

The European Union's Human Security Approach: Transitioning from Childhood towards Adolescence

A tale of innocence and experience in the Sahel.



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Abstract

This thesis examines EU's adoption of a human security approach and the extent to which it has been part of crisis management discourse as well as practice in the Sahel region of Africa.

It tells the story of a maturing process for a core approach in EU security policy; that is, human security, which has evolved from a state of innocence to gradual experience and adolescence. Such transition has exposed the tensions that exists between EU ambition and capabilities – between idealism and realism in international relations – and between political discourse and practice. It will be argued that human security continues to reflect a process of maturing as it is still learning from its own incoherence, which sometimes end up doing more harm than good for those suffering. The outcome of this research confirms this. Using the Sahel region of Africa as a case study, this qualitative study engages with critical theory to understand the implications of what is labelled *a second-generation human security approach*. The driver behind such a conceptual transformation in EU discourse is argued to be instrumental, pointing to co-option and institutionalization of human security into mainstream discourse. If we are to see a return of emancipatory human security, this research suggests to draw on 'local-local' understandings of security as well as the notion of post-colonial renegotiations of peacebuilding. Only then can the EU produce real change for the individual at all levels of society.

Key words: EU human security, CSS approach, principled pragmatism, Sahel interventionism, the liberal peace project.

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Table of contents

Abstract.....	2
List of Abbreviations/Tables	4
1. Introduction	5
1.1 Research Design	6
1.2 Research Rationale	7
1.3 Methodological Framework	10
1.3.1 Theory	10
1.3.2 Qualitative Research Methods	11
1.3.3 Limitations	11
2. The Birth of a New Paradigm : 1990s and onwards.....	12
2.1 Learning from past hardships	12
2.2 A New Approach to Security	13
2.3 Origins of Contemporary Human Security	15
2.4 Freedom from Want & Fear	15
3. The Innocence of Human Security in a Complex World	18
3.1 A source of peril & a promise?.....	18
3.2 Value of Innocence: The Cosmopolitan Core of Human Security.....	19
3.3 Value of Gaining Experience: Critical Theory & Emancipation	21
3.4 Value of Questioning Everything: Poststructuralist Suspicion	23
4. The Early Childhood Phase of Human Security: 2003 and onwards	25
4.1 Testing New Waters: Human Security in the CSDP	25
4.2 From the ESS to the HSSG Reports.....	28
4.3 The European Security Strategy	29
4.4 The Barcelona Report: Human Security Doctrine for Europe.....	29
4.5 The Madrid Report: A European Way of Security	31
5. A Transition towards Maturity? Entering the World of Experience & Adolescence.....	33
5.1 A Reform in Discourse and Concept	33
5.1.1 Moving Towards a new version of Human Security?	33
5.1.2 EU Global Strategy: Principled pragmatism	35
5.1.3 The Berlin Report& ‘Second Generation Human Security’.....	37
5.1.4 A reinvigorated framework	39
5.2 Case Study: EU Civilian Operations in the Sahel	42
5.2.1 EU Policies in the Sahel	43
5.2.2 Overview: Actions aimed at Security and Stability	44
5.3 Critical Analysis: From lexis to praxis	49
5.3.1 Human Security Challenges in EU Civilian Missions.....	49
5.3.2 Discussion.....	58
6. Conclusion.....	62
7. Bibliography	64

List of Abbreviations:

AQIM: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

CFSP: Eu's common Foreign and Security policy

CSDP: Common Security and Defense Policy

CSS: Critical Security Studies

EEAS: European external action service

ESS: European Security Strategy

EU: European Union

EUGS: European Union Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy.

HSSG: Human Security Study Group

IHL: International Humanitarian Law

MUJAO: Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa.

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

RtoP: responsibility to Protect

UN: United Nations

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

Figures:

Table 1: traditional vs human security

Table 2: overview of current EU missions and operations

Table 3: ESS guiding principles and tools

Table 4: the six principles of the Madrid report

Table 5: overview of second-generation human security instruments

Table 6: Human Security in the Sahel

I

Introduction

“To be secure, in today’s world, Europeans need to make a contribution to global security. Europe needs military forces but they need to be configured and used in quite new ways (...) different from classic defence and war-fighting. They need to be able to address the real security needs of people in situations of severe insecurity in order to make the world safer for Europeans.” (Barcelona Report 2004: 7)

On December 2003, the European Council ambitiously decided to make responsibility for global security a centrepiece of the so-called European security strategy (ESS) (Barcelona Report 2004: 7). This novel doctrine on security thinking and ‘doing’ argued for a more capable and active Union, which would focus on preventive engagement, rather than containment, in conflict situations (Barcelona Report 2004: 14). The ESS declared human security as the most appropriate approach for EU in the twenty-first century by calling for a bottom-up focus to secure every human being and their freedom from basic insecurities (European Council S407/ 08 2008: 3). In adopting this human security approach, the ESS was envisioned as a step closer to facilitating more durable democratic transitions around the world. No longer would security focus on relations with states, but instead with human beings.

This thesis tells the story of a maturing process for a core approach in EU security policy; that is, the story of human security and how the concept has evolved from a state of innocence to gradual experience and adolescence. More than a decade has passed since the EU witnessed the birth of human security. Under this period of time, it has become clear that the concept needs to keep up with a Union that proactively continues to expand and undertake a range of operations aimed at addressing security threats facing vulnerable communities and persons. The role that human security plays in a European way of security is in this sense far from clear-cut. Despite its features in numerous declarations, agreements and policy papers, human security remains conceptually controversial and far from consolidated in practice. The degree by which its principles can be implemented in peacebuilding remains extremely relevant today and constitutes one of the most challenging tasks of EU external activity.

1.1 Research Design:

For this reason, the following thesis will examine the European Union's adoption of human security and the extent to which it has been possible to operationalize its principles in a constantly changing security landscape. The leading research question reads as follows: *what explains the European Union's adoption of human security and to what degree is it playing a role within the Union's external relations?*

Since its emergence, the promotion of EU human security has touched upon a very sensitive field; that of humanitarian intervention and the seemingly changing role of states as well as their borders. Human security is a concept that encompasses both broad and narrow definitions of severe threats to individuals and communities. The concept, however, remains highly contested as it has no single universally accepted definition. Its ambiguity and desire to tackle human insecurity holistically has in turn invited criticism from both sides of the spectre. For one, proponents of human security argue that the concept has been overstretched, rendering it hollowed out and unpractical. Others, underscore theoretical weaknesses in evaluating the concept characterized as vague and arbitrary. Critics similarly point to the risk of co-option and institutionalization, robbing the concept of its norm-changing potential (Chandler & Hynek 2011). It is from this vantage point that some have argued that human security represents nothing less than traditional security and imperial interests cloaked in softer rhetoric. In either case, human security is an attempt to tackle the changing nature of modern security: therein the declining importance of the state in what is envisioned to be an increasingly post-westphalian world order. It offers a reformed perspective on what security is, who the most legitimate provider of security is and whether it is the state or individuals who will be the recipient (Thompson 2016: 8).

In order to operationalize the leading research question, the thesis will be structured according to the following sub-research question:

- *What is human security and what explains EU's adoption of the human security discourse?*
- *How has the concept of human security been expressed in the common foreign, security and defence policies of the EU?*
- *To what extent has human security been part of EU crisis management in the Sahel region of Africa: how has human security been applied in relevant documents leading up to the mission and on the ground?*

These questions stem from an optimistic belief that the Union's human security doctrine may offer real progress for contemporary challenges in constructing peace and stability. The author of the study further holds the assumption that the concept is increasingly being re-casted through more modest discourse, which is policy-oriented and shaped according to pragmatic solutions. For this reason, this thesis argues that human security aspects will continue to find relevance in EU external policy, albeit in more reformed, hybrid ways.

1.2 Research Rationale:

Informed by a curiosity to uncover the meaning and influence of human security in EU external policy, this research is an attempt to rethink the impact the concept has had on policy-making and missions. The reason why these questions matter is not just related to shaping EU policy recommendation which in of itself is of value. More so, the European Union is claiming that it is making a distinct contribution to secure the world through human security. EU's so-called human security approach has become a defining feature of what legitimizes EU external action in contemporary conflicts. Moreover, it has developed into an integral part of EU's self-image as a global actor in the twenty-first century (Barcelona Report 2003: 29). Therefore, given its doctrinal status, EU's discourse of human security attributes immense importance to a new way of doing security. But is this rightfully placed?

The puzzle that drives this research is accordingly to assess this very importance that has been given to human security, both in EU policy as well as in practice. One should expect that the more human security plays a role in the common foreign, security and defence policies of the EU; the more can we expect to see a move away from traditional state-centred security, i.e. in line with the paradigm shifting nature integral to human security as proponents argue. In line with the study's main assumption: that EU's human security approach is in a gradual process of maturing towards a fully-fledged paradigm, the thesis will only look into on-going ESDP missions. This will be to capture human security in its newest form and application as this is the only way we can analyse the concept's contemporary impact and evolution from what it used to be. One of the main architects behind the conceptual reforms of human security in an EU context is Mary Kaldor. Together with the Human Security Study Group, their contributions on how to operationalise human security will serve as guidelines for this study's analysis.

The purpose of this thesis is thus, first and foremost, to analyse the concept of human security within the foreign policy of the EU. At a first glance, human security may seem like pretty-

sounding and straightforward notion that seeks to re-orient protection from the state to populations. However, a second glance reveals that the concept is deeply complex and imbued with many meanings: a reality that is often hidden away behind the concept's 'do good' jargon. Speaking of language, the EU's human security discourse will be central for this study. A guiding assumption and recurring theme in this study is to locate, what the author expects is, a gap between human security as a language; lexis, and as action on the ground; praxis. The principles of EU's human security doctrine should apply to both ends and means. However, actual security projects often portray a disjuncture between broad aims set out by politicians in 'ivory towers', and the too restrictive mandates given to civilian agencies.

The possibility of a policy-practice gap matters for this study, not because of its mere existence. Rather, if it does exist, it is about to what degree it keeps certain principles from being implemented. Evaluating the extent to which human security is visible in missions is in this sense a much more fruitful exercise. Furthermore, a natural follow-up question will be how to combat impediments that keep human security from being realized. Whether this failure to protect people on the ground exists or not, this policy-practice nexus will assist this thesis to join the conversation on how to strengthen EU's legitimacy in interventions abroad.

This thesis sees great value in studying the European Union's norm-changing approach to security, referred to as human security, for several reasons. These include:

- *Human Security: much ado about nothing?*

What has especially intrigued the author about EU's human security, is the transformative potential that the doctrine was originally ascribed. Probing into the practical value of such claims, this study seeks to better understand if EU's human security approach corresponds with emancipatory and norm-changing aspirations – or if the concept falls victim to a narrative of subservience and co-option. Unfolding EU's usage of human security in this manner may indicate a number of things about what direction the Union is heading as a global actor (Mayer & Vogt 2006).

- *Future of global security enforcement*

Human security offers a window into the future of global security enforcement. But beyond its celebrated emancipatory potential, human security is worth studying due to its shortcomings as well. An obvious example is the widened usage of the human security narrative. Described by

Doucet & Larrinaga (2008: 134) as a conceptual “overstretch”, it is in a similar vein that critics have come to view human security as an amorphous and unclear political concept. Notwithstanding, I argue that it is precisely such controversies that renders human security a paradigm worth studying as it allows researchers to test where, when and under what circumstances such possible shortcomings befall human security operations. Once this is done, I believe that a more nuanced enquiry can be made on the added value of human security for EU missions and the implications for global security enforcement that derives from this EU approach.

- *A test of character*

It is compelling to question the importance EU has attributed to such a political concept as it says a lot about the Union’s norm-based self-image as well as desire to display a cosmopolitan philosophy to security. The EU is a new type of polity and a twenty-first century model of global governance. It can be argued that the EU is itself based on an experimentation of the cosmopolitan approach (Kaldor 2007: 123). Thus, applying human security can be interpreted as a test of the Union’s readiness be seriously cosmopolitan on the international stage; to translate its words into deeds rather than falling back to geopolitical considerations. What is more puzzling to explain though, is how willing the EU is prepared to take such an emancipatory perspective: in other words, whether the EU is serious about closing the security-gap or if it’s merely co-opting human security to legitimize external interventions.

- *Unify and legitimize the European Union*

Another reason why human security links well with EU affairs relates to the Union’s challenges today with disintegration. In many ways, we are at the crossroads of EU’s destiny which at the moment is being tried through sweeping populism across the continent. Human security, if successfully implemented, thus represent an interesting unifying concept capable to re-new an interest in EU’s existence both from within the European continents and abroad. It would mark an important contribution to global security, all the while increasing the legitimacy and visibility of the EU (Kaldor 2007: 197).

1.3 Methodological framework

Theory:

Part of the vivid debates and controversy surrounding human security has to do with its conceptual and normative standing. This thesis will explore and attempt to shed a different light on the theoretical perspectives which has so far dominated discussions on the value of EU's human security approach; cosmopolitanism and critical & poststructuralist theory. Both critical perspectives have been accused of not constituting a bona fide approach to international security nor deserve validity due to its fractured, often contradicting views within their own camps (Hynek & Chandler 2013: 47). This paper will thus explore these critical stances for what they are: a continuum of approaches that defy straightforward categorisation. As the same can be said for human security in terms of the lack of shared agreement of its meaning, the author contends with Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2015: 35-36) in arguing that this has rendered human security an appropriate site for critical approaches. Using these frameworks, the purpose of my theory is to deliberately avoid engaging with human security from a purely pro- or anti standpoint. It is suggested that this would be foolish as it fails to capture as well as explain the tension that has emerged between a range of theoretical perspectives. Furthermore, aligning with either side of the extreme has only worked towards marginalizing the discussion on human security, not giving the emerging paradigm a chance to evolve nor be reconceptualised through different theoretical lenses. This thesis will therefore attempt to make a break with what seems to be the conventional or foreseeable discussion about human security: it will seek a more pragmatic understanding of what drives EU's usage of the concept and its dynamics in practice. In doing so, alternative deeper understanding of human security is promoted in new and changing contexts. A plurality of discourses and methodologies is claimed to be necessary in tandem with the constantly changing social realities that human security addresses. Arguably, if human security is a concept in constant motion, then so should the theory that sets out to explain it.

Qualitative Research Methods:

In this thesis, the research method employed resembles a qualitative research method the most. It is the most efficient way to explore the above-mentioned research questions as this paper will be based on a literature study, with particular focus on human security as a concept and the extent to which it is visible in EU discourse and practice. Human security is a rather wide research field and

hence there are a number of sources to work with. The majority of these sources are not always topical and so the data-collecting process of this thesis was driven by locating leading scholars who are taking part in contemporary discussions on EU human security. The Union's incorporation of this approach is outlined in a number of reports and policy-papers. Besides these, the thesis will also include speeches, academic articles, fact-finding reports from EU missions. Together, these sources make out a sound basis for analysis throughout this thesis. The format used to conduct my research is that of a case study. Another more appropriate term is perhaps that of a regional case study as EU's human security approach is explored in the Sahel both through regional strategy frameworks and through reference to country-specific missions operating in the region. This research design holds particular value as it paves the way for a deeper understanding of strategic dynamics on the ground, both from a regional and national vantagepoint. It creates a space for the researcher to speak of both broader impacts EU policy is having in the Sahel, while at the same time using single-country cases of EU civilian intervention to for more detailed insights into mission outcomes and impact at the local levels of society (George & Bennet 2005: 74).

Limitations:

There are however limitations pertaining to the research design and method of this study. While the thesis aims to examine the maturing process of EU's human security concept, it is impossible to consider all factors or events that has contributed to its evolution – let alone the impact of the institutional security architecture of the Union or its various partnerships that carry security concerns. Navigating through the complex field of security literature is neither a straightforward task when considering that topical information on something as new as human security is not always accessible. Being a rather novel and inexperienced paradigm in peace-making, the case-study in this thesis must inevitably rely on limited empirical observation available only through second-hand sources, i.e. observations made by other scholars or practitioners via articles, mission documents and factsheets. This in turn restricts the generalizability of the conclusions made in the analysis chapter. This concern for sufficient data has equally guided this paper's case-study selection. The Sahel region was for this reason selected as it showed relatively more data availability on on-going and independent ESDP civilian missions.

II

The Birth of a New Paradigm: 1990s and onwards

In this chapter, the concept of human security will be explored. The aim is to provide a comprehensive understanding of this novel security paradigm: ranging from unpacking its normative elements to the various interpretations that the concept has been imbued with since its adoption by the EU. Relevant aspects of the Union's historical, political and institutional developments will be highlighted to better understand the evolving discourse around human security. As the chapter will show, the different versions of human security share fundamental ideas that are grounded in the security of the individual. The difference is more of 'packaging than of substance' (Campos 2014: 19).

2.1 Learning from the Past

The repetition of horrific mass atrocities continues to be one of the most disconcerting developments in human history. Since the end of WW2, bold proclamations like "never again" proved vain as numerous genocides were allowed to play out in front of a seemingly uncommitted international community (Gottwald 2014: 1). Even when such atrocities took place in Europe's own backyard, as exemplified during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, political deadlock caused the EU inaction and de-legitimacy (Mayer & Vogt 2006: 79). Still to this day, the international community demonstrates an inability to prevent mass atrocities. Whether these are committed in Syria, neighbouring Iraq, Yemen, Ukraine, Sudan or the Congo; they represent the stark reality of a volatile global community which is still struggling to find a lasting peace. Moreover, these conflicts have changed in nature. As argued by Mary Kaldor (2007:191) - author of the widely-acknowledged work *New and Old Wars: organized Violence in a Global Era* - they are no longer exclusive to national armies or contained within a particular territory: rather they play out in a globalized world where threats and insecurity transcend borders. It is from this rather dark and troubled context that human security has emerged. Similarly, it is against this background that the EU has embraced the notion of human security as part of its external relations: a novel paradigm seen to better equip the EU with preventing security threats globally.

2.2 A New Approach to Security

“The human security paradigm not only changes the way we look at the world, it leads to a new way of acting in the world – and to a new diplomacy.” (McRea & Hubert 2001: xxi, in Hynek & Bosold 2009: 738)

Human security is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities. It is a security philosophy that challenges the traditional state-centred orientation to protection. The traditional Hobbesian model of security was founded following the peace treaty of Westphalia in 1648 (Krasner 1995: 115). Concerned with the primacy of the state, this model of security revolved around a state’s ability to defend itself against external threats (Glasius 2008: 32). Preserving the territorial integrity of a state, had a secondary implication though: that of providing security for the people living within it. In doing so, the state earned legitimate monopoly of violence within its borders (Thompson 2016: 14). It was not up until the end of the Cold War era where it was spelled out that secure states are not a guarantee of secure citizens. As a result, traditional security thinking began losing credibility, paving the way for security thinking to be reoriented from the state onto the individual (Liotta & Owen 2006: 38).

Non-military aspects of insecurity came to prevail in the form of natural disasters, joblessness, international criminal networks and the like. These were issues that left a gap in a discourse that had up until then only considered ‘hard’ aspects of security (Kaldor 2007: 149). In effect, the inadequacy of traditional security thinking necessitated a *broadening* of security thinking; one that was more in tune with the changed nature of wars and threats (Kaldor, Martin & Selchow 2007: 279). The notion of ‘new wars’, coined by Mary Kaldor, does well to explain the implications of this new security landscape (Kaldor 2007: 150). Whereas old wars defined peace as either the relations between states or enforcement of law within domestic affairs, ‘new wars’ reflect a separation between the international and the national (Allan & Keller 2006: 5). This blurring of the ‘Great Divide’ reflect the complex nature of contemporary conflicts (Kaldor 2007: 6-8). No longer were they only confined to territories or fought between armies. They involved state alike non-state actors, affect combatants as well as non-combatants, pose threats ranging from political violence – poverty - organized crime- human rights violations to massacres – genocides – and other mass atrocities directed at civilians.

What enabled scholars to begin considering other types of insecurities and re-assess the reach of security was the increasing importance of a human rights regime (Kaldor 2007: 15, 177). It came to

bridge peace with human rights compliance and brought about ‘just peace’: a narrative that emphasized the protection of individuals rather than states (Allan & Keller 2006: 6). Contemporary warfare thus showed how nuclear security concerns, associated with the ‘just war’ doctrine of the past, needed to be rethought. This was what new wars implied. New wars implied the pursuit of just peace where legitimacy was now linked with human rights, rule of law and global civil society activism (Kaldor 2007: 155). New wars also implied a reformed view on the right way to make war, i.e. jus in bello, as this now came to be legitimized around approaches based on cosmopolitan consent and international law (Kaldor 2007: 166).

The definition of ‘just peace’ is subsequently what Kaldor uses to characterize notion of human security, which has since the 1990s reflected an approach more in tune with the realities of the twenty-first century. Firstly, it expanded security concerns horizontally as well as vertically. Secondly, it mirrored new post-war values that underlined the existence of universal rights held by all peoples. This also included the international community’s obligation to ensure their protection and respect globally. The right to security is after all a human right enshrined in all relevant human rights documents (Matlárý 2008: 135). The manner to bring about protection to populations invokes a central tenet of human security: that of responsibility to protect (RtoP). These norms are different, but complementary means to bring about human security (Popovski 2010: 217). Most frequently applied means to achieve human security are: humanitarian help, intervention, peacekeeping operations, peacebuilding, early warning and other preventive operations, sustainable economic development, diplomatic missions.

The difference between traditional and human security can be summarized as follows in table 1 (Tadjbakhsh 2013: 49, Campos 2014: 21, Liotta & Owen 2006: 38):

Table 1: Traditional vs. Human Security

	Traditional Security	Human Security
Referent of security	The state	The individual
Values at stake	The integrity of the state and national independence	Individual safety, freedom and a dignified life.
Security from what	Traditional threats	Non-traditional threats such as poverty, disease, natural disaster, landmines, violence,

		human rights abuses etc. as well as traditional threats.
Security by what means	<p>Military force is key, used unilaterally to enforce the primacy of the state</p> <p>Cooperation between states beyond alliance relations is tenuous</p>	<p>Human-oriented governance, with focus on enforcing human rights and - development.</p> <p>Force is secondary instrument to soft power, guided by cosmopolitan ideals and multilateralism.</p>

2.3 Origins of Contemporary Human Security

While the true origins of human security may be difficult to determine, the UN Human Development Report of 1994 is widely considered a milestone publication for our contemporary understanding of human security (Chandler & Hynek 2011: 30, Newman 2016: 1171). The 1994 UNDP report did well to pioneer human security as a people-centred concept. It captured the broad range of conditions that constitute threats to survival, livelihood and dignity of individuals. Despite this, the report did not provide a clear-cut definition of human security. It put forth a holistic emphasis on the welfare of ordinary people because it aimed at being inclusive of a variety of security issues. For this reason, the report insured that both ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’ were the best paths to tackle global insecurity (Glasius 2008: 34). The chief architect of the 1994 Report, Mahbub ul-Haq, further argued that the paradigm-shifting potential of human security consisted in the seven elements that comprise and make human security distinct. Deeply interconnected and able to overlap, these areas of security were identified as economic-, food-, health-, environmental-, personal-, community- and political-related (UNDP 1994: 24-25).

2.4 Freedom from Want & Freedom from Fear

The development of human security after the 1994 UNDP report, signalled various attempt to imbue meaning to the concept’s rather broad terminology. The landmine convention of 1996-97 was the first of such. It paved the way for Canada and Norway to interpret human security in physical terms, associated with the types of threats that harm a person and the person’s dignity

(Benedek 2008: 11, Matlár 2008: 135-36). Towards the end of 1998, a second central adaptation of human security was launched by the Japanese government. Pledging to sponsor the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, Japanese prime minister Obuchi extended the scope of human security threats to suddenly include issues as global warming, transnational crime, refugees, human rights violations, AIDS, terrorism, landmines and the use of child soldiers (Prince 2001: 90). This *broad* Japanese/UN understanding of human security showed a more inclusive approach to protection from violence and advocated self-empowerment as a means to live a secure life in dignity. This approach leaned closer to the wording of the 1994 UNDP Report and its seven components of human security that aim to protect ‘the vital core’ of the individual (Berg 2009: 17).

The Japanese initiative shed light and invoked the differences between two schools of thought on how to best apply human security. The work of UNDP and the Japanese government, suggest that human security is not only protection from violent threats, but also so much more than that. Combining freedom from fear with freedom from want, this version emphasizes the role of poverty reduction and human empowerment; chronic threats that can only be dealt with by bringing in long-term planning and development planning to the security discourse (Commission on Human Security 2003: 4). Celebrated in academic circles, this approach failed to generate equal enthusiasm for those concerned with how to translate the concept into practical policies. Their main critique related to the report’s all-encompassing interpretation of human security. Hence, they argued that the broad school risked rendering this new form of security void of meaning, overstretched and silenced of its progressive ideas (Chandler & Hynek 2011: 43). Accordingly, these same opponents reading human security in *narrow* terms, i.e. as the freedom from fear, sought to respond to this implementation gap by limiting the concept’s focus to violence. Violence, indicating an action-oriented methodology, was in this regard was strongly associated with poverty, weak states and other forms of inequality.

These early interpretations on how to operationalise human security are important because each form part of current logics to security thinking. More than that, they reflect the process by which different schools of thought applied new depths to the concept and by doing so exposed the subjective categorizations used to construct ‘threats’ facing human security. Indeed, insecurity is in the eye of the beholder, as argued by Tadjbakhsh (2013: 44). At the same time, scholars such as Tadjbakhsh (2013: 53) as well as Liotta & Owen (2006: 43-44) are adamant in pointing to the degree of moral clout these conceptualization-processes have brought with it. They argue that as human security straddles in countless definitions, it has gone against Ul Huq’s original

intent of reconciling North-South divisions on global justice. Instead, it has further consolidated the divide by entrapping each side in their own political reality of how to prioritize insecurity.

For instance, if Canada's narrow reading of human security tried to advocate their own peacekeeping tradition - one that along with EU's security understanding - focuses on threats against civil and political rights, then Japan's conceptualization is an attempt to represent the preferences of Asian/ emerging countries for development concerns (Tadjbakhsh 2013: 53). In practice, however, human security interventions tend to fall back on the Canadian reality of security to the detriment of the South's development concerns. The idea of human security relies on the state for its operationalization, thus exposing a fundamental contradiction. Within this framework of state sovereignty and governments, human security is produced in a manner that endorses the very norms and structures that may have caused human insecurity (Newman 2016: 1175). 'Idealism thus become enmeshed in realism' and human security is misused; its actions, which are taken on behalf of the powerless, are determined only by the powerful and their understanding of what counts as insecurity (Liotta & Owen 2006: 44).

Today, narrow or broad versions of human security don't capture the essence of contemporary threats to populations and hence illustrate that established labels can become outdated. But what about the usefulness of human security? This is the problem that seems endemic to the study of human security – that of defining the core values of human security, rather than to leave it suspended in all-encompassing and elastic terminology (Sané 2008: 5). The question however remains. If human security is all these things, then what is it not? For now, this seems like a challenge that can only be answered through continued scholarly debate and policy experimentation.

III

The Innocence of Human Security in a Complex World

Following the last chapter's assessment of human security, including the various meanings and definitions the concept has taken on since the 1990s, this chapter is more concerned with mirroring what theoretical debates has had to say about these different conceptualizations and the interest at play behind them. What follows is thus a theoretical exploration into the academic controversy human security has spurred. Through theory, enquiry will be made into the meaning of human security; one that delves into, but also goes beyond the concept's cosmopolitan and emancipatory impulses since the 1990s. This paper will do so through a critical theory and post-structuralist lens. With the adoption of human security into mainstream discourse, several critical scholars have posited that the 'innocent' emancipatory intentions of human security have in practice been corrupted by the interests of hegemon powers. Whether human security ultimately challenges or reinforces traditional understandings of security will thus be a central discussion-point of this chapter.

3.1 A Source of Promise & Peril?

As already shown, human security's rise to prominence in contemporary security discourse has received both praise and contestation. Rooted in the realm of policy, it has worked as *an evaluative framework* that seeks to securitize everyday human challenges such as deprivation, environmental degradation and human rights abuse (Tadjbakhsh 2013: 44). It represents a way of engaging with security processes that other approaches until its emergence had eschewed and kept out of the 'high politics' policy area. In this sense, human security forms part of a broader academic movement that critiqued security thinking insofar what get to count as threats and what doesn't. Over the past 20 years, however, human security is argued to have become enfeebled in policy practice, no longer "posing difficult question for holders of power" (Newman 2016: 1066). Proponents - more concerned with how to make the concept neatly fit into policy papers - has failed to engage in a more rigorous academic debate about preserving the concept's critical value (Campos 2014: 15-16). Thus, human security in policy terms is thought to have gone from being a fairly radical challenge to state-centric realism to a rather conservative idea. As argued by Newman (2016: 1171), it now not only runs parallel, but secondary, to traditional security thinking.

This continues to be a rather troubling predicament for the concept's credibility today, and has even prompted a great ordeal of scholars to conclude that human security can never truly be critical whilst also being policy relevant (Newman 2016: 1167). The theoretical enquiry that has since followed human security's rise to prominence has not been shy of pinpointing the concept's shortcomings as this section will show. On one hand, responses to its innovative and norm-changing promises has been reasserted through cosmopolitan principles of equal rights and freedom. On the other hand, the concept's shortcomings have also been addressed by a range of critical approaches that speaks of a security discourse that swings between deceptive emancipatory claims and biopolitical control of populations (Hynek & Chandler 2013: 54). This theoretical tension inherent in human security is not merely a result of its conceptual ambiguity. What is more, it exists because of its ability to traverse across a number of policy fields. The development-security nexus is a clear example of this and testifies to how processes of underdevelopment lead to conflict, but also vice versa (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 158). With this nexus in mind, human security and its contemporary discourse has come to represent universal value. For instance, the claim that all individuals have a fundamental interest in being able to pursue a conception of a good life, is rather uncontroversial. And to sustain a minimal level of such rights, it requires standard political, civil freedoms as well as material resources; all of which point to the cosmopolitan core of human security used by proponents to distinguish the concept.

3.2 The Value of Innocence? The Cosmopolitan Core of Human Security

Inspired by cosmopolitan theory, proponents have long equated human security with modern efforts to promote principles of altruism and fighting inequalities. Human security draws its human-centred inspiration from cosmopolitan theory, a world understanding that places its primary locus for moral concern and respect on the human being (Newman 2016: 1167). The human being is thus fundamental and emphasis is placed on attaching equal moral worth to all individuals, irrespective of community or a person's national belonging, political beliefs etc. Accordingly, a cosmopolitan theory holds that all individuals have rights to the resources and freedoms needed for them to lead a 'minimally decent life' (Fabre 2012: 7). If these resources are acquired, the better-off individual will gain more independence to pursue their own goals and life projects. This is what Cécile Fabre identifies as 'the rights-based sufficientist theory of justice' (2012: 1). It reiterates the importance given to principles such as self-sufficiency and -reliance as promulgated through the security-development nexus. This theory of justice in cosmopolitan thought underlines that such rights must

be ensured for all. This not only helps to protect the community's shared morals, but also advances the political self-determination of all peoples (Fabre 2012: 1). From this perspective, cosmopolitan theory expresses an individualist, egalitarian and universal basis.

Fabre's notion of a minimally decent life (2012: 7): one in which individuals enjoy a set of basic capabilities. Here, the capabilities approach by Sen tends to be referenced, due to its prominence and fit with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Measurements of capabilities, although widely contested, usually draw on life, body and health; bodily integrity; basic health and average longevity; emotional and intellectual flourishing; control over material resources as well as control over ones social and political environment.

Recognizing the extent to which cosmopolitan thought make up the core pillars of human security is important. It explains the support the concept has garnered globally when it emerged in the policy realms as a discourse with little practical guidelines or experience. Indeed, it survived on altruistic motives such as promoting human welfare through increased individual capacities, equal rights and enjoyment of freedoms, which were thought to pave the way for a more peaceful society. One in which communities and people may flourish.

However, the inevitable changes the concept of human security underwent since its adoption into mainstream discourse, has not only made critics question the cosmopolitan motivations behind its usage today. Human security is at heart a critical turn in how to 'do' and 'think' about security, which in turn has lead critics to voice grave concern towards the extent contemporary human security has remained true to the norm-changing spirit that inspired its birth.

This alleged betrayal of human security's cosmopolitan and emancipatory impulses is what has prompted some scholars to claim that the once-promising paradigm has lost its way (Turner, Cooper & Pugh 2011: 83). In turn, authors such as Pogodda, Richmond, Tocci, Ginty, Vogel (2014: 242) as well as Hynek & Chandler (2013: 49) all speak to the notion that human security has been exhausted, hollowed-out, emptied of meaning and co-opted into serving hegemonic interests in global politics. The theoretical building blocks that have informed these critical perspectives, namely that of critical theory and post-structural thinking, thus offer alternative understandings of what human security means.

3.3 Value of Gaining Experience: Critical Theory & Emancipation

Among the multiple critical approaches, one specific variant termed critical security studies (CSS) or the Welsh School approach, links the study of security to critical theory in a manner particularly relevant for this paper. The Welsh school is grounded in a normative goal of liberating of emancipating the human being (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 31). It adopts an overtly normative approach to the study of security so to say, claiming to provide a more focused take on what security means in today's world. Thereby, it differs from how security is studied per the Copenhagen or Paris school of thought (Hynek & Chandler 2013: 52-54). This paper will strive to largely make use of CSS in the name of critical theory. It will be used in relation to human security because 1) it provides the logic inherent to the broader academic movement that has created the human security paradigm 2) it imbues human security with norm-changing values that critically minded scholars claim has been hollowed out.

The three implications of CSS on security, that has paved the way for the human security paradigm, are the broadening,, deepening and extension of any security agenda. (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 29). In essence, these processes show how the human security approach rides on a constructivist attempt to rethink security studies (Tadjbakhsh 2013: 44). As a theoretical concept, it contributes to a broad multidisciplinary reconceptualization of security. Accordingly, human security is in its pure form an expression of critical scholarship on security (Newman 2016: 1166).

CSS' promotion of a more comprehensive view of security, reflected a broader critical turn in academia and links with three core ideas. Firstly, CSS provides the core idea that security is a derivative concept. In effect, CSS sought to problematize the neorealist emphasis put on the state by questioning the way political problems was set up (Hynek & Chandler 2013: 47). That human security is not so much to do with how it is promoted *within* existing institutions. Instead, it is of questioning the broader legitimacy and effectiveness of such institutions (Newman 2016: 1174).

Secondly, CSS questions knowledge and its representation of global security threats in objective and neutral terms (Christou et al. 2010: 343). Critical theory holds that knowledge has an inherently social character because it derives from academic analysts who are inevitably embedded within the social world they seek to analyse. The same goes for how we choose to present a security issue or frame a specific threat to populations globally. It is not a neutral act, but a series of choices made about what gets to count and doesn't count as security threats. 'Security is what we make of

it' and a broadened security agenda is therefore in order, to better capture the multitude of threats people face today all over the world (Christou 2010: 343).

Thirdly, by understanding knowledge as socially constructed, CSS underlines how security is intended to present the world in a certain manner, which will have consequence for how others read it, make policy from it and implement it. It invokes what Antonio Gramsci famously argued about theory; that it is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose' (Hynek & Chandler 2013: 48). This core idea argues that security should no longer be for the state, for the purpose of its survival. Rather, it needs reform by drawing on the individual as 'the referent object' of security (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 35). Through a cosmopolitan point of departure, CSS holds that: "[s]tates are, at base, human communities; therefore, the ultimate referents of security should be the human beings that make up the state, not the state itself in some abstract sense" (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 35).

The distinguishing feature of the CSS project in critical theory, and what has pushed it to the forefront of security debates, is its notion of emancipatory agency. Albeit contested, proponents argue that "Critical Security Studies is for the voiceless, the unrepresented, and the powerless in world politics and its purpose is their emancipation." (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 41). An emancipated-oriented approach to security thus aims at a deeper purpose of transforming society into a more secure and free social reality (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 41). It argues for a more expansive conception of security that isn't conflated with human survival. Rather, as put forth by one of CSS' strongest proponents; Ken Booth, in *Security and Emancipation* (1991), insecurity is understood as the genuine absence of threats where the individual has possibility to maximize life-chances in addition to life choices. It follows from this rationale that the more secure people are from the threats of war, poverty and oppression, the more emancipated¹ they will be; "[s]ecurity and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security." (Booth 1991: 319).

Emancipation as a theoretical concept is not new to the broader tradition of critical theory and reflects several ideas borrowed from Marxian thought (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 35). That being said, CSS offers no framework for translating emancipation into praxis.

¹ Emancipation defined as "the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do" (Booth 1991: 320).

Rather it argues against this, claiming emancipation is not an end-point of itself, but a process in which human suffering differs across space and time. Whatever criteria for emancipatory action must thus be developed according to context-specific circumstances. Emancipation as a practice of resistance is envisioned to grow organically out of everyday struggles by those suffering (Hynek & Chandler 2013: 49). Truly progressive change can only grow out of this; a process of immanent critique where gradual reform and improvement emerge as nonviolent strategies for emancipation (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 35). Booth labels this emancipatory realism, and it is thought to present a better solution for progressive change than the rigid blueprints for utopia that merely exaggerates insecurity globally (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 35).

3.4 Value of Questioning Everything: Poststructuralist Suspicion

Together with post-colonial and later modernist thinking, poststructuralism regards the notion of emancipation as one tied into the kinds of Enlightenment thought that ought to be challenged. It does so by asking if this dedication to emancipation is misguided.

The core vocabulary used by CSS proponents such as Booth, where emancipation is constructed as a broad goal with ties to Enlightenment thinking, is held to work as a potentially dangerous meta-narrative (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 77). This is especially so as there is no universal definition of what emancipation is which in turn renders it easy to legitimize illiberal practices. Poststructuralism thus suspiciously points to the risk of tainting the historical association of emancipation with western hegemony and liberal imperialism at the global level (Hynek & Chandler 2013: 54). For other poststructuralist thinkers, emancipation altogether is contested due to the possibility that it is inappropriate to non-western contexts. Here, it is argued, western notions such as the right of self-determination for every ethnic group can turn into a recipe of grave disorder and anarchy (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams 2015: 2015). This is not to say that post-structural thinking opposes the principle of emancipation. Instead, this stance underlines the suspicion proponents have towards sweepingly broad categorization and meta-narratives.

To overcome the inversion of 'critical' security thinking (Hynek & Chandler 2013: 49), poststructuralist thinkers have advanced the idea of needing to include multiple western and non-western perspectives on the meanings of freedom. By doing so one may be able to challenge the historical connotation and type of politics that security has been injected with; one that inhibits rather than advances political equality. Others, more radically see the logic of insecurity as inappropriate altogether. If to 'securitize' means to legitimise extraordinary measures for

intervention to exert control into public and private lives, then these scholars argue that a *de-securitization* is in order to achieve true emancipation (Owens 2011: 16). Emancipation is in this sense considered as distinct from security.

At its core, poststructuralism highlights the politics of language, interpretation and representation in our constructions of danger and risk. The role of language is central as it exposes what experience of the social world that influences human interpretation of events and problems. This particular form of knowledge is what leads to the reproduction of norms and metanarratives in western society such as emancipation. Post-structural writing has in this sense also opened the door for Foucauldian-inspired critique of CSS' emancipatory discourses as well as practices on security. Most influential is possibly that of Mark Duffield, who sees the emancipatory approach of human security as complicit in the promotion of a western neoliberal agenda (Hynek & Chandler 2013: 54). Being primarily applied at the level of populations in the Global South, Duffield argues that development work is securitized to render fragile states as 'insecure' towards their populations and the wider world (Small 2011). In such scheme, notions of emancipatory agency become appropriated as part of western liberal state's main tool for biopolitical technologies of governance. Consequently, human security works to administer the lives of Southern populations and is said to represent nothing more than a return of the state to development discourse.

In sum, considering how human security is a shift towards an alternative ontology of security, this chapter has looked closer into the contestation voiced by CSS and post-structural thinkers. This has highlighted how *securing* the human in mainstream discourse is posited as corrupting 'the innocence' of human security, i.e. its emancipatory potential. This theoretical tension will in the following chapter be situated in the context of the European Union and its human security policy discourse. Whether or not, a similar *transition* can be said to exist in EU' adoption of the concept remains to be seen.

IV. The Early Childhood Phase of Human Security: 2003 and onwards


With the founding of EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the Union is increasingly engaging as a global actor in the world stage. The following chapter will provide an overview of the CFSP while critically assessing it within the framework of human security. In doing so, three central documents concerning human security in EU policy will be highlighted. The purpose is to understand to what extent this people-oriented concept has influenced strategic documents that decide the objectives and conduct of the CFSP. These documents are: the European Security Strategy (2003), the Barcelona report (2004) and the Madrid report (2007). Taken together, the author will argue that these make up the first-generation typology of human security. Before anything, however, an introduction to the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is given.

4.1 Testing New Waters: Human Security in the CSDP

EU security policy has seen unprecedented growth at a ground level with increase in both the Union's ambition and diversity of such missions (Christou 2014: 364). The fact that most security operations have been civilian is significant from a human security perspective (Möstl 2011: 154-155). From monitoring the peace process in the Aceh to maintaining border stability in Rafah or overseeing presidential elections in the democratic republic of Congo, the EU is adding to its experiences and lessons learned. In doing so, since 2003 the EU has deployed well above 30 external security missions abroad – thereby building a foreign policy *acquis* (Kaldor, Martin & Selchow 2007: 282). As the table beneath illustrate, the CSDP has more than 5000 personnel globally posted in 15 current security missions, EU's security operations reflect a build-up in capability. An outward sign of this capability feature is the creation of 18 military battlegroups and of civilian response teams (Kaldor, Martin & Selchow 2007: 282). However increased security action does not translate into increased coherent and efficient EU security interventions; and accordingly, a central question remains as to how the EU's foreign and security policies is exercised; whether CSDP strategic goals formulated in national capitals are met on the ground.

Before submerging into such debate, it is fruitful gain a better understanding of how human security has developed within the ESDP, later renamed as the CSDP.

Table 2: Overview of current EU missions and operations (March 2016)²



The CSDP is rooted in the creation of the ESDP, which was launched through the 1998 St. Malo Declaration (Matlary 2008: 132). This event reflected the novel ambition of the Union to ‘lay its full role on the international stage’, equipped with capacity for autonomous action with means and readiness to respond to international crisis situations (Campos 2014: 29). Born in 1999, the ESDP was mandated a role as the military arm of the Union. As time would tell, though, ESDP missions also came to use non-military and civilian means to crisis management. Unlike other global security actors, the ESDP thus presented a more comprehensive approach to conflict management as it sought to cover a range of issues related to security; an ambition which led to the European Council launching the civilian dimensions of ESDP in 2000 that identified four priority areas for the EU to pursue: policing, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil operational, strengthening civilian administration (Campos 2014: 30). Operational the next year, the ESDP mandate was further developed through the Berlin Plus agreement of 2002 that gave EU

² Retrieved from: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en

missions recourse to NATO collective assets and capabilities (Campos 2014: 30-31). Since then, the ESDP ambitions has continued to go beyond its originally intended scope.

The changes made with the Lisbon Treaty reflect these renewed ambitions in the security and defence policy of the EU. This is not to say that the changes introduced by the new treaty has revolutionized the Union. Member States continue to act under an intergovernmental structure, unanimity remains the name of the game, qualified majority voting still excludes decisions with military or defence implications, while the role of the European Commission and the European Parliament stays limited in the CSDP (Möstl 2011: 147, Shepherd 2015: 164). The Lisbon Treaty, nonetheless, is the first EU treaty that makes specific mention of the external operational dimension of the Union, with special emphasis is put on enforcing human rights, and in extension of that human security (Gottwald 2014: 10).

Hence, the Lisbon Treaty holds some key innovations that deserve mention here. Not only did the treaty move towards including additional provisions related to the CSDP such as a mutual assistance- and a solidarity clause. The document also prepared a framework for the Permanent Structured Cooperation. In addition, it laid the groundwork to create the diplomatic arm of the EU: the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Shepherd 2015: 163). The EEAS was aimed towards improving coordination between civilian and military actors in crisis management to make better use of the wide range of instruments available at early planning stages. This, in result, is imagined to unify the European Council, member state officials and the Council Secretariat into one agency when representing the Union abroad (Campos 2014: 29). Last, but not least, the Treaty allowed for an expansion of the Petersberg Tasks by way of joint disarmament operations – humanitarian and rescue tasks – military advice and assistance tasks – conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks – tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. (EEAS EUROPA 2016, Campos 2014: 39, Möstl 2011: 147). The combination of civil and military capabilities in this regard point towards the EU desire to increase human security in crisis situations. Particular added value can be stressed through the civilian component. As some studies suggest, the civilian crisis instruments make up one of the most tangible contributions to human security. Their focus on policing activities for instance aim to protect and empower people, enabling communities to fend for themselves through all stages of a conflict (Möstl 2011: 151).

Thus, even if there is no explicit mention of the term ‘human security’, traces of its rationale is very much present in the new treaty framework.

Beyond the update in treaty, it must be kept in mind that the ESDP is still a comparatively recent development embedded in the CFSP. As argued by Möstl (2011:148), it has done remarkably well without the Lisbon Treaty, expanding fast in operations and institutions. Given the influence human security has had on certain member states of the EU, one would expect the paradigm to have had some form of impact on the development of the ESDP. Yet, so far the concept has not often been referred to explicitly in official EU documents on the ESDP (Benedek 2011: 25, Möstl 2011: 148). This lack of official recognition, however, does not mean that human security plays no role in the ESDP. On the contrary, the practical embodiment of the ESDP reveals that human security continues to exist in the back of the minds of EU decision-makers (Benedek 2011: 25, Möstl 2011: 148). The following section illustrates this.

4.2 From the ESS to the HSSG Reports

With these institutional readjustments over time, it is peculiar to note how the European Union has grown into the role of a *sui generis* security provider (Mälksoo 2016: 374, Shepherd 2015: 156). The Union was not built to be a defence alliance nor did it have a doctrine to act from since the outset of its external engagements. The closest thing to such a phenomenon came first in 2003 with the European Security Strategy (ESS). This document signified an EU way of writing security. It promoted a new role for the European Union in an increasingly interconnected world of insecurity. In doing so, it served as a site for narrating the EU into existence as a formal security actor (Martin & Kaldor 2010: 6). At the same time, it introduced human security as a paradigm to security thinking.

Since the ESS, additional sites for ordering the world according to a human security doctrine has emerged. Two of the most prominent studies conducted in the context of the EU are the Barcelona and Madrid Report by the HSSG led by Mary Kaldor. The following sections will offer a short stocktaking of these initial documents put out by the EU on human security. The author will argue that these constitute a first-generation typology of writing EU human security. Taken together, these early conceptualizations of human oriented security will link to chapter 5 where discursive changes made to the European way of writing security will be analysed in-depth, with the argument made that a second-generation of human security is taking hold.

4.3 The European Security strategy

The 2003 ESS was the first security strategy of the European Union. With the subtitle ‘A secure Europe in a better world’, it represented the first formal attempt to shape principles and clear objectives for advancing EU security interests abroad. Although the term human security was not explicitly used in the ESS, it is implicitly present throughout the document (Barcelona Report 2003: 7, Berg 2009: 24). Several features point to this, ultimately showcasing what the report identifies as the European Union’s transformative zeal of spreading good governance, especially rule of law, protection of human rights and democracy promotion (Mälksoo 2016: 378). One of such features is post-Cold War environment. The report argues that following the Cold War, the EU finds itself in a new security environment inhabited by more diverse, less visible and less predictable security threats, ranging from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, regional conflicts, state failure and organized international crime (Barcelona Report 2003: 1).

Under these conditions, the Union’s defence is inextricably linked to risks against human welfare developing outside own borders. Under these novel security circumstances, internal and external challenges are entangled to the degree of near-impossible distinction (Mälksoo 2016: 379, Shepherd 2015: 160). Recognizing the dynamic new character of threats, the catchword of the ESS is ‘effective multilateralism’. Here, the EU recognizes that the most effective way to alleviate human insecurity is in sync with a wider multilateral system where international law and the UN charter are at the forefront. Finally, the ESS proposed a more comprehensive approach to deal with the post-Cold War security threats (Shepherd 2015: 156). If these risks had a boundary-crossing nature, then its solutions needed to be multipronged. The document thus spoke to strengthening the coherence of political, military, civilian, diplomatic and trade instruments in conflict prevention and crisis management.

4.4 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona report

Human security as a concept had its first real impact on EU policy through the Barcelona report (Martin & Kaldor 2010: ix). The report was authored by an independent academic group; the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, headed by Mary Kaldor. Released in 2004, this document detailed the scope, organization and intent of the EU to “build its security policy on a ‘human security doctrine’, aimed at protecting individuals through law-enforcement with the occasional use of force.” (EU-UN EUROPA 2004). In many ways, the proposals made in the Barcelona report

sought to develop the ESS through a less ambiguous human security perspective. A couple notably aspects arise from this. As Kaldor argues, the European Union needs human security because

“Europeans cannot be secure while millions of people live in intolerable insecurity... where people live in lawlessness, poverty, exclusivists ideologies and daily violence, there is fertile ground for criminal networks and terrorism. Conflict regions export or transport hard drugs and guns, to the European union. That is why a contribution to human security is now the most realistic security policy for Europe.” (Barcelona Report 2004: 7)

The report does not shy away from expressing lofty ambitions for the EU and its potential to provide security on a global scale. *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, in this regard, stands out as one of the most direct documents to date which has so openly declared the Union’s independence and duty to act beyond own borders (Liotta & Owen 2006: 48). Defined as outright responsibilities, these are clearly stated: “A human security approach for the European Union means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not only on the defence of the Union’s borders, as was the security approach of nation-states.” (Barcelona Report 2004: 9).

From this outset, the document presents a decidedly narrow definition of human security by limiting its focus to violence and how to stop it through ‘law-enforcement with occasional use of force’ (Liotta & Owen 2006: 49). Broader conceptualizations are however featured as necessary when faced by more egregious threats.. The doctrine, in other words, recognizes the value of both freedom of fear and -want conceptualizations.

The report continues by outlining three elements that comprise a Human Security Doctrine for Europe (Liotta & Owen 2006: 49). First, a set of seven guiding principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity. These can be utilized as both ends and means by politicians, diplomats, soldiers, civil workers or the public of Europe (Barcelona 2004: 14-20). The second and third elements function as practical capabilities for how to apply these principles (Barcelona Report 2004: 20, 24).

Table 3: Guiding principles and tools

Guiding principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity	Human Security Response Force	New Legal Framework
1. The primacy of human rights	Includes	Based on
2. Clear political authority	15 000 men and women, from which 5000 of these	Domestic law of host states
3. Multilateralism	are expected on permanent	

4. A bottom-up approach	standby	Domestic law of member states
5. Regional focus	Incorporates both military and civilian dimensions	International criminal law
6. The use of legal instruments	Multinational	International human rights law
7. The appropriate use of force	Voluntary element	International humanitarian law

Much like the ESS, this report places the EU in a ‘new war’ global environment (Barcelona Report 2004: 8-9). Since most violence during conflict is inflicted on civilians, the EU demonstrates new useful thinking by proposing a Human Security Force. With both military and civilian specialists, the force draws on doctors, other medical personnel, legal specialists, human rights monitors and police or military forces (Liotta & Owen 2006: 49). Ambitious and far from complete, the dialogue had at least begun with via the Barcelona doctrine.

Its guidelines sparked great interest with the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, at the time, Javier Solana, this study group was reconvened under the Finish presidency of June-December 2006 as the Human Security Study Group (HSSG) to examine how the EU could implement a human security agenda (Martin & Kaldor 2010: ix). The Study Group’s findings were presented to Javier Solana in the so-called Madrid Report on 8 November 2007.

4.5 The Madrid Report: A European Way of Security

A key task of the Madrid Report was to set out ways for the Union to conceptually embrace human security as a new strategic narrative and make more explicit that human-centred security was a distinctive EU approach (Martin & Kaldor 2010: 3). A second contribution of the Madrid Report was to outline what it actually meant for the EU to implement a human security approach and how to institutionalize the concept within the ESDP (Campos 2014: 36). Countering the too fuzzy or imprecise critique that opponents directed against human security during this time, six core concept developed from the Barcelona Report were reiterated and refined. They provided a structure for translating values implicit in human security into organizational guidelines for mission-personnel on the ground. These six principles are (Madrid Report 2007: 13-18):

Table 4: The six principles of the Madrid report

1. The primacy of human rights	1. Effective multilateralism
2. Legitimate political authority	2. An integrated regional focus
3. A bottom-up approach	3. A clear and transparent strategic direction

Since the Barcelona report of 2004 declared human security as the most appropriate approach for EU in the twenty-first century, the Madrid report spells out what this approach means and responds to the criticism it has received (Council of the EU S407/ 08 2008: 3). Accordingly the report argued for a “need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security.” (Council of the EU S407/ 08 2008: 10).

Against the background of the Treaty of Lisbon and the global war on terror, it concludes that the EU should define its own distinctive *European Way of Security* based on human security principles. By deploying police, judicial experts as well as soldiers, the EU will seek to not only respond to a changing world, but to do more to shape the response to these events (Council of the EU S407/ 08 2008: 12). The Madrid report also distinguishes itself by deliberately pushing for a broad interpretation of human security (Campos 2014: 36). Such concern with both physical and material wellbeing links well with the report’s three key proposals on how to advance the EU human security agenda. The first proposal being a Public Declaration of Human Security Principles that functions as a guideline for when and in which crisis the EU should intervene. The second proposal is a new strategic framework for ESDP missions to ensure that every operation aims to restore the host country’s normal politics, thereby ruling out lengthy occupations or foreign administrations. Also, such operations are to be headed by a civilian commander capable of providing better coherence between Brussels and EU hubs around the world. The final suggestion designed a human security ESDP mandate to practically translate human security commitment into actual ESDP missions. Most noticeably, it included human security cards for all mission personnel that would remind staff of the six aforementioned principles along with the goals and methods of the operation.

V. Analysis

A Transition towards Maturity? Entering the World of Experience & Adolescence

This chapter will function as the central unifying tenet of what this research has so far accomplished. The assessment made of EU discourse on human security, from the ESS to the HSSG reports, has provided us with analytical benchmarks that capture a first-generation human security in EU policy and praxis. Chapter 5 will extend this analysis by arguing that EU human security is continuously transitioning, i.e. taking steps closer to maturing, by now emerging as a second-generation human security framework. In policy, this will be shown through discursive shifts embedded in a) the EUGS' principled pragmatism and b) the HSSG Berlin report's explicit reference to second-generation human security. In practice, this transition will be studied in relation to selected EU civilian operations in the Sahel as well as its wider Sahel Strategy 2015-2020. Being on-going deployments, these missions form part of the Sahel Strategy and it will therefore be interesting to see if their relevant documents leading up to practice also display a human security approach..

5.1 A Reform in Discourse and Concept

5.1.1 Moving towards a New Version of human security?

The broad development-focused conceptualization of human security, which drove the concept into spotlight at the early stages, seems to have found a new home within EU policymaking. Through EU's adoption of human security, a much tighter attempt has been made at fostering a crisis- or threshold-based conceptualization. For these reasons, authors such as Mary Martin and Taylor Owen wrote back in 2010 that a second coming of human security might be on its way with a far greater impact than its earlier forms.

The ESS as well as the Barcelona and Madrid reports stand as significant attempts to breathe new life into human security. This is also what previous chapters of this research have shown. The high point of institutionalizing the concept, in ways the UN had failed to do (Martin & Owen 2010: 216), however, came first with the implementation report of the ESS in 2008. Here, the Council of the EU marked a formal shift in EU security policy by explicitly referring to human security as central to EU's strategic goals. This is notable as the Council had previously been rather hesitant to declare a firm commitment to human security (Martin & Owen 2010: 217). Furthermore,

compared to previous texts, the report draws extensively on human security notions affirming respect for human rights and the importance of gender dimensions to security.

There were several bumps on the road for the EU moving forward. As with the Madrid report, human security in the 2008 implementation plan was attacked for being ‘too warm and fuzzy’ by some member states. This was while others pursued bilateral efforts to press for the ESDP’s normative commitments to human security along with human rights and gender. Finland was among these. Their dedication was also expressed through practical measures by piloting human security training for civilian and military personnel on ESDP missions. Also, throwing their weight behind the shift to human security was the European Parliament. In 2008 the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs voted to amend a report on the implementation of the ESS (Martin & Owen 2010: 2016), resulting in greater acceptance of the human security principle. Other dividing lines to factor in also came from internal institutional disagreements. It is suggested that in contrast to the modesty and more calculated steps taken by the European Council, the European Commission’s stance has been to explicitly advance human security. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who up until 2009 served as the Commissioner for External Relations has ardently forwarded human security as synonymous with what the EU is. More than so, she highlighted what the UN failed to do by adding to what both the Barcelona and Madrid Report had been pushing for: rejecting to choose between a narrow and broad application of human security. To this point, in 2006 she explained; *“the philosophy underlying the EU’s approach to security, as outlined in the Security Strategy, is that security can best be attained through development, and development through security. Neither is possible without an adequate level of the other. That’s why we focus on the holistic concept of human security”* (Martin & Owen 2010: 218).

Combining physical protection and material security allowed human security to be located differently compared to that of the UN. It gained definitional depth through the EU context, which has since provided it with a clearer conceptualization. This is the key difference between UN and EU narrative of human security. The lesson learned is that if institutionalization is not coupled with clear conceptualization, then the concept is quickly rendered empty of any meaning. For the EU, ‘drilling down’ into the concept has worked to justify foreign policy ambitions and supply a strategic narrative for the ESDP (Kaldor, Martin & Selchow 2008: 1).

If the concept is to fare better with the EU than with the UN in the coming years, then human security must also pass the test of time and practice. Assuming that authors such as Mary Martin & Taylor Owen are right in pointing to a renewed version of human rights emerging, then

the Union must continue to articulate a conceptualization as well as political narrative along those lines that can be used in policy terms. This is where the EUGS and HSSG Berlin report comes into play. Each represent a reinvention of how the EU writes and understands human security. Most importantly, they underline the coming of age of a second-generation human security approach to conflicts.

5.1.2 EU Global Strategy: Principled Pragmatism

“Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions. It implies a broader interest in preventing conflict, promoting human security, addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a safer world” (EUGS 2016: 14).

Presented on 28 June 2016, the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) stands out as it is the only EU strategy that explicitly list the Union’s vital interests abroad. And in doing so, the report makes a surprising move away from emphasizing its conventional ‘democracy-to-promote-security’ nexus towards a focus on resilience of people and their societies. Human security is in this sense framed in the language of resilience and fighting inequalities. The report deviates from earlier ‘almost utopian’ visions on how to get there, as suggested by Biscop (2016:1). Whereas the EU promoted a model of security in 2003 that read “the best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states”, today’s world clearly testifies to the challenge of such efforts. Advancing good governance and democracy is more challenging than initially thought and when conflicts erupt, as witnessed in Yemen or Syria, the EU is often unable to intervene or respond to protect populations. In retrospect, the ESS has been held up as overoptimistic and unpractical; a limitation which the EUGS actively combats by being more conscious of what is possible to achieve given the Union’s own capabilities and dependence on partnerships. The report anchors this approach under the heading of principled pragmatism.

Principled pragmatism is a concept that stems from what the Union describes as a realistic assessment of the current strategic environment that the EU finds itself in, coupled with an idealistic aspiration to promote a better world. More than parlance, principled pragmatism is envisioned as a guide for the Union’s external actions in the years to come (EUGS 2016: 16). It contributes by seeking to strike a balance between on one hand, ‘rash interventionism’ and

isolationism. It thus adds a more sensitive and modest, not just human, face to the EU's responsibility towards others. The concept is thus designed to guide more EU external actions in a more modest direction. It displays a more grounded and responsible attempt at bringing about change. Biscop (2016: 2) labels this a return to *realpolitik* with European characteristics.

Following this line of reasoning, the EUGS, unlike the Union's previous security strategies, distinguishes itself as it consciously puts European security concerns above its ideal aspirations. The modesty of realism imposed by principled pragmatism is clearly present in the five priorities that the report identifies for EU external action (EUGS 2016: 9-10). They include: (1) the security of the EU itself; (2) the neighbourhood; (3) how to deal with war and crisis; (4) stable regional orders across the globe; and (5) effective global governance. The first principle is a significant example of EU's sobering stance on security as it places a much stronger focus on Europe's own security compared to previous documents, and on the neighbourhood: "We will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield". Secondly, compared to the ESS, the EUGS report places less importance on democratization of fragile states. Rather than changing the regimes of such states, the report suggests that focus should be on reducing their fragility through resilience. Resilience, defined as the ability of states and societies to reform, withstand or recover from internal and external crisis, ensures sustainable security for Europe as well as its surrounding regions (EUGS 2016: 23). Spurring resilience reform in fragile states is in essence the EU approach of promoting resilience to 'secure' states, understood as key for prosperity and democracy.

Hence resilience, rather than democratization, has taken the front seat in driving sustainable change and security in fragile state. By pursuing 'tailor-made policies', support to a resilient society is by extension thought to foster democracy, trust in institutions and sustainable development. These elements lie at the heart of a resilient state. Once again, these suggest a step back, more modest in its aspirations. The only safeguarding of democratic quality will be of Europe's own democracies (EUGS 2016: 15). From this context, human security is deemed indispensable. As a framework to enforce human rights, it is often challenged by own governments, through poverty and inequality, and can help bring about home-grown positive change. Human security is, furthermore, consisting of multiple dimensions according to the EUGS; "from security to gender, from governance to the economy." (2016: 28). It thus makes use of both the narrow and broad interpretation of human security compared to past EU security strategies.

In sum, the EUGS makes a number of interesting statements about the role of human security in EU policy. The global strategy shows, first and foremost, that the concept remains relevant and explicit to the Union's external relations since this people-centred philosophy emerged in 2003. However, the notion has taken on different forms after its adoption into policy and the EUGS clearly show a more calculated mention of human security compared to earlier strategies. Through principled pragmatism, human security still operates as a framework to bring about security to the wider world. Yet, these efforts of promoting security are no longer prioritized as democracy and human rights promotion. Rather, it is presented as part of a comprehensive approach to conflicts and a more modest interest in resilience. The change in direction, in terms of defining and prioritizing human security, as signalled by the EUGS is thus significant, but not necessarily in an alarming sense. The report seeks change because earlier attempts have been insufficient. It shows a new direction or approach being tested in security thinking: something in of itself testifying the vitality and constant motion of human security. It reflects that human security is a work in progress.

5.1.3 HSSG Berlin Report & Second-Generation Human Security

Published February 2016, the Berlin Report of the HSSG is aimed towards rethinking EU strategy towards conflict. In many ways, the document is an extension of arguments presented from previous texts. A central theme remains that of the EU needing to adapt to twenty-first century realities or so-called 'new wars' that require more tailored people-oriented responses to peace building (Berlin Report 2016: 4). The Berlin Report, nonetheless, stands out from previous security strategies as it engages proposes a renewed version of EU's human security approach; entitled second generation human security. In order to understand the need for such shift in discourse; present just as much in the EUGS, it is necessary to ask what previous HSSG reports had overlooked. One way to contemplate this is by asking the question of what contemporary warfare *actually* allows in terms of civilian protection and peacebuilding. The EUGS claims that European security is perfectly compatible with a human security approach. But is this applicable to the realities on the ground of all conflicts that the EU is confronted with? Question such as these has for instance prompted authors like Argyro Kartsonaki & Stefan Wolff (2015: 5) to argue that the EU applies human security in a predominantly instrumental way. The Union's human security responses to conflicts in the wider neighbourhood, they write, is in particular directed to those areas where the Union has the strongest security interests of its own. This in turn suggests that the EU confronts other conflicts

through different approaches, where they don't adopt human security principles as consistently as in cases where the Union is considered to have significant security interest of its own. Whether their choice is instrumental or not, this notion pushes one to think about what type of violent conflict that EU's human security framework applies to in practice.

The HSSG's latest report; the Berlin report of 2016, speaks to these underlying nuances that inhibit the EU from promoting real human security in contemporary violent conflicts around the world. Published only months prior to the EUGS report, the paper emphasizes in a similar vein a more responsible way to forward EU's security interests through a peacebuilding approach that moves 'From Hybrid Peace to Human Security'. Lessons learned, expressed in the HSSG Berlin Report, is that EU policies leading up to that time had all caused what is characterized as hybrid peace. Under these conditions, extremist groups subvert security policies to continue their violent activities, while risk escalation is merely furthered. As exemplified in cases such as Libya and Syria, sanctions and humanitarian assistance ends up becoming a channel of assistance for the war economy, while top-down mediation only works to entrench the views of opposition parties and reconstruction only provides further space for the warring parties at the expense of ordinary citizens (Turkmani & Haid 2016: 19, 22). Similar patterns can be found in the Western Balkans. Here, EU human security measures are of little effect as police remains answerable to resilient conflict structures that "subvert and twist these approaches to strengthen their own networks to the detriment of everyday peace and welfare" (Berlin Report 2016: 9). The consequences of applying such empirically inadequate strategies has prevented the full transition of security from the state towards the individual. Human security has in this sense never been truly accomplished. Whenever the Union attempts to include novel approaches to human security; state-building, law and order, policing, civil-military operations to enforce human rights etc., they prove prone to subversion as well due to the power relations inherent to top-down peace agreements. These shortcomings can be seen in several contemporary conflicts which the EU has attempted to respond to.

5.1.4 A reinvigorated framework

In order to combat the creation of such conditions characteristic to hybrid peace and wars, the Berlin Report stands out compared to previous HSSG documents by proposing that the EU adopt a second-generation human security approach to conflicts. Deriving from rights-based legitimate political authority, this new version is envisioned to take forward human security principles and adapt them to realities on the ground. As explained in the Berlin report (2016: 4):

“A second generation human security approach uses methods of addressing global challenges that involve politics, law, and economics, and that are both individual and collective, both top down and bottom up, and both global and regional and locally driven. It is a practical strategy for ending wars rather than pursuing ever-elusive victory in war.”

In a similar fashion, second generation human security is described as a consciously practical strategy for the twenty-first century world. Being focused on the individual, horizontally and vertically as already stressed since the ESS, it is multi layered, incremental and inclusive peace processes (Berlin Report 2016: 8). In practice, it encompasses activities such as support for local ceasefires and civil society, security assistance to establish safe areas or corridors for the protection of individuals and continuous engagement with all phases of a conflict. The instruments of a second-generation human security, which will be contextualized in the case study that follows, include:

Table 4: Overview of second-generation human security instruments

<i>Instruments</i>	<i>Implementation</i>
Creative diplomacy to combat lack of political direction and overly technical approach.	Elements include mediation at all levels of society, imaginative and entrepreneurial diplomats, ‘smart multilateralism’ bridging rule of law and regional cooperation.
Justice to combat criminalised nature of violence and war economy	Justice networks driving change both internally and externally, truth commission exemplify both a top-down and bottom-up approach of conflict reconciliation.

<p>Smart sanctions to prevent criminalization of formal economies, thereby strengthening conflict networks.</p>	<p>Poor record of achieving desired results in conflict situations, the legitimacy of EU sanctions depends on improved engagement with civil society, impact monitoring and compliance with international law.</p>
<p>Conditionality aimed at countering predation, corruption, sectarianism and impunity</p>	<p>Rather than introducing neo-liberal reforms, deeper structures need reform as politico-economic elites of host country become adept to subvert EU conditionality. Especially if these policies are tied to neo-liberal policies, such as privatisation and welfare reform, which merely exacerbate human insecurity.</p>
<p>Civilian-led missions aimed at promoting human security approach</p>	<p>Mandates with a policing rather than war-fighting mandate exemplify this. Includes combination of humanitarian workers, human rights monitors, legal experts, police and where needed military forces that consists of both men and women.</p>

The last point is a significant tenet of how to take human security forward, from praxis to lexis. It argues, by building on the instruments mentioned, that human security is first and foremost civilian-led and involves tools that includes military forces when necessary. Whether bottom-up or top-down, it's a political strategy that seek to address all levels of conflict by peace-making that aims at human welfare. Particular emphasis is placed on civil society and legitimate livelihoods, but this requires long-term continuous engagement with a range of stakeholders. Only then, can the EU foster prevention and early warning, crisis management and reconstruction simultaneously.

In sum, this version of human security displays a more matured response to the realities of hybrid warfare. In doing so, it seeks to establish both legitimate political authority and legitimate livelihoods to counter hybrid peace as well as social conditions. Rather than just adding

to the analytical toolbox of EU's human security term, this approach reforms it and presents an old-new distinction to understanding the concept.

However, the precise effect of EU's human security approach depends on the actual mechanisms and policy implementations in different geographical contexts. The Union may very well use human security as a notional script for 'doing' security, but the agenda varies according to EU specific diagnosis of the security problematique in a given country. More than so, one must also factor in the pressure exerted on the EU by other countries, EU's proximity to the state, power relations between them, the country's political structures and member state's particularistic interests (Pogodda, Richmond, Tocci, Ginty & Vogel 2014: 236). The following case study selection will explore such nuances further.

5.2 Case Study: EU Civilian Operations in the Sahel

This section considers EU responses to the Sahel region vis-à-vis individual countries in terms of policies that aim at security and stability actions. Outlining the way these are carried out, EU principles defining human security will be subjected to critical analysis. The predominant benchmark for evaluating the extent to which human security is operationalised will be based on the elements featured in the HSSG Berlin Report as this stands as the latest conceptualization by the EU. The case selection of EU civilian missions in the Sahel centres around three countries due to the limited length of this thesis. Given that Mali and Niger constitutes the two largest recipients of EU assistance to the Sahel, receiving the lion share of program funds, these have been chosen to consider operational impact (EU Sahel Action Plan 2015: 21). Chad, in contrast, is a country that regionally carries immense importance as it bridges the Maghreb countries and those of the Sahel. For a regional outlook and depth, Chad is also included in this analysis. Acknowledging the limits that arise from only working with three countries as to the representative value of this analysis, this section will nonetheless strive to provide a holistic analysis and conclusions of EU human security that is applicable across the Sahel.

Definition of Sahel

As there is no uncontested definition of the Sahel, this thesis will follow the official EU geopolitical and cultural bounds of the Sahel: the narrow G-5 Sahel notion. This group comprises of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. However, Sahel strategies over time has come to reflect the impracticality of such traditional measures of what marks the extent of the Sahel. These papers, rightly so, recognize the need to go beyond national borders between the Sahel West Africa and the Maghreb as these are increasingly blurred together. Any long-term solution will have to take into account these complex interregional relationships as suggested by Alexander Wrigly (2016: 3). Algeria, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan are thus just as important players for the long-term stability of the region, once again underlines the need to involve actors who indirectly already play large roles in maintaining peace in the Sahel, to become decision makers alongside the G-5 Sahel.

Crisis background

The rapid development of numerous security threats in the Sahel has taken the international community by surprise. Ranging from AQIM, Ansar Dine and MUJAO in northern Mali, the region faces long-term threats that will only worsen if not yet properly addressed. Desertification, the Tuareq uprisings and desire for independence, lack of educational and employment opportunities along with insufficient capacity by Malian security forces to deal with a security vacuum, are just among the latest in a series of crises that threaten to further destabilize the entire region. Finally, spill-over from North Africa, especially with the onset of the Libyan civil war reflects the pressing need to adapt to changed conflicts and an increasingly regionalised world (EU EAS Sahel Action Plan 2015: 4, Wrigley 2016: 8).

5.2.1 EU Polices in the Sahel

Being one of the poorest and most environmentally damaged places on earth, the Sahel region constitutes an area with many sources of human insecurity and instability. The region faces numerous challenges that not only inhibit human development, but equally limits communities from pursuing a minimally decent life. The nature of risks are in this respect indeed sophisticated, having spurred beyond institutional weakness into sectors such as social and gender inequality, internal tensions and fragile governance (Kartsonaki & Wolff 2015: 210). In addition to the long history of famine and extreme poverty that has plagued the Sahel, insecurity in the form of violent conflict and terrorism has merely contributed to region's entrapment in a vicious cycle of negative development. Against this background, the EU Council welcomed the Strategy for Development and Security in 2011. Aiming to push the region towards sustainable development, the strategy aimed at eliminating extreme poverty and security threats. The three-year action plan was completed by 2014 and emphasized "improving access to basic resources such as roads, social services, and education" as well as capacity-building between Mauritanian, Malian, and Nigerien governments and military forces. Today, EU presence in the Sahel remains through the *EU Sahel Strategy Regional Action Plan 2015-2020* (Wrigley 2016: 1). The Council adopted the Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020 on April 2015 as a policy envisioned to take the Sahel Plan from 2011 'to the next steps' (EU EAS 2017).

Challenges posed in this sensitive region however is notwithstanding of a rather remote and isolated character; a point that even the Action Plan takes time to point out. This naturally raises the question why the Union has a mutual interest in recuing insecurity and

improving development in the Sahel, compared to other fragile regions of the world. However, the Sahel Action Plan is not shy of mentioning that it's concentrated engagement in this region is partly due to the security of its own citizens. It reads as follows; [t]he problems facing the Sahel not only affect the local populations but increasingly impact directly on the interests of European interests.” (EU EAS Sahel Action Plan 2015: 1). To this point, the document holds that human insecurities exacerbate the vulnerability of citizens in the region as well as globally; a perspective that a) all EU security strategies since 2003 has characterized as part of new war security threats b) more specifically, what the Berlin Report, identified as principled pragmatism where the Union exhibits a concern with securitizing ‘dangerous’ regions for the sake of its own stability in a deeply globalised world.

Table 6: Human Security in the Sahel

Human insecurity in the Sahel is presented through extreme poverty, effects of climate change, frequent food crises, rapid population growth, fragile governance, corruption, unresolved internal tensions, risk of violent extremism and radicalisation, illicit trafficking as well as terrorist linked threats (EU EAS Sahel Action Plan 2015: 1).

In few areas is the interdependence of security threats so clear as in the case of Sahel-Europe relations. For one, threats such as poverty and fragile governments creates inherent instability that impact uncontrolled migratory flows. Further, terrorist activity in the Maghreb, filling power-vacuum and finding sanctuary in areas like focus on Western targets, while criminal economies is discouraging development cooperation, aid and investment between the two entities; all of which disproportionately impacts the vulnerability of communities in the Sahel (EU EAS Sahel Action Plan 2015: 1-2).

5.2.2 Overview: Actions aimed at Security and Stability

The establishment of the 2011 Sahel strategy lead to the launching of three important CSDP missions in the region: EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUTM Mali & EUCAP Sahel Mali and the short-lived EUFOR TCHAD/RCA. The purpose of their deployment was to assist host governments to overcome conflicts destabilizing them; all of which were internal territorial conflicts, triggered predominantly by Tuareg rebels and/or Islamic insurgent groups. The following section will explore mission mandates and their approaches to security in greater detail.



Sahel operation 1: EUCAP Sahel Niger was established August 2012 and is currently operating on its third mandate, which is expected to end July 2018.

EUCAP Sahel Niger is a civilian mission that is directed at assisting, advising and training Nigerien authorities in combating terrorism as well as organized crime. Made possible by regional and international cooperation, the mission's

aim is to enforce Niger's security, rule of law and managements of resources. The mission mandate is built around the development of an 'integrated, coherent, sustainable and human rights-based approach' which contributes to Nigerien security agencies in their fight against conflict networks. The EU has engaged an authorized force of 80 personnel. Next to these, around 120 international experts, the majority of whom are from European security forces and justice department, also serve to strengthen the security capabilities of Nigerien authorities. The latter is permanently stationed in the country's capital and mission headquarter, Niamey. So far, the experts deployed within the EUCAP Sahel Niger operation has trained over 8,000 members belonging to the country's internal security forces, armed forces and judiciary (EUEAS *EUCAP Sahel Niger Civilian Mission* 2016). In extension to the EUCAP Sahel program, the EU has also launched a program for justice and the rule of law in Niger, entitled PAJED I and PAJED II (Kartsonaki & Wolff 2015: 211). As extended, more concentrated efforts to strengthening the governments judicial branch, these missions add onto efforts of combatting organized crime next to developing rule of law by creating a specialized chamber to deal with terrorism and trafficking. PAJED II followed in the steps of PAJED I by responding to the judicial institutions most urgent needs. The operation combined the improvement of infrastructure and equipment, institutional support and the strengthening of judicial actor's capacity. In doing so, the EU target to re-enforce the administrative presence of the Niger government, especially in the North of the country.



Sahel operation 2: EUTM Mali is similarly a civilian mission of the Union, established in February 2013 and currently operational on its third mandate until May 2018. The mission is a military training operation that aims at providing military and training advice to Malian Armed Forces. At the request of Mali and relevant international decisions (UNSC Resolution 2085, 2012),

EUTM was launch as a commitment to restoring political authority and democratic order through

the implementation of the Transition Roadmap adopted by the Malian National Assembly in January 2013. This roadmap oversees an electoral calendar coupled with the prospects of negotiations with the North. Mandated to help the Malian authorities “to exercise fully their sovereignty over the whole of the country and neutralize organized crime and terrorist threats” that inhibit security in the country (Kartsonaki & Wolff 2015: 212), the EUTM primarily seeks to advance restoration of military capabilities, Malian territorial integrity and reducing the threat posed by terrorist groups (EUTM 2017). Headquartered in Bamako, the mission has expanded since its birth. Within the frame of international law and civilian command, the mission consists of 200 instructors or experts and 150 soldiers. The operational goals of modernizing the Mali Armed Forces consists of two pillars: a) provide support for the formation of the country’s armed forces, i.e. training four battalions as well as training of military trainers b) advice and assessment on military commandment and control, the logistical chain and human resources. By the same token, formation in humanitarian international law and protection of civilians and human rights. The EUTM mission characterizes its overall approach as a comprehensive one to dealing with crises in the Sahel. Its approach advances the assumption that development and security are mutually dependent, but also that any sustainable security solution for respective countries in the Sahel requires a regional answer. Hence, from this perspective, Mali is no exception. Besides training on technical, legal and human security issues, the EUTM objectives also consist of contributing to *the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process* framed by the Peace Agreement. This was upon Malian request and in coordination with MINUSMA (EUTM 2017). Finally, the mission provides support for the G-5 Sahel Process by tackling issues pertaining to coordination and interoperability within the G-5 Sahel national armed forces (EUTM 2017).



Sahel Operation 3: EUCAP Sahel Mali is a civilian addition to the Union’s existing training mission in Mali, established in 2014. With a mandate to establish a legitimate political authority in the country, the mission’s objective is to “allow the Malian authorities to restore and maintain constitutional and democratic order and the conditions for lasting peace in

Mali, and to restore and maintain State authority and legitimacy throughout the territory of Mali” (Kartsonaki & Wolff 2015: 212). The mission mandate is thus centred around the ability of Malian internal security forces to ensure constitutional and democratic order, with a view to improve their

operational efficiency, re-establishing their respective hierarchical chains as well as the role of the administrative and judicial authorities to supervise their missions and potential redeployment to the north of the country. The mandate thus seeks to put in place ‘the conditions for a lasting peace’ as well as maintain state authority throughout the whole country’s territory. In practice this means the EUTM is supporting national authorities by providing experts for training and strategic advice for the Malian police as well as Internal Security Forces, i.e. Gendarmerie and National Guard. However, the mission goes beyond that of the EUTM by also cooperating with relevant ministries in order to advance security sector reform. EUCAP Sahel Mali is thus a reflection of the Malian state’s wider desire to “modernize its security forces and enable them to respond more effectively to the need for protection of the entire Malian population throughout the country” (EUCAP Sahel Mali 2016). Following the crisis in Mali which necessitated a French intervention, the crisis response department of the European External Action Service was deployed to support the implementation of a short-term Instrument-for-Stability (IfS) package (Kartsonaki & Wolff 2015: 213). Under this IfS package, emphasis was put on restoration of security and protection of civilians - providing immediate support to Malian local authorities - promotion of dialogue and reconciliation initiatives - reduction of radicalization and violent extremism.



Sahel Operation 4: EUFOR TCHAD/RCA was a military mission headed by the EU which existed from 2008-2009. It is however, important to mention as it was one of the most multinational missions ever authorized in Africa. Further, the EU continued to contribute to mission objectives after UN take-over, albeit in an indirect manner. Aimed at tackling the longstanding crisis in

Darfur in neighbouring Sudan, the operation consisted of 3,700 personnel from 26 EU as well as non-EU countries. The mission mandate was mainly to “contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons, and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid” (Kartsonaki & Wolff 2015: 213). In practice, this required improvements to security that ensured the free movement of humanitarian aid workers, mission personnel and protection of UN personnel, premises, installations and equipment (EU Security and Defence Policy 2009). By 2009, the UN became responsible for EUFOR in both Chad and the Central African Republic. This mandate transfer however did not stop the Union from engaging on the ground. Several member states and third countries contribute to the UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad

(MINURCAT), while around 2,000 troops who served under EUFOR becoming part of MINURCAT (Kartsonaki & Wolff 2015: 213). EU contribution in terms of monetary funding also played an important role. Through the Accompanying Programme for Stabilisation, the Union emphasized the need for safe and permanent return of displaced people. the IfS has also been instrumental in financing MINURCAT's programs to train, equip and support deployment of Chadian police responsible for security on refugee camps and other sites for displaced communities in eastern Chad (EU Security and Defence Policy 2009). MINURCAT, the UN force tasked with training police and improving judicial infrastructure, completed its mandate on December 2010 (in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1923, 2010) at the request of the Chadian government which has since "pledged full responsibility for protecting civilians on its territory" (EU Commission Annual Report 2015: 15).

5.3 Critical Analysis: From lexis to praxis

From Lexis to Praxis

Following in the footsteps of Mary Kaldor and the HSSG reports, this thesis will seek to apply both the language and practice of human security in relation to the Union's Sahel operations outlined above. In doing so, the core principles and instruments of human security in its various discursive forms since 2003 will be situated in relation to the operations in order to assess to what extent certain elements are implemented and prioritized on the ground level. To carry out a critical analysis, mandate details and concepts inherent to these missions will be subjected to a critical and post-structural reading. By putting on these lenses, the thesis will attempt to show how the concept still suffers from shortcomings, which may have been redeemed in lexis, but not yet in praxis. Areas of critical analysis will include themes as state-building and conditional sovereignty, problematizing subject autonomy and liberal peace models. These can, in other words, function as blind spots that only a CSS and poststructuralist approach helps to identify and accentuate. These limitations may be an expression of the will-full ignorance by the concept's proponents. The forthcoming discussion however will present the argument that it is part of human security's maturing process. That, at the end of the day, it is still a concept in the making, far from consolidated.

5.3.1 Human Security Challenges in EU civilian missions

- *Weak Governance, Capacity Building and Vulnerable Populations*

Common to the above-mentioned Sahel operations is the difficulties faced by weak governance in terms of providing protection, assistance, development and public services to local populations. Insufficiency in decentralised decision-making and provisions has, in both Mali and Niger, posed serious challenges in the area of justice. The result has been social inequality, which has plagued economic and political security expressed in the form of recurrent rebellions and internal tension. Young people are especially made vulnerable, as insufficient prospects for the future push them into extremism and participation in criminal networks. The solution posed to deal with such vulnerabilities and threats to human security is framed as strengthening state-building capacity in all the Sahel operations included in this paper. Security as state-building is nonetheless a contested approach in contemporary CSS. It argues that state-building as an expression of human security permits liberal models of peace to be promoted and put in the front seat, rather than local

preferences and needs. In effect, an institutional framework of ‘security’ from the West is reproduced, more concerned with narratives of freedom, markets and democratization. This reshapes societies in normative ways while merely pacifying conflicts and refraining from addressing their deeper structural causes. Poststructuralism follows this critical logic by reading these endeavours as biopolitical modes of discipline and control (Chandler 2010: 84). This facilitates an understanding of *post-liberal governance*, which will be elaborated in the discussion section of this chapter.

In EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali this state-building and institutional appeal is visible through mandates based on restoring ‘a lasting peace’ through reforming military capacity and reinforcing the role of the judiciary (EUTM Factsheet 2016: 1). In sum, improving governance practices and institutional capacities in this manner is thought to provide a safe environment that enables the people of Mali to exercise their rights in full, including their right to security and justice (EUCAP Sahel Mali Factsheet 2016: 1). EUCAP Sahel similarly aims to construct a ‘well-functioning security sector’ by reinforcing the relevance as well as capacity of Nigerien state authority and security agencies. Albeit these are mandated to be developed in an integrated, coherent and sustainable human rights-based approach; the mission is erected around traditional security concerns such as enforcing national border control to regulate and combat irregular migration, illicit drug trafficking and wider criminal networks. Human security principles inherent to the mission, such as smart multilateralism and regionalism, become hybridized and instrumentalized to fit purposes of propping up the primacy of the state rather than ensuring provisions for communities that prevent them from sliding into participating in various types of organised crime and terrorism. Most reflective however of what constitutes what the Berlin report labelled as a *hybrid peace outcome* of peacebuilding can be found in Eufor Tchad/RCA; a mission which despite its visible human security traces demonstrates the grave impact corruption and power-abuse of elites can have on the reality of humanitarian interventions. More than so, the case of Eufor Tchad/RCA expose that what impedes human security from being fully operationalised is EU’s self-driven motives for security, which partly coalesces with Sahel’s instability and thus receives half-hearted, rather superficial quick-fix solutions. Principled pragmatism is another way of putting it, where the EU’s concern for its own security is embedded behind the Union’s seemingly human centred conflict management in Africa, which Alyson J.K. Bailes notes ‘is mainly for the good of Europe and only secondly for the good of Africa’ (Styan 2012: 652).

With that said, Eufor Tchad/RCA is expressly different from the state-centred approach which is visible in EUCAP Sahel Mali, Niger as well as EUTM. Designed to be regional in scope, this mission was orchestrated to tackle the humanitarian fallout from the disastrous crisis in Darfur. Principles of smart multilateralism, regionalism and the primacy of human rights are deeply entrenched in the mission's mandate. Second-generation human security is, moreover, expressed through its multidimensional presence which acted as a bridging concept, preparing the ground for a UN takeover. Being the largest and most ambitious ESDP mission that the EU has undertaken outside of Europe, it is of significant importance that this endeavour was not mandated to support state building or security sector reform (Styan 2012: 651). Rather, unlike EUTM and the EUCAP missions, this mission was an armed humanitarian mission, in which Eufor troops was allowed, under mandate, to use armed force if necessary (EU Security and Defence Policy: 2009). This unique element in of itself points to what both the Madrid and Berlin Report identified as essential to human security practices in civilian led missions, where a combination of humanitarian workers, human rights monitors, legal experts, police and military force are involved to uphold human protection. This was the case in Chad as Eufor facilitated security as well as humanitarian assistance in cooperation with AU, UN and civil society actors (European Security and Defence Policy 2009). This distinction is important to underline. Rather than addressing human insecurity through state-building, a paradigm intermeshed with the liberal peace project, Eufor Tchad/RCA was clearly mandated to take on the role of an enabler or facilitator of security. The outset of the Eufor mission was thus early on presented as an ESDP success. This holds true in a narrow logistical sense when considering the thousands of troops; containers and vehicles shipped to relatively inaccessible part of Africa; contingents from 24 European armies able to cooperate for nearly a year in hard terrain.

The success of the operation is after all attributed to Eufor demonstrating a real concern for the local communities in Chad, focusing on providing human welfare as both freedom from fear and want. Ranging from military patrols, both short-range and long range, which contributed to the feeling of safety in communities – to helping create secure conditions protecting populations from health and food insecurity, shelter and security protection, as well as education. Furthermore, Eufor also protected the local population by removing 350 unexploded ordnance items, all the while facilitating humanitarian aid to more than 250,000 people between 2007-2008 from health and food insecurity, providing emergency shelters and protection as well as education (European Security and Defence Policy 2009). However, acute limitations to EU's ability to

promote a human security approach are also revealed when critically assessing the political cohesion or military capacity of the mission. As noted by Styan (2012: 657), there is an element of superficiality to EU sending military troops to protect populations in neighbouring Chad and not to intervene in Darfur as this almost appears to suggest that the Union only chose to deal with one aspect of the humanitarian symptoms rather than addressing the civil war that has forced widespread displacement. Bailes (2008) criticize this approach on the grounds that EU use human security in an instrumental way, picking and choosing between the less demanding tasks while disregarding the greater conceptual limitations of this:

“Choosing operations that require relatively little force and risk, or where the professional military component is minimized, means ignoring some of the literal and metaphorical cries for help that ought to mean most for a European sense of values: cases of manifest genocide as in Darfur, or indeed, violent abuses of human rights and human security going on just over the EU’s new frontiers in Chechnya or the Palestinian territories. The deliberate choice not to build up more reaction capacity in depth or to attend the further stages of strategic deterrence also creates risk that the EU’s modest forces could end up needing to be rescued themselves if things go unexpectedly wrong.” (Bailes 2008: 120)

What makes critical authors further question the purely humanitarian face attached onto the Eufor mission is the context it arose from. As David Styan (2012: 657) writes “the mission was a product of both the 2007 election of Sarkozy’s new government in France and the need, in Paris and, to a lesser extent, in Brussels, to be seen to ‘do something’ on Darfur, without compromising the delicate diplomatic equation of the African Union and the UN presence in Sudan itself.” Understanding the political pressures behind the seemingly humanitarian mission, might lend support to explaining why certain human security principles were addressed while others were neglected. These contradictory pressures further lead UN and NGO agencies to express wariness and distrust about the militarization of development assistance to refugees, noting military forces should only be used where necessary (European Security and Defence Policy 2009). Hence, while successfully being able to deploy short-term military power to securitize areas around refugee camps in Chad, the Eufor mission showed severe shortcomings in terms of putting in place more sustainable human security conditions by advancing a viable political settlement in Chad. In other words, it can be argued that there was a trade-off between certain human security principles for purposes of promoting the good of Europe rather than urges to help those suffering (Styan 2012: 665). The norms and values of the Chadian state was far from in correspondence with a human

security agenda. Whatever forms of liberal agenda-setting that has been attempted to be introduced in the country, such as economic reform, conditionality or transparency, is only present in notional form in Chad. The international attention paid to the region because of the crisis in Darfur has moreover been a source of revenue for the ruling elite of the country, masterfully manipulating humanitarianism to advance own political agendas (Styan 2012: 667). In effect, the elite power grab in Chad continues to this day to subvert any efforts made to advance real changes to human protection and the provision of security by ruling authorities.

- *Regional Cooperation and Smart Multilateralism*

The efficacy of the Sahel policies, including the EU missions, depends on the recognition and reconfiguration of the Sahel as a region deeply intertwined with states inside as well as outside the porous borders of Sahelian territory. These complex and deeply-involved relationships is argued to be key for any successful framework for security cooperation (Wrigley 2016: 2). In correspondence, the Sahel missions of the Union are common by design in that they allow for a multi-sectional understanding of what and who poses a threat. Combatting terrorism, trafficking by criminal networks and training security authorities are all among the main actors targeted in these missions, displaying a reformed understanding of security threats as well as peace-making methods inherent to second-generation human security. The former reflects the hybrid sophisticated evolution of insecurity typical of the twenty-first century, where wars are no longer only carried out by states against other states in a battle field. The latter, reformed peace-making methods, speaks to the instrumental use of principles such as human rights - regionalism – bottom-up approach – effective/ smart multilateralism, that are present in the Sahel operations. These principles are present throughout all the HSSG reports included in this thesis and as *lexis*, these act as policy guidelines for how human security should be implemented. To extent to which this is carried out in *praxis* varies depending on the mission, though.

In EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali, the peace-making tenet of human security is expressed through the mission concept of sustainable education, operational interoperability and human rights mainstreaming. What especially stands out in the case of EUTM, is the mission's 'advice, train and educate' concept, which has contributed to the creation of the Combined Mobile and Training Team (CMATT) and Train-the-Trainers scheme. These have helped decentralize mission activities in education, training and advising so to reach different military regions of the country. Broadening the exchange between the EUTM and Malian Forces in this sense is not only a

claim to a committed partnership, but geared towards Malian counterparts taking ownership of the training processes in more sustainable ways, where security forces can lead in achieving the aim of a successful reform process (EUTM 2016). As explained in June 2016 by EUTM Mission Commander, Brigadier General Werner Albl, the CMATT program

“aims at supporting the Malian Armed Forces leaders at all levels to take over responsibility with respect to leadership, education and training within their own units in order to continue the reform process which has already begun. It also allows the Malian Armed Forces to guarantee the stability and territorial integrity of the country in a sustainable way” (EU CMATT in Ségou 2016).

At face value, stressing the sustainability and national ownership of the mission does echo human security aspects of long-term partnerships and multilateral approaches to peacebuilding. At the heart of this initiative is also an EU attempt of lending support to Malian authorities for constructing self-sustaining security forces, capable of administrating nationally-owned education and training systems for the overall defence of the country. Beneath the surface, critical and post-structural objections can be made as each contend that military education and training provides for pacification and ‘regimes of truths’. Here, prevailing discourses on IHL and respect for human rights is rendered essential for ‘doing’ security, whereas needs extending beyond that of the state is not a primary facet of this ‘subjugated knowledge’. Hence, joblessness, or social and economic inequality only gets to count as part of this prevailing discourse as relational to maintaining state authority.

EUCAP Sahel Niger arguably also contain clear expressions of human security peace-making tools. The mission not only recognizes the need for regionalism and smart multilateralism to fulfil its mandate to fight against terrorism and organised crime. The country goes a long way to implement it exemplified even through CSDP coordination with other missions in the regions like EUBAM Libya and EUCAP Sahel Mali (EUCAP Sahel Niger 2017). Putting on a more critical or post-structural lens, one may be able to induce a different reading of the purposes behind such inclinations towards regionalism and international support. Lets consider EUCAP Sahel Niger and why its considered integral to EU security. Niger’s geographical position at the centre of the unstable Sahel, the country borders several countries where terrorism is gaining ground such as Mali, Nigeria and Libya. European logic for intervention is thus said to aim at preserving Niger’s relative stability in a preventive manner, much in line with the second-generation human security agenda, so to secure that it doesn’t slip into political collapse. Surrounded in an environment of

fragile states, long-term cooperation between Nigerien elites and the EU is therefore key to achieve an agenda of halting the spread of global terror, criminal trans-border trade and unregulated migratory flows towards Europe. This is particularly so in the Agadez region, which has seen an increase of assistance. Agadez is, however, also significant for another reason. The degree to which human security principles is used for European self-interest in EUCAP Sahel Niger is perhaps most visible when considering the French interest in securing uranium mines in the Agadez region. Protecting these mineral resources has major economic stakes and implications, both for EU-Sahel relations, but even more for France as these reserves supply significant proportions used for the member state's domestic power system (Hahonou 2016: 10).

Regionalism and smart multilateralism, as exemplified in both the case of EUCAP Sahel Niger, is on one hand valuable principles of a second-generation human security. On the other hand, a critical approach to analysis helps to uncover the deeper dynamics at play to security interventions, where EU self-interest become apparent. Stabilizing elite rule through reinforcing state security institutions as well as their control over territory is a rationale applicable to all Sahel operations mentioned above. What EUCAP Sahel Niger helps to shed light on, is the manner political realism is constituted when interventionist projects of security are launched in the name of human welfare and prosperity. The case in point shows that human security principles such as regionalism and smart multilateralism are present to a large extent in practice, but imply a concern for other regional interests or national interest. The former being containing threats facing European territory and stability. The latter being France's own national and economic stability through mineral resource supplies.

- *The rule of law and provision of security*

Whether it is Mali, Niger or Chad, these states have all insufficient operational and strategic capacities to maintain wider security branches such as law enforcement and judicial sectors. This is displayed both from the mission mandates as well as made clear in the Sahel Regional Plan (EUEAS 2015: 4). The Sahel Regional Plan explains further that due to such circumstances, the Union regards these states unable “to control their own territory, to ensure human security, to prevent and respond to the various security threats, and to enforce the law (conduct investigations, trials etc.) with due respect to human rights”. Translated into practice, this explains EU reform of legal frameworks and law enforcement capacity. These are all measures that are understood as necessary to remedy regional ineffective border management in the case of EUCAP Sahel Niger –

lack of modern investigation techniques and methods of gathering, transmitting and exchanging information as in the case of Eufor Tchad/RCA – obsolete or inexistent equipment and infrastructure as in the case of EUTM/EUCAP Sahel Mali (EUEAS 2015: 3). These legal models and instruments for governance are far from home-grown or adapted to the regional/national/ local dynamics of the Sahel. Rather these side-line local political norms for peace-making by instead relying on European expert knowledge and skills that has been historically successful for the European peace project. An example of such is EUTM’s advice-train-educate concept display a human security perspective through disseminating knowledge embedded in the respect for human rights and IHL. Being an essential part of EUTM training, education of this sorts include “a basic understanding of humanity, distinction, proportionality and military necessity as core principles” (EUTM 2016). The role of gender-based violence, protection of women and prevention of sexual violence as well as handling of refugees and internally displaced persons is also part of the IHL education. This reflects the normative underpinnings of the mission whose mandate is that of training – of promoting right-based understandings of population protection that goes beyond providing means for a minimally decent life.

EUCAP follows suit in the dissemination of ‘expert knowledge’. The Nigerien security forces are being trained by experts on how to respond to crises through training on collection and sharing of intelligence between security forces, developing forensic science expertise, improving human resources management, ensure that armed forces act on sound legal basis in their mission to combat terrorism and trafficking. Once again, however, such schemes are imposed in a top-down fashion so to say, despite the fact that these missions are present at the request of host states. What makes it top-down is that security sectors are refurbished and remodelled according to European best practices and lessons learned, i.e. what has worked for the European experiment with peace-building is not guaranteed to work in other regional contexts defined through wholly different socio-economic and historical dynamics. EU engagement in this sense is not an ‘organic’ product built on profound knowledge of local dynamics. Rather, founding assumptions of a liberal peace replaces this with European prescriptions for good governance and lasting peace prescriptions. However, as many critics has repeatedly pointed out and shown (Chandler 2010: 29), attempts to universalize western models in non-liberal contexts merely tends to reproduce, if not exacerbate, problems of instability and conflict.

Hence, it will not prove sustainable. At worst, international support to reinforce state authority and legitimacy can prove to delegitimize the state, which in the long-term drive

individuals to further extremism and violence. A case in point is the EUCAP Sahel Niger mission (Hahonou 2016: 5-6) where brutal repression and violations of human rights has been carried out by Nigerien security forces, especially in the impoverished Diffa region, in the name of state security. The Diffa region has been subject to a series of Boko Haram attacks and so violent counter-responses to already existing insecurities has already undermined the legitimacy of the Nigerien government and state in the eyes of the ordinary citizen. This in turn has counter-productive effects, weakening the Nigerien state legitimate political authority while endangering legitimate livelihoods as Nigeriens become pushed into radical movements such as Boko Haram. At best, the result is what the Berlin report characterizes as hybrid peace, where a fragile version of institutional human security is projected, but ends up being subverted and ultimately making no real change for the security prospects of ordinary citizens.

Provisions of security in this manner also has an impact on the extent to which EU is able to apply second generation human security via legitimate political authority and legitimate livelihoods. Reforming security sectors to look more western does not deal with the underlying fragility of systems being set-up. Hybrid peace still characterize situations plagued by continuing crime, human rights violations and the ever-present danger of reverting back to war (Berlin report 2016: 9). And so, merely reacting, instead of also preventing the underlying causes, to symptoms of fragile states has not proven sustainable. It diverts attention away from many of the conditions and insecurities that give rise to conflict, towards solely focusing on symptoms of underdevelopment, i.e. securitization of underdevelopment rather than the individual.

5.3.2 Discussion

- Working within the confines of the liberal peace project

“The best that international organizations can do for the cause of human security is actually not to increase more insecurities by failing to coordinate properly between partners and between sectors. The ultimate challenge is to make sure that interventions do no harm.” (Tadjbakhsh 2005: 4, in Berg 2009: 36)

When politics meet practice as in the case of EU security missions in the Sahel, it becomes visible how elements of a human security approach is present. This is both through relevant documents or discourse leading up to the mission as well as actual practices and approaches during implementation. However, what explains that some principles are more employed than others, or regarded more fitting for usage? This thesis shows that this is a matter of principled pragmatism. As the cases analysed above show, mission objectives tend to reflect a second-generation human security approach where mission objectives are made to favour European security interest firstly and only secondly human insecurities elsewhere. The extent to which human security is allowed to be integrated in a mission is thus highly instrumental and depends on how well it contributes to particular European values or security interests.

In effect, EU peace-making has been understood as working within the restrictive confines of the liberal peace project, where intervention is guided by assumptions that reproduce western norms, subjects and modes of governance. On one level, this has been termed the liberal hubris of EU peacebuilding (Chandler 2010: 31). Yet, as reflected in this paper’s case study, a secondary and perhaps deeper level of analysis can be read into such interventions. The mentioned EU Sahel operations were, to varying degrees, driven by a desire to roll back the post-colonial or -conflict state. Whether it was aimed at reconstructing or supervising state institutions, this limiting of government autonomy served to open ever larger areas of domestic policy to externally driven markets and political processes. Concurring with Chandler (2010: 104), such transformations mark a paradigm shift from classical liberal assumptions to *post-liberal* framings of state-building discourse. The pre-fix; *post*, underlines this break with classical liberalism. It signifies the inversion of a liberal rights-based understanding of political legitimacy, where concepts such as autonomy and self-determination for the state is problematized (Chandler 2010: 76). Once problematized, external intervention is made to appear as assistance to reconstruct state autonomy as exemplified in the selected case studies. Here, rather than undermining the host-country’s sovereignty, as presupposed by classical liberalism, such actions are instead promulgated as supporting it through

overcoming the so-called sovereignty gap (Chandler 2010: 96). Whether in Mali, Chad or Niger, EU intervention went to show that autonomy was not the grounding principle of legitimacy, but rather it was the problem that invited regulatory intervention. And following the logic of post-liberal governance, the policy prescriptions of EU missions in these Sahel countries focused on *ways of rule*, i.e. technical and administrative capacities, as opposed to how such authority is derived in the first place. Consequently, key to post-liberal governance is the notion of understanding sovereignty in functional terms. Turned on its head, it is no longer a product of autonomy. Rather, it is understood as a capacity to manage autonomy, that can either be enhanced or weakened (Chandler 2010: 51). Rule of law is among the instruments used for this and, as exemplified in the Sahel case study, state-building becomes explicitly post-liberal through the inversion of law, where it is rendered legitimate independently of those subject to it (Chandler 2010: 104). This goes against classic liberal conception of law because ‘any law independent of those subject to it can only be tyranny’ (Chandler 2010: 104). Hence, rule of law in a post-liberal agenda is in essence a critique of the liberal subject and state governing rationality.

The result of a post-liberal framing of autonomy and rule of law, is that of the EU co-producing sovereignty in allegedly fragile states (Chandler 2010: 101). Specifically, this means that it is actively taking interest in areas which used to be of domestic political responsibility in host states. Ranging from judicial to military support in the cases studied above, EU discourse and agenda on good governance ties the hands of such governments, thereby setting the rules as to when sovereignty is adequately enhanced. In doing so, the EU is not only attaching conditionality onto sovereignty, but furthermore claiming to be the legitimate authority to judge other states in their capacities to govern.

- The return of emancipatory human security

“Discussions around human security put too little emphasis on empowerment and on the agency approach, of the role of individuals as agents of change. An expanded notion of human security requires growing recognition of the role of people - of individuals and communities - in ensuring their own security.” (Tadjbakhsh 2005: 12, in Berg 2009: 36)

Varying in terms of what country and sector is targeted, much of the critique explored in earlier chapters against human security has proven to hold true in the case of the Sahel. First and foremost, the appropriation and institutionalization of human security has taken the form of post-liberal

governance. What has enabled this transformation to take place to begin with was the usage of a concept ambiguous enough for practitioners to frame differently, and even to a certain extent, bedevil the coherence and legitimacy that was once part of human security's emancipatory origins. This so-called hijacking of human security (Roberts 2011: 69), guised in developmental concerns is visible in the Sahel case studies, where the Union's mandates were more concerned with enhancing state control in conflict areas or training state institutions on how to govern adequately. Indeed, this lends support to the idea that human security has become captured by the conservative wing of liberalism, deployed as a veneer to legitimize interventionary projects focused more on regional order and propping up state institutions.

The expansion of human security since the 1990s, however, was perhaps a signal that this 'drilling down' process from the EU was inevitable. That sooner or later, the inexperience of human security was bound to evolve by learning from its practical limitations, incoherence and faulty applications. And it was only by doing that the concept has been able to put to test its emancipatory claims in the real world. Its conceptual ambiguity, which remained even after the EU adopted the concept into security policy, allowed the EU to give human security a different face; to rejuvenate its principles and operationalize a conceptualization more fitting for a European security agenda. Examples of the sorts of interest that could be driving such agenda are plentiful in the context of the Sahel. As already mentioned, the Union's concern for population welfare in this 'classic periphery of the EU borderlands' range from a) securing energy supplies b) expanding export markets for European good and c) preventing unwanted migration, drug trafficking and terrorism from reaching EU territory (Del Sarto & Tholens 2013: 2). In this respect, human security is more involved with traditional security concerns than protecting populations.

But how does one then move on from here to regain the concept's once emancipatory and norm-changing potential? Because of increased local involvement, the liberal peace project is increasingly losing legitimacy and its aspirations of universal claim is being more openly contested (Richmond 2011: 43). This thesis however has made it clear that for a truly emancipatory version of human security to appear, it needs stern disentanglement from framings of the liberal peace, - state building and the Western norms that follow. Political authority and livelihoods will otherwise not prove legitimate nor sustainable. This, what some has termed a post-colonial renegotiation of liberalism, revises the self-determination and self-governing abilities which should direct policy (Richmond 2011: 44). It unlocks possibility to engage with 'local-local' understandings of security, rendering subjects of conflict states more than mere helpless victims. By

recognizing difference, one enables agency and a more organic respect for autonomy. This is what a second-generation EU human security might bring for the future of state- and peacebuilding, enabling more emancipatory versions to resonate.

VI

Conclusion

This thesis has told the story of how EU's human security approach is transitioning from a phase of childhood towards adolescence. This conceptual transformation was necessitated by a constantly changing security landscape in which hybrid wars are all too often being confronted through inadequate and outdated peace-making methods. As an emerging paradigm, human security seeks to replace traditional state-centric frameworks for security, which has both endangered and overlooked the real threats to individuals. From this perspective, human security is presented as a norm-changing, more sophisticated understanding of what constitutes real threats. Its conceptual framework is moreover argued to have the potential to be an emancipatory and empowering security approach for individuals.

For the EU, human security is an extension of such aspirations. It represents a new way of acting in a world where a *broadening* of security thinking has been necessary; one that is more in tune with the changed hybrid nature of wars and threats. When initially adopted in European Security Strategy of 2003, EU's conceptualization of human security was in many ways premature, lost in ambiguous definitions and elastic terminology. This is what this paper has labelled as part of the first-generation version of human security. What has since prompted EU officials to drill into the concept's normative idea, to render the framework more operational, is the lesson learned that institutionalization needs to be coupled with clear conceptualization. This process, which has resulted in changes to EU discourse as well as narratives of human security, has been assessed through key common foreign, security and defence policies of the EU. Clearest reform in discourse and concept, emerged with the EUGS and the HSSG Berlin report of the 2016. Taken together, this paper argues that these key doctrines mark the coming of a second-generation of human security based on principled pragmatism.

Moving from lexis to praxis, this thesis has employed a critical and post-structural analysis to underline the political incoherence of human security when practiced in the case of CSDP operations in the Sahel. Through critical analysis, it was shown that human security had relevance to the realities addressed through EU Sahel missions, yet in a limited manner. Several principles integral to the EU human security approach was present in the selected EU missions,

especially when considering mission mandates that focused on civilian-led missions. When discourse meets practice, though, the acclaimed transformation from conventional security to human welfare concerns prove to be far from accomplished. In other words, the Sahel case study shows that EU human security approach is still under way and thus not a fully-fledged paradigm yet. In consequence, human security has done the opposite than being a radical challenge to state-centric realism. Rather, it not only runs parallel, but secondary, to traditional security thinking.

The Sahel case, furthermore, exposed that mission objectives tend to reflect a second-generation human security approach where mission objectives are made to favour European security interest firstly and only secondly human insecurities elsewhere. The extent to which human security is allowed to be integrated in a mission is thus highly instrumental and depends on how well it contributes to particular European values or security interests. Principled pragmatism is another way of putting it. In this sense, human security unfortunately becomes a vehicle that ‘is mainly for the good of Europe and only secondly for the good of Africa’

In sum, the human security doctrine displays the great contradiction between ambition and reality, but also many convenient choices about matching language to action. This has been evident in the evolution of the concept. Starting out being overly ambitious, ambiguous and difficult to translate to practice, EU’s human security approach has developed into a more modest and reality-anchored approach that corresponds to the reality of what is and can be done on the ground. The price it is has paid for such maturation has nonetheless been that of co-option. A return to a truly emancipatory human security approach has been identified through notions such as emancipatory realism and postcolonial renegotiation of peace-making. Only that way can the architecture of global peacebuilding that perpetuates hierarchies of disadvantage, dependency and deprivation be truly addressed.

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