Who's steering this ark?

Exploring the role of the power in environmental governance in the Waikato Region of New Zealand

Renée Jens

LUCSUS

Lund University Centre for
Sustainability Studies

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Abstract

Collaborative governance is an approach used by governments to create policies in an equitable manner through the consensus seeking decision-making process via the collaboration of stakeholders that will be affected by the solution. However, one of the many critiques of this approach is that there are power imbalances between those involved, that instead make the outcome inequitable. Collaborative governance was used in the Waikato Region of New Zealand, in the form of the Collaborative Stakeholder Group (CSG), to create a policy for environmental management. Due to the policy receiving a negative critique when it was released to the public; deemed unfair and unworkable, and no one wanting to take ownership of the solution, I draw on this case, with the aim of this thesis being to understand how power influenced this collaborative governance process in the Waikato Region. To understand the use of power in the CSG, a document analysis of the CSG workshop notes was undertaken to identify examples of the three power dimensions as defined by Steven Lukes' theory of power, to understand which groups had power over others. It was found that the CSG exhibited behaviour that was common in critiquing literature of the collaborative approach. There were conflicts between stakeholders based on historic events in the Waikato and NZ, imbalanced representation of groups presenting at the workshops due to influence by the powerful – the government, and the government using the approach for their own gain to meet their objectives. If the timeframe was made longer to allow the building of trust within the CSG, and if the government had stuck to a steering role and let the stakeholders self-govern the process, the outcome may have been more successful. The participatory approach advocated by sustainability science did not create a sustainable solution. For this governance approach to work, collaborative governance cannot be undertaken superficially, and power dynamics between stakeholders need to be actively identified to ensure a sustainable shift to more sustainable societies. The flaws of this approach must be worked through, the process and justification for using this approach must be transparent, and the community must be actively involved in the discussion and setting the objectives to ensure the benefits that this approach advocates are met.

Acknowledgements

Acronyms

CSG   Collaborative Stakeholder Group
HRWO Healthy Rivers Wai Ora
NZ   New Zealand
TLG   Technical Leaders Group
WRC   Waikato Regional Council

Definitions

Maori   Indigenous people of New Zealand
Iwi   Maori tribe

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1   Introduction: Collaboration for Sustainable Development

The Waikato Region (herein known as the Waikato) in New Zealand (NZ) is a prosperous area noted for its agricultural industries, as well as being an important area for Maori (Waikato Regional Council, 2016b). This area contains New Zealand's largest river; the Waikato river, providing economic benefit for the Waikato and NZ. It is an important setting with multiple unique actors, such as environmental protection interests, government interests, private interests, and cultural interests. However, through the development of this region the Waikato River has become contaminated due to the land use that takes place near the river, thus encouraging proactive measures by the regional government to try and ensure the health of the Waikato River and the many other polluted rivers in this region. The regional government developed a plan to cooperate on solving this environmental issue through the method of collaborative governance.

The regional government used collaborative governance to bring stakeholders together that were linked to polluted waterbodies in the Waikato, to create a policy that would ensure the sustainability of the rivers'. In October 2016, the policy, created through the collaborative governance process, was released to the public to make submissions on. Through the media's portrayal of the events that followed, it appeared that the process was not successful. The policy was critically described as "flawed" (The Country, 2016) "unfair" (Piddock, 2016a, 2016b) "morally wrong" (Piddock, 2016a; Smallman, 2017) "unsustainable" (Piddock, 2016a, 2016b; Smallman, 2017) "a disaster" (Piddock, 2016a; Smallman, 2016b) "inequitable" (Piddock, 2016b; Smallman, 2016a) "stealthy" (Piddock, 2016b) "unrealistic" (Jolly, 2017) and "ethically wrong" (Smallman, 2016a).

This seemingly democratic and fair approach to creating environmental policy is meant to enhance the stakeholder's ownership of the solution. But, the negative reception the policy obtained when released to the public for submission begs the question of what went wrong in this promising approach.

One of the critiques of collaborative governance is the occurrence of power imbalances; either between stakeholders involved in the process (Ansell & Gash, 2008) or by the government still having the ultimate power in decision making and steering the process towards their objectives (Fish, Ioris, & Watson, 2010). But power is a multifaceted concept with many dimensions and cannot be pinned down as a scapegoat without further investigation. It is not just a matter of stating power imbalance as a source of the problem, but identifying exactly how it was an unequal collaboration, to learn and improve the collaborative process. Seeing that "serious reform (of international governance) is inextricably tied up with questions of power" (Partzsch, 2016, p. 193) it is of vital importance to scrutinise relations and dimensions of power. And this is what I wish to tackle in this research.

1.1 Research Aim and Problem Definition

In my thesis, I carry out a case study of this specific collaborative governance example in the Waikato Region, aiming to gain a deeper understanding of the power dynamics. I will situate my thesis within the ongoing debate of collaborative governance and focus specifically on this one case. My assumption and hypothesis is that it was uneven power imbalances that affected the outcome of this process and I will therefore use the theoretical lens of power for my analysis. I will be doing this through carrying out a document analysis of the workshop notes taken during the regular stakeholder meetings for this collaborative governance process, using Steven Lukes' (2005) power theory as the analytical framework to guide my research. My research aims to answer the following questions:

1) How did power influence the collaborative governance process in the Waikato Region of New Zealand?
   a. How were different power dimensions exemplified in the collaborative governance process?
   b. Which individual or group exercised power over another individual or group?

Before I carry out my specific research process, I will first explain how my thesis topic relates to the broader sustainability picture and justify the importance of examining power in processes of collaborative governance to ensure future sustainable development.

1.2 Relation to Sustainability Science

Sustainable development, defined by Kates et al. (2001), is about "meeting fundamental human needs while preserving the life-support systems of planet Earth" (p. 641). According to Kates et al. (2001), the idea of sustainable development gained traction in the 1980's when scientists started to consider the links between nature and society, which then gave rise to the field of sustainability science. Sustainability science links global processes with ecology and society to address complex systems that respond to multiple, interrelated stresses (Kates et al., 2001).

Sustainability science has been advocating participatory approaches to solve complex environmental problems that are inherently social, economic and political (Evans, 2012). It involves stakeholders related to the problem who come from outside of academia (Lang et al., 2012), along with "scientists, … advocates, active citizens, and users of knowledge" (Kates et al., 2001, p. 641). This is to allow for the integration of "the best available knowledge, reconcile values and preferences, as well as create ownership for problems and solution options" (Lang et al., 2012, p. 25). Collaborative governance; a type of participatory approach, "can help address environmental problems, by securing collective action between diverse groups that make society up" (Evans, 2012, p. 1).

As we transition towards more sustainable societies, with multiple stakeholders involved in this transition, "it is fundamentally important to understand the specifics of multi-actor power relations in transitions" (Avelino & Wittmayer, 2015, p. 629). An understanding of the power relations between stakeholders in the transition to a more sustainable society is very much relevant to that of the governance processes that help these transitions (Avelino & Wittmayer, 2015) to identify the likely downfalls in the transition to a more sustainable future.

In the following sections I define the concept of collaborative governance, followed by describing my analytical framework using Steven Lukes' power theory as my research lens. I then define the case of the collaborative governance approach used in the Waikato. This is followed by presenting my methodology, after which I present the findings from my analysis, and finally conclude on how power may have influenced the collaborative governance approach in the Waikato Region.

2   Theoretical Framework: Governance

Governance itself is the "purposeful efforts to guide, steer, control or manage sectors or facets of society" (Kooiman, 1993, p. 2) in a particular direction. I briefly introduced and discussed the concepts of environmental governance in the introduction and in this section I will go into more detail as to why it is used by certain groups as well as the debate surrounding this approach in terms of the benefits and its critiques. I firstly describe environmental governance as a broad concept, then position collaborative governance within it to showcase how this concept can be used for environmental change.

2.1   Environmental Governance

Solving environmental problems requires society to change the way it works, because environmental problems are inherently social (Evans, 2012). To change current systems, governments lack the resources to do this themselves, and governance is a way to collectively work through the problem to create a shared solution with shared resources (Evans, 2012). Environmental governance can be classified as a: hierarchy, market, or network approach (Evans, 2012):

- Hierarchy governance has an authoritative body to make decisions, and the stakeholders work to achieve these pre-made decisions. The benefit is that there is a clearly defined outcome, but it lacks innovation and flexibility. Rules are adhered to through force (Evans, 2012). Therefore, hierarchy leans towards governing that is traditionally used by governments (Evans, 2012).
- The market type of governance is based on the financial market in which stakeholders are seen as suppliers and consumers of resources. Financial incentives through profit is what drives the stakeholders to work together (Evans, 2012).
- Network governance is the most common form of governance, bringing together independent stakeholders from different sectors to achieve a common goal (Evans, 2012). Collaborative governance, mentioned above, falls into this category.

Adaptive governance is another type of governance that draws upon network governance, but specifically relates to the holistic management of social and ecological systems (Evans, 2012). It brings together stakeholders that are involved in a particular social-ecological system, "to monitor that system and change their behaviour accordingly" (Evans, 2012, p. 38) due to common moral concerns. The belief is that the natural resource will be more successfully managed, and there is flexibility to adapt to the changing environment (Evans, 2012). High levels of trust are needed for this type of governance to be successful, as stakeholders need to learn from each other (Evans, 2012). Adaptive governance (and therefore normative governance) was the collaborative governance type used in the

Waikato Region to create a solution to an environmental problem; polluted waterways. This governance type is explored in more detail in the next section to map out the debate surrounding collaborative governance.

2.2   Collaborative Governance

Collaborative governance is used and initiated by government departments to involve the public in a process to make decisions based on a formal, planned approach that seeks to find consensus between the multiple stakeholders involved, to create public policies (Ansell & Gash, 2008). The government has a clear leadership role in the process and have the final say in the policy document, but it is the public stakeholders involved in the process that actively decide on the contents of the policy through consensus reaching (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Although consensus is the goal, this is not always possible in a collaborative process, as there are conflicting views between stakeholders, but as long as consensus is strived for, the process is still classified as collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

Collaborative governance has many touted benefits, but also many critiques. This approach is therefore widely debated. In the following sections I detail the main benefits and critiques of collaborative governance, to give a background on why it may have been used in the Waikato Region, and give a hint as to where this approach may have gone wrong.

2.2.1   Benefits of Collaborative Governance

The main identified benefits of collaborative governance, used at its best, are as follows:

i)   democratic consensus reaching in decision-making,

ii)   active engagement by public stakeholders in decision-making that goes beyond consulting

iii)   an equitable and legitimate process and outcome through a collaborative effort

iv)   enhanced knowledge sharing ensuring a more cohesive policy approach,

v)   an opportunity for smaller groups to be heard on an equal level with the larger, dominant groups, and

vi)   a more efficient and sustainably managed capital of natural resources (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Castro, 2007; Evans, 2012; Fish et al., 2010; Schuckman, 2001).

In summary, if used correctly, collaborative governance can enhance democratic involvement, overcome the 'us against them' mentality of usual policy making, and can provide rational management of natural resources. The outcome will be fair and equitable through a transparent process. These benefits did not appear to be achieved in the Waikato.

2.2.2 Critique of Collaborative Governance

There are many challenges to collaborative governance, with many believing the above described benefits of the collaborative approach are "idealistic or naive" (Christens & Speer, 2006, p. 2). The main critiques of the approach are as follows:

 i) power imbalances between stakeholders favouring certain interests, causing mistrust and,

 ii) leading to a reinforcement of the government's power,

 iii) it is a strategy used to reach an already determined objective (not democratically decided),

 iv) there are existing conflicts and strongly held ideals between stakeholders that need to be overcome,

 v) information is too technical for stakeholders to fully understand the environmental problem, and

 vi) poor leadership and institutional design (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Castro, 2007; Evans, 2012; Fish et al., 2010; Petersen, Klauer, & Manstetten, 2009; Schuckman, 2001)

Power is explicitly stated in points i) and ii), however it can also be the underlying factors for iii) and iv), hence, power is my focus point for this research. I perceived power dynamics as playing a role in the failure of the Waikato's collaborative approach due to its major presence in the critique of collaborative governance. In the following section I given an overview of the power theory that I used as the analytical lens for my research.

3 Analytical Framework: Power Theory

To answer my research question of how power influenced the collaborative governance approach, I use power theory as a lens to look at the specific case in the Waikato, because, as stated before in Section 2.2.2, power is as a major critique for collaborative governance. The particular theory on power that I use is that specified by Steven Lukes in his book 'Power' (2005).

In his book, Lukes (2005) states that power can be both overt and covert, describing power as he sees it in three different dimensions. One- and two-dimensional power are views of power established by others, but Lukes (2005) gives his own account of these views, and also assigns them the title 'one- and two-dimensional' power respectively. Lukes (2005) finds these power dimensions as not being comprehensive enough to describe all aspects of power in society, hence, he builds upon these and defines his own view of power, defining this as the third-dimension of power.

In my analysis of the collaborative governance approach I will identify the occurrences of Lukes' (2005) power dimensions in the workshops (stakeholder meetings – explained in more detail in Section 4) of this approach. To understand why I decided that certain workshop events exhibited certain power dimensions, and thereby influencing the process negatively, it is important to understand the definitions of these power dimensions as given by Lukes himself as detailed below.

3.1 An Overview of Steven Lukes' Three Power Dimensions

In a podcast interview with Steven Lukes by David Edmonds and Nigel Warburton, Lukes states that "in the most general level power is just the capacity to bring about consequences" in a social context. (Edmonds & Warburton, 2015). Lukes makes it clear that the use of force is not about power, because power is about achieving compliance. The use of force means that there was no compliance, so the exercise of power failed (Edmonds & Warburton, 2015). Power, therefore, can be defined as a successful attempt at compliance. In the subsequent sections I give an overview of the three different power dimensions.

3.1.1 One-Dimensional Power

In his book, Lukes (2005) draws on Robert Dahl to describe one-dimensional power as A having power of B, because A has the capacity to get B to do something B would not otherwise do (which is potential power), and when A successfully gets B to do something B would not generally do, then this is actual power; power has successfully been exercised. But, for one-dimensional power there must also be an observable behaviour, which relates to decision making because there is a conflict of interests (Lukes, 2005). So, for Dahl, by identifying who succeeds in the decision making, it shows which individual or group has more power in society (Lukes, 2005). This conflict of (subjective) preferences are "assumed to be consciously made, exhibited in actions, and thus to be discovered by observing people's

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behaviour" (Lukes, 2005, p. 19), and revolves around policy preferences and political participation (Lukes, 2005). For example, in the collaborative governance process, consensus must be reached in deciding what to include in the policy. If someone does not agree with a decision to accept a proposal to be included in the policy, yet the majority agree, and if the outcome means the proposal is accepted, then power has been exercised by that majority group.

3.1.2   Two-Dimensional Power

Lukes (2005) explains two-dimensional power from the various works of Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz (1962, 1963, 1968, 1970, 1975) on their idea of the 'second face' of power. This type of power happens when a person, or group, prevents policy conflicts from becoming public, either by their deliberate action, or unconsciously done (Lukes, 2005). This form of power is in political agenda setting, in identifying who decides the agenda, and what is included in the agenda (Lukes, 2005). If an issue is not on the political agenda, then it is prevented from becoming an actual issue as it is never discussed (Lukes, 2005). For example, relating this to the collaborative approach, if I look at the workshop notes I can see what topics were presented and who presented these. By finding out who created the workshop agendas, and what matters get discussed, I know who has the power to decide what will be included in the new policy document, and what topics are left out.

3.1.3   Three-Dimensional Power

To give a brief definition of Lukes' (2005) third dimension of power, it is power "to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things" (p. 11). It "works against people's interests by misleading them, thereby distorting their judgement" (Lukes, 2005, p. 13). At its most effective, power can work to favour the interests of the powerful, without the powerful having to do anything (Lukes, 2005). Power does not only have to satisfy your own interests, for "you can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others' interests" (Lukes, 2005, p. 12).

The previous dimensions both focus on the actual observation of behaviour, where something explicitly did or did not happen, which Lukes (2005) sees as inadequate, because this means that power requires an actual conflict. However, as Lukes (2005) states "this is to ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place" (p. 27). Although not directly observable like the other forms of power, this third dimension is not invisible and indirect evidence can be found to recognise the occurrence of this third power dimension (Lukes, 2005). In the podcast interview with Edmonds & Warburton (2015), Lukes does acknowledge that because there is no clear evidence of this type of power, it is quite rightly open to interpretation about what happens.

You have to acknowledge the idea that "people's preferences and ideas can themselves be the result of power" (Edmonds & Warburton, 2015), which is why Lukes elaborates on the type of one-dimensional power that Dahl proposes. Power can also be unintentionally exercised "where people can be powerful without intending the results in question" (Edmonds & Warburton, 2015).

Using a hypothetical example that could relate to the collaborative governance approach, one stakeholder (called Stakeholder A) has come up with a reason why fencing off a particular area (called Area B) is a good thing to do to prevent river pollution. Stakeholder A has marketed it in such a way that all the other stakeholders agree that it is in their best interests to implement this, because if they don't, it will negatively affect them. So, fencing off Area B becomes part of the policy. But, in reality, fencing off Area B doesn't actually benefit, nor affect the other stakeholders at all, and would not make a difference to river pollution. Stakeholder A has used the third dimension of power to persuade the other stakeholders, manipulating their preferences without them realising. Stakeholder A is powerful.

4 Background: Governance in the Waikato Region

In the Waikato, the Waikato Regional Council (a regional government body) initiated and lead a collaborative governance approach for creating a policy for healthy rivers in the Waikato Region. As stated before, this collaborative governance approach is the case I use to carry out my research to determine why this approach was not successful through possible power imbalances. In the following, I describe the case of the Waikato with relation to relevant historical facts, and then how the collaborative governance approach was set up to address an environmental problem.

4.1 Problems in the Waikato Region

The Waikato is located in the North Island of New Zealand (Figure 1). In this region runs the Waikato River; the longest river in New Zealand (Waikato Regional Council, n.d.-b). The Waikato River spans a distance of 425 km, with its catchment area covering 12% of the North Island's area (Waikato Regional Council, n.d.-a). The catchment area is made up of pastoral farming, exotic forestry, native forests, wetlands, horticulture and cropping, urban areas and other uses (Waikato Regional Council, n.d.-c). These land uses have caused the waterbodies in the Waikato, including the Waikato River, to become more polluted over time (Waikato Regional Council, 2016b).

Figure 1. The size and location of the Waikato Region within New Zealand. The dark blue highlighted area of the smaller map shows the area involved in the collaborative governance approach. Sources: Waikato Regional Council (2016b) *and Statistics New Zealand (2006). Images modified by author.*

Environmental problems cannot be treated in isolation, as political, social, and economic factors are intertwined; hence, the cause of the rivers' pollution can be traced back to early colonisation of New Zealand (NZ). As mentioned in Section 2.2.2. strongly held ideals, and conflicts between stakeholders are also a threat to environmental governance, it is important to identify what some of these conflicts and ideals might be. I therefore give a brief history of the Waikato, drawing on facts from NZ's wider history as this also affected/affects the Waikato today.

4.1.1   Brief History of the Waikato Region

Maori came to NZ in 1300 AD and in this group were ancestors of the Waikato-Tainui; the Maori iwi (tribes) within the Waikato (Waikato Tainui, n.d.). In 1770 Europeans settled in NZ and in 1840, the Treaty of Waitangi (the Treaty) was signed between the NZ Maori chiefs and the British Crown (herein known as the Crown); giving the British sovereignty over NZ (Ministry of Business, 2016). This document has also been the source of many conflicts between Maori and the Crown ever since its adoption, and is still ongoing today.

The increasing influence of the Crown in NZ lead to a deteriorated relationship with the Maori, resulting in land wars where, contrary to the Treaty, land was stolen from Maori (Ministry of Business, 2016). In 1863, the Waikato War occurred where almost all of Waikato-Tainui's land was confiscated (Waikato Tainui, n.d.). In 1995, the Waikato-Tainui were the first iwi to resolve its grievances with the Crown, and received money and land worth $170 million (NZD) (Swarbrick, n.d.-c).

4.1.1.1   Land Use Changes

In the 1820's Europeans started trade with Maori in the Waikato and farming the land (Swarbrick, n.d.-a). Over time forests were felled, lowland was turned to pasture, and swamps were drained (Swarbrick, n.d.-b); significantly altering the natural environment. Today, a substantial 53% of the land use around the Waikato River is pastoral farming (Waikato Regional Council, 2012a) which is mainly dairy farming. The government also promoted intensive agriculture production during the 1960/70's, in which subsidies and cheap loans were given to farmers to "develop poor quality lands, facilitate irrigation … [and] develop hill country", also providing incentives to farmers to have more stock on the land (Nightingale, 2008).

In 1986, the government liberalised NZ's economy and overhauled sate sectors, and ended agricultural subsidies (New Zealand Government, 2017). After neoliberalisation of NZ, the dairy sector has been the most economically successful agricultural industry, expanding onto the once powerful sheep and beef sector's land (Burton & Wilson, 2012).

4.1.1.2 *Current Land Use*

Today, not surprisingly, the Waikato's economy is dominated by primary industries (e.g. agriculture, forestry, mining), and the subsequent manufacturing industries that support these primary industries. In order of importance, the following sectors push economic growth in the region: dairy, livestock, forestry, manufacturing, education, and tourism-related services (Knuckey & Chen, 2013). The regional government deems it important that these industries are supported to maintain (and grow) its economic position for the development of NZ, and to ensure its own economic development for the wellbeing of its citizens (Waikato Regional Council, 2012b).

Environmental organisations within New Zealand continuously blame the agricultural industries for degrading NZ's natural environment (Rosin, 2013). The Waikato River is intensively used, with poor water quality predominantly in areas where intensive farming occurs (Land Air Water Aotearoa, n.d.). Although never explicitly stated that the ongoing, expansion of dairy farming is the main cause for river pollution; instead blamed on livestock as a whole, it is widely known as the most likely cause (Wilson & Burton, 2015). To combat pollution, an adaptive governance approach was recently undertaken by the regional government, which will be discussed in the following section.

4.2 Adaptive Governance Approach in the Waikato Region

The collaborative governance approach, as defined in Section 2.2, that was used in the Waikato is classified as environmental governance as it aims to fix an environmental problem through collaboration of non-state actors (Waikato Regional Council, 2016c). In this case, the regional government body (the Waikato Regional Council (WRC)) would steer the process, and stakeholders from different sectors of society would be actively involved in creating a policy. Due to legislation, five local River Iwi were also partners in the Project and also decision makers (along with the WRC) of the final policy (Healthy Rivers/Wai Ora Joint Working Party, 2013).

The collaborative governance approach was chosen by those running the Project as they wanted "high quality stakeholder involvement" in creation of the policy, and to have "enduring solutions in the [policy] itself" (Healthy Rivers/Wai Ora Joint Working Party, 2013, p. 2). The collaborative approach aimed at "collating information from industry groups about current initiatives; gathering specialists together to explore different land management scenarios; and investigating the implications of these different options on people and resources" (Healthy Rivers/Wai Ora Joint Working Party, 2013, p. 2).

This collaborative governance approach was called the Collaborative Stakeholder Group (CSG), that fit within the wider policy change project of the 'Healthy Rivers Plan for Change/Wai Ora: He Rautaki Whakapaipai Project' (HRWO) (herein known as the Project). The Waikato community identified water pollution and quality as the largest environmental problem for the region (Waikato Regional Council,

2016b). This is how the stakeholders that were involved in the CSG were able to come together as they are local to the problem, so they feel a responsibility to help the environment because of their connection to the area (Evans, 2012).

4.2.1 Principles of the Governance Approach

The principles that guided the stakeholders in the governance approach (see Appendix 9.1) for the policy formation have similar objectives as that of adaptive governance e.g. they were encouraged to be innovative in their solutions, and trial and error through experimentation was also encouraged (Waikato Regional Council, 2016b). Stakeholders came together voluntarily to address the problem of the polluted Waikato rivers (Waikato Regional Council, 2016b). The polluted waterways are embedded in a social-ecological system. Adhering to adaptive governance principles, monitoring of water quality showed levels of pollution that are not desirable, and hence society went about to make changes to their behaviour to adapt to changing pollution levels.

There were set rules set up by those leading the Project and by stakeholders within the CSG, which is important for successful collaboration, as "they provide certainty and security for different actors" (Evans, 2012, p. 48). Apart from addressing water pollution, the Project would also ensure legal obligations are met.

To summarise the collaborative governance process, the Project's procedure was to develop the CSG, who would then create a policy change recommendation, which the WRC and River Iwi would make the final decision on, before being released to the public for submissions. The policy recommendation was echoed in the final policy released to the public in 2016. Although the CSG did not to make the final decision, according to Ansell & Gash (2008), it is still a form of collaborative governance as they are actively involved in the policy creation.

4.2.2 Non-State Stakeholders of the Problem

Due to the large problem area, there are numerous stakeholders involved. The public stakeholders that made up the Collaborative Stakeholder Group (CSG) were represented by 24 people in 14 different sectors[1] who would be directly impacted by the policy change. An independent chairperson and facilitator ran the CSG meetings in the form of workshops, with the independent notetaker writing the workshop meetings which were called workshop notes.

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[1] The Project separated the community representatives from the sector representatives in their classification. In my thesis, I classify the community as a 'sector'.

The independent positions within the CSG took on the usual NGOs role in environmental governance; ensuring a legitimate process by promoting inclusion of all stakeholders. Identified by literature, they have five major roles in environmental governance (Evans, 2012):

1. Collecting, disseminating and analysing information
2. Providing input to agenda-setting and policy development processes
3. Performing operational functions
4. Assessing environmental conditions and monitoring compliance with environmental agreements
5. Advocating environmental justice   (p. 69)

The stakeholders were actively involved in intensive debates of scientific material and information obtained in consultative processes with the wider community, and the different sectors (Healthy Rivers/Wai Ora Joint Working Party, 2013). Scientific material was supplied to the CSG by the Technical Leaders Group (TLG); an independent scientific group to help inform the CSG on the creation of the policy change (Healthy Rivers/Wai Ora Joint Working Party, 2013). As it was a collaborative governance approach, consensus was strived for within the CSG (Waikato Regional Council, 2016b).

Delegates were assigned to most sectors to be involved in the CSG discussion if the main sector representative (in Table 1 below) could not attend. Some sectors initially had different representatives that resigned during some stage of the CSG process, I acknowledge these people in brackets with italics. The stakeholders met for a total of 30 workshops that first started on the 27th March 2014 and ended on the 7th July 2016, as the Waikato Regional Council wanted the policy finished by October 2016. Of these 27 months, a total of 58 days was used for the workshops.

Incentives were given to stakeholders to ensure attendance. Those that attended due to their work were effectively paid by their employer to attend, and those that were not attending as part of their job were given an honorarium and had certain expenses paid (personal communication, April 20th 2017). This ensured that financial costs were not an issue for the collaborative approach, however time that the stakeholders spent with the CSG was a large resource cost.

Table 1. CSG sector representatives and independent parties closely involved with the CSG workshops. Source: Waikato Regional Council (2016a) modified by author

Sector	Person(s) Representing the Sector
Dairy	George Moss, Dr Rick Pridmore
Energy	Stephen Colson
Environment/NGOs	Al Fleming, Michelle Archer, (*Tony Roxburgh*)
Forestry	Patricia Fordyce[2]
Horticulture	Chris Keenan
Industry	Dr Ruth Bartlett
Local Government	Sally Davis
Maori Interests (Maori)	Alamoti Te Pou, Weo Maag, Gina Rangi, (*Topia Rameka*)
Rural Advocacy	James Houghton
Rural Professionals	Phil Journeaux
Sheep and Beef	James Bailey
Tourism and Recreation	Alastair Calder
Water Supply Takes	Garry Maskill
Community	Jason Sebastian, Brian Hanna, Gayle Leaf, Evelyn Forrest, Dr Gwyneth Verkerk, Liz Stolwyk, Matt Makgill, (*Hone Turner, Ruthana Begbie*)
Independent Parties	**Representative**
Independent Chairperson	Bill Wasley
Independent Facilitator	Helen Ritchie
Independent Notetaker	Person on contract to WRC

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[2] At workshop 26 Patricia resigned; Sally Strang was her replacement for the remaining 5 workshops

5 Methodology and Research Design

In this section I first introduce my ontology and epistemology, setting the scene for my research methods, present my case study, then the materials used and my analysis approach. I conclude by discussing limitations, ethical concerns and reflexivity.

5.1 Ontology and Epistemology

In this thesis, I use critical realism as both an ontology and epistemology, positioned in between positivism and constructivism (Naster, 2014), because, as identified by Easton (2010), "critical realism is particularly well suited as a companion to case research" (p. 119) which is the objective of my research. As an ontology, critical realism acknowledges that there is an objective reality outside of the senses of the researcher and it is through the research method that we attempt to understand that reality (Bhaskar, 2011). As an epistemology critical realism acknowledges that "reality is socially constructed … [but that] the 'real' world breaks through and sometimes destroys the complex stories that we create in order to understand and explain the situations we research" (Easton, 2010, p. 120). As Sayer (1992) states, knowledge can be checked empirically. Events that we can observe are the result of different causes, these events are more vague than the theories we place on them (Naster, 2014). In this case, I assume a connection between the power dynamics at play within the workshops and the ultimate success of the workshops in achieving effective environmental governance of the Waikato rivers.

5.2 Methodological Approach

I chose a qualitative methodology, because, according to Stake (2010) "[w]hat qualitative studies are best at is examining the actual, ongoing ways that persons or organizations are doing their thing" (p. 2). As I am examining the ways that a process is being carried out by a governmental organisation, a qualitative approach is, by this definition, deemed suitable. The role of the qualitative researcher is to "gain a holistic overview of the context … its logics, its arrangements, its explicit and implicit rules" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 6) and is done in this study through an analysis of power, "attempting to capture data on the perceptions of local actors 'from the inside'" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 6). I wanted to know how and why environmental governance occurred as it did in the Waikato by unveiling the power dynamics in the workshops. Understanding the reasons behind people's actions makes it easier to find solutions to problems. If we do not make the effort to understand the underlying issues and intricacies of a problem, solutions will not be sustainable (Stake, 2010). Seeing that the underlying aspiration of my research is to essentially test a hypothesis; that power imbalance was at the core of the failed collaborative process, qualitative analysis proves useful due to its "potential for… seeing whether specific predictions hold up" (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 10). Within qualitative studies

testing out theories is becoming more prominent, pointing to a "growing maturity of the strategy" (Bryman, 2008, p. 373).

5.3   Document Analysis

My specific research method is a document analysis, defined as "a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents" (Bowen, 2009, p. 28). It is specifically suited for looking into case-studies, which is the scope and aim of my thesis. The purpose of a document analysis is to "elicit meaning, gain understanding and develop empirical knowledge" (Bowen, 2009, p. 27), in this case, used to gain an understanding of the power dimensions exercised within the collaborative governance approach that was used in the Waikato to gain further insight into how power influences governance processes.

I used document analysis as my method because it is an efficient method, as the documents I used were publicly available, and the nature of the documents I used were unobtrusive and non-reactive (Bowen, 2009). They also provided coverage over a long time period (Bowen, 2009); giving me a timeline of events spanning over two years.

5.4   Case Study

I chose to study the Collaborative Stakeholder Group (CSG), as this collaborative governance approach, along with the co-partners, is a novel method for constructing this policy type within the Waikato, and greater New Zealand (Waikato Regional Council, 2016c). This approach is therefore a learning tool for future collaborative governance processes. This case study provides a unique insight into this approach to understand why this particular governance process did not work and can be applied to the slightly more general case of New Zealand, to help with future environmental governance in New Zealand. It can also be used to draw generalisations on the much broader concept of environmental governance and particularly for improving collaborative governance.

5.5   Material

I relied on documents as my main form of data material, consisting of 30 documents of workshop notes. This can be classified into one of the types of secondary documents defined by McNeill & Chapman (2005) as 'public or official records'.

As the collaborative governance approach occurred in the Waikato between 2014 and 2016, it was not physically possible for me to directly observe the workshops. Documents can "tell us about the attributions and intentions of the periods to which they refer and describe places and social relationships at a time when we … were not simply present (May, 2001, as cited in McNeill & Chapman, 2005, p. 156). Hence, the next best thing was to use secondary data in the form of workshop notes that were taken during each of the workshops. There were a total of 30 workshops, covering a total of 58 days. Within these workshop notes it was noted: attendance, the workshop agenda, who spoke,

who discussed, what was discussed, what was agreed, what was disagreed etc. These notes were in effect the recordings of what occurred throughout each of the workshop days.

I judge the workshop notes based on Scott's (1990, as cited in Bryman, 2008, p. 516) criteria of documents: "authenticity, credibility, representativeness, meaning" (p. 6).

The workshop notes are authentic and credible as the notes were taken by an independent party during the workshops, approved by both the independent chairperson and independent facilitator, to then be approved by the CSG itself (personal communication, April 27, 2017). The workshop notes are official state documents, provided by the Waikato Regional Council under the transparency rules that the government must follow.

The workshop notes appear to be mostly representative of what happened, however, they are not a full description of what happened, and they are also subjected to the note-taker's own ideas of what was important enough to be included in the notes (Bryman, 2008). There may be things that were agreed to be left out of the notes. In terms of meaning, for most of the document I am able to understand what is being recorded, however, there are times when the note taker has, in the interest of time, omitted some words so I am unable to get a full understanding of the context of a sentence. In this sense, I may be missing some important information.

Being at the workshops to analyse people's behaviour, and to note instances of covert power would be beneficial for a power analysis, but I believe the workshop notes are the next best thing for me to have 'observed' the workshops.

5.6   Analysis Approach

Analysing documents is described by Bowen (2009) as "an iterative process" (p. 32). In an attempt to make my analysis approach "as rigorous and as transparent as possible" (Bowen, 2009, p. 38), I outline the steps I took to analyse my research question based on my material as described above.

1) Reading the workshop notes
2) Identifying the workshop agenda, recording:
   a. The title of each agenda heading
   b. Who was presenting, and what group they represented
   c. What they were presenting
3) If a presentation occurred that was not an agenda item heading, but was still a formal presentation, recording;
   a. The title of the presentation
   b. Who was presenting, and what group they represented

        c.   What they were presenting

4)   Identifying where there were disagreements in the consensus process

        a.   Who disagreed and why

        b.   Was the disagreement included or excluded in the final policy document

5)   Reading the workshop discussions and highlighting any points I deemed to be interesting or relevant to the power dimensions

As my lens for analysing the workshop notes was Lukes (2005) power dimensions, I used number 4) (above) to conduct my one-dimensional power analysis to identify conflicts of interest and who 'won' in the decision making process i.e. who was able to get the decision to be in their favour. I then used a combination of 2) and 3), along with a personal communication from an important staff member of the Project to analyse two-dimensional power, to determine who decided the workshop agendas, and which groups were more dominant on the agendas. To analyse three-dimensional power I used a combination of all the above items, along with using literature on the collaborative process, and NZ history. This method answers both of my sub research questions simultaneously, as identifying the examples of power dimensions in the workshops also identifies who was involved in the use of power.

5.6.1 *Limitations, Reflexivity, and Ethical Concerns*

Although I had set out to determine the topics and issues that were discussed during the CSG workshops, I quickly learnt that this was not feasible given the timeframe, because the topics and issues were not confined to the agenda headings. The discussions were quite detailed, and so in the interest of time I decided that the above data collection method would be enough to analyse the power dimensions.

Analysing power is very subjective, with the third-dimension of power being especially so. In carrying out the analysis I had to place what I know, my culture, and my values on the situation to identify what I believe would signify an example of power. Someone else may disagree with my examples of power or find other occurrences of power I did not consider. This does not make my analysis less valid, it only provides another view point. The third-dimension of power is also not directly observable, which makes it very hard to identify an occurrence of this power type. Using the workshop notes may have made it easier to analyse this type of power as it is a record of events leading up to a situation, which can be used to help realise if a situation is an example of the third power dimension. By just trying to analyse the third power dimension based on one moment in time, this does not provide enough information to effectively understand the power situation. Other information must be incorporated. The extra information that I deemed important for this power analysis were historical events of New Zealand and the Waikato, along with literature on the collaborative governance process.

Although very helpful and interesting, due to the limitations of time and thesis size, it was not possible for me to identify and analyse every occurrence of power connected with the CSG. The key examples I do provide in my analysis are enough to provide a critique of the collaborative governance process to show there are power imbalances.

All information used in this thesis is public with no personal, sensitive information so there are no ethical concerns for this thesis. In the one email communication I did use, I have omitted this person's name as I specifically stated in my first email that I was not going to include their name in this thesis.

In the next section I give the findings of my analysis to determine how power influenced the collaborative governance approach in the Waikato.

6 Analysis: Power in Governance

After extracting the data from the workshop notes, as described in the previous section, and then analysing the data using Steven Lukes' theory on power, I was able to identify examples of the different power dimensions as defined by Lukes (2005) within the Collaborative Stakeholder Group (CSG) workshops, whilst also identifying who exercised power over others.

In the following sections I present my analysis of the different power dimensions that occurred during the workshops. I first give examples of one-dimensional power, followed by examples of the second and third power dimensions respectively. After the examples of each power dimension I summarise the findings and relate the power examples back to governance literature, to gain an understanding in how power influenced this collaborative governance process.

6.1 One-Dimensional Power

In the following sub-sections I give some examples of one-dimensional power that were made apparent during the Collaborative Stakeholder Group (CSG) workshops. The different stakeholders that I identify in these examples are those which either exercised the power, or had power exercised upon them. Those who have exercised the power are the more powerful stakeholders within the CSG, and are therefore more likely to have a higher influence on the created policy.

As described in Section 3.1.1, one-dimensional power relates to observable conflicts, and those that have power are the ones that 'win' in decision making, and has gotten the other individual or group to 'comply' with their interests (Lukes, 2005). Therefore, I identify which stakeholders (in the form of sectors) had disagreements in the decision-making process when deciding what should be included in the policy. These disagreements can also be based on the existing conflicts as discussed earlier in relation to governance processes.

The disagreements that I use refer to the procedure used by the CSG for formal consensus reaching on proposals of what should be included in the policy. A proposal would be put forward to the group, in which the sector representatives would vote on whether it should be included in the policy. If not everyone voted in favour, then this is a disagreement.

As these disagreements are the result of decision-making, if a proposal is included in the policy despite some sectors disagreeing, then those that agreed with the proposal (against the views of the ones that disagreed) have exercised the first power dimension over those that disagreed. The same goes if someone disagreed and the proposal couldn't be included in the policy; the one that disagreed is more powerful than the others in that they prevent something from being included in the policy. Those that have gotten their interests met are more powerful. There were not many of these disagreements,

which means consensus was obtained for the majority of the policy contents. In the following I give some important examples of the disagreements based on the sectors involved in this one-dimensional power use, and see how they either used power or had power used on them, ultimately giving me a good overview of which were the most powerful actors in the process.

6.1.1 Independent Chairperson

The independent chairperson was regarded as an independent entity for the collaborative process. For an unassuming position, the independent chairperson has a very powerful role in guiding the policy creation. The chairperson was not involved in the discussion and decision making directly, however, he had a lot of power over the public stakeholders. When it came to formal disagreements on what should be included in the policy, the chairperson had the important position of deciding when to proceed and if there was enough consensus to reach an agreement (CSG, 2014c). He therefore effectively decided what issues were more important than others, so in choosing when to proceed he places his own values into the process, thereby giving him power over others who disagreed. He also simultaneously makes those in agreement more powerful than the ones who disagreed.

6.1.2 Maori Interests Sector

The Maori Interests sector (Maori) exercised one-dimensional power over the other sectors as the Maori sector successfully got the other sectors to agree to letting their sector be exempt from a rule that applies to everyone else. As stated earlier, Waikato iwi recently had land returned to them from the Crown. They wanted to be excluded from a rule that prevented the conversion of land to higher intensity land use (CSG, 2015c, 2015g, 2015h, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). This is because they believed it was a priority that they should be allowed to develop their newly acquired land for their economic and social wellbeing (CSG, 2016b). It was recognised that this land development would have social and cultural benefits that would outweigh a small cost to the river in terms of pollution (CSG, 2016e), with this small cost modelled and presented by the Technical Leaders Group (TLG) who represent science. The exemption from this rule change was specifically contested by the environmental/NGO sector, but this exemption was still applied in the final policy. Maori are more powerful than other sectors based on this example.

Iwi, although not industry bodies themselves, do have businesses in different industries that is predominantly in agriculture. Therefore, they favour decision making that enhances their economic interests. Developing the land is in their economic interest. The environmental/NGO sector is against the favouring of industry's economic interests at the expense of the environment, and was the only sector to clearly disagree; stating that the CSG is meant to create environmental policy, not social policy (CSG, 2016e), as the land development exemption for Maori is to right the wrongs inflicted by the government in New Zealand's early settlement.

6.1.3 Environmental/NGO Sector

The environmental/NGO sector was the most verbal in its disagreements during the workshops, and were the main sector to have disagreements preventing unanimous agreement in decision making. Despite their 'loud' voices, they were unable to win in decision making. They were not able to successfully use one-dimensional power, and instead the other sectors were more powerful in that they won in decision-making against the environmental/NGO sector.

For example, the environmental/NGO sector disagreed when it felt the policy content lacked in providing for the environment. The previous example of how Maori were more powerful than the environmental sector is one of these disagreements.

The Technical Leaders Group (TLG), representing science, also exercised power over the environmental/NGO sector when this sector wished to include information for better water quality that was outside of that recommended by the TLG into the policy document. However, the other CSG sectors, in placing higher value on the TLG's science, rejected this proposal (CSG, 2015b). The TLG, therefore, had more power than the environmental/NGO sector.

Even though all sectors apparently had some issues that were not present in the policy, the environmental/NGO sector was more vocal than other sectors in its concern that the issues its sector had voiced were not present in the policy (CSG, 2016d). At the same workshop, the environmental sector announced they had sought legal advice as they felt that that there had been large changes from what was initially discussed at the beginning of the collaborative process (CSG, 2016d), they appeared to be the only sector to do so.

6.1.4 Sheep & Beef Sector

The sheep and beef sector had two main disagreements that both related to costs. In one decision-making situation, the sheep and beef sector were more powerful than the other sectors. In another disagreement, they were not able to get the other sectors to comply to their wishes. Their attempted use of one-dimensional power failed, making the other sectors more powerful.

The first example was a successful use of the first dimension of power in which they successfully got the other sectors to exempt them from a rule as sheep and beef farmers do not have the financial resources to comply (CSG, 2015f). They were able to manipulate other sector's views by stating that if they were included in the particular rule, it would mean creating an unachievable target which would undermine the project's credibility (CSG, 2015f). Excluding sheep and beef from this rule is not in the best interest of each sector, as it allows for more pollution from sheep and beef farms compared to other sectors, yet it is in the interest of the CSG to reach the common goal of having a credible process.

The other disagreement was also about high costs, but in relation to a variety of rules in the policy. The sheep and beef sector, in sensing the policy would affect them economically, as with the historical reform of 1986, lobbied the CSG to bend a rule in their favour to allow for their farms to have flexibility to intensify, because, if not done, it would affect their ability to function within the financial markets, thus meaning they do not have the costs to meet the policy demands (CSG, 2016e, 2016f). The CSG was generally sympathetic that it faced high costs, but felt uncomfortable in this situation to give this sector different rules than others (CSG, 2016e). The more economically powerful dairy sector, who has already been voluntarily making changes in farm management to enhance its public image, was greatly opposed to the sheep and beef's attempt at exemption. Dairy saw that its sector had done a lot to help stop pollution, so others could also do the same. This is a competition mentality, in the "I've done more than you" sense, but dairy have the resources to do more than other sectors. The sheep and beef sector does not have the same privileged position as the dairy sector. The sheep and beef sector, in not having their needs met, lodged a formal objection to the Project, stating it could not accept the policy (CSG, 2016f).

Below I give a summary and discussion of the examples brought up relating to the use of one-dimensional power in relation to collaborative governance.

6.1.5   *Discussion of One-Dimensional Power Influencing Governance*

From the above examples, it was identified that the more powerful sectors and people were the independent chairperson, the Maori sector, and Technical Leaders Group (TLG), with sheep and beef not being quite as powerful, and the environmental/NGO sector having no power at all within the workshops. In the following I discuss how the above examples relate to governance.

The independent chairperson's position does create a power imbalance, yet, it is very necessary to have an 'independent' person who ensures the process continues smoothly and does not fall into disarray. It is an important moderator position in collaborative governance processes as Ansell & Gash (2008) found in their extensive study. The conflicting views between the sectors makes this position very important to move the process along through a tight timeframe as stated in Section 4.2.2.

It is not in the CSG's interests to right the wrongs done by the Crown towards Maori, that is the role of the government itself. The collaborative governance approach is meant to ensure that the government is not involved in the decision-making, yet, as mentioned in Section 2.2.2, the government will always be the most powerful. The CSG are working in their interests, to ensure Maori are given special treatment. This creates bias in the process, causing uneven power imbalance.

The reliance on the Technical Leaders Group (TLG) creates expert bias. This is based on "the culture of institutions and decision makers … often stuck in the mindset that only experts can answer policy

questions" (Evans, 2012, p. 199). This is also a source of distrust, as the TLG works 'behind closed doors' and then reports back to the CSG "according to the DAD (Decide-Announce-Defend) model" (Evans, 2012, p. 199). Although expert knowledge is considered valid, there is the risk that the views and interests of the wider community are not incorporated enough into their work.

According to Schuckman (2001), environmental sectors find that different interests and information are not discussed nor considered adequately enough in this type of process. Environmental sector's tend to place higher trust in the legal system, and distrust the collaborative process, which, according to Schuckman (2001) is due to the courts being their best (and usually only) way of having their interests met. The collaborative process is never in favour of the environmentalists, and is skewed towards groups that can work together with a common interest, which is most commonly and dominantly the economic interest (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Environmental sectors, who don't have the economy as a large interest, are left out, and as seen in the CSG, the collaborative process is uneven against their interests. As the environmental sector's main interest is that of the environment, it is ironic that their interests are not met in the policy aimed to help the environment. If the environmental sector is highly suspicious of this process then it leads to an issue of trust. Time was not taken to build trust between the different stakeholders. Network governance states that stakeholders are motivated to work together by ethical concerns for their area in which they live (Evans, 2012) but it seems that sectors partake through motivation of costs, in trying to minimise the costs for their sector, so they get a better outcome. This is not based on cooperation, it is based on competition.

Although the environmental/NGO sector had no power during CSG decision-making, the policy favoured the general view of environmentalists by using tighter regulations. The network mode of governance, which adaptive governance is based upon, is supposed to favour a voluntary solution that needs cooperation, and should be a solution that will most likely be adopted by the community (Evans, 2012).

The issues raised by the sheep and beef sector in relation to costs and flexibility, showed that the solution would not be accepted by the community; which is exactly what happened. The formal objection to the policy by the sheep and beef sector should have been used as a warning to those implementing the policy that the policy would not be well received by the wider Waikato community. Time was needed to work through this monumental issue to ensure the policy would be accepted. This relates to the availability of resources in an adaptive governance process.

Farmers acknowledge the need to change their behaviour, and want to do so, but the experimentation aspect of adaptive governance is not suitable when resources are minimal. The farmers do not have the financial resources to undertake solutions that 'reinvent the wheel', and neither does the

government. Resources are spread too thinly for large system change (Evans, 2012). If sectors were to work together in collectively pooling their resources, instead of seeing this process as a competition between sectors, then perhaps more resources would be made available to implement an effective solution. The cooperation aspect of governance was missing in the Waikato's approach.

Time was not taken to overcome existing conflicts and build trust. The involvement of an independent chairperson helps to create trust in the process, as this position is one of authority that brings with it distinct rules, in making the process fair for all stakeholders and creating equitable solutions. Although this builds trust within the process, it does not build trust between stakeholders. If time had been taken to work through conflicts between sectors, such as the environmental/NGO sector and businesses, and the sheep and beef sector and dairy, then it could be fully understood why these disagreements occurred, and identify the best way to work through and overcome them to make for a more robust and widely accepted policy.

6.2   Two-Dimensional Power

In this section I present examples of the second power dimension apparent in the CSG workshops. As described in Section 3.1.2, Lukes' (2005) definition of the second dimension of power refers to political agenda setting and what is or is not included on the agenda. Those with power choose what gets decided, and they prevent possible issues from becoming actual issues (Lukes, 2005).

The examples of the second dimension of power that I identified in relation to the CSG were focused on looking at the agenda for the CSG workshops. The powerful were able to decide which groups got more representation during the workshops. Likewise, if a group is able to get themselves represented on the CSG agenda, then they are also powerful. Those that get more representation on the agenda are able to voice any concerns that they have to the CSG, so these can be issues discussed by the CSG in the hope they will get favourably resolved. What gets discussed within the workshops enables it to be contemplated for the policy. If a group cannot be/or has not been included on the CSG agenda, then any concerns that they have are never given the opportunity to be discussed by the CSG, and will not have been given the opportunity to even be considered for the policy.

Each group that was involved in the CSG workshop has their own values and interests. They each have particular issues that they deem important based on these differing values and interests. In my analysis I do not explain what these issues were due to time constraints; as there were many workshops and long discussions within the workshop notes. Many issues were brought up by different groups. The term 'issues' that I use relates to concerns or recommendations that groups may have brought up based on their interests, which therefore signifies the group has an 'issue'. I do not discuss the details of these issues, therefore, I use it as a broad term to acknowledge different groups' interests. Hence,

if a group is unable to get themselves onto the agenda to make their voice heard, it means any 'issues' they may have based on their interests are not represented; they are not made into actual issues to be discussed by the CSG.

6.2.1   Deciding the Workshop Agendas

Those that decided what is included in the workshop agendas are powerful in their use of the second dimension of power. The independent chairperson and independent facilitator created the workshop agendas, with overarching input from the Project partners, and some input from the Technical Leaders Group (TLG) and the Collaborative Stakeholder Group (CSG) sectors.

The independent facilitator within the CSG drafted the agendas for individual workshops with help from the independent chairperson, who then confirmed the draft (personal communication, April 20, 2017). Staff within the Project (see Figure 2) and those within the CSG also had the opportunity to have input into the agenda if they wanted to discuss some matters (personal communication, April 20, 2017). The independent facilitator and chairperson decided who would present certain information, with the chair of the TLG usually deciding who would present research matters (personal communication, April 20, 2017). There was, however, an overarching schedule already provided for the CSG workshops that detailed when certain matters were to be discussed throughout the Project's duration (personal communication, April 20, 2017). This was created by those leading the project; the regional government and chosen River Iwi. Consequently, although the 'independent' facilitator and chairperson get to create the individual workshop agendas, they are actually being influenced greatly by those running the whole project. At the same time, they are placing their views on what is important to discuss, giving them the second dimension of power.

Figure 2. How the CSG fits in with the wider Project and which groups interact with each other. Source: Waikato Regional Council (2014) modified by author

6.2.2 Objective Setting

The Waikato Regional Council created boundaries within which the CSG had to work. As a government body, they are restricted by legislation, and hence imposed these restrictions onto the CSG. Instead of just stipulating the rules for the process, the government also stipulated the rules for the outcome.

At the first workshops the CSG were told by the Project Manager (who is part of the regional government) what their objectives were, and what they could and could not focus on, along with certain interests of the government that must be met (CSG, 2014a, 2014b). Effectively, it means that if these criteria were not met, the final decision makers would not be using the policy created by the CSG. Though the Project Manager and Project Coordinator "supported the direction the CSG wished to go in and ensured the delivery of CSG requests and direction were delivered on by staff and consultant resourcing" (personal communication, April 20, 2017), the government have still clearly organised what issues are not to be discussed by the CSG, regardless of what the CSG sectors would like to consider.

6.2.3 Representation in the Workshop Agendas

The workshop notes displayed the agendas for each workshop. The headings on the agenda identified what was planned to be discussed, and by whom. I call these 'presentations'. I recorded each presentation heading, identifying the topic, who presented, and which group this person represented.

I excluded items that occurred in every workshop agenda: the introduction, opening statements, CSG only time (no notes were available for this), approvals and update sessions, and chairperson closing comments, as well as items that were just CSG discussions, because no one group was formally presenting. By looking at the item headings within the CSG workshop notes, and subsequent presentation headings for that agenda item, the groups that formally presented the most at the workshop could be identified. If a group is able to get themselves onto the agenda, it allows their issues to become actual issues (Lukes, 2005) to be considered by the CSG. These groups have successfully carried out the second-dimension of power. However, if one group ends up presenting more than another group, it means there is a power imbalance, as higher weighting is given to some groups' interests, and not others (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Fish et al., 2010) which is not beneficial in a collaborative governance process.

6.2.3.1 Waikato Regional Council

The Waikato Regional Council dominated the agenda. This is not surprising as they are the ones leading and implementing the collaborative governance approach, but that does not mean it is fair. By giving the CSG a set timeline that needed to be met, along with items that were obligatory, it leaves little room for other matters to be placed on the agenda. It may cause people or groups to feel like there is no time for matters they would like to discuss, and relegates their input as less important. Their values are subverted to those with power as they do not have the resources to 'rebel' (Lukes, 2005).

6.2.3.2 Collaborative Stakeholder Group Sectors

The CSG were involved in presentations and a great deal of discussions during the workshops; making up 31% of the agenda allocation for the workshops (excluding the regular agenda items previously mentioned). Of the CSG involvement, there were only 15 formally acknowledged times where the sector representatives in the CSG were able to give feedback to the greater CSG on what their sectors' thoughts were, displayed graphically below in Figure 3. This therefore comes out at a meagre 4% of the total agenda items. Even though the sector representatives would have been able to advocate their sectors' views during CSG discussions at other times during the workshops, their interests were given little time on the Project agenda, despite the collaborative approach revolving around the involvement and representation of different stakeholders. Potential issues that each sector may have had were not able to be included on the agenda, therefore not becoming an actual issue to be considered by the CSG.

Figure 3. Proportion of CSG presentation and discussion time that was formally allocated to feedback from individual sectors represented within the CSG.

6.2.3.3   Smaller Groups Given a Voice

There was a gross imbalance in presentations by sectors represented within the CSG (Figure 4) with Maori taking a large majority of 33% of individual sector presentations, with both the rural advocacy and rural professional sectors having no formal presentations on the CSG agendas. In the past, Maori have not had much involvement in environmental decision making through the government (Craig et al., 2000), but with the River Iwi as decision makers it appears that Maori are compensating for past lost opportunities to make their voice heard. In this situation the 'smaller' groups (Maori) are finally given the resources to effectively participate which is what collaborative governance should do (Schuckman, 2001), except Maori have then exploited these newly acquired resources for their greater benefit at the expense of the other stakeholders within the CSG. Even though the majority of those involved with the CSG thought this collaborative process was 'fair' (personal communication, April 20, 2017), this example suggests otherwise. Particular issues have clearly been organised on (and off) the agenda.

Figure 4. Share of presentations by the individual CSG sectors in the CSG workshop agendas

6.2.3.4 Community Engagement

While it appears the community sector had little involvement in the workshop agendas, it must be remembered that there were many community engagement events throughout the Project's timeframe. The results from these events were discussed at the CSG workshops, but they were not formally part of the workshop agendas (as they were events outside of the workshops), nor were these presented by community members, so they were not recorded as 'community'.

However, these engagement events aren't collaborative. According to Cooke & Kothari (2001), these engagement events do not mean the community is actually heard; they are a 'ghostly presence', only present to give the process more 'credibility and legitimacy' for pre-made decisions. The second dimension of power was therefore used by the CSG at these community engagement events; it was discussed within the CSG workshops what was to be included in the presentations to the communities, and what information would be shared or not (CSG, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015e). The CSG also wanted to present to the communities a united front (CSG, 2015d); that they were working in cohesion (even if this was not true). By presenting a particular front to the general public, and deciding what can or cannot be discussed, it discredits the transparency of collaborative governance.

Next, I give a summary and discussion of the examples brought up relating to the use of two-dimensional power in relation to collaborative governance.

6.2.4 Discussion of Two-Dimensional Power Influencing Governance

From the above examples, it was identified that the government had the most power in deciding the agenda and setting the objectives, whilst also dominating the agenda themselves. This is despite the governance process' aim to give stakeholders active involvement in the process. In the following I discuss how the above examples relate to governance.

The government has steered the collaborative approach, but they have steered too hard. In collaborative governance, governments can manage the approach to go in a particular direction, in this case it was to ensure the health of the Waikato rivers. But, in telling the CSG what they must discuss, and what will be monitored, is not collaborative governance. It is hierarchy governance: governing by force (Evans, 2012). Rules should be applied that relate to the process, not to the content. As Evans (2012) stated, "governance … is essentially about procedures, or how things should be done, rather than *what* should be done" (p. 187). By stipulating what already needs to be discussed, it reinforces both the power of the government, and the existing power given by the government to their high interest groups (Fish et al., 2010; Petersen et al., 2009).

With the government stating the objectives that must be met by the CSG, it reiterates the view by Castro (2007) and Christens & Speer (2006), that the government (the Waikato Regional Council) only see this collaborative governance process as a tool to reach their desired objective, a critique of this approach in Section 2.2.2. This process did not foster democratic discussion between the stakeholders in the CSG to allow them to decide the objectives.

The Waikato Regional Council presented the most during the workshops as they are seen as the experts in policy making. This reinforces the government's existing power over others. In a collaborative governance approach, one of the touted benefits is that the process is equitable (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Fish et al., 2010; Schuckman, 2001), yet, with the government having managed to incorporate their interests onto the agenda, in which they themselves have decided a time frame on, it does not allow for fair and equitable decision making, because others are prevented from being on the agenda due to the government's domination

This issue is similar to that mentioned in the one-dimensional power examples with the TLG. Emphasis is placed on the expert's ideas, without really considering the public stakeholders. The CSG were not able to formulate their own innovative solutions as a truly adaptive governance approach would have allowed, and instead they have been steered by the government towards traditional governing; in that of tighter regulation. Although the regulations are new for this region, it is not innovative, and it does not allow for true ownership of the policy by the community. The decisions undertook by the CSG were "shaped to a large degree by the pre-established rules and procedures" of institutions (Evans, 2012, p.

47). In the government and River Iwi establishing the overarching rules and what needs to be done, this "tends to fail, as they cannot capture diverse requirements of different actors and different contexts" (Evans, 2012, pp. 49–50). If there had been the opportunity to allow for the stakeholders to self-govern, and in deciding the rules themselves, it would have had a more effective outcome (Evans, 2012).

The River Iwi, as co-partners for the Project, managed to get the Maori sector more representation onto the CSG agenda. Maori's interests were able to be discussed more. A benefit of this approach, as mentioned in Section 2.2.1, is that smaller groups get to have an equal voice with larger groups. Maori, the usually marginalised group, were prioritised by those running the Project as being more important, and should have more influence than other sectors in the final policy. This does not create an equal platform compared to other sectors, but it does make them more powerful than usual. Horticulture, dairy, tourism and recreation, and sheep and beef were other sectors that had high representation on the agenda. Hence, the CSG discussions ended up revolving around these more powerful sectors. Their issues were therefore brought up more than other sectors, despite other sectors possibly having information that could have made for a more successful policy.

For ethical reasons, public stakeholders need to be involved in the process to give them a right to decide how their society operates, and practically, involving the public is a way of ensuring the legitimacy of the solution (Evans, 2012). Active public engagement is one of the benefits of collaborative governance (see Section 2.2.1). Effective participation by the community will allow the CSG to decide on what is important to the community to be captured in the policy. But the community engagement events did not allow for effective participation, as they were steered by those within the CSG, sharing only some information, and asking the community previously defined questions, so they only get certain answers back. These engagement events were simply a way for the CSG to tell the public what was happening, and not get important ideas back. If the CSG has listened more to the community, and actively engaged with them in true governance style, the policy could have been made more suitable to the public's wishes. It is of course hard to include everyone in the governance process, and resources limit the extent of this inclusion (Evans, 2012). However, more care should have been taken in how the community engagement events were run, rather than just being a side project to make the Project and policy appear legitimate. Collaborative governance is meant to create equal and fair discussion, yet those representatives within the CSG make themselves more powerful than the people they are representing on their behalf, when really, they should be seen at equal levels.

6.3   Three-Dimensional Power

The most powerful individuals and groups are able to use the third power dimension, which I described in Section 3.1.3. Three-dimensional power exists where power slyly alters people's beliefs and

preferences to favour the powerful so people's values cannot be presumed as 'true', because their values could be the result of power (Lukes, 2005). Whether actions of the powerful were deliberate or not, it is still a form of power; as power can also be inadvertently carried out without the powerful ever intending the consequences that occurred. The powerful can also further other groups' interests (Lukes, 2005). I give two examples of this third power dimension below.

6.3.1 River Iwi as Co-Decision Makers

River Iwi were able to successfully get the government to comply with their wishes in allowing them to be decision-makers in the Project, giving them almost equal power as the Waikato Regional Council. This is an example of the first power dimension. But, it is also that of the third, and most powerful form of power. This power was used by the government.

In allowing River Iwi to be co-partners in the Project, the government is simultaneously obtaining the compliance of Maori, in that they will have no further conflict with the government as the government has adhered to their wishes. It is the ultimate form of power to prevent conflicts or grievances from occurring (Lukes, 2005). The government have had a long history of conflict with Maori, especially so with the Waikato iwi. In allowing the River Iwi to be co-partners in the Project to create a policy, the government are able to remain powerful through ensuring compliance, with its citizen's grievances subdued. Maori think it is in their interests to be decision-makers, but in reality it is in the best interest of the government to allow them to have this role, as it creates some peace, allowing the government to ultimately stay the most powerful in society.

6.3.2 The Government are the Most Powerful

The collaborative governance process in itself has received widespread criticism for its power imbalances (see Section 2.2.2), in that it furthers the interest of the state. This is the use of the third power dimension by the government over those that are involved in the Project. By advertising the governance approach as collaborative, democratic, fair, equitable, etc., the government fails to mention that it is inherently used to favour the interests of those who implement and steer the process. Although river pollution was the main goal to be reached in this policy, it was not the only goal. The collaborative process was a way to legitimise Maori's role in the process, to further their interests, as the Environmental/NGO sector said: it's ultimately a method to create social policy (CSG, 2016e). The government is using this approach to further their interests, as demonstrated before in allowing River Iwi to be co-partners.

This can be related to the one-dimensional power examples in Section 6.1. The government allowed policy biases in the form of some groups being exempt from rules, which indicates they have a vested interest in these biases. The government is a governing body and they ultimately want to stay in power,

so if they find that creating biases for some groups will allow them to stay powerful, then they will do so, despite the overall goal of the policy for cleaning up the rivers. When it comes to staying in power, the environment is forfeited to keep groups – those that the government deems as threatening to its position of power, happy and compliant.

As seen in the second power dimension examples (in Section 6.2), the government still has significant power influence into the policy outline for this environmental governance process. They have quite considerably used this collaborative governance process for their interests, sidestepping legitimate democratic decision-making. The network governance approach was not really carried out, with the government using this method as a 'cover' for their predetermined plan.

In the following I give a discussion of the examples of three-dimensional power in relation to collaborative governance.

6.3.3   Discussion of Three-Dimensional Influencing Governance

In the above examples, it was again seen that the government was the most powerful in the collaborative governance approach. I discuss how this creates power imbalance in the governance approach.

The Collaborative Stakeholder Group (CSG) was created by the government as a strategy to meet set objectives and adhere to legislation created by the government. This strategy was portrayed as adaptive governance, in that it sought to have stakeholders present and involved in democratic decision making to reach consensus over what should be included in a policy to bring about environmental change in a social-ecological system to ensure the community goal of healthy rivers was met. In reality, it was a method used by the government to allow them to govern more vigorously over land use with more stringent regulations, whilst simultaneously advancing the interests of the Waikato-Tainui iwi whom the government had wronged in the later 1800's by being bound in legislation. The government placed objectives onto the policy that the stakeholders had to meet. As the stakeholders did not get a legitimate say in deciding what the solution would include, they have a greater reason to oppose the solution, as it was not created in their interests, but instead the interests of the government.

7 Conclusion

The aim of my research was to gain an understanding of the power dynamics between different stakeholders involved in the collaborative governance approach used in the Waikato, New Zealand, to understand how power can influence this governance approach to cause specific outcomes that benefit some at the expense of others. Using Lukes' (2005) power theory with his three different power dimensions allowed me to identify the different power dynamics between stakeholders and get an insight into why this particular project was received so negatively.

My analysis shows that, in line with one of the main critiques of collaborative governance outlined in Section 2.2, an imbalance of power is the most likely cause of the perceived failure of this approach used in the Project in the Waikato Region.

Using Lukes' (2005) three dimensional power theory allowed me to go into depth of the power issues, by systematically identifying the overt, and behavioural based one- and two-dimensional power examples within the CSG, as well as the more elusive third dimension. For example, by unveiling the one-dimensional power use by Maori, and the two-dimensional power use by the government in setting the agenda and objectives, it was possible to understand the more 'sneaky' powers hiding underneath the surface of the process where the government was able to use this process to further their interests and other groups' interests to allow the government to stay powerful through compliance. It was also very important to investigate the history of the Waikato, as historical conflicts and events greatly affect governance. Consequently, by illuminating the third dimension it was easier to see how the more visible power struggles could come about. Trying to identify the power imbalances of the collaborative process by jumping straight in with the third dimension of power is not possible due to its covert nature and subjectivity, yet this is what inherently causes the other power dimensions.

The skewed power dynamics on the different levels resulted in an imbalanced and inequitable process in different ways by:

i. The government elevating some stakeholders' interests above others,

ii. Time was not allocated for the considerable need of trust building,

iii. Higher value was placed in government and science experts over community stakeholders interests

iv. Creating tighter regulations that don't instil community ownership of the solution

v. Promoting competition and not cooperation of resources needed for an effective solution

vi. The government setting the rules, objectives, and agenda that are not democratic decisions, to allow them to stay in a position of power

vii.   The wider community were not adequately engaged, their voices were not justly heard

My research shows that the institutional design of this approach was essentially flawed. The government was giving a smaller group, who is usually marginalised, a greater say in decision-making. In using a faulty governance model that they had created, they have simultaneously placed a negative connotation of having Maori as joint decision makers, which is dangerous for the future when these two groups need to collaborate again. It is not the Maori who brought about a greatly contested policy, but ultimately that of the government. Although beneficial for Maori to finally have their interests met, the great power imbalance, where the government ruled this supposedly governance approach, led to unwanted outcomes.

There was also no time taken in building trust between stakeholders. The 14 sectors involved in the CSG, apart from a select few, are fairly independent from each other, with little trust between them. With low levels of trust, collective action was not going to be effectively achieved (Evans, 2012). Trust is essential to work through conflicts, create cooperation, and a shared ownership of a fair solution. The solution does not need to be equally handed out to all, only that it is just, and agreed upon. Trust is the backbone for an effective outcome.

It appeared that the Collaborative Stakeholder Group (CSG) were able to work together over a period of around two-years, before the final decisions on the policy content towards the end of this process caused the governance approach to fall apart. More time was needed to have ensured a more effective and agreed upon policy. The approach was for the most part collaborative, and in the spirit of governance, with stakeholders voluntarily coming together to better their environment. There is interest in changing people's behaviour and farming practices, but not in the way adaptive governance and this policy ultimately advertises.

Adaptive governance 'embraces uncertainty', yet there are inflexible social-economic systems, and lacking resources for farmers to fully embrace this uncertainty. Farmers are risk averse as they deal with an industry that is already unstable in the face of climate change, global markets, and local climates; they don't need more uncertainty added to their business. There is a limit to how much they can experiment before it is no longer economically and socially viable for them, despite their desire to change their behaviour. In listening more to the communities involved in this process, and identifying past events that impact resources and the culture of an area, it would have been recognised that experimentation in this particular social-ecological system was not going to work.

Identifying the motivation for each sector allows for different solutions to be implemented. For example, the dairy sector is strongly motivated by their public image, already carrying out better farming practices. They operate on the basis of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and it seems to

be working. The sheep and beef industry, not set up to be as resource rich as dairy, would most likely benefit from the principles of Elinor Ostrom's idea of "communities developing and enforcing their own rules" (Evans, 2012, p. 16) to sustainably manage common resources. Or, considering that almost all sectors are businesses, a market approach may have been more beneficial. Placing tighter regulations in a fundamentally 'one-size-fits-all' policy, enhances the state's domination, and does not allow for meeting the diverse requirements of the different sectors.

It is important that these shortcomings are worked through, that power imbalances are made more equitable and transparent, because if we cannot get governance to work then we will keep failing to "organize our societies and economies in such a way that they do not harm the environment" (Evans, 2012, p. 1). Therefore, we must obtain a better understanding of governance to create genuine change (Evans, 2012); "governance is about steering and emergence, not rigid control and revolution" (Evans, 2012, p. 219)

Sustainable development requires innovative solutions, a shift away from traditional governing by force, and instead towards sustainable solutions that will be taken up and carried out by the communities. "A comprehensive analysis of power is a precondition for understanding how a transition to sustainability can be enhanced, or prevented" (Partzsch, 2016, p. 207). My research has shown that the issue of power imbalances cannot be taken lightly if fair and sustainable outcomes are desired, they must be explored, identified, and worked upon. Essentially, as Thomas Hobbes quite wisely said: "knowledge is power".

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9   Appendix

9.1   Principles to Guide the Policy Creation

These principles will guide the plan review process:

1. Communities affected by decisions have a right to participate in making them.

2. Identify and clarify decisions to be made from all perspectives. Strive for clarity about, and connection with, the decision-making process.

3. Stakeholders feel they have had an opportunity to understand the problem and contribute to its solution. Under promise and over deliver. Be clear about what can and can't be changed.

4. Build trusting relationships through well-run processes, including face-to-face meetings.

5. Demonstrate that we have listened and provide feedback on what we have heard.

6. Recognise that people need sufficient time, information and support to understand the issue of water quality and translate it into their day-to-day lives.

7. We will engage in a way that suits the preferences and needs of that person or group.

8. Encourage creative thinking in finding potential solutions. Support trial and error. Accept interim solutions.

9. Continue to identify and update directly affected communities on the process and decisions.

10. Stay in touch, even when the going gets tough. Acknowledge emotions.

11. Sustain momentum by acknowledging success, reinforcing the positive and focusing on the outcome. Ask "can we move on"?

12. Be clear about roles in the plan change process, using the International Association for Public Participation spectrum to assist this clarity.

These principles may be summarised as:

Trusting relationships

Build trusting relationships through well-run processes and positive behaviours, such as providing feedback, adequate information, time and support, active listening, and space to understand the issues.

Quality engagement

Engage in a way that suits that person or group and maintains open, honest and transparent communication. Communities affected by decisions have a right to participate in making them.

Evidence-based processes

Understand the problems and givens in the project and encourage innovative solutions.

Sustain momentum

Sustain momentum by acknowledging success, reinforcing the positive and focusing on the outcome and asking "can we move on?"

9.2 Personal Communication – 27th & 20th April 2017

N.B. Questions asked by me are in italics.

Who wrote up the CSG workshop notes that are found on the WRC website?

They were written up by a person on contract to WRC for the project, then checked by the independent facilitator and chairperson before they were sent to the CSG for confirmation at the subsequent workshop.

Who set the agenda for the workshops? – Who decided what was going to be presented and by whom, and how far in advance was each agenda set?

The agendas were drafted by the Independent facilitator with input from the independent chair, and confirmed by the independent chair with input from staff and the CSG itself in respect of matters they wished to discuss. There was opportunity for CSG members and staff to seek to have matters placed on the agenda.

There was a programme of work and this was timetabled to be presented at certain times. Who presented particularly in terms of the research work was determined mostly by the chair of the Technical Leaders Group. The independent facilitator and chairperson determined who would present on particular items.

What did you find were the main reasons for being absent/resigning?

Reasons for people resigning related to retirement from their employment; unable to commit the time required to participate in the CSG; or health/ personal reasons. Several members had babies during this time period which affected their ability to attend all meetings.

The challenge of balancing their day jobs and commitments with attending a two-day workshop every month or so, or more frequently towards the end of the project. Alternates often attended when a member could not

What was the Project Sponsor's interest in funding the project? Who was she affiliated with?

Tracey May as noted was the project sponsor on behalf of the Waikato regional Council. The council funded the Healthy Rivers project including the collaborative stakeholder group and the research required and associated processes.

Who were the Project Manager (Jo Bromley) and Project Coordinator (Jenni Somerville) affiliated with? How much influence did they have as to what happened at the CSG workshops?

Both Jo Bromley and Jenni Somerville were employed by Waikato regional Council. They had roles to support the project, ensure resources were provided and administrative and project management tasks and support were attended to and provided. They supported the direction the CSG wished to go in and ensured the delivery of CSG requests and direction were delivered on by staff and consultant resourcing. They also worked to integrate all aspects of the project such as the collaborative process (CSG), with its technical alliance, the co-governance (Healthy Rivers Wai Ora committee) and co-management (Te Ropu Hautu) aspects and the WRC Councillors as ultimate decision makers.

What was the role of the Project Steering Group?

Te Ropu Hautu was the steering group for the HRWO project and comprised of senior iwi, council staff including Chief Executive and Waikato River Authority Chief Executive.

The purpose of the group was to maintain an overview and providing integrated direction to the project team responsible for reviewing the Waikato Regional Plan as it related to the effects of discharges on the health and wellbeing of the Waikato and Waipa Rivers.

Did you find that the CSG was inclusive – people felt safe, happy and part of the process; all the voices were heard, with no one individual dominating; CSG members stayed in the process; the CSG worked well together towards a goal? (This question comes from one of the project success indicators)

　　Safe, Happy, Part of Process:

The process provided for equal participation through a range of facilitation techniques that were used throughout to maximise the opportunity for all voices to be heard. Sectors nominated their representatives which was important for sector mandate and buy in to the collaborative process. It is my view (supported by feedback from CSG members) that the vast majority of CSG members felt that the process was fair and credible. Key element in respect of process credibility.

Diversity of perspectives around the table:

Representation from a range of sectors that will be impacted by policy directly involved in making the policy

Extensive consultation throughout the process with sector and the community.

Independence of the Chair and Facilitator.

Voices:

There was an environment created and opportunity for all voices to be heard. The range of views on matters were able to be put on the table. Having said that, this does not mean that all views could be incorporated into the final plan change, as people had to shift in order to achieve agreement. No one member dominated the CSG workshops and deliberations; although some were more vocal than others, this did not mean that their views necessarily prevailed. Whilst there were many strong views articulated it came down to one vote per member and consensus was reached on a great many of the final provisions contained in the plan change.

Where there were differences in opinion these were clearly documented and where members disagreed with a particular provision or policy they were able to and did formally document their differing views and the reasons for them.

However, sectors could fully appreciate the perspectives of other sectors before making decisions.

Members stayed and participated for the total journey. The commitment of time was challenging due to an extension of the project timeframe. This was assisted by having delegates to participate in the process when a member could not attend.

Group approach:

The CSG worked extremely well and in a respectful manner towards each other. The work consisted of both informal working groups and formal sessions.

Did you find the CSG process was limited by costs and time?

WRC offered an honorarium and paid certain expenses to members of the CSG who were not there as part of their job in an effort to ensure cost would not be a limitation to the CSG. However, the amount of time required imposed a cost to members' regular businesses and activities. CSG was not constrained in terms of limitation on costs by the WRC. There was sufficient funding available for the CSG to effectively do its work and for the carrying out of research etc.

The timeframe was extended, and it was felt by many that time constraints of having the plan change recommended by CSG to the Council by the October local government elections resulted in pressures on CSG, staff, iwi partners and elected members. Some indicated that some further time would have assisted in a more measured completion of CSG's work. However, several members of the CSG were of the view that it had to be finished due to having been involved for over 2.5 years, and there were competing interests for their time and own wellbeing.