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**Plenty Problems to Solve:
Donor Proliferation and Aid Fragmentation in Myanmar**

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Abstract

The need for donor coordination has been increasingly established through international development practices and international agreements. Myanmar, as a newly democratizing nation, has a many diversified donors implementing development projects nationally. This study will assess the need for donor coordination in Myanmar by using donor proliferation and aid fragmentation as a proxy for donor coordination. An analysis of the sector, region, and financing will be conducted in order to identify overlap, fragmentation, and proliferation patterns. Areas with need for coordination are identified and recommendations for coordination efforts are provided. This study finds substantial need for donor coordination in order to increase the empowerment of local populations and the Myanmar national government.

Key Words: Aid coordination, Donor proliferation, Aid Fragmentation, Myanmar Development Architecture, Mohinga

Word Count: 9929

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Plenty Problems to Solve: Donor Proliferation and Aid Fragmentation in Myanmar

I. Introduction

In recent years, development aid has increasingly been questioned as a form of assistance to developing countries. Aid efficiency has been criticized in the face of years of development assistance and limited results in eliminating global poverty. Donor coordination is increasingly being seen as a tool to increase the legitimacy of development assistance by increasing the efficiency of development structures. However, the incentives for nations to coordination are extremely varied. From economic incentives to political influence, a complex networks of factors influence aid coordination worldwide.

Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, is new to development coordination due to its recent political, economic, and societal opening after 53 years of brutal military rule (1962-2015). Prior to 2011 development aid was virtually unable to reach the country, in part due to many donors' lack of interest in the country as a result of its political situation. Since the 2015 democratic elections, the first democratic election in Myanmar's history, the country has undergone substantial change. From the availability of affordable phones with Internet to daily-banking accounts, the reality of its population has irreversibly changed. However, 25.6% of the population lives below the national poverty line (ADB 2017). Estimates state that in Yangon only 42% of inhabitants have running water in their houses and less than 10% of the populations has a connection to sewage infrastructure (Kapoor 2016).

Since the first democratic elections in 2015, development aid flowing into Myanmar has steadily increased. Low government capacities to deal with the large amount of development aid flooding the country undermine the ability of the government and its population to determine their own development. In order to ensure empowerment of local populations and national self-determination aid coordination needs to address the high administrative cost of development aid.

The aim of this study will be assessing the need for donor coordination in Myanmar. During my time working in Myanmar (2015-2016), I was exposed to many of the challenges in coordination between donors as well as implementation of projects. Due to the large amount of aid flowing into Myanmar, the need for coordination is apparent. This study will assess the need for coordination in Myanmar with the backdrop of the existing donor coordination architecture. The indicators multilateral/bilateral aid, donor proliferation, and aid fragmentation will be used as proxies for donor coordination. Donor proliferation refers to the amount of sectors a donor is active in. For this analysis donor proliferation will be measured at the country level. Aid fragmentation refers to the amount of actors financing projects within a given sector. Donor countries that are strong proliferators commonly contribute to aid fragmentation.

How do aid coordination patterns, as measured by donor proliferation and aid fragmentation, show the need for increased donor coordination in Myanmar?

The study will begin with an analysis of the aid coordination literature and the current aid landscape, followed by an introduction to Myanmar's history and aid structure. The data from Mohinga, the Myanmar Aid Information Management System, will form the basis of the analysis. The findings section will begin with an introduction to the general characteristics of Myanmar's development landscape. An analysis of the sectorial distribution of projects across donors, sectors, and regions will follow in order to measure donor proliferation. This will be followed by an analysis of aid fragmentation by assessing the distribution of donors within sectors. Lastly, an analysis of the regional distribution of sectors and donors will be conducted in order to test the findings from the previous sections. Recommendations for potential coordination will be provided at the end.

II. Theoretical Background

This analysis will be guided by the concept of 'Trusteeship' in development and the critique of development made by Post-Development theory. Trusteeship is defined as the “intent which is expressed, by one source of agency, to develop the capacities of another” (Cowen and Shenton 1996, p.ix). The critique of the current development culture made by Post-Development theory, explains why unequal power relations still define development practices and explain why effective donor coordination is so difficult to achieve.

Post-Development theory emerged in the 1970s in response to the focus on economic development and growth (Rist 2008, p.170). It argues for a rethinking of development in response to the current practices of technocracy, problem-focus, and persistent dominance of the North over the South.

Arturo Escobar (1995) traces the earliest understanding of development to the birth of the colonial experience (p.234). With the emergence of colonialism, the intent to develop became central to European expansion under the banner of freeing people from the shackles of traditional society (Cowen and Shenton 1996, p. 156). Colonial powers saw themselves as the 'trustees' of development with the responsibility to 'help' colonies industrialize (ibid.).

It is, however, questionable, if colonizers can be represented as trustees of development since their interests were limited to extracting resources (Rist 2008, p.110) and in most cases did not involve the desire to develop their colonies further than was necessary for their own benefit (see Kohli 2004). Additionally, the guise of 'development' was used to legitimize resource extraction and cultural domination worldwide (Nilsen 2016). True trusteeship wasn't fully realized on a global scale until the early 20th century when decolonization occurred. It is commonly stated that development began with Truman's speech in 1949 (Rist 2008; Escobar, 1995), however, as Bernstein notes, it was the 'global scope of aspiration and effort' in the post-1945 world that redefined development (Cowen & Shenton 1996, p. 6). The worldview of the colonizers was reintegrated and strengthened in the new development discourse and practice of development (Rist 2008, p.119). The global

South was placed in categories and labeled with slogans such as 'underdeveloped', 'poor', 'illiterate' (Escobar 1995, p.109). These conditions could be eradicated through the Western process of industrialization of the 18th and 19th century that enabled Europe to prosper economically.

Today's aid architecture is still defined by unequal power relations. As before, the European economic experience of industrialization is applied globally through development work, among others. Earliest critiques of 'supply-driven' aid and fragmentation were raised in the 1960s with increases in Western aid (Leiderer 2015, p. 1424). Strategic economic interests are found to have an influence on aid incentives (Fuchs et al. 2013, p. 7). Donor's actions are in many instances too entrenched in national interests and conflict with coordination principles or national development agendas (Leiderer 2015, p. 1431). Fuchs et al. (2013) assessed in their study whether 'commercial and political self-interests' hinder coordination. They found that export competition undermines donor coordination (ibid., p.7). Donors still act on their own beliefs of how a country should develop and further their own interests through development instead of empowering local governments and populations to define their own future. As critiqued by some Post-Development theorists, the current international development culture further perpetuates the unequal power relations between the North and South (Rist 2008, p. 97). By implementing development based on donor's national interests, the ability of recipient governments for self-determination is undermined.

The result of the current international development culture is a simplistic view of the world, which sees all solutions in statistical quantities and the rational management of development. In her book, "The Will to Improve", Murray Li (2007) elaborates the difference between the intentions of development and actual outcomes. She coins the term 'rendered technical' to explain how projects are solved by meeting specific technical and measurable criteria, determined by technocrats, instead of social and political constructions that define the prosperity of some groups over others (Murray Li 2007, p.235). Increases in development actors as well as increases in the types of financing mechanisms further confuse an already complex network of power relations.

This structure has increasingly been questioned since the 1990s (Gore 2013, p.773) as a result of growing awareness of patterns of trusteeship and unequal power relations. These trends can be identified in the commitments made in the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals. However, implementing the commitments made seems to be more difficult than expected. Examples of progressive development trends include for instance South-South partnerships. Kelegama (2012) argues they need to be incorporated into the current development system in order to address the issues with North-South development (p.29). South-South relations are based on an equal relationship of mutual interest, sovereignty, and self-reliance of developing nations (Gore 2013, p.6). Gore refers to them as 'Horizontal Partnerships' and 'Vertical Partnerships' (ibid., p.773). It has become clear that 'Vertical Partnerships' in development are failed systems (ibid., p.781). Today's approaches have a more 'hybrid system', involving 'Vertical' as well as 'Horizontal Partnerships' between donors, implementing agencies and recipient countries (ibid.).

Yet, many principles and systemic issues have only been addressed in theory. Constant aid duplication (Aldasoro et. al. 2010) and high administrative burdens on recipient governments are growing issues in development cooperation (Kilby 2011, p.73). Problems with the current system include aid effectiveness, donor visibility, division of labour, Global Public Goods, and norms and standards (Klingegiebel 2014, p.28). The language of effective aid is being used to create a new global governance system that includes a wider spectrum of actors, resources, and produces a new role for Development Assistance Committee of the OECD states (Gore 2013, p.782). As subscribed by post-development theorists, many of the recent developments in aid architecture are characterized by bottom-up approaches and processes (ibid.).

Post-Development theory proposes development can only occur from local constructions. These constructions are representations of the people and history commonly overlooked in development. The critiques of the current global economic system and development practices made by Post-Development theory explain the complexity of the field of development. The current development system has been unable to integrate the social and cultural dynamics necessary to understand the needs and desires of different cultures. Empowering populations in developing countries to

determine their own national development is key to removing the North-South dichotomy and reinvigorate the purpose of development today.

III. International Agreements on Development Coordination

The increasing acknowledgement that the current international aid architecture lacks effective donor coordination, has led to the establishment of different international agreements. Since the Millennium Summit in 2000, aid flows have steadily increased, leading to considerations of how to reorganize the existing aid architecture (Kelegama 2012, p.21). The Paris Declaration (PD) (2005) and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) (2008) were designed to address the issues with the current system.

The aim of the Paris Declaration was to maximize aid effectiveness through synchronizing efforts and including the full variety of actors (Kelegama 2012, p.1.). It established 5 core principles; 'Ownership', 'Alignment', 'Harmonization', 'Managing for Development Results', and 'Mutual Accountability' (Paris Declaration, 2005, pp.3).

'Ownership' refers to the importance of recipient governments to determine their own development agenda. It empowers national governments and allows them to define the priority areas for developmental aid. The second principle, 'Alignment', calls on donors to align their aid with the priorities set by recipient governments in their national development plan. These two principles reverse the power relations of previous development patterns. Instead of donor nations dictating development agenda according to their own perceptions of recipient needs or political and economic interests, the recipient government has the ability to determine its own national development. Aid should only support national development plans.

The third principle, 'Harmonisation', addresses the need for centralization of different guidelines and standards across donors and implementing organizations. The report 'Less Paper More Aid' (2016) draws attention to the need for harmonisation of donor reporting, project requirements, and auditing standards. It does not question the necessity for accountability mechanisms, but draws attention to the waste of human resources as a result of extensive and unharmonized accountability requirements (ibid,

p.7). The report found that consulted NGOs on average had "36 reporting deadlines per country per year"(ibid.). Each report takes on average 440 hours to complete and it is estimated that about 50% of reports represent duplicated content that could be shared across donors (ibid.). Addressing the harmonisation of standards will lead to increases in aid efficiency.

The fourth principle, 'Managing for development results', calls on the international aid community to define clear goals in their projects and development agendas in order to enable effective monitoring of projects. Through proper monitoring, best practices can be established and shared across sectors and nations. Currently, actors tend to keep their practices in house (Aldasoro et al. 2010, p.922). Donors need to accept that implementing effective projects is more important than the volume or apparent success rate of existing projects.

The last principle, 'Mutual Accountability', expresses the need for donor, as well as recipient, countries to take on responsibility for the successes or failures of development projects. The Zambian government experimented with new aid principles as early as the 1990s (Leiderer 2015, p. 1426). One method implemented in 2002, with the agreement 'Harmonization in Practice', was assigning a lead donor for each sector who was responsible for coordination between different projects and actors within one sector (ibid.). Despite Zambia only meeting 3 of 8 indicators of the Paris Declaration in 2011, it performed far better than most recipient nations in 'Ownership' of projects and coordination between national Ministries (ibid., p.1436). How the principles in the Paris Declaration can be put in practice needs to be assessed at the donor and recipient level, and will entail simultaneous success and failures.

Studies assessing the success of the Paris Declaration find very limited improvements (Kelegama 2012, p.23; Leiderer 2015, p.3). Aid overlap has only increased since the Paris Declaration (Aldasoro et al 2010, p.933; Nunnenkamp et al. 2013, p.557). Studies concerning success of the PD commonly only assess the global scope of development practices. Due to different economic and political interests, governance systems, or spheres of influence, the same donors and implementing agencies can take on different roles in in different countries. For this reason country level assessments

need to be conducted in order to identify proliferation and fragmentation at the recipient country level.

The AAA and Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2012) acknowledge that slow progress has been made since the PD and aim to increase aid coordination. Noteworthy is a focus on increased capacity building for recipient countries in order to facilitate implementation of the PD principles. A commitment is made towards decreasing aid fragmentation and including the full diversity of development actors in the development dialogue.

Both agreements show the initiative of donors to agree on principles despite difficulties in implementation (Klingeiebel 2014, 71). A commitment is still a symbolic gesture due to its unbinding legal nature. Therefore, incentives for donors to provide aid need to be changed. The global presence of donor countries tends to be valued stronger than aid efficiency, since effective coordination could undermine national interests (Aldasoro et al. 2010, p.922). A shift in international development thought is essential in mitigating the effect of donor proliferation and aid fragmentation.

IV. Myanmar Development Structure

This section will highlight the current donor coordination structure in Myanmar. Its competence has not been researched and little evidence for success or failures exists. Despite the existence of a coordination structure, the degree of coordination needs to be questioned. Through this study the effectiveness of this structure will be measured indirectly through the findings on donor proliferation and aid fragmentation.

The international basis for the current Myanmar development structure are the PD and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (Khin 2015). The domestic development structure is split into three levels:

1. the Myanmar Development Cooperation Forum (MDCF),
2. the FERD-Development Partners Working Committee Meetings (FERD-DPWC),
3. and 16 Sector Working Groups (SWGs).

The structure was created by the military government under Thein Sein in 2013 (MIMU, 2014). Many give credit to the MMR government for creating this structure at such an early stage in its transition from a closed to an open economy (Rieffel and Fox 2013, p.21).

The first level consists of meetings between the government of MMR and DPs. The meetings are held regularly and chaired by the UN and the Asian Development Bank (MIMU 2014). The MDCF replaced the former Partnership Group for Aid Effectiveness (*ibid.*), established in 2009, containing 45 donors, mostly OECD members (Rieffel and Fox 2013, p.17). In January, 2013, the first meeting of the MDCF took place in Nay Pyi Taw. It was chaired by the national government, which is quite uncommon in other countries (Rieffel and Fox 2013, p.19). At this meeting the Nay Pyi Taw Accord was adopted (*ibid.*). The implementation of the goals set forth in the PD and Busan is the Nay Pyi Taw (NPT) Accord and the NPT Accord Action Plan (*ibid.*).

The second level consists of meetings between FERD and DPWC every 2-6 months. The SWGs are intended to facilitate coordination efforts between different donors/implementing agencies active in one sector. They are designed to be a 'one-stop shop' for coordination and are split into 16 different sectors (Rieffel & Fox, 2013, p.23). The private sector is also invited to the SWGs in order to facilitate communication with businesses and society.

In addition to the national level structures, a Development Partners-only coordination structure. The Development Partners Group (DPG) meets every 6 months in order to share information on new and ongoing projects (MIMU 2015). The second level of the DP-only structure consists of the Development Partners Working Committee (DPWC). It consists of 9 actors and meets once a month (*ibid.*).

Data on these structures is extremely limited and does not elaborate how they function nor identify their active members. Additionally, research on the implementation of the Nap Pyi Taw Accord has not been conducted.

V. Methodology

The aim of this study is measure aid coordination through aid fragmentation and aid proliferation. The distribution of development projects across donors, sectors, and regions will be used as a proxy for development cooperation. A quantitative analysis of data extracted from the Mohinga database in the timeframe of January 2016-April 2017 will be conducted.

Firstly, a statistical overview of the data will be created. This will allow the observation of preliminary trends to be further examined in a second phase of analysis. Descriptive statistic will be used to summarize the 658 project entries. The distribution of bilateral and multilateral aid will provide a first indicator of aid coordination trends. The second step will entail an analysis of the sectorial distribution of donors to measure donor proliferation. The overlap and selectivity of the individual actors will be used as an indicator of aid coordination. Thirdly, an analysis will be made of how 'crowded' or 'deserted' sectors are. The number of actors in a sector will be used to measure aid fragmentation. Lastly, the regional distributions of aid will be examined to test whether the above findings are substantial.

Indicators

Bilateral versus Multilateral Aid

Shifts from bilateral to multilateral aid have been occurring in recent years (Klingegiebel 2014, p. 1). Bilateral aid is the more traditional form of aid and is still favoured by most donor nations due to its higher visibility and autonomy (ibid., p.24). Tied bilateral aid is still prevailing today due to its use as a tool for political influence in recipient countries (ibid.).

Bilateral donors tend to cause fragmentation resulting in higher aid unpredictability (Bacarreza et al. 2015, p.443). Kilby (2011) argues that fragmentation is a result of competition of donors. Donors prefer an international and diversified portfolio, resulting in smaller projects in many different regions and sectors (ibid.). Large numbers of donors and small projects erode administrative capacities in recipient countries (Knack and Rahman 2007, p.2)

Multilateral aid is considered a more modern and efficient approach to aid financing, since it is fuelled through specific institutions and therefore decreases transaction and administrative costs for recipient countries. Aldasoro et al. (2010) finds that the total share of multilateral aid has not increased since the 1970s (p.923). It is quite difficult to differentiate between bilateral and multilateral aid in practice (Klingegiebel 2014, p.21) today due to its intertwined nature. Much of aid is not 'genuinely' multilateral, but acts through multilateral channels to increase its legitimacy (ibid, 24). Many multilateral organizations have been unable to balance legitimacy with funding resulting in decreased multilateral aid flows (Kelegama 2012, p.23). Considering the importance of multilateral and bilateral for development effectiveness and decreases in donor proliferation and aid fragmentation is essential.

Aid Fragmentation

The term 'Aid Fragmentation' is commonly used in aid coordination literature to refer to the distance between donors active within a sector. Aid fragmentation is measured by the number of donors active in a sector or country. By measuring aid volumes and the number of actors within a sector, one can observe how 'crowded' or 'deserted' a specific sector is. When a sector has a large number of actors it is considered highly fragmented.

High level of aid fragmentation lead to collective action problems (Aldasoro et al. 2010, p.921; Bacarreza et al. 2015, p.944) and decrease the accountability of donors towards aid failures (Bacarreza et al. 2015, p.442). Additionally, high fragmentation can lead to difficulties in information gathering and distribution. The risks associated with deficits in information are duplicated projects, high transaction costs, or imbalances in sectorial aid allocation (ibid., p.922). Aid fragmentation is seen as a sign of inefficient development practices.

Donor Proliferation

Donor proliferation is the counter side to aid fragmentation. Donor proliferation reflects the distribution of a donor's development portfolio within a given country. It is measured by the amount of sectors a donor is active in. Aldasoro et al. (2010) study donor trends in regard to donor proliferation at the international level. When

analyzing sectors donors are active in, they find that almost all donors are active in all sectors (p.929). Donor proliferation decreases efficiency through higher transaction costs (Klingegebhel 2014, p.21). Rahman and Sawada (2013) use the term 'Aid Bombardment' instead of aid proliferation to exemplify how local governments can be overwhelmed by the aid volumes (p.609).

Aid fragmentation is in many cases used as a measurement of proliferators. Countries with the most aid fragmentation tend to receive aid from the strongest aid proliferators (ibid.). This finding connects the national with the international aspects of development culture. It identifies that countries that are considered proliferators internationally contribute to aid fragmentation on the national level.

Material

The Basis for the Analysis will consist of the data from Mohinga, the Myanmar Aid Information Management System. Since development aid is new to Myanmar, barely any studies have been conducted on donor coordination or the need thereof. The timeframe from January 2016-April 2017 was chosen in order to analyze development projects in the aftermath of the December 2015 General Elections in Myanmar.

Mohinga was developed in cooperation with the national government after experience sharing with other nations, such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, etc., (Open Government Guide 2016). When Mohinga was launched on February 7, 2015, it contained an estimated 80% of all official development assistance to Myanmar (ibid.). The Myanmar Government had recorded about 400 projects, which stand in large contrast to the 1300 entered into Mohinga before it's launching (ibid.). These numbers highly speak to the Myanmar Government being overwhelmed with the amount of aid. Aid coordination needs to be strengthened in order to ensure the Government has the capacity to create a national development plan as well as monitor existing and future development funding.

Mohinga displays quantitative project data on projects, including for instance implementing organization, donor, project sector and region, projects amount, project

partners in the Myanmar Government, etc. It is possible to download the information in an excel spreadsheet for further analysis.

The largest constraints of using Mohinga as a basis for analyzing the country's development flows is that the system relies on donors community input of data. Not all donor nations are reliable when inputting their project data. Especially in regard to disbursements, the database lacks sufficient information due to negligence of the donor community to input disbursements in a timely fashion.

Ethical considerations

It is important to consider that there are very many different ethical guidelines, which in many instances also contradict one another. Ethical dilemmas cannot always be predicted and therefore ethics must be understood as fluid guidelines that need to be reconsidered during the research process (EU Guidance Note 2010, p.7-8). Specifically, the researcher needs to re-examine his/her role during the entire process in order to make sure that borders are not overstepped.

Assumptions

The assumptions of this analysis are related to the costs associated with development projects. The term 'transaction cost' refers to any cost associated with making a transaction or participating in a market. Each aid activity entails some form of transaction cost from the commitment state to the end of implementation phase. These costs vary depending on the types of projects, financing mechanisms, and implementing agencies.

Transaction costs do not grow with the volume of aid since they are considered fixed costs of development projects. For instance, the overhead costs associated with office space or head offices outside of project regions are included in the transaction cost. For this reason, the transaction cost is relatively high the smaller the project or development portfolio is. Many other factors influence the relative weight of the transaction cost within a development project. From this we can conclude that higher absolute numbers of development aid are associated with higher transaction costs. These assumptions and conclusions are considered in the above-mentioned literature and form the basis of the discussion and research on donor proliferation and aid

fragmentation. Following from the above discussion, the preferred aid architecture is based on less projects and higher aid volume per project.

VI. Limitations

Before beginning the analysis it is important to discuss the limitations of this study and its application. The qualitative section reflects the theoretical discussion and previous research on donor coordination through the lense of donor proliferation and aid fragmentation. However, patterns in donor proliferation, aid fragmentation or volumes of aid should not be confused with aid effectiveness debates. Aid coordination contributes to aid effectiveness, but cannot be used as a measure thereof.

The quantitative data extracted from Mohinga is limited in different ways. Firstly, as mentioned above, project information is input by each reporting organization resulting in incomplete or inconsistent inputs. It is also highly possible that data is input incorrectly since there is no mechanism to verify inputs. In order to analyze the relationship between sectors, regions, and financiers all activities with one of these fields incomplete had to be deleted. The number of projects was reduced from 659 to 517 additionally increasing the uncertainty of the data.

It should be assumed that some donors are not included in Mohinga. For instance, the People's Republic of China does not appear to be entering their data into Mohinga since no project exists with Chinese funding. This could be explained through for instance a classification by the government of China in which funding going to Myanmar is not considered official development assistance. Many projects of other donors are also not entered into Mohinga for the same reason and therefore provide a limited picture of the actual development landscape in Myanmar.

In addition to the limitations of the input of the data, many problems arose when attempting to do a quantitative analysis. The form in which the data is downloaded makes it difficult to properly analyze it. For instance, in the section on project sectors and regions multiple options are put in one cell. This forces the analyst to do a preliminary combing and re-input of the data in order to enable an analysis. The results could create a slight distortion of sectorial and regional data.

Despite the limitations discussed in this section, the quantitative data provides a reliable basis for a study of this kind. The analysis will provide a general analysis of development patterns in Myanmar in order to assess the need for coordination. Slight discrepancies will not substantially alter the findings of this study.

VII. Significance

This analysis will depart from the previous literature in that it focuses on the recipient country level and will therefore provide a more in depth understanding of how donors act in a newly democratizing nation. Due to its recent economic and political opening, Myanmar has catapulted itself to the center of attention for development agencies and donors. For these reasons, among others, Myanmar has the potential to avoid mistakes made in the past and establish effective mechanisms to address aid cooperation, fragmentation, and proliferation that cater to local needs.

International development trends are usually a reaction to donor's interests. Unequal distributions of aid globally are a side-effect of self-interested aid. The academic debate on international development often mentions the concepts of 'Aid Darlings' and 'Aid Orphans' (Kelegama 2012, p.24). These terms are used to show to unequal distribution of aid allocation across the globe. They are systemic problems that arise when donors direct their development aid too strongly to one country versus another. Especially in the context of newly democratized nations, there tends to be substantial aid overshooting as donors adjust to the new political circumstances (Bacarreza et al. 2015, p.458). Overshooting occurs when donors commit more funding than was promised (ibid.). Myanmar, due to the recent changes, has the potential to become an aid darling if donors feel they receive something from sending aid to Myanmar.

Additionally, the current government is fairly inexperienced and has low administrative capacities to deal with national development as well as foreign aid. In this context it is especially important for the donor community to attempt to decrease the administrative burden of aid flows. The Myanmar government needs to be given time to create a national development plan, which can be used by the donor community as a guideline for their development initiatives. In order to empower local

governments and decrease the North-South divide it is essential for the donor community to effectively coordinate, not only with each other but also with the local government. These circumstances are not unique to the case of Myanmar and can be observed in other countries as well. This study will provide an analysis of aid coordination in Myanmar that will be indirectly applicable to other nations receiving high aid flows.

The product of this study will be targeted not only towards the academic community, but also apply the literary discourse to the context of Myanmar. An analysis of aid fragmentation and donor proliferation in Myanmar has so far not been published. Since this study analyzes the data currently entered in Mohinga it can be of substantial use for practitioners in the field of development in Myanmar, as well as the Myanmar government. The most fragmented sectors and largest proliferators will be identified across regions. The areas with the highest need for coordination will be identified and recommendations made for improvement of aid coordination.

This study will provide a limited basis for generalizations and application to other regions and countries. The results can, however, be used as an exploration for further national data analysis in Myanmar but also in other countries and regions.

VIII. Findings

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1

Number of Financers	47	Number of Regions	16
Number of Implementing	226	Sector Count	29
Number of New Projects	657		
Total Commitment (USD)	8,456,861,952		
Total Disbursement	1,865,187,346		

Before engaging with the analysis an introduction to the general characteristics of aid flows will be provided. The dataset provides many different categories to assess aid fragmentation. For this study, the category of 'Financers' has been chosen versus 'Implementing'. This decision has been made in order to find the closest source to funding. Additionally, implementing agencies are extremely varied in their mandates and functions. There are 226 active implementing agencies in Myanmar (see Table 1), of which 97.3% have less than 10 projects and 77.9% have less than 3 projects. This speaks for an extremely high degree of proliferation at the level of implementing agencies. Since most agencies are only implementing one or two projects, it is difficult to find substantial trends of fragmentation across donors. The degree of donor proliferation at the implementation level is interesting for a global study but not relevant for this study.

Table 2:

Range	Financers Count	Percentage
0-2 Projects	21	44.7
3-4 Projects	4	8.5
5-9 Projects	9	19.1
10-19 Projects	4	8.5
20-29 Projects	1	2.1
More than 29 Projects	8	17.0

The variable 'Financers' provides a more substantial basis from which to analyze aid fragmentation and donor proliferation. Most countries in Africa and Asia have 25-26 official donors, bilateral and multilateral (Bacarreza et al. 2015, p.443). Myanmar, in

contrast, has 47 official donors only in the timeframe examined. This high number speaks for Myanmar becoming an 'aid darling' since the elections in 2015.

Of the 47 donors, 20 can be counted as multilateral donors and 27 as bilateral donors. The average actor has 12.9 projects, with the highest number of projects being 73. This average is rather low showing a tendency to have few projects. 44.7% of donors have less than 3 projects further supporting this conclusion (see Table 2). Of the donors above the 75% percentile in project count, only three are multilateral institutions. This trend shows high amounts of projects by donor nations and lower numbers by multilateral institutions.

Regional Distribution

Table 3:

Region/State	Total	Percentage	Project per citizen
Bago Region	26	2.8	187207
Ayeyarwady Region	39	4.2	158585
Sagaing Region	34	3.7	156628
Shan State	46	5.0	126618
Mandalay Region	55	5.9	112104
Magway Region	35	3.8	111916
Yangon Region	70	7.6	105153
Tanintharyi Region	18	1.9	78245
Mon State	37	4.0	55524
Rakhine State	61	6.6	52276
Kayin State	31	3.3	50777
Naypyitaw	25	2.7	46410
Kachin State	44	4.7	38396
Chin Region	58	6.3	8255
Kayah State	41	4.4	6991
Nation-wide	307	33.1	167708

The regional distribution of projects is of significance when examining the relevance of aid fragmentation and donor proliferation, since it provides an additional variable against which to measure findings treated in the other two categories. It is, however, important to note that all embassies and development agencies are located in Yangon.

Due to the remoteness of many of the regions, most projects are coordinated from country offices in Yangon. Most institutions and implementing agencies do not have offices of significant size in the project region. For these reasons, coordination potential is not necessarily undermined if donors are active in different regions.

The variable 'Region' is divided into 15 regions and one category 'Nation-wide'. 'Nation-wide' has by far the highest number of projects with 307. This represents 33.1% of all entries. Yangon, as the largest city, has 7.6% of all projects. Rakhine State comes third with 6.6% of projects. When ranking the regions according to projects per citizen, Rakhine State, however, comes in 6th. Rakhine is located along the Western coast and is the second least developed region in Myanmar (Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development 2010). It is plagued by ethnic tensions, high unemployment, and high poverty. Many donors might be unwilling to implement projects in unstable regions. The distribution of aid in Rakhine is focused on the sectors of health, government, peace and conflict, and agriculture reflecting the most urgent needs of the region.

Kayah State, despite being among the smallest of Myanmar, has 4.4% of all projects, ranking 8th out of 16. When ranking the regions according to project per citizen Kayah State, however, has the lowest count of projects per citizen. The two regions with the largest number of projects per citizen are Bago and Ayeyarwady. That both these regions border Yangon Region might explain the proportionately high number of projects.

Kachin state ranks in 13th in number of projects per citizen and 7th in the ranking by count of projects. It is located in the mountains in the North of Myanmar. Large segments of the country are controlled by ethnic militia, who yearly earn billions of USD through the mining of jade and rubies among other natural resources (Htwe 2016). Kachin and Shan state are also the main producers of opium and other drugs. This is of significance since Myanmar is the second largest exporter of opium worldwide after Afghanistan (UNODC 2015). Shan State ranks 6th in project count and has the third largest number of projects per citizen. The largest sectors in Shan State are agriculture, health, and peace and conflict. These trends are more or less expected considering the priorities in these regions.

One more noteworthy trend is Sagaing Region having the third highest number of projects per citizen. Sagaing Region is located next to Kachin State in the North, bordering India. The region is very remote and lacks basic infrastructure and services.

The distribution of projects and sectors within the regions reflect the political, geographic, and socio-economic factors of the regions. One can conclude that in general the projects at least regionally address appropriate issues.

Ranking of Donors

Upon a first examination, it is difficult to differentiate which donors are the most active in Myanmar. Ranking the donors by number of projects, regions, sectors, or commitment results in quite different lists. For this analysis, donors have been split into the categories 'Countries' and 'Organizations' in order to differentiate between bilateral and multilateral aid. This has been done in order to reflect the above-discussed importance of incorporating more multilateral aid into country development portfolios.

Table 4:

Country	Number of Projects
Multiple Donors	73
Japan	71
Government of Germany	63
European Union	50
Government of Norway	47
United Kingdom	43
U.S. Agency for International Development	37
Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation	36
Asian Development Bank	22
Global Affairs Canada	19

The strongest trend, when examining the 'Countries' category, is Japan's position. Independent of the variable determining the ranking, commitment, project count, and sectors, Japan is always at the top of the list. One can therefore conclude that Japan must be the most active donor in Myanmar. The top 5 on each of the four lists contain: Japan, United Kingdom, U.S. Agency for International Development,

Government of Norway and Government of Germany. Only when ranking donors by commitment, Norway no longer falls in the top 5 showing a relatively smaller size of projects compared to the other large donors.

Before examining the ranking of 'Organizations', it is necessary to discuss one financing entity in the dataset. 'Multiple Donors' is used to refer to all projects that are either channelled through organizations or represent commitments by multiple donors to one project. Therefore, they can be used as a measure of the commitment of the donor community to providing aid through multilateral channels. In many instances commitments to multilateral organizations are also input individually with the organization specified under 'Implementing', resulting in duplication of the data. For this analysis, the project and sector counts are more important than portfolio and project volumes, decreasing the significance of duplication. 'Multiple Donors', despite its unbinding categorization, is at the top of all four rankings, with the exception of coming second to the European Union in amount of project regions.

Collaboration Type

As discussed above, multilateral collaborations are favoured over bilateral flows due to lower transaction costs associated with multilateral financing and implementation. High bilateral financing is a sign of donor proliferation and aid fragmentation due to the increased activity of actors within and across sectors.

Table 5:

Collaboration Type	Count	Percentage
Bilateral	375	66.6
Multilateral	188	33.4
Total	563	100.0

Collaborations nationally consist of 66.6% bilateral and 33.4% multilateral funding. This count excludes all projects that have empty cells in the 'Collaboration Type' column. This distribution reflects the average proportions of bilateral and multilateral aid of donor countries in their global portfolios. These numbers show that substantial interests exist for donor visibility in recipient countries. These vary depending on the donor, but include economic and political interests.

Table 6:

Country	Bilateral Count	Multilateral Count	Total Project
France	5	0	5
Korea	9	0	9
United Kingdom	33	1	34
Germany	42	2	44
Sweden	15	1	16
Switzerland	31	5	36
Norway	37	7	44
Canada	5	8	13

When examining the data according to donor nations, the nations with the highest percentage of bilateral aid in their development portfolios rank as follows: France, Korea, UK, Germany, and Sweden. First trends speak for these four nations as strong aid proliferators. By far the lowest percentage of bilateral aid is Canada with 38.5% bilateral aid in contrast to 84,1% by Norway, the second lowest rate.

From a preliminary examination of general data for Myanmar's development patterns, Canada and Finland show potential for being the lowest proliferators. They have the highest percentage of multilateral aid in their development portfolios with 62.5% and 61.5% respectively. The only other donor country with a higher percentage of multilateral aid flows than 20% is Italy, with 33.3%. Strong proliferators tend to have higher rates of bilateral aid and therefore cause high rates of aid fragmentation in the sectors they are active in. France, Korea, the UK, Germany and Sweden, based on the type of aid flows, appear to be the strongest proliferators. These nations will be specifically examined in regard to aid fragmentation and donor proliferation in order to establish if the preliminary conclusions are supported by further explorations.

Aid Type

The variable 'Collaboration Type' specifies the form of funding in practice. In order to gain a better overview, I have split the categories according to traditional development practices and what can be considered 'new' development practices. 'New' forms of development are categorized according to whether they can be understood as forms of multilateral funding. Traditional Development Practices tend to implement development projects through means that do not incorporate local populations or the local government. This means they do not empower the local governments or support the development and implementation of national development agendas.

Table 7:

Traditional Development Practice	'New' Development Practice
Project-type intervention	Budget Support
Core support to NGO, other private bodies, PPPs, and research institutes	Contribution to specific-purpose programmes and funds managed by international organisations (Multilateral, INGO)
Administrative costs	'Core contribution to Multilateral institutions
Other technical assistance	
Scholarship/training in donor country	

From the distribution of projects across these categories, 81.5% of projects are counted as traditional development practices and 18.5% can be counted as 'new' forms of development practices. This distribution shows a strong tendency of the donor community in Myanmar to implement projects directly instead of fuelling funds through multilateral bodies. These trends are usually a result of beliefs by the donors that the recipient country would not be able to effectively and efficiently use aid funds. Post-Development theory explains these trends through the North-South dichotomy that still today characterizes development practices and its perpetuated in our economic system.

Donor Proliferation

In this section Donor Proliferation will be analyzed by examining sector counts and overlap between donors. This measure will be used as a proxy of donor coordination. Multilateral institutions have been listed separately in order to reflect the difference between funding mechanisms. All countries with less than 5 projects have been

removed from the evaluation, in addition to all projects with empty cells in the columns 'Region', 'Sector', and 'Financing'. The tables provided in this section only contain actors selected from the analysis.

Table 8:

Countries	Project Count	Sector Count	Projects per Sector
Government of India	5	1	5.00
New Zealand Aid Program	9	2	4.50
Embassy of Sweden	16	5	4.00
Government of Germany	63	16	3.94
Government of Norway	47	18	2.61
Japan	77	20	3.85
Government of Italy	9	11	0.81
Government of France	5	4	1.25
Government of Finland	8	6	1.83

The average amount of projects lies at 11.86 with a standard deviation of 16.69. The skewedness of the data reflects the relatively low number of projects by most donors and a few donors with very high project counts. This trend is further supported by 50% of donors having between 1.5 and 13.75 projects. The data would be more heavily skewed if small actors had not already been removed.

The donors active in the most fields are Japan (23), Norway (19), and Germany (17). In order to compare countries with large differences in project numbers, the number of sectors needs to be put in relation to the amount of projects each nation is funding. For this reason, donor proliferation will be measured by project per sector rates instead of absolute sector count.

When examining the distribution of the project per sector ratio, 50% of donors have ratios between 2.1 and 3.92 (ref: Table 8). Actors in the 25th percentile can be regarded as aid proliferators since they have relatively low project per sector ratios compared to other actors in Myanmar. India and New Zealand have the best ratios. India has 5 projects, all of which are in the agricultural sector. New Zealand is only active in the sectors agriculture and education, and has 9 projects, giving a ratio of 4.5 projects per sector. The nations with the worst ratios are Italy, France, and Finland.

Each of the countries has about 1 project per sector and has between 5 and 9 projects. When examining the project data in detail, one finds that each project is active in a different sector. All three of them are in the lowest 25th percentile, therefore providing evidence towards acting on proliferation.

However, to ensure this conclusion is appropriate further explorations into other variables that could explain the discrepancy are necessary. Finland, in the above section, had low levels of proliferation due to the high percentage of multilateral aid, contradicting the project per sector count. Taking a closer look at the data input for Finland, one finds that of implementing organizations entered, four represent contributions to multilateral organizations such as the UNDP. One can conclude that as predicted in the above section, Finland is not a strong proliferator. It funds projects in many different sectors, yet these funds are fuelled through multilateral organizations and therefore Finland cannot be considered a high proliferator. The sectorial distribution shown in the calculations is therefore misleading, since it only reflects the variables chosen for this study. This is a good example of how incomplete input of data can result in misleading information.

There are two approaches that can be used to address nations/donors that send especially high percentages of aid flows through multilateral organizations. One could place them in a position of power in the aid coordination architecture as a 'good example'. On the other hand, one could also remove them from having a central role in aid coordination in order to reduce the number of donors active in the field. If extremely high percentages of aid

Table 9:

Agency	Project Count	Sector Count	Project per Sector
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	7	1	7.00
Multiple Donors	73	13	5.62
UNICEF Core Resources	8	2	4.00
European Union	50	15	3.33
Asian Development Bank	22	11	1.69
World Bank	8	10	0.89

The categorization 'Multiple Donors' is included in the calculations of donor agencies. It will be assumed that they are forms of collective financing of multilateral institutions. When examining the ratio of projects per sector the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and UNICEF prove to be the most selective in sectors since they are only active one and two sectors respectively. This is, however, not surprising considering the narrow mandate of the organization. They are good examples of best practice but not a very reliable benchmark to compare countries to due to the differences in mandate.

The worst proliferators at a first glance are the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with 9 and 13 sectors respectively. The WB has 0.8 projects per sector and the ADB has 1.6 projects per sector. The European Union, despite being active in the most sectors, has 3.33 projects per sector, which is an acceptable rate considering that it has 50 projects. The EU is right on the marker of the 25% percentile, which decreases the importance of the absolute sector count. Since the WB and ADB are in the 25th percentile it can be concluded that in relation to other actors, they can be considered proliferators. Since the EU is right on the marker of the 25th percentile, further analysis is necessary.

An interesting trend in ranking is that the WB and ADB have higher commitments than the European Union, but are outnumbered in number of projects, regions, and sectors. This indicates that projects by the EU tend to have smaller financial volume than those by the WB and the ADB. It shows discrepancies in multilateral institutions and allows for an evaluation of their development funds in relation to one another. From this section one could conclude that the EU is a relatively stronger proliferator than the ADB due to the smaller project sums and high number of sectors.

From the above analysis of the WB, ADB, and EU, it is not entirely clear which actors can be considered a proliferator. All three are active in a large number of sectors. Due to the higher aid volumes, multilateral organizations can successfully become lead donors in specific sectors. Sectorial overlap by these three donors occurs in the sectors Agriculture, Education, Government, and Rural Development. The EU is by far more active in the government sector than the ADB and the WB.

When comparing the two categories of donor nations and donor institutions it is significant that Japan, Norway, and Germany are active in more sectors than the EU and 'Multiple Donors'. This trend shows that Japan, Norway, and Germany tend to be strong proliferators of aid. It is noteworthy that they are also among the largest donors and for this reason active in more sectors. In the ranking of projects per sector they are above the 25th Percentile, meaning they are only moderate proliferators. Norway has about 1 project less per sector than Japan and Germany, but around 15-20 more projects. One can thus conclude that Norway is a stronger proliferator than Japan and Germany.

Aid Fragmentation

In this section, aid fragmentation will be analyzed by examining projects and actors per sector. It will also be assessed whether strong aid proliferators are active in fragmented sectors. All sectors with less than 6 actors have been removed since they are too small to provide reliable information.

Table 10:

Sector	Project Count	Actor Count	Project per Actor
Transportation	20	2	10.00
Peace and Conflict	70	7	10.00
Education	106	18	5.89
Health	110	19	5.79
Agriculture	60	21	2.86
Infrastructure	35	16	2.19
Rural Development	14	10	1.40
Forestry	6	5	1.20
Fishery	6	5	1.20

When examining the ratio of project per actor, 'Transportation' is the least fragmented sector with only two actors, Japan and the ADB. 'Peace and conflict' is the sector with the second highest rate of project per actor. It, however, has 70 projects, which adds up to 50 projects more than 'Transportation'. For this reason the actor per sector is most likely higher than if it was a smaller sector.

The sectors with the lowest project per actor rate are 'Fishery' and 'Forestry'. Each has 6 projects, 5 actors, and a project per actor ratio of 1.2. Almost every project in these

sectors is financed by a different donor. These are, however, rather small sectors that might have different sectorial fragmentation across regions. Both sectors are, however, in the 25th percentile, below 1.7 projects per actor, showing high tendencies of fragmentation. Neither has strong proliferators active in the sector. For this reason, it is essential to examine if regional differences exist.

'Rural Development', despite being a larger sector, has a project per actor ratio of 1.4. Since this value is also below the 25th percentile, one can conclude that 'Rural Development' is a fragmented field with substantial need for coordination. Since 'Rural Development' can occur anywhere in Myanmar and the sector is so highly fragmented, creating regional sector working groups would only hinder donor coordination. It is difficult to make recommendations for this sector since the degree of fragmentation is too high to come to any conclusions. The only possibility is for actors, with few projects, to leave the sector or send funding through other donors or multilateral organizations.

The 'Agriculture' and 'Infrastructure' sectors, despite being relatively large sectors seem to have modest rates of fragmentation. These trends could be explained by regional differences in actors and the sectorial fragmentation across regions.

To summarize the discussed trends, 'Transportation' is definitely the least fragmented sector due to the extremely low number of actors and 'Rural Development' appears to be the most highly fragmented sector due to the low project per actor rate. The 'Agriculture' sector will be further examined for regional discrepancies in order to assess the degree of fragmentation.

Regional Discrepancies

In this section, I will examine the sectors that appear to have the highest and lowest sectorial fragmentation to test whether the results differ when examined across regions.

Due to the unclear trends of the 'Agriculture' sector, a cross-regional analysis of sectorial fragmentation is necessary. Of the 21 actors with projects in the agricultural sector, the US is active in the most regions, followed by 'Multiple Donors', the ADB,

and Germany. All other donors are active in less than 5 regions and most of them in 3 or less. This speaks to an extremely high degree of fragmentation within the agricultural sector. Following up on the above analysis, it is clear that the agricultural sector is highly fragmented and in need of coordination by major actors.

When taking a closer look at the 'Rural Development Sector' across regions, the EU, ADB, and France are active in the largest number of regions. It is significant that the EU, ADB, and France show moderate to strong trends in proliferation and are active in one of the most fragmented sectors. The World Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development each only have one project, showing a high degree of fragmentation due to the large number of donors in the sector. The results speak to the WB being an aid proliferator in the agricultural sector. The ADB in contrast appears to be one of the strongest actors in the agriculture sector. Since the ADB is also active in many sectors, specializing on the agriculture sector and taking over the role of lead donor in this sector would provide a strong basis for effective aid coordination.

In the Education sector 'Multiple Donors', Japan, and Germany are active in the most regions. When only examining Shan State, one finds that Canada, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, and the US are financing projects in the Education sector. The need for coordination in this area is strong considering that Education is the third largest sector nationwide. Since Japan and Germany have the most regions and are among the largest donors in the sector it would be beneficial to create sectorial coordination surrounding these donors. Countries with small numbers of projects in this sector should consider redirecting aid through multilateral pathways. Considering the EU is active in 17 sectors nationwide, redirecting funds to other sectors would increase their aid efficiency as well as the ability of other donors to coordinate within the Education sector.

The sector 'Infrastructure' should be further examined since the project per actors rate, 2.2, is quite low considering the sector has 35 projects. When examining regional distribution, one finds that projects are distributed evenly on the national. Japan is, in number of projects and regions, by far the most active donor in the 'Infrastructure' sector.

IX. Summary of Findings

This section will summarize the above findings and elaborate their significance with the concepts of trusteeship and the critique of development made by Post-Development theory. Post-Development theory, as discussed earlier, calls for the empowerment of local populations. In the context of development coordination, Post-Development theory calls for donor coordination in order to adapt development projects to national development agendas in an effort to shift power away from donor nations towards local governments and populations.

Preliminary descriptive statistics found trends identified in the academic literature that speak for the need for increased coordination in Myanmar. 66.6% of aid flowing into Myanmar is bilateral aid and 81.5% of aid types are traditional development practices. The large share of bilateral aid speaks to unequal power relations in which donor nations impose their understanding of local needs on Myanmar through the implementation of development practices. This further entrenches the unequal power relations between the North and South. These distributions speak to a low degree of inclusion of the Myanmar government in development practices. Increased coordination can aid in increasing government capacities and political and economic self-determination.

The analysis in regard to donor proliferation found that most donors have few projects in many sectors. This speaks to low degrees of coordination as well as a development funding made randomly or based on political or economic interests. It was found that France, Italy, and the UK are the worst aid proliferators. Norway, Germany, and the US, who represent the largest donors, are simultaneously also moderate proliferators and set the stage for smaller actors in Myanmar. Too many sectors undermine the ability to coordinate as well as gain sector-specific knowledge. Despite the literature arguing that multilateral aid decreases donor proliferation and aid fragmentation, this study finds that the ADB, WB, and EU act as strong proliferators. They have substantial overlap in project sectors and regions.

In regard to aid fragmentation, it was found that the largest sectors are also the most fragmented with disproportionately high numbers of actors. 'Rural Development' is

the most fragmented sector and also contains modest to strong proliferators. This speaks to a relationship between strong proliferators and fragmented sectors. Those sectors with high degrees of fragmentation also contain the highest proliferators.

The two proxies, donor coordination and aid fragmentation, show that aid coordination needs to be improved in Myanmar. As predicted by Post-Development theory and the general donor coordination literature, unequal power relations still underpin development coordination in Myanmar. The trends identified in this study show donor's interests and clashing with donor coordination incentives. For this reason, commitments to increased donor coordination are necessary in order to decrease the administrative burden of development in Myanmar in addition to empowering the local government and population. The current development system in Myanmar is characterized by economic and political interests that perpetuate the North-South divide.

X. Conclusion

The ever-changing nature of the international development architecture forces donors and recipient countries to adapt to new circumstances. Since colonialism, trusteeship has imposed itself on developing countries through the guise of development. Post-Development theory draws attention to the deficits in our current global economic order and its implications for development. The North-South dichotomy is still integrated in development discourse as well as development practice. Unequal relationships still characterize the current development architecture and further strengthen the Post-Development critique of our current system

After its democratic election in 2015, all attention was paid to Myanmar to see how the new democratic government would deal with legacies of the former military government. Development aid was slow to enter Myanmar, but once it did, there was no stopping it. This study examined donor coordination in Myanmar through the lense of donor proliferation and aid fragmentation. Descriptive and analytical statistics were used to assess regional and sectorial trends in aid allocation. The analysis from Mohinga provides support for donor proliferation and aid fragmentation within the development sector in Myanmar. These two trends are signs of coordination deficits

and where used in this study as proxies for donor coordination. It can be concluded that there is definitely an urgent need for donor coordination in Myanmar, especially in the 'Agriculture', 'Infrastructure', 'Education', and 'Rural Development' sectors. Recommendations for the basis of an initiative to improve aid coordination in Myanmar were made on the basis of the analysis.

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