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Pulling up the drawbridge:
From Vote Leave to the Brexit White Paper

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Abstract

On 23th June 2016 the United Kingdom held a referendum on whether or not to leave the European Union. The results were 52% to 48% in favour of leaving. This was accomplished by Vote Leave, the designated campaign group in favour of leaving the European Union, convincing enough citizens to vote in their favour. This thesis examines how much of the Leave campaign's rhetoric has permeated the White Paper with regards to immigration which Prime Minister Theresa May has published as the basis of the Brexit negotiations. This has been done through the use of critical discourse analysis. The theory of Border Politics and David Harvey's matrix of time and space are utilised to gain a deeper understanding of the different strategies Vote Leave used to convince the British people to vote in favour of leaving. Due to this being such a historically defining moment in British and European history, and due to the amount of people who will be affected by this, Vote Leave's rhetoric has not had an overwhelming impact on Theresa May's White Paper.

Key Words: Brexit, United Kingdom, European Union, Vote Leave, Immigration, Border Politics

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Table of Content

List of Tables and Figures	v
Abbreviations	vi
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Brexit	3
1.2 Aim of Research	6
1.3 Delimitations	7
1.4 Disposition	7
2 Theoretical Research	9
2.1 Physical Bordering	11
2.2 Psychological Bordering	14
2.3 Social Bordering	16
3 Methodology	20
3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis	20
3.2 Vote Leave	23
3.3 White Paper	25
3.4 Additional Documents	27
3.5 Methodological Delimitations	27
4 Analysis & Discussion	28
4.1 Principle 4: Principle 4: Protecting our strong and historic ties with Ireland and maintaining the Common Travel Area	28
4.2 Principle 5: Controlling immigration	33
4.3 Principle 6: Securing rights for EU nationals in the UK, and UK nationals in the EU	41
4.4 Border Politics	46
5 Conclusion	51
5.1 Brexit Negotiations	53
6 Bibliography	55
Appendix 1: Vote Leave Publications	61
Appendix 2: Governmental Documents	64

Appendix 3: Laws65

List of Tables and Figures

Tables

Table 1: Likert matrix adapted from Harvey’s “Space as a Keyword” (2006:282)	11
Table 2: Vote Leave Immigration Statistics	37

Figures

Figure 1: How British Councils voted in the Brexit Referendum	5
Figure 2: EEA+ nationals by years since first arrival in the UK, Q1 2016	43

Abbreviations

CTA	Common Travel Area
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
EC	European Community
EEA	European Economic Area
EEA+	Combination of European Economic Area, European Free Trade Association and European Union nations
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
NHS	National Health Service
NI	Northern Ireland
ROI	Republic of Ireland
UK	United Kingdom
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party
USA	United States of America

1 Introduction

“The country has just taken part in a giant democratic exercise, perhaps the biggest in our history. Over 33 million people from England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar have all had their say... there are times when it is right to ask the people how we are governed, and that is what we have done. The British people have voted to leave the European Union and their will must be respected.”

David Cameron, 24th June 2016

On the 23rd June 2016, The United Kingdom (UK) and Gibraltar held a referendum on whether or not to stay in the European Union (EU). It was in the early hours of 24th June that it became clear that the UK had made its voice heard, and that the people wanted to leave the EU. The final result was an extremely close 51.9% Leave and 48.1% Remain, or a difference of 1.2 million votes (BBC, 2016a). Between the five main regions which took part in the vote, England and Wales had an overall majority to leave the EU – 53.4% and 52.5% respectively – (Ibid.), whereas Northern Ireland (NI), Scotland and Gibraltar voted to remain – 55.8%, 62.0% and 95.9% respectively (Ibid.). Although every council in Scotland and Gibraltar voted in a majority to remain, the larger cities in England, Wales and NI, such as London, Cardiff, Belfast, Manchester and Liverpool all voted to remain in the EU (Ibid.), this was not enough to keep the country in the EU. Directly after the vote was announced there was talk of NI joining the Republic of Ireland (ROI) which under the Belfast Agreement is a possibility, and Scotland holding a second independence referendum, thus hypothetically breaking up the UK (Aljazeera, 2016) into what would eventually be the United Kingdom of England and Wales.

The UK has always had a turbulent relationship with the European Project. They tried to join in 1961 and 1967 being vetoed both times by France’s President Charles De Gaulle. It was not until 1973 that they were formally accepted into the European Community (EC) (Heffernan, 1998:188). Even after they were finally accepted into the EC, they remained unsure about how this project was maturing,

and whether their membership within the EC, and the Common Market, was beneficial for the country. The referendum held in 2016, was not the first of its kind for the UK. On 5th June 1975 the country held a referendum on whether to stay in the EC, or leave merely two years after joining (United Kingdom Parliament, 2017). With a total of 67% of the voters voting to remain in the EC (BBC, 2008), it was clear that people wanted to be part of the Common Market. Throughout their time as a member state of the EU, they have refused to adopt the Euro, and did not partake in all the subsections which made up the Schengen Agreement – the most notable being the disappearance of border control when moving from one EU nation to another – (European Union, 2009).

The UK has always seen itself as different to the rest of Europe. They have not been successfully invaded for close to a millennium, they have historically been the most powerful country in the world, and at one point the UK was synonymous with the phrase “the empire on which the sun never sets” (Bartlett, 2004:72). The UK is seen to be the overall most influential country on the planet. It is possible to find British influence in every aspect of society. The *lingua franca* is English, some of the most notable scientists, authors and explorers have come from the British Isles, the Industrial Revolution (Anderson, 1991:81) and the way we live in modern society was started and established in the UK (Ibid.:155).

This huge amount of power and influence which the UK - or more specifically England - had still resonated in the British national identity, and its history is an integral part of what it means to be British. Due to this bullish personality Hooson (1994:20) argues that the British identity is the most powerful national identity on the planet, and Brits no longer feel British, they think British. Even as the nation was part of the European Project, it has always taken a step back from the other nations. One notable factor is that they are located on an island. When one talks about mainland Europe, the word which Brits use is ‘the continent’. Although geographically the UK is part of Europe, if a newspaper gave people the chance to win “flights to Europe”, people would automatically know it meant flights to the continent, (Ludlow, 2002:101) and not Londonderry or the Isle of Skye. As a nation, the Brits see themselves as something different, something more

than continental Europe. There is no clear answer to what makes them *more*, they just know their Britishness makes them feel somehow more superior, more advanced and more morally correct than others, and why wouldn't it? (MacShane, 2016). They have been brought up to think like this.

On 23rd June 2016, a referendum was held on whether the UK should remain in the EU or not. Although this referendum claimed to be about getting better Free Trade Deals around the world, and slowing down the rate of immigrants from the poorer EU nations migrating to the UK, this referendum was fundamentally about regaining the British identity which people felt they had lost (Wilkinson, 2016). This country thinks differently than other nations in the world, they see themselves as *the* country, and wanted to "Take Back Control" (Vote Leave, 2016). The official campaign to leave the EU was called Vote Leave, and throughout their campaign they explained with clarity and conviction why the UK would be safer, wealthier and more equal outside of the EU. They relied on the discourse that British people have about themselves, and utilised its history, global dominance, and uniqueness (Durkin, 2016) to convince the British people to vote to leave the EU. Although they were successful, their methods at some points were slightly questionable (Wilkinson, 2016), and seen as directly attacking the European project and everything it has done for peace, prosperity and unity within Europe and abroad over the past 60 years.

1.1 Brexit

The term Brexit comes from a portmanteau of the word British and Exit, and became the term used to describe Britain's withdrawal from the EU; by the media, officials and the general public. Brexit has always been in the woodworks for the UK, but it was not until the 2015 general election, where the Conservative government promised an in/out referendum by the end of 2017 (BBC, 2015a) in a ploy to attract United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) supporters. The Conservatives had lost seats in the 2014 European Elections to UKIP (Osborn et al., 2015), and needed to ensure the votes in order to stay in power in the general election the following year.

After the Conservatives won the election, opinions started to surface on whether the UK should remain in the EU or not. These voices soon came together to create various campaign groups. For the Leave side, Vote Leave and Leave.EU were the two main campaign groups, the former being lead by Labour and Conservative politicians and the latter by more nationalistic parties such as UKIP (Stone, 2016). Vote Leave was chosen by the Electoral Commission as the official campaign in favour of leaving the EU (Electoral Commission, 2016). Vote Leave was strategically chosen over Leave.EU which Nigel Farage was associated with (UKIP leader at the time) as it had the possibility of alienating the centre ground voters (BBC, 2016b), but most importantly did not represent as legitimate an image for a future Brexit (Electoral Commission, 2016). Vote Leave tried to push the economic benefits of leaving the EU, but somehow immigration would always get brought up in the debates, articles published and speeches that were held. It was an impossible factor to avoid, and ended up playing an extremely important role in the outcome of the referendum (Martinson, 2017).

The remain side consisted of one main campaign Britain Stronger in Europe which although not directly linked to David Cameron, was endorsed by him (Ibid.). Britain Stronger in Europe managed to get the nickname “Project Fear” relatively quickly after becoming the official campaign due to their tactics leaning on scaring people into voting Remain (Deacon, 2016). This was picked up by Vote Leave and was used against the Remain campaign to prove that they could not explain how the UK would be better off inside the EU, only that there would be serious ramifications on employment and that the citizens of the UK would be worse off.

In the early hours of the 24th June, two things happened; firstly, it became clear that the UK and Gibraltar had voted in favour of Brexit but secondly and more damagingly it became clear how truly divided the UK was on this vote. 51.9% voted to leave and 48.1% voted to remain (2016a).




Figure 1: How British Councils voted in the Brexit Referendum. (Daily Express, 2016)

Scotland, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar voted as a whole to remain in the EU, whereas Wales and England – the two more populated nations – voted in majority to leave. London, Manchester, Newcastle, Leeds and Bristol, some of the largest and most international cities in the UK voted to remain. Birmingham, the UK’s second city voted to leave by a mere 3,800 votes (BBC, 2016c). The outcome of this referendum, with the anomaly of Birmingham, exposed how multicultural cities filled with middle class Millennials were more likely to vote Remain. The Leave voters on the other hand seemed to be citizens who did not see the benefits immigration brought, not because they were out rightly xenophobic, but because they were rural inhabitants thus less exposed, from less developed cities (such as Hull or Bradford), so had more competition for the blue collar jobs, which in turn

meant they were usually less educated. 68% of Millennials voted to remain, whereas only 42% of those who were allowed to vote in the 1975 referendum voted to remain in the EU (BBC, 2016d). 28 out of the 30 councils with the fewest University graduates voted to leave the EU. The two areas which voted to remain were in Scotland (ibid.).

On the morning of 24th June, David Cameron, who had voted to remain, informed the nation that he would not be the right “Captain” to take the UK out of the EU. He stated that he would step down and a new leader of the Conservative Party would be elected before the Conservative Party Conference in October 2016 (Cameron, 2016). Theresa May – who also voted Remain – became the new Prime Minister of the UK on 13th July and became the leader who would take the UK out of the EU. She promised to enact Article 50 by the end of March 2017, a promise she kept by officially notifying the EU on 29th March of the UK’s plans to leave. On 2nd February 2017, the British government published the White Paper which would be used as the basis for their divorce negotiations. “The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union” (title of the White Paper) consists of 12 Principles which May deemed as both the most important and representative of how the UK can leave the EU in the most productive and beneficial manner. This paper includes ensuring free trade with the EU, protecting the Common Travel Act between the various nations in the British Isles and cooperating in the fight against crime and terrorism.

1.2 Aim of Research

The aim of this research is to gain a deeper understanding of whether or not Vote Leave, the official campaign for taking the UK out of the EU, managed to influence the White Paper produced and presented to the EU by Theresa May and her government on 29th March 2019. The research question proposed here is as follows: *How has the rhetoric from the Leave campaign permeated the White Paper?*

This question embodies whether Vote Leave were influential or not in ensuring what they campaigned for is represented in the White Paper. This will be done through conducting a critical discourse analysis of both the White Paper and

the documents published by Vote Leave to see if there is correlation or not between the documents. Although this analysis plays the major role in this research, analytical tools articulated by David Harvey's matrix of time and space and theories of Border Politics will be vital in order to gain a full and in depth understanding of this research question.

The point of interest stems from the contemporary relevance of the UK's journey out of the EU. As the White Paper – which was released in February 2017 - is integral to this research, it gives the possibility of starting a discussion about how this vitally important document was influenced by the Vote Leave campaign. Thus far there has not been any published research on the White Paper, but due to its relevance, in the coming future every inch of the document (and other aspects of Brexit) will be analysed by researchers aiming to understand the ramifications of Brexit and what it will mean for both the EU and the UK.

1.3 Delimitation

As the aim of this research is to understand whether Vote Leave's rhetoric managed to permeate the White Paper, this gives the possibility to look at 13 months of arguments of why Brexit is beneficial for the UK, in addition to a 77-page White Paper presented by Theresa May. It is possible to find aspects of society which will be affected by the UK leaving the EU in both documents. This includes trade agreements and immigration to health care and security issues. Due to the time and length given for this research paper, this has been whittled down to understanding the rhetoric about immigration presented in both groups of documents. Although immigration is only present in 3 of the principles, it plays one of the most important roles in these negotiations, and has been put at the forefront of the negotiations by both the UK and the EU.

1.4 Disposition

Following this introduction chapter where the blueprint of this research paper has been laid out and a brief history of Brexit has been given, chapter 2 will delve into the theory of Border Politics. The focus of this chapter is to gain an understanding

of how the different elements that constitute border politics play a role in how humans create borders between themselves and the Other. Within this chapter, David Harvey's matrix of time and space will be utilised to gain a deeper understanding on the three main border identities; physical, psychological and social. This will create the basis for a theoretical framework which will later be used in the analysis of the Vote Leave documents and the White Paper.

Chapter 3 presents the methodological framework which will be used in the analysis. Within this chapter, there will be an explanation why critical discourse analysis is being utilised in order to see how much of Vote Leave's rhetoric is present in the White Paper.

After an understanding of the theoretical and methodological frameworks have been established, the focus changes to the analysis of Vote Leave's rhetoric. Chapter 4 constitutes four sections. The first three are the Principles of the White Paper which are being used for the analysis and the last combines them with the theories found in chapter 2. This chapter will expose how much of Vote Leave's rhetoric is actually present within the White Paper.

Lastly, Chapter 5, the conclusion, will summarise the findings that have been discovered within this paper, alongside the possibility of further research if more research were to be done on this topic.

2 Theoretical Research

National borders are inherent to modern society (Vaughan-Williams, 2012:01), and can be identified as; physical, psychological and social. Borders function as barricades against “forces of disruption” and the “ravages of the exterior world” (Volk, 1995:52) which constitute anything from divisions along ethnic, racial and cultural lines to physical and geographical divisions created by seas and mountains. Borders come in many different forms, from the bark of a tree and the skin of a grape to the walls of Jericho and Troy, all trying to keep the unwanted living organisms out of their inner core (ibid.:53). Are borders a natural phenomenon or not? Biologically speaking, borders are intrinsic to the survival of living organisms, but in a socio-political sense are they as vital? National borders are a socially constructed, politically charged idea which are reconstructed by people accepting history and the status quo of their everyday lives (Vaughan-Williams, 2012:01). The different types of human made borders that exist throughout the world - although each having unique characteristics - are intertwined and have been constructed through fiction (McIver, 2003: 47), fantasies (Harvey, 1992:203), stories and national histories (Vaughan-Williams, 2012:08).

Space and time are basic categories of human existence, which are commonly taken for granted (Harvey, 1992:201). In modern society, many different aspects of time - from daily meals to birthdays - get grouped together in an effort to create a sense of security (ibid.:202). Space, like time, is not very contested and usually accepted as a natural phenomenon. Due to space being physically measurable it is generally accepted that we can talk about it objectively and even though through subjective imagination, fiction and the mental spaces and maps that are created, we know that they are merely personal imaginaries of the “real thing” (ibid.:203). In his work “Space as a Keyword”, Harvey constructs a Likert matrix (Harvey, 2006:282) which can give a deeper understanding to how time and space are experienced within the different lived realms of spatiality. Harvey himself claims this matrix is not definitive, but merely suggestive in the sense that it can easily be altered for varying situations (ibid.:281), and in the light of Brexit - and

the research being performed here -, it is possible to utilise this matrix to gain a more thorough understanding of how the politics of borders functions (see table 1).

Within the matrix there are three main categories from the first dimension: absolute space, relative space and relational space which are used to understand space and time (Harvey, 2009:134). Each of these can be affiliated with the three dominant border types: physical, psychological and social respectively. Along the columns of the matrix, Harvey uses three spatiotemporal spaces - argued for by Lefebvre - to show the fluidity of time-space which are necessary in order to grasp an understanding of the world around us (Ibid.:134). Material space (experienced space), representations of space (conceptualised space) and spaces of representation (lived space) are the three column headings, and albeit important in explaining the theory of border politics, upon looking at the Brexit White Paper - which will be discussed later - the links are not always as obvious. Although they are not explicitly obvious, ontologically speaking, to understand 'space', one must understand the different human practices which create the different conceptualizations of space and how they both affect one another and play a part in creating human society (Harvey, 2009:140).

Table 1. Likert matrix adapted from Harvey’s “Space as a Keyword” (2006:282)

	Material Space (Experienced Space)	Representations of Space (Conceptualised Space)	Spaces of Representation (Lived Space)
Absolute Space (Physical Bordering)	Newton’s theory of absolute space, Territorial border, Creates sense of security	Physical country uniquely located on a map	Physical geographic definition of ‘us’ and ‘them’, Foucault, Control/safety of citizens own lives
Relative Space (Psychological Bordering)	Circulation of people, ‘us’ and ‘them’, distance bordering	Einstein’s theory of relativity, Limology, biopolitics, power of historical events	Psychological geographic definition of ‘us’ and ‘them’, Islamophobia, Brexit, Foucault’s biopolitics, Machiavelli
Relational Space (Social Bordering)	Experiences and memories, conservation of culture	National memories – ‘us’ and ‘them’, Wendt, Leibniz, Creation of unity and loyalty	Politically shared memories, Commonwealth citizens

2.1 Physical Bordering

It is widely discussed that between Western States borders are becoming increasingly weakened, due to globalisation and the rate that the world is becoming interlinked through world trade, merging economies and increased levels of migration (Ganster and Lorey, 2004:xi). This idea is backed up by John Agnew who claimed that the modern geopolitical imaginary constitutes a “territorial trap underpinned by three problematic assumptions: that states have exclusive power within their territories as represented by the concept of sovereignty; that domestic and international spheres are distinct; and that the borders of the state define the

borders of the society so that the latter is constrained by the former” (Vaughan-Williams, 2012:14-15).

The traditional geographic discourse of bordering can be described in a rather facile manner in that the focus was merely on physical lines - may they be natural borders - and static outcomes from a political decision making process - such as the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 -. During the first half of the twentieth century this was as far as border politics went (Newman, 2006:175), and one could get away with saying that the border marked the end to one sovereign states power and the beginning of another (Vaughan-Williams, 2012:14). In today’s geopolitical society, the point of interest has moved further from the traditionalist viewpoint that power ends on the borderline and into one with a more complex understanding of where one power ends and the next begins (Newman, 2006: 175).

Sir Isaac Newton stated that absolute space was a fixed and immovable framework in which objects could be clearly identified. On a small scale, individual persons can be identified due to their unique location by definition as nothing else can physically be in that exact location at that time. Harvey has taken Newton’s work on absolute space from physics to geography in that a distinctive place can be identified by its unique location on a map - essentially a cadastral map - (Harvey, 2009:134) or an example of representations of space (from the second dimension). In order to understand absolute space, it is vital to look at the second dimension of Harvey’s matrix, and look at how this affects the world we live in. Foucault argues that a territory is created through power being exercised in a certain space, and that even though the majority of this power is located within a certain area – the nation state - it does expand past the physical boundaries of a country (Vaughan-Williams, 2012:81). This idea that sovereign power extends past the border relates to the conventional inside/outside model (ibid.:81) which is vital in studying borders, and transcends all three types of bordering practices that occur: physical, psychological and social. The inside/outside model - or us and them - gives citizens a sense of security that within their borders they are safe from the outsiders, and that they have control over their lived space (spaces of representation) however distinct or indistinct the physical border is. As much as this is true, the extremity of how

powerful a border is can often go unnoticed: two extreme examples are the Berlin Wall and the border between North and South Korea, where both historically and within current society, the border was a divide between two completely different societal regimes. In contrast to the aforementioned borders, there are an ever increasing amount of borders which contradict Newton's absolute space in that their power no longer ends at the border, but through supranational agreements technically flow beyond this line. Sovereign states have - to some extent - power which affect nations that are in different time zones or in different continents: The European Union, The East African Community or the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to name a few. Baudrillard, although not explicitly talking about borders, employs a geographical metaphor that continental plates never fit seamlessly together, but slip over one another in a way that somehow functions (Philo, 2000:230). This idea can be taken for sovereign power and how the power does not end dead on the border but in fact flows over into other nation states in many different ways, may it be the rejection or acceptance of a visa at an embassy or a physical passport check, hundreds of kilometres away from the actual country.

As Baudrillard stated, some postmodernists - Foucault included - have noted that due to the fluidity of modern sovereign power, states are no longer deemed timeless and finished forms of themselves (Sheehan, 2005:146). Foucault himself stated that we do not live in a void but that we live inside "a set of relations that delineates sites" (Philo, 2000:229). It is possible to make the link that Foucault is recognizing absolute space but also commenting on the fact that it is not a static unique space but more one that can spill over into other areas. Foucault and Baudrillard have raised valid points, that within modern society it is no longer possible to have a cut off line where sovereign power automatically ends - such as a national border - due to globalisation, migrant and information flows crossing borders with such ease. This being said, Harvey's absolute space is still valid within the realm of modern day border politics, as even though it is not as *absolute* as Newton's theory of absolute space, the ability that the 'border' created in the representations of space and spaces of representation (from the second dimension

of the matrix) is one which both physically and emotionally separates the ‘us’ from the ‘them’. This idea of ‘us’ and ‘them’ has become explicitly important within this decade, due to a change within the political narrative of bordering. Even though it is the psychological and the social aspects of border politics where this type of narrative is under the most scrutiny - and what will be discussed later in this research paper - both of those aspects would not be ‘protected’ without a heightened defence at the physical border of the nation.

2.2 Psychological Bordering

Psychological bordering plays a more complex role in the psyche of bordering. Within this context of bordering, it is more than just a physical geographical line which plays a role in the ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Hedetoft, 2003:202), instead it is a combination of history and geography which produces this psychologically constructed line (Harvey, 2009:135). Harvey claims that Einstein’s work on relativity is essential in creating relative space. “Space is relative in the double sense: that there are multiple geometries from which to choose and that the spatial frame depends crucially upon what it is that is being relativized and by whom” (Harvey, 2006:272). The explanation behind this statement is that many people can be in the same physical space at the same time - essentially representations of space - yet can have completely different imaginaries of their current space (Harvey, 2009:135) by choosing what is deemed important to that respective person.

It is important to touch upon the study of Limology in order to understand psychological bordering. Limology looks at more than just the physical borders between nations, instead it looks at the historical and social constructs created by those borders (Vaughan-Williams, 2012:40). John Agnew, who critiqued the traditionalist view of the physical border, undermines their viewpoint and claims that that mentality simply ignored the fluidity of borders throughout the course of history and how political geography is not objective (ibid.:42). The vitality of looking at history when studying borders - especially psychologically – are made evident when talking about the ‘us’ and the ‘them’. Most people have complex identities constructed from various ethnocultural groups: cultural, linguistic, and

religious (Kolossoff, 2006:12). A nation is seen to be weak if these varying ethnocultural groups do not come together and unite as one 'us' against the undesirable 'them'. This can be seen throughout history with the Nazis, the USSR, the Colonial Empires, or Israel and Palestine. It is also possible to see it in modern society, with the UK deciding to divorce itself from the EU, or the general rise in Islamophobia within Western society (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011:61). Borders are ever changing, and even if they do not physically change, the political psychology of borders can determine who is the 'us' and who is the 'them'. This protectionist stance is where nationalism is birthed from and what populist and right leaning politicians feel the need to infiltrate in order to get peoples to agree with their policies (which will be discussed in chapter 4).

Referring back to Harvey's matrix in relation to relative space, upon looking at the second dimension of material space, it is possible to see how psychological bordering takes place. Material space in this context can be seen as the circulation of people, information or even capital. As is deemed one of the most important aspects of border politics, the 'us' and 'them' falls right into place upon looking at the circulation of information and people. Traditionally a border is understood as a physical, manned frontier, where travellers go through a passport check to gain legitimate entry into a country (Vaughan-Williams, 2012:17), yet an ever increasing amount of countries are changing the location of their borders in a feat to 'protect' their nations from unwanted people (from hereon called distance bordering). Examples of this are the UK, with passport checks in two locations in Belgium, two in the Netherlands, and seven in Northern France (ibid.:19). The United States of America (USA), which has two border controls in Ireland and one in the United Arab Emirates, and Sweden which technically had one at Copenhagen Kastrup Airport. Through new technologies the first line of defence has moved away from these respective countries actual borders, and have hypothetically made people feel more secure within their national boundaries, or at least that is the aim.

Spaces of representation in coordination with relative space, allow for Foucauldian discourse to become relevant through the use of biopolitics (ibid.:79, Senellart, 2008:21). Foucault describes biopolitics as the use of biological features

to target political strategy. Further developing on his notion of biopolitics, he uses elements from Machiavelli's sixteenth century work which focuses on *sûreté* (safety) of the Prince and his territory (Peters, 2006:166) but instead looks at *sécurité* (security) of the population, and those who govern it (Vaughan-Williams, 2012:80). His alteration comes from the rise and development of the modern political rationale, and the fact that states are seen as a population of co-existing beings who share a similar history and can only prosper as well as their nation does (Peters, 2006:167). The need to protect oneself and enable one's nation to prosper locks seamlessly into psychological bordering, through keeping the 'them' out from the national border. Relating back to Harvey's spaces of representation, Foucault's biopolitics is a way that a nation's citizens may feel less anxiety and thus put more trust in their government in knowing that there is *sécurité* of the population.

Through applying Einstein's theory of relativity, when explaining representations of space, biopolitics and distance bordering are both important aspects to understanding how they play a role in border politics. Foucault's unravelling of space and place, and how they are affected by various events, histories, and people (Philo, 2000:221), allows for relative space to be conceptualized and essentially edited to work in favour of the nations, political parties or whoever needs to show they can protect their citizens. The way that this is conceptualized is relatively subjective, as only the factors that are deemed necessary to scare or comfort citizens within - or outside - the borders are utilised (this will be thoroughly analysed later in chapter 4). Using the UK as an example they have managed to comfort their citizens by having their borders spread out throughout mainland Europe - distance bordering -, and have rigorous passport and visa checks, thus ensuring no unwanted 'others' are let onto the island (biopolitics).

2.3 Social Bordering

Gaston Bachelard (1964:06) wrote "all really inhabited space bears the essence of the notion of home." In order to create a place - or in this context a nation - one must have a history, its people must have memories, and must take part in cultural practices and social relations. To be successful in this feat, individuals must come

together as a collective entity and endorse the space's narrative and accept it as their own (Harvey, 2009:177-179). Combining Bachelard's idea of home and Harvey's description of a space is how a nation - or one's homeland - is formed. Social bordering practices are yet another way to distinguish the 'us' from the 'them' (Castles and Davidson, 2000:45).

Relational space signifies how space and time co-constitute each other in a similar way to how people's memories and dream get fused together (Harvey, 2009:137). Due to relational space being more philosophical, space and time cannot be so simply separated. In accordance with material space, spaces (or events such as social interactions) are created through constantly flowing experiences, and unlike in absolute space do not remain constant and the same in that exact place, but instead they form a memory which, although it cannot be recreated, due to its fluidity create a history or a memory which is specific to that space (or event) (ibid.:140). This concept is utilised by politicians through the creation of collective memories, in which they connect historical happenings in an attempt to conserve the essentials of culture and identity that create a nation (ibid.:178). Upon combining relational space with both representations of space and spaces of representation against the backdrop of an individual's experienced space (material space), it is possible to make it seem more drastic and important. A nation's collective memories cannot, by this definition, be shared easily with the 'other', as they do not have the situated experience that someone from within the nation does. Alexander Wendt uses this argument to state that borders are merely social constructions of a territory (Vaughan-Williams, 2012:46), and through this, state identities can not only be learned but also have an effect on how the 'us' treats the 'them'. Malcolm Anderson, although not agreeing fully with Wendt, has similar thoughts on this process. He notes that social Othering, which is created by those in power, was present before the modern construction of a nation, and will be vital for the survival of societies after the demise of the modern state (ibid.:48).

Relational space is a more abstract concept than absolute and relative space, and as argued by Leibniz, claims that processes do not occur *in* space, but are constructions of space (Harvey, 2006:273). Relationality allows for people to deal

with circumstances in a more situated manner - which Du Bois calls ‘double consciousness’¹ - (ibid.:277). This is truly where many aspects of contemporary politics come into play. Through spaces of representation it is possible to see how politicians claim that through their governance, their country will prosper the most. They rely on shared memories (Jacobs and Van Assche, 2014:189), fantasies and fears of substantial populations who do not have face-to-face contact with one another to condone what they are being told about their nation in a way that it will make them feel that together they can set themselves apart from the rest of the world (Scholte, 2005:227). This becomes more complicated when taking into account double consciousness, especially within modern political discourse.

Take the Brexit vote for example: A Cypriot woman living in Manchester for a year was eligible to vote. For her to be able to cast her vote, she must take into account the fact she is currently a national of both a Commonwealth nation and an EU nation living in another EU country. She will most likely reflect on other consciousness’s such as her nation’s historical ties to the British Empire, and that she is an immigrant in the UK, yet has the right to reside there at the moment due to both nations being in the EU and she has the right to vote on a matter which a Brit who has lived in Cyprus for 15 years does not have. Although this example is one which drifts into the realm of representations of space, her lived experiences - spaces of representation - will play a vital role in her decision. Does she vote to remain, and draw the line of ‘us’ as EU citizens, thus having a collective identity as a united Europe and ‘them’ as the rest of the world? If she envisages the UK out of the EU, and voted Leave, does it mean that through the historical ties of her nation to Britain she sees the Commonwealth as the ‘us’ and the EU – alongside the rest of the world – as the ‘them’? It is difficult to know, but through time and space, this is where the theories Newton and Leibniz differ so drastically.

Elements from material space and spaces of representation transcend representations of space through applying the process that takes part when one’s memory and history is put into question. Internal political power relies on the unity

¹ The ability for a person to situate themselves within normative society, yet at the same time within one’s own subordinated group (Bruce and Dickson, 1992:302).

and loyalty of people geographically dispersed throughout the nation (Hechter, 2000:60). Culture and unity - through history and memory - is created through conceptualizations and representations that can convey one's lived experience to others (Harvey, 2009:143). This is done as we seek for accurate reflections on realities that surround us as they constitute the way we live our lives (Harvey, 2006:279). According to John Williams, state borders are ubiquitous due to them being a necessary facet of human existence (Vaughan-Williams, 2012:49) in that they create 'fences' between neighbours who have different histories and memories and allows for their differences to be tolerated by one another.

In order to understand physical, psychological and social bordering, it is important to take in the various aspects of space (and time) as they are not solely absolute, relative or relational. Varying situations make for different elements of space to be taken into account (Harvey, 2006:275). With regards to political bordering, Harvey's matrix of space is key to explaining the varying elements of border types which are present within modern society. What does a border mean to an Albanian or a Zambian? How do the different concepts of space define the spaces they experience, live or conceptualise? Or in a more contextual sense, how have these different elements of border politics played a role in why people voted the way they did in the Brexit referendum on 23rd June 2016 or how the White Paper was influenced?

3 Methodology

In order to understand how the rhetoric from the Leave campaign has permeated the White Paper, it is important to utilise various methods to help answer said research question. Within this specific research paper, critical discourse analysis will be used as the main method due to this being an analysis of the British government's White Paper "The United Kingdom's exit from and new partnership with the European Union". This will be done through the use of different channels use by Vote Leave. Within the White Paper, there are twelve principles which form the official White Paper ranging from ensuring trade with European markets and controlling immigration to the expected - and hoped - delivery of a smooth, orderly exit from the EU.

3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

The reason for this research is to see how influential the official Leave campaign was in ensuring their policy changes were implemented when the UK left the EU. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) has been chosen as the most suitable method to investigate this due to the need to analyse many varying types of political documents. The reasoning behind this is due to the analysis consisting of examining the rhetoric of the Leave campaign, and the White paper, thus investigating the use of language as a form of societal power relation (Fairclough, 2010:87). No other method is as useful as this one in completing this task. As stated above, the White Paper will be used as the base document to be analysed, but in order to grasp a greater understanding of it, documents from the Leave campaign must first be analysed and understood.

The documents which will be used from the official Leave campaign will consist of written, oral and audio visual texts. Throughout the run up to the referendum, speeches and debates were held, newspaper articles and press releases were published and documentaries aired in order to inform the nation as to why British citizens should vote 'Leave' on 23rd June. This large amount of information was released through various different media channels in order to get the same

information out to everyone from the Silent Generation to the Millennials. The Leave campaign utilised the full span of modern media to get their information out in the right form of media to target the whole population in a way that they would listen. This method, although used by almost every political organisation in modern society, creates an interesting basis for analysis as information which would be presented to a young adult would most likely not be utilised in the same way as it would for a recent retiree (Jones, 2012:48). The way media (and information) is contextualised in an era where almost all questions can be answered at the click of a button has meant that the same piece of information has to be handled in varying ways in order for the information to be absorbed by the diverse range of citizens that were eligible to vote.

As written, oral and audio visual texts will be analysed from the official Leave campaign, the sources will come from their website www.voteleavetakecontrol.org, clips uploaded onto YouTube, Newspaper articles, tweets and documentaries which were aired on television in 2015 and 2016. Even though the UK has voted to leave the EU, there is still new information being released from those who voted and campaigned to leave (and stay) on topics relating to what would happen once Article 50 was triggered, or once the country officially leaves the EU (in 2019). For the sake of this research a cut of date has been chosen. The texts which will be analysed will span from 7th May 2015 until 23rd June 2016. These dates have been chosen as on 7th May the Conservative party won the general election, and one of their manifesto commitments was to hold a renegotiation of Britain's membership within the EU, thus upon their victory, voices from both sides started to appear. June 23rd 2016 has been chosen as the cut-off date as it is the date the referendum was held, thus the last day which people could change their opinion on the matter, and the final day where the Leave and Remain campaigns could truly convince people to vote in favour of their opinions.

The White Paper was released on 2nd February 2017, consisting of twelve principles which would successfully take the UK out of the EU. Even though there is a gap of over seven months between the referendum and the release of the White Paper, texts between these two dates will not be analysed as even though there may

be information which has shaped the White Paper, it was information which was not given to the public prior to the referendum. The reason for this is due to the point of interest stemming from exploring how much of the Leave campaigns rhetoric prior to the referendum is present in the White Paper, essentially, looking at how much of what the Leave campaign stated would happen if the people voted to leave the EU

Through the use of CDA, it becomes possible to see how, and if, Vote Leave managed to represent a reality for post Brexit Britain. CDA is based upon a view that semiosis² is an irreducible part of social processes (Fairclough, 2001:123). Semiosis is part of social activity helping to create the way social life is produced (ibid.:123) which in turn creates the possibility for it to be analysed. CDA includes the critique of particular aspects of social life, and in the case of this paper, the critique - and analysis - of the Leave campaigns rhetoric. The type of CDA that will be enforced here will be normative CDA. Normative CDA is seen to evaluate “social realities against the standards of values taken as necessary to a ‘good society’” (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012:79). Although it is reasonable to discuss what a ‘good society’ is, in the case of politics, and this specific referendum it is possible to say that for Vote Leave a ‘good society’ constituted a society outside of the EU.

The use of normative CDA allows for the critiquing of unequal relations of power and forms of domination which are detrimental to the well being of society (ibid.:79). One aspect of normative CDA which plays an integral part in this method of critique is the use of manipulative language. Manipulative language is essential within politics, if you are to persuade citizens to vote one way rather than the other (Strauss and Feiz, 2014:322) and as van Eemeren (2005:xii) argues, manipulation can intentionally deceive one’s addressees by persuading them of one’s own interests in a covert manner which is in disagreement to critical standards of reasonableness. Through the use of CDA, it will become clear as to whether the motif found throughout the Leave campaign was one of trying to create a ‘good

² Semiosis is defined as “the production of signs [and meaning] through visual signs, body language as well as spoken [and written] language” (Fairclough, 2001:121).

society’, thus it will be possible to find links between their campaign and the White Paper. In contrast to this, if there is no clear link between the Leave Campaign’s rhetoric and the White Paper, by utilizing CDA, it will be possible to form an argument that their campaign was more of a manipulative one, and that a small group of elites convincingly managed to make British citizens vote for a type of Britain which in reality - through the current government - cannot exist.

The discourse analysis of the Leave campaigns documents will consist of qualitative analysis alongside a minor content analysis. Although the qualitative research will carry more weight in the analysis, the content analysis will also be important in order to grasp a deeper understanding of how much of the rhetoric from Vote Leave is actually present in the White Paper. Qualitatively speaking, texts will be analysed through looking at which themes were spoken about and within the ‘movement and security of people’ discourse that is being researched here, and what received more emphasis, especially when looking at the most ‘important’ reasons to vote Leave. Even though the research will not be conducted using a mixed methods approach, the quantitative research will be done through looking at how often certain specific themes with regards to the ‘movement and security of people’ come up, and see if the fact that they came up often meant they were put into the White Paper, or not.

3.2 Vote Leave

On 13th April 2016, Vote Leave was officially recognised as the campaign in favour of leaving the EU (Stone, 2016). Although it was not officially recognised until then, it was established in October 2015 consisting mainly of UKIP, Conservative and Labour members (BBC, 2015b) and was persuading citizens and producing arguments on why Britain was better, safer, stronger and wealthier outside of the EU long before they became the ‘official’ opposition campaign. The reason for mentioning this is due to the fact that they were a constant presence before they became official, and a substantial amount of information would be left unanalysed if the texts prior to April 2016 were to be ignored as Vote Leave had not been recognised as the legitimate exit campaign. The ability to use documents

and texts from a span of 13 months will help construct the jigsaw of rhetoric needed to understand how the Leave campaign permeated the White Paper.

Throughout the 13 month long campaign to leave the EU, Vote Leave used many different tactics to enable themselves to be heard by everyone on the British Isles - and to some extent those eligible to vote residing abroad - through bus tours, public speeches, newspaper articles, magazines articles, pamphlets posted through the front door and the power of word of mouth. As has been written, the different methods that were utilised were done in order to grasp the attention of everyone regardless of age or class.

The use of newspapers (both printed and online) was vital for Vote Leave, as it was the easiest way for their information to be released to the working population, thus the voting population. Throughout the campaign, many members of Parliament, and important figures of Vote Leave expressed their opinion through writing articles for various newspapers. Examples of this can be seen through Boris Johnson's - former Mayor of London, current Foreign Secretary and key figurehead of Vote Leave - constant presence in supporting Brexit in newspapers such as the Daily Telegraph. The importance of analysing texts from various newspapers, especially newspapers which openly supported Britain leaving the EU, such as the Daily Mail, the Sun and the Daily Telegraph (Ridley, 2016) allows for a more in-depth and critical analysis of the Leave campaign's rhetoric. Although the newspapers which openly supported Brexit, and share many of the same political views, have target audiences which vary quite drastically thus the language used to present the facts has been altered to become relevant to their respective readers.

Noam Chomsky (1975:37) states that language is the creator of culture, and within politics (among other things) it is the only way we can unite communities through transmitting one's knowledge to a larger group. This helps create a schema of knowledge and subconsciously rules the way we live our lives (Hyland, 2005:114) - or in the case of Brexit, the way people voted -. Culture is an ambiguous term with varying definitions (ibid.:114), but in this context it is not being used in the way that the different people who Vote Leave were targeting were from different cultures, as the majority were British citizens living in the UK, but instead

the word is used to describe people from different ‘cultural classes’. Although the Daily Mail and the Daily Telegraph will be using the same facts to convince people to vote Leave, the language used will range from dramatic fear mongering to eloquently structured arguments respectively.

Despite newspapers being available for all to read, speeches, documentaries and internet snippets are more likely to be accessed by people from different groups throughout the nation due to the information being broadcast on television, in public and through the internet. Analysing the discourse of the speeches made by key figureheads and the language used within documentaries such as *Brexit: The Movie* will open up a discussion to see how information was passed on successfully to the general public in an easily digestible format. The difference between newspapers, videos and speeches is that one is written and one is spoken and although they will be producing the same information, the use of *Langue* (written) and *Parole* (spoken) language will vary in the mind of the people receiving the information (Evans, 2015:20). *Parole* language is seen by Saussure as having a more unique and intrinsic connection to the mind - and people’s opinions - than written language through seeing the speaker - or knowing the identity of the speaker -, their specific voice, tone and ability to articulate properly when speaking (ibid.:20).

3.3 White Paper

As aforementioned the White Paper was released seven months after the referendum, during this time many scenarios were hypothesised in relation to what would happen (if and) when the UK decided to leave the EU. There was much talk about whether a Hard Brexit or a Soft Brexit would happen, or whether a ‘good deal’ would be made with the EU (Asthana et al., 2017). One example being ensuring the right of EU citizens already residing in the UK prior to the referendum, and British citizens living on the continent. Although before the White Paper was released, it was merely journalists, researchers and citizens speculating the different outcomes with them all voicing their opinion for what they thought benefited the nation - and themselves - the best. Upon the release of the White Paper in February 2017, a more concrete and detailed - yet upon a first glance slightly ambiguous -

plan was released on how the different laws and elements of EU society would be removed and restructured in post Brexit Britain.

Although all twelve principles presented in the White Paper will affect British society in ways which (at the moment) no one can be sure about. The UK is the first nation who have voted to leave this union which they incorporated themselves so deeply into. In order to understand what is being researched here the analysis of the White Paper, will entail focusing on three of the twelve principles:

- **Principle 4:** Protecting our strong and historic ties with Ireland and maintaining the Common Travel Area (including Annex B: UK/Ireland)
- **Principle 5:** Controlling immigration
- **Principle 6:** Securing rights for EU nationals in the UK and UK nationals in the EU

These three principles have been chosen as they best reflect the concept of Border Politics and - as will be discussed later - look at how through leaving the EU, Britain's physical, psychological and social borders will change.

Principle 4, 5 and 6 all focus on the movement and security of people, which in today's political discourse are unavoidable topics. In an ever globalising world, the movement of people has become an inevitable element of global society, which has naturally meant that people from varying corners of the globe with different religions, skin colours, cultural customs and values are being thrust together in a way which - although it has occurred throughout the history of the human race - has never been this intense. This has played on the minds of the Conservative government (Brown, 2016), as they understand that in modern society no nation can truly survive without both immigration and emigration – despite there being a trend to brand migrants as benefit leeches - and as a nation they do not want to be perceived as racist, xenophobic or anti-immigration.

3.4 Additional Documents

In addition to the White Paper, various EU laws and official statistics mentioned in the White Paper will be utilised to strengthen the following discussion alongside the official letter sent to President Donald Tusk from Theresa May on 29th March 2017 informing him that the UK would be leaving the EU.

3.5 Methodological Limitations

The research done in this thesis is limited to documents which have been published by Vote Leave. Although campaign groups such as Leave.EU, Grassroots Out or Labour Out were also a constant presence and may have influenced how UK citizens voted or what content is found in the White Paper, they were not chosen as the official campaign in favour of Brexit, thus their opinions, comments or statements have not been used in this research.

As critical discourse analysis has been chosen as the analytical method used to answer the research question, it must be stated that this is an interpretive approach, which per definition can not be objective. The information presented here, and the way this thesis is constructed, is done in a way that fits with myself as a researcher. Being a British National and a long term immigrant of various EU nations and a citizen whom was not allowed to vote in this referendum - but would have been a hypothetical 'Remainer' – will definitely play a role in how this information is analysed. The main aim is to look at the Vote Leave's rhetoric in the White paper, and that will be done, but the way it is analysed may be perceived differently by someone who falls on a different end of the political spectrum, or by a person who was in favour of Brexit.

Even though there were 12 Principles presented in the White Paper, only the Principles focusing on immigration have been chosen for this analysis. They have been chosen due to the length and time given for this thesis, and if other Principles had been chosen and analysed, a different outcome may have appeared on the influence Vote Leave had on the White Paper. This has been noted, but due to the point of interest being immigration, this is what will be the focus of this research.

4 Analysis & Discussion

The aim of this research is to analyse whether the Vote Leave campaign has managed to portray truths about what the UK would be like if the British people voted Leave on 23rd June 2016. More specifically, this thesis aims to answer the research question: How has the rhetoric from the Leave campaign permeated the White Paper? This analysis is not an attempt to brand Vote Leave as a bigoted anti-EU campaign who managed to convince just over 50% of the UK to vote to leave the EU through the use of lies and deception. Instead, it is an attempt to understand whether what Vote Leave deemed important information to share with the British public in the run up to this referendum has managed to filter into the White Paper of the current Conservative government. It is about fathoming what Theresa May – who voted Remain in this referendum – and her government deemed as important to consider in this monumentally difficult and historically defining task of leaving the EU.

The analysis is divided into four sections. The first three sections look at the three Principles presented in the White Paper that are directly related to immigration – Principle 4, 5 and 6 – and how Vote Leave’s rhetoric has been implemented within these chapters. The last section of this analysis examines the three Principles together through the lens of Border Politics in order to gain a deeper understanding of how Vote Leave’s rhetoric which is present in the White Paper is due to the different types of border practices.

4.1 Principle 4: Protecting our strong and historic ties with Ireland and maintaining the Common Travel Area.

The UK’s only land border is shared with the Republic of Ireland (ROI), a nation which has close ties to the UK, historically, economically and culturally. Although the two nations have over the past century had a turbulent relationship, from the 1916 Easter Rising to the Northern Ireland Conflict (1966-1998) they have in the 21st century managed to create peace.

The Common Travel Area (CTA) is a special travel zone created in 1923, which allows for the free movement of people between the UK, Ireland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. The CTA was a well established agreement between the different nations in the British Isles, long before they joined the European Economic Community on 1st January 1973. The CTA has been given special privileges in Protocol 20 of the EU Treaties³, where the UK and Ireland may continue to make arrangements between themselves relating to the movement of people within the CTA.

Throughout the run up to the referendum, there was not much evidence of Vote Leave speculating on what will happen to the CTA with regards to the movement, ability to reside and employment prospects post Brexit. The first time it was mentioned was in a retweet from the Northern Ireland (NI) Vote Leave twitter account posted on 24th May 2016⁴:

“Passed from a non-EU country (Switzerland) into an EU country
France without immigration controls or passport check.”

This tweet although not explicitly mentioning the CTA, was retweeted in order to prove a point that it is possible to cross borders from EU nations to non-EU nations. The metaphor of the border between France and Switzerland being synonymous with what the border between NI and ROI will look like post Brexit – in that it will remain open – ignores the fact that Switzerland and France have both signed the Schengen Agreement, whereas the UK and ROI have not, thus the circumstances may be different. Even though the CTA allows for passport free crossing at the border, it is not unrealistic that if May pushed for a Hard Brexit, border checks would reappear between the ROI and the UK.

On June 1st 2016 the Leave campaign mentioned how people would be affected along this historically important and contested border. In a statement⁵ made

³ Protocol (No 20) on the Application of Certain Aspects of Article 26 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to the United Kingdom and to Ireland of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47

⁴ <https://twitter.com/WestminsterDUP/status/735054281364115461>

⁵ Restoring public trust in immigration policy - a points-based non-discriminatory immigration system (Statement, 2016)

by Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Priti Patel and Gisela Stuart, they verbally informed the public what would happen to the CTA post Brexit:

“First, there will be no change for Irish citizens. The right of Irish citizens to enter, reside and work in the UK is already enshrined in our law. This will be entirely unaffected by a vote to leave on 23 June.”

“As the Northern Ireland Secretary has made clear, the common travel area that has existed since the creation of an independent Irish state will not be affected. There will be no change to the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic.”

This idea that the CTA would be left unaffected was later ratified by Better Off Out⁶ a sub-campaign for Vote Leave who were aiming their campaign at Irish voters living in the UK:

“The long-established Anglo-Irish Common Travel Area, which goes back to 1923, is a matter exclusively for the British and Irish governments and is not an EU matter. Irish people will continue to move freely between the two islands and across the North-South border inside Ireland as they have always done... Claims that a Leave vote would endanger the Northern Ireland peace process are wholly unfounded. This is part of “Project Fear”.”

This remark creates the idea – within Social Bordering - that the CTA is the ‘us’ and the EU is the ‘them’, and that the EU will have no say in how this historical agreement is handled.

For Theresa May’s government, upon the release of the White Paper, it was clear to see her passion to keep the CTA alive, and functioning as smoothly as possible:

⁶<http://www.betteroffout.net/10-reasons-that-irish-people-in-britain-and-northern-ireland-should-vote-to-leave-the-eu/>

“We aim to have a seamless and frictionless a border as possible between Northern Ireland and Ireland”

“We want to protect the ability to move freely between the UK and Ireland... to deliver a practical solution that allows for the maintenance of the CTA.”

Within her letter to Donald Tusk formally invoking Article 50, the difficulties of this border and the importance of upholding the current agreement get mentioned:

“We must pay attention to the UK’s unique relationship with the Republic of Ireland and the importance of the peace process in Northern Ireland... We want to avoid a return to a hard border between our two countries, to be able to maintain the Common Travel Area between us... and to continue to uphold the Belfast Agreement.”

It is clear that the British Government wants the CTA to be left unaffected due to economic and historical reasons, but most of all in order to keep peace on the island of Ireland. This border was heavily guarded during the NI Conflict, and if there is to be a Hard Brexit, there is a strong possibility that a hard border will be reinstated. Neither the UK nor ROI want this as it will have strong negative economic impacts on both NI and ROI, such as the dissolution of the Single Electricity Market, or taxes being introduced on the 30% of NI’s milk production and 48% of food, beverages and tobacco which are exported to ROI annually.

Vote Leave claimed that due to CTA being established in 1923, long before the EU was even founded, meant that neither ROI nor NI will be affected in any way. This is a contestable statement, as depending on how successful the negotiations go, will directly affect the outcome of the future of the CTA. Currently the Belfast Agreement, signed by both nations in 1998, states that citizens of NI can either identify themselves as British, Irish or both, and is a vitally important characteristic which May wants to uphold to ensure peace within NI. Within

Principle 4 – and Annex B⁷ - of the White Paper, the CTA is brought up eight times, and each time it is mentioned May has used the word “protect” to emphasise the importance of the survival of this agreement. It is in the best interest of the current union which exists in the British Isles that the CTA remains the same post Brexit, and that what was said by Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Priti Patel and Gisela Stuart that due to the CTA pre-existing the EU nothing will change comes true. NI voted 55.7% Remain, stating it wanted to stay in the EU. The country relies heavily on ROI for trade, education and energy, and if the CTA changes for the worse, and those living in NI are badly affected, they can hold a referendum on their status as members of the UK. In Annex B it states:

“We are committed to the principle of consent enshrined in the Belfast Agreement, which makes clear that Northern Ireland’s constitutional position is a matter for the people of Northern Ireland to determine”

Thus, NI has the possibility to hold a referendum on their status within the UK, and can if they want, choose to join ROI and – like when the German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic of Germany – accept their constitution as theirs and subsequently rejoin the EU. For the UK to remain united, and for Vote Leave to have credibility on this particular point, the CTA needs to be protected and remain as unchanged as physically possible, and those living in ROI and NI have to be able to keep on living like they did prior to June 23rd 2016.

Although Protocol 20 gives the UK and Ireland special privileges which can be discussed solely between them, it is not justifiable to tell the British people, or Irish citizens living in the UK, that due to the CTA being older than the EU, nothing will change once the UK leaves the EU, especially as it has never existed when one jurisdiction was outside the EU and the other within. Vote Leave claimed that there “will be no change” to the CTA. This statement relies a tremendous amount on the ability of the UK and Irish Government to convince the remaining 26 EU countries of the importance of ensuring the rights both nations enjoyed under Protocol 20

⁷ UK/Ireland

remain legitimate, and that this will not only ensure peace on the island of Ireland but will keep NI, and the rest of the CTA more secure. Vote Leave made this major statement in a relatively blasé way, and through only mentioning it twice in their whole campaign, the amount of conviction that this statement has relies on the Government making this a possibility. It is stated in Principle 4 that both governments will do their best to ensure the CTA remains protected, and that they understand the importance of keeping it alive for economic, security and historic purposes. Whether these desires become reality relies on a lot more than keeping the peace in NI and the upholding of the Belfast Agreement. The survival of the CTA relies on the UK's stance on how 'hard' their exit will be, and that remains to be seen.

4.2 Principle 5: Controlling immigration

The main aim for the current Government and something which can be seen in both Vote Leave's campaign and the White Paper is that after the country leaves the EU, the Government wants the UK to remain a nation which is still open to migrants, and one which understands the value that migrants can bring. This being said, the approaches which the Government and Vote Leave have taken do vary quite substantially. The opening paragraph in this principle of the White Paper states:

“We will remain an open and tolerant country, and one that recognises the valuable contribution migrants make to our society and welcomes those with the skills and expertise to make our nation better still.”

Throughout this chapter May expresses her desire for “genuine” immigrants arriving “lawfully” to the UK.

“openness to international talent will remain”

“we welcome the contribution that migrants have brought... to our economy and society... especially high-skilled immigration”

“Immigration can bring great benefits – filling skills shortages, delivering public services and making the UK’s businesses the world-beaters they often are. But it must be controlled.”

This principle tries adamantly to show that the UK will remain as open as it was whilst in the EU with the only change being that immigration will now be controlled in a sustainable and productive way for the UK. May notes that the large number of EU migrants coming to the UK is no longer sustainable and that there has been a rise in “public concern about pressure on public services” and due to this there will be changes to how immigration occurs in the UK:

“the Free Movement Directive will no longer apply and the migration of EU nationals will be subject to UK law.”

Principle 6 goes into further detail in regards to how the UK will deal specifically with EU citizens, but as this principle involves overall immigration from the entire globe, ensuring that the UK’s future plans for immigration are clearly understood are extremely vital. Principle 5, like Principle 6, need to be handled with caution, especially with immigration arrangements for EU nations, as they need to ensure the best possible deal for their citizens that currently reside in the other 27 EU nations.

From the tip of the iceberg it is possible to see many similarities between how Vote Leave and the Government depict how to deal with the migrant situation. They both admit immigration has spiralled out of control, especially for the UK being an island nation, and as the UK is one of the most developed and wealthiest nations on the planet, there is a trend that migrants emigrate for economic purposes as it allows them to improve their lives, but for Vote Leave and the Government, British citizens must come first. Upon examining to a deeper extend into how Vote Leave presented this information, a different light has been shone onto the impact immigrants have.

Firstly, the term “highly skilled migrants” is used 12 times in the space of 16 documents published by Vote Leave where the topic of immigration was brought

up. In the documents which do mention it, two techniques are utilised, the first being where they directly attack the EU's freedom of movement directive:

“...doesn't even stop convicted murderers from coming into the country from Europe; meanwhile it stops physicists from Caltech ... who can contribute in valuable ways to this country...”

The second, enlightening the British people that if they “take control” - Vote Leave's catchphrase – they will create an immigration system which works for British people and shows the world how open they are:

“...would involve allowing in migrants whose skills we need...”

“...how much more respected in the world, when we have an immigration policy that stops discriminating on the basis of whether you are an EU citizen and instead selects people on the basis of their contribution to this country.”

This second method used by Vote Leave to talk about how immigration laws will change is similar to what is found within Principle 5, and an overall more positive and *safe* way to talk about such a fragile topic. Although Vote Leave used gentler approaches to discuss the need to change the UK's immigration policy, they also spoke about immigration in such ambiguous and general terms that it allowed for over 400 million people to be unfairly grouped into a collection of immigrants whose sole purpose is to come to the UK, endanger its citizens, and benefit from the country's free healthcare and the National Living Wage⁸.

Subtly by using the term “highly skilled” when referring to migrants, a distinction is made between the right and wrong type of immigrants. Although the White Paper does make reference to being open and welcoming to immigrants with the skills need to better the nation, it is very carefully worded as not to completely

⁸ Currently £7.50/hour and available to all EU citizens living in the UK aged 25 and over.

banish 'unskilled' migrants from the UK. Vote Leave on the other hand throughout their campaign was not as subtle. A term used throughout the campaign by Vote Leave was "scaremongering" when referring to how the Remain side was trying to scare people to vote to remain in the EU. This word, especially in the context of controlling immigration can be used aptly for Vote Leave. Throughout their campaign, citizens were bombarded with large numbers, and references to populations the size of cities that were coming to the UK.

Table 2. Vote Leave immigration statistics

Date	Author	Migrant size	Period of time	Reference to city/country?
2016-04-10	Priti Patel	1.6 million	2007-2015	Population of Birmingham and Manchester combined
2016-04-18	Priti Patel	25,000 pupils from EEA countries	2014	
2016-04-18	Priti Patel	475,935 births to EU mothers	2005-2014	
2016-04-23	Iain Duncan Smith	3 million	2016-2030	
2016-04-23	Iain Duncan Smith	1/4 million from EU	yearly	Population of Swindon and Aberdeen combined
2016-05-07	Michael Gove	88 million		Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey joining EU
2016-05-15	Priti Patel	88 million		Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Turkey joining EU
2016-05-26	Boris Johnson	1.25 million	2005-2015	More people than Birmingham
2016-05-26	Boris Johnson	270,000 EU citizens	2015	
2016-05-29	Michael Gove, Boris Johnson & Gisela Stuart	net migration 184,000	2015	Population of Oxford
2016-05-31	Vote Leave	76 million		Turkey joining EU
2016-06-01	Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Priti Patel & Gisela Stuart	net migration 184,000	2015	Population of Oxford
2016-06-02	Liam Fox	5 million	2016-2031	Population of Birmingham, Glasgow, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield, Bradford and Bristol combined
2016-06-06	Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Gisela Stuart & John Longworth	400 thousand	yearly 2016-2030	

These large numbers (found in table 2) stay in people's minds, and make people believe that a huge amount of foreigners are invading, or going to infiltrate their homeland. No one can imagine how much 270,000 or 5 million people is, so the use of cities in the UK allows people – especially those from those cities – to situate how many people would actually be coming to the UK, and creates an illusion that whole new cities will have to be built in order to be able to take in all these migrants.

On 10th April Priti Patel claimed in an interview published in *The Sunday Express*⁹ that 1.6 million EU citizens had settled in the UK over a 9 year period. It is possible to see the same statistic in the White Paper, but what she, and the newspaper, neglected to tell the reader is that within that same period 3.6 million migrants from the remaining nations on the planet migrated to the UK, and 3.1 million citizens officially emigrated from the UK as well. Of a total 5.2 million people migrating to the UK, 1.6 does seem like a large number taking into account they are coming from 27 nations out of a total 196, but given the fact that over 440 million EU citizens have the right to live there, less than 0.4% came to the country in that period. Understandably Patel wanted to incite fear into British citizens to convince them of the need to vote Leave, and by using a number like 1.6 million – or the size of Manchester and Birmingham combined – it sounds much more dramatic than 0.36%.

In addition to this agglomeration of statistics which have some relatively obvious inconsistencies in the amount of EU citizens coming to the UK - a prime example being the Newspaper Article¹⁰ published on 23rd April by Iain Duncan Smith and the speech¹¹ held by Liam Fox on 2nd June – throughout Vote Leave's campaign there was a constant aura towards the 'wrong type' of immigrant getting access to the UK. Although the term 'wrong type' is never used, it is insinuated –

⁹ 'Our economy would be better with a Brexit' Employment Minister blasts EU membership (*The Sunday Express*, 2016)

¹⁰ To stay in Brussels means government are rowing back on pledge to cut migration (*The Daily Mail*, 2016)

¹¹ Memories of Green? The cost of uncontrolled migration (Speech, 2016)

23 times in 16 documents related to immigration - in various different ways. A statement¹² made by Boris Johnson on 26th May is a clear example of this:

“...how we remove those who abuse our hospitality...the EU is extending visa-free travel to the border of Syria and Iraq. It is mad.”

What is being said here is a vote for Remain is a vote to allow the EU to extend Britain’s borders to the war torn Middle East, allowing ‘them’ inevitable access to the UK.

Alongside this, a statement¹³ made by Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Priti Patel and Gisela Stuart on 1st June mentions the *fearful* Eastern Europeans who will put more undue pressure on public services in the UK:

“These problems will only get worse when countries in the pipeline to join the EU become members in the near future...Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey...”

The campaign even went as far as to merge the Mediterranean nations into the same group as those deemed to be the root of the immigration crisis in the UK. Priti Patel’s interview on May 15th in The Sun¹⁴:

“...the hardships inflicted on countries like Italy, Portugal and Spain through the Eurozone crisis and austerity, it’s hardly surprising people are coming here.”

A letter¹⁵ written to David Cameron by Michael Gove, Boris Johnson and Gisela Stuart:

¹² The only way to take back control of immigration is to Vote Leave on 23 June (Statement, 2016)

¹³ Restoring public trust in immigration policy - a points-based non-discriminatory immigration system (Statement, 2016)

¹⁴ Unwise monkeys: ‘Sneering’ David Cameron, Gordon Brown and John Major branded bananas by Brexit-backing Priti Patel (The Sun, 2016)

¹⁵ Risks of Remain (Letter, 2016)

“Millions of people in southern Europe ... are giving up hope of their countries escaping recession. Unsurprisingly, migrants from those countries are disproportionately coming to Britain.”

This mass generalisation and manipulation of what is actually happening in these countries is nowhere to be seen in the White Paper, and seemingly was used to inflict fear that the failing economies of these nations will be followed by mass migration to countries with thriving economies, the UK being the most popular. It is not directly false to say that the Mediterranean nations are not the most prosperous nations in Europe right now, but the use of language that was utilised to describe them, creates an imagine that mainland Europe is a failing collection of countries draining the UK’s generosity dry.

On 30th April The Telegraph published an interview¹⁶ with Iain Duncan Smith where he talked about how dangerous immigration was, and manipulated the information to such an extent that figuratively speaking it meant nationalistic parties had hit the jackpot, and those who were not too knowledgeable on all the facts and figures felt a real need to vote Leave in order to secure their safety:

“Millions of people came into the EU in the last 12 months alone – most of whom nobody knows who they are. We saw what happened in Paris and Brussels. These were attacks planned and supported by the ability of jihadis to criss-cross borders.”

It is fact that the Brussels and Paris terror attacks were not caused by refugees coming to Europe, and the insinuation that the two were mutually inclusive creates an assumption that cuts incredibly deep into the psyche of what a border represents. Allowing people to believe that immigration brings with it terror and death is scaremongering at its core, and will without a doubt make people feel they are safer outside the EU. Manipulating the struggle of refugees to the status of jihadis brings

¹⁶ EU Referendum: Iain Duncan Smith interview - Tory veteran says vote to leave on June 23 will make Britain great again (the Telegraph, 2016)

with it a rhetoric of xenophobia and the dire need to distinguish the ‘us’ from the ‘them’ in order for there to be *sécurité* of the nation state and its people.

This accumulation of reasons why staying in the EU is bad for the UK in regards to immigration are extremely varied, and range from the ability to attract the best talent, to the political attack on half the continent and refugees fleeing war. It is clear to see that some, but not all, of these elements are visible within Principle 5 of the White Paper, and for the best interests of British citizens living within the EU (found in Principle 6), it is best that the majority of Vote Leave’s rhetoric with regards to immigration has been ignored.

4.3 Principle 6: Securing rights for EU nationals in the UK, and UK nationals in the EU

In the letter sent to Donald Tusk on 29th March, May makes reference to the importance of putting the people of both the UK and the EU as the top priority within the negotiations, and that their future livelihoods should be discussed first:

“We should always put our citizens first. There is obvious complexity in the discussions we are about to undertake, but we should remember that at the heart of our talks are the interests of all our citizens. There are, for example, many citizens of the remaining member states living in the United Kingdom and UK citizens living elsewhere in the European Union, and we should aim to strike an early agreement about their rights.”

This openness to ensure the best possible outcome for EU citizens living in the UK and vice versa is extremely evident within the White Paper as well.

“Securing the status of... EU nationals already in the UK and to UK nationals in the EU is one of this Government’s early priorities for the forthcoming negotiations.”

It is evident within this Principle of the importance securing the rights of around 4 million people – 2.8 million EU citizens (excluding ROI citizens) in the UK and 1.2 million UK citizens in the EU – as it is stated in the White Paper:

“The Government would have liked to resolve this issue ahead of formal negotiation... this has not proven possible. The UK remains ready to give people the certainty they want... at the earliest opportunity.”

This has not been possible due to rules set out in Article 218(3)¹⁷ that negotiations can only begin once Article 50(2)¹⁸ has been officially triggered. This has inevitably left millions of people doubting their future prospects in the 28 EU nations on whether they will be able to stay in their respective host nations after the UK officially leaves the EU.

During the run up to the referendum, there was literally one reference made to what would happen to the EU citizens already residing in the UK. In the same statement¹⁹ made on 1st June where Irish citizens were told the Common Travel Area (CTA) would remain completely intact and citizens from ROI would not be affected in any way, Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Priti Patel and Gisela Stuart promised EU citizens they would be able to stay in the UK without a doubt as long as they were lawful residents:

“...there will be no change for EU citizens already lawfully resident in the UK. These EU citizens will automatically be granted indefinite leave to remain in the UK and will be treated no less favourably than they are at present.”

One could think that every EU citizen has automatic lawful residency in any other EU country as protected by the EU Free Movement Directive. This would mean that any EU, European Economic Area (EEA) or European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (from hereon called EEA+) – a total of 31 nations - citizen who is officially registered in the UK by 28th March 2019 (subject to change) will be granted automatic status to live there visa free, but this is not the case. Within this speech

¹⁷ Article 218(3) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47

¹⁸ Article 50(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47

¹⁹ Restoring public trust in immigration policy - a points-based non-discriminatory immigration system (statement, 2016)

the use of the term “lawfully resident” makes reference to specific EU regulations. In Article 16(1)²⁰ it is stated:

“Union citizens who have resided legally for a continuous period of five years in the host Member State shall have the right of permanent residence there.”

This same message is conveyed in the White Paper but in reference to both UK citizens living in the EU and EU citizens in the UK:


“As provided for in both the EU Free Movement Directive (Article 16 of 2004/38/EC) and in UK law, those who have lived continuously and lawfully in a country for at least five years automatically have a permanent right to reside.”

This law currently transcends all 31 nations, and under EU law as long as the UK remains part of the EU, both UK citizens and EU citizens can accrue the years needed to claim permanent residency before the UK’s laws change and subsequently the UK’s status changes to third country status within the EU. This is ratified within the White Paper:

“While we are a member of the EU, the right of EU nationals living in the UK and UK nationals living in the EU remain unchanged”

As much as this is true, those who do not meet the critical five years by 2019 remain in the dark about what will happen to their status in either the EEA+ or the UK. Neither Vote Leave nor the Government have made clear claims on what will happen to these people, but as both the Government and the EU have made obvious that citizens must come first in these negotiations –dependent on how ‘hard’ the Brexit will be – there is the possibility of a special deal being made between the UK and the EU with regards to those who will be most affected by this.

²⁰ Article 16(1) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2004] OJ L 158/77



Source: Migration Observatory analysis of Labour Force Survey, Q1 2016

Figure 2: EEA+ nationals by years since first arrival in the UK, Q1 2016 (Migration Observatory, 2017)

As it stood in quarter one of 2016, 3.5 million EEA+ citizens lived in the UK. From that 3.5 million, 975,000 citizens (27%) had moved to the UK between 2012 and 2016, and of that 27%, 435,000 (44%) will have fulfilled the required five years to claim permanent residency in the UK before they leave the EU.

If Vote Leave and the Government are to keep to their word that “there will be no change for EU citizens already lawfully resident in the UK” and have “lawfully [lived] in [this] country for at least five years automatically have a permanent right to reside” respectively, then the only EU citizens that have to fear for their status in the UK being altered are the 526,000 who moved to the UK in 2014 and 2015, and any EU citizens moving there between 2016 and 2019. This number is relatively small compared to the amount of EU citizens whom have a permanent right to reside, and by the way that Vote Leave spoke about EU immigrants coming to the UK and pressuring the country’s public services to breaking point, they have given many of those who voted Leave false hope. This has been done by the rhetoric used made it seem like the problem migrants from the EU could be extradited back to their motherlands, when in fact the migrants

from these member states have been part of the EU for more than the required five years, so those who came early on can “automatically have a permanent right to reside”.

Throughout Vote Leave’s campaign there was not a single mention to how UK citizens residing in the EEA+ would be affected by this vote. There are currently around 1.2 million UK citizens living in the other 30 EEA+ countries who will, like the EU citizens in the UK, be affected by Brexit the most. Under UK law²¹, any UK citizen who has not been registered to vote in the UK for 15 years is no longer allowed to vote. It was estimated that around 800,000 UK citizens living in the EU were either too young or had surpassed the 15-year marker thus losing their eligibility to vote. The White Paper does make note of the importance of securing UK nationals living in the EU:

“To this end, we have engaged a range of stakeholders, including expatriate groups, to ensure we understand the priorities of UK nationals living in EU countries.”

This comment is the first by an official body to take into account the importance of working out the needs of the UK’s expatriate community – or even mention them – , as even though the ones who have lived in one of the EEA+ countries for five years or more can apply for permanent residency, there is still a large percentage of retirees – living in Spain, Malta and France – or Millennials – living in Germany and Scandinavia – who may not reach the required amount of years needed.

Naturally the Government has to take into account its expatriate population as they have to be seen to look after all their citizens regardless of where they are located on the globe, and know that if they give EU migrants in the UK a hard time, the EU will replicate that with the UK’s expatriates in EEA+. Within Vote Leave – and the Remain campaign for that matter – it seemed that there was no desire for them to take into account the expatriates, maybe due to the fact that they had made their own decision to live on the continent – retirees -, or maybe due to expatriates who are moved by their company are usually given sizeable relocation bundles, so

²¹ Section 141, Chapter 42, Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (UK)

any additional costs incurred with Brexit will be covered by their respective companies? As there is no evidence of expatriates being mentioned, all one can do is speculate, even though it seems peculiar that within such a context, there was no mention of how the lives of 1.2 million people will be drastically changed if the country were to vote to leave the EU.

4.4 Border Politics

Throughout the run up to the referendum, the majority of aspects which affect people's daily lives were covered; business, trade, security, the survival of the National Health Service²² (NHS), and the UK in the world. Albeit these all play important roles within the UK re-establishing themselves in a post Brexit world, the one element of this referendum which was a constant throughout, played an important role after the referendum, and will be at the top of the priority list until the UK officially leaves the EU is immigration.

It was clear throughout Vote Leave's campaign that they wanted to see the UK establish itself as a country with controlled migration and a nation which had "take[n] back control" of who could enter, let alone stay or create a life on the island. Throughout their campaign, they made this very clear, and it was possible to see the varying approaches they took, some which can be seen in the subsequent White Paper and some which cannot.

The White Paper makes reference to the benefits of what globalisation has brought to the country, especially through immigration both from the EU and the rest of the world. Even though May praises immigration, she makes a clear statement that for an island nation, the Free Movement Directive instated by the EU has weakened its physical border which has led to uncontrolled migration. The way this is written, comes across that due to the UK being an island nation, its borders cannot be extended, and that the country has become overpopulated due to immigration. Even though implying that non-island nations have the power to extend their borders is quite a peculiar statement to make, as all the land that is

²² The name of the public health services in Great Britain, and the term commonly used for public health services in Northern Ireland.

above sea level is currently controlled in some way, so technically continental nations are no different to island nations. Through leaving the EU, the UK has the power to regain some of their sovereign power which has been taken away by being part of this Union, and are able to retreat back to the more traditionalist way of how a physical border works. This links to Harvey's matrix (Table 1) when applying Material Space or Representations of Space with Absolute Space (Physical Bordering). Vote Leave played on the idea of the UK's unique *lived space* in an advert²³ quoting John Major the former Prime Minister making claims for the need to have border controls:

“There can be no question about lifting our border controls, we are an island, we need them, they are vital.”

There is no particular reason why the UK being an island would necessitate it having border controls, they are one of four nations in the EU that have a natural border from mainland Europe. Including the English Channel, the UK has eleven border checks in the three closest mainland nations to ensure a heightened amount of *sécurité*. Through making reference to the UK being an island nation, was meant to do more than merely referencing its physical geography, it was supposed to tap into the psychological aspects of bordering.

The UK has not been successfully invaded for close to a millennium, and throughout its long and dramatic yet prosperous history it has managed to create a national identity unlike any other nation. Through the use of Relational Space and Material Space (Table 1), Vote Leave manipulated the idea that UK citizens have about their homeland and utilised their proud heritage to stage a verbal attack on the EU. Early on they established the ‘us’ and the ‘them’ as the UK and the EU, and convincingly persuaded people that through being part of the EU, the country's identity was withering away by ‘them’ coming in and invading what was rightfully, culturally and historically British. Bombarding prospective voters with statistic after statistic about how many migrants have come to the UK and how many will

²³ Who do you trust? (Advert, 2016)

emigrate to the UK if they remain in the EU fits seamlessly into this political scare tactic that by allowing ‘them’ in, one is threatening one’s own *sécurité*.

In Liam Fox’s speech on 2nd June he spoke about the risks of 5 million migrants coming to the UK in the next 15 years, and what it would do to public services. In this speech²⁴ he utilises the fact that the UK is an island to his advantage and taps into the historical perception British citizens have of their homeland. The island is known for its lush green landscape of rolling hills and the serene countryside:

“How much of our green space will disappear, possibly forever?”

He links immigration to the destruction of the British countryside, and makes people realise that due to the UK having a border which can extend no further than the sea, there is no way other way to deal with overpopulation other than to develop on available land - which would be the countryside -. Even though this is a technical truth, the way this was done allowed for Liam Fox to manipulate the British psyche in a way which only a reasonable person who cherishes their landscape would vote Leave, and a vote to remain in the EU was a vote to destroy the UK’s infamous countryside.

Although the loss of the UK’s countryside was used in a psychological context, it is also important to be aware that the use of this collective memory - which almost every Brit has - comes under the classification of Social Bordering as well. Memories and unitedness are key to the creation of a nation, and with them one creates possibly the strongest form of Othering.

This type of Othering is created by an ability to experience things in a way which cannot be recreated or learned. The multiple references of the EU extending to the borders of Syria and Iraq and the linking of terror attacks in western Europe and refugees makes a clear statement that staying in the EU means creating a collective memory with people who do not share the same norms or values. Ultimately, Vote Leave is claiming that if the UK remains in the EU, it would mean having to share a European identity with people who have nothing to do with Europe and its liberal, progressive and innovative way of thinking. This was not an

²⁴ Memories of Green? The cost of uncontrolled migration (Speech, 2016)

option for Vote Leave, as they saw Britain as a superior and more advanced nation who strives for equality and peace.

The full frontal attack on migration is sizably more aggressive in the Vote Leave campaign compared to the White Paper. The White Paper is an official document which will be used as the basis for the negotiations between the British government and the EU, and as May states in her letter to President Tusk:

“We are leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe – and we want to remain committed partners and allies to our friends across the continent”

Thus if she had used some of the language which can be found in the Vote Leave campaign, it would become very clear that she does not want to remain ‘friends’ with the continent. This being said, elements of the different types of Border Politics can be found throughout the White Paper as well. They are subtler but are still present.

Having a whole Principle on protecting the CTA – especially as this was something which got very little mention in Vote Leave’s campaign – instates that for May and her government protecting this historical and socially significant area is key in ensuring Brexit is as successful as possible. Due to the tensions in NI and the need to uphold the Belfast Agreement, May is directly announcing that for her the ‘us’ is the CTA and the ‘them’ is the EU. In order to keep the CTA as similar to what it is now, the only land border that the UK has needs to remain unmanned regardless of the fact that ROI is in the EU and the UK is not, and the tensions which may rise due to the separation must be dealt with in the most suitable manner possible to ensure that all the hard work that both the ROI and UK government’s have done does not go to waste.

The same goes for EU citizens already living in the UK and UK citizens living in the EU. Vote Leave makes one comment about migrants already in the UK, yet there is a whole Principle on it within the White Paper. For the Government this is an extremely important matter as they know that the harsher the UK is on immigrants in the UK, the harder the EU will be on the UK citizens living throughout Europe. Albeit this is important for the Government, for Vote Leave,

this aspect of immigration would not have got the voters riled up and passionate about voting to leave the EU. The passion that was created from the bombardment of immigration statistics would have been much less if voters had been constantly reminded that any EU citizen living in the UK for more than five years will be able to stay or that the – mostly wealthy – expatriates dotted around Europe may have a harder time living their lavish lives visa free on the continent. Directly leaving this information out worked perfectly for the psychological and social bordering needed to convince the average citizen to vote Leave, but in reality plays an extremely important role within the coming discussions.

Throughout the campaign, it became clear that in order to ensure a vote in favour of Brexit, Vote Leave could leave no stone unturned and had to expose immigration from the EU to the fullest extent, or more realistically to the extent which worked for them. The immigration that occurs within the CTA, although historical and important for the commonwealth was almost completely ignored. UK citizens living in the EU did not get a single mention, even those living in Gibraltar, an Overseas Territory who were allowed to vote in this referendum. For Vote Leave, the only aspect of immigration which did truly matter was that of shaming over 400 million EEA+ citizens, and painting them in a derogatory light. The White Paper, although not as explicit as the Leave campaign, has done the same. Both have played with the psychology and social sides of bordering in ensuring that the UK is very clearly the ‘us’ and the EU is the ‘them’, and proven the need for *sécurité*. The formality and language the White Paper has used gives May and her government the possibility for something good to come out of these negotiations, especially for the CTA, NI and UK citizens living in the EU.

5 Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to examine if the rhetoric found in Vote Leave's campaign had permeated the White Paper or not. If they had been successful, then it will be possible to find the same language and ideas in both collections of documents. In order to answer this question fully, one must first look objectively at the literal information and facts which can be found in both the Leave campaign's documents and the White Paper.

Objectively speaking, it is possible to see that the majority of the facts that Vote Leave presented to the public in the run up to the referendum can be found in the White Paper. Vote Leave make reference to the current immigration trend that is happening in the UK is unsustainable for the nation, and that in order for the country to keep growing economically something must change. This same idea can be found in the White Paper. Neither wants to cut off immigration, in fact, both want the new UK to be the European hub of highly skilled immigration.

Both Vote Leave and the current government have made it very clear that the Common Travel Act (CTA) must remain unchanged post Brexit. This means that Irish, Northern Irish and UK citizens must keep the same rights as they did prior to the nations of the British Isles joining the EU and under Protocol 20 whilst they were both in the EU.

Lastly, although only mentioning it once in their whole campaign, Vote Leave did inform EU citizens whom had lived in the UK for five years or more that they would be granted automatic access to stay in the country post Brexit. Theresa May made this clear in the White Paper as well, stating that the UK would follow EU law until they officially left the EU.

From a facts based standpoint, it is possible to say that Vote Leave informed the British public in an informative and truthful manner, and it is possible to find similarities between their campaign and the White Paper. This research has aimed to examine more than just the facts. The aim of this research was to look at the rhetoric of the Leave campaign, and once this is taken into consideration a different conclusion arises.

Theresa May published a document which gives a good explanation of what she wants to happen within these negotiations, and how she plans on taking her country out of a union which they have been part of for 44 years. Principle 4, 5 and 6 cover the majority of aspects which will affect British, Irish and EU citizens, albeit it sometimes being slightly ambiguously. She presented the problems the country faces at the moment with immigration in a positive manner as possible when it comes to telling 440 million citizens they are no longer *openly* welcome to the UK anymore. This paper comes off relatively democratic, and at no instance does she slander the EU, its citizens or the influence it has had over the UK historically.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for Vote Leave. They were chosen as the official campaign to leave the EU over Remain as not to ostracise the centre ground citizens of the UK who could sway either way. Clearly they were successful, as the country ended up voting in favour of Brexit, but in many instances they proved there was no solidarity between the UK and the EU, or at least there should not be. Through the use of psychological and social bordering they defiled EEA+ immigrants, claiming laws would not change within the CTA nations as the agreement made between the UK and ROI was older than the EU (thus making it a superior law?) and never mentioned the 1.2 million UK citizens spread out through Europe. For Vote Leave, the UK is still this great super power – and to some extent it is -, which cannot be tied down by any union. The country and its people are superior. They are British.

Throughout the campaign, Vote Leave tried to convince UK citizens that this campaign was not about nationalism and people, but that it was about being more open to the world and the creation of better trade deals which would in turn make the country wealthier. This is not what this campaign was about and it can be seen throughout the whole Vote Leave campaign. The slogan of the campaign was “take back control”. Take back control of the borders, take back control of immigration, take back control of the laws. People felt they had lost control of their Britishness, and Vote Leave played perfectly to that. They created fear in the nation's citizens, manipulated their psyche – through psychological bordering - into one where refugees were terrorists and eastern and southern European citizens were

coming to the UK to take all the jobs. It is not uncommon during campaigns for people of power to incite fear into their citizens, and prove that they are the only people who can save them. Donald Trump did this in the USA, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders have done this France and The Netherlands respectively, and Vote Leave did the same.

Immigration has spurred to the forefront of elections throughout the West over the last decade, and this referendum was no different. Upon the publishing of the White Paper and in the letter sent to President Tusk, Theresa May clearly stated the importance immigration would play in the Brexit negotiation with the EU, but for her, and unlike any leader in history, different rules apply. Different rules apply because this is not a normal election, this is a fundamental change within society. It is for this reason to state that although the facts voiced by Vote Leave have permeated the White Paper, the rhetoric has not.

5.1 Brexit Negotiations

Theresa May is planning on taking the UK out of a union which it has been part of for 44 years, where thousands of laws have been created and become intertwined in UK law. Under the rules set out in Article 50, May has two years to complete the exit negotiations unless the other 27 EU nations unanimously agree to give the UK more time, thus at the moment the UK will officially have left the EU on 29th March 2019. On 18th April, May announced that there would be a snap election on 8th June 2017, which if she wins will mean she remains in power until 2022, instead of the proposed 2020. If the Conservative party do not win, and the Labour party are victorious, Vote Leave's rhetoric will have permeated the new White Paper even less due to Labour's stance on Brexit – which would most likely be not at all -.

As strategic as this general election is, the EU have said they will not start formal negotiations until after the election, giving the victorious leader even less time to finalise negotiations. The reason that Vote Leave's aggressive anti-EU rhetoric has not permeated the White Paper is down to the sole reason that once a nation leaves the EU, they cannot just rejoin when they feel like it. The EU is a club, and in order to be part of the club, one must follow the rules stated. The

UK has been given many pardons to not partake in core aspects of the EU such as the single currency or the open border Schengen agreement. If they were to rejoin they would most likely not be granted these liberties again. Brexit is not like a normal election, in a normal election you can change your mind after four or five years, this vote will affect every generation in a way that the UK will have never experienced before. The decisions that May, or Jeremy Corbyn (if the Labour party wins the election) make in the coming years will potentially sit alongside the Battle of Hastings, the Slave Trade, the British Empire and the two World Wars as historically defining moments in British history.

May is aware that the harsher she is on EU citizens residing in the UK, the more intolerant the EU will be on the 1.2 million UK citizens currently living in the EU which will in turn affect the UK badly in a more general sense. May and Tusk have both made it clear that the security of EU citizens in the UK and UK citizens in the EU must be the first hurdle that is tackled, and further negotiations will proceed after this vitally important factor is officially finalised. The British people voiced their opinion that they wanted stricter controls on immigration, and May has every right to do this, but if she makes them too strict, and dissatisfies the EU, the UK can only lose. It is one country against 27, and even though most people that voted Leave will not admit it, it is for this reason that Vote Leave's rhetoric has not influenced the White Paper as much as they would have liked.

As this research was based on the immigration aspect of the Leave Campaign, three possibilities are created here for further research. Firstly, the analysis of the other Principles in the White Paper, analysing the economic aspects which will be affected by Brexit, or the securitisation of a post Brexit UK in modern Europe. Another route which can be taken would be to follow the progress made by the future Prime Minister, whoever that may be, and examine to see whether Vote Leave's rhetoric reappears throughout the negotiations, or whether May, if she wins the election, keeps to her current White Paper, and the terms she has set out in the document become a reality.

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Appendix 1: Vote Leave Publications

Publication Date	Author	Title	Type of Document	Link
2016-01-22	Dominic Cummings	Economist interviews Vote Leave	Interview	http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/economist_interviews_vote_leave_campaign_director_dominic_cummings.html
2016-02-24	Lord Owen	EU has tested us to breaking point – it's time to leave	Newspaper Article (The Sun)	https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/politics/250538/lord-owen-eu-has-tested-us-to-breaking-point-its-time-to-leave/
2016-03-05	Vote Leave	Who do you trust?	Advert	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jRDsXPjg8XU
2016-04-10	Priti Patel	'Our economy would be better with a Brexit' Employment Minister blasts EU membership	Newspaper Article (Sunday Express)	http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/659613/Britain-UK-economy-Employment-Minister-Priti-Patel-blasts-EU-membership
2016-04-18	Priti Patel	Uncontrolled migration is putting unsustainable pressures on our public services	Newspaper Article (The Daily Mail)	http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3544949/Schools-breaking-point-says-employment-minister-Priti-Patel-says-migration-EU-unsustainable-pressure-education-system.html
2016-04-23	Iain Duncan Smith	To stay in Brussels means government are rowing back on pledge to cut migration	Newspaper Article (The Daily Mail)	http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-3554760/IAIN-DUNCAN-SMITH-says-desperation-stay-Brussels-means-government-rowing-pledge-cut-migration.html
2016-04-25	Vote Leave	Take Back Control	Advert	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9La0WGBgwiA
2016-04-30	Iain Duncan Smith	Tory veteran says vote to leave on June 23 will make Britain great again	Interview/Newspaper Article (The Telegraph)	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/30/eu-referendum-iain-duncan-smith-interview--a-vote-to-leave-on-ju/
2016-05-07	Michael Gove	David Cameron will be forced to take immediate steps to protect borders and national security in the days after a Brexit	Newspaper Article (The Telegraph)	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/06/michael-gove-says-david-cameron-will-be-forced-to-take-immediate/

Publication Date	Author	Title	Type of Document	Link
2016-05-15	Priti Patel	Unwise monkeys: ‘Sneering’ David Cameron, Gordon Brown and John Major branded bananas by Brexit-backing Priti Patel	Interview/News- paper Article (The Sun)	https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/news/1177032/unwise-monkeys-sneering-david-cameron-gordon-brown-and-john-major-branded-bananas-by-brexit-backing-priti-patel/
2016-05-20	Vote Leave	Paving the road to Ankara	Advert	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A8su2vCq950
2016-05-24	Northern Ireland Vote Leave	“Passed from a non-EU country (Switzerland) into an EU country France without immigration controls or passport check.”	Tweet	https://twitter.com/WestminsterDUP/status/735054281364115461
2016-05-26	Boris Johnson	The only way to take back control of immigration is to Vote Leave on 23 June	Statement	http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/boris_johnson_the_only_way_to_take_back_control_of_immigration_is_to_vote_leave_on_23_june.html
2016-05-29	Michael Gove, Boris Johnson & Gisela Stuart	PM challenged to set out the facts on EU immigration	Open letter to the David Cameron	http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/pm_challenged_to_set_out_the_facts_on_eu_immigration.html
2016-05-31	Vote Leave	Win £50 million with Kevin and Gary!	Advert	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFqmeptq0AU
2016-06-01	Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Priti Patel & Gisela Stuart	Restoring public trust in immigration policy - a points-based non-discriminatory immigration system	Statement	http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/restoring_public_trust_in_immigration_policy_a_points_based_non_discriminatory_immigration_system.html
2016-06-02	Liam Fox	Memories of Green? The cost of uncontrolled migration	Statement	http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/rt_hon_liam_fox_mp_memories_of_green_the_cost_of_uncontrolled_migration.html
2016-06-04	Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Gisela Stuart & John Longworth	Risks of Remain	Open letter to the David Cameron	http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/michael_gove_boris_johnson_and_gisela_stuart_on_the_risks_of_remain.html

Publication Date	Author	Title	Type of Document	Link
2016-06-06	Michael Gove, Boris Johnson, Gisela Stuart & John Longworth	Voting to stay in the EU is the risky option	Statement	http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/voting_to_stay_in_the_eu_is_the_risky_option.html
2016-06-15	Chris Grayling	A framework for taking back control and establishing a new UK-EU deal after 23 June	Statement	http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/a_framework_for_taking_back_control_and_establishing_a_new_uk_eu_deal_after_23_june.html
No Date	Better off Out	10 reasons that Irish people in Britain and Northern Ireland should vote to leave the EU	Information on the website	http://www.betteroffout.net/10-reasons-that-irish-people-in-britain-and-northern-ireland-should-vote-to-leave-the-eu/

Appendix 2: Governmental Documents

Publication Date	Author	Title	Type of Document	Link
2017-02-17	Theresa May	The United Kingdom's exit from and new partnership with the European Union	White Paper	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-united-kingdoms-exit-from-and-new-partnership-with-the-european-union-white-paper
2017-03-29	Theresa May	Prime Minister's letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50	Letter to President Donald Tusk	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministers-letter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50

Appendix 3: Laws

European Union Laws

Article 16(1) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
[2004] OJ L 158/77

Protocol (No 20) on the Application of Certain Aspects of Article 26 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union to the United Kingdom and to Ireland of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47

Article 50(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47

Article 218(3) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C
326/47

United Kingdom Laws

Section 141, Chapter 42, Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000
(UK)

