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The power of (In)security narratives in populist Social Media:
The far-right's attempt of reclaiming conversation

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Abstract

This thesis explores the way how far-right populist movements manifest themselves through social media. It approaches the problem by taking a political psychology perspective of ontological security which informs the behavioural need of an individual and groups to search for stable identity narratives to create a secure feeling of biographical continuity. The theoretical assumptions further incorporate the performative reasoning of such social movements to securitize subjectivity and the 'everyday' by introducing a post-Copenhagen theory. Both perspectives motivate this thesis to create a new theoretical understanding of ontological security suited to the contemporary media landscape and new forms of political communication. This is followed by a narrative analysis of the Facebook representation of the German Alternative for Germany (AfD). The narrative analysis is executed to spot most salient metanarratives throughout the year 2016 which have the aim to provide pleasing stories and ontological security. The results show that the AfD is relying on real events and 'small stories' to frame an 'enemy within' and 'the other' which threatens a socially constructed Germanness. Through a powerful narrative structure this identity is to be defended by the AfD solely.

Key Words: Ontological security, Securitization, Nationalism, Identity, Populism, Social media, Facebook, Narrative analysis

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List of abbreviations

AfD Alternative for Germany

PEGIDA Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident

1. Introduction

Nowadays, globalisation is barely a buzzword anymore, it has developed and become a standard in everyone's everyday life. The restructuring of modern institutions which act, think, and operate globally and advances reshape daily life. There is not much left of the optimistic narrative of all the opportunities, prospects, and positive changes it was accompanied with in people's mind as traditionally known and embedded notions are in question (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011). Mainly social and technological changes and advances have transformed everyday life tremendously while at the same time becoming more vulnerable exposed (Silverstone, 1993). New social movements have developed against established traditional neo-liberal order such as the Occupy Wall Street Movement on the one hand while on the other hand movements which are trumpeting for greater national security in face of rupturing national borders and loss of national sovereignty such as through mass immigration (Castells, 2012). Globalisation and all its effects, outcomes and responsibilities are under enormous critique in the public discourse and points unfiltered at individual's security of being. Specifically, in Europe, Euroscepticism and continuous declining levels of political trust are one result of widespread insecurities (Aschauer, 2016; Bârgăoanu, Radu and Negrea-Busuioc, 2014). New risk and fears determine the life of every citizen. Global events have raised extensive awareness about the connectedness of the world we live in today. Especially negative ramifications such as terror attacks, ecological disasters, pandemics, and economic crises standing in the way of pursuing life as people used to know it. Consequently, people have started to spend a considerable amount of time thinking, trying, and finding new ways to continue their life as they used to know it. Citizen's routines, traditions and identities are constantly contested through the new time-space compression. This compression is the main source of many anxieties (Giddens, 1990). Moreover, global processes - economic, social, cultural - affecting the national, regional, and local sphere in our daily lives. This phenomenon is often referred to as a global-local nexus (Scholte, 2005).

This phenomenon is most omnipresent and perceivable in the environment of new social spaces operated and communicated through new media. Nowadays, new media plays a crucial factor in many people's life as they have started to spend a reasonable amount of time online every day. Social media takes a special role. It is a new technology and a product of globalisation itself. It reproduces social relations and empowers networks to produce knowledge and information (Eskola, 2012), again with all possible ramifications. New threats and anxieties which are challenging the existential feelings are communicated in fast flowing, vast amounts, and are ever present in social media than ever before. These threats and anxieties are used in different variations by different actors all over the world. Research has been particularly drawn around restoring citizens trust through increasing government transparency (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006), but also social movements and organization are the focus of social science research in relation to social media (Castells, 2012). Social movements use social media to raise awareness, attract sympathizers and most notably trying to achieve policy change.

The political stage in western societies faces the rise of new nationalism, which are represented and gathered in populist parties such as the French Front National, Party for Freedom in the Netherlands or the PEGIDA movement and Alternative for Germany to only name a few (Kinnvall, 2012). Often started as small protest movements, they gained greater support and relatively quickly among a greater public. These parties established themselves to challenge profound liberal democratic structures using extensive populist rhetoric to gain exclusiveness within traditional democratic party systems (Canovan, 1999). Populism offers simple answers to complex problems and thereby offering an alternative in the political landscape (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008). Historically, populism is not an occurrence of the 21st century and has been broadly speaking always been around with changing ideological occurrences (Reinemann et al., 2017). Nevertheless, they often appear accompanied with questionable anti-democratic theses and tactics by referring to 'the nation' and reproducing far-right ideology especially in face of worldwide migration streams (Stevens and Vaughan-Williams, 2014; Hellström,

2016). Last year saw the election of a US president who targeted free press after taking office using the terminology of ‘alternative facts’ to justify his actions. Some parts of the electorate in Western societies seem to accept such populism and therefore prefer to judge from the bottom of emotions, of what feels right, rather than trusting logical reasoning and hard facts in their decision-making. In other words, perceptions have become reality, which render facts obsolete (The Economist, 2016). The reasons for such reawakening of nationalism are extremely diverse and multi-layered. Negative effects of globalisation or post-modernity seem to take the most widespread explanation or reason in social science research and media discourse.

In our ‘risk society’ as Ulrich Beck (1992) termed it, everyone is exposed to potential threats and anxieties which raises important questions of (in)security in relation to identity of the individual (Scholte, 2005; Wæver, 1996). Citizens questioning traditional procedures and policy-making as some have created disbelief and frustration with government performance. Threats, fears, and anxieties are often the reason for feelings of unrest, resulting in search for new identities to feel secure in this world (Kinnvall, 2004). In a globalised world, unrest is often sparked by economic, cultural, and political forces where possible uncertainties are always present in people’s mind. As a response, calls in online environments where people can unite and feel togetherness while claiming loud voices for greater security measures often at the expense of marginalization of minorities, acceptance of xenophobia and sympathizing for radical thinking (Canovan, 1999). Additionally, right-wing, and populist parties are aggressively claiming and using everyday uncertainties for their popularity with the potential costs of greater polarization within the society such as in Germany in recent years (Abadi et al., 2016). Such frustrations and protests do not only appear on the street in forms of demonstration but they also start their protests online at home, in the space of social media calling for practices of securitization (Stevens and Vaughan-William, 2014; Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). Social media provides an often ‘law-free’ space to

create meaning within social networks which makes it an essential attractive new environment for new far-right populist movements (Castells, 2012).

Highly polarizing issues raise questions like: How do governments react to increasing nationalism and radicalism? How do citizens perceive or react to securitization in social media? What does it mean for the self and identity to be exposed to such securitization? For example, security measures to ecological disasters seem logical as they imply a normative risk. On the other hand, the search for subjective security takes a complete different narrative when identities are being the topic of the security agenda. Ultimately, how are certain narratives created or recreated through new national movements?

1.1. Purpose, aim and research question

The primary aim of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between ontological security and securitization. This will be done by looking closely at the nature of ontological security in a globalised world. As challenged routines, identities and trust relations play a crucial part in ontological security theory, I will specifically focus on identity construction and narratives which are the subject of securitized subjectivity. Further narrowing it down, I will look at the narrative of nationalism, its force, and effects regarding security of the being. For this work, I aim to explain the popularity of ‘new nationalistic movements’ and their operative strategy in online networks. The necessity will be to explain the need of populist movements to implement securitization by using a bottom-up narrative approach which supposedly speaks for the voter. The principally interesting mark will be to investigate the power relations of securitization by addressing ontological insecurities in the social space of social media. This thesis will aim to contribute to existing scholarship within and between political psychology, critical security studies, globalisation, and political communication. Furthermore, this work will make a first step of combining theories of ontological security with concepts of framing ensuing from the reasoning that new nationalistic movements creating powerful narratives by using the logic of securitization and framing to essentialize

and consequently achieve a policy change through addressing the masses. Methodologically, this thesis will take a narrative analysis approach to dismantle Facebook posts. Facebook posts will be used as the level of analysis based on the normative understanding from populist research that traditional media and its gatekeeper function can be bypassed by use of this new technology where social movements generally lack the financial or organizational means. By applying this method, I want to detect a narration structure within the online environment which has become a tool in everyday life for many people. Moreover, the purpose is to make a first step into the online space within ontological security scholarship and to bring to light the manifestation of securitized identities.

Therefore, the following research question will guide this thesis:

How do populist movements securitise narratives of identity in social media from the broader perspective of ontological security?

This is followed by two sub questions which will guide this thesis:

- How are emotions and identities being challenged in the context of securitization?
- How does social media framing affect ontological security?

1.2. (De)Limitations

This thesis will frequently use the terms ‘social movement’ or ‘movement’. Further, they are often used with the alignment towards the terminology ‘far-right’ or ‘populist’ or both. I will use ‘social movement’ and ‘movement’ interchangeably. When reading it is important for the reader to keep in mind that the presented terms are being used in the meaning they appear. Only seeking to provide guidance and avoid misunderstanding, I will not further define these terms to leave space for an open theoretical discussion.

As this thesis, will take on a case study approach and further will only look at the far-right populist party Alternative für Deutschland (hereafter AfD) in Germany. Consequently, this case study is somewhat limited in its validity towards other far-

right populist movements in other countries. In particular, Germany and its historical background (Nazism) are a special case because of generally unease feelings towards nationalism thus far-right ideology within the society (Huddy 2001; Reinemann et al., 2017). At the same time, the rise of a German far-right populist party is hence an interesting case to look at.

As the research question includes the level of analysis, this paper only will look at social media posts and not include any material or happenings besides the online environment. I do not see this as a shortcoming of this work as it is the aim of the thesis to theoretically link ontological security and securitization theory to an empirical application within new media. Only looking at social media allows for an alternative understanding of how the contemporary media environment is contested with traditional media where the thesis will uncover how an explicit posting of news may contain intentional meaning.

Finally, this thesis will only look at a limited period in which social media postings are being analysed using narrative analysis. On the one hand, this will allow a more concrete analysis of a meta narrative by also consulting visuals. On the other hand, it will limit the research in a way that neglects a directional position shift within the party from its emergence in 2013.

1.3. Philosophical scientific positioning

Ontologically this thesis will use a social constructivist approach to different concepts and theories of ontological security. Also, it will take a critical security approach by introducing and discussing the prominent theory of securitization situated in the Copenhagen school. Furthermore, post-Copenhagen securitization theory together with a political psychology understanding of ontological security frame the ontological base of this work. Together, both concepts build the main theory which will additionally take a media and communication angle.

From an epistemological perspective, this work is situated in a social constructivist approach with the aim to uncover the implementation of a meta or national narrative

made within the German social media landscape and the ontological-political constitution of such relations by using a qualitative approach. In doing so, it will less likely uncover an objective truth but more the social practices and operations being presented through a narrative structure.

Methodologically, narrative analysis will be used to analyse the emotional context as well as intention behind posts and stories on Facebook. A case study as the method will allow me to uncover the detailed construction of such narrative using epistemological tools. As the level of analysis is situated, online right-wing movements are able to shift the ontological normative into their direction. Something which should be considered throughout this thesis.

1.4. Disposition

The thesis proceeds as follows. First, I will introduce a literature review which will cover previous research being made in contemporary social media, right-wing movements and populism and research in connection to social media. Secondly, the background section will provide a closer look at the ontological dimensions of trust and narratives which are being created in national movements as well as the importance of securitizing identity for such national movements. In chapter four, ontological security will situate the thesis within a political psychology framework to conceptualize identity construction. Furthermore, post-Copenhagen school theory will be used to explain and show the securitization attempt and hence narrative construction of far-right movements to manifest their position. At this junction, I will take a critical approach to link both theories to framing and populism. This is followed by presenting the methodology in which the choice for narrative analysis will be motivated as well as a discussion about the level of analysis. Chapter six will provide a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the meta-narrative extracted from AfD's Facebook appearance. Finally, the last chapter will provide directions for future research and concluding remarks in which the study will be critically discussed and evaluated.

2. Previous research

Before introducing and discussing the theoretical concepts, I will provide a brief overview of previous research. This allows me to both review significant literature and highlight potential gaps but also to situate this research in a coherent frame which then allows me to motivate my points of departure.

2.1. Social Media

Research situated within social networks has been increasingly rising since the mid-2000s with the invention and establishment of various platforms such as Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest, Reddit, Tumblr, or Instagram to only name a few. According to research by the Pew Research Center (Mitchell et al., 2014) Facebook has taken the spot of the largest and most used social media network people use. This is mainly to obtain news and inform yourself about recent events. Ergo, recent academic work has been situated in the online space of Facebook with the focus of social outcomes, government performance, and perception of all kinds, of different variables and linkages.

In detail, it has proven to be a supporting tool in crisis communication, to impart new policies, retain trust in the government or shape perception about transparency (Husain et al., 2014; Nohrstedt, 2010; Tolbert and Mossberger, 2006; Donahue, Eckel and Wilson, 2013). It is argued that the interaction effects of social media are either one-way informational or two-way interactional (Lu, Zhang and Fan, 2015). The idea of expanding on social representation online is done to attract collaboration, transparency, and participation from the government side while on the citizens account it works to establish trust, accountability, integrity, and satisfaction. Lu and colleagues (2015) results show how citizen's perception of the government is changed positively but the effect of trust and accountability stay mainly untouched. In contrast, Park et al. (2015) find out that active Twitter communication by political leaders establishes trust to single political figures as well as to the overall government. However, this effect is only observable in direct personal communication between citizen and politician. Warren, Sulaiman and

Jaafar (2014) show that social media is largely being used as a new tool of outrage with the idea to find a voice and togetherness (See also Castells, 2012). They further argue that political efficacy is greatly determined by trust which firstly, is dependent on how information is provided and secondly, that social media's ability to foster online civic participation increases trust between groups and individuals and has the power to reduce feelings of uncertainty and may even decrease bigoted and judgmental postings hence increases social resilience online. Those findings are supported by Reuter and Spielhofer (2016) with the focus on crisis communication. Even though literature on crisis communication is not part of my research it allows for an understanding of the importance of trust or mistrust in explicit situations of uncertainty. Unlike a normative feeling of uncertainty, interactional information can increase trust and ultimately reduce feelings of situational uncertainty.

In general, social media and crisis research has extensively uncovered a cognitive-emotional distinction in which the right tools, the right information can decide about successful communication in which emotions such as anxiety or uncertainty are classified as a negative outcome and cognitive awareness as a positive effect (Utz, Schultz and Glocka, 2013; Chung and Lee, 2016). The collective power of media in which I respectively include social media is investigated in the work of Watson (2012). He shows how social movements especially of marginalized groups use framing methods to gain voice and credibility often by desecuritising frames of the governing elite. On the other spectrum, Molly Andrews (2014) brings together new media and the narratives we use to make sense of our daily life. She argues that social media helps to bring individual and collective imagination of distant others together to make sense of the self and other. Squire et al. (2014) pointing out the importance of a changing narrative practise and agency in the online sphere which offers completely new narrative structures and modes of research.

This section showed that especially trust and accountability are two changing and important reasons and desired outcomes to practice within social media by changing perceptions and expectations. The collective power through an emotional structure of framing and narratives is also an important feature of social media use, something

which will be covered in a later section again. Despite the fact that scholars acknowledge the importance of an emotion-cognitive linkage they do not cover the meaning of ontological security for the individual neither how narratives ontology affect.

2.2. Right-wing movements and populism

The literature on populism is widespread and contested especially due to an increasing issue importance in recent decades. The main problem of populism though is that there does not exist a universal definition for it. Some call it an ideology of homogenous people against the elite and a dangerous ‘other’, while others say it cannot be defined as an ideology as it entails only a specific rhetoric in politics as it used likewise by left and right-wing politicians (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008; Aalberg and De Vreese, 2017). However, there is a clear tendency to connect it to groups and movements which follow a nationalistic or right-wing ideology. One of the reasons for that is that populist rhetoric clearly makes a distinction between ‘the people’ and ‘the other’. Populists see themselves as the saviours of democracy. They see themselves as true democrats and claim they speak directly for ‘the people’, for the democratic sovereign (Canovan, 1999). Like right-wing movements, they use the rhetoric of speaking for the “‘silent majority’ of ‘ordinary, decent people’, whose interests and opinion are regularly overridden by arrogant elites, corrupt politicians and strident minorities” (Canovan, 1999:5).¹

Such rhetoric is traditionally situated in nationalism discourse in the attempt to reproduce the nation (Hellström, 2016). Right-wing movements thus claim to be the only entity for social cohesion against the ‘other’ through negotiating a national identity. Hellström argues that far-right movements political communication is based around two layers of identity formation; one which is populist rhetoric based in presenting a positive image of the movements; and another which uses concepts between the state, the nation, and the people (2016:21). According to

¹ (See also Kinnvall, 2014).

Özkirimli (2010) nationalism and nation can be quite ambiguous terms to define. He states there is no objective need to define the nation but it is important how and which cultural collectives of the nation are important for actors. Therefore, it is the discourse of nationalism which defines nations and which sets the frame for how one makes sense of the world. Such discourse is not only concentrated on language, as identities are formed through metanarratives which glue together different meanings and ideas of nation (Suny, 2001; cited in Özkirimli, 2010). Nationalism thus can be understood as making (a) identity claims and dividing like in populist rhetoric the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ or ‘others’. It is the clear distinction between different identities and loyalty to the collective determining nationalism. Also, their discourse is deeply rooted in making (b) temporal claim with strong argumentation and linkages to the past and experiences. Lastly, they make (c) spatial claims in which the notion of ‘home’ and national territory are intensified. No matter if ‘home’ is imagined or is a physical social space, everyday social practises are essential claims in nationalism discourse (Özkirimli, 2010).

Others, have started to use the term ‘new nationalism’ (Kaldor, 2001; cited in Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2010) to describe the focus of the ‘enemy within’ rather than nationalism between nation states (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2010). A similar argument is provided by Van Dijk (1997), who argues that nationalism and right-wing movements have started to argue along cultural lines rather than focusing on ethnic or religious racism solely. He shows that the reproduction of the underlyingly nation happens in various forms in everyday language of politicians. Furthermore, he states that such language is incorporated from right-wing movements which allows them to construct ‘others’ as a threat to national identity, norms, values and culture allowing them to magnify the differences between in- and outgroups. As traditional parties fail to respond to globalisation and changed modes of life, the past seems like an attractive reality again (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008). By creating an idealized or imagined story of the past, populist movements often refer to the ‘heartland’ which it is to defend (Taggart 2004). This can appear around the notions of the “political, economic, nationalist, and cultural”

and is usually displayed in their style of communication (Reinemann et al., 2017). Most noticeable is how this communication uses national ‘myths’ “in the sense that they are used to 'empty reality' of its everyday ambiguities and abolish the complexity of human activities” (Hellström, 2016:62). Finally, Kinnvall (2014) states that right-wing movements are known to be active creators of narratives which reproduce the national identity and reimage the past in order to provide “ontological security in the present” (ibid., 2014:322). This is done by securitizing subjectivity of the majority population against cultural ambiguities profoundly triggered through globalisation effects.

In sum, it is generally not quite clear if populist rhetoric is simply part of right-wing ideology and of such movements or if populism itself entails a right-wing tendency. However, populism does not by necessity choose a right-wing tendency. The problem of defining both terms in adequate ways plays one part. Regardless of a correct determination both populism and nationalism place emphasis on national identity and a distinction to an outgroup or ‘others’. Furthermore, it is important for such movements to claim ‘home’, everyday social practices, and the reproduction or reimagining of norms, values, and identity from the past exclusively for them but also to achieve a secure ontological position.

2.3. National movements and Social Media

National movements in relationship to social media has been relatively neglected and therefore research to date is relatively limited. However, research on social movements and their strategy of framing issues, has been critically discussed by Snow and colleagues (1986). The rendering of events or issues in a meaningful frame allows a movement to organize and guide collective and individual action. Framing always requires agency in order to select meaningful communication and make them salient (Entman, 1993). However, as Benford (1997) argues most research on movements and framing neglect the importance of human agency. Coming back to national movements and social media, most research is focused in explaining radicalization online and the role of such networks (Fenton, 2016;

Koehler, 2014). Koehler (2014) conducted qualitative in-depth interviews with eight German former right-wing extremists regarding the use of social media and found out, besides some obvious and expected findings such as greater integration between members, organizational convenience, and advantages of anonymous space, that such movements greatly construct realities online. In the regard of agency, Kinnvall (2014) argues that national movements make use of their agency online in telling socio-historical narratives. The emotional meaning of such narratives gives people “a position, a place, in a story” (ibid., 2014:321).

Furthermore, such movements securitize the ontological by introducing campaigns which claim to save the country against corrupt politicians and ‘the other’. Using national myths and using narratives allows populists to create meaningful frames to rally people and create feelings of togetherness. Social media as argued by Alvares & Dahlgren (2016), Aalberg & De Vreese (2017) and Engesser et al. (2016) offers the platform for populist movements to spread their messages and allow them to ignore the gatekeeper function of traditional media although still dependent on traditional media as they lack the means of traditional parties to speak aloud to the people (See also Kinnvall, 2014). Understanding the ‘heartland’ and the securitization of ‘the other’ are the main communicative strategies, nationalist populist movements use, to manifest themselves in social media. Results from Engesser et al. (2016) show that the terminology of ‘heartland’ can be triggered by single words or popular icons. Furthermore, the ‘heartland’ works as an ideological depository and they recommend researching this phenomenon more intensively in the future. Finally, Reinemann et al. (2017) argue that populists attempt to bring ‘the people’ into being and thus trying to create a new identity online.

To summarize the previous section, it can be said that research about national or far-right movements is relatively limited. Populism seems to catch the eye of scholars, but as the reviewed literature in the prior sections shows populism and nationalism are usually strongly linked. The focus is often on the communicative aspects of populist rhetoric only. A newly gained agency created through social media itself allows such movements to tell narratives which bring people together.

I argue that the 'heartland' is a major attribute in framing narratives about the past and the nation. Together with a securitization of 'the other' populist movements trying to create a new social identity which allows the individual to feel ontologically secure. The attempt of creating a new social identity or prime certain aspects of an existing one gives people feelings of unity, belonging, positive emotions and thus feelings of ontological security.

3. Points of Departure

Terror attacks have been directed at major European cities in recent years massively. The last two years marked an intensified security climate for Europe in the aftermath of attacks in France, Belgium, Germany, and Sweden. Moreover, an enormous stream of refugees has been knocking at European doors putting nation states under enormous stress to handle this ongoing crisis effectively. At the same time, citizen's daily routines and habits are being put under an enormous test and are actively being challenged through socioeconomic changes in a globalised world. Consequently, public trust into authorities is questioned when security measures seem not effective enough. Accordingly, for global processes and institutional transformations, such recent events bring great feelings of uncertainty, often accompanied with emotional stress about one's future. The overall declining trust levels for decades in many western democracies are paramount in form of outrage on the streets and online questioning politician's accountability (Castells, 2012; Tolbert and Mossberger, 2006). Trust as one of the key requirements for political efficacy on a governmental level, but also a prime condition to establish feelings of ontological security and guaranteeing collective coherence (Aschauer, 2016; Kinnvall, 2004; Giddens, 1991). Lack of trust, frustrations, and lack of meaningful solutions for the majority therefore account for the establishment of different kinds of social movements, with the rise in national movements as well (Castells, 2012; Kinnvall, 2014; Canovan, 1999). On the individual level, "...perceptions of crisis (which are conceptualized using the three Ds of fear of societal decline, political disenchantment, and social distrust) exert an influence on ethnocentrism..." (Aschauer, 2016:311). Loss of trust on all levels, but in particular towards authorities and daily uncertainties as well as feelings of powerlessness seem to be one of the major driving forces which let citizens question cultural diversity and the protection of liberal norms.

Individual feelings and perceptions of potential threats and uncertainty play an incremental part in understanding the silent acceptance of security measures but often with scrutiny to accept exclusionist and intolerant hostility against minorities

and people who are being classified as a potential threat for the host society (Stevens and Vaughan-Williams, 2014). Globalising effects such as migration or international terrorism are not occurring in isolation to the nation state, it is the individual who feels fear and threatened in everyday routines. It is often the move out from the political into the security discourse which generates a normative meaning of topics which are treated as a security issue. Insecurity about own cultural identity enable doubt in the multiculturalist ideal of many European nation states, often leading to frame identity as a matter of insecurity (Huysmans, 2007). The fear of blurring cultural identity let people align themselves towards ethnocentric thought often to reembrace better times in the past when European integration was not as developed as today and migration less of an issue. The tendency to ethnocentrism is thus a result of societal malaise and at the same time explains a rise of nationalism often appearing in populist parties and movements which have gained votes especially in the last EU parliament election 2014 (Aschauer, 2016). Nationalistic movements seem to offer the right answers in a world of eroded borders, boundaries, lost identities, and uncertainties. The question about identity is thus often not a collective one solely but primarily an individual one. The construct of being, continuing everyday routines and self-identity has become an important aspect in questions about social relations nowadays. Sociologically framed by Anthony Giddens (1991) with the term: 'ontological security', it has found theoretical discussion and reputation in the field of international relations in recent years. However, it has been under-conceptualized by overlooking the societal and individual level of security research and ontological uncertainty, calling for a new debate in the current changing political landscape (Kinnvall, 2004; Krolkowski 2008; Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011; Croft, 2012; Chernobrov, 2016). Identity together with trust relations are among others an incremental part of Giddens (1991) theory of ontological security.

Particularly, credibility in politicians is declining and alienation from traditional politics is rising. This is worrying for many traditional democracies as nationalism and populism together seem to tell attractive stories in securing national identity

against the backdrop of a globalising character. For instance, through narratives, populist groups make sense of what they are in comparison to other traditional parties. Giving meaning to reality through narratives accounts for both individuals and the collective. Thus, using narratives also means where one social identity depends on how we portray ourselves to others (Scuzzarello 2015). This reasoning is along the lines of Tajfel and Turner's (1979) in- and outgroup theory. According to Hammack (2008:222) identity is manifested through the cognitive engagement of personal narratives made "through social interaction and social practice". His understanding implies that individuals engage with master narratives which frame the equivalent to what is known as a dominant discourse in society. When global processes such as migration are at work, existing discourses are contested and new narratives are needed (Hammack, 2008). Populist movements provide such narratives and use them to rally people together to maintain support in contested times (Polletta, 1998). Germany has been chosen because it takes a relative big role regarding setting norms within the European Union, additionally due to its history it has always been a special case in dealing with nationalism and radicalisation. Furthermore, it is one of the few countries who have experienced the highest total number of new refugees during the peak of the crisis in 2015, an event which is often referred to as a key signifier in populist narratives to create safe identity (Chernobrov, 2016).

4. Theoretical Framework

In the following chapter I will revisit the concept of ontological security which was first translated into a sociological framework by Anthony Giddens (1991). Since then his theory found prominence in the subfields of political sociology, political psychology, and international relations. First, I will provide the general theory of Giddens in which the theoretical framework is situated in. After that I critically discuss relevant work of the Copenhagen school in which critical security theory builds the explanatory section. Next, political psychology and post-Copenhagen theory will be introduced and applied to connect both concepts to social media and the operating reasoning of national movements in such environment.

4.1. Revisiting Ontological Security

The term ontological security sociological was coined by Giddens (1991) in his work about the consciousness self and identity in today's modern world. The continuation of the self and understanding individual being in this world as the prime endeavour (ibid., 1991). But is this a new phenomenon solely? Modern processes or as Giddens describes it, modes of life by modernity have reshaped the world rendering social relations differently than to pre-modern times. These processes have changed or disestablished all traditional. Globalisation or global processes and the globalising character of social relations is met through the dis-embedding of traditional and local interactions, and constant reflexivity of such. These dynamics and a "restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space" are met through trust relations in social systems and abstract system such as experts of today's modern institutions and organizations (Giddens, 1990:21).

What Giddens intended to point out was not only how Globalisation has increased advances more rapidly but rather what it means for the single individual, as they have to revise the meaning of their own body as well as their being in space and time.

To understand your own being reveals at the same time fears, threats, and anxieties thus creating the need to feel ontological secure. Everyday life and all its actions

confront everyone with all possible ramifications – positive as well as negative - locally, nationally, and globally (Giddens, 1991). Important to understand from Giddens theory, is that feelings of ontological insecurity have the potential to threaten the social existence and continuation of the self. Traditional identities are now decoupled which previously worked as a protection mechanism for the self (ibid., 1991). Consciousness is necessary to find answers in a changed global reality. Such exposure to change, which can take practical as well as abstract forms, accompanied with the occurrence of new threats. Giddens describes this as a psychological crisis, in which “time, space, continuity, and identity are constantly questioned” (ibid., 1991:37). Therefore, reproducing everyday routines provides support and answers in the search for stability against potential anxieties. Routines work not only as a coping mechanism but at the same time enable us to establish and pursue connections of basic trust to each other (ibid., 1991). What does Giddens mean with that?

Giddens explains basic trust, and its emergence as a product from relationships during early infancy. I will explain his example in a simplified version here. An infant is completely depended on its caretaker. The caretaker or the ‘other’ – as trust is not necessarily attached to one specific individual only – logically takes care of the infant. The result: Basic trust develops early in life as there is a continuous routine established and practiced in the caretaking process itself. Taking it a step further, the infant also learns to accept the absence of the caretaker over time. Given that, the caretaker returns after its absence and continues its routines. This basic trust, as Giddens beliefs, is a key component for the continuation of daily life (ibid., 1991). It is to note that trusting at the same time also means to be able to understand the possibility of loss and rupture of trusted ones and trust into abstract systems. Like routines, basic trust, and trust relations work as a mechanism to sustain our being in the world, to handle and bracket out existing fears and risks, hence to feel more ontological secure (ibid., 1991).

As a result, individual behaviour and emotions determine how ontological (in)secure one feels. Thus, to develop a sense of self-identity means to follow

routines and to be consciousness about the self at the same time. In addition, Giddens's theory highlights the ability to reflexively undertake actions and activities, hence routines prolong also a strong need of self-biography which we seek to continue (ibid., 1991). To complete the picture, we must take a step back and understand the logic of space-time compression and "...change in what is absent – out of sight for the moment or, never directly encountered but simply accepted as 'there' (Giddens, 1991:43). A problem here is that distance realities can never be portrayed perfectly, they are mediated through media which arrive in a framed character at the receiver. Ultimately, to live day-to-day, the combination of practiced everyday routines, developed, and sustained basic trust and the seek for biographical continuity is framed in what Giddens calls: a protective 'cocoon' (ibid., 1991:56). This 'cocoon' establishes to fade out and eliminate any ruptures which could threaten self-identity.

There are certain aspects where Giddens theory can be critiqued, some of them will be discussed in the following section. First, his theory is conceptualized in a way which makes it easy to work and apply it as an empirical tool. What do I mean with that? Giddens is uncovering some characteristics which are needed to 'go on' in life and to sustain ontological security. Therefore, the concept of trust relations and trust tokens offer a relative simplified analytical tool to apply empirically. Furthermore, for Giddens, reflexivity of the self is crucial to keep on track with routines and to feel ontologically secure. In his theory, it is not clear how or if perceptions and reflexivity are connected in some sense. I would argue that he is not providing a clear answer in this regard, raising the questions; Does a reflexive analysis of complex global processes through the individual lens take place consciously and does it also mean that one can perceive a sense of own ontological security? Or did Giddens mean that most is happening in our unconsciousness such as his explanation of basic trust? Beyond certainty on these issues, I will introduce critical security theory and the concept of securitization in order to frame a societal-psychological understanding further on in the thesis.

4.2. Securitizing identity and emotions

Classical security theory is based on the premise, very much like ontological security that there is an existential threat, which if no measures taken will make the continuation of the status quo impossible. It is, therefore, in traditional sense about survival of the state, culture, or society. In contrast to ontological security which is based on individual security of being and identity, securitization theory takes the premise that security threats “justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them”, and therefore does not conflict with ontological security but adds the practical component to practice security (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998:21). Framed by Buzan and colleagues (1998) the Copenhagen school securitization theory is placed as a more extreme version of politicization. A securitization move is only able to be successful because an actor presents an issue as an existential threat, even though it does not necessarily qualify as a real objective threat. For instance, security at practice, was performed by the Bush administration, after 9/11, who framed international terrorism as a threat to western society, culture, and freedom. Terrorism never threatened the destruction of the whole society in absolute real terms but through securitization the Bush administration could pose terrorism as a serious threat to western values and ideals. Furthermore, this also shows that securitization does not happen in an equilibrium and hence cannot simply be imposed with random will. To make the securitization move successful, the audience, which on a state level is usually the population of a country, needs to accept the move (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). This basically means that the audience accepts the need for all three steps to have successful securitization: (1) existence of existential threat, (2) need for emergency action, and (3) effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules (ibid., 1998:26). Important to understand is the difference to ontological security as a securitization move is, generally speaking, possible to be applied to any issue. It is a process which can take on politicized and non-politicized issues and does not have to go through the government per se. Moreover, securitization as practice cannot be decided by individuals or groups without the acceptance of the audience. Securitization is,

therefore, socially constructed, intersubjective, and requires language in form of a definitive speech act to be at practice (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998).

There might be some overlapping characteristics but the distinction between both theories is crucial to understand how emotions and identities are being challenged in the context of securitization? For ontological security, existential threat means losing identity and the 'protective cocoon' against existential anxieties and thus leads to a status of ontological insecurity. In comparison, a securitization move is a practice to frame an issue as an existential threat, as a threat which requires total priority. The consequence of performing securitization is, further, to call for extraordinary measures to continue existence of the nation and society (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). It conflicts therefore with the question if we speak about physical or ontological threats. This raises the question if it is physical security or ontological security which is threatened? According to the securitization framework both can be a threat to existence while this question is not that clear in the ontological security framework. In Giddens's theory, emotional cognition can constitute a threat for routines. This means that emotions frame if the ontological secure position is threatened or not. The securitization of threats to ontological security therefore discomforts the identity of an individual. For instance, this can be experienced when far-right movements use cultural differences between immigrants and the host community to securitize identity of minorities and blame open border policies as one of the reasons. Continuous affordance to securitize, therefore, works as tool to construct the picture of the 'enemy within' (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2010; Huysmans, 1998). Furthermore, it is not surprising that people get attracted by populist speech which addresses the emotional-cognitive and identity of a being. It is especially important to understand how the role of social media is being used in respect to the relationship between the ontological-emotional as well as cognitive part. Consequently, it is to acknowledge that language is social and political in the realm of securitization and therefore allows the simultaneous construction of identities and differences in the speech act (Hansen, 2006).

In this regard, it also helps us to understand that security is “conceptualized and politically practiced differently in different places and at different times” (Bubandt, 2005:291), hence security narratives are socially constructed and claim to be something ‘good’ at the individual level and insecurity as something purely ‘bad’. (Wæver, 1996). Populist nationalistic narrative thus is a move to construct a securitization language to secure national identity. The nature of populist movements is to claim that they are the defenders of societal identity. Securitization is hence used as a device to realize an imagined community with an identity which can be understood within the premise of ‘vernacular security’, which must be understood as site-specific management of threats and (un)certainities (Bubandt, 2005). In line with Croft and Vaughan-Williams (2016), I argue that populist movements, not only use a nationalistic application as a new identity, but also offer attractive and effective management of uncertainty and ‘dread’ to provide appealing narratives. This also speaks then in the realm of everyday security practices. Such a scenario is aimed to mobilize individuals in moments of uncertain events and link them to scenarios and hence routines from everyday life (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). Both scholars argue that it is social media and the management of the everyday which offers a promising avenue to study ontological security (Croft and Vaughan-Williams, 2016). Before introducing a broader attempt in understanding securitization theory, I will turn now towards the psychological-political perspective of nationalism.

4.3. Nationalism – Telling the right story?

Ontological security found popular recognition in all different fields of social science. Though, there has been two main foci established between the state level often discourse in international relations literature and the societal or group and individual level. In order to explain how far-right populist movements manifest themselves in social media one has to understand the psychological and sociological application of ontological security for the group and individual.

Today's social movements in response to today's globalisation, offer and challenge existing political structures and try to reach policy change with all kinds of different issues. To understand why populist movements are appealing I will uncover how ontological security can be restored from the individual side of things. Individuals who are in search for a stable identity and did not find themselves in organized groups and biographical continuity. The aim here is not to investigate why and how individuals feel insecure, uncertain, and left alone today solely, but looking in this direction allows me to provide a discussion about the more organized form of collective action and how social movements make use of the ontological. The ones which are willing to protect group identity by actively creating a distinction between 'us' or 'the people' and 'the other'. Thus, I ask here; how are global processes creating such psychological dichotomy in the first place?

In an ever-globalised world, identity, according to Giddens (1991) is one of the most important factors which keep one ontological secure and in place. To have and continue a stable identity means to construct a way of feeling in place or at 'home'. A place where emotions and routines might be challenged but can be absorbed through the stable feeling of 'home' (Kinnvall, 2004; Croft, 2012). It is an emotional set of meaning which constitutes 'home' for someone rather than a cognitive one. In contrast to Giddens's (1991), Mitzen (2006) later developed the idea that routines are emotionally laden as they are developed through emotional safety, basic trust relations and even influences cognition. The global-local relation is not only physically observable, for instance through daily media news coverage, but most people have emotionally established fears and anxieties which affect and rupture their behaviour and routines (Silverstone, 1993). This is often palpable through migration effects (Huysmans, 2006).

The combination of mediated as well as experienced vulnerability and existential anxiety means that identity wishes and demands to re-establish to attain feelings of ontological security again. Kinnvall (2004) uncovers the importance of identity in a more profound way than Giddens did and at the same time is able to show that

nationalism and religion have the ability in providing necessary beliefs and stories to reaffirm ontological security.

Using today's migration as a starting point she argues, secure self-identities and recreating lost security are crucial points to feel ontological secure. Like Giddens (1991) argued, trust as the bearer and creator of the protective 'cocoon' against existential anxieties in what Kinnvall calls biographical continuity, which is the development of a consistent narrative which then answers important questions about the self. 'Home' as a functional protective space is thus the place where routines have established. The discussion how routines are developed is crucial one to understand here. As described by Giddens (1991) and Kinnvall (2004) feelings of ontological security are emotionally driven but the way routines are 'lived', is the cognitive and behavioural response to an emotional status. This idea developed by Mitzen (2006) allows us also to understand the importance of basic trust. Trust is a necessity for social life to function and to follow everyday routines. Consequently, it is the routines everyone 'lives' which constitute our identity and feeling of ontological security to existential threat. Finally, now it is not hard to understand why global processes and increased mediated coverage bears all kinds of different fears and anxieties especially those which can directly be linked to daily routines. Hence, it is a continuous search for identity as it is a process of becoming rather than carrying a fixed one. (See also Somers, 1994). Kinnvall (2004) uses social-psychological intergroup theory to explain how individuals in group settings create an outgroup but only to manifest their own position socially.² In Kinnvall's work the creation and demonization of a threatening 'other' is demonstrated through numerous example in history with violent outcomes. At this point it helps

² The creation of in- and outgroup is originated in the rational-choice behaviour of individuals. Theoretically based on three principles: (1) Individuals want to achieve and maintain a positive social identity, (2) Positive social identity is achieved through a distinction between a favourable positive ingroup to a less relevant outgroup, (3) when unsatisfied with social identity, individuals will leave the existing group and join another one or make effort to make the existing group positively distinct (Tajfel and Turner, 1979:40). For a full discussion consult Tajfel and Turner (1979).

to understand why far-right populist movements constantly seek to introduce a distinction between ‘the people’ and ‘the other’.

Additionally, the search for a pleasing narrative to secure self-identity becomes more perceptible through a thick-signifier analysis which will later also help to understand how populist groups manifest themselves by securitizing identities. Shifting identities into the security discussion requires a discourse producer. To make this power relation work the marginalized group does hold a definite weaker power position than the discourse producer (Huysmans, 1998).

In his theory, I would argue that Huysmans tried to blur the lines between physical and ontological security. He is setting physical on the same level as of ontological security. I think crucial to understand is that there is a difference between feeling ontological insecure or being directly exposed to physical harm. It seems to me that what he tried to show was that individuals tend to equal physical insecurity with ontological insecurity. A valid point which also is often commented on regarding Giddens’s theory; that it simplifies what is going on in our unconscious. There are elements present which are not tangible or not classifiable in the physical – ontological question. Thus, for instance states provide security using reflexive measures and creating an enemy (Huysmans, 1998).

Huysmans (1998) introduced the concept of ‘thick signifier’ and frames it around the securitization discourse which has often been applied in international relations literature and on the state level (see Mitzen, 2006; Steele, 2005). His main argument enables us to understand that securitization is not just happening in an external world. It is a question of what security means for the overall organization of our everyday social life and social relations (Huysmans, 1998). Securing an issue defines how we want to stand towards ‘the other’ and to ourselves. It also implies that we have to recall the questions: how do we want to position ourselves and what makes ‘us’ us? This is what Kinnvall (2004) asked: what happens with identity and what does it mean for self-identity? The ‘other’ so to speak helps the majority group to create a collective identity and

“this implies that the enemy-other is not only created by the self, but has been a previous part of the self. This unconscious self is neither an object nor a subject; it is an abject. The construction of an abject-other becomes a means to securitize subjectivity as it reduces anxiety and increases ontological security” (Kinnvall, 2004: 753).

Followed by a discourse construction in which the ‘other’ group becomes essentialized to only a few cultural characteristics. The same process applies for the self which consequently allows the discourse to highlight differences and turns the ‘other’ into an enemy as they according to Kinnvall (2004:755) “do not (seem to) subscribe to a common belief system thus challenge the very foundation of the group”, the majority group which holds greater power to create a discourse in the first place. To continue, Kinnvall is able to show that in times of increased ontological insecurity and existential insecurity many people seek for distinctive stable identities, thus identities are reaffirmed in nationalism and religion as those identifications provide the most comforting stories by containing explicit narratives of a reimagined past of home, stability and continuity. She describes how chosen traumas repeatedly use the abject-other to enable a transportation of stories from the past to the current generation and therefore describes a virtues circle of nation as a protectionist identity (Kinnvall, 2004; Kay 2012). The essentialisation and securitization of subjectivity to distinct from the ‘other’ thus also allows to create increased non-liberal thought and behaviour which often is manifested in the most basic identity-signifiers (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2011). It is therefore no surprise to see the emergence of a new far-right in Europe as migration and socioeconomic changes are present issues. Fear becomes attached to an object, such as migrants, however when governments seem unable to respond meaningful and ultimately foster the creation of anxieties and a present unavoidable fear (Vettenranta, 2015).

In societies where meaningful answers and solutions are lacking and a clear near future is not imaginable people tend to marginalize and reduce so called ‘outsiders’ to only basic characteristics, though to exactly those characteristics which are first socially constructed and secondly tend to display differences to the host community even more (Skey, 2010). I concur with Kinnvall that nationalism and religion offer

calming narratives in seek for a secure stable identity as they offer feelings of 'home' and a strong discourse which is simplified intelligible and historically created. However, an interesting angle would also consider alternative social movements which place themselves on a different ideological end such as the Occupy Movement. In general, Giddens's theory of ontological security has the shortcoming of neglecting learning-processes over-time and the assumption that individuals constantly think rationally about their feelings of security, being and self-identity which is also the starting point of the self-consciousness debate (Mitzen, 2006).³

I work on the assumption that one does constantly revise rationally, though as many have argued, in moments of great uncertainty and crisis people feel threatened more ontologically, either because of explicit exposure or mediated exposure, and start turning towards non-rational and polarized thinking (Kay, 2012). Ridout and colleagues (2008) and perception-risk literature offers interesting insights regarding my critique about learning effects and media exposure. Their argument based on cultivation theory is that people tend to fit their threat perception based on the image they derive from media. Further, political knowledge and global experience seem to affect individual perception. Increasing international mobility would increase global experience, offering a vague conclusion though.

Returning to Mitzen's (2006) work, she highlighted the importance of human agency, even though her discussion is based on state level theory, it allows us to

³ Pizzorno (1986) argues that besides the known idea of low- and high loyalty members which decide rational in group situations there is a third group which he calls the 'identifiers'. Such individuals are not part of a group for rational ends but for a collective reality from which she receives their individual identity. She will only leave if the identity of the group changes. In addition, a group deterioration will not lead to questioning but to only confirming the individual's identity. According to Pizzorno this requires faith, "Once the identity, the faith, or the love are lost, then a new person is born" (ibid., 1986:358). Lastly, to conclude his idea, it ends to be a game of recognition deciding about participation which gives attachment to identity. This identity is strengthened through commitment and can make the 'othering' mechanism work.

understand further why people seek stable identities. The loss of human agency is a disruption in feeling oneself 'as a whole', a break in self-identity. She further explained the process of agency as something that can negatively conflict with physical security. Individuals routinize behaviour to sustain their identity. As loss of agency would threaten the ontological secure position, individuals become attached to their routines which makes it difficult to alter them or let them go (ibid., 2006:347). Even though there is physical harm involved sticking to existing routines can generate ontological security. In this regard scholars tend to use the marriage example in which one partner physically abuses the other but instead of breaking out of the relationship, the beaten one stays. A breakout of this relationship would hurt the need for identity and thus lead to ontological insecurity (Giddens, 1991). This reasoning and example helps to understand that some actors have failed to develop the ability to rationally revise their behaviour thus staying in a physical harming environment. Generally, the power of human agency is always an essential ingredient in the securitization as well as social movement literature as it allows actors to create a discourse and at the same comfort ontology (Benford, 1997; Mitzen, 2006; Kinnvall, 2004).

I have theorised now why people search for new identities and further that nationalism offers a reimagination of the past, of something which has been lost but through powerful narratives is desirable in moments of existential anxieties and fracture of self-identity. Furthermore, a collective bonding of the majority ingroup against an outgroup offers a practical understanding of populist movement rhetoric. Hence, nationalism as an identity-signifier seems like a logical choice. Through securitization of subjectivity the creation of an 'other' is inevitable. This is based on the argument that 'the other' always must be present to be able to create powerful narratives – nationalism and religion - to uplift one's ontological security. It can therefore work to explain why people support greater national security in price for civil liberties and protection of 'home', furthermore it explains why they can fall into, what I call, the 'populism trap'. This trap is based on the logic of addressing people's existential anxieties and providing reassurance through a new social order

which is only achievable through a policy change (Marlow, 2002). By creating a securitization discourse about the ‘other’ which is based on the most basic socially constructed cultural characteristics, populist movements are able to provide simple logical answers and narratives which provide ontological security in nationalism. To close the theoretical picture, I will now turn towards Croft’s (2012) post-Copenhagen theory.

4.4. Linking Securitization to Ontological Security

The work of Stuart Croft (2012) offers an additional insight with an interlinking concept of identity securitization and the meaning for ontological security. As our everyday life is highly transformed through processes of securitization – migration as a threat to identity, economic crisis to individuals and the state or climate change to the globe, to only name a few - Croft sees the need to bring the focus back from theorising the ontological in international relations and back to the individual level (See also Krolkowski, 2008; Chernobrov, 2016). Croft uses the British government as an example which introduced public campaigns after the 2005 London bombings to raise awareness among the public. The goal was to spot potential terrorist activities and eventually establish new routines next to existing routines. For Croft, ontological security means also to understand how the nation state tries to prevail a national identity in which narratives can enhance security. As discussed earlier, Giddens (1991) narratives or biographical continuity allows each one of us to develop an individual story of who and what we are. From Kinnvall’s (2004) work we also know how imagined narratives are attractive stories to recreate identity. Reliability of narratives thus creates feelings of ontological security.⁴ Additionally, our self-identity is produced in what Giddens (1991) calls ‘protective cocoon’

⁴ Like Bubandt (2005), Croft underlines that our framework of reality, the everyday interactions can be “appropriate and acceptable in one time and place” but may not be in another (Croft, 2012:21). This as Croft further argues, “allows humans to create and develop their own personal narratives, their own situational accounts of who they are and why they behave as they do. These biographies give a sense of direction, and of worth. And it is the quality of the reliability of those narratives for the individual that creates the sense of ontological security” (Croft, 2012:21).

where our trust in experts and social tokens are structured, although requires constant re-grounding as failure undermines trust structures and consequently the ontological secure position (Croft, 2012). One point I see often overlooked or neglected in ontological security research. I highlighted these characteristics again to understand Croft's argument of ontological security and how his post-Copenhagen theory of securitization helps to explain the relationship to "identity, narrative and security" and how ontological security leads to the securitization of identity of others (Croft, 2012:17).

An important characteristic in Croft's argument is that in each identity, fragility of the one being exists as well as robustness to each own position. A crucial feature is also to be aware of the ever-present ontological insecure position, which is expressed in dread (Croft, 2012). For him, the meaning of 'home', as discussed in relation Kinnvall (2004) can also constitute in "local identity-groups" which aim it is to prevent "any form of change", if necessary by reimagine the past or to reimagine a cultural socially constructed community. In the most unfiltered execution even with the use of violence (Croft, 2012:34-36). Against traditional securitization theory, his theory is meant to be more descriptive than performative and relaxes key elements and adds new ones as well. First, he states that the speech act can "be communicated through a variety of texts" so possible by silence and image. Such securitization is, thereby, "situated within a whole series of other signs and texts" (ibid., 2012:80). Secondly, the securitization attempt can be also produced through "socially powerful agents", which grants securitization performed by cultural sources. I have previously referred to this as a discourse producer. The third argument states that the audience needs to reconstruct and perform various roles of securitization in coherence with the dividing categories called for. In contrast, the audience is possible to resist against the securitization attempt. In other words, to successfully securitize it needs performative everyday actions by the audience and the elite which also contributes to "ontological security of individuals" (ibid., 2012:83). Finally, securitization in his sense is successful through performative lived actions, thereby, reconstituting the securitization move,

“whether it be through employment practices, through jokes, or by specific expressions of identity such as those which occur in the field of sport” (ibid., 2012:83). His reinterpretation of securitization theory offers a strong empirical concept to conduct research on national movements as cultural or societal actors trying to securitize the identity of ‘the other’ by creating strong narratives using nationalism as a key language. It is attractive for those individuals who searching to reaffirm their identity which is undertaken with the attempt to live performative securitization. Further, it constitutes a new identity who are in search for one as performative actions would bolster ontological security. Precisely as Bubandt (2005) and Croft & Vaughan-Williams (2016) have argued, the effective management of dread and uncertainty of the everyday constantly provides pleasing narratives or ‘like-mindedness’ of performative securitization for the individual urgently searching for identity and thus ontological security. Albeit, the performative securitization is hereby, I argue, only an attempted notion as populist groups do not successfully reach acceptance within majority in society. Populism is taking the prime position in applying a unique manifestation in social media to gain support.

To finalize the link to ontological security, it is essential to understand that securitization is a process to reconstruct identity by which the audience must accept, extend, and deepen the attempted securitization by the actor. Therefore, through performative routines the ontological security link becomes distinctive. It is also to acknowledge that such attempts to reconstruct identity is a “process in constant motion, and to understand that this motion is not unilinear. Thus, a successful securitization move may lead to a variety of identity reconstructions” (Croft, 2012:86). The ‘greater’ the process of ‘othering’ in the securitization move the more it reaffirms and strengthens the identity of the discourse producer. On an empirical account, such ‘othering’ ranges mainly among various cultural as well as racial characteristics as outlined by Croft:




Figure 1: The range of Otherness
 (Croft, 2012, 91)

4.5. Finishing the frame - Securitizing subjectivity

Now it becomes important to understand the practical application of both theories. Kinnvall's psychological framework of ontological security theory allows to understand the importance of identity and its reconstruction through nationalism – which is an incremental part of contemporary populist movements ideological agenda. Moreover, Croft's post-Copenhagen theory allows for an understanding of the performative actions and power relations of a securitization move set in action by a cultural or societal actor itself. Both theories agree that a discourse about the notions of 'home' is a crucial factor in achieving ontological security and coherence among the majority population. Both theories also agree that the distinct creation of a picture of 'other' is at the one hand an inevitable reaction for identity construction but on the other hand allows actors to abuse such determination to feel more ontological secure themselves by using their power to polarize and

marginalize the position of 'other'. While Kinnvall provides a crucial understanding of how individuals need an emotional secure narrative to feel ontological secure, Croft provides an explanatory dimension with the tools to understand securitization framing in a new post-Copenhagen approach.

How can this be applied to national populist movements? The biographical need through securitizing subjectivity to feel ontological secure is not to be reduced to the individual level but also to the collective level. Movements not only have the need for biographical continuity but also understand the power of securitizing subjectivity through using and framing their narratives. The use of a frame in the act of framing together a narrative becomes the prime resource to operate and manifest in social media as mediated experience for the ontological is from substance here. Social media plays an extraordinary factor in mediating news stories into people's homes. According to Silverstone (1993), the importance of media in everyday life has different functions of significance. Emotionally it works as both disturber and comforter, cognitive it informs but also misinforms and spatially and temporally it becomes itself a routine of everyday life. His argument is that media's role changes the quality of space and time. The mediator both materially and symbolically brings globalization and its outcomes closer. Silverstone hereby offers a first integration of media to daily life something initially overlooked by Giddens (1991) and much later acknowledged but which allows me here in this thesis to make the step into social media and the world of frames and narratives.

Research on social movements has focused on framing theories specifically. Securitization theory and framing theory overlap here. As populist movements using social media to a great extent, one also faces all kinds of media and different dynamics. Any form of media can create a form of discourse which qualifies its subjects. Securitization theory is therefore not only bounded to the speech act when a specific subject, as outlined by Croft (2012) in Graph 1, is to be securitized (Hansen, 2008). This appears when the discourse is based on national identity and nationalism as the identity to answer the original research question:

How do populist movements securitise narratives of identity in social media from the broader perspective of ontological security?

Consequently, one must find how “‘a threatening other’ is explicitly constituted as such” (Hansen, 2008:55) and go beyond the traditional empirical understanding of language and text solely. Describing a specific subject to produce a discourse is thus also always a form of framing. A ‘frame’ originally coming from cinematography implies to denote a certain issue and explain everyday interaction and communication (Pinto, 2014; Snow et al., 1986). Goffman (1974:21) defines it as a “schemata of interpretation” that allows “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” issues or subjects individually but also collectively. It allows to use different signifier within one frame or along many different frames to create a coherent narrative. For populist movements, this means that for instance the use of an identity signifier allows the movement to frame a polarized picture between host and migrant community in everyday life situations.

The action of framing has the aim to organize “the audience’s experience into interpretative frames, and guide their action to fulfil the objectives outlined by the strategic actor” (Pinto, 2014:164). Further, as Entman (1993:52) describes it, framing an issue gives power to influence the transfer of information – “such as a speech, utterance, news report, or novel” – from a producer to the consciousness of the receiver. Therefore, social media works as the operating tool for information in the most unambiguous and perceivable way. Ultimately, a frame involves the selection made by a producer of a perceived reality and to make more salient through the transfer (Entman, 1993). A societal actor is using its power of agency, which respectively achieves a higher leverage in social media due to easy and direct ways of communication. The cognitive side enables a producer to create powerful narratives by highlighting certain cultural characteristics and emphasizing on attributes which support the producer’s goal. The receiver shall understand the narration with the intended goal of the producer (Crow and Lawlor, 2016). Accordingly, empirical work has greatly focused on the connection between producer and receiver and the transfer of information within a frame.

Ultimately, a speech act within securitization theory is a method of framing. The meaning of framing outgoing from a collective actor hence is often used in relation to social movements and to explain their strategy and communication with the public. The frame itself operates to create perception and to control affection towards a subject (Butler, 2007). In a negative notion, to affect against a subject. The agent creating the frame is also able to set norms either visually or narratively (Butler, 2007). Securitization theory however claims to call for extraordinary measures by rendering an existential threat within the speech act. It limits itself with this kind of understanding as Williams (2003) argues. Though, as a social practice it is basically able to drag every issue into the realm of security and classify it as an existential threat (Williams, 2003). This being a major criticism to this theory itself allows at the same times to understand the need to develop and analyse securitization outside the traditional boundaries as argued in Croft's post-Copenhagen theory. As argued by Williams (2003:522) it must be understood as an "existing reality and a continual possibility" and thus needs to take visual securitization and alternative actors outside the traditional understanding into consideration.

Lene Hansen's work (2011) untangled the power of visual securitization by analysing the effect of how images 'speak security'. The phenomenon of visual securitization specially comes from greater understanding due to technological advances such as social media in which text does barely stands alone and most of the time is linked with pictures or even videos appearing simultaneously for the receiver. In sum, visuals can 'speak security' but they are always dependent on the textual discourse as well, as visuals increase security communication between actors. Important to note is the immediacy, circulability, and ambiguity addresses directly the ontological understanding of visuals. To identify with the visual is an important factor of securitization which at the same time offers vulnerability of staged or doctored visuals (Hansen, 2011). This can be a big problem in the internet age where pictures or videos can be easily adjusted and edited to someone's need and use. The use of visuals in framing a discourse is thus a crucial factor to consider

as it increases the perceptual power when the discourse is aimed to identify oneself within the frame of nationalism. I argue by selecting the ‘right’ attributes within the frame then allows not only to reproduce or describe a known object, and consequently highlight them, but also to create new attributes to the object (McCombs and Ghanem, 2001). This power of a frame also allows this thesis to understand the link to securitization theory again, when an issue is clarified as an existential threat and a call for extraordinary means.

Understanding the basic concept of a frame and framing qualifies to understand how populist movements operate as their communication places a significant role in understanding populism (Aalberg and De Vreese, 2017). Populist strategy exploit the gap between promise and performance of the government often by applying the notion of a better past as in the logic of old times are often remembered as the ‘better times’ (Canovan, 1999; Aschauer, 2016). The notion of ‘heartland’ as I have discussed in an earlier section is a distinct way of framing the nation. According to Taggart (2004) the ‘heartland’ is usually not being used as a term in language but rather entails different notions of narrative and topics which frame the underlying idea of ‘heartland’ which it is to defend. As we have seen in Hellström’s (2016) work this is often done by using national myths to reimagine the nation in populist discourse. In other words, the nature of populist movements is hence to claim that they are the only ones defending societal identity. This was also evident in the discussion in Kinnvall’s (2004) work before.

Populists try to “invoke some sense of a crisis”, similar in the sense of using securitization, to spread the message of “soon it will be too late” while at the same time offering simple solutions and answers to complex problems which seem logically to the masses (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008:5). Also, a populist communication style itself can attract followers “which is based around: anti-elitism, reference to/construction of “the people” and/or exclusion of out-groups” (Reinemann et al., 2017:15). Finally, social media offers an uncomplicated tool in culturally pursuing securitization of identity. It is not a coincidence that the German PEGIDA movement is using abbreviations for Patriotic Europeans Against the

Islamization of the Occident. Their name itself contains a form of ‘othering’ already. The use of online media ultimately offers such movements the agency to create different discourses on an everyday basis, this is done by securitizing identity of others, securitizing subjectivity of the host community or spreading narratives containing fear, threat, and existential anxieties of everyday routines. Especially through telling a collective narrative of becoming, populist movements can manifest themselves but more importantly develop a narrative of collective identity of a coherent community or nation (Polletta, 1998). Moreover, the power of a story is to get attached to them, to keep reading one could say, once an individual is ‘soaked’ into populist rhetoric, they offer “familiarity, pleasurable surprise, and emotional identification” (Polletta, 1998:425). Through such online narrative structures they attempt of creating a new social identity or re-create aspects of an existing one - such as nationalism - which gives people feelings of unity, belonging, positive emotions and thus feelings of ontological security (Reinemann et al., 2017).

5. Methodology

A stable identity can be achieved through addressing one's ontological feelings of insecurity through processes of securitizing subjectivity, a strategy which seems like an everyday repertoire of far-right populism. The thesis argues that everyday threats and events are thus best addressed through telling 'small stories' (Page, 2015). In particular, identity is best transported through using a narrative structure within social media. Accordingly, populist language and its communication understands itself as means to manifest the movements agenda and gain in support. It is therefore necessary to introduce narrative analysis.

5.1. Why analysing narratives?

“Narratives are the stories people construct to make sense of their reality. Narratives help us understand who we are, where we come from, and the implications of that for our current lives. At a collective level, narratives provide cohesion to and transmit shared beliefs of common origins and identity” (Andrews, Kinnvall and Monroe, 2015:141).

Narratives require cognition in order to organize perceptions and weave them together to coherent meanings of everyday life. Consequently, narratives of political nature play a crucial role in the construction of political behaviour and how the political environment is understood by individuals and groups (Patterson and Monroe, 1998). In Somers (1994) view, narratives have an ontological as well as epistemological dimension. People tell narratives to position and locate themselves and accordingly make guided actions out of narratives. Narratives constitute social identities in which agency allows to understand the actions being made. Further, Somers (1994:616) frames narrativity as a constellation of connections “embedded in time and space, constituted by causal emplotment.” Narratives do not exist in isolation they must be analysed as “patterned matrices or conceptual networks” (Somers, 1995:232). Therefore, an understanding of narratives is complete when a context is set in relations to other events which allows to see a logical narrative plot. To understand the identity aspect of narrativity one has to incorporate the ontological emplotment of social actors into the analysis (Somers, 1994).

This means that identities are expressed and build through a narrative, which can provide cohesion at the collective level within the realm of social media. As I already argued, social media bypasses the lack of agency as it allows direct communicable means for an actor. Therefore, epistemologically I see the use of narratives as social constructs which allow populist movements to make meaning of their communication. The aim of a narrative communication is to reach a threshold of believe within the majority in which citizens start to accept and believe the story being told and turn it into social facts (Subotic, 2015). Ontologically they are placed to create security for the individual and as tools of manifestation between traditional political parties and other social movements. Along the reasoning of Hammack (2008) such 'new' narratives by populist movements position themselves to fill the gap between dominant discourses in moments of uncertainty.

In a similar fashion, Scuzzarello (2010) argues that narratives always contain some form of legitimacy in which specific representations of actors or relationships between different entities shape the understanding of our world. Narratives need to achieve legitimacy to gain visibility and resonance within the wider audience. Consequently, narratives claim power in everyday discourses and thus allow an attempt to securitize subjectivity online from a pool of constant changing stories in the first place.

I argue populist movements set up specific frames which are reproducing a nationalistic ideal at the cost of polarisation and marginalization between minority and host community. This has the effect to securitize specific issues which fit the ideology of nationalism and allow people to reimagine the past and get attached to a populist narrative. Accordingly, a categorization of different narratives within the social media of the AfD will be provided. This will make it possible to spot different characteristics and dominant narratives easier. The impact of the frame thus is only a method itself to highlight certain values and objects in a narrative. Therefore, in this analysis it is from importance to untangle the emotional-cognitive component of narratives which addressing specific ontological insecurities such as 'other', identity or notions of 'home' (Kinnvall, 2004).

5.2. Narrative analysis

To identify the different narratives and to understand the manifestation of the narrative being told in social media I will take in what Polkinghorne (1995) calls an analysis of narrative. Applying narrative method enables me to look at narratives which produce paradigmatic categories as stated above. Categorisation allows to sort the material as well as highlight major changes within a narrative structure. Furthermore, it allows me to analyse narratives along the content often expressed in describing specific themes which can be found across many narratives or for instance, similar “types of stories, characters, or settings” (Polkinghorne, 1995:12). The data I will derive by applying this method allows me to seek for common themes and manifestations as well as to illustrate my theory. To spot a certain notion across narratives I will deductively use concepts from the theory illustrated.

Securitization theory commends to focus on the speech and thus language extensively. However, language will be less of importance as it is viewed as a resource for narratives (Riessman, 2005). This does not mean that I leave out the meaning of language but I will not specifically try to spot changes by comparing the meaning of single words. For instance, if a Facebook post shows similarities to hate speech or sarcastic joking language I will take this into consideration. (See Croft, 2012). From importance will be to uncover the structure between the narratives, if there is a coherent structure between narrative networks (Somers, 1995). Like Scuzzarello (2010:17) I also will break down the “data into simply narratives or sets of narratives with a beginning, a middle and an end” and will not examine a single online post as an independent narrative. Furthermore, I will take other visuals besides text such as pictures or videos into consideration as they mark a standard repertoire in social media and add a better understanding to the narratives itself and of securitization theory (Page, 2015; Hansen, 2008).

Somers (1994) established four different dimensions of narratives. Two of them will be applied within this analysis: (1) “Public narratives refer those narratives attached to cultural or institutional formations larger than the single individual” For

instance, narratives about “the working-class hero”, with the range to narratives of the nation, church, and myths (ibid., 1994:619). Social media creates, in Somers view, and “connect events to create a “mainstream plot” (ibid., 1994:619). (2) The other dimension is meta- or master narratives which entail sociological concepts of “social systems, social entities, and social forces” (ibid., 1994:619) such as grand narratives about “capitalism vs. communism” or in populist reasoning ‘the people’ vs. ‘the elite’ (ibid., 1994:619). At this point it is important to note that even though Somers is making a distinction between narrative types she also points out that a clear distinction is not possible which means they are not mutually exclusive and can overlap to some degree. Accordingly, this thesis uses these dimensions to spot distinct narratives and to analyse them to the plots which I will discuss now in detail.

I assume to face three different main plots in the narratives. One plot I call the ‘saviour plot’ which generally aims to provide a narrative of the movement as the saviour in great uncertainty. This plot is motivated by the theoretical understanding of existential anxiety in which daily routines and a physical threat is present such as after a violent incident. The second plot I call the ‘blaming plot’ which can be described according to popular populist rhetoric with the aim to narrate the current elite as for instance incapable, corrupt, and distrustful (Engesser et al., 2016). The two-former fit the most to contemporary understanding of populist movement communication. However, the third addresses ontological security according to a psychological-emotional context in which identity, biographical continuity and generally the securitization of subjectivity is schematized. I called it therefore the ‘subjectivity plot’. It further works as an overarching theme for the former two because people would choose to stick to the ‘saviour plot’ and ‘blaming plot’ to exercise their ontological status and need for biographical continuity.

Additionally, Facebook posts will also be analysed by taking the comment section into consideration. This will add an important understanding of the emotional context to such narratives, a tendency which is most likely observable throughout the comment section. Examining the comments will give an understanding of how individuals reinforce narratives, and reflect the interactive component of social

media (Lu, Zhang and Fan, 2015). For ethical aspects, I will not add or reveal any linkages or names of the actual person who made a comment I use in the analysis. The level of analysis will be the Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) which established in February 2013 and today holds seats in ten German regional parliaments. In the aftermath of the economic crisis they first started with a clear 'anti-European' or 'anti-EURO' agenda. Facebook is used as the object of analysis because it is the most used platform to obtain news within available social media platforms (Mitchell et al., 2014). Further, Twitter due to its limitation of 140 characters is in my opinion too limited to create some form of coherent, logical communication and narrative network. Finally, I will focus on Facebook posts being published in the year 2016 on the national representation of the AfD only. Due to a massive number of postings – almost twice a day – and the significant events in this year it should give enough content to examine for a narrative analysis. I will select key signifier posts which attain a high social media response by its audience. In addition to that, posts with a relatively high number of Likes, Comments, and Shares work as representation signifiers for AfD's narrative structure.

5.3 Emplotment structures

Narrative type	Emplotment type	Description	Examples
Public narratives	1.1. Saviour plot	- Framing great uncertainty in everyday life, notions of existential anxiety for the people, AfD offers easy solutions.	- “Again, asylum seekers have harassed women in the most obtrusive way on an open street. ... Everyone who cannot behave forfeits their rights to stay and should be deported immediately” (28.10.2016).
	1.2. Blaming plot	- Framing of elite as backstabber of the ‘common citizen’, framing elite as incompetent, distrustful, corrupt, etc.	- “So, the money of the German taxpayer was buried in the banks to save Greece. ... And again, there is not attempt from the government to initiate a Grexit.” “They do not care about the simple man” (04.05.2016).
	1.3. Subjectivity plot	- Framing; loss or break up of national identity, existential fears to biographical continuity and citizen as ‘causalities’	- “After one year, we have civil war similar conditions in Bautzen ... How will that continue? Are we going to see minarets in the future?” (17.09.2016).
Meta narratives	2.1. Saviour plot	- Framing great uncertainties outgoing from the current system, status quo. Economic anxiety is existential. Can entail creation of an enemy picture (political elite/EU/other).	- “The ECB, the IWF and German politicians ... are starting a frontal attack on our money. The elimination of cash money will happen slowly and sneaky so German citizens will realize it when it is too late” (20.02.2016).
	2.2. Blaming plot	- Framing the elite vs. ‘the people’ or state vs. ‘nation’, framing elite as incompetent, distrustful, corrupt, etc.	- “One does not has to be a financial or migration expert to realize that Mrs. Merkel is doing great harm to the German society. ... There are less people who are getting deceived by her lies. (04.03.2016).
	2.3. Subjectivity plot	- Framing existential threat or fear to biographical continuity of the nation and society as a bigger picture.	- “The import of Muslim religion, which is at the same time a culture doctrine, means the fall of the western culture, the validity of classical human rights ... and the western system of government” 10.06.2016).

6. Analysis

The AfD made its first Facebook entry on the 3rd of March 2013 by stating that this the official representation of AfD followed by pictures from its first official party meeting. Today, the AfD has an outreach of nearly 320.000 Facebook Likes. In March 2016, the party could count already about 233.000 persons following their posts (Neuerer, 2016). A short comparison: The governing parties of the current big coalition have together 236.000 Likes – CDU (Christ Democrats) nearly 130.000, SPD (Social Democrats) about 136.000 Likes. This short snapshot shows one clear tendency. The AfD as a far-right populist party relies on its social media representation by finding voice for many more supporters compared to the established traditional parties. The data is obtained by using Facebook's internal search function which allows to search posts made by one specific Facebook account at a specific month and year. Due to Facebook's reversed chronological order the latest entry is always shown first for the observer and the oldest at last. However, this narrative analysis will present the findings in a logical chronological structure by starting from 1. January 2016 and ending on the 31. December 2016. This allows to spot the beginning, middle and end of overarching narrative (Scuzzarello, 2010).

Along the presented table six different narrative emplotments have been spotted. It must be added that the AfD did not always posted along the reasoning of the presented emplotment table. In a few instances, especially towards the end of 2016 the party was calling increasingly for donations by its supporters due to the general election 2017 in Germany. Further, rather general postings such as short notifications about a AfD politician's appearance in a TV talk show or postings about press conferences have not been part of this analysis. Crucial in this analysis is also the fact that in many postings there was sometimes a two or even threefold appearance or tendency of different emplotment types and as stated an overlapping of different narrative types was observable as well. For instance, while there is an attempt to securitize subjectivity along cultural lines there is in the same sense also a blaming structure of framing 'the elite' as the ones who have betrayed 'the

people’. This is an often-used technique by the AfD and entails that it not always clear which plot it can be applied to. Therefore, this analysis will not go step by step through all different types or plots but present an overall narrative concept to illustrate the theoretical motivation of this thesis (See Somers, 1995; Scuzzarello, 2010). In addition, such postings seem to create a securitization of ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’ by creating the state, institutions, and politicians, creating an enemy picture.

6.1. Narrating an enemy

AfD’s narration in early 2016 starts on the backdrop of sexual harassments which occurred during the New Year’s Eve night 2015/2016. Mainly in Cologne but also in other German cities incidents of organized sexual assaults by larger groups of men were reported (Noak, 2016). The AfD is using these incidents to create a bigger story of betrayal, lies, and subjectivity against German politicians but primarily the German media. The picture on the 10th of January therefore gains high attention due to its simple statement: “German Media: Camouflage, Conceal and Lying.” (My translation).



Figure 2: German Media

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativefuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1060120364018302/?type=3&theater>, 10.01.2016)

While the text in the post itself does only contain several different claims against German media and the way they skew and falsify their reporting. The picture speaks ‘facts’ by framing media as distrustful and lying. The power mechanism of such false ‘facts’ is reproduced when one is turning towards the comment section. Many commentators affirm that the media is lying or reporting one-sided, thus reproducing a common notion of blaming ‘the elite’ in the sense of corrupt and working against ‘the people’. (See also 25.07.2016; 14.10.2016; see appendix). Some commentators call for greater support for the PEGIDA movement by relativizing German people on the street fighting against the police and the state while claiming that refugees enjoy a policy of free passing. Again, a meta-narrative of ‘the elite’ vs. ‘the people’ is thereby ontologically reproduced on the account of framing ‘all refugees’ as possible criminals. However, it confirms what Croft (2012) classifies as reconstructing securitization, by showing acceptance of performative actions on the street. This post does not stand in isolation, it is the result of entries made days before the 10th of January in which the AfD frames a distinctive picture of victim and enemy within a single plot. Putting all entries in perspective they are creating a first narrative structure. A post from the 5th of January 2016 therefore asked:

[...] Is this the “open-minded and colourful” Germany Merkel wished for? Is this what she meant, when she was speaking of being open, tolerant, and benevolent towards foreign cultures? [...] Many have warned of that but the responsible ones are once again surprised, so little understanding of reality and no life experience is left there. Uncontrolled entry leads to that an offender, like in this case, is not able to be identified. But even when one would find these persons, it would not have any consequences to their refugee status. Simple crimes like rape are not enough, there must be murder first to have an impact to their status. [...] Such cynicism! Go tell this the traumatized people! (05.01.2016, My translation; see appendix)

This posting shows the intentionality the AfD is operating with. Even though there is no clear stating of a perpetrator neither from official nor news side, the AfD is generalizing and targeting refugees as an enemy to traditions in which feasts and routines are threatened. Emotionally reproduced in the comment section in

comments such as: “Do not complain if there will be over 10 Million refugees in our country. Because then Cologne was just the opening act.” (05.01.2016, My translation; see appendix). It allows to frame and picture ‘the refugees’ or ‘the other’ as an enemy. By using a saviour plot in which a potential threat to biographical continuity is presented. It thereby shows an early creation of an abject-other (Kinnvall, 2004). At the same time, one also can spot that the AfD is addressing the elite personally by creating a dialogue-like structure in the posting itself. Now, looking forward to the 10th of January again, the emplotment structure gains visibility. Based on an actual event the threat to everyday routines and identity is presented by securitizing ‘the other’ which simultaneously allows to securitise subjectivity against ‘the elite’ which is framed as lying or concealing mistakes from ‘the people’. I presented those entries to allow an understanding of how the general narrativity contains different plots and narrative types in which specific frames lead to intended outcomes. Furthermore, how the emotional reproduction of AfD’s followership in the comment section elevates the meaning of the posts. Additionally, how routines are emotional laden and people create the feeling to defend them actively (Mitzen, 2006).

On the momentum of this one blaming and subjectivity plot the AfD starts a series of different blaming plots in which German politicians are framed to have betrayed the German economy and the AfD positions themselves in providing simple solutions by securitizing global processes which conflict with national interests. In the sense that they trying to frame several ‘bad’ insecurity narratives (Wæver, 1996). In different posts days after the 10th, the AfD intensifies such plots which are for instance directed to frame Sigmar Gabriel, Germany’s vice-chancellor, as a scape goat for Merkel’s policies or Germany’s finance minister who is accused to betrayal German citizens by misusing taxes. In the reasoning of lost trust in expert systems the AfD is able to provide simple solutions again and reground its position to provide ontological security (Croft, 2012). At the 22nd of January, an Imam from Cologne is interviewed allowing the AfD to use this to securitize a controversial

statement made by the Imam, which here consists of the first two sentences in the complete quote itself:

“One of the reasons, why Muslim men rape or harass women is due to the way they dress. If they walk around half-naked and perfumed, then such things happen. It is like spilling oil into fire.” [...] We do not assume that women are walking around half-naked at a cold New Year’s Eve, but of course we understand if one feels that half-naked means that women do not wear the burqa. And even if they would have done so, there is no right in this world which grants a man to throw himself on a woman. Such reduction of women to their bodies and sexuality is intolerable. For a long-time, women had to fight for recognition and equality here, no one will take this from us again. [...] We are asking, why no one is giving clear statements, because the Islam clearly does not belong to Germany! (22.01.2016, My translation; see appendix).

The story being told in that plot gives the AfD agency and legitimacy to steer the discourse and to generalize the Muslim minority again by using multiple frames. The saviour plot in which actual physical threat is caused by ‘the other’ and in which the AfD calls to exclude ‘Islamic’ ideology. Further, through securitizing subjectivity, in this case the German woman, the AfD creates an emotional backlash within its greater fellowship in which German identity must be protected against foreign influence. This first observed narrative structure hence shows how performative actions are emotionally created and accepted within the comment section, which is only made possible by pushing a picture of the abject-other into the observing public. However, it must be noted that there are many commentators which see such posts as overstepping rightful lines and accusing the AfD of adjusting statements to their own needs.

6.2. Closing the identity narrative

Generally, next to the described plot structure the AfD is continuously trying to frame Germany, German money and ‘the people’ as ‘the taxpayers’ hence as losers in a globalised world. This is made possible again through several blaming plots in which German politicians betray its citizens by deciding over their heads. Ontologically, German taxpayers are placed as the ones to suffer from EU

regulations and policies (26.01.2016; see appendix), as the ones who have to give up economic freedoms (22.01.2016; see appendix) or the ones who have to pay for ‘wrongful’ immigration policies allowing the AfD to misuse such postings to their needs (01.02.2016, 16.02.2016, 20.09.2016; see appendix). These entries allow the AfD to create a picture of a German citizen who suffers economically the most from ‘the anti-democratic EU’ and politicians who are framed as a ‘corrupt caste’ often close to conspiracy theories within the comment section: “Draghi has been educated by Goldman Sachs and then was sent from America to Europe to destabilize the Euro. Completely incomprehensible why European politicians agreed to him” (03.02.2016, My translation; see appendix). Postings such as the later one finalizing the populist rhetoric of ant-elitism (Reinemann et al., 2017).

The framing of economic fears is one of the main public narratives being told by the AfD. It is either used to securitize the loss of economic freedom or economic burden which is being framed as an existential threat providing an explicit public narrative which consequently is continuously reproduced throughout the comment section. This narrative starts its story in early February 2016 just after German newspapers reporting about thoughts made by the government to abolish cash notes in the future and later overlaps in a similar fashion with a discussion about public broadcast fees. Most observable in interactional terms at the 3rd of February, 5th of February, 20th of February and 27th of February (see appendix). Such events offer the AfD a perfect opportunity to use ‘small stories’ in which the AfD claims agency to speak for ‘the people’, thus ultimately creating feelings about the loss of economic freedoms, government surveillance or generally ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’. Such postings are spread over the entire year and I see them in a two-fold intention. First, to create a coherent narrative and thus remembering mechanism and to secure the position of the AfD as speaking for the people by pointing at one’s existential anxiety and secondly, to transport the narrativity and hence the emotional-cognitive ontological position attached to postings which frame and address ‘the other’ and ontological insecurities (Croft, 2012). The most observant is that at the 27th of February in the comment section:

“The Government wants to abolish cash money to control financial streams more effective and to be able to extort every single cent from the native population, just to give away OUR tax money in BILLIONS to some foreigners.” (27.02.2016, My translation; see appendix).

The security narrative about Germans as the ‘payers’ for ‘others’ allows to reproduce common notions of German identity and claim agency to create a discourse. Eventually, claiming a reliable discourse (Croft 2012), in which parts of an existing identity are reproduced to achieve ontological pleasing narratives (Kinnvall, 2004; Reinemann et al., 2017).

The presumable success of such transportation becomes most observable much later in mid and end of June 2016 in which a blaming plot frames the financial minister as masking his actions from the public in which ‘taxpayer’s money’ will be reallocated for refugees. “Everything is financed from the health care fund, our iron reserve for the health care system, the nest egg of the tax payers. (16.06.2016, My translation; see appendix). The implementations of previous ‘small stories’ thus make such transfers of securitizing ‘taxpayer’s money’ and ‘the people’ almost identical in language and enable a cognitive transportation.

To finalize the securitization transfer frame one has to look at several posts in which the AfD is taking a position against potential deals with Turkey and a denunciation of Turkish culture respectively. Starting at the 11th of February the AfD is using narrativity within one of its postings and claims that Erdogan, the Turkish Prime Minister, has “publicly admitted extorting the EU” in which further the AfD uses the terminology of ‘them’ (the EU states) which are not able to secure EU borders to protect ‘us’ (the people) (11.02.2016, My translation; see appendix). They frame an alternative understanding – claiming agency again - in which the AfD states to know that Erdogan will not meet the conditions of the EU-Turkey refugee deal eventually offering a site-specific management of this specific ‘threat’ (Bubandt, 2005). Like many other postings, they extensively use direct quotations, however they refer their postings on news articles in which such quotes can easily be taken out of context. For instance, while one newspaper speaks about that Erdogan ‘could’ make use of extraordinary measure to pressure the EU, the AfD on the other

end is using Erdogan's quotes to frame and present accomplished facts in which new refugees will come to Germany. Thus, create feelings of existential anxiety. Using language in this sense has a new quality as it allows the AfD to create even more powerful frames and thus leverage such entries into coherent reliable narratives as posts can be adjusted in the sense that they reach the same reading quality for the observer (Croft, 2012; Polletta, 1998).

The comment section consequently creates its own dynamics:

"It is unbelievable how this woman (Merkel) is systematically executing Germany and the EU." "Citizens who still have feelings for our country, who love it, have to go out on the streets and protest to end this nightmare." "Many say that Merkel already got the bill from the Turks and the rest of the European chiefs [...] but this is not true, we will get the bill because our tax money will be wasted." "I'm completely destroyed. Our beloved GERMANY. I am afraid about the future of our children." (11.02.2016, My translation; see appendix).

By using various blaming plots the AfD is aiming to frame a distinctive 'othering' narrative against Germany's Turkish minority. This is made possible through real events again, in which any opportunity is used to securitize German identity. This German identity seems to be primed along economic fears in which 'the people' or 'the taxpayers' is betrayed by 'the corrupt elite' and is facing existential anxieties. This is the obvious message the AfD creates in its posting, however I believe that intentionally the AfD uses this strategy to frame threats to biographical continuity in which 'unfair' deals with 'the other' and any form of 'foreign' influence is threatening German identity and feelings of Kinnvall's (2004) argument of 'home'. At this point it must be highlighted that the slow process of an underlying 'othering' of the Turkish community most likely started before 2016 and now reaches sufficient threshold to be exploited within an effective discourse of insecurity (Croft, 2012).

6.3. Defending Germanness

This framing strategy can be explained through the backdrop of Germany's history in which a distinctive and severe 'othering' would reactive a historical

remembering. Yet, it makes it easier to emotionally attach actions made by the Turkish government and stick them to the Turkish minority in Germany. On the 3rd of May 2016, the emplotment continues by securitizing German values and laws against Turkish understanding of democracy such as repression of freedom of press, freedom of speech and protection of minorities. This securitization of subjectivity works in the same reasoning as before: The post is framed to securitize Germaneness against cultural influence from ‘the other’ which again develops its polarizing dynamic in the comment section:

“[...] I stay with my argument, Turkey and Islam is alike the middle age and regression on all levels.” “Eventually one can only arm themselves to protect the own family and her/himself.” (03.05.2016, My translation; see appendix).

The same narration occurs through different plots several times in July and reaches relevance on the 22nd of July in which Turkey and Turkishness in Germany is constantly framed as the same. The AfD aims to provide a generalized picture of Turkish people by neglecting any differences between Turks and hence try to securitize them in non-rational simple thought as ‘the other’ to increase the own ontological secure position (Kinnvall, 2004).

The AfD is calling for a complete ending of any talks and negotiations as “Turkey and its Ottoman traditions have nothing in common with Europe!” In the same sense, Picture 2 speaks to close all doors to Turkey into Europe. (22.07.2016, My translation; see appendix). Such traditions are reproduced in the comment section: “[...] every Turk who goes out on the street in favour for Erdogan, send them via express directly back to their holy country.” “[...] All Turkish citizens should be send bit by bit back to their home country.” (22.07.2016, My translation; see appendix). Especially the emotional aspects show the intention and successful ‘othering’ mechanism created through a longer narrative structure.



Figure 3: Close the door to Turkey

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativefuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1187565341273803/?type=3&theater>, 22.07.2016)

Such securitization of subjectivity against ‘the other’ is specifically implemented when real life events allow the AfD an extra opportunity to prime cultural differences and to polarize between the host community and minorities. It should be noted that such securitization attempts are in most cases executed in presenting a blaming plot in which underlyingly anxieties and threats to identity are being framed, this is being done to create an almost obvious intentionality which creates intended dynamics within the comment section. It should be added that a party like the AfD is operating with a similar strategy of a social movement by finding issues and ideological gaps in traditional party discourse to attract followers and potential votes, therefore the AfD is dependent on real events which allow to elevate and prime own positions. However, to use the gap in the traditional political landscape especially through social media and its interactive component allows the AfD at the same time to abuse its position by securitizing subjectivity of the host community and arrange my idea of the ‘populism trap’ in which the party tries to invoke an urgency for a new social order (Marlow, 2002).

Pursuing a coherent and positive picture and hence preserving identity towards other states seems to be a responsive and interactive issue within AfD’s Facebook narrativity as well. It is thereby not only a way of polarizing to ‘the other’ but also

to continue a positive image towards other nation states. Here, ‘the equal’ are other European states in which the AfD attempts to uphold a positive image with, allowing to blame the own national elite again and thus creates legitimacy. At this point it is difficult to say if it is the aim to create a blaming plot based on actual foreign criticism towards the German government or if postings which seem to shed negative light on Germany are a threat to people’s biographical continuity and picture of positive national identity.

It follows that German identity is interchangeable used in the sense of a nationalistic primary. Germany is framed as the nation state with whom the European partners losing patience with because of its current refugee policies. Further, the AfD creates a rhetoric in the comment section in which Germany as the ‘big securing state’ is representing ‘correct’ European values and norms which will disappear (15.02.2016, 02.03.2016, 06.04.2016, 13.07.2016; see appendix). The connection to ‘German money’ and ‘the taxpayer’ which I discussed earlier allows the AfD to pack these plots into a coherent narrative structure. Furthermore, this fits into the same plot structure in which European/German identity must be defended which especially starts to gain awareness after the attacks in Brussels on the 22nd of March and much later after the Berlin attacks on the 20th of December (see appendix):

“It is about our identity as liberal enlightened Europeans! We intent on ending this kind of drives! [...] Today, people died again and many more will die as long as you don’t know yourself for what you stand for and what you are. [...] The dream of a colourful Europe is destroyed, bombed away again. Finally accept it! It’s time for a change!” (22.03.2016, My translation; see appendix).

The intention is to create feelings of existential threat to identity of the being. Pursuing biographical continuity is therefore framed in narratives which address ontological insecurities (Croft, 2012). This is achieved by continuously securitizing European or German identity and national borders as a physical entity which has “to be finally closed and defended.” (06.04.2016, My translation; see appendix). By framing and presenting potential threats and fears, the notion of ‘homeland’ in which a border is phrased as something physical and thus bounding people together.

Such a securitization attempt in different narrative and plot styles is to a great extent leveraged and supported by subjectivity plots. The securitization of subjectivity consequently allows to tell different ‘small stories’ about cultural differences which have the intention to polarize between communities and to present a coherent construction of an abject-other (Kinnvall, 2004). It sometimes can be enough to post a picture with an unambiguous clear and short message - such as in Picture 3 about full-face veil - to trigger commentators which fear the eruption of the ‘homeland’. The cultural threat which adds to the emotional aspect of the ‘homeland’.



Figure 4: Ban full-face veil

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativefuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1120086598021678/?type=3&theater>. 08.04.2016)

A similar plot is being told, again, in reference to real events which allows the AfD to frame cultural extortion and threats to everyday routines:

Men and Women separated – such a difference we used to know from Muslim countries. The waterpark [...] seems to have introduced such rules now. Two “refugees” from Afghanistan did sexually coerce guest of the waterpark. [...] “Separation of gender at the waterslide” [...] We asking ourselves? How much do we have to adjust in our own country? Do we have to sacrifice the normal, revealing live to protect the weakest ones? We have fought hard for our freedoms in our county and we don’t

want to abandon those freedoms only because some guests are not able to behave (04.03.2016, My translation; see appendix).

The possibility to frame ‘the other’ as a disturber of everyday routines which threaten daily life is therefore the last incremental narrative structure. The narrativity and legitimacy of this post is explicitly accomplished by using quotes throughout the text which creates a form of official news post itself and attach legitimacy. Such framing and securitization of daily routines is creating desired dynamics in the comment section in which people see a threat of living in an Islamic country: “This is unbelievable. Do we live in Germany or in an Islamic country? Send them away, out of Germany. Fast! [...]” (04.03.2016, My translation; see appendix). Such a dynamic in the comment section also shows how religious-cultural characteristics can turn into emotional prejudices in which a prominent understanding of refugees as all being Islamic propagators is created.

The AfD eschews every potential recourse to remind their followers about an imminent mass immigration which threatens “growing European identity, which is based on variety and specific characteristics of the nations and regions in Europe.” (26.04.2016, My translation; see appendix). The use of a soon releasing book gives the AfD reason to frame European identity which allegedly appears only within the nations itself. Thus, underlyingly aiming to create a successful emotional-cognitive response through the comment section again. The narrative structure starts to become more coherent ones a cultural ‘othering’ from the inside and ‘small stories’ about economical destruction of ‘the people’ and eroding ‘homeland’ through cultural assimilation or the sheer amount of ‘others’ are frequently used to create a rhetoric of ‘soon it will be too late’ (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008). This is achieved by constantly dragging topics into a security dialogue where the AfD claims legitimacy for (10.5.2016, 14.05.2016, 27.5.2016, 15.07.2016, 15.09.2016; see appendix). Finally, the end of narrativity and successful securitization is partly achieved through an emotional coherent transportation mechanism within the audience. This mechanism creates an enemy picture in which relative straightforward blaming plots are almost always contain an emotional ‘othering’ rhetoric only to pursue a coherent picture of community or nation even further

(Kinnvall, 2004; Polletta, 1998). This is mostly present in blaming plots which frame ‘the elite’ vs. ‘the people’ alike and do not have something in common with migration, refugees, or criminal foreigners in the first place (23.05.2016, 03.07.2016; see appendix)

Postings such as the one from the 17th of September where the frame encloses “changes within Germany as the result of uncontrolled immigration” and finally creating a picture of “civil war alike riots” and cultural change through “minarets in typical German towns” create a closing narrative structure (My translation; see appendix). Ultimately, they are able to bypass the emotional-cognitive aspect of being in which the story being told becomes the only ‘true’ story and respectively allowing the AfD to use ontological insecure ‘small stories’ to create a bigger pleasing narrative. A common performative arguing we have seen in Croft’s (2012) theory. In other words, through the sheer amount and quality of such narratives they are creating feelings of collective identity, belonging and feelings of ontological security.

7. Telling the right story – Concluding remarks

The aim of this thesis was to build a first theoretical framework which drags the sociological and psychological understanding of ontological security closer to contemporary issues within an ever-mediatised political landscape. In particular, how social movements manifest themselves in or through social media? This was achieved by connecting post-Copenhagen School theory and theoretical aspects of framing to the existential need of biographical continuity which constitutes the meaning of being in this world. Social media and its use by political, societal, and individual actors gained in visibility and thematization within the last decade and will most likely continue to be an even more essential part for everyday life routines in the future. The goal was to discover how populist movements securitize narratives of identity in social media from the broader perspective of ontological security.

By applying a narrative analysis approach, I was able to portray my theoretical arguments within a performative applied case of the AfD. Analysing a public and meta-narratives structure allows to get a broad picture of how framed (in)securities creating a polarized identity structure. The AfD relies on a repertoire of frames and plot types which resort on populist rhetoric of anti-elitism and underlying creation of an ‘other’. This ‘othering’ is achieved among AfD’s fellowship through highlighting simplified notions of an existing identity, which gained appearance throughout the year 2016 in Germanness especially along cultural and economic lines. Economical fears seem to work in the German case as they prime an existing picture of the self, created by ‘others’ such as other European states. Additionally, an ‘othering’ is created by highlighting cultural differences between ‘the other’ and the host community. It follows the reasoning of thick-signifiers which allow powerful stories to reach acceptance.

The effective telling of ‘small stories’ which allows to constantly use a ‘othering’ language creates an emotional bonding to the readership of the AfD. Providing a bigger narrative by telling the same ‘small stories’ in different frames over and over again leads to a feeling of becoming. I believe the notion of ‘heartland’ is thus not

only a reimagine of the past based on a nationalistic premise but also the emotional attachment of processing a becoming which creates ontological security. The attempt to establish a new order is ultimately only successful if it is reproduced within the audience which bypasses cognitive reflexivity, one concept Giddens established as one of the most crucial ones in his theory about ontological security. As populist rhetoric creates an emotional attachment, it creates at the same time feeling of trust, an effect far-right movements use within their narrative structure by blaming the established parties explicitly. Hence, the securitization of subjectivity also works to re-establish trust which was lost in Giddens's idea of expert systems of post-modernity previously. As a consequence, the often-used conception of 'home' is protected by a coherent narrative structure which establishes both trust and ontological security.

From a general viewpoint, the overall shift back to identity politics within social science research underlines the importance of understanding the leveraging power of narratives for organisations and individuals. Understanding this power relation does not only allow to understand how subjects create meaning but how an emotional-cognitive constitution of narratives allows to steer a deliberate securitized discourse. The space and platform social media provides allows to claim legitimacy beyond traditional communicable ways. The power of narrating is thus not only established through a coherent structure but also through the ability to connect to different stakeholders fast, direct, and uncomplicated. Which results in greater agency for the discourse producer. The sheer amount of information a person is exposed to makes an effective narrativity inevitable for successful political communication. It also should be noted that today's connectivity, what social media logically comes with, also changes the societal effect how humans think about each other. The ontological placing of the ones which are connected in more intensive ways in contrast to the ones who might still be completely disconnected from social media creates unavoidable different dynamics within the society in its entirety.

It is also the effect of mediated experience which influences the view we create about others and consequently also about us as a society or as an individual being. It gives the entity which tells and mediates the narrative, again, a power position because frames constitute a subjective form of narrativity. Moreover, mediated narratives which we face everywhere today affects our emotional cognitive way of thinking about being. As seen in the case of the AfD the continuous framing of 'others' addressed emotions more than cognitive reflexive thinking. The AfD therefore abuses the ontological insecure position to establish a thick secure identity narrative.

As a final thought, future research should focus on the meaning of interactivity in social media within a narrative approach. Focusing more exclusively on the comment section or certain responses would allow to analyse personal narratives being told by different users in response to specific entries. This would enable for a more profound emotional understanding of ontological security and how individuals make meaning from entries by telling their own life stories. Furthermore, a mixed-method approach analysing the narrative structure over a longer time and applied on different society would produce comparable results which seem crucial in understanding in how far-right populist movements operate in the realm of social media.

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Appendix

Chronological order of Facebook references used in the Analysis section.

05.01.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1057757344254604/?type=3&theater>

22.01.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1066924960004509/?type=3&theater>

26.01.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/Prof.Dr.Joerg.Meuthen/photos/a.554885501326826.1073741828.554345401380836/575432925938750/?type=3&theater>

01.02.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1072848776078794/?type=3&theater>

03.02.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/Dr.Frauke.Petry/photos/a.782724038446912.1073741828.782456275140355/1056098347776145/?type=3&theater>

05.02.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1075512672479071/?type=3&theater>

11.02.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1079089182121420/?type=3&theater>

15.02.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1081186601911678/?type=3&theater>

16.02.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1081828731847465/?type=3&theater>

20.02.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1084024074961264/?type=3&theater>

27.02.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1088809677816037/?type=3&theater>

02.03.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1090968987600106/?type=3&theater>

04.03.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1092198260810512/?type=3&theater>

22.03.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/Dr.Frauke.Petry/photos/a.782724038446912.1073741828.782456275140355/1086806981371948/?type=3&theater>

06.04.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1118670321496639/?type=3&theater>

26.04.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/Dr.Frauke.Petry/photos/a.782724038446912.1073741828.782456275140355/1113463568706289/?type=3&theater>

03.05.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1135803673116637/?type=3&theater>

10.05.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1139657296064608/?type=3&theater>

14.05.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1142756285754709/?type=3&theater>

23.05.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1148165145213823/?type=3&theater>

27.05.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1151014794928858/?type=3&theater>

16.06.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1163664043663933/?type=3&theater>

03.07.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativ fuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1174363092594028/?type=3&theater>

13.07.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativfuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1181339621896375/?type=3&theater>

15.07.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativfuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1182970568399947/?type=3&theater>

22.07.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativfuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1187565341273803/?type=3&theater>

25.07.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativfuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1189723294391341/?type=3&theater>

15.09.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativfuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1232565193440484/?type=3&theater>

17.09.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativfuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1233443163352687/?type=3&theater>

20.09.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativfuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1236709236359413/?type=3&theater>

14.10.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativfuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1258211867542483/?type=3&theater>

20.12.2016:

<https://www.facebook.com/alternativfuerde/photos/a.542889462408064.1073741828.540404695989874/1333505923346410/?type=3&theater>