

# Mapping Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment ideals:

The Swedish Social Democratic Party's welfare ideology  
from 1948 - 2014

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# Abstract

This thesis asks how developments in The Swedish Social Democratic Party's welfare ideology over the past 70 years can be understood, using the conceptual lenses of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals. To answer this question, the thesis models a tailor-made seminal analytical tool; a code scheme of numerous operational indicators for Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals. The tool conceptualizes the three welfare ideals as utterly distinct, and hence serve as a foundation for an ideal type analysis of The Swedish Social Democratic Party's advocated welfare ideal. The tool is applied to 21 election manifestos, published by The Swedish Social Democratic Party between 1948 and 2014. Through a numerical content analysis, the thesis identifies operational indicators for each welfare ideal, and examines short- and long-run developments of the party's expressed desires for the structure of the welfare system. In sum, the thesis concludes that the Keynesian ideal has been, and continues to be, most important for The Swedish Social Democratic Party. Yet, from 1948 to 1976/1979 this ideal was contested by the Social Investment ideal. From 1976/1979, the Neoliberal ideal has instead contested the Keynesian. Since the breakpoint, the Social Investment ideal has steadily increased its influence.

*Key words:* Keynesianism, Neoliberalism, Social Investment, Welfare, Ideology, The Swedish Social Democratic Party

Words: 20 888

# Table of contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1	Research problem.....	3
1.2	Disposition .....	4
<b>2</b>	<b>Previous research.....</b>	<b>6</b>
2.1	The Industrial Revolution and employer-worker social cleavage.....	6
2.2	Developments of social democratic parties.....	7
2.3	Developments of SAP .....	12
<b>3</b>	<b>Purpose .....</b>	<b>15</b>
3.1	Gaps in preexisting research .....	15
3.2	Research question.....	15
3.3	Scientific and popular relevance .....	16
3.4	Delimitations .....	17
3.5	Definitions of notions.....	18
<b>4</b>	<b>Theoretical framework.....</b>	<b>20</b>
4.1	The conceptual lens of Keynesian welfare ideals .....	23
4.1.1	Rights and duties in Keynesian welfare .....	23
4.1.2	Access and governance in Keynesian welfare .....	24
4.1.3	The responsibility mix in Keynesian welfare.....	24
4.2	The conceptual lens of Neoliberal welfare ideals .....	25
4.2.1	Rights and duties in Neoliberal welfare .....	25
4.2.2	Access and governance in Neoliberal welfare .....	25
4.2.3	The responsibility mix in Neoliberal welfare.....	26
4.3	The conceptual lens of Social Investment welfare ideals .....	27
4.3.1	Rights and duties in Social Investment welfare .....	27
4.3.2	Access and governance in Social Investment welfare .....	28
4.3.3	The responsibility mix in Social Investment welfare.....	28
4.4	Concluding remark on Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals .....	29
4.5	Tailored analytical framework .....	30
4.6	How to go from here?.....	33
<b>5</b>	<b>Material and method .....</b>	<b>34</b>
5.1	Ontological and epistemological stance .....	34
5.2	Material .....	34

5.3	Choosing textual content analysis .....	35
5.4	Applying textual content analysis .....	36
5.4.1	Code scheme of operational indicators .....	37
5.4.2	Statistical analysis of inter and intra ideal type developments.....	39
5.4.3	Validity and reliability .....	41
5.4.4	Methodological shortcomings .....	42
<b>6</b>	<b>Results.....</b>	<b>44</b>
6.1	Inter ideal type developments .....	44
6.2	Intra ideal type developments .....	48
<b>7</b>	<b>Discussion and conclusion .....</b>	<b>53</b>
7.1	Main findings .....	53
7.2	Discussion on inter ideal type developments .....	54
7.2.1	Ideological (in)stability, and the three waves of welfare state developments .....	54
7.2.2	Ideological dissolution and the neoliberal inclination.....	55
7.2.3	Contextualizing the inter ideal type developments .....	56
7.3	Discussion on intra ideal type developments .....	58
7.4	Summarizing comment .....	59
7.5	Concluding remark.....	60
<b>8</b>	<b>Suggestions for further research .....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>Appendices.....</b>	<b>62</b>
9.1	Swedish governments from 1945 .....	62
9.2	Sweden's GDP-Growth 1950 – 2014.....	64
9.3	Code schemes in English.....	66
9.4	Code schemes in Swedish .....	73
9.5	Coding example election manifesto 2010 .....	77
9.5.1	Coding example election manifesto 2010 – Swedish.....	77
9.5.2	Coding example election manifesto 2010 – English.....	79
<b>10</b>	<b>References.....</b>	<b>81</b>

# Figures, equations and tables

## List of figures

Figure 1 – Conceptual lenses and waves of welfare state developments combined .....	22
Figure 2 – Example of code scheme subgroup levels .....	37
Figure 3 – Example of code scheme indicator identification .....	38
Figure 4 – Length of election manifestos .....	41
Figure 5 – Number of indicators found in election manifestos .....	42
Figure 6 – Ideal type proportions .....	44
Figure 7 – Sweden’s GDP-Growth 1950 – 2014 .....	64

## List of equations

Equation 1 – Relative weight between ideal types .....	39
Equation 2 – Standard deviation of relative weight of ideal types .....	39
Equation 3 – Mean value for the ideal types’ proportion within the waves of welfare state development .....	40
Equation 4 – Relative weight between ideal type subgroups .....	40
Equation 5 – Mean values for first level code scheme indicator subgroups .....	40

## List of tables

Table 1 – Definitions of ideology and welfare .....	19
Table 2 – Core elements of Keynesianism (A) .....	30
Table 3 – Core elements of Neoliberalism (B) .....	31
Table 4 – Core elements of Social Investment (C) .....	32
Table 5 – Ideal type proportions by year .....	45
Table 6 – Variation and standard deviation of ideal type proportions .....	46
Table 7 – Mean value for the ideal type’s proportion over the waves of welfare state developments .....	48
Table 8 – Internal developments Keynesianism .....	49
Table 9 – Internal developments Neoliberalism .....	50
Table 10 – Internal developments Social Investment .....	51
Table 11 – Mean values for first level code scheme indicator subgroups .....	52
Table 12 – Abbreviations of party names .....	62
Table 13 – Swedish governments from 1945 .....	63
Table 14 – Sweden’s GDP-Growth 1950 – 2014 .....	65
Table 15 – Keynesian indicators .....	67
Table 16 – Neoliberal indicators .....	68
Table 17 – Social Investment indicators .....	70
Table 18 – Keynesian indicators in Swedish .....	74
Table 19 – Neoliberal indicators in Swedish .....	75
Table 20 – Social Investment indicators in Swedish .....	76

# 1 Introduction

‘Next year, a whole new kind of election campaign awaits.’

(My translation, DNa, 2017)

The second Sunday of September in 2018, it is once again time for the Swedish population to visit their polling stations and vote for the next mandate’s constellation of political parties in government and in opposition (Swedish Election Authority, 2017). One can wonder if the former Swedish social democratic prime minister Per Albin Hansson – the ancestor of the Swedish welfare state – would recognize the welfare ideology of his party today (Nationalencyklopedin a)? The national election is one among many in Swedish history, yet this occasion seems to symbolize something more than merely a (possible) change in the country’s political power constellation. Instead, national media portrays the upcoming election as a ‘bloodbath’ [my translation] (Mellin, 2017). The Swedish population is fed with dramatic statements about political parties in crisis. Supposedly, ‘[i]mmense [ideological] uncertainty will characterize the election campaign’ [my translation], caused by substantial changes in power dynamics of the party system (DNb, 2017). Furthermore, Sweden has a ‘completely new [political] agenda’ [my translation] (DNa, 2017). Focus is now directed towards how the established Swedish welfare system should attend to the modern issues of immigration and integration (DNa, 2017). The cry of change is inescapable for the electorate.

The matter is not only brought to the fore by national news channels. Scientific scholars have also directed attention towards the issue<sup>1</sup>. For example, the Swedish political scientists Maria Oskarson and Marie Demker provide important suggestions for the Swedish case. They propose that the importance of the dichotomous left- and right-wing politics is decreasing and that this has caused change in the Swedish party system (Demker, 2015, p. 270; Oskarson & Demker, 2015, p. 629). Recent developments involve two important tipping points. Firstly, The Moderate Party, The Liberal Party, The Center Party and the Christian Democrats acting as one united body in the run-up for the national election in 2006, meant that the right-wing policy priorities, in general, moved towards the middle. To cope, The Swedish Social Democratic Party (the major actor to the left) also had to move towards the ideological middle. The major political forces converged and the right- and left-wing divide has since then become less

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<sup>1</sup> This body of literature goes beyond the Swedish borders and encompasses a multitude of explanations to the features of contemporary European politics (Giddens, 1998, p. 37-38, 43; Moschonas, 2002, p. 318).

prominent. The decline in prominence of dichotomous right- and left-wing politics has allowed other cleavages to become more important when competing over the electorate's votes. Secondly, the strong bond between the party which has dominated the parliamentary arena during the last century and its unconditional support group, has been (gradually) dissolved. The Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP<sup>2</sup>) no longer has monopoly on the labor workers' votes (Demker, 2015, p. 270; Oskarson & Demker, 2015, p. 629).

Oskarson and Demker consider these two occurrences as cardinal to recent peculiarities in Swedish party politics. Importantly, the authors argue that the actions of The Swedish Social Democratic Party have allowed a firm establishment of the 'radical' Sweden Democrats (Oskarson & Demker, 2015, p. 629). Due to recent trends, The Sweden Democrats can both compete over the electorate's votes on issues other than the traditional right- and left divide and persuade the (no longer SAP loyal) working-class voters (Oskarson & Demker, 2015, p. 629-631).

The actions of SAP are thus pinpointed as crucial to the perception of a political system in chaos, currently faced by the electorate. Yet, many questions about the details of this crucial behavior remains unanswered. Has the spread of neoliberal ideas about the efficiency of the market and individual above collective responsibility infiltrated the SAP? Has SAP dismissed extensive responsibility for the labor worker in favor of enhanced labor market flexibility?

To navigate in the political landscape and make well-grounded decisions – both in September 2018 and in further political decision-making – society at large needs comprehensive answers to such questions. This thesis provides important contributions to this kind of understandings by examining SAP's political supply in detail. It addresses key questions, like the ones posed above, by conducting a systematic temporal analysis of SAP's welfare ideology. The analysis encompasses three contrasting views on how to structure the welfare system. It considers SAP's relation to (1) Keynesian state- and equality-centric ideals, (2) Neoliberal market- and autonomy-centric ideals, and (3) Social Investment future- and multipurpose-centric ideals. The analysis covers SAP's political supply from the end of the Second World War until present day. The contrasting views on how to structure the welfare system are considerably comprehensive. The thesis is thus shaped to study both SAP's positioning along the right- and left-wing divide and the party's appeal to the electorate.

In sum, this thesis both enables the Swedish citizen to gain better understanding of the party system's conditions and provides further analysis and substance to the academic debate.

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<sup>2</sup> The Swedish Social Democratic Party is in Swedish called *Socialdemokraterna*. The party is henceforth referred to as SAP (the common abbreviation of *Socialdemokraterna*).

## 1.1 Research problem

Political systems could be studied from an almost infinite number of perspectives. Yet, this thesis focuses exclusively on developments of the welfare ideology advocated by the SAP. To convince the reader of the suitability of this focus, this passage serves to answer three core questions; (1) why study welfare state ideals, (2) why study social democracy, and (3) why study The Swedish Social Democratic Party? Jointly, answering these questions means accounting for the research problem of this thesis. How has the initially hegemonic and politically rigid SAP adjusted its core concern – the structure of the welfare state – to survive in a modern environment tinged by intensified competition and change in rules of the political game? That is the puzzle!

Studying welfare state ideals is important as the logic of such morals are constantly present in everyday politics. Supposedly, the welfare state has served as western democracies' 'major peace formula' in the aftermath of the Second World War (Offe, 2006, p. 66). Nevertheless, modern globalization – regarded as intensified intergovernmental interaction – reveals cross border discrepancies in views of how to organize and attend to needs of the (inter)national population (Scholte, 2005, p. 49-50, 54-56, 64-67, 84). The welfare structure is thus no longer only an internal matter – within country borders – but approaching the status of an international issue, with implications crossing national frontiers (Wall, 2012).

According to the Danish sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen, the welfare structure of such capitalist democracies can be divided into three distinct categories; liberal, conservative (or corporatist), and social democratic welfare state regimes<sup>3</sup>. Social democratic welfare state regimes represent the smallest cluster (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 111-112). This regime type differs from the two others in a number of ways, two of which are especially important for this thesis. First, the structure of social democratic welfare state regimes was prominently set by a distinct party family – namely the Social Democratic Parties. The linkage between the liberal and conservative types, and specific political parties is considerably less close. Second, social services of social democratic welfare state regimes encompass a comparatively wider part of the population. In the liberal and conservative regime types, the welfare state is designed to satisfy minimum level needs (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 112). By contrast, in social democratic regimes, the welfare state 'promote an equality of the highest standards' (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 112). In sum, studying social democracy is thus an important component to understand structures of more rare welfare systems.

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<sup>3</sup> A detailed explanation of these categories falls outside the scope of this thesis. However, for an exhaustive analysis, the interested reader should consult Esping-Andersen's (1990) *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*, Cambridge: Polity.



Not only does Sweden embody a prime example of Esping-Andersen's social democratic welfare state regime, but the Swedish SAP also represents a unique case among other social democratic parties (Arts & Gelissen, 2006, p. 186; Esping-Andersen, 2006a, p. 167, 169; Therborn, 1994, p. 59). During the last century, SAP has accounted for an incomparable parliamentary power (Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 77; Therborn, 1994, p. 59,61). Esping-Andersen writes about SAP's dominance as a 'hegemony' [my translation] (Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 77). Yet, the author advocates caution in equalizing the Swedish welfare state to SAP (Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 75). Instead, the development of Swedish welfare has been characterized by substantial political agreement – wide across the political spectra (Thullberg & Östberg, 1994, p. 5).

Furthermore, as any other (non-authoritarian) political actor, SAP has had to balance internal ideals and external pressure (such as political collaborations, swing in electoral opinion etc.). This holds for SAP's welfare ideal too (Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 77). To avoid a naive perception of SAP as an unprecedented creator of an ideologically uniform welfare state, it is therefore important to examine internal developments of SAP's welfare state ideals. Concisely, this thesis is required as it elaborates on the (partly misleading) conception of SAP as the sole progenitor of a sturdy Swedish welfare pathos.

Finally, as explained in the introduction, studying SAP's political supply is important not only to the academia but to (the Swedish) society at large. This, as the behavior of the party affects the general structure of the party system and thus everyday political experiences of the population (Oskarson & Demker, 2015, p. 629-631, 646).

## 1.2 Disposition

This section explains the outline of the rest of the thesis. The thesis begins by presenting previous research related to the research problem. The section on previous research provides the thesis with information of how the research problem has been solved before, as well as identifies gaps in preexisting knowledge. Further, the passage on previous research serves as a foundation for this thesis's later discussion on its results.

The purpose of this thesis is then presented, involving the specified research question: *How can developments in SAP's welfare ideology over the past 70 years be understood, using the conceptual lenses of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals?* This section also explicitly states the identified gaps in preexisting research, as well as accounts for the thesis's scientific and popular relevance. Importantly, the section moreover describes the content delimitations and the notion definitions involved in this thesis.

Next, this thesis's theoretical framework is presented. The theoretical framework consists of two important parts. The first part involves a temporal benchmark, to which the results of this thesis are later compared. This temporal dimension is important as it allows a comparison between SAP specific responses

to socioeconomic and cultural changes, and the general traits of such adjustments. The second part encompasses three conceptual lenses, each accounting for a distinct view on welfare ideals. Finally, the section describes how the general theoretical implications have been modeled into a tailor-made analytical tool.

After presenting the theoretical framework, this thesis discusses the choice of research material and method. The method's presentation explains in detail how characteristics of the three conceptual lenses were sought in the material (by using a numerical content analysis). Subsequently, the thesis presents and discusses the results generated herein. The findings are discussed in relation to suggestions of previous scholars and in relation to the temporal benchmark presented in the section on theoretical framework.

Ultimately, the thesis concludes by answering the initially postulated research question. In sum, this thesis concludes that the Keynesian state- and equality-centric ideal has been, and continues to be, most important to SAP. Yet, from 1948 to 1976/1979<sup>4</sup> this ideal was contested by Social Investment future- and multipurpose-centric ideal. From 1976/1979, the Neoliberal market- and autonomy-centric ideal has instead contested the Keynesian. Since the breakpoint in 1976/1979, the Social Investment ideal has steadily increased its influence. At last, the thesis propose ideas for how future research could shed even more light on the research problem at issue.

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<sup>4</sup> Herein, 1976/1979 means 1976 or 1979. This, as the exact figures makes it hard to tell if 1976 or 1979 represents the precise breakpoint.

## 2 Previous research

In order to understand the developments of SAP, it is first necessary to consider the distinct characteristics of social democratic political parties as well as how these have developed over time – in general terms. It is also relevant to review the research which has already been done on the SAP in particular. Accordingly, the following section serves to answer three central questions; (1) what distinguishes social democratic parties, (2) what do previous scholars suggest regarding (welfare) ideological developments of social democratic parties, and (3) what does the preexisting literature imply on SAP specific developments? Together, answering these three questions means both accounting for how this thesis's research problem has been previously resolved as well as identifying gaps in the preexisting knowledge.

### 2.1 The Industrial Revolution and employer-worker social cleavage

The research done by the social scientists Seymour Martin Lipset (American) and Stein Rokkan (Norwegian) is relevant for this thesis as it sheds light on the birth and initial characteristics of social democratic political parties. Lipset and Rokkan provide a detailed explanation of the developments and characteristics of political systems overall. The authors present comprehensive suggestions for how to understand a particular polity, as they focus both on the behavior of political parties and the behavior of the electorate (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 1-2). With an emphasis on Western countries, Lipset and Rokkan carry out a comparative historical analysis, contrasting 13 political systems (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 2).

The authors provide this thesis with important suggestions of how to understand the operational logic of political parties. Lipset and Rokkan argue that the characteristics of various political systems can be traced back to times of conflict (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 5). Conflicts cause social cleavages, i.e. dichotomous splits between concerned parties with polarized interest. The authors suggest that the particularities of setting give rise to certain forms of conflict (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 6). Political parties serve to channel such contrasting interests. Lipset and Rokkan define political parties as '*alliances in conflicts over policies and value commitments within the larger body politic*' (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 5). Hence, the authors imply that political parties represent and express specific – opposing – interests (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 5-6). This insight motivates studying variation in SAP's programmatic appeal over time, as SAP

statements – in the logic of Lipset and Rokkan – embody fundamental political disagreements of the contemporary society.

Central for this thesis, Lipset and Rokkan consider the Industrial Revolution as especially important to the birth of social democracy. Industrialization – and its advanced production technologies – enhanced societal wealth. The authors suggest that conflicting economic interests during this period caused a cleavage between labor workers and capital owners (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 14, 19).

The French political scientist Philippe Marlière concurs with the suggestion of conflict, between employers and workers, as fundamentally important to young European social democracy (Marlière, 1999, p. 1). As the economy prospered the wage-earners grew in number, resulting in a more powerful working-class. Lipset and Rokkan propose that this group had particular interests in labor market conditions and security (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 21). They mean that labor workers feeling ‘socially and culturally alienated from the [capital] owners and employers’ resulted in a ‘formation of a variety of labor unions and the development of nationwide Socialist parties’ (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 21). This happened in ‘every country of Europe’ (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 21, 35). However, the authors argue that it was not until the Russian Revolution in 1917 that social democratic parties became a distinct subgroup to the general socialist ‘lower-class mass parties’ (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967, p. 35).

Marlière makes an important contribution to the understanding of early European social democracy. The author suggests that ‘[t]he historical aim of social democracy was to fight back the most oppressive aspects of capitalism’ (Marlière, 1999, p. 1). Relatedly, the author suggests that – once well established – the social democratic parties, in many countries of Europe, accounted for a monopoly of the support of the left-wing voters. Hence, social democratic parties could incorporate a substantial amount of right-wing ideas, without losing the political left (Marlière, 1999, p. 8-9).

## 2.2 Developments of social democratic parties

The preexisting research on developments of social democracy and social democratic parties is rather extensive. Therefore, subsequent presentation represents only a limited selection of research highly relevant for this thesis (i.e. focused mainly on ideological developments). As will show, scholars differ significantly in how they sentence the developments of social democratic parties.

In 1998 the British sociologist Anthony Giddens wrote about the renewal of social democracy, suggesting that societal changes forced social democratic parties to deviate from classical social democracy – formulating a genre of third way politics (Giddens, 1998, p. 7, 26). Giddens’s main focus is directed towards Britain, but the author argues that the conclusions of the study have geographically wider implications (Giddens, 1998, p. 2).

Like Lipset and Rokkan, Giddens argues that social democracy grew from a symbiosis of socialism and early industrialization. The main concern for the

emerging social democratic parties was to construct extensive redistributive welfare state systems. Giddens suggests that this infant social democracy was considerably similar among western European countries. It rested on Keynesian economic ideals and considered comprehensive governmental involvement in citizens' lives as desirable. Nevertheless, Giddens argues that social democratic parties later (partly) abandoned the left pole and have moved towards the center of the political spectrum (Giddens, 1998, p. 3-4, 6-7, 9, 17-18, 44, 46-47). This argumentation proposes that the circumstances faced by SAP (identified by Oskarson and Demker) are not unique to the Swedish party. Instead, the puzzle of how initially hegemonic and rigid social democratic parties have adjusted to modern competition, seems to have geographically wider relevance.

Giddens's argumentation is included in this presentation as the core enigma of Giddens's research substantially aligns with the research problem identified herein. Like this thesis, Giddens also dwells upon how social democracy has adjusted to the transformed political landscape. Accordingly, his study is relevant for this thesis as it provides explanations of the external pressure encountered by social democratic parties and the parties have responded to such pressure. Giddens argues that defining a political left and a political right always involves considerable ambiguity (Giddens, 1998, p. 37-38). According to Giddens, the move away from post-war socialism, towards contemporary market solutions, has blurred the distinction between left and right even more (Giddens, 1998, p. 43). The author suggests that there are currently 'no alternatives to capitalism' and social democracy needs to find its way to cope with this (Giddens, 1998, p. 24). Further, Giddens's suggestions concur with Marlière's argumentation. Marlière proposes that, originally, social democracy fought capitalism, but in later days the European parties have no longer had the capability to resist the right-wing sympathies. Instead, social democratic parties have incorporated traditional capitalist views in their own political agenda (Marlière, 1999, p. 1, 8-9).

The developments also entail a more complex constellation of the electorate. In harmony with Oskarson and Demker, Giddens argues that party affiliation is no longer (as strongly) connected to socioeconomic class affiliation (Giddens, 1998, p. 23). Social democratic parties have lost their original industrial electorate as '[t]he traditional working class has largely disappeared and the old working-class communities [...] have altered their character' (Giddens, 1998, p. 104). Furthermore, the author emphasizes the challenges of Europeanization, which involve decline in national autonomy and diversification of population compositions (Giddens, 1998, p. 134-135).

Giddens's analysis proposes that changes in the structure of the economy was the driving force behind social democratic ideological developments. The 1980s involved a spread of neoliberal ideals and trust in the free market (Giddens, 1998, p. 8, 17-18). With a lack of 'a consistent 'class block' [of voters] on which to rely', social democracy had to adapt to the capitalist society to retain parliamentary power (Giddens, 1998, p. 23). Accordingly, what Giddens refers to as '[t]hird way [social democratic] politics' was born (Giddens, 1998, p. 99). In essence, Giddens suggests third way politics to (Giddens, 1998, p. 100):

[look] [...] for a synergy between public and private sectors, utilizing the dynamism of markets but with the public interest in mind. It involves a balance between regulation and deregulation, [...] and a balance between the economic and the non-economic in the life of the society.

This is however as far as Giddens goes in specifying this third way social democracy. His study lacks a more lucid description of the means and structure of such politics. Importantly though, Giddens suggests that – if social democracy finds its third way – it ‘can not only survive, but prosper’ (Giddens, 1998, p. vii). Yet, the author suggests that finding a prosperous third way would require social democrats ‘to revise their pre-existing views more thoroughly than most have done so far’ (Giddens, 1998, p. vii).

In short, Giddens’s research provides this thesis with three important insights. After the Second World War the distinction between politics of left and right has (1) been blurred. This has led to (2) social democratic parties losing their original support group. Thus, (3) only studying traits of left versus right in social democratic ideology development will not reveal the entire truth.

In 2002, the French political scientist Gerassimos Moschonas performed a study similar to Giddens’s. Like Giddens’s, Moschonas historical analysis aims to unravel the transformation of social democracy from the end of the Second World War until the turn of the twenty-first century (Moschonas, 2002, p. 4, 7). Yet, Moschonas’s study has slightly wider implications as the author suggests ways to understand the developments of European social democracy ‘*in its entirety*’ without focusing on the unique characteristics of specific political systems (Moschonas, 2002, p. 7). Moschonas considers changes in social democratic party ideology as a continual premise, suggesting that ‘[t]he *overall* social-democratic cartography is changing’ (Moschonas, 2002, p. 318). In contrast to Giddens’s, the focus of Moschonas’s analysis is directed mainly towards the operational logic of social democratic parties. The author suggests that the parties’ former stability has been replaced by modern flexibility (Moschonas, 2002, p. 320).

Moschonas also emphasizes social democratic parties’ initial close relationship with a particular part of the electorate. According to Moschonas, early post-war social democracy was characterized by a unique ‘*system of action*’ (Moschonas, 2002, p. 313). This system involved a close relationship to a certain set of institutions and a certain electorate. Social democratic parties had a firm connection to labor unions and appealed (almost exclusively) to the ‘traditional working class’ (Moschonas, 2002, p. 313).

How then did this system of action cope over time? Moschonas suggests the early post-war social democracy was significantly anchored in left-wing political ideology, emphasizing equality (Moschonas, 2002, p. 313, 315). However, Moschonas argues this social democratic originality was lost half a century after the end of the Second World War (Moschonas, 2002, p. 313-314). Instead, social democratic parties had transformed into ordinary political forces and hence abandoned their ‘social democratic *modus operandi*’ (Moschonas, 2002, p. 314).

This involved breaking the close link to previously mentioned institutions and electorate (Moschonas, 2002, p. 313-314, 316, 319).

Moschonas also provides important suggestions to why SAP's operational logic might have changed. First, Moschonas stresses the parties' attitude towards the electorate as one important aspect. Furthermore, former political and institutional stability was discarded in favor of 'tactical flexibility' (Moschonas, 2002, p. 320). The author argues that, during the second half of the twentieth century, social democratic parties began utilizing momentarily adaptability (i.e. rapid adjustment to the public opinion) to the electorate as a competitive advantage against other political parties (Moschonas, 2002, p. 320). The 'ideological and programmatic flexibility' meant that the social democrats are very sensitive to the contemporary opinions of the – now inconstant – electorate (Moschonas, 2002, p. 320).

Moschonas research is further relevant for this thesis since it provides an indication of how to suitably picture the developments of social democracy. Moschonas suggests that the ideological developments vary between political systems and that the developments within a particular system have been nothing but linear. However, he identifies abandoning a glorification of Keynesian economic ideas in favor of the market economy, as a common neoliberal trait (Moschonas, 2002, p. 316-318, 323-324). Yet, the author claims that '[s]ocial democracy is not dead' (Moschonas, 2002, p. 10). Moschonas concludes that '[s]ocial democracy certainly still seeks to ally in one project the celebrated 'invisible hand' of liberalism with the 'visible hand' of the state' (Moschonas, 2002, p. 321). Nevertheless, recent ideological flexibility illustrates a new social democracy which – due to its electoral vulnerability – 'displays greater openness to new sensibilities, whether left, right, or 'neither left nor right'' (Moschonas, 2002, p. 320).

The last sentence is crucial here. In harmony with Giddens, Moschonas's emphasis on *neither left nor right* signals that a rewarding analysis must tackle developments of social democracy with perspectives that go beyond the dichotomous left and right. Additionally, Moschonas's analysis enlightens this thesis on three important items. (1) Social democratic parties have lost their former ideological stability in favor of modern flexibility. (2) The developments over the last 50 years have, thus, been none-linear. Finally, (3) since social democratic parties have lost their close connection to a homogeneous group of voters, they now have to continuously persuade a heterogenous and unreliable electorate.

In their entirety, the fundamentals of Giddens's and Moschonas's analyses concur – social democracy remains as a political force, but the manifestation of the parties' ideology has been (considerably) adjusted to please the modern electorate. To illustrate a body of literature at conflict with this view, this thesis includes the research of the Australian social scientist Ashley Lavelle. In 2008, Lavelle performed an analysis of developments in social democracy by examining the Australian, British, German and Swedish systems (Lavelle, 2008, p. 7). The author seeks to answer the question: 'Is the neo-liberalization of social democracy just a passing phase, or is the project beyond repair?' (Lavelle, 2008, p. 1).

Lavelle's simple answer is yes, the project is beyond repair as 'social democracy is dead' (Lavelle, 2008, p. 1).

Lavelle refers to the first three decades after the Second World War as the 'golden era' of social democracy (Lavelle, 2008, p. 9). The author suggests that the prosperity of social democracy was significantly dependent on post-war economic growth. Supposedly, the flourishing economy was suitably combined with social democratic Keynesian economic ideals of an active state, urging private consumption (Lavelle, 2008, p. 9, 20).

However, the 1970s decline in economic growth, according to Lavelle, also became the fall of social democracy (Lavelle, 2008, p. 12, 20). The author suggests that '[w]hen the international recession struck in the mid-1970s, traditional Keynesian measures proved incapable of restoring previous growth and employment levels' (Lavelle, 2008, p. 33). To be willing to invest in the economy, citizens demanded implementation of policies that facilitated private profitability. Lavelle argues the implementation of such policies to implicate a paradigm shift towards embracing neoliberalism as the political ideal (Lavelle, 2008, p. 26, 32-33). The author claims all other conventional explanations to why social democratic parties made a neoliberal turn – such as Europeanization, globalization or change in the electorate – to be caused by the decline in economic growth (Lavelle, 2008, p. 26).

Why then did this implementation of neoliberal policies pose the death of social democracy? Lavelle argues that the changes that took place from the 1970s and onwards undermined the most fundamental characteristics of social democratic politics (Lavelle, 2008, p. 1-2). The author means that '[n]eoliberalism is fundamentally at odds with social democracy' (Lavelle, 2008, p. 21). He essentially stresses three aspects which render contemporary social democracy unrecognizable to its former self. First, social democratic parties no longer have any special relationship to labor unions. Instead, these are treated just as one interest group among many. Second, Lavelle suggests that social democratic parties no longer distinctively strive to even out wealth inequalities (Lavelle, 2008, p. 11-12, 14-16). Third, 'social democrats today have no intentions of reforming capitalism' (Lavelle, 2008, p. 11). Cumulatively, these three factors stipulate the death of social democracy. Lavelle claims that – as there is no foreseeable alternative to the contemporary capitalist system – traditional left-wing social democracy is unlikely to be resurrected (Lavelle, 2008, p. 19, 21, 26).

Lavelle makes another interesting point. According to Lavelle, 'policy regimes are converging [...] to the right', and hence 'there are no longer any significant [political] oppositions' (Lavelle, 2008, p. 38). Supposedly, the general convergence of political parties urges the emergence of political extremes (Lavelle, 2008, p. 37). (Thus, Lavelle draws conclusions in line with Oskarson and Demker's suggestions about the upsurge of The Sweden Democrats, but in a wider international perspective).

Lavelle's research is of high importance for this thesis. The observant reader might have noticed that the elements of Lavelle's analysis do not, in fact, differ that much from Giddens's and Moschonas's. Instead, merely the assessment of the elements' meaning is at conflict. Whilst Giddens and Moschonas identify a



new type of old social democracy, Lavelle preaches that social democracy is no more. Thus, Lavelle's study shows that – despite opposite conclusions – some (common) aspects are favorably included in any study on transformations of social democracy. These aspects include (1) the constellation of the electorate, (2) tension between the political left and the political right, (3) elaborations on the conflict between Keynesian and neoliberal ideals.

## 2.3 Developments of SAP

In regards of research on SAP, there is a multitude of scholars narrowly examining only certain aspects of the party's politics. The existing literature on specific policies and decisions is tremendous. Nevertheless, profound research on general developments of SAP's ideology is far more scarce.

One of the best examples of such rare research is found in the Swedish political scientist Herbert Tingsten's work from 1941. Tingsten performs a thorough analysis of SAP, using a multitude of material communicated by the party itself. These include party leader statements (written and oral), debates held in the Riksdag, SAP policy proposals and more. The analysis takes off at the birth of SAP in the late 1800s and terminates in the 1940s (Tingsten, 1973, p. 707; Tomasson, 1973, p. vii).

Tingsten's research is important to this thesis since it accounts for SAP's (early) ideological response to the dissolution of a distinct political left and right. Tingsten shows that SAP – like social democratic parties in general – has been sensitive to changes in its surroundings. The focus of this thesis is thereby even more firmly motivated. However – partly due to the temporal constraint – Tingsten's propositions do not precisely consider this thesis's research problem. Instead, the author's implications are more focused on the overall density of SAP ideology (in contrast to this thesis's interest in the explicit components of such ideology). Yet, Tingsten's suggestions are included herein, as his research postulates one of the more profound argumentations on SAP developments.

Tingsten identifies the initial period of SAP's history as significantly tinged by classical Marxist ideology (Tomasson, 1973, p. xi). However, the author means that such extreme statements were soon muted. Instead, SAP changed its political profile – which was fully-fledged in the 1930s – towards becoming a party with welfare put at the top of the agenda (Tingsten, 1973, p. 698, 706-706).

Looking at the later years of the analysis, Tingsten recognizes a considerable decline in ideological relevance (Tingsten, 1973, p. 714; Tomasson, 1973, p. viii). The decline was not only noteworthy for SAP's rhetoric, but 'the traditional ideologies [...] had become highly attenuated in Sweden [overall] and were replaced by a far-reaching consensus politics' (Tomasson, 1973, p. viii).

Unfortunately, without detailed explanation, Tingsten proposes the developments of SAP to be caused by a multitude of factors. Among these, Tingsten mentions economic circumstances but makes sure to point out that economy is not the only factor driving ideological development. SAP

developments are to be regarded as responses to contemporary circumstances in general, both national and international (Tingsten, 1973, p. 712-713). In a nutshell, Tingsten describes ‘the character of [Swedish] Social Democratic development [...] as an inevitable process of ideological dissolution’ (Tingsten, 1973, p. 714).

In 1980, the political scientist Diane Sainsbury (born in America but later settled in Sweden) partly took off where Tingsten terminated. Sainsbury argues that research outside the scope of Marxism is needed (Sainsbury, 1980, p. 5). Focusing on SAP, Sainsbury asks ‘[w]hat role does ideology play in electoral politics’ and ‘[w]hat effects does electoral politics have on ideology?’ (Sainsbury, 1980, p. 4). Sainsbury’s analysis focuses on election campaigns between the years 1944 and 1948. The author turns to various types of material – all with the aim to spread social democratic election propaganda (Sainsbury, 1980, p. 13-14, 18).

Sainsbury focuses on the presence of ideological statements in the material. She defines ideology as a combination of statements including (1) perceptions of what reality is like and (2) opinions of how reality should be and how to get there (Sainsbury, 1980, p. 7-8).

Sainsbury herself suggests her work to be of certain importance as it provides research on SAP written in English and as it focuses on ideology beyond the conceptual borders of Marxism (Sainsbury, 1980, p. 5). In sum, the author suggests that (Sainsbury, 1980, abstract):

modifications and persistent elements in ideological content can be explained by tactical uses, thus suggesting that the effects of tactical functions on ideological content may furnish a valuable perspective in understanding aspects of the revision process of party ideology.

Sainsbury’s contribution to this thesis is of a slightly different character than the contributions of the other scholars. Like Tingsten, neither Sainsbury addresses the detailed content of SAP’s ideological substance. Accordingly, Sainsbury’s research offers little insight into the character of SAP’s ideological developments. Yet, her work has important implications for how to operationalize abstract party ideology to concrete measurements. Accordingly, this thesis makes important use of Sainsbury’s suggestions both when defining welfare ideology and formulating operational indicators for such ideology.

A more recent study was done by the Swedish political scientist Jonas Hinnfors in 2006. Jonas Hinnfors performs an in-depth analysis, focused particularly on SAP’s attitude towards the market. Hinnfors makes articulated claims precisely about the stability in SAP’s view on the welfare system. Hence, his study relates strongly to this thesis’s research problem.

The author asks if SAP really has ‘become a neo-liberal party?’ (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 71). Hinnfors carries out the analysis based on the hypothesis that – despite short turn fluctuations in political advocacy – the ‘overarching ideology [of the party] remains stable over time’ (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 16). Further, he denotes the idea of the desirable welfare state as one of the ideologically stable issues (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 16). Hinnfors’s SAP specific suggestions, in other

words, somewhat oppose Giddens's, Moschonas's and Lavelle's analyses of general traits of social democratic ideology. Hinnfors seems to suggest that SAP – in contrast to the general developments – has not changed its overarching ideology in any remarkable way.

Hinnfors's argumentation of fundamental SAP characteristics also differs from the general implications. Hinnfors suggests that even early SAP rhetoric involved a 'market-economy friendly approach' (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 72). Supposedly, this approach embraced the idea that Sweden was in some aspects dependent on the (international) market, and the welfare state should merely complement the market functions. In its early days, however, the market friendly approach was rather subtle. Instead, (without a detailed explanation to why so), Hinnfors suggests the mid-1980s to constitute a break through for explicit support for the market economy (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 74-76, 79-80, 82). 'Gone was most of the socialist prose' (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 79). The author implies that this rhetorical change was due to societal changes. As privatization and entrepreneurship had become catchwords of the economy, these were also included in the welfare state discourse (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 82, 84). In conclusion, Hinnfors suggests that all (Swedish) political parties are dependent on 'international capitalism' but that 'SAP have found the dependency rewarding and in general have been positive towards the market' (Hinnfors, 2006, p. 84).

Hinnfors's research provides this thesis with an indication of that SAP has not exactly followed the general developments of social democratic ideology. Instead, it motivates further research on the unique characteristics of the Swedish party.

## 3 Purpose

This section motivates the perspective taken in this thesis. First, it identifies gaps in preexisting research. Second, it presents this thesis's research question. Third, it explains how answering this question involves filling the gaps in previous research. Thereafter, it explains why this thesis is relevant even beyond the research field of political science. Finally, it presents and motivates content delimitations and notion definitions involved in this thesis.

### 3.1 Gaps in preexisting research

The research presented above provides this thesis with an important foundation, necessary to perform delicate research on SAP's welfare ideology. However, there are a number of insufficiencies connected to previous scholars' research. *First*, there is a deficit in studies that focus on recent developments in SAP's general welfare ideology. *Second* and consequently, there is a need for a systematic comparison over a long period of time. Such long-term analysis is necessary (1) to distinguish swift fluctuations from lasting changes in SAP's welfare ideology, and (2) to disentangle the (partly) conflicting suggestion of previous scholars. *Third*, the preexisting research lacks a detailed decomposition of the ideological elements in SAP's welfare advocacy. Previous scholars pay too little attention to the interplay between different ideological perspectives. *Fourth*, there is (yet) no analytical tool sophisticated enough to perform such analysis.

### 3.2 Research question

Based on findings and flaws in previous research, this thesis aims to answer the research question:

How can developments in SAP's welfare ideology over the past 70 years be understood, using the conceptual lenses of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals?

Answering this explicit research question involves systematically approaching the research problem postulated in the introduction of this thesis; how the initially hegemonic and politically rigid SAP has adjusted its core concern – the structure

of the welfare state – to survive in a modern environment tinged by intensified competition and change in rules of the political game.

### 3.3 Scientific and popular relevance

This thesis is scientifically relevant as it supplements previous research by filling the gaps identified in section above. It does so, firstly, by involving an examination of modern SAP developments. Secondly, the thesis allows a long-term analysis (spanning over 70 years). Thirdly, this thesis generates a comprehensive analytical tool, tailor-made to examine welfare ideology. This tool is the thesis's most important contribution to the research field. Furthermore, the thesis is relevant as it examines how the hegemonic SAP has developed in times when the cleavage that created the party no longer is at the top of the social agenda. Finally, the thesis contributes to the research field by utilizing a method different from the commonly dominating. Instead of a qualitative approach, this thesis exploits quantitative tools<sup>5</sup>. Accordingly, not only the content of this thesis's results, but also how they are generated, supplement the preexisting literature. The methodological contribution is important since scientific knowledge is, overall, enriched by synchronizing the findings of qualitative and quantitative research (King et al., 1994, p. 4-6). Relatedly, the findings of this thesis are discussed in close relation to previous scholars' suggestions.

This thesis also has important popular relevance, i.e. relevance outside of the academics' ivory tower. Concisely, the structure of the Swedish welfare system affects each and every one of the population. From the cradle to the grave, the individual is (sometimes involuntarily) exposed to welfare services. Further, opinions on how to organize the welfare system constitute a core part of the political debate. In a representative democracy like Sweden, it is therefore important that the electorate is properly informed of the various political parties' suggestions. This thesis provides such information about SAP – Sweden's, through history, biggest party and the core creator of the foundation for continued Swedish welfare. Consequently, the presentation is relevant for the layman who wishes to disentangle parts of the alien current situation described in the introduction.

The thesis is not only relevant for researchers and the ordinary population (qua the electorate), it can also serve to enlighten professional politicians. This, as the thesis provides reflection on if SAP remains what they initially promised to be. Furthermore, the analysis uncovers how short-term decisions – in the run-up for elections – affect the appearance of SAP's coherent, long-run, approach. Jointly, it can help politicians understand the electoral support for SAP. Ultimately, the

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<sup>5</sup> The suitability of quantitative tools is discussed at length below, see section 5 (Material and method).

thesis touches upon SAP's ability to steer Sweden in a different direction than other political parties would.

The three types of relevance, discussed above, are not limited by Swedish national frontiers. Instead, since developments in various European party systems tend to have important common traits, this thesis might also be relevant to other polities in Europe (Gallagher et al., 2011, p. 238-240, 251-251).

### 3.4 Delimitations

This thesis involves three important delimitations. *First*, the thesis exclusively examines developments, of the welfare ideology advocated by SAP, from the end of the Second World War until today (i.e. 1945 to 2017). Moreover, SAP developments other than of welfare ideology fall outside the scope of this paper.

SAP had its breakthrough in the 1930s, just in the run-up to the Second World War. Then, the advocated welfare state was (rather) limited and directed to a minority of the Swedish population (Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 84, 86-87). The period after the war involved further popular establishment of the party (Moschonas, 2002, p. 313-315). However, in the post-war period SAP faced a demographic structure considerably different from the one of the 1930s. In the aftermath of the war and the industrialization it had brought about, the Swedish middleclass grew in size. SAP thus had to widen its welfare state model to attract the new average Swedish citizen. This represents the time when SAP launched their idea of a generally applicable and class neutral welfare state (Esping-Andersen, 1994, p. 88). Accordingly, the year 1945 – commonly accepted as the end of the Second World War – poses a motivated starting point for this thesis.

In general, previous scholars have paid significant attention to the decades just after the Second World War. The research on this golden era of (SAP-) social democracy is extensive. However, research on later times is more scarce. To enrich the research filed, this thesis therefore uses the year 2017 – the time of writing – as its end point for the temporal analysis. This end point is further motivated as it allows the thesis to analyze both short- (for example between the elections in 1948 and 1952) and long-term SAP developments (for example between the golden era and today).

*Second*, the thesis exclusively utilizes three conceptual lenses<sup>6</sup> to examine SAP developments. This thesis includes Keynesian welfare ideals because these represent the basis for the initial construction of the Swedish Social Democratic post-war welfare state and hence the Swedish Model (Ellison, 2006, p. 411). Neoliberal welfare ideals, on the other hand, are included as they represent a critique towards Keynesianism. Hence, the Neoliberal ideals herein function as an

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<sup>6</sup> The names of the conceptual lenses are henceforth written with a capital first letter, this to indicate that I am referring to the specific fictional archetypes modeled herein.

opposite to Keynesianism, to which SAP has had to adapt (Offe, 2006, p. 67). Finally, focusing solely on Keynesian and Neoliberal ideals means neglecting important aspects of SAP's developments. Therefore, the thesis includes Social Investment ideals as a third lens. Social Investment ideals are relevant when analyzing SAP as they are argued to both represent a completely new way to structure welfare and yet to have been important in Swedish policy making since the early post-war period (Esping-Andersen, 2006b, p. 446; Lister, 2006, p. 455-467). Furthermore, Social Investment ideals (partly) challenge the idea of Keynesian and Neoliberal ideals being incompatible. By simultaneously borrowing from and rejecting the aforementioned lenses, Social Investment ideals provide a needful complement to the analysis (Lister, 2006, p. 455-467).

*Third*, examining why political parties modify their ideology falls outside the scope of this thesis. Instead, the understanding that parties adjust their political position over time is considered a given assumption. This assumption rests mainly on Anthony Downs's suggestions on behavior of political parties. In 1957 Downs presented a theory on why political parties act like they do. Downs claims that political parties are interested in holding office only for the sake of power and glory, not to improve the wellbeing of the inhabitants of the polity (Downs, 1957, p. 28). Consequently, maximizing the number of votes is the main goal of the party which 'manipulates its policies and actions in whatever way it believes will gain it the most votes' (Downs, 1957, p. 31). Given that society is not static, Downs' argumentation motivates examining political alternations over a considerable time span, and allows the assumption that SAP has modified its ideological stance over time.

### 3.5 Definitions of notions

The term welfare ideology can be considered the very alfa and omega of this thesis. In fact, it can be broken down into two separate notions; (1) welfare and (2) ideology. (Table 1 provides a bullet point summary of how the concepts are herein defined.)

Starting with ideology, it is herein defined as (borrowing the words of the Finnish political scientist Andreas Fagerholm) a '*coherent set of ideas*' (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 144). These ideas are inherently subjective and driven by non-universal values (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 142-144). Further, the ideas involve perceptions both of what is and what ought to be, as well as how to get there (Sainsbury, 1980, p. 7-8, 10). Finally, the specific sets of ideas (i.e. ideologies) are primarily communicated by political parties (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 152-153).

Accordingly, ideologies are favorably studied by examining manifestos produced by the parties themselves (Fagerholm, 2016, p. 152-153). Furthermore, considering an ideology as a set of ideas expressed through august ideals, means that systematically studying party ideals equals studying political ideology (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 141).

Turning to the notion of welfare then, this thesis adopts a ‘social policy perspective’ of welfare (Bent, 2008, p. 54). Thereby, the thesis regards welfare as political parties’ concerns of how to organize society, focusing mainly on the population’s living standard. Welfare is thus normative and channeled through policy instruments. The instruments include management directions, expressions of wanted goals and means to measure the instruments’ performance. Further, the instruments involve statements on the division of public- and private sector responsibilities (Bent, 2008, p. 53-54, 58).

**Table 1 – Definitions of ideology and welfare**

<i>Ideology</i>	<i>Welfare</i>
<p>...is coherent set of ideas which are inherently subjective and driven by non-universal values.</p> <p>...involves perceptions of what is, what ought to be and how to get there.</p> <p>...is communicated by political parties.</p>	<p>...involves political parties’ concerns of how to organize society.</p> <p>...focuses on citizens’ living standard.</p> <p>...is channeled through normative policy instruments.</p>



## 4 Theoretical framework

This section presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. It serves to identify what the conceptual lenses of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals mean, and how they are related (over time). The passage mainly involves suggestions made by Anton Hemerijck and Jane Jenson. Hemerijck describes general traits in welfare state developments, and suggests socioeconomic factors as the prime cause of these changes. Jenson, on the other hand, pays closer attention to details of the different welfare state approaches. Jointly, Hemerijck's and Jenson's suggestions provide a theoretical springboard for how to structure and observe traits of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment ideals.

The Dutch political scientist and sociologist Anton Hemerijck argues that post World War Two developments of welfare states should be regarded as three waves of changes. The waves are suggested to be strongly connected to contemporary socioeconomic circumstances. In general, Hemerijck views economic crises as opportunities for potential political changeover. Thus, the author offers a 'three-stage developmental sequence', explaining general trends in the structure of welfare systems from 1945 until today (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 33).

Hemerijck's conceptions are included in the present thesis firstly as they provide a long-term understanding of the challenges met by European policymakers as well as how ideology has evolved to fit the socioeconomic climate. Secondly, Hemerijck's three-stage model of development can thus be used as a benchmark for Swedish social democratic ideology – a point of reference to tell if SAP has followed or deviated from the general evolution of welfare ideology. Thirdly, the temporal development presented by Hemerijck emphasizes the relevance of Keynesianism, Neoliberalism and Social Investment as conceptual lenses through which we might examine SAP ideology. In addition, Hemerijck's conclusions are in line with the three welfare ideals presented by Jenson, thereby creating harmony in the theoretical framework.

Hemerijck's first wave emerged in connection to the war ending. Society was characterized by extensive industrialization and a need to care for the population of a war-torn Europe. The circumstances called for a wave of welfare state expansion (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 33, 35). The author suggests that Keynesian economic theory constituted the pillar for the era of welfare state expansion. State expenditures functioned as an opposite pole to private spending – reducing the effects of economic fluctuations (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 34, 37).

The status of the citizens evolved to encompass the 'right' to social protection (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 34). Full employment and income transfers became the catchwords of the era. Yet, the wave of welfare state expansion involved a narrow view of its participants. Hemerijck suggests that the state focused primarily on

protecting male industrial workers from unemployment (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 35, 37-38). In sum, Hemerijck suggests that the first wave of welfare state development was based on Keynesian economic theory, which (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 34):

provided the intellectual ammunition for the post-war construction and expansion of the modern welfare state, based on demand stabilisation through income-transfer social insurance provision with male-breadwinner full employment as the prime objective.

By contrast, Hemerijck's second wave of welfare state development was characterized by Neoliberal retrenchment. The author suggests that a decline in the post-war economic growth was crucial to the onset of the second wave. Hemerijck claims that the 1970s' Bretton Woods collapse and the later oil crises were the tipping point of expansive welfare policies (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 33, 39-40).

If unemployment was the state's fear during the era of welfare state expansion, escalating inflation and monetary instability were the threats of the second wave. A mistrust in the state's capability to simultaneously maintain wide-ranging social benefits and handle emerging mass unemployment called for increased faith in the market forces (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 40-41). Hemerijck suggests that downscaling reforms replaced state authorities with individual responsibility for wellbeing. The author explains that the Neoliberal wave involved replacing social policies intended to enhance demand (i.e. the population's purchasing power), by supply-oriented means, making the tie between employer and employee more flexible (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 39, 41-43). In essence, Hemerijck argues that (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 43):

Well-functioning markets were seen as the best guarantee for wellbeing, self-reliance and autonomy. Inequality is inherent in markets and even necessary to motivate self-sufficient individuals as economic actors.

According to Hemerijck, the third wave of welfare state developments emerged in a slightly different way than the two previous eras. The first and the second wave both sprung from severe economic recessions. The third wave – of Social Investment policies – instead involved a 'disenchantment with neoliberal policy prescriptions' (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 34). Hence, whilst the first and second wave are considered economically rooted, the third wave rests on political concerns (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 34).

Contemporary characteristics of the social environment are key in understanding the wave of Social Investment welfare. Instead of an industrial society (faced the first wave and partly the second wave), Hemerijck describes the society of the third wave as post-industrial and knowledge-based (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46, 48). Accordingly, the socioeconomic damage done by the 1990s' currency crisis and the financial crisis in 2008 required very different political tools from those applied in the early post-war era (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 34, 44, 46). Hemerijck claims that the major political argument, embedded in the third wave,


was a view that the market alone might be an insufficient security provider for some societal issues. These include, for example, in-work poverty and single parenthood (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46, 48). Therefore, the state regained authority in specific areas, since (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46):

[T]he social investment perspective sees improved social equity go hand in hand with more economic efficiency. Social policy provisions are viewed as investments, potentially enhancing both social protection and productive potential.

Hemerijck thus provides a temporal yardstick for evolutions of welfare ideology, which can be summarized as follows. The social climate after the Second World War called for times of *welfare state expansion*. However, the later decline of economic growth combined with unfortunate events in the economic sector during the 1970s, resulted in *Neoliberal retrenchments* of the welfare state – limiting the role of the state. However, a growing skepticism in the market’s unprecedented ability to assure the population’s wellbeing sparked a 1990s retrieve of state capabilities in a wave of *Social Investment* ideals.

The Canadian social scientist Jane Jenson proposes a means to analyze recent trends in welfare provision, comparing these to previously prominent perspectives. The author labels current developments as inspired by Social Investment ideals, and contrasts it to Keynesian and Neoliberal welfare ideology (Jenson, 2012, p. 65-67). Applying Jenson’s analytical grid is considered appropriate as she provides a framework suitable for the time period considered in this study (from the year 1945 until today). Accordingly, Jenson’s conceptual lenses harmonize with Hemerijck’s suggestions. Figure 1 provides an illustration of how Jenson’s and Hemerijck’s understandings can be combined. Whereas Hemerijck lays out the socioeconomic context in place during each wave of welfare state development, Jenson complements his study by deeper conceptualizations.

**Figure 1 – Conceptual lenses and waves of welfare state developments combined**



Jenson structures her conceptualization of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals around a particular analytical outline; the citizenship regime (Jenson, 2012, p. 66-67, 71, 75). Jenson describes the citizenship regime as involving aspects of ‘rights and duties, access and governance, and the responsibility mix’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 66). The ‘rights and duties’ concern whom is entitled to social security and under which conditions (Jenson, 2012, p. 71). The ‘governance dimension’ refers to how the social services are structured, including

the distribution between centralization and decentralization, and between the public and the private sector (Jenson, 2012, p. 75). Finally, the ‘responsibility mix’ refers to who bears the main responsibility for the health and security of the citizens of a polity (Jenson, 2012, p. 67).

The following section presents the essence of Jenson’s three welfare ideologies. The presentation follows Jenson’s analytical structure. However, as detailed as they are, this thesis’s research design requires some completion of Jenson’s suggestions. To enable a comprehensive analysis, the implications of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals are supplemented with ideas of additional scholars.

## 4.1 The conceptual lens of Keynesian welfare ideals

At core, this thesis considers the Keynesian welfare ideals as state- and equality-centric. The state should protect the citizens in general and ensure social equity in particular. The following passages present the content of the conceptual lens of Keynesian welfare ideals in detail.

### 4.1.1 Rights and duties in Keynesian welfare

Jenson describes Keynesian welfare ideals as centered around the goal of full employment for the male part of the population. Keynesian ideals consider the male breadwinner as the core target of welfare rights and duties. The man must work but is also entitled social protection via his connection to the labor market. The major duty of the younger part of the population is to complete the compulsory education (Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73).

Jenson describes the main function of Keynesian social services to be to enhance equality among the population (Jenson, 2012, p. 71). The author claims Keynesian equality to be ‘equality of condition’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 72). Such equality is ensured through universal rights, assigning the state a high level of responsibility for the population’s ‘security and social protection’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 71). Unemployment, poor health and old age are considered the major pitfalls for the population’s ability to care for themselves. When the citizens face such social risks, the state shall intervene and protect its citizens (Jenson, 2012, p. 72).

The rights and duties are further elaborated by additional scholars. Moschonas especially emphasizes that, in line with Keynesian welfare ideals, the citizens have the right to be protected against labor market insecurities (Moschonas, 2002, p. 66). In a similar vein, the sociologists Carl-Ulrik Schierup (Danish/Swedish) and Stephen Castles (Australian) explain that the state is obliged to protect the (male) workers (Schierup & Castles, 2014, p 255).

#### 4.1.2 Access and governance in Keynesian welfare

Jenson suggests the Keynesian ideal welfare system to be considerably hierarchical. It should be clear which authority is accountable in the extensive state bureaucracy. The state is given substantial responsibility for the wellbeing of its citizens, whereas the private sector is considered a '[w]ealth-creating sector' (Jenson, 2012, p. 75). The author argues regulating spending to be a key task of the bureaucratic system. This because success is understood in terms of the amount of input spent on welfare creating services (Jenson, 2012, p. 75).

In addition to the state as protector of the citizens, Jenson claims Keynesian welfare ideals to encourage organization of interest groups. Such associations are considered to play an important role in guarding certain interests, as well as favoring the representativeness in representative democracies (Jenson, 2012, p. 75, 77).

Janet Newman et al. adds to the aspect of access and governance in Keynesian welfare by suggesting that social services – according to this conceptual lens – should be standardized (Newman et al., 2014, p. 370). Additionally, Moschonas emphasizes that social services should be equally available among the citizens and that wealth, in general, should be evenly distributed (Moschonas, 2002, p. 21, 63). The Dutch social scientist Johan De Deken adds further to this understanding, suggesting that Keynesian welfare ideals encourage social services to be generous and easily accessible (De Deken, 2014, p. 266). This means that social services are provided (also) to passive citizens (for example, people who are not actively participating in the labor market) (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 51).

#### 4.1.3 The responsibility mix in Keynesian welfare

Jenson argues the Keynesian state to have a far reaching balancing function. In regards of caring for the population's wellbeing, the state is to supplement the market as well as the family. Expenditures of the state shall function as an opposite pole to private spending, hence balancing business cycle fluctuations. Further, the state shall be there to protect and secure the citizens in times of 'inadequate or limited market access' (Jenson, 2012, p. 67). In essence, Jenson claims that the Keynesian ideal state '[s]hould spend to provide protection against social risks' (Jenson, 2012, p. 68).

Moschonas elaborates further on the responsibilities of the Keynesian state. In harmony with Jenson, he suggests that this state should be considerably active and influential, and that the welfare system overall should be organized around state institutions. Furthermore, the responsibility of the Keynesian state reaches only within the country's geographical frontiers. Thus, the state takes on a national perspective and the economy is managed through consumption- (i.e. demand) oriented means (Moschonas, 2002, p. 63, 262).

## 4.2 The conceptual lens of Neoliberal welfare ideals

This thesis considers the Neoliberal welfare ideals as utterly different from the Keynesian ideals. Herein, Neoliberal welfare ideals are considered as market- and autonomy-centric. Social services should be provided by the market and the individual should have ultimate control over her life. The following passages describe the content of the conceptual lens of Neoliberalism in detail.

### 4.2.1 Rights and duties in Neoliberal welfare

Jenson suggests that ‘dismantling many of these [Keynesian universal] citizenship rights’ stands at the core of Neoliberal welfare ideals (Jenson, 2012, p. 71). Instead, trust is put in the market’s ability to cater to the population’s needs. The author suggests the principal goal of a Neoliberal welfare state to be to foster independent citizens. This involves assigning substantial responsibility to the individual and her family. Further, inequality is viewed as a necessary part of market economies (Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73). Jenson argues the Neoliberal perspective to view ‘lack of market income as private matters’ and strive to restrain all forms of income transfers (Jenson, 2012, p. 73).

It is every citizen’s duty to have a job in order to secure her own wellbeing. Jenson claims Neoliberal welfare to be a form of ‘workfare’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 73). To be granted any of the (limited) citizenship rights, the individual must first and foremost have a job and ‘any job is [considered] a good job’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 73). Women and young people should participate in the labor market only if they can afford to do so. Accordingly, the young part of the population is expected to stay within the education system until they are financially independent individuals (Jenson, 2012, p. 72).

The American political scientist Duane Swank specifies the individual’s duty to provide for herself. According to the Neoliberal ideal, income replacement should be especially limited (in a system where social service expenditure should be restricted overall). Instead, labor market insecurity should be dealt with by the individual herself (Swank, 2014, p. 176). Besides restricted income replacement, this also involves limited rights of the workers and, hence, limited responsibilities for the employers. In general, the Neoliberal state should facilitate matching between labor market actors (for example by keeping minimum wages low and possible to negotiate) (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 41, 43; Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 256, 267).

### 4.2.2 Access and governance in Neoliberal welfare

Jenson considers ideal Neoliberal welfare as based on wide-ranged privatizations. Where privatization is not possible, the public sector should be run like private corporations. According to Jenson, the Neoliberal privatization ideal views

increased economic efficiency as a success factor. The lower the cost for the service the better (Jenson, 2012, p. 75-76). Further, Jenson argues that privatization is promoted 'in the name of 'choice'' (Jenson, 2012, p. 76). The Neoliberal ideal considers the ability to personally select social service provider as an important aspect of the citizens' autonomy. This, since citizens are regarded as 'experts' on their own needs and desires (Jenson, 2012, p. 76).

Concerning societal representation, Jenson argues Neoliberal ideals to advocate representation of 'individuals' and not groups' (Jenson, 2012, p. 77). Accordingly, the ideal discourages issue-organizations (Jenson, 2012, p. 77).

Swank clarifies the Neoliberal ideal's view on access to social services. The author explains that eligibility for social services should be considerably restricted and that – once an individual has been granted social services – she (as a service user) should go-pay (Swank, 2014, p. 176). Consequently, social services should be targeted to (limited) specific needs, as well as provided on a means-tested basis (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 41, 43; Swank, 2014, p. 176).

Newman et al. make an important contribution related to the relationship between the service user and the service provider. In the spirit of the Neoliberal ideal, the welfare service user should be in control of her situation and thus have the power to choose service provider (Newman et al., 2014, p. 370). Privatizations are regarded the key to such supremacy of the individual (Hemerijck, 2014, p. 40-41, 43).

### 4.2.3 The responsibility mix in Neoliberal welfare

The state's responsibility is considerably limited in Neoliberal welfare. Instead, Jenson's analysis suggests that the Neoliberal market '[s]hould provide wellbeing for all' (Jenson, 2012, p. 68). Thus, the individual is assigned substantial responsibility to make sure that the market supports her and her family. Jenson claims delimiting the role of the state to be a way to avoid 'creat[ing] the risk of [state] dependency' (Jenson, 2012, p. 68). The author suggests that restricting entitlement to social services and promoting labor market entrance are means by the state to circumvent such dependence (Jenson, 2012, p. 69). In sum, Jenson claims Neoliberal welfare to consider 'social spending and state intervention [as] in conflict with economic prosperity' (Jenson, 2012, p. 68).

Hemerijck pinpoints the responsibility of the Neoliberal state by suggesting that this state's primary functions should be to ensure that the citizens do not violate each other's' rights. Social services should be outsourced or contracted out (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 40-41, 43; Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 259). This idea is substantiated by the German political scientist Claus Offe's argumentation that the conceptual lens of Neoliberalism regards social spending as a hinder of economic growth. This, as social spending discourages both investments and paid employment (work) (Offe, 2014, p. 62, 65).

Hemerijck makes another important contribution to the conceptual lens of Neoliberal welfare ideals. Supposedly, the economy is herein managed through

supply-oriented means. This involves, for example, having an independent central bank and keeping inflation to a minimum (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 40-41).

### 4.3 The conceptual lens of Social Investment welfare ideals

In some sense, this thesis regards Social Investment welfare ideals as a compromise between the Keynesian and the Neoliberal ideals. Yet, the conceptual lens of Social Investment does not merely represent a mixture in content of the two previously presented lenses. Instead, this thesis argues that the core suggestions of Social Investment welfare ideals are distinct enough to constitute a separate (parallel) conceptual lens. Concisely, Social Investment ideals are herein regarded as future- and multipurpose-centric.

#### 4.3.1 Rights and duties in Social Investment welfare

Jenson suggests that ‘human capital’ is the catchword of the Social Investment welfare ideal (Jenson, 2012, p. 72). The population ‘have a duty as citizens to invest in their human capital by seeking education and training’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 73). According to Jenson, Social Investment welfare is significantly concerned with urging the population to protect themselves from potential future misfortune. Thus, the state encourages the citizens to invest in their human capital as well as to privately save considerable amounts of money (Jenson, 2012, p. 72-73). Jenson claims Social Investment equality to mean ‘[e]quality of opportunity’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 72). To ensure such equality, investment in human capital should start already in preschool. In addition, the Social Investment ideal considers learning as a life-long possibility. Jenson proposes that the Social Investment state therefore promotes higher education for all (Jenson, 2012, p. 72-73).

Further, the author suggests that the Social Investment welfare ideal allows some state interference. The Social Investment state should offer support ‘when the market fails to provide the service at an affordable price’ (Jenson, 2012, p. 72). Jenson claims that such support is primarily directed towards poor families with children (Jenson, 2012, p. 73).

De Deken makes an important note on the support from the state. Looking through the conceptual lens of Social Investment welfare ideals, for social equality and economic efficiency to be compatible, benefits must be provided only on a short-term basis (De Deken, 2014, p. 260, 266).



### 4.3.2 Access and governance in Social Investment welfare

Regarding the structure of the welfare system, Jenson suggests that '[t]he design of governance arrangements [in Social Investment welfare] relies extensively on notions of consultation, communication and local involvement' (Jenson, 2012, p. 77). The primary role of the state is to invest in the citizens' potential to be productive. According to Jenson, the Social Investment ideal considers improving individual capacities beneficial not only to the individual herself. Instead, the ideal means that improved individual capacities jointly create an improved common society (Jenson, 2012, p. 75, 77).

To best create high individual and collective productivity, Jenson argues the Social Investment welfare ideal to advocate '[n]etworking and partnerships' (Jenson, 2012, p. 75). Hence, the ideal encourages none-governmental issue-organizations. Further, the author suggests that success is measured in the quality of outcomes (Jenson, 2012, p. 75, 77).

### 4.3.3 The responsibility mix in Social Investment welfare

In Social Investment welfare, the citizens and the state share responsibility for the population's wellbeing. Jenson suggests that such responsibility is taken through investments. The conceptual lens regards expenditures today as investments in the future. The citizens are obliged to invest in their own human capital as well as save for future expenses. Jenson proposes the Social Investment ideal to thereby (partly) replace social service expenditures with private savings (Jenson, 2012, p. 68-69). The author describes that 'via savings [the citizens are supposed to care] for their retirement pensions and their children's' education' (Jenson, 2012, p. 69).

Despite substantial individual responsibility, Jenson argues that the Social Investment ideal also assigns the state some welfare responsibilities. The state's primary function is to protect the citizens when the market fails to do so. This involves combating child and working poverty, as well as facilitating balancing work and family lives (Jenson, 2012, p. 68-69). Finally, the author describes how the sharing of responsibilities (between the state and the individual) springs from the Social Investment perspective taking 'new' social risks into account (Jenson, 2012, p. 63). Contemporary demographic and economic circumstances have provoked these new risks, including, for example, female career opportunities and adjustments to a post-industrial society (Jenson, 2012, p. 69).

Hemerijck adds to this list of issues which the Social Investment state is obliged to attend to. These new social risks involve, for example, attending to long term unemployed, single parenthood, immigration etc. Moreover, the state should attend to skills being obsolete but the individual herself also has de duty to invest in her human capital (De Deken, 2014, p. 266; Hemerijck, 2012, p. 47-48, 51-52).

An important attribute of the Social Investment state – that welfare should be enabling – is brought up by the Belgian sociologist Bea Cantillon. Accordingly,

the state should attend to the ability for the individual to balance work and leisure (Cantillon, 2011, p. 437, 439). Importantly, here social services aim to break the cycle of intergenerational poverty. Caring for children and young people is important as they constitute tomorrow's society. Concisely, social spending is regarded as investment in the future. However, the lifelong perspective should not only be taken on by the state. Instead, it should be profitable for citizens to transfer their own money over the life course (compared to consuming all in the present) (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46-48, 51-54).

Finally, the Social Investment state is (like the Neoliberal) managed through supply-oriented means. For this conceptual lens, this involves creating productive future taxpayers. Human capital improvements are key. In a sequential perspective, the Social Investment ideal proposes that human capital is tightly linked to employment. Thereby advanced education level creates both higher individual income and tax revenue. In turn, the higher income and tax revenues help improve general economic growth (De Deken, 2014, p. 262; Hemerijck, 2012, p. 51, 53).

#### 4.4 Concluding remark on Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals

The alert reader might have observed that the content of the Social Investment ideals appears to coincide twice with the implications of the other conceptual lenses. First, the passages above explain that the Neoliberal and Social Investment ideals both advocate the economy being managed through supply-oriented means. Second, the presentation suggest that both the Keynesian and Social Investment ideals consider issue organizations (associations) desirable. An overlap of contents, between the three conceptual lenses, would violate a core premise of the later conducted ideal type analysis; that the artificial ideal types must be mutually exclusive (Esaïsson et al., 2012, p. 143-144). However, the herein perceived overlap is nothing but a chimaera.

For Neoliberalism, the supply-oriented means of the economy strictly involve controlling inflation, keeping the currency stable and the central bank independent. In contrast, for Social Investment ideals, supply-oriented means involves enhancing individual and common productivity to increase (future) tax revenues (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 40-41, 51). In regards of issue organizations, the conceptual lens of Keynesianism includes only labor unions or issue-organizations with explicit, specific economic interests (Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 255). In opposite, the issue-organizations of the Social Investment ideal involve local associations that embody more than just one, narrowly defined, economic interest (Jenson, 2012, p. 77). Thus, the contents of the conceptual lenses are still utterly distinct.

## 4.5 Tailored analytical framework

From the suggestion in previous passages, this thesis has modeled a unique analytical tool. The tool is comprehensive and serves as a tailored means to answer how developments in SAP welfare ideology, over the past 70 years can be understood, using the conceptual lenses of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals. This tailor-made tool (or analytical framework) represents this thesis's prime seminal contribution to the field of political science. Table 2, 3 and 4 provides an abbreviation of this tool. The analytical framework in its entirety, is included in Appendix 9.3 and 9.4.

To module the analytical framework, this thesis has transformed the previously presented running text to explicit statements (or bullet points). The statements included in table 2, 3 and 4 encompass Jenson's suggestions on rights and duties, access and governance, and the responsibility mix in Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals. However, the statements are structured in accordance with what this thesis regards as most important for the three welfare ideals. In the analytical framework, A represents Keynesianism, B represents Neoliberalism and C represents Social Investment welfare ideals.

**Table 2 – Core elements of Keynesianism (A)**

<b>A. Core elements of Keynesianism</b>
<b>A1. The state should protect the citizens</b>
<b>A1.1 The state should ensure social justice/equity</b>
<b>A1.2 Social services are universal rights</b>
<b>A1.3 Social services aim to enhance equality</b>
<b>A1.4 Social services aim to protect/secure the population</b>
<b>A1.5 Social services are compensatory/provided retroactively</b>
<b>A1.6 Social services should focus on especially important issues/risks</b>
<b>A1.7 Social services are improved through higher spending/input</b>
<b>A2. The state should act as an economic stabilizer</b>
<b>A2.1 The state should govern through an extensive bureaucratic apparatus</b>
<b>A2.2 The state should balance economy cycles/act countercyclically</b>
<b>A2.3 The economy is managed through consumption/demand-oriented means</b>
<b>A2.4 Consumption of social services takes place in the present</b>
<b>A3. The state should reduce the citizens' (financial) dependence on the labor market</b>
<b>A3.1 The state should reduce labor market insecurity</b>
<b>A3.2 The state should ensure full (male) employment</b>
<b>A3.3 Issue-organizations/associations are desirable</b>
<b>A3.4 Citizens should complete mandatory education</b>

The core elements of Keynesianism are structured around three prominent categories of statements (A1, A2 and A3). Mainly, the statements in group A1 (The state should protect the citizens) correspond to Jenson’s idea on rights and duties, and the responsibility mix. Here, the citizens are granted a multitude of rights and the state has extensive responsibilities for the population’s wellbeing. Accordingly, the state is the most important actor in the Keynesian responsibility mix.

The statements in group A2 (The state should act as an economic stabilizer) relates mainly to the view on access and governance and the responsibility mix. Again, the state is assigned considerable responsibility. This time to balance economic cycles. Further, governance of welfare services should take place through an extensive state apparatus.

Finally, the statements in group A3 (The state should reduce the citizens’ (financial) dependence in the labor market) relates mainly to Jenson’s rights and duties, as the statements here signal how the state is obliged to attend to the labor workers’ rights.

**Table 3 – Core elements of Neoliberalism (B)**

<b>B. Core elements of Neoliberalism</b>
<b>B1. The welfare sector is a burden</b>
<b>B1.1 The state's primary function should be to ensure that citizens do not violate each other's rights</b>
<b>B1.2 The state should support only the poorest citizens</b>
<b>B1.3 Social service expenditures should be restricted</b>
<b>B1.4 Social spending hinders economic growth</b>
<b>B1.5 Social services cause (undesired) state-dependent citizens</b>
<b>B1.6 Social services are improved through higher efficiency/lower costs per service</b>
<b>B2. The market sector is the solution</b>
<b>B2.1 Social equality/equity and economic efficiency are incompatible</b>
<b>B2.2 Social services should be privatized/provided by the market</b>
<b>B2.3 The economy is managed through supply-oriented means</b>
<b>B3. The citizens should be independent and in control</b>
<b>B3.1 The citizens should be self-reliant</b>
<b>B4. The labor market should be deregulated</b>
<b>B4.1 Labor market insecurity should be dealt with by the individual herself</b>
<b>B4.2 The state should facilitate matching between labor market actors</b>
<b>B4.3 Unemployment compensation should be limited</b>
<b>B4.4 Everybody who is able to should work</b>
<b>B4.5 Issue-organizations/associations are undesirable</b>
<b>B4.6 Citizens are encouraged to attain tertiary education in order to achieve financial independence</b>

Table 3 shows that the elements of Neoliberalism are structured around four prominent categories of statements (B1, B2, B3 and B4). The statements in group B1 (The welfare sector is a burden), relates to all aspects of Jenson’s analysis. In regards of rights and duties, the statements suggest that the citizens are granted only minimum rights and the state is thus assigned minimum responsibility for the citizens’ wellbeing. This also relates to Jenson’s responsibility mix. Considering the access and governance, the statements of this group signal that access to social services is restricted.

The statements in group B2 (The market sector is the solution), has clear connection to Jenson’s view on access and governance, as the statements in this group signal that the market should be the service provider. Further, group B3 (The citizens should be independent and in control), explicitly communicates the individual’s prominent role in the responsibility mix in welfare ideals.

Finally, the statements in group B4 (The labor market should be deregulated), relates mainly to Jenson’s ide of rights and duties. The statements of this group illustrate that, here, workers’ rights are significantly restricted.

**Table 4 – Core elements of Social Investment (C)**

<b>C. Core elements of Social Investment</b>
<b>C1. The state should support citizens when the market fails to do so</b>
<b>C1.1 The market should handle old social risks/issues</b>
<b>C1.2 The state should handle new social risks/issues</b>
<b>C2. Social services aim to prevent citizens from needing state support</b>
<b>C2.1 Social equality/equity and economic efficiency are compatible</b>
<b>C2.2 The welfare state should be enabling</b>
<b>C2.3 The welfare state should be future-oriented</b>
<b>C2.4 The welfare state should encourage the citizens to take on a lifelong perspective</b>
<b>C2.5 The welfare sector should consist of partnerships and networks</b>
<b>C2.6 Social services are improved through higher productivity capacity/better outcomes</b>
<b>C3. Education/human capital is central for wellbeing</b>
<b>C3.1 Citizens have the duty to invest in their human capital</b>
<b>C3.2 Human capital improvements create economic growth</b>
<b>C3.3 The economy is managed through supply-oriented means</b>
<b>C3.4 Issue-organizations/associations are desirable</b>

Finally, table 4 shows that the elements of Social Investment welfare ideals are structured around three prominent categories of statements (C1, C2 and C3). The statements in group C1 (The state should support the citizens when the market fails to do so), mainly relates to Jenson’s idea on rights and duties, and the responsibility mix in welfare ideals. This group of statements signals that the

individual is granted rights in relation to some issues (see discussion above on old- and new social risks). Moreover, the statements of this group signal that the state and the market share responsibility for the citizens' wellbeing.

The statements in group C2 (Social services aim to prevent citizens from needing state support), in essence relates to all aspects of Jensen's analysis. Importantly, the emphasis on partnerships and networks (statement C2.5) is especially related to how the welfare system should be administered, i.e. related to the idea of access and governance.

At last, the statements in group C3 (Education/human capital is central for wellbeing) are related mainly to the aspects of rights and duties, and the responsibility mix in welfare ideals. Accordingly, the statements of this group signal that the individual is obliged to invest in her human capital. Further, the statements also suggest that the individual – in addition to the state and the market – also has significant responsibility for her own wellbeing.

## 4.6 How to go from here?

Hitherto, this thesis has reviewed the research field, postulated the research question, laid out the relevant theoretical framework and described how a tailor-made analytical tool has been derived from the broader theoretical implications. The upcoming section (on material and method) elaborates on how to observe these ideas, in SAP's ideological developments from the Second World War until today. Crucially, the logic behind the next section involves two important expectations. The literature provides reason to expect (1) change in balance of welfare ideals over time. This is herein referred to as *inter* ideal type developments. However, the literature also motivates expecting (2) change in balance of the welfare ideals' core elements (i.e. A1, A2, A3, B1, B2 etc.). This is herein referred to as *intra* ideal type developments. The expectations of both inter and intra ideal type developments are of importance to the following presentation on this thesis's numerical content analysis.

## 5 Material and method

This section explains the logic of this thesis's choice of research material and method. It starts by presenting the selected material and continues by explaining the methodological foundations in detail. Last, it comments on the shortcomings associated with the chosen procedure. To start with, however, the ontological and epistemological premises of the thesis shall be clarified.

### 5.1 Ontological and epistemological stance

Regarding the character of reality and the comprehensibility of such reality, this thesis joins a positivistic approach (as defined by Badersten & Gustavsson, 2010, p. 40-43). Put more specifically, it embraces 'an ontological assumption that there is a reality which is independent of our subjective consciousnesses [as well as] an epistemological assumption that it through systematic observations is possible to attain legitimate knowledge of this reality' [my translation] (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 19). These premises constitute the basis for the subsequent reasoning about selected research material and method.

### 5.2 Material

As this thesis focuses on The Swedish Social Democratic Party, SAP election manifestos have been chosen as research material. Election manifestos are characterized by including a number of political goals which the party wishes to fulfill during upcoming mandate period. Thus, political parties are the remitters and the citizens of an electoral district (in this case the Swedish population) constitute the recipient (Swedish Labor Movement's Archives and Library, 2014; The Manifesto Project).

During the time period addressed in this thesis, SAP published 21 election manifestos<sup>7</sup> (Swedish Labor Movement's Archives and Library, 2014). To maximize the accuracy of the project, this thesis applies a total selection, including all 21 documents. In general, the 21 election manifestoes published by

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<sup>7</sup> The manifestos were published in 1948, 1952, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1964, 1968, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014 (Swedish Labor Movement's Archives and Library, 2014).

SAP between 1948 and 2014<sup>8</sup> constitute appropriate research material for four reasons. *First*, the manifestos aim to communicate precisely (what is herein defined as) political ideology. *Second*, the manifestos present a unitary stance for SAP as a whole (not statements from particular individuals or local partisan subgroups). *Third*, the manifestos address the public and hence present the political ideology officially communicated to the electorate. *Fourth*, the publication frequency of the election manifestos allows this thesis to catch short-term fluctuations as well as long-term developments of SAP welfare ideology.

In the same period SAP – of course – produced various other political works, which potentially could have been examined herein. These include for example parliamentary debates, budgets and budget propositions, suggested and implemented policies etc. However, such material is excluded from current study as this thesis focuses solely on ideological advocacy preached in the run-up for national elections. Information given in the alternative resources listed above are instead suggested to mainly give information about actions taken by parties when holding office or being in opposition (i.e. after the election process). Further, the alternative resources are produced to inform other parties and politicians internally. This means that the content and presentation might differ from the one given to the public, thereby falling outside the scope of this thesis.

SAP party programs are also left out. This decision might seem more conspicuous. Party programs serve principally the same purpose as election manifestos, yet these documents are not included in current thesis. The decision to exclude party programs rests on two pillars. First, only four<sup>9</sup> programs, with considerable temporal distance, were published during the period (Swedish Labor Movement's Archives and Library, 2011). This circumstance undermines the possibility to see short term developments. Second, the party programs generally differ by only minor adjustments. This rigidity aggravates the ability to examine temporal ideological developments at all.

In sum, the 21 election manifestos published between 1948 and 2014 serve as the most appropriate research material given the purpose of this thesis.

### 5.3 Choosing textual content analysis

Herein, textual content analysis was used as the foundational method. To structure the content analysis, the thesis used ideal types as means of categorizing what was found in the 21 election manifestos. An ideal type stipulates a refined imaginary construction of the addressed phenomenon. It serves as an analytical grid to apply

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<sup>8</sup> No manifestos were published between 1945 and 1948, nor have any (yet) been published after 2014. Thus, studying the manifestos published by SAP between 1948 and 2014 equals studying the manifestos for the time period addressed in this thesis (i.e. 1945 until today).

<sup>9</sup> The programs were published in 1944, 1960, 1975, 1990 and 2001 (Swedish Labor Movement's Archives and Library, 2011).



to the material to examine how reality corresponds to the fictive construction (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 139-141, 197; Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 63, 150). To seek SAP developments in ideological emphasis, a temporal comparison of the results was carried out.

The content analysis rested on two pillars. One part of the thesis consisted in generating descriptive statistics from the 21 election manifestos. For this purpose, numerical content analysis was used. Such analysis allows processing extensive material to examine the occurrence of various political stances (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 58-59, 63, Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 50, 197-198). Numerical content analysis is a generally accepted method when studying the content of political writings such as election manifestos. This as the analysis is exceptionally suitable for carrying out temporal comparison of the character and scope given to certain – explicitly communicated – stances (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 50-51, 53, 59, 87; Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 198-199).

A second pillar of this thesis consisted of comparing the results to the sequential theoretical implications of three waves of welfare state developments. Furthermore, by examining the relative emphasis within each welfare ideology (i.e. ideal type), this study also involved entering an unexplored field. The results of this thesis contribute to understanding – hitherto sparingly studied – internal developments in Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals. In addition to the descriptive approach presented, the thesis thus also holds an exploratory approach.

## 5.4 Applying textual content analysis

Ideal type Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare were modeled from the conceptual lenses presented above. The three ideal types are mutually exclusive. Thus, they present distinguishing features for each utterly distinct welfare ideology containing parallel approaches on how to coordinate state, individual and market (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 143-144). The thesis used various scholars' preexisting suggestions when modelling the three ideal types. Thereby, the thesis constructed comprehensive, detailed, analytical grids for Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals by synchronizing several complementary ideas.

The three ideal types were used to perform a systematic temporal comparison. Each of the 21 election manifestos was analyzed through the same lenses of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals, respectively. This procedure allows an efficient assessment of an extensive material, using time as a point of reference to identify potential change (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 146; Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 166-167). It is thereby a suitable methodological onset for this thesis as the paper seeks to examine long term patterns in SAP ideological developments.

### 5.4.1 Code scheme of operational indicators

First, the ideal types were operationalized by listing a number of indicators which are presented in a code scheme, including in total 133 indicators<sup>10</sup>. The indicators were adjusted to suit this thesis’s definition of welfare ideology. Therefore, the indicators focus on identifying (1) judgements of reality, (2) formulations of goals and demands, and (3) means to achieve these. For a linguistical fit between the body text presentation of the ideal types and the code scheme, words such as *is/are*, *aim/aims* and *should* are frequently reoccurring among the indicators. Furthermore, to enhance the cohesion between the SAP election manifestos (which are published in Swedish) the code scheme was translated into Swedish.

The code scheme presents the indicators listed in code scheme subgroups. This, in order to be able to examine not only SAP’s relative support between the ideal types but also what is especially stressed within each ideal type. A taste of this tailor-made framework has been presented (see table 2, 3 and 4). For the code schemes in their entirety (both English and Swedish), consult Appendices 9.3 and 9.4. The subgroups represent prominent issues, unique for each ideal type. The reader shall be aware that the ideal types are mutually exclusive and formulated to cover the same aspects for each ideal type respectively, but that the code scheme indicators are organized differently depending on ideal type. The subgroups involve up to three levels of precision among the indicators. The logic is clarified with an example using parts of the Keynesian code scheme indicators, see figure 2.

**Figure 2 – Example of code scheme subgroup levels**

<b>A2. The state should act as an economic stabilizer</b>
<b>A2.1 The state should govern through an extensive bureaucratic apparatus</b>
<i>A2.1.1 The state should have wide-ranging authorities</i>

Figure 2 displays an excerpt of the second subgroup of Keynesian indicators called ‘A2. The state should act as an economic stabilizer’. A2 is a first level indicator. Further, ‘A2.1 The state should govern through an extensive bureaucratic apparatus’ is a more precise category within subgroup A2. Thus, A2.1 is a second level indicator. Finally, ‘A2.1.1 The state should have wide-ranging authorities’ is an even more precise category within subgroup A2. Therefore, A2.1.1 is a third level indicator. Separating the code scheme indicators

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<sup>10</sup> Each ideal type includes approximately the same number of indicators. Keynesianism involve 42, Neoliberalism involve 46 and Social Investment involve 45. Hence, no ideal type is favored by the code scheme. Instead the scheme allows equal possibilities to identify ideas supporting each category.

in three levels allows a delicate analysis of potential temporal variation within each ideal type.

The 21 election manifestos were then coded manually. The manual coding facilitates examination of subtle and complex statements made by the SAP, which might have been lost in an automatic analysis using computer software (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 51). Every sentence in the manifestos was examined and could involve one, several or no indicators. Whenever an indicator was identified, it was noted in a scoreboard<sup>11</sup>. As the ideal types are mutually exclusive, a specific statement could only manifest one ideal type. The scoreboard kept separate track of indicators found (1) in each manifesto/year, (2) for each ideal type and (3) for subgroups in each ideal type. Accordingly, the aggregate number of indicators for each manifesto/year, ideal type and ideal type subgroup was calculated and displayed in the scoreboard.

Figure 3 provides an example of where indicators were found in election manifestos and how these were classified. The figure shows how three separate statements about improvement were classified as belonging to different ideal types. (Appendix 9.5 provides a more detailed coding example by presenting the coding of the 2010 election manifesto at length.)

**Figure 3 – Example of code scheme indicator identification**

Statement in election manifesto	Identified indicator
<p><i>'The welfare is growing again. Through the extra amount of money given to municipalities and county councils, the number of employed in (health)care and education are rising. The quality of welfare can be enhanced.'</i></p> <p>(My translation, SAP, 1998, p. 2)</p>	<p><i>A1.7 Social services are improved through higher spending/input</i></p>
<p><i>'The reformation of the public sector continues <u>in</u> order to make the sector more efficient, more service oriented and to offer greater freedom of choice and influence among the citizens.'</i></p> <p>(My translation, SAP, 1985, p. 2)</p>	<p><i>B1.6 Social services are improved through higher efficiency/lower costs per service</i></p>
<p><i>'During the next mandate period, the education results shall rise so that Sweden within ten years has an equal school system and belongs to the top five education systems in the EU.'</i></p> <p>(My translation, SAP, 2014, p. 14)</p>	<p><i>C2.6 Social services are improved through higher productivity capacity/better outcomes</i></p>

<sup>11</sup> The scoreboard is not included herein but available upon request.

## 5.4.2 Statistical analysis of inter and intra ideal type developments

The next step of the numerical content analysis, involved generating descriptive statistics. The statistics were generated by a number of equations. Equation 1, 2 and 3 examine *inter* ideal type developments (i.e. change in balance of welfare ideals). Equation 4 and 5 examine *intra* ideal type developments (i.e. change in balance of the welfare ideals' core elements – hence breaking down the analysis to first level ideal type subgroups).

In order to examine SAP's ideological dynamics, through the conceptual lenses of Keynesianism, Neoliberalism and Social Investment welfare, the developments of relative weight between the three ideal types was calculated using the following equation:

### Equation 1 – Relative weight between ideal types

$$PI_{ij} = \frac{\sum x_{ij}}{\sum x_j}$$

Note: PI refers to ideal type proportion (i.e. the relative weight of the ideal type), x refers to a code scheme indicator (e.g. the statement C2.2 The welfare state should be enabling), the subscript i refers to the ideal type (i.e. Keynesianism, Neoliberalism or Social Investment), and the subscript j refers to the election year. Hence, the number of indicators for a given ideal type in a given year are summed and divided by the total number of indicators for all ideal types the same year.

The results section of this thesis presents the findings of relative weight in a line chart and a table. In accordance with equation 1, the lines presented for each manifesto/year together add up to 100 percent.

To be able to examine SAP's ideological stability over time, the standard deviation of the allotment of code scheme indicators was calculated for each ideal type, using the following equation:

### Equation 2 – Standard deviation of relative weight of ideal types

$$SD_i = \sqrt{\frac{\sum (PI_{ij} - m)^2}{n}}$$

Note: Based on results calculated through the use of equation 1, the standard deviation from each ideal type can be derived. SD refers to standard deviation and the subscript i refers to a particular ideal type and j to a particular year, m refers to the mean of  $PI_{ij}$  for all election years and n refers to the total number of election years.

To study periodical prominence of the various ideal types, the mean values of the relative ideal type weights were calculated. The mean values for each wave of welfare state developments were calculated respectively, using the following equation:

**Equation 3 – Mean value for the ideal types’ proportion within the waves of welfare state development**

$$PI_{iw} = \sum PI_{ij} / \text{total years in } w$$

Note:  $PI_{ij}$  has then been recalculated for each time period (i.e. wave of welfare state developments). Essentially by breaking down the initial statistic into smaller pieces. Thus,  $PI_{iw}$  refers to ideal type proportion (i.e. the relative weight of the ideal type), during a given wave,  $w$ . Hence, equation 3 estimates the mean values for the ideal types’ proportion within the waves of welfare state development.

To examine which aspects of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare SAP stresses, the relative weight between the ideal type subgroups was calculated using the following equation:

**Equation 4 – Relative weight between ideal type subgroups**

$$PS_{ijs} = \sum x_{ijs} / \sum x_{ij}$$

Note:  $PS$  refers to ideal type subgroup proportion (i.e. the relative weight of the welfare ideals’ core elements),  $x$  refers to a code scheme indicator (e.g. the statement C2.2 The welfare state should be enabling), the subscript  $i$  refers to the ideal type (i.e. Keynesianism, Neoliberalism or Social Investment), the subscript  $j$  refers to the election year, and the subscript  $s$  refers to the subgroup.

The result section of this thesis presents the findings of relative weight among subgroups in tables. In accordance with equation 4, each table adds up to 100 percent for each ideal type each year. Equation 4 only includes first level subgroups. This, to enhance the possibility to make broader generalizations of the results and avoid a muddy analysis, excessively sensitive to minor ideological deviations.

To estimate the prominence of specific ideal type subgroups overall, the mean values for the relative subgroups weights were calculated. The mean values for the entire time period studied were calculated using the following equation:

**Equation 5 – Mean values for first level code scheme indicator subgroups**

$$MPS_{is} = \sum PS_{ijs} / \text{total years}$$


Note: Here,  $MPS_{is}$  represents the mean of ideal type subgroup proportions. Calculated using the sum of  $PS_{ijs}$  from equation 4, which is divided by the total number of election years.

### 5.4.3 Validity and reliability

It is particularly crucial to achieve high validity – i.e. correspondence between what the study aims to measure and what is actually measured – in an ideal type analysis (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 57; Kvist, 2007, p. 477). The validity of this thesis is highly dependent on the code scheme’s subtlety. There for – to optimize the thesis’s validity – the code scheme was formulated in harmony with the generally accepted language used in the research field. Furthermore, the research material was carefully chosen to synchronize with the postulated ideal types. Consideration has thus been taken to the coherence of what SAP communicates through the election manifestos and what the ideal type analysis aims to capture (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 82; Lile, 2017, p. 38-40).


Manual coding may be regarded as potentially problematic in terms of its reliability – i.e. consistency in measurement – compared to automatic coding using computer software (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 57). To reduce the likelihood of human error, all material was coded twice. Wherever discrepancies appeared between the first and second coding, the author of this thesis carefully considered how the particular statement should be classified or if it should be left out. This consideration has been done by consulting the coding of similar statements in the manifestos. Thus, in times of ambiguity, codings of other parts of the texts have served as guidelines for how to categorize certain statements. Finally, figure 4 shows the length of the manifestos and figure 5 shows the total number of code scheme indicators found in the same manifestos.

**Figure 4 – Length of election manifestos**  
(Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014)



**Figure 5 – Number of indicators found in election manifestos**

(Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014)



These figures show that the number of words and number of code scheme indicators of each manifesto are connected. If the documents are expected to be (approximately) equally dense with ideological statements, figure 4 and 5 together imply that the manual coding of this thesis has been done with high consistency, thereby fulfilling the standards for high reliability.

#### 5.4.4 Methodological shortcomings

Some opponents might question the suitability of quantitative method within the field of political science – the things that count cannot be counted. However, this thesis aligns with King et al. in the belief that quantitative research has an important place in social science (King et al., 1999, p. 4-6). Here, the numerical content analysis allows a temporal scope which would have been difficult to match if performing qualitative research. Accordingly, this thesis provides exceptionally comprehensive results on SAP's welfare ideological developments. Furthermore, the lucid code schemes enable an analysis with close attention to detail – despite the extensive temporal scope. Consequently, this thesis does not regard the qualitative method as a shortcoming, but as an advantage.

Some might also be critical to this thesis's emphasis on description. In contrast to such criticism, this thesis considers descriptive research as essential to political science. Descriptions are valuable both in and of themselves, and as a foundation for further explanation (Esaiasson et al., 2017, p. 160; King et al., 1999, p. 34).

A significant part of this thesis is dedicated to, in detail, describing the work of others. This might signal that too little attention is given to the original research performed herein. Accordingly, the thesis might not seem independent but appear as a summary of previous scholars' work. However, the close attention to others'

work is a necessary part of this thesis's construction of its ideal type analysis. Therefore, the reader should not regard the extensive presentation of preexisting literature as superfluous or irrelevant. Instead, it should be considered as an important element of this thesis's independent research.

Finally, there are a number of shortcomings associated with ideal type analysis. Firstly, beforehand deciding which ideal types that should be exclusively included in the thesis means that the study is unable to capture other perspectives. Secondly and relatedly, if the accordance between the formulated ideal types and the information communicated in the material is poor, the study might suffer considerable validity problems (Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 167). However, these issues are merely tangential and may be addressed through close attention to detail. The correspondence between the kind of information communicated in the election manifestos and the kind of information sought to be captured in the thesis's three ideal types, is regarded high enough to carry out a fruitful analysis.

Furthermore, the ideal type analysis leaves little flexibility to the later discussion of the results. A major part of the analysis has already been done when modeling the ideal types. Consequently, the subsequent results' discussion might appear jejune. To appreciate the contribution of this thesis, the reader should therefore pay close attention to the modeling of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals.

Lastly, ideal type analyses involve the risk of restricting intersubjectivity. The study is considerably dependent on the researcher's judgement (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 144; Bergström & Boréus, 2012, p. 169). This thesis moderates such difficulties by making the research process transparent and consistent. In sum, the passages on research method and appendices 9.3, 9.4 and 9.5 are considered precise enough to avoid the researcher's subjective judgement gravely undermining the cogency of the thesis's results.



## 6 Results

This section presents the findings from the textual content analysis according to the classification of ideal types. First, the section compares and contrasts the results of the three ideal types; i.e. *inter* ideal type developments. Thereafter, the passage discusses the findings for internal developments within each welfare ideology – hence breaking down the analysis to first level ideal type subgroups; i.e. *intra* ideal type developments.

### 6.1 Inter ideal type developments

The overall findings are summarized in figure 6. The graph displays the relative salience of the three ideal types over the entire time period studied. (Figure 6 is constructed using equation 1). The relative salience tells how SAP balanced the state- and equality-centric, the market- and autonomy-centric, and the future- and multipurpose-centric ideals, at each point in time.

**Figure 6 – Ideal type proportions**  
(Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014)




Figure 6 illustrates three main findings. First, the proportion of Keynesian indicators is higher than the two others in all election manifestos. Second, Neoliberal indicators are the least prominent in all documents. Third, between 1948 and 1976/1979 the proportion of Keynesian indicators and Social Investment

indicators exist in and (almost) inverse relation. When the proportion of Keynesian indicators rises the proportion of Social Investment indicators declines, and vice versa. Since 1976/1979 however, the Social Investment proportion seems to rise steadily. Instead, since 1976/1979, the Keynesian proportion rises when the Neoliberal declines and vice versa.

Table 5 presents the precise proportion of ideal type indicators. Hence, it clarifies SAP's balancing act between the state-, market-, and future-centric ideals. Both table 5 and figure 6, show that the proportion of Keynesian indicators peaked in 1958, accounting for 93% of the total indicators. By contrast, the proportion of Keynesian indicators reached its lowest point in 1948, then accounting for only 47%. The proportion of Neoliberal indicators, on the other hand, peaked in 1994 with a proportion of 23% of the total number of indicators. However, in 1958, 1960, 1973 and 1976 the proportions of Neoliberal indicators were all zero percent. Finally, the proportion of Social Investment indicators peaked at 42%, in 1964 and had its lowest proportion of 7% in 1958.

**Table 5 – Ideal type proportions by year**  
(Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Proportion Keynesian indicators</i>	<i>Proportion Neoliberal indicators</i>	<i>Proportion Social Investment indicators</i>
1948	47%	19%	33%
1952	50%	19%	31%
1956	61%	11%	28%
1958	93%	0%	7%
1960	63%	0%	38%
1964	51%	7%	42%
1968	74%	5%	21%
1970	78%	5%	17%
1973	92%	0%	8%
1976	82%	0%	18%
1979	64%	16%	20%
1982	74%	6%	19%
1985	69%	11%	20%
1988	51%	16%	33%
1991	63%	8%	30%
1994	50%	23%	27%
1998	54%	14%	32%
2002	56%	4%	40%
2006	61%	4%	35%
2010	53%	9%	38%
2014	56%	7%	36%

Comparing the peaks and valleys, figure 6 shows that the proportion of Keynesian indicators differs the most over time. The difference between highest and lowest proportion for these indicators is 46 percentage points. The proportion of Neoliberal indicators differs the least, spanning only 23 percentage points. The proportion of Social Investment indicators once again appears in between, as this proportion spans 35 percentage points.

The spread in ideal type proportion can also be illustrated by presenting the standard deviation of indicators allotment for each ideal type. The standard deviation tells how stable SAP has been in their emphasis on the state- and equality-centric, the market- and autonomy-centric, and the future- and multipurpose-centric ideals, respectively. Table 6 shows that the allotment of Keynesian indicators has a standard deviation of 0,13, which is the highest value among all ideal types. The allotment of Neoliberal indicators has the lowest standard deviation of 0,07 and Social Investment indicators have a standard deviation of 0,1.

**Table 6 – Variation and standard deviation of ideal type proportions**

(Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Variation Keynesian distribution std = 0,13</i>	<i>Variation Neoliberal distribution std = 0,07</i>	<i>Variation Social Investment distribution std = 0,10</i>
1948	-0,17	0,11	0,06
1952	-0,14	0,10	0,04
1956	-0,03	0,02	0,01
1958	<b>0,29</b>	<b>-0,09</b>	<b>-0,21</b>
1960	-0,01	-0,09	0,10
1964	-0,13	-0,02	0,15
1968	0,10	-0,03	-0,06
1970	0,14	-0,04	-0,10
1973	<b>0,28</b>	<b>-0,09</b>	<b>-0,19</b>
1976	0,18	-0,09	-0,10
1979	0,00	0,07	-0,07
1982	0,10	-0,02	-0,08
1985	0,05	0,02	-0,07
1988	-0,13	0,07	0,06
1991	-0,01	-0,01	0,02
1994	-0,14	0,14	0,00
1998	-0,10	0,05	0,05
2002	-0,08	-0,04	0,13
2006	-0,03	-0,04	0,07
2010	-0,11	0,00	0,11
2014	-0,07	-0,02	0,09

By presenting the variation from the mean value for each observation (i.e. SAP election manifestos), table 6 shows which years fall outside of the standard deviation for indicator allotment of each ideal type. (Table 6 is constructed using equation 1 and 2). There are seven<sup>12</sup> observations in which the proportion of Keynesian indicators fall outside the standard deviation range. For Neoliberalism, the proportion also falls outside in seven<sup>13</sup> observations, and for Social Investment the proportion falls outside the standard deviation range in five<sup>14</sup> observations.

It is significant that in the year of 1958 and 1973, the observations for all ideal type indicators fall outside the standard deviation range. This might mean that the manifestos of 1958 and 1973 are particularly different in the allocation of ideal type indicators (meaning that SAP's relative weight between Keynesianism, Neoliberalism and Social Investment is especially anomalous these years). Looking closer at these years, table 5 shows that in 1958 Keynesian indicators held 93% of all indicators. The same year, Neoliberal indicators accounted for zero percent and Social Investment indicators accounted for 7% of the total number of indicators found in the election manifesto. In 1973, the Keynesian proportion was 92%, the Neoliberal proportion was again zero percent, and the Social Investment proportion was 8%. Thus, in 1958 and 1973 Keynesian indicators reached their highest proportion and both Neoliberalism and Social Investment indicators had their lowest quotas.

Finally, table 7 shows the mean values for the percentages of indicators for the three ideal types, separated according to the presumed waves of welfare state developments (table 7 is constructed using equation 3<sup>15</sup>). Here, the mean values give an idea of how SAP generally balanced the state- and equality-centric, the market- and autonomy-centric, and the future- and multipurpose-centric ideals, over three broad periods.

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<sup>12</sup> The observations for the proportion of Keynesian indicators fall outside the standard deviation range in election manifestos from 1948, 1952, 1958, 1970, 1973, 1976 and 1994.

<sup>13</sup> The observations for the proportion of Neoliberal indicators fall outside the standard deviation range in election manifestos from 1948, 1952, 1958, 1960, 1973, 1976 and 1994.

<sup>14</sup> The observations for the proportion of Social Investment indicators fall outside the standard deviation range in election manifestos from 1958, 1964, 1973, 2002 and 2010.

<sup>15</sup> In table 7, the mean values for the first wave together add up to 101%. This figure is against the logic of equation 3. The aggregated proportion for all ideal types should be precisely 100%. However, the abnormal number of 101% is a consequence of impreciseness in the presentation. Here, all figures have been rounded up – hence the joint overstep. More precise figures for the proportions are: Keynesianism 62,7 %, Neoliberalism 8,7% and Social Investment 28,5%.(SAP election manifestos 1948-2014). However, this imperfection is merely a cosmetic issue and has therefore been neglected in the continued presentation.

**Table 7 – Mean value for the ideal type’s proportion over the waves of welfare state developments**

(Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014)

<i>Period</i>	<i>Mean value Keynesian proportion</i>	<i>Mean value Neoliberal proportion</i>	<i>Mean value Social Investment proportion</i>
<i>First Wave</i>	63%	9%	29%
<i>Second Wave</i>	73%	8%	19%
<i>Third Wave</i>	56%	10%	34%

Table 7 shows that the mean for the Keynesian stance was highest during the Second Wave, with a mean value of 73%. The Neoliberal and the Social Investment stances, on the other hand, both reached their highest mean value during the Third Wave of welfare state developments, with a mean value of 10% and 34% respectively. In accordance with figure 6, table 7 also shows that the mean values for the Keynesian stance are higher than mean values for the other two during all three waves.

## 6.2 Intra ideal type developments

The passage below presents the results for the, hitherto, more unexplored area of internal developments of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals. Table 8, 9 and 10 show the relative importance of each ideal type (first level) subgroup<sup>16</sup>. (The tables are constructed using equation). The figures in table 8, 9 and 10 tell how SAP balanced the internal elements of each welfare ideal, at each point in time.

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<sup>16</sup> In table 8, 9 and 10, alone or shared domination is indicated with bold black outer lining.

**Table 8 – Internal developments Keynesianism**

(Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014)

<i>Year</i>	<i>A1. The state should protect the citizens</i>	<i>A2. The state should act as an economic stabilizer</i>	<i>A3. The state should reduce the citizens' (financial) dependence on the labor market</i>
1948	65%	6%	29%
1952	75%	13%	13%
1956	73%	7%	20%
1958	93%	0%	7%
1960	100%	0%	0%
1964	73%	3%	23%
1968	79%	0%	21%
1970	62%	14%	24%
1973	73%	0%	27%
1976	79%	7%	14%
1979	82%	4%	14%
1982	70%	0%	30%
1985	90%	3%	6%
1988	92%	0%	8%
1991	91%	2%	7%
1994	100%	0%	0%
1998	88%	5%	6%
2002	88%	3%	9%
2006	85%	4%	11%
2010	89%	0%	11%
2014	94%	2%	4%

Table 8 illustrates that, among Keynesian indicators, subgroup A1 (The state should protect the citizens) is the most prominent during the entire time period studied. Subgroup A2 (The state should act as an economic stabilizer) is the least prominent, and always lies just below or at the same level as subgroup A3 (The state should reduce the citizens' (financial) dependence on the labor market).

Table 9 and 10 tell that the results for Neoliberal and Social Investment indicator subgroups are considerably less consistent.

**Table 9 – Internal developments Neoliberalism**

(Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014)

<i>Year</i>	<i>B1. The welfare sector is a burden</i>	<i>B2. The market sector is the solution</i>	<i>B3. The citizens should be independent and in control</i>	<i>B4. The labor market should be deregulated</i>
1948	43%	43%	14%	0%
1952	50%	33%	0%	17%
1956	75%	0%	0%	25%
1958	0%	0%	0%	0%
1960	0%	0%	0%	0%
1964	25%	0%	0%	75%
1968	0%	0%	100%	0%
1970	0%	33%	0%	67%
1973	0%	0%	0%	0%
1976	0%	0%	0%	0%
1979	14%	43%	29%	14%
1982	0%	100%	0%	0%
1985	20%	60%	20%	0%
1988	50%	13%	38%	0%
1991	0%	29%	43%	29%
1994	60%	7%	3%	30%
1998	25%	30%	0%	45%
2002	17%	0%	33%	50%
2006	30%	30%	20%	20%
2010	42%	0%	17%	42%
2014	30%	0%	20%	50%

Table 9 shows that the subgroup B1 (The welfare sector is a burden) dominates alone<sup>17</sup> four years (1952, 1956, 1988, and 1994). Subgroup B2 (The market sector is the solution), on the other hand, dominates alone three times (in the years 1979, 1982 and 1985). Subgroup B3 (The citizens should be independent and in control) dominates alone only twice (in the years 1968 and 1991) – the fewest times – and subgroup B4 (The labor market should be deregulated) dominates alone the most – five – times (in the years 1964, 1970, 1998, 2002 and 2014).

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<sup>17</sup> Dominates alone means that there is no overlap in majority among subgroups in the ideal type. For example, if category B1 and B2 have the same proportion of indicators in an election manifesto, that year is not accounted for as a year when a subgroup dominated alone.

**Table 10 – Internal developments Social Investment**  
(Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014)

<i>Year</i>	<i>C1. The state should support citizens when the market fails to do so</i>	<i>C2. Social services aim to prevent citizens from needing state support</i>	<i>C3. Education/human capital is central for wellbeing</i>
1948	33%	50%	17%
1952	30%	40%	30%
1956	48%	24%	29%
1958	0%	100%	0%
1960	67%	33%	0%
1964	28%	48%	24%
1968	50%	25%	25%
1970	36%	18%	45%
1973	0%	100%	0%
1976	33%	67%	0%
1979	56%	33%	11%
1982	17%	50%	33%
1985	22%	33%	44%
1988	53%	29%	18%
1991	48%	41%	11%
1994	14%	50%	36%
1998	30%	39%	30%
2002	27%	36%	38%
2006	33%	37%	29%
2010	15%	47%	38%
2014	17%	39%	44%

Table 10 shows that, for Social Investment, the subgroup C2 (Social services aim to prevent citizens from needing state support) dominates in general but not all the time. The subgroup dominates alone eleven times (in the years 1948, 1952, 1958, 1964, 1973, 1976, 1982, 1994, 1998, 2006, and 2010). Further, subgroup C1 (The state should support citizens when the market fails to do so) dominates alone six times (in the years 1956, 1960, 1968, 1979, 1988 and 1991) whereas subgroup C3 (Education/human capital is central for wellbeing) dominates alone only four times (in year 1970, 1985, 2002 and 2014). Additionally, the allotment of Social Investment indicators differs from the one for Neoliberalism as the subgroups for Social Investment do not overlap in domination. Keynesian subgroups alike, the Social Investment code scheme indicators subgroups always dominate alone (i.e. there are no overlaps in majority proportion). However, unlike the uncontested Keynesian subgroup A1, the (alone) domination of Social Investment code scheme subgroups varies over time.

An alternative way to examine the intra ideal type developments is to look at the mean values for the total proportion of indicators of each (first level)



subgroup. Table 11 presents such means. (Table 11 is constructed using equation 5<sup>18</sup>). Here, the mean values give an idea of which aspects of Keynesianism, Neoliberalism and Social Investment were most discussed, throughout the entire time period.

**Table 11 – Mean values for first level code scheme indicator subgroups**

(Source: SAP election manifestos 1948 – 2014)

<i>Ideal type subgroup</i>	<i>Mean value</i>
A1. The state should protect the citizens	<b>83%</b>
A2. The state should act as an economic stabilizer	3%
A3. The state should reduce the citizens' (financial) dependence on the labor market	14%
B1. The welfare sector is a burden	<b>23%</b>
B2. The market sector is the solution	20%
B3. The citizens should be independent and in control	16%
B4. The labor market should be deregulated	22%
C1. The state should support citizens when the market fails to do so	31%
C2. Social services aim to prevent citizens from needing state support	<b>45%</b>
C3. Education/human capital is central for wellbeing	24%

Table 11 shows that, for Keynesianism, the mean value for subgroup A1 (83%) is considerably higher than the mean value for subgroup A3 (14%). The mean value for A3 is in turn much higher than the value for subgroup A2 (3%). For Neoliberalism, the mean values are more equal, starting with B1 (23%) as the highest value, and then falling in order B4 (22%), B2 (20%) and B3 (16%). For the Social Investment code scheme indicator subgroups, there is less deviation between the mean values than for the Keynesian ones, yet the mean values are slightly more spread out than the ones for Neoliberalism. Here, subgroup C2 (45%) has the highest mean value, followed by subgroup C1 (31%). Subgroup C3 then has the lowest mean value (of 24%).

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<sup>18</sup> In table 11, the percentages for the subgroups of the Neoliberal ideal (B1, B2, B3 and B4) do not add up to 100%. This might appear odd, but the figures are in line with equation 5. Accordingly, the aggregated proportion of Neoliberal indicators has been divided by 21 (the number of analyzed election manifestos). However, in four of the election manifestos (from 1958, 1960, 1973 and 1976) no Neoliberal indicators were found. In order for the percentages of the Neoliberal subgroups to add up to 100%, the aggregated proportion of these indicators should instead have been divided by 17 (21-4). This would yield the following distribution: B1 28%, B2 25%, B3 20% and B4 27% (SAP election manifestos 1948-2014). As shown, the internal hierarchy of Neoliberal subgroups is not affected by the size of the denominator. Table 11 therefore presents the precise figures generated by equation 5.

## 7 Discussion and conclusion

Finally, it is time to discuss how this thesis answers the research question of how developments in SAP's welfare ideology over the past 70 years can be understood, using the conceptual lenses of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals?

The following presentation first reviews this thesis's main findings. Thereafter, it discusses the results at length, starting with this thesis's findings on *inter* ideal type developments. Importantly, this involves comparing the results to the three waves of welfare state developments. Subsequently, the section considers this thesis's findings on *intra* ideal type developments. Finally, the section provides a summarizing comment (at a higher level of abstraction) and presents this thesis main conclusions. Altogether, the passage addresses the research problem postulated in the introduction of this thesis.

### 7.1 Main findings

In sum, subsequent discussion involves three main findings which both support and contradict the preexisting literature. *First*, the results indicate that the developments in SAP welfare ideology have involved considerable short-term fluctuations. From one election to another, the relative emphasis between Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment welfare ideals has been proven highly flexible. The degree of ideological flexibility appears to have been (yet with a slight tendency to decline over time) constant since the end of the Second World War. Further, the results presented herein indicate that SAP's welfare ideological developments do not concur with the stylized temporal changes as three waves of welfare state developments.

*Second*, the rank order between Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment ideals has been constant in the long-run. Since the end of the Second World War, the Keynesian welfare ideals have always been the most prominent. The Social Investment ideals have always had a position in the middle, and the Neoliberal ideals have always been the least prominent. Moreover, the Neoliberal element of SAP welfare advocacy has been the most consistent since the Second World War. In contrast, the Keynesian element – albeit always most prominent among the three – has had the highest difference between its ups and downs in relative ideological emphasis. Relatedly, the overriding welfare ideology of SAP does not seem to have been watered-down over the past 70 years. Instead, SAP shows the same ideological density (considering the three conceptual lenses all together) throughout the entire time period.

*Third*, the character of SAP developments, among the conceptual lenses internally, is discordant. Time does not seem to have effected SAP's emphasis within Keynesianism at all. Thus, developments in SAP welfare also involve a considerable element of stability, in regards of the core view on the use of the welfare system. However, the internal stability of Keynesianism does not translate neither to the Neoliberal nor the Social Investment ideals. These are instead tinged by vast internal fluctuations, which appear to be inconsistent over time.

## 7.2 Discussion on inter ideal type developments

### 7.2.1 Ideological (in)stability, and the three waves of welfare state developments

A core advantage of this analysis is the over time perspective, which enables of both a short- and long-term analysis. This is of great use when examining ideological stability and/or flexibility<sup>19</sup>.

Starting with the short run implications, figure 6 and table 5 indicate that SAP continuously – and rapidly (from election to election) – change their ideological emphasis. Both the Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment indicators demonstrate remarkable swings. Looking, for instance, at Neoliberalism between 1976 and 1979, the proportion jumps from zero to 16 percent. Social Investment shows an eye-catching example from 1958 to 1960, where the proportion rises with 31 percentage points. This indicates momentary ideological flexibility, in line with Moschonas's claims. Moschonas's suggestions gain further support from the fact that 19 out of 63 observations fall outside the standard deviation (table 6). However, the results do not seem to indicate increased flexibility over time. If anything, rather the opposite. From 1994, the differences in ideal type proportions between elections seem somewhat smaller (figure 6). Thus, Moschonas's idea of non-linear developments gains support from this thesis, but his suggestions on flexibility increasing over time do not seem to hold for SAP's welfare ideology.

Focusing, instead, in the long run implications, it is relevant to relate the results to Hinnfors's suggestions. First, it is interesting that the ideal type proportions never intersect. The proportion of Keynesian indicators is always highest, the Social Investment proportion is in the middle, and the Neoliberal is at the bottom (figure 6). This internal hierarchy indicates that Hinnfors is right in regards of long-term SAP ideological stability. Breaking down the analysis to

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<sup>19</sup> The word flexibility is herein used in a non-normative way. This thesis uses the word only since it corresponds to Moschonas's vocabulary. For the sake of this thesis, the word could be considered as merely representing instability.

focusing on Hinnfors's suggestions on SAP's relation to the market – via Neoliberal indicators – this thesis's results seem to provide even more support. The standard deviation of Neoliberal indicators is lowest of all ideal types (table 6). Accordingly, the mean values of the Neoliberal proportion vary the least over the three waves of welfare state developments. Together, this means that Neoliberal element of SAP welfare advocacy has been the most consistent since the Second World War. Again, this could be interpreted as proof for Hinnfors's claim that SAP has pursued a stable attitude towards the market's involvement in the welfare system.

Overall, Hemerijck's idea of three waves of specific welfare state developments gain little support from this thesis's results on SAP ideology. Focusing on the peaks of indicator proportions (figure 6 and table 5), only the Keynesian ideal type reaches its highest value in the anticipated period. As predicted, the Keynesian indicators peak during the first wave, but neither the Neoliberal nor the Social Investment indicators reach their highest values when they were expected to do so. Instead, the proportion of Neoliberal indicators peaks in the third wave, and the one for Social Investment – like the proportion of Keynesian indicators – peaks during the first wave.

Focusing, instead, on the mean values of ideological proportions (table 7), only the Social Investment ideal type accounts for its highest value during the expected period. As anticipated, the mean value of the Social Investment proportion is highest during the third wave. Contrastingly, the mean value of the Keynesian proportion is highest during the second wave, and the Neoliberal proportion – like the one for Social Investment – has its highest mean value during the third wave.

In sum, the findings on SAP's welfare ideological developments do not concur with Hemerijck's suggestions. Neither do they, however, show any other obvious trend in temporal developments, which could replace Hemerijck's propositions.

## 7.2.2 Ideological dissolution and the neoliberal inclination

Section 5.4.3 regards figure 4 and 5 as indicators of that this thesis achieves high reliability. Nevertheless, the figures could be interpreted in another way too. As figure 4 and 5 show, the correspondence between number of words and number of identified indicators is remarkable constant over time. This indicates that SAP has had the same ideological density over the entire time period examined. Accordingly, the results presented herein oppose Tingsten's ide of inevitable ideological dissolution. Instead, the overall ideological emphasis, seems persistent.

Neither considering the peaks and valleys (figure 6 and table 5), nor the mean values (table 7) of ideological proportions, does SAP appear to have given up Keynesian ideals in favor of Neoliberal ones. Instead, SAP's Neoliberal emphasis seems to have been most stable (and the least prominent), compared to both Keynesianism and Social Investment. Thus – focusing on welfare ideology

specifically – this thesis shows no proof of Lavelle’s idea of Neoliberal ideals taking down social democracy.

Interestingly though, 1948 to 1976/1979 Keynesianism and Social Investment appear to have an inverse relation. Accordingly, these welfare ideals seem to compete over space in SAP's welfare ideology. However, in 1976/1979 there is a change. Since 1976/1979, the Social Investment emphasis seems to be steadily rising (albeit not yet reaching the top score of 1964). The initial inverse relationship between Keynesianism and Social Investment has thus become less obvious since the 1976/1979 election. Perhaps this reflects Giddens’s suggestion of social democratic parties – since the Second World War – trying to cope with capitalism and find Social Investment as a third way; between Keynesianism and Neoliberalism.

Since 1976/1979, Keynesianism seems to instead be competing with Neoliberalism. The Keynesian and Neoliberal proportions are less close (in numbers) than the Keynesian and Social Investment proportions are. Yet, figure 6 shows that, since 1976/1979, the Keynesian emphasis rises when the Neoliberal declines and vice versa. In sum, the later years indicate a competition over space in SAP's welfare ideology between Keynesianism and Neoliberalism, combined with a steady rise of the party's advocacy of Social Investment welfare ideals.

### 7.2.3 Contextualizing the inter ideal type developments

As stated previously, this thesis does not aim to explain causes of change in SAP’s welfare ideology. Yet, following passage touches upon such explanations. The section is, however, highly relevant to this thesis and serves to contextualize the presented results. Therefore, the section first considers SAP’s cooperation with other political parties. Second, it reflects on SAP’s position in parliament (i.e. in government or opposition). Third, the section discusses the findings on SAP developments and contemporary economic circumstances.

Since the end of the Second World War, SAP has taken part in two coalition governments (Appendix 9.1). The first one lasted from 1951 to 1957. Then SAP cooperated with The Center Party. The second coalition government was formed by SAP and The Green Party in 2014, and is still in place at the time of writing (Nationalencyklopedin b). This means that SAP has formulated three election manifestos based on political cooperation with another party; in the years 1952, 1956 and 2014. In principle, this political cooperation could have affected the characteristics of the welfare ideology communicated by SAP. However, the election manifestos from the years 1952, 1956 and 2014 do not seem to deviate from the others in any noteworthy manner. Instead, the manifesto from the years 1956 and 2014, both fall within the range of the standard deviation. In the year 1952, the Keynesian and Neoliberal distribution falls just outside (table 6).

The reasoning above suggests that SAP’s welfare ideal advocacy is not considerably affected by neither political cooperation itself, nor whom the party cooperates with.

During the time period examined, SAP has formulated its election manifesto five times when in opposition (i.e. when the party did not hold office); in the years 1979, 1982, 1994, 2010 and 2014 (Appendix 9.1) (Nationalencyklopedin b). Three of these – the years 1979, 1982 and 2014 – fall within the range of the standard deviation (table 6). In 1994, however, the proportion of Neoliberal indicators reaches its highest level whereas the proportion of Keynesian indicators almost reaches its bottom (table 5). In 2010, on the other hand, both the Keynesian and Neoliberal distribution fall within the range of the standard deviation, but the proportion of Social Investment indicators reaches one of its highest values (table 5 and 6). Accordingly, neither being in opposition seems to affect SAP's welfare ideal advocacy in any distinct way.

In sum, the passage above indicates that SAP is not prone to change its welfare ideology due to pressure from other political parties. This could have (at least) two possible interpretations. First, it could indicate that pressure from other political parties is irrelevant for SAP's welfare ideological development. This would explain why none of the aforementioned scholars have highlighted this aspect as a reason to ideological change. Second and alternatively, it could suggest there is already a wide-ranging consensus among Swedish parties on how to operate the welfare system. If so, SAP would not need to adjust its view depending on the party's temporary power position. This second interpretation harmonizes with Giddens's and Lavelle's idea of a general dissolution of strict right- and left-wing politics. However, the suggestion of SAP as insensible to pressure from other parties, is poorly substantiated by this thesis. To make solid claims about this issue, a deeper analysis (of for example implementation or policy suggestions) is necessary.

If the previous research presented herein does not highlight pressure from other political parties as a prime causal effect to ideological developments, then what does it emphasize? As presented in the section on previous research, the resounding answer is SAP external economic circumstances. Therefore, the following section pays attention to SAP's welfare ideology in connection to Sweden's annual GDP-growth since the Second World War (due to the lack of uniform information, the year of 1948 has been left out). However, this passage should be read with some discretion. The section only considers GDP-growth the very same years as SAP published their manifestos. Nevertheless, SAP is likely more affected by the general economic growth over a number of years. Therefore, the following reasoning might be slightly deficient.

Overall, there seems to be no evident trait in how SAP's welfare ideology responds to economic trends – neither to expansion nor to recession. The Keynesian as well as the Neoliberal indicators reach their highest proportions in times of both economic expansion (defined as annual GDP-growth  $\geq 4\%$ ) and economic recession (defined as annual GDP-growth  $\leq 2\%$ ). For example, in both the years of 1973 and 1976, the proportion of Keynesian indicators reached top scores (table 5). However, the Swedish GDP-growth differed substantially between these years. In 1973 GDP grew by 4%, whereas the year of 1976 only involved 1,2% growth (Appendix 9.2) (SCB). Similarly, the proportion of Neoliberal indicators was especially high in the years of 1952 and 1994 (figure 6).

These years' manifestos correspond to a GDP-growth of only 1,5% in 1952 and – as much as – 4,1% in 1994 (Appendix 9.2) (SCB).

The results for Social Investment are slightly different. For his proportion, both the peaks and valleys occur during times of GDP-growth above 2%. For example, the proportion of Social Investment indicators peaks in 1964 when the annual GDP-growth reaches 6,8%. When the Social Investment proportion instead is at its lowest point, in 1958, the growth rate is still 2,8% (table 5 and Appendix 9.2) (SCB).

In sum, this thesis's results show no distinct trait in how SAP react to external economic circumstances – in regards of the advocated welfare ideal.

### 7.3 Discussion on intra ideal type developments

The contrast in internal developments of the different ideal types, is remarkable. Time does not seem to have effected SAP's emphasis within Keynesianism at all (table 8). The most important aspect of Keynesianism is – throughout the entire time period – that the state should protect the citizens (subgroup A1). Again, this signals that Hinnfors is right. SAP remain stable in their fundamental view on welfare ideology – Keynesian indicators dominate in every election manifesto, and within Keynesianism subgroup A1 (The state should protect the citizens) is always most the prominent.

In relation to Jenson's aspects of welfare ideology components, this means that the views on rights and duties, and the responsibility mix is most important to SAP's Keynesian emphasis. Interestingly, the aspect of access and governance seems to be the least important. This, as the subgroup A2 (The state should act as an economic stabilizer) is the least emphasized.

Unfortunately, both the Neoliberal (table 9) and the Social Investment (table 10) ideal types show considerably scattered results. These results, on the other hand, point towards SAP having a high level of flexibility in what is advocated – even within Neoliberalism and Social Investment ideal welfare. Yet again in accordance with Moschonas's suggestions. Interestingly, though, they appear about equally scattered over time. Hence, SAP does not appear to have been neither more nor less inconsistent over time.

This variation means that SAP, for Neoliberalism and Social Investment, incorporates all Jenson's perspectives more or less evenly. This conclusion is further motivated since the subgroups (marginally) dominating in Neoliberalism B1 (The welfare sector is a burden), and Social Investment C2 (Social services aim to prevent citizens from needing state support), are both regarded as relating to all aspects of Jenson's analysis (see section 4.5).

When analyzing the mean values for first level subgroups, the Social Investment ideal type is of certain interest to this thesis (table 10). This, as the view that social services aim to prevent citizens from needing state support (C2) is the most salient idea. The prominence of this idea might signal just what Giddens and Moschans refer to when they suggest that social democracy is trying to find

its way, balancing the tasks of the market and the state. According to this thesis, the Social Investment welfare ideal implies substantial initial state responsibility. Later, however, the responsibility is transmitted to the individual, who must admire and maintain her capabilities in the (labor) market.

## 7.4 Summarizing comment

This thesis does not point towards any radical changes in the welfare ideology advocated by SAP. In contrast, SAP remains loyal to the prime advocacy of the Keynesian state- and equality-centric ideals. Neither does the analysis indicate that the spread of Neoliberal ideas – about the efficiency of the market and individual above collective responsibility – has infiltrated SAP to a noteworthy degree. The influence of Neoliberal market- and autonomy-centric ideals on SAP welfare ideology is stable and remains low over time. Consequently, this thesis does not consider SAP's behavior – in regards of the advocated welfare ideal – as a prime cause of (neither past nor present) changes in the Swedish party system. Nevertheless, the welfare ideological emphasis seems slightly more mixed now than before. Since 1994, SAP advocates a more diverse welfare ideal which involves a steady rise of the Social Investment emphasis (starting in 1976/1979). This could be interpreted as SAP partly abandoning state-centric extremes in favor of an ideology somewhat closer to the middle of the political spectrum.

So, in the long-run, SAP seems to have remained stable in their view of the very foundations of the welfare system, but what about the short run? This thesis points towards SAP being flexible, in their rhetoric about desired welfare system, already since the yearly days after the Second World War. From election to election, the party has adjusted their recommendations. SAP's ideological stringency does, hence, not seem to have been eroded over time. Instead, short-term flexibility thus appears to be an inherent part of SAP's operandum (yet with a slight tendency to decline over time).

This thesis has frequently returned to the issue of SAP's especial relationship to a certain part of the electorate. Despite this thesis not being explicitly designed to examine this relationship, it yet offers some insights into SAP's attitude towards the electorate. Notably, the importance of the state's responsibility for its citizens' wellbeing always trumps the importance of market efficiency and flexibility. The difference in emphasis of state- respectively market-centric ideals might have become reduced over time, yet it remains significant. Moreover, SAP's main focus, among these state-centric ideals, is of great relevance here. Since the end of the Second World War until today, SAP continues to advocate the state as the ultimate protector of the population. This thesis thus concludes that – in regards of the advocated welfare ideal – SAP's attitude towards the electorate has not undergone any essential transformation. Instead, SAP's welfare ideology remains loyal to the state-centric ideals, and the state-centric ideals remain loyal to the initially postulated prime obligation of the state; to protect the citizens.



Again, this means that Jenson's ideas of rights and duties, and the responsibility mix in welfare ideals, are the overarching aspects of SAP's welfare ideology.

Interestingly, this thesis shows that – parallel to the maintenance of the state-centric ideals – SAP has incorporated both market- and autonomy-centered ideals, as well as future- and multipurpose-centric ideals. The importance of multipurpose-centric ideals – already in the early aftermath of the Second World War – shows that such an intermediate approach (between complete resignation to either the state or the market), has constituted an important pillar of SAP's program for a long time. In opposite to the claim that social democratic parties have formulated this kind of middle way to cope with recent developments of European party systems, this thesis thus suggest that this was included in Swedish social democracy even long before the golden era.

## 7.5 Concluding remark

In conclusion, the understanding of developments in SAP welfare ideology, over the past 70 years, involve the following key insights: The Keynesian state- and equality-centric ideal has, and continues to be, most important to SAP. From 1948 to 1976/1979, this ideal seems to compete against the Social Investment future- and multipurpose-centric ideal, in regards of space in SAP's welfare ideology. However, in 1976/1979 there is a change in the structure; since 1976/1979, the Social Investment emphasis seems to be steadily rising. Since 1976/1979, Keynesianism seems to, instead, be competing with the Neoliberal market- and autonomy-centric ideal. In sum, the later years indicate a competition over space in SAP's welfare ideology between Keynesianism and Neoliberalism, combined with a steady rise of the party's advocacy of Social Investment welfare ideals.

## 8 Suggestions for further research

This section suggests two main approaches further research could take on to shed more light on the research problem addressed herein. First, the field would benefit from a comprehensive examination of the general traits in SAP's policy suggestion and implementations. This thesis has previously suggested that the literature on SAP policies already is extensive. That is true. Yet, these studies tend to focus narrowly on the characters of only one or a few suggestions or implementation. An analysis broader in content and temporal scope would assist the discussion on how SAP has coped with changes of the (party-) political system. Moreover, an analysis focusing explicitly on implementations might contribute with a picture closer to reality, than this thesis. Since this thesis focuses on what SAP communicate about themselves, there is likely a discrepancy between what is observed in this study and what is experienced by the population (in terms of actual policy implementation).

Second, to fully understand SAP's (welfare) ideological developments it would be fruitful to carry out an analysis more deeply focused on the theoretical implications of different welfare ideals. An in-depth analysis of the precise implications of Keynesian, Neoliberal and Social Investment ideals would help revealing what it actually means for SAP to, for example, increasingly incorporate Social Investment ideals in the desired welfare system. Such study would preferably outline the fine nuances of different welfare ideals, and thus enable an analysis which covers – what this thesis might have experienced as – conceptual blind spots.

## 9 Appendices

### 9.1 Swedish governments from 1945

Table 12 shows the English and Swedish names of the political parties relevant for this thesis, and how these names are abbreviated. Then, table 13 shows which party or parties, that have held office during the examined time period, and whom has been prime minister.

**Table 12 – Abbreviations of party names**

(Source: The Swedish Parliament a; The Swedish Parliament b)

<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>English name</i>	<i>Swedish name</i>
C	The Center Party	Centerpartiet
KD	The Christian Democrats	Kristdemokraterna
L	The Liberal Party	Liberalerna
MP	The Green Party	Miljöpartiet
M	The Moderate Party	Moderaterna
SAP	The Social Democratic Party	Socialdemokraterna

**Table 13 – Swedish governments from 1945**

(Source: Nationalencyklopedin b)

<i>Time period</i>	<i>Prime Minister</i>	<i>Party/parties in government</i>
1945-1946	Per Albin Hansson (SAP)	SAP
1946-1951	Tage Erlander (SAP)	SAP
1951-1957	Tage Erlander (SAP)	Coalition between SAP and C
1957-1969	Tage Erlander (SAP)	SAP
1969-1976	Olof Palme (SAP)	SAP
1976-1978	Thorbjörn Fälldin (C)	Coalition between C, L and M
1978-1979	Ola Ullsten (L)	L
1979-1981	Thorbjörn Fälldin (C)	Coalition between C, L and M
1981-1982	Thorbjörn Fälldin (C)	Coalition between C and L
1982-1986	Olof Palme (SAP)	SAP
1986-1991	Ingvar Carlsson (SAP)	SAP
1991-1994	Carl Bildt (M)	Coalition between M, C, L and KD
1994-1996	Ingvar Carlsson (SAP)	SAP
1996-2006	Göran Persson (SAP)	SAP
2006-2014	Fredrik Reinfeldt (M)	Coalition between M, C, L and KD
2014-	Stefan Löfven (SAP)	Coalition between SAP and MP

Table 13 shows that SAP has accounted for head of government in ten (see shaded cells) of the 16 government constellations which have taken place since the Second World War. Two times during this time period has SAP taken part of coalition governments. In the years 1951 to 1957, a coalition government including SAP and the Center Party held office. Since 2014 (and at the time of writing) SAP and the Green Party are the incumbents.

## 9.2 Sweden's GDP-Growth 1950 – 2014

Figure 7 and table 14 present Sweden's annual GDP-growth, during the examined time period. Due to the lack of uniform information, the year of 1948 has been left out. Instead, the growth of 1950 serves as the benchmark for the other years. Hence, the growth of the year 1950 takes on the value zero.

**Figure 7 – Sweden's GDP-Growth 1950 – 2014**

(Source: SCB)



**Table 14 – Sweden's GDP-Growth 1950 – 2014**

(Source: SCB)

<i>Year</i>	<i>GDP-Growth</i>
1950	0%
1952	1,5%
1956	3,3%
1958	2,4%
1960	3,5%
1964	6,8%
1968	3,6%
1970	6,9%
1973	4%
1976	1,2%
1979	3,8%
1982	1,4%
1985	2,3%
1988	2,5%
1991	-1%
1994	4,1%
1998	4,2%
2002	2,1%
2006	4,7%
2010	6%
2014	2,6%

### 9.3 Code schemes in English

This appendix presents the code schemes for each ideal type respectively. In each code scheme, the right column provides references for the explicit indicator in the left column.

**Table 15 – Keynesian indicators**  
(References in the right column)

<b>A. Core elements of Keynesianism</b>	<b>References</b>
<b>A1. The state should protect the citizens</b>	(Jenson, 2010, p. 62; Jenson, 2012, p. 71)
<b>A1.1 The state should ensure social justice/equity</b>	(Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 442; Moschonas, 2002, p. 21, 63)
<b>A1.2 Social services are universal rights</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73)
<i>A1.2.1 Social services should be consistent</i>	(Newman et al., 2014, p. 370)
<i>A1.2.2 Social services should be standardized</i>	(Newman et al., 2014, p. 370)
<i>A1.2.3 Social services should be distributed equally/equally available among the citizens</i>	(Moschonas, 2002, p. 63)
<i>A1.2.4 The state should be accountable for social services</i>	(Newman et al., 2014, p. 370)
<b>A1.3 Social services aim to enhance equality</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73)
<i>A1.3.1 Equality means having the same living conditions</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73)
<i>A1.3.2 Wealth should be fairly/eavenly distributed</i>	(Moschonas, 2002, p. 21, 63)
<i>A1.3.3 Income transfers enhance equality</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73)
<b>A1.4 Social services aim to protect/secure the population</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 71-73)
<i>A1.4.1 Citizens should be guaranteed social services</i>	(Jenson, 2010, p. 60)
<i>A1.4.2 Social services function as insurance against misfortune</i>	(Jenson, 2010, p. 63)
<i>A1.4.3 Social services are provided to passive citizens</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 51)
<b>A1.5 Social services are compensatory/provided retroactively</b>	(De Deken, 2014, p. 260; Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 73)
<i>A1.5.1 Social services should be generous and easily accessible</i>	(De Deken, 2014, p. 266)
<i>A1.5.2 Benefits should be provided on a long-term basis</i>	(De Deken, 2014, p. 266)
<b>A1.6 Social services should focus on especially important issues/risks</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 72-73)
<i>A1.6.1 Unemployment is especially important for social services</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 72-73)
<i>A1.6.2 Poor health is especially important for social services</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 72-73; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 429)
<i>A1.6.3 Old age is especially important for social services</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 72-73)
<i>A1.6.4 Disabilities are especially important for social services</i>	(Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 429)
<b>A1.7 Social services are improved through higher spending/input</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 75)
<b>A2. The state should act as an economic stabilizer</b>	(Offe, 2014, p. 60)
<b>A2.1 The state should govern through an extensive bureaucratic apparatus</b>	(Jenson, 2010, p. 69; Jenson, 2012, p. 75)
<i>A2.1.1 The state should have wide-ranging authorities</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 75)
<i>A2.1.2 The state should have wide-ranging responsibilities</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 75)
<i>A2.1.3 The state should be active/influential</i>	(Moschonas, 2002, p. 63)
<i>A2.1.4 The welfare system should be organized around state institutions</i>	(Moschonas, 2002, p. 63)
<i>A2.1.5 The state should take on a national perspective</i>	(Moschonas, 2002, p. 63, 262)
<b>A2.2 The state should balance economy cycles/act countercyclically</b>	(Crouch & Keune, 2014, p. 332-333; Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 73)
<b>A2.3 The economy is managed through consumption/demand-oriented means</b>	(Moschonas, 2002, p. 63, 262)
<i>A2.3.1 Aggregate demand should be expanded</i>	(Aspromourgos, 2012, p. 150)
<i>A2.3.2 Evening out wealth increases the citizens' consumption power</i>	(Moschonas, 2002, p. 63, 262)
<i>A2.3.3 Evening out wealth involves supporting wage-earners</i>	(Aspromourgos, 2012, p. 150)
<b>A2.4 Consumption of social services takes place in the present</b>	(Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 440)
<b>A3. The state should reduce the citizens' (financial) dependence on the labor market</b>	(Moschonas, 2002, p. 66)
<b>A3.1 The state should reduce labor market insecurity</b>	(Moschonas, 2002, p. 66)
<b>A3.2 The state should ensure full (male) employment</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 73)
<i>A3.2.1 Male industrial workers constitute the labor force</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 73; Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 255)
<i>A3.2.2 The state should protect the (male) workers</i>	(Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 255)
<b>A3.3 Issue-organizations/associations are desirable</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 77)
<i>A3.3.1 Strong labor unions/specific economic issue-organizations are desirable</i>	(Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 255)
<b>A3.4 Citizens should complete mandatory education</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 72)



**Table 16 – Neoliberal indicators**  
(References in the right column)

<b>B. Core elements of Neoliberalism</b>	<b>References</b>
<b>B1. The welfare sector is a burden</b>	(Jenson, 2010, p. 62-63; Ofte, 2014, p. 62, 65)
<b>B1.1 The state's primary function should be to ensure that citizens do not violate each other's rights</b>	(Hemerjck, 2012, p. 40-41, 43)
<b>B1.2 The state should support only the poorest citizens</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 72)
<b>B1.3 Social service expenditures should be restricted</b>	(Swank, 2014, p. 176)
<b>B1.4 Social spending hinders economic growth</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 68, 72-73; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 434; Ofte, 2014, p. 62, 65)
<i>B1.4.1 Social spending discourages investments</i>	(Ofte, 2014, p. 62, 65)
<i>B1.4.2 Social spending discourages work/paid employment</i>	(Ofte, 2014, p. 62, 65)
<i>B1.4.3 Taxes should be low</i>	(Hemerjck, 2012, p. 40-41, 43)
<b>B1.5 Social services cause (undesired) state-dependent citizens</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 68, 71-73)
<i>B1.5.1 Social services should be limited</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 68, 71-73)
<i>B1.5.2 Eligibility for social services should be restricted</i>	(Swank, 2014, p. 176)
<i>B1.5.3 Social services should be targeted</i>	(Hemerjck, 2012, p. 41, 43; Swank, 2014, p. 176)
<i>B1.5.4 Social services should be means-tested</i>	(Hemerjck, 2012, p. 41, 43)
<i>B1.5.5 Income transfers should be limited</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 68, 71-73)
<i>B1.5.6 Income replacement should be limited</i>	(Swank, 2014, p. 176)
<i>B1.5.7 Service users should co-pay</i>	(Swank, 2014, p. 176)
<i>B1.5.8 Social services should be provided only to active citizens</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 68, 71-73)
<b>B1.6 Social services are improved through higher efficiency/lower costs per service</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 75; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 442; Swank, 2014, p. 176)
<b>B2. The market sector is the solution</b>	(Hemerjck, 2012, p. 40-41, 43; Jenson, 2010, p. 62-63)
<b>B2.1 Social equality/equity and economic efficiency are incompatible</b>	
<i>B2.1.1 Markets involve inequality</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 68, 72-73)
<i>B2.1.2 Inequality is necessary to motivate citizens to personal progress</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 72)
<b>B2.2 Social services should be privatized/provided by the market</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 73, 75-76)
<i>B2.2.1 When privatization is not possible, public services should be run as business-like organizations</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 75-76)
<i>B2.2.2 Social services should be outsourced/contracted out</i>	(Hemerjck, 2012, p. 40-41, 43; Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 259)
<i>B2.2.3 Social services should be influenced/run by multiple actors</i>	(Jenson, 2010, p. 69)
<i>B2.2.4 Social services should be decentralized</i>	(Jenson, 2010, p. 69)
<i>B2.2.5 The market should take on an international/global perspective</i>	(Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 256)
<b>B2.3 The economy is managed through supply-oriented means</b>	(Hemerjck, 2012, p. 40-41)
<i>B2.3.1 Inflation should be kept low</i>	(Hemerjck, 2012, p. 40-41)
<i>B2.3.2 The currency value should be kept stable</i>	(Hemerjck, 2012, p. 40-41)
<i>B2.3.3 The central bank should be independent</i>	(Hemerjck, 2012, p. 40-41)

**Neoliberal indicators continued**  
(References in the right column)

<b>B3. The citizens should be independent and in control</b>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 41, 43; Jenson, 2012, p. 69, 71, 73; Newman et al., 2014, p. 370)
<b>B3.1 The citizens should be self-reliant</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 68, 71-73)
<i>B3.1.1 The individual has the primary responsibility for her own and her family's wellbeing</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 71, 73)
<i>B3.1.2 Citizens are experts on their personal situation/circumstances</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 75-76)
<i>B3.1.3 The social service user should be in control/have the power to choose service provider</i>	(Newman et al., 2014, p. 370)
<i>B3.1.4 Privatizing social services gives the service user the ability to choose service provider</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 40-41, 43; Jenson, 2012, p. 75-76)
<b>B4. The labor market should be deregulated</b>	(Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 256, 267)
<b>B4.1 Labor market insecurity should be dealt with by the individual herself</b>	(Swank, 2014, p. 176)
<b>B4.2 The state should facilitate matching between labor market actors</b>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 41, 43)
<i>B4.2.1 Workers' rights should be limited</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 41, 43; Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 256, 267)
<i>B4.2.2 Employers' responsibilities should be limited</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 41, 43)
<i>B4.2.3 Minimum wages should be low/possible to negotiate</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 41, 43; Schierup & Castles, 2014, p. 256, 267)
<b>B4.3 Unemployment compensation should be limited</b>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 41, 43)
<i>B4.3.1 Working should be profitable (compared to relying on unemployment compensation)</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 54)
<b>B4.4 Everybody who is able to should work</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 69)
<b>B4.5 Issue-organizations/associations are undesirable</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 77)
<i>B4.5.1 Citizens should represent themselves individually</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 77)
<b>B4.6 Citizens are encouraged to attain tertiary education in order to achieve financial independence</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 72)

**Table 17 – Social Investment indicators**  
(References in the right column)

C. Core elements of Social Investment	References
<b>C1. The state should support citizens when the market fails to do so</b>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 69, 72)
<b>C1.1 The market should handle old social risks/issues</b>	(Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 430)
<i>C1.1.1 The market should attend to unemployment</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 72-73; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 430)
<i>C1.1.2 The market should attend to poor health</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 72-73; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 429-430)
<i>C1.1.3 The market should attend to old age</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 67, 72-73; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 430)
<i>C1.1.4 The market should attend to disability</i>	(Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 429-430)
<b>C1.2 The state should handle new social risks/issues</b>	(Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 430)
<i>C1.2.1 The state should attend to the working poor</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 47-48, 51-52; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 429)
<i>C1.2.2 The state should attend to child poverty</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 73)
<i>C1.2.3 The state should attend to female career opportunities</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 47-48, 51-52)
<i>C1.2.4 The state should attend to single parenthood</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 47-48, 51-52)
<i>C1.2.5 The state should attend to combining work and family life</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 47-48, 51-52)
<i>C1.2.6 The state should attend to immigration</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 47-48, 51-52)
<i>C1.2.7 The state should attend to long term unemployment</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 47-48, 51-52)
<i>C1.2.8 The state should attend to skills being obsolete</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 51)
<i>C1.2.9 The state should attend to the ability to balance work and leisure</i>	(Cantillon, 2011, p. 437, 439)

## Social Investment indicators continued

(References in the right column)

<b>C2. Social services aim to prevent citizens from needing state support</b>	
	(De Deken, 2014, p. 260; Jenson, 2010, p. 63; Jenson, 2012, p. 72; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 429, 437, 440, 442)
<b>C2.1 Social equality/equity and economic efficiency are compatible</b>	
<i>C2.1.1 Social services enhance the individual's productivity level</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46, 50-51, 54-56; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 429, 437, 440, 442)
<i>C2.1.2 Enhancing individuals' productivity levels benefits society as a whole</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46, 50-51, 54-56)
<i>C2.1.3 Benefits should be provided on a short-term basis</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46, 50-51, 54-56; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 429, 435)
<i>C2.1.4 Social services are provided to active citizens</i>	(De Deken, 2014, p. 260, 266)
	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46, 50-51, 54-56)
<b>C2.2 The welfare state should be enabling</b>	
<i>C2.2.1 Equality means having the same opportunities</i>	(Cantillon, 2011, p. 439)
<i>C2.2.2 Social services aim to break the cycle of intergenerational poverty</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 72)
<i>C2.2.3 The welfare state should ensure social inclusion of all</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 51; Jenson, 2010, p. 61)
	(Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 429, 437, 440, 442)
<b>C2.3 The welfare state should be future-oriented</b>	
<i>C2.3.1 Social spending is regarded as investment in the future</i>	(Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 429, 435)
<i>C2.3.2 Caring for children and young people is important as they constitute tomorrow's society</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46-47)
	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 51, 53)
<b>C2.4 The welfare state should encourage the citizens to take on a lifelong perspective</b>	
<i>C2.4.1 Citizens should save money so they can provide for themselves in times of future misfortune</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 48)
<i>C2.4.2 It should be profitable for citizens to transfer money over the life course (compared to consuming all in</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 72)
	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 54)
<b>C2.5 The welfare sector should consist of partnerships and networks</b>	
	(Jenson, 2012, p. 75)
<b>C2.6 Social services are improved through higher productivity capacity/better outcomes</b>	
	(Jenson, 2012, p. 75)

## Social Investment indicators continued

(References in the right column)

<b>C3. Education/human capital is central for wellbeing</b>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 53)
<b>C3.1 Citizens have the duty to invest in their human capital</b>	
<i>C3.1.1 Investment in human capital starts in pre-school</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 72-73)
<i>C3.1.2 Citizens should complete tertiary education</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 72-73)
<i>C3.1.3 Citizens should complete occupational training</i>	(De Deken, 2014, p. 266; Jenson, 2012, p. 72-73)
<i>C3.1.4 Learning can also take place in informal settings</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 72-73)
<i>C3.1.5 Skills must be continuously updated</i>	(Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006, p. 436)
<i>C3.1.6 Citizens should be able to undergo human capital improvements at any age</i>	(De Deken, 2014, p. 262)
	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 47-48, 51-52)
<b>C3.2 Human capital improvements create economic growth</b>	
<i>C3.2.1 Human capital/education is tightly linked to employment and thereby creates income tax revenue</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 53)
	(De Deken, 2014, p. 262; Hemerijck, 2012, p. 53)
<b>C3.3 The economy is managed through supply-oriented means</b>	
<i>C3.3.1 Society should create productive future taxpayers</i>	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 51)
	(Hemerijck, 2012, p. 51)
<b>C3.4 Issue-organizations/associations are desirable</b>	
<i>C3.4.1 Local involvement associations are desirable</i>	(Jenson, 2012, p. 77)
	(Jenson, 2012, p. 77)

## 9.4 Code schemes in Swedish

This appendix presents the code schemes translated into Swedish. Herein, the references have been left out. However, the references for each indicator in Swedish are the same as for the corresponding indicator in English (for example, the reference to *C1.1 Marknaden bör hantera/ombesörja gamla sociala risker/frågor*, is the same as to *C1.1 The market should handle old social risks/issues*). Thus, the interested reader can consult the code schemes in English to find the explicit references.

Table 18 – Keynesian indicators in Swedish

<b>A. Kärnfaktorer för Keynesianism</b>
<b>A1. Staten bör skydda medborgarna</b>
<b>A1.1 Staten bör försäkra social rättvisa</b>
<b>A1.2 Valfärdstjänster är universella rättigheter</b>
<i>A1.2.1 Valfärdstjänster bör vara konsekventa/likvärdiga</i>
<i>A1.2.2 Valfärdstjänster bör vara standardiserade</i>
<i>A1.2.3 Valfärdstjänster bör fördelas jämnt över/vara lika tillgängliga för alla medborgare</i>
<i>A1.2.4 Staten bör vara ansvarsskyldig för valfärdstjänster</i>
<b>A1.3 Valfärdstjänster syftar till att öka jämställdheten/jämlikheten</b>
<i>A1.3.1 Jämställdhet/jämlikhet innebär att ha samma förutsättningar i livet</i>
<i>A1.3.2 Förmögenhet bör fördelas rättvist/jämnt</i>
<i>A1.3.3 Inkomstöverföringar ökar jämställdheten/jämlikheten</i>
<b>A1.4 Valfärdstjänster syftar till att skydda/trygga befolkningen</b>
<i>A1.4.1 Medborgarna bör garanteras valfärdstjänster</i>
<i>A1.4.2 Valfärdstjänster fungerar som en försäkring för olyckor/motgångar</i>
<i>A1.4.3 Valfärdstjänster tillhandahålls passiva medborgare</i>
<b>A1.5 Valfärdstjänster är kompenserande/tillhandahålls retroaktivt</b>
<i>A1.5.1 Valfärdstjänster bör vara generösa och lättillgängliga</i>
<i>A1.5.2 Bidrag bör tillhandahållas under lång tid</i>
<b>A1.6 Valfärdstjänster ska fokusera på speciellt viktiga frågor/risker</b>
<i>A1.6.1 Arbetslöshet är speciellt viktigt för valfärdstjänster</i>
<i>A1.6.2 Dålig hälsa är speciellt viktigt för valfärdstjänster</i>
<i>A1.6.3 Hög ålder är speciellt viktigt för valfärdstjänster</i>
<i>A1.6.4 Funktionshinder är speciellt viktigt för valfärdstjänster</i>
<b>A1.7 Valfärdstjänster förbättras genom högre utgifter/insats av resurser</b>
<b>A2. Staten ska stabilisera ekonomin</b>
<b>A2.1 Staten ska styra genom ett omfattande byråkratiskt system</b>
<i>A2.1.1 Staten bör ha omfattande befogenheter</i>
<i>A2.1.2 Staten bör ha ett omfattande ansvar</i>
<i>A2.1.3 Staten bör vara aktiv/inflytelserik</i>
<i>A2.1.4 Valfärdssystemet bör vara organiserat kring statliga institutioner</i>
<i>A2.1.5 Staten bör anta ett nationellt perspektiv</i>
<b>A2.2 Staten ska jämna ut konjunktursvängningar</b>
<b>A2.3 Ekonomin hanteras genom konsumtions-/efterfrågerelaterade åtgärder</b>
<i>A2.3.1 Total efterfrågan bör utökas</i>
<i>A2.3.2 Att jämna ut förmögenheter ökar medborgarnas köpkraft</i>
<i>A2.3.3 Att jämna ut förmögenheter innebär att stötta lönearbetare</i>
<b>A2.4 Konsumtion av valfärdstjänster sker i nuet</b>
<b>A3. Staten bör minska medborgarnas (ekonomiska) beroende av arbetsmarknaden</b>
<b>A3.1 Staten bör minska osäkerhet på arbetsmarknaden</b>
<b>A3.2 Staten bör försäkra full sysselsättning (för män)</b>
<i>A3.2.1 Arbetskraften utgörs av industriarbetande män</i>
<i>A3.2.2 Staten bör skydda (de manliga) arbetarna</i>
<b>A3.3 Sakfrågeorganisationer/förbund är önskvärda</b>
<i>A3.3.1 Starka fackföreningar är önskvärda</i>
<b>A3.4 Medborgarna bör fullgöra skolgångens obligatoriska del</b>

Table 19 – Neoliberal indicators in Swedish

<b>B. Kärnfaktorer för Neoliberalism</b>
<b>B1. Välfärdssektorn är en börda</b>
<b>B1.1 Statens primära funktion bör vara att försäkra att medborgarna ej kränker varandras rättigheter</b>
<b>B1.2 Staten ska enbart stötta de fattigaste medborgarna</b>
<b>B1.3 Utgifter för välfärdstjänster bör vara begränsade</b>
<b>B1.4 Välfärdsutgifter hindrar ekonomisk tillväxt</b>
<i>B1.4.1 Välfärdsutgifter motverkar/avhåller initiativ till investeringar</i>
<i>B1.4.2 Välfärdsutgifter motverkar/avhåller initiativ till arbete</i>
<i>B1.4.3 Skatter bör vara låga</i>
<b>B1.5 Välfärdstjänster orsakar (oönskat) beroende av staten hos medborgarna</b>
<i>B1.5.1 Välfärdstjänster bör vara begränsade</i>
<i>B1.5.2 Behörigheten/rätten till välfärdstjänster bör vara begränsad</i>
<i>B1.5.3 Välfärdstjänster bör vara riktade</i>
<i>B1.5.4 Välfärdstjänster bör vara behovsprövade</i>
<i>B1.5.5 Inkomstöverföringar bör vara begränsade</i>
<i>B1.5.6 Inkomstersättningar bör vara begränsade</i>
<i>B1.5.7 De som erhåller välfärdstjänster bör betala en del av tjänsten</i>
<i>B1.5.8 Välfärdstjänster bör enbart tillhandahållas aktiva medborgare</i>
<b>B1.6 Välfärdstjänster förbättras genom högre effektivitet/lägre kostnad per tjänst</b>
<b>B2. Marknadssektorn är lösningen</b>
<b>B2.1 Social jämställdhet/rättvisa är oförenligt med ekonomisk effektivitet</b>
<i>B2.1.1 Marknaden innebär/involverar ojämlikhet</i>
<i>B2.1.2 Ojämlikhet är nödvändigt för att motivera medborgarna till personlig utveckling</i>
<b>B2.2 Välfärdstjänster bör privatiseras/tillhandahållas av marknaden</b>
<i>B2.2.1 Om privatisering ej är möjligt bör tjänster i offentlig regi drivas likt (privata) affärsrörelser</i>
<i>B2.2.2 Välfärdstjänster bör outsourcas/läggas på entreprenad</i>
<i>B2.2.3 Välfärdstjänster bör influeras av/drivas av ett flertal aktörer</i>
<i>B2.2.4 Välfärdstjänster bör vara decentraliserade</i>
<i>B2.2.5 Marknaden bör anta ett internationellt/globalt perspektiv</i>
<b>B2.3 Ekonomin hanteras genom utbudsrelaterade åtgärder</b>
<i>B2.3.1 Inflationen bör hållas låg</i>
<i>B2.3.2 Valutavärdet bör hållas stabilt</i>
<i>B2.3.3 Centralbanken bör vara fristående</i>
<b>B3. Medborgarna bör vara självständiga och kunna styra över sina egna liv</b>
<b>B3.1 Medborgarna bör vara självtillräckliga</b>
<i>B3.1.1 Individen har det primära ansvaret för sitt eget och sin familjs välmående</i>
<i>B3.1.2 Medborgarna är experter (har unik kunskap om) sina livssituationer/förutsättningar</i>
<i>B3.1.3 Den som nyttjar en välfärdstjänst böra kunna styra/ha makt att välja tjänsteleverantör</i>
<i>B3.1.4 Privatisering av välfärdstjänster skänker nyttjaren möjligheten att välja tjänsteleverantör</i>
<b>B4. Arbetsmarknaden bör vara avreglerad</b>
<b>B4.1 Osäkerhet på arbetsmarknaden bör hanteras av individen själv</b>
<b>B4.2 Staten bör underlätta matchningen mellan parter på arbetsmarknaden</b>
<i>B4.2.1 Arbetsstagares rättigheter bör vara begränsade</i>
<i>B4.2.2 Arbetsgivares ansvar bör vara begränsat</i>
<i>B4.2.3 Minimalöner bör vara låga/möjliga att förhandla om</i>
<b>B4.3 Arbetslöshetsersättningen bör vara begränsad</b>
<i>B4.3.1 Att arbeta bör vara lönsamt (i jämförelse med att förlita sig på arbetslöshetsersättning)</i>
<b>B4.4 Alla som kan bör arbeta</b>
<b>A3.3 Sakfrågeorganisationer/förbund är icke önskvärda</b>
<i>B4.5.1 Medborgarna bör representera sig själva individuellt</i>
<b>B4.6 Medborgarna uppmuntras att genomföra högre akademisk utbildning för att uppnå ekonomisk självständighet</b>



**Table 20 – Social Investment indicators in Swedish**

<b>C. Kärnfaktorer för social investering</b>
<b>C1. Staten bör stötta medborgarna</b>
<b>C1.1 Marknaden bör hantera/ombesörja gamla sociala risker/frågor</b>
<i>C1.1.1 Marknaden bör hantera/ombesörja arbetslöshet</i>
<i>C1.1.2 Marknaden bör hantera/ombesörja dålig hälsa</i>
<i>C1.1.3 Marknaden bör hantera/ombesörja hög ålder</i>
<i>C1.1.4 Marknaden bör hantera/ombesörja funktionshinder</i>
<b>C1.2 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja nya sociala risker/frågor</b>
<i>C1.2.1 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja arbetande fattiga (fattigdom trots förvärvsarbete)</i>
<i>C1.2.2 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja barnfattigdom</i>
<i>C1.2.3 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja kvinnors möjlighet till karriär</i>
<i>C1.2.4 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja ensamstående föräldrar</i>
<i>C1.2.5 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja möjligheten att kombinera arbets- och familjeliv</i>
<i>C1.2.6 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja invandring</i>
<i>C1.2.7 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja långtidsarbetslöshet</i>
<i>C1.2.8 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja när färdigheter blir förlegade</i>
<i>C1.2.9 Staten bör hantera/ombesörja möjligheten att balansera arbete och fritid</i>
<b>C2. Valfärdstjänster syftar till att förebygga medborgarnas behov av stöd från staten</b>
<b>C2.1 Social jämställdhet/rättvisa är förenligt med ekonomisk effektivitet</b>
<i>C2.1.1 Valfärdstjänster ökar individens produktivitet</i>
<i>C2.1.2 Att öka individens produktivitet gynnar samhället som helhet</i>
<i>C2.1.3 Bidrag bör tillhandahållas under kort tid</i>
<i>C2.1.4 Valfärdstjänster tillhandahålls aktiva medborgare</i>
<b>C2.2 Valfärdsstaten bör vara möjlighetsskapande</b>
<i>C2.2.1 Jämlikhet innebär att ha samma möjligheter</i>
<i>C2.2.2 Valfärdstjänster syftar till att bryta överföring (arv) av fattigdom mellan generationer</i>
<i>C2.2.3 Valfärdsstaten bör försäkra social inkludering av alla</i>
<b>C2.3 Valfärdsstaten bör vara framtidsorienterad</b>
<i>C2.3.1 Valfärdsutgifter anses som investeringar i framtiden</i>
<i>C2.3.2 Omsorg av barn och unga är viktigt eftersom de utgör morgondagens samhälle</i>
<b>C2.4 Valfärdsstaten bör uppmuntra medborgarna att anta ett livslångt perspektiv</b>
<i>C2.4.1 Medborgare bör spara pengar så att de kan sörja för sig själva vid händelse av framtida olycka/motgång</i>
<i>C2.4.2 Det bör vara lönsamt för medborgare att överföra/fördela pengar över olika livsfaser (i jämförelse med att konsumera allt i den nuvarande)</i>
<b>C2.5 Valfärdssektorn bör bestå av partnerskap/samverkan och nätverk</b>
<b>C2.6 Valfärdstjänster förbättras genom högre produktionskapacitet/förbättrade resultat</b>
<b>C3. Utbildning/humankapital är centralt för välmående</b>
<b>C3.1 Medborgarna är skyldiga att investera i sitt humankapital</b>
<i>C3.1.1 Investeringar i humankapital börjar i förskolan</i>
<i>C3.1.2 Medborgarna bör genomföra högre akademisk utbildning</i>
<i>C3.1.3 Medborgarna bör genomföra yrkes/arbetsplatspraktik/träning/vidareutbildning</i>
<i>C3.1.4 Lärande kan även ske i informella miljöer</i>
<i>C3.1.5 Färdigheter måste uppdateras kontinuerligt</i>
<i>C3.1.6 Medborgarna bör ha möjlighet till förbättring av sitt humankapital vid alla åldrar</i>
<b>C3.2 Förbättringar i humankapital skapar ekonomisk tillväxt</b>
<i>C3.2.1 Humankapital/utbildning är nära kopplat till anställning och skapar därigenom skatteintäkter</i>
<b>C3.3 Ekonomin hanteras genom utbudsrelaterade åtgärder</b>
<i>C3.3.1 Samhället bör skapa produktiva framtida skattebetalare</i>
<b>C3.4 Sakfrågeorganisationer/förbund är önskvärda</b>
<i>C3.4.1 Samfund för lokalt engagemang är önskvärda</i>

## 9.5 Coding example election manifesto 2010

The passages below present an extract from the SAP election manifesto published in 2010. The passages first present the first page of the manifesto as it is originally written (the Swedish text is thus herein presented exactly as in the election manifesto). Then, the section presents an English translation of the manifesto (my translation). In both sections, footnotes mark when code scheme indicators have been identified, as well as the classification of the identified indicator.

### 9.5.1 Coding example election manifesto 2010 – Swedish

VÄGVALET

VI VILL GÖRA SVERIGE TILL ETT MÖJLIGHETERNAS LAND

Valet 2010 blir ett avgörande vägval: Vilket Sverige ska vi ha? Valet står mellan två helt olika drömmar, helt olika vägar för framtiden.

När ekonomin växer blir det avgörande vägvalet; ska vi använda resurserna till fortsatta skattesänkningar för de mest välbeställda eller för fler jobb och bättre välfärd. Vi socialdemokrater vill att Sverige ska vara ett möjligheternas land för alla<sup>20</sup>, där var och en – oavsett bakgrund<sup>21</sup> – får chansen<sup>22</sup> att förverkliga sina drömmar. Jämlikhet frigör individen och får ekonomin och samhället att växa<sup>23</sup>. Det är ett välfärdsland där vi väljer att konkurrera med kunskap istället för låga löner. Där jobben blir fler, den sociala rörligheten är hög och alla får chansen<sup>24</sup> att dra sitt strå till stacken. Där vi löser samhällsproblemen och investerar för framtiden tillsammans<sup>25</sup>. För det vinner alla på. Det är Socialdemokraternas väg.

Den andra vägen har nu prövats i fyra år. Där gynnas de rikaste när skatterna sänkts med lånade pengar. Där växer klyftorna och lönerna pressas ner. Resultatet av den politiken är inte jobb. Vår gemensamma ekonomi krymper och personal sägs upp i skola och sjukvård. Företagen har svårt att anställa trots att arbetslösheten<sup>26</sup> är skyhögt, för utbildningsmöjligheterna är för få. Det försämrar konkurrenskraften och höjer räntorna på bostadslånen. Nu behövs en ny färdriktning. Den 19 september står svenska folket vid skiljevägen. Då ska vägvalet avgöras. Ska färden mot ett kallare Sverige fortsätta i fyra år till, och kommer det att vara värt priset?

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<sup>20</sup> C2.2.1 Jämlikhet innebär att ha samma möjligheter.

<sup>21</sup> C2.2.3 Välfärdsstaten bör försäkra social inkludering av alla.

<sup>22</sup> C2.2.1 Jämlikhet innebär att ha samma möjligheter.

<sup>23</sup> C2.1 Social jämställdhet/rättvisa är förenligt med ekonomisk effektivitet.

<sup>24</sup> C2.2.1 Jämlikhet innebär att ha samma möjligheter.

<sup>25</sup> C2.3.1 Välfärdsutgifter anses som investeringar i framtiden.

<sup>26</sup> A1.6.1 Arbetslöshet är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster.

Socialdemokraterna väljer jobben<sup>27</sup>. Vi vill att Sverige ska vara ett möjligheternas land<sup>28</sup>.

Det här är vår syn på vad som behöver göras på de fyra områden där vägvalet är som tydligast:

## 1. FLER JOBB

Vi vill att Sverige ska vara ett konkurrenskraftigt land i full sysselsättning<sup>29</sup>. Vi vill skapa villkor för exportindustrin, tjänstesektorn, småföretagen och välfärden att utvecklas starkt och anställa fler<sup>30</sup>. Vi ska ta vara på de stora möjligheter till utveckling och nya gröna jobb som finns i omställningen till en hållbar utveckling. Människors vilja till arbete är landets viktigaste tillgång<sup>31</sup>. En regering som slösar bort den resursen och låter arbetslösheten<sup>32</sup> växa brister i ansvar för landet. Varje arbetad timme behövs. Med fler jobb så växer landets ekonomi. Vi ska tillbaka till överskott i de offentliga finanserna. Så tryggar<sup>33</sup> vi en bättre välfärd och större möjligheter till ett rikare liv för dig – oavsett<sup>34</sup> om du bor i en storstad eller i landsbygd. Regionalpolitiken ska utvecklas. Arbetslinjen betyder rätt till arbete, plikt<sup>35</sup> att arbeta och möjligheter att rusta sig för nya jobb. Därför vill vi investera i 100 000 nya jobb<sup>36</sup>, praktik<sup>37</sup> och utbildningsplatser<sup>38</sup> de närmaste åren.

Socialdemokraterna väljer fler jobb<sup>39</sup> istället för ökade klyftor:

(SAP, 2010, p.1)

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<sup>27</sup> A1.6.1 Arbetslöshet är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster.

<sup>28</sup> C2.2 Välfärdsstaten bör vara möjlighetsskapande.

<sup>29</sup> A3.2 Staten bör försäkra full sysselsättning (för män).

<sup>30</sup> A1.7 Välfärdstjänster förbättras genom högre utgifter/insats av resurser.

<sup>31</sup> C3.2 Förbättringar i humankapital skapar ekonomisk tillväxt.

<sup>32</sup> A1.6.1 Arbetslöshet är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster.

<sup>33</sup> A1.4 Välfärdstjänster syftar till att skydda/trygga befolkningen.

<sup>34</sup> A1.3.1 Jämställdhet/jämlikhet innebär att ha samma förutsättningar i livet.

<sup>35</sup> B4.4 Alla som kan bör arbeta.

<sup>36</sup> A1.6.1 Arbetslöshet är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster.

<sup>37</sup> C3.1.3 Medborgarna bör genomföra yrkes/arbetsplatspraktik/träning/vidareutbildning.

<sup>38</sup> C3.1.2 Medborgarna bör genomföra högre akademisk utbildning.

<sup>39</sup> A1.6.1 Arbetslöshet är speciellt viktigt för välfärdstjänster.

## 9.5.2 Coding example election manifesto 2010 – English

### THE CHOICE OF PATH

#### WE WANT TO MAKE SWEDEN A COUNTRY OF OPPORTUNITIES

The election in 2010 will be a conclusive choice of path: What kind of Sweden do we want? The choice is between two completely different dreams, completely different paths for the future.

When the economy is growing, the conclusive choice of path becomes; should we use the resources to reduce taxes for the people who are already the most well-off or to create more jobs and an improved welfare. We social democrats want Sweden to be a country of opportunities for everybody<sup>40</sup>, where each and every one – regardless of background<sup>41</sup> – has the opportunity<sup>42</sup> to make their dreams come true. Equality frees the individual and makes the economy and society grow<sup>43</sup>. It is a welfare state where we chose to compete with knowledge instead of low salaries. Where the job opportunities are more, the social mobility is high and everybody has the chance<sup>44</sup> to pull one's weight. Where we resolve social issues and invest in the future together<sup>45</sup>. Because it benefits us all. That is the path of the Social Democrats.

The other path has now been tried out for four years. Where the richest people are favored when taxes are lowered using borrowed money. Where rifts are growing and salaries are pushed down. The result of such politics is not more jobs. Our shared economy is shrinking and staff members are dismissed within education and healthcare. The companies have difficulties hiring despite the sky-high unemployment<sup>46</sup>, as educational opportunities are too few. It weakens the competitiveness and raises the interest rates on housing loans. Now a new course is necessary. On the 19th of September the Swedish people face the crossroad. Then the choice of path will be determined. Shall the journey towards a colder Sweden precede for four more years, and will it be worth the price?

The Social Democrats chose the jobs<sup>47</sup>. We want Sweden to be the country of opportunities<sup>48</sup>.

This is our view of what needs to be done in the four areas where the choice of path is the most obvious:

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<sup>40</sup> C2.2.1 Equality means having the same opportunities.

<sup>41</sup> C2.2.3 The welfare state should ensure social inclusion of all.

<sup>42</sup> C2.2.1 Equality means having the same opportunities.

<sup>43</sup> C2.1 Social equality/equity and economic efficiency are compatible.

<sup>44</sup> C2.2.1 Equality means having the same opportunities.

<sup>45</sup> C2.3.1 Social spending is regarded as investment in the future.

<sup>46</sup> A1.6.1 Unemployment is especially important for social services.

<sup>47</sup> A1.6.1 Unemployment is especially important for social services.

<sup>48</sup> C2.2 The welfare state should be enabling.

## 1. MORE JOBS

We want Sweden to be a competitive country in full employment<sup>49</sup>. We want to create circumstances for the export industry, the service sector, the small companies and the welfare to develop strongly and hire more<sup>50</sup>. We will seize the big opportunities to development for development and new green jobs which exist in the transformation to a sustainable development. People's will to work is the country's most important asset<sup>51</sup>. A government which wastes this asset and allows the unemployment<sup>52</sup> to grow is failing in taking responsibility for the country. Every hour of work is needed. With more jobs the country's economy grows. We will reclaim the surplus in public finances. That is how we secure<sup>53</sup> a better welfare and greater opportunities to a richer life for you – regardless<sup>54</sup> of if you live in a city or in the country side. Regional politics shall be expanded. The workstream [translation of the political term Arbetslinjen] means the right to work, the duty<sup>55</sup> to work and the possibilities to equip oneself for new jobs. We therefore want to invest in 100 000 new jobs<sup>56</sup>, internships<sup>57</sup> and trainee positions<sup>58</sup> in the coming years.

The Social Democrats chooses more jobs<sup>59</sup> instead of an increased divide:

(My translation, SAP, 2010, p. 1)

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<sup>49</sup> A3.2 The state should ensure full (male) employment.

<sup>50</sup> A1.7 Social services are improved through higher spending/input.

<sup>51</sup> C3.2 Human capital improvements create economic growth.

<sup>52</sup> A1.6.1 Unemployment is especially important for social services.

<sup>53</sup> A1.4 Social services aim to protect/secure the population.

<sup>54</sup> A1.3.1 Equality means having the same living conditions.

<sup>55</sup> B4.4 Everybody who is able to should work.

<sup>56</sup> A1.6.1 Unemployment is especially important for social services.

<sup>57</sup> C3.1.3 Citizens should complete occupational training.

<sup>58</sup> C3.1.2 Citizens should complete tertiary education.

<sup>59</sup> A1.6.1 Unemployment is especially important for social services.

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