actors.

The findings from the case studies therefore suggest that mutual trust, generated by commonly experienced insecurity and shared visions, can create the conditions under which humanitarian and development priorities can be aligned. For humanitarian NGOs mutual trust might be a particularly strong incentive given the potential threat to 'impartiality' and 'neutrality' insofar the affiliations of partners are unknown. Importantly, the evidence from the case studies also reveal that successful cooperation is more likely provided that participation is restricted to involve similar types of NGOs. These findings are particularly relevant for contexts of protracted crises given domestic insecurity (conflict and weak governance) as a main characteristic.

6.6. Importance of Leadership

A final identified incentive for cross-mandate cooperation, which is rather neglected in existing literature and hence of particular relevance to cross-mandate cooperation, seems to be a strong and dedicated leadership. Despite the fact that Tshouakeau et al. (2011 in Murdie 2013: 316) do identify lack of leadership *within funding structures* as an obstacle to cooperation in general, they are not concerned with cooperation *between NGOs*. As illustrated with the case of SomReP there was both a strong joint leadership facilitated by representatives from the 7 member NGOs as well as a chief of party, who was very persistent in advocating for cooperation and demanding in terms of receiving status reports from the respective NGOs within the consortium. On the other hand, and in support of this finding, was the lack of leadership identified within Somalia NGO Consortium; i.e.

the leadership seems to advocate for continuous isolated action, which does not urge the members to cooperate across mandates, and furthermore the overall leadership of the consortium seemed unable or unwilling to acknowledge the issues raised by development NGOs in regards to the short-term dominated agenda. These findings therefore suggest that incentives of both humanitarian and development NGOs can be facilitated and reinforced by a strong leadership.

7. Conclusion

In this thesis it has been demonstrated that both humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs respond strongly to economic incentives, and that cross-mandate cooperation can be successful under conditions that recognise the continuous importance of the distinct principles of humanitarian and development action receptively; especially donors are in a position to either stimulate or impede these conditions.

The majority of the incentives and disincentives identified in this thesis are common to both humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs, which implies that the challenge of different mandates and principles is not as overriding as anticipated. The distinct principles are nonetheless not completely irrelevant, since incentives and disincentives rooted in these principles persist. Insofar these are not recognised, they do have the strength to overweigh the common incentives. For humanitarian NGOs the identified additional time-demand required from cross-mandate cooperation is a disincentive given the humanitarian reliance on being able to provide rapid assistance. Furthermore, the developmental focus on underlying and somewhat invisible dynamics is a disincentive, since humanitarian NGOs most often are measured according to their ability to deliver identifiable results which ensures continuous funding. Cooperation with development NGOs therefore potentially implies a loss of funding for humanitarian NGOs, which illustrates the power of material incentives over their behaviours. In relation to the strength of material incentives, it can also be concluded that an environment of funding scarcity has the power to both encourage and discourage humanitarian NGOs to cooperate with development NGOs; whether the outcome of funding scarcity is cooperation or competition might very likely be determined by the level of mutual trust, which will be explained in detail in a later paragraph (the implications of funding scarcity most likely apply to development NGOs as well, but evidence of funding scarcity was only detected within the humanitarian system in this thesis). A final incentive for humanitarian NGOs specifically is the recognition and protection of the humanitarian principles. As illustrated by the

case of SomReP this does not necessarily imply that a traditional compartmentalised understanding of the principles must be maintained, but instead that 'impartiality' and 'independence' can still be maintained in cooperation with development NGOs despite the fact that they are more state-centric in their behaviours. For development NGOs only few specific disincentives for cooperating with humanitarian NGOs were identified, which nevertheless confirm the importance of recognising the distinct principles of the two fields. The disincentives of development NGOs are the short-term agenda of humanitarian NGOs and the programmatic restrictions posed by the humanitarian principles.

Despite the fairly thinner evidence of invectives particular to development NGOs, it is reasonable to conclude that the different principles of humanitarian and development action respectively are important to acknowledge in order for cross-mandate cooperation to happen. Protracted crises contexts might nonetheless provide a small window for aligning the incentives of the two types of NGOs. That is, given the lack of governance and breakdown of local institutions, development activities do not necessarily involve interference with government affairs per se (e.g. policy development and good governance demands) but can 'settle' with providing citizens with services that the sitting government is not able to, and hence ensure the protection of the humanitarian principle of 'impartiality' in particular. Successful cross-mandate cooperation of course also demands a certain level of flexibility from the involved NGOs who must recognise the need to compromise, which the case studies suggest is possible up to the point where autonomy or access to funding is lost. The continuous importance of the humanitarian and development principles finally illustrates that cross-mandate cooperation cannot be expected to occur unconditionally; regardless of compromise and flexibility, the roots of the principles will still be present and accordingly set natural limits to cross-mandate cooperation.

Despite these different incentives rooted in distinct principles, evidence from the case studies strongly indicates that these can be mitigated by material incentives, which both humanitarian and development NGOs respond very well to. That is, the behaviours and willingness of both types of NGOs to cooperate are deeply driven by economic incentives. In particular access to funding, lack thereof and the risk of economic losses have the power to align the humanitarian and development incentives covered above. Explicitly it was demonstrated in SomReP, the Southern Forum, and the Northern Forum how access to funding and the risk of economic losses generated conditions for cross-mandate cooperation, whereas the lack of access hampered cooperation and resulted in a decline of participation within Somalia NGO Consortium. In the light of the particular strength of

economic incentives, donors predictably play an important role in terms of creating or disrupting conditions for cross-mandate cooperation. In particular it has become clear that compartmentalised perspectives of donors hamper cooperation, since they encourage isolated action and reinforce the disincentives created by the contrasting principles of the two fields. When donors on the other hand allow for programmatic flexibility and designs that recognise the need to accommodate both 'state-centric' and 'state-avoiding' behaviours over the long-term and the short-term, those disincentives are overweighed by the access to funding. In addition to this important responsibility of donors, it can likewise be concluded that a strong leadership within a given programme or consortium can facilitate and reinforce the incentives of humanitarian and development NGOs to cooperate.

A particularly strong incentive for both types of NGOs, that similarly seems powerful enough to align humanitarian and development action, is mutual trust. This incentive is particularly strong in contexts of protracted crises context given the commonly experienced security concerns of the NGOs. The strength of mutual trust is illustrated by the contrast in the Somalia cases, where it became clear that mutual trust has generated conditions for cooperation within SomReP, whereas distrust has hampered cooperation and created a competitive environment within the Somalia NGO Consortium. Importantly, this trust seems to be generated by relational characteristics of the involved NGOs; that is, SomReP, as well as the remaining successful cases that enjoyed high levels of trust, were mainly constituted by INGOs, whereas Somalia NGO Consortium involved local NGOs and INGOs. Based on this evidence it can be concluded that cross-mandate cooperation among NGOs is most likely insofar the constellation is restricted to involve similar types of NGOs.

As put forward in chapter 1, the aspiration of this thesis was to contribute to fill a gap within existing literature and hence build on the collection of theories on inter-organisational and inter-NGO cooperation; the conclusions above bear witness to the fact that this has been accomplished, since the findings reveal hitherto unexplored dynamics of cross-mandate cooperation. Some of the evidence corresponds to existing theoretical arguments, which confirms their relevance to cross-mandate cooperation as well. Other results, in particular the ones concerning the importance of the distinct principles, do not seem present in existing theory. In conclusion, the evidence from this thesis has therefore contributed to theory building. Finally, the results have a practical implication as well, since they contribute to a better understanding of the pitfalls and limitations of cross-mandate cooperation, which will benefit policy makers, donors and implementing actors in their realisation of the humanitarian-development nexus.

Since this specific topic is mainly discussed at the international advocacy level, and therefore relatively new to academia, the findings from this thesis alone obviously cannot fill the existing gap; instead the evidence open up for a variety of possibilities for continued research. Firstly, due to the challenge of obtaining data, the thesis is leaning towards the humanitarian perspective, which existing theory also suffers from; for potential future research it would be relevant to collect data on development NGOs exclusively in order to gain an in-depth understanding of their specific incentives. Secondly, the identified variation in the willingness of NGOs to cooperate across mandates during particularly dire crisis is rather interesting and deserves further examination. The importance of economic gains and enhanced impact for this variation has been indicated in the thesis, but an in-depth comparable study of incentives during and after particular dire crises could potentially provide supplementary knowledge about how to sustain such cooperation beyond times of crises. Finally, the importance of mutual trust and relational characteristics for successful cross-mandate cooperation would be interesting to investigate further; with Olson's collective action framework in mind, it would be particularly relevant for future policy making to investigate whether the size of cooperative constellations influence the trust among NGOs. Even though the thesis has not been concerned with this variable, similar dynamics identified within the larger-scale Northern and Southern Forums and the smaller-scale SomReP, indirectly suggest that the number of participants does not influence cross-mandate cooperation. Stronger evidence is nonetheless needed, which makes it a relevant subject for further research.

As a final remark to this thesis it is relevant to emphasise that a larger number of interviews could potentially have benefited the depth of the study and enhanced its generalisability. Despite this limitation, however, the results of the thesis have opened up for investigation of a hitherto unexplored topic. A topic that will be relevant for continuous research up until 2030 at least, where the Sustainable Development Goals should be realised, though the importance of generating knowledge on this topic will most likely be relevant beyond 2030 given the new climate of protracted crises and the recognition within the humanitarian system that innovative approaches are strongly needed.

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Appendix 1: Mapping of development flows and humanitarian flows from 2000 to 2016

| HUM[7] and DEV[8] flows (in MUSD) 2000 – 2015 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Sudan | | South Sudan | | Jordan | | Lebanon | | Somalia | | Ethiopia | | Afghanistan | | DRC | | Pakistan | | Myanmar | |
Year	ODA[9] Total	HUM	ODA Total	HUM	ODA Total	HUM	ODA Total	HUM	ODA Total	HUM	ODA Total	HUM	ODA Total	HUM	ODA Total	HUM	ODA Total	HUM	ODA Total	HUM
2000	224.7m	130.1m			552.7m	1m	200m	n.a.	102.2m	46.2m	687.2m	6.1m	136	73	177.1m	28.9m	702.7m	24.2m	105.6m	
2001	192.1m	234.3m			449.5m	n.a.	198.4m	n.a.	149.3m	54.7m	1.1bn	202.7m	410.4m	5.5m	245.4m	154.1m	1.9bn	48.2m	125.7m	1.6m
2002	304.9m	267.7m			563.2m	1.8m	203.3m	3.6m	152.7m	76.4m	1.3bn	92.3m	1.3bn	1.6bn	1.2bn	176.6m	2.1bn	10.7m	119m	8.6m
2003	620.5m	357.9m			1.3bn	2.8m	534.4m	889.8m	176.2m	63.6m	1.6bn	496.4m	1.6bn	457.1m	5.4bn	187.1m	1bn	10.2m	125m	11.1m
2004	994.5m	1bn			603m	800m	265.8m	7.6m	201.2m	112.6m	1.8bn	85.9m	2.3bn	162.4m	1.9bn	224m	1.4bn	7m	123,5m	17.1m
2005	1.8bn	1.4bn			708.5m	1.9m	230.5m	7.3m	240.2m	158.7m	1.9bn	544.7m	2.8bn	81m	1.9bn	270.2m	1.6bn	1.2bn	144.8m	27.2m
2006	2.5bn	1.4bn			571.6m	6.4m	819m	542.9m	396.2m	276m	2bn	393.1m	2.9bn	173m	2.2bn	448.3m	2.1bn	110.6m	145.7m	27.3m
2007	2.1bn	1.4bn			640.2m	17.2m	979m	126.3m	393.4m	363.4m	2.6bn	276m	5bn	173.9m	1.4bn	511.2m	2.3bn	78.6m	195.9m	37.6m
2008	2.6bn	1.7bn			737.9m	53.5m	1bn	78.4m	765.9m	640.1m	3.3bn	1.1bn	4.9bn	560.4m	1.8bn	646.6m	1.6bn	66.8m	534.5m	620.6m
2009	2.4bn	1.7bn			740.4m	63.9m	580.3m	64.1m	661.6m	663.8m	3.8bn	706.7m	6.2bn	688.6m	2.4bn	692m	2.8bn	758.9m	355.8m	205.8m
2010	2bn	1.4bn			951.3m	52.3m	447.7m	35.7m	505.7m	491.1m	3.5bn	626.6m	6.5bn	729.3m	3.5bn	571.1m	3bn	3.9bn	354,8m	143m
2011	1.7bn	938m	437m	465.4m	971m	56.5m	476.3m	43.8m	1bn	1,4bn	3.4bn	812m	6.9bn	894.7m	5.5bn	545.9m	3.5bn	486.4m	380,1m	82.6m
2012	1.4bn	676.3m	1.2bn	867.3m	1.6bn	261.9m	711.5m	162.5m	990.1m	841m	3.2bn	676.8m	6.7bn	514.7m	2.8bn	649.4m	2bn	461.5m	50.2m	101.6m
2013	1.5bn	635.4m	1.4bn	916.6m	1.4bn	936.3m	621.6m	1bn	1.1bn	716.8m	3.8bn	537.2m	5.2bn	525.3m	2.6bn	741.1m	2.2bn	276.9m	3.9bn	206.4m
2014	874.8m	647.3m	1.9bn	2bn	2,7bn	917.6m	819.6m	1.1bn	1.1bn	672.5m	3.6bn	556.9m	4.9bn	507.3m	2.4bn	575m	3.6bn	321.1m	1.4bn	209.9m
2015	899m	647.1m	1.7bn	1.4bn	2.1bn	932.1m	975m	1.3bn	1.2bn	592.9m	3.2bn	515.9m	4.2bn	415.1m	2.6bn	513.8m	3.8bn	244.7m	1.2bn	196.7m
2016		647.7m		1.3bn		584m		1.2bn		619.3m		1.3bn		531.2m		476.7m		263.1m		183m

[7] Data obtained from Financial Tracking Service (FTS): an overall estimate of the total humanitarian funds (based on reporting by Central Emergency Response Fund, Country-based Pooled Funds, governments, EU & ECHO, NGOs, charities and foundations). Important, however, to note that the reporting is voluntary. The general estimates will nevertheless still be enough to assess the consistency and approximate share of influx of humanitarian aid compared to development aid

[8] 2013-2015 data obtained from OECD (https://public.tableau.com/views/OECDDACAidataglancebyrecipient_new/Recipients?:embed=y&:display_count=yes&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no?&:showVizHome=no), 2006-2012 obtained from WB (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?end=2014&name_desc=false&start=2006&view=chart)(2013-2014 numbers have been crossed checked w. OECD data to validate)

[9] Net Official Development Assistance = Total contribution including humanitarian assistance.

Appendix 2: Interview guides

Country: Somalia Somalia NGO Consortium Coordinator in Somalia NGO consortium Conducted 05-04-17		

	Main Question	**Focus points for interviewer**
<u>Introduction</u>	Introduction of me, the overall topic of my thesis and a short outline of the interview, take your time and ask if any questions are unclear	
	Your career	- *No. of years with XX* - *Previous experience within the humanitarian or development sector*
	What are your roles in Somalia NGO Consortium?	- *Coordination?* - *Mapping?* - *Information sharing?* - *Frequent contact with/dialogue with members?*
<u>Main</u>	***Based on your experience - what are the benefits and the disadvantages of the consortium?***	
	Have there been any changes in the consortium in the light of the humanitarian-development nexus?	- *What do you think it takes in order for the nexus to be successful?*
	What obstacles do you face in the coordination of the consortium?	- *Are these obstacles related particularly to humanitarian/development coordination?* - *Obstacles the same?*
	Have the members expressed arguments for participating in the consortium?	- *And are such arguments different among humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs?*
	Have the members expressed concerns about participating in the consortium?	- *Differences in the concerns of humanitarian NGOs and development NGOs?*

	Particular situations/times where you have experienced a strong willingness/commitment from the membership NGOs to coordinate? - In your experience why is that? ***Do you as the coordinator do anything to motivate participation by the NGOs?***	 - *Anything in particular for humanitarian NGOs?* - *Anything in particular for development NGOs?*
<u>Rounding off</u>	***Any questions?*** ***Anything to add?***	- Thank you Offer to send the final product/thesis

Country: Somalia Somalia Resilience Programme (SomReP) NGO representatives involved in SomReP Conducted 20-04-17		
	Main Question	**Focus points for interviewer**
<u>Introduction</u>	Introduction of me, the overall topic of my thesis and a short outline of the interview, take your time and ask if any questions are unclear ***Your career*** ***Your/[NGO's] role in SomReP?***	 - *No. of years with XX* - *Previous experience within the humanitarian or development sector*
<u>Main</u>	 ***Benefits for* [NGO] *– why work in a consortium and not alone?*** ***Disadvantages for* [NGO] *– did you encounter obstacles specific to the consortium set-up?***	 - *Why work with longer-term development objectives when the mandate is humanitarian and refugee oriented?* - *Obstacles particularly related to hum/dev cooperation?*

	Particular phases of the programme where you experienced better or weaker cooperation?	- *Planning?* - *Evaluation?* - *Implementation?* - *Particular critical time?*
	In an evaluation report of SomReP from 2016 it is indicated that humanitarian and development NGOs have different identities and cultures. Do you agree with this?	- *If yes: how did this influence the cooperation among the NGOs?*
	On a general level, would you characterise the cooperation within SomReP as successful or unsuccessful? Why?	- *Shared planning?* - *Common vision?* - *Joint leadership?* - *Increased impact? Etc.* - *What do you think it takes in order for the nexus to be successful on the implementing level?*
<u>Rounding off</u>	***Any questions?*** ***Anything to add?***	- Thank you Offer to send the final product/thesis

Appendix 3: Interview transcripts

Interview w. Somalia NGO Consortium Representative
Skype connection: CPH – MOG
05-04-17

1   Introduction of representative, responsibilities, short introduction to the NGO Consortium

2   Organise meetings and contact with local authorities

3   I coordinate all the information sharing and advocacy related activities and responsibilities among
4   our members. We also have a monthly meeting for our members in Mogadishu, where we address
5   challenges the best way we can to be more effective. Mainly, those are our goals

6   *I: I lost you for a second, but did you say that members are mainly humanitarian right now or is it*
7   *both humanitarian and development NGOs?*

8   Yeah both both, actually, the NGOs, we have more than 80 members of national and international
9   NGOs that work both in the development sector and the humanitarian sector. So they mainly work
10 in both areas, development and humanitarian

11 *I: In relation to that and in the light of the global priority of the humanitarian-development nexus,*
12 *have you then made any changes in the consortium, adapted to this new priority?*

13 Yeah, actually most of the organisations have development and humanitarian programming in most
14 cases. And when there is also a drought situation, when there is humanitarian crisis, they also focus
15 more on saving lives. So in general the NGOs have been very active these days in responding to the
16 crises that hit the country in general. Although it was very slow, but there are always gaps in
17 humanitarian response due to funding, due to access, so a number of challenges generally but they
18 are trying responding to the drought and still continuing with development projects. So they do both
19 because generally it is better coordination between humanitarian and development actors in Somalia
20 is very important. We always need to have that kind of strategy in both humanitarian and
21 development.

22 *I: So what you think it takes in order for such a nexus to be successful? Are there any obstacles*
23 *rights now?*

24 What I would suggest is for all humanitarian and development partners or NGOs, they need to
25 always have in mind that they can be effective in both humanitarian and development. For example,
26 if we have an NGO who .. Let's say, if an NGO comes in today to Somalia to support those people
27 affected by the drought it is better they also have the mentality that in the future when the drought is
28 over .. so they connect humanitarian and development. Instead of life-saving they go beyond life
29 saving and build resilience, it is good to always have that connection. In that way they can have
30 more impact and support the local communities

31 *I: So you would suggest that it is within the individual NGOs that they should be doing both*
32 *development work and humanitarian assistance? You do not have for example 30 strictly*
33 *humanitarian NGOs and 30 strictly development NGOs …*

34 Yes that is what I would suggest. I think it would be better if every NGO instead of specialising in
35 one area, they can have many two-fold programmes in parallel, one in emergency and one is a
36 developmental programme, and that way the programmes can support each other. And in the same
37 communities, the same people, if both programmes are targeting the same target groups.

38 *I: As a coordinator do you face any obstacles, are there any challenges to coordinating the efforts?*

39 Actually mainly no. Mainly as a coordinator for this I do not actually see special challenge sin my
40 work. But generally a challenge that we face as national and international NGOs is the emergence
41 of these new states; there is a development of new laws and regulations from them. A directive will
42 for instance come from Ministry of Finance in the south-west expecting NGOs to pay taxation
43 effective from that date without even having the taxation framework for that. So there are a number
44 of challenges to the NGOs and we are facing similar challenges in regions like Jubaland, but we
45 always sit with the authorities and discuss with them. So there are a number of challenges in
46 relations to, you know, the new laws that are coming out of the new directives.

47 *I: you mentioned that you are in frequent contact with the member NGOs. In your contact with*
48 *them, have they ever mentioned any concerns in terms of participating in the consortium?*

49 Eh, generally, since the consortium is a member organisation and we serve our members, we always
50 consult with them. For example, the consortium has started the process of strategic planning for the
51 next three years from 2017-2019 and we were able to reach out to all our members in all locations,
52 and our consultants have travelled to Hargeisa [Somaliland] and had meetings and different
53 workshops with national and international NGOs, then they went to Garowe, Puntland, they also
54 had a similar workshop for national NGOs and international NGOs separately. So what we
55 normally do is that we consult our work very closely with our members, and mainly most of them
56 are very okay and very happy with the support we are giving them. Because what we are, we
57 consider ourselves to be a voice for them, we always share their concerns with them, share
58 knowledge, and add better view to local authorities at federal level, at regional level at government
59 level. So we take their messages to the next levels. We have always maintained very strong
60 relations with all the members.

61 *I: So would you say that you provide a stronger voice for the smaller NGOs?*

62 Yes. Actually, we are considered to be their voice, we always discuss their issues and challenges
63 and try to link out to authorities.

64 *I: Have you ever experienced that there was a low commitment to participating in the consortium.*
65 *Any situations where there is a strong commitment or a weak commitment?*

66 Generally the commitment of the members is very god. Because at all of our meetings and
67 workshops we always provide space so people can speak their minds and share their views. So
68 generally the commitment of the members is very good. Maybe one or two you can get someone
69 who might not be very committed but generally the commitment is very good.

70 *I: So you provide space for every NGO to speak and share their thoughts at these meetings?*

71 Yeah yeah. Actually our monthly meetings are open and that is open to all members, both national
72 and international. We have monthly meetings in Mogadishu then Garowe, Hargeisa and Nairobi.

73 *I: you mentioned that that sometimes there are maybe two or very few NGOs that are not very*
74 *committed – why do you think that is?*

75 Yes. Actually since it is a member organisation, you might find one NGO for example, and that has
76 been there for some time, even not now, but in the past few years. Maybe let us say three years
77 back, one or two NGOs might think that the consortium is for international NGOs. This work is for
78 international. But that is not the case. And that is what they think maybe because most members are
79 international NGOs than national NGOs, so someone might tell you. But generally, 99% know that
80 this forum is for everyone regardless of whether they are national or international. We are also now
81 organising meetings for national NGOs, so they can also meet other donors. So we are working very
82 closely with the national NGOs also.

83 *I: Then I wanted to ask you if you do anything to motivate the NGOs to participate?*

84 We facilitate training for them. And sometimes when we offer trainings to them, to our members,
85 we do not charge them, we might even cover their costs for example. So that is what we do to
86 motivate them to take part in the consortium activities. Also, since we are having almost daily basis
87 communication with them we maintain always close cooperation with them on all issues that come
88 up or on ad hoc basis.

Interview w. SomReP member
Phone call: CPH – MOG
20-04-17

89 Interviewer (hereafter I): *Why did you choose to work in a consortium and not alone?*
90 SomReP: Brief introduction to SomReP and listing of the NGOs involved

91 SomReP: So one of the reasons, to come back to your question why we came together is number
92 one, to utilise the expertise, number two is actually to joint instead of competing and complement
93 each other. So instead of competing for resources we realise that it is better that we complement
94 each other and through that even the donors are very happy to fund the project of Somalia
95 Resilience Programme. Number three, it was a donor focus there was a lot of fatigue, you know,

96 even the humanitarian support throughout Somalia for a long time from 1992. The donors wanted
97 something different and it was only the consortium that could sell through. So those are the reasons.

98 *I: I read that sometimes there is an issue in terms of separate funding structures for humanitarian*
99 *purposes and development purposes. Did you encounter anything like that?*

100 SomReP: Yes yes yes. Most of the donors as much as they got fatigue in the humanitarian they look
101 at Somalia as an emergency context first. So what we try to sell was that we told them: "look there
102 are areas where there are rivers, two big rivers, there are people who want to not work on their own
103 but they do not have the capacity after the fall of the central government". So we faced the
104 challenge of this but through innovation we did this innovation of, you know, support through
105 agriculture and infrastructure, and the livestock market. And also what we looked at was also, you
106 know, the natural resource management which there is no central government in Somalia. So
107 through that actually many donors were interested in funding that. One of them is EU, DANIDA,
108 the other ones is SIDA, then we have Australian aid, we had the USAID themselves. So there are
109 many donors, actually our core donors for emergency, has actually converted to support us in the
110 resilience because we are building the households, instead of people falling into emergency, we told
111 them [donors]: "let's go to the village and support these people during the drought they can
112 understand. We give them boreholes, we support them in irrigation farming we also support them
113 in, you know, in capacity building through vocational skills training and those kind of initiatives,
114 and we really sold it.

115 *I: On the other hand, I want to ask you if there were any disadvantages or any obstacles when you*
116 *had to cooperate in this consortium?*

117 SomReP: Yes yes. Of course there are challenges. In every consortium you will not miss
118 challenges. One of them was of course that it takes a long time to make a decision because of the
119 hierarchy. The bureaucracy, you know. This is [member NGO1],[member NGO1] did this, and a
120 report was not submitted, [member NGO2] there is some data not coming from in from [member
121 NGO2], you can understand that you cannot push them the way you want, you know, they have
122 their own liberty, and sometime they can frustrate you, you know, if you are not careful. So that is
123 one of them. The other one was, you know, we did not get all the money we wanted from the
124 donors, so some agencies did not get as much money as others because of the different expertise [of
125 the involved NGOs]. So that has given some challenge and some envy. SomReP is a leading forum
126 by [member NGO] because of their presence, so [NGO] was in Somalia from 1997 some years after
127 the collapse of Somalia. [NGO] was in Hargeisa in Somaliland. So because of our presence,
128 because of our capacity, and some d1onors do not care about the equity in distribution they will say:
129 "what compliments you have in this area", and you say: I have EU, I have other ECHO projects, an
130 DANIDA, and then they will say: "oh SomReP is the right organisation to take this money because
131 of complementarity". So sometimes inequality in the money distribution because of the different
132 expertise sometimes bring envy in the consortium. So I don't think there were many other
133 challenges. The other challenges, I know there is the donor fatigue in Somalia so we didn't get as
134 much money as we wanted so that is also a point to note, now you see the donors focus is in Syria,

135   the donor focus is in Iraq, in the drought situation in South Sudan as much as there is a drought in
136   Somalia, so we are facing the donor fatigue it is not the funding you know, as you recall [separate
137   funding structures].

138   *I: In relation to that, I read a review of SomReP made by Samuel Hall, and there it was indicated*
139   *that there are some differences in the identities and cultures of the participating NGOs, is this*
140   *something that you experiences.*

141   SomReP: Yeah, I know the Samuel Hall report of resilience that you are referring to. It's true that
142   the coordination aspect is a problem, I don't think that there are cultural difference or anything,
143   because SomReP is not a religious organisation, it does not advocate for spread of religion or
144   anything, it is a professional organisation. So the thing is, the differences they [Samuel hall] have
145   focused very much on is lack of coordination, not knowing the difference of the organisations, not
146   knowing the difference between the emergency, they have not been trained, so I think some of the
147   challenges [identified by Samuel Hall] were overtaken by events, they [Samuel Hall] were
148   screaming what had been done, coordination must be improved. So the challenge is the drought and
149   the climate change is affecting the resilience so you cannot do a lot of development activity, so that
150   is one challenge we have, which is general and then I am not sure if Samuel Hall reports that.

151   *I: That is why it is nice to talk to you when you have been involved and can provide another*
152   *perspective. Then I wanted to ask if there were any particular phases of the programme where there*
153   *was better cooperation or weaker cooperation?*

154   SomReP: Well of course the first initiative, when we started, there was a very strong cooperation,
155   and still the cooperation is there, of course you wouldn't miss some hiccups around but I know
156   there is a structure. I just want to give you a feedback on how the structure looks like. There is a
157   chief of party who reports to the steering committee who are drawn from the 7 country directors of
158   the different organisations, so I know in terms of coordination the chief of party is very strong in
159   terms of advocating cooperation and reports and everything, and the other thing is we have
160   technical units also that is hosted under [NGO] but reports to chiefs of party. So through that I think
161   that the coordination and report within SomReP is very good. But coordination with the other
162   resilience programmes, the UN one and there is another one led by Save the Children and NRC
163   [Norweigan Refugee Council], so I think our coordination internally is okay, but between the other
164   consortia it is very difficult, it is not that much strong I must admit.

165   *I: There is a lot of focus on the different mandates of humanitarian organisations and development*
166   *objectives. A lot of focus on the humanitarian principles and how they cannot be aligned with*
167   *development objectives – principles of neutrality, independence.*

168   SomReP: I know, impartiality, independence; I know I know I know. Fine. You know, Somalia, if
169   we look at the context of Somalia that you are studying. Somalia lost its central government in
170   1992, maybe you were very young or not born that time.

171   *I: I was born but very young, you are absolutely right*

172   SomReP: Okay. So you can imagine there is no central government, these organisations filling in,
173   you know, social services required that the government was supposed to give out. You know in
174   Denmark there is free health care, the government gives money to the social protection. These
175   things have been lost, infrastructure has been broken down, the canals in the water have been
176   bombed. So the international responsibility is that this resilience is filling in the gap that the
177   government was supposed to fill. I know that at a time the government will come on board and we
178   must build different alignments. So in terms of the development, while we are looking at the
179   neutrality and impartiality we are looking at the services, which are not provided by the
180   government, which are not in place. So we are capacity building the ministry of agriculture, we are
181   capacity building the ministry of livestock, with time our prayer is that in the next two-three years
182   the central government and the ministries will take over some of the responsibilities. And hopefully
183   some of the donor money will be directed towards the ministries to capacity build them and the
184   urgencies will not be there or they will do something that is very small in terms of intervention.

185   *I: So it hasn't been a problem for you during SomReP?*

186   SomReP: I know that in a country like Kenya, which is now a middle class country, the urgency is
187   that they [NGOs] are doing civil society, you know, supporting the opposition, capacity building
188   them, telling them about human rights and democracy issues. Those ones, when we reach that level
189   you can query: "you guys are interfering with the government system, are you not losing your
190   neutrality because you are sided with this? We are purely doing needs-based support on both social
191   responsibilities and the other development and humanitarian support currently. So we are not
192   realigning ourselves with either the opposition or the government but we are watching the areas
193   liberated by the government. So that is we are not going to the areas where the criminals and this
194   other opposition are.

195   *I: then I just have one final question before I set you free: I was just wondering what you believe it*
196   *takes for a humanitarian-development nexus to become successful on the implementing level?*

197   SomReP: I think they both work together. You cannot just do development. Like now there is a
198   drought, we have stopped all the resilience development, we are now doing emergency response,
199   and one difference, which we have now started in the Horn of Africa, we will now start the recovery
200   component of the project so I think they are intertwined, it is good that they work together, it is
201   good that we have the donor flexibility to switch off, even when it rains we cannot do this
202   supporting of emergency. I think the interface in terms of humanitarian and development working
203   together will give that flexibility and the timely response. Because when there is emergency we
204   should be able to have money to respond to emergency and when there is development we should
205   be able to switch to that without any hesitation, which will be very good for the agency. But one
206   thing you should know there should be a clear distinction of when each interference can be changed
207   although under the climate change it is also very difficult to know with the drought prevailing and
208   the rainy season. So this climate change is unpredictable.

Appendix 4: Classifications of humanitarian and development NGOs within SomReP

SomReP members

Since the overall values, strategies and mandates of some of the NGOs are somewhat ambiguous and only some of the organisations explicitly define themselves as either humanitarian or development driven, justifying the classification of SomReP as a consortium constituted by humanitarian and development NGOs respectively demands a certain level of analysis and interpretation. A brief comparison of the official values and goals of the respective organisations with some of the main points from chapter 4 will nevertheless reveal their affiliation.

DRC refers to themselves as a 'humanitarian non-governmental, non-profit organisation' that is able to rapidly respond to recurrent crises in Somalia and the needs of Somalis in humanitarian crises (DRC 2017). Furthermore, the visions and values of DRC refer explicitly to the concepts of neutrality and independence. With reference to the previous definition of humanitarian action it therefore seems clear that DRC works under a humanitarian mandate. During SomReP DRC implemented components of the programme in the Dollow District (Gedo Region), where they built productive capacities of communities and households.

Oxfam's vision is, according to their international website, 'a just world without poverty'. In line with this vision, their purpose is to 'create lasting solutions'. In order to achieve this purpose Oxfam applies a combination of rights-based approaches; in particular they subscribe to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in all their work (Oxfam 2017). Therefore, when recalling the previously put forward characteristics of development action (e.g. eradication of poverty and inequality; the longer-term perspective; the Human Rights framework of the Sustainable Development Goals) Oxfam's activities seem to fall under a development mandate. During SomReP Oxfam developed a community based disaster risk management approach, which was used by all the consortium members (SomRep, 2014: 3). It can therefore be concluded that the consortia was constituted of at least one humanitarian and one development NGO respectively. When looking at the official values and statements of the remaining organisations, however, it becomes more difficult to determine their mandate.

COOPI for instance refers to the themselves as 'an independent humanitarian organisation that fights against all kinds of poverty'. This one sentence already gives rise to some confusion about

their mandate since poverty eradication is usually ascribed to development organisations. Despite the label as a humanitarian organisation and an agenda that includes the support of populations affected by wars or natural disasters, COOPI is at the same time 'dedicated to breaking the cycle of poverty' and aims a contributing to a world in which 'ideals of equality and justice, sustainable development and social cohesion can be achieved' (COOPI 2017). Despite a somewhat ambivalent official message, COOPI must nonetheless be recognised according to their own classification as humanitarian. During SomReP, COOPI implemented a 'voucher for work' programme in Luuq. Similarly ADRA defines themselves as a 'global humanitarian organisation' that delivers both long-term development programmes as well as immediate emergency responses. As part of SomReP ADRA ran a 'Food security, Food for Peace Project (FFP)' (ADRA 2017).

Some of the organisations do not label themselves neither development-oriented nor humanitarian. CARE is one example. When looking into their official objectives and values, however, it becomes clear that CARE is mainly concerned with processes of development. Despite the fact that they refer to emergency relief as one of their activities, they also define themselves as a 'global leader dedicated to ending poverty', and it is mentioned that their main activities include sustainable activities, civil society and media development, small-scale enterprise development, and primary school education (CARE 2017). During SomReP, CARE implemented cash programming, a conflict resolution programme (to mitigate conflict over water & pasture) and water trucking in Badhan. Similarly, ACF does not define the organisation explicitly by mandate but instead refers to how ACF in their work responds to and prevents humanitarian crises, while at the same time addressing vulnerability and longer term resilience in crises (ACF 2017). The mandate of ACF hence seems to be humanitarian since their work in primarily centred around contexts of crises, but importantly they also incorporate elements of development thinking when aiming at longer-term improvements. During SomReP ACF implemented cash programming as well as programmes for livestock vaccinations and water trucking in Eyl and Elbarde

Finally, World Vision Somalia is more difficult to position within this framework. In particular due to its own definition as 'a global Christian relief, development and advocacy organisation', it is difficult to determine which mandate World Vision works under. When looking at their missions in Somalia in particular it is likewise described how a variety of emergency and rehabilitative programmes have been implemented in order to address both immediate needs as well as the underlying causes of vulnerability (World Vision Somalia 2017). In addition it is emphasised how

World Vision applies a development approach that increases participation while at the same time promoting the rights of Somali children, which resembles the characteristics of development action (i.e. the concept of 'participation' and the importance of Human Rights). On the other hand, however, World Vision subscribes to international standards such as SPHERE and the Red Cross Code of Conduct (World Vision Somalia, 2017) which, as emphasised in chapter 4 provides a framework for humanitarian action. During SomReP World Vision implemented programmes for livestock vaccinations, cash programming, borehole rehabilitation, and water trucking in Dangorayo.

Despite some ambiguities, the above section does confirm that SomReP was constituted by NGOs with humanitarian and development mandates respectively, which underpins the relevance of looking into dynamics of cooperation within this particular programme.