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Gendered Political Recruitment in Myanmar

The case of the Democratic Party for a New Society

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ABSTRACT

With 10,5% women in parliament, Myanmar ranks number 157 out of 193 countries on the rate of women in parliament. This thesis aims at investigating the gendered institutions that influence women's descriptive representation in politics through a case study on political recruitment within the Democratic Party for a New Society, DPNS, and their youth wing Youth for a New Society. The main research question of the thesis is *how is political recruitment to and within the DPNS and YNS gendered?* Parties are the key gatekeepers to political office and understanding the internal dynamics of one party contributes to the wider understanding of women's underrepresentation and men's overrepresentation in politics. This could make policies to change this pattern more effective. Interviews with DPNS party members have been analysed through the supply and demand model of political recruitment, with a feminist institutional approach. The analysis shows how informal institutions relating to supply and demand undermine political recruitment institutions that are supposed to favour women, such as a 30% gender quota. However, a women's working committee is now trying to change this, mainly through establishing new formal institutions to counteract the informal institutions limiting women's representation within the party.

Key words: Burma, Myanmar, Candidate Selection, Feminist Institutionalism, Gender, Gender Quota, Party Policy, Political Recruitment, Representation, Supply and Demand

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နိဒါန်း

လွတ်တော်၌ အမျိုးသမီးအမတ် ၁၀.၅ % ရှိခြင်းဖြင့်၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် လွတ်တော်အတွင်း အမျိုးသမီးအမတ်နှုန်းထားမှာ နိုင်ငံပေါင်း ၁၉၃ နိုင်ငံတွင် အဆင့် ၁၅၇ တွင်ရှိသည်။

ဤစာတမ်းသည် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအတွင်း ကျားမဆိုင်ရာ ဦးစားပေးမှုနှင့်ပါတီသက်၍ အမျိုးသမီးများ နိုင်ငံရေးနယ်ပယ်တွင် ကိုယ်စားပြုနိုင်မှုကို သုတေသနပြုရန် လူ့ဘောင်သစ်ပါတီ (DPNS) နှင့် လူ့ဘောင်သစ်ပါတီ လူငယ် တို့၏ ပါတီဝင် စုဆောင်းရွေးချယ်မှုကို ဆန်းစစ်လေ့လာခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဤစာတမ်း၏ အဓိက မေးခွန်းမှာ လူ့ဘောင်သစ်ပါတီ နှင့် လူ့ဘောင်သစ်ပါတီ လူငယ် အတွင်း စည်းရုံးရွေးချယ်မှု လုပ်ငန်းစဉ်များတွင် ကျားမဆိုင်ရာ ဦးစားပေးမှု မည်သို့ရှိမည်နည်း ပင်ဖြစ်သည်။

နိုင်ငံရေးအတွင်း ဝင်ရောက်ရာတွင် နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီများသည် အဓိက သော့ချက်ဖြစ်ရာ၊ ပါတီ တစ်ခု၏ လုပ်ငန်းဖြစ်စဉ်များကို နားလည်ခြင်းဖြင့်၊ နိုင်ငံရေးနယ်ပယ်တွင် အမျိုးသမီး ကိုယ်စားပြုမှု နဲပါးခြင်း၊ အမျိုးသား ကိုယ်စားပြုမှု များပြားခြင်း တို့ကို ပိုမိုကျယ်ပြန့်စွာ နားလည်နိုင်ပြီး၊ ကွာဟချက်များကို ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲရန် မူဝါဒများကို ထိရောက်စွာ ချမှတ်နိုင်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။

လူ့ဘောင်သစ်ပါတီ အဖွဲ့ဝင်များနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံမေးမြန်းချက်များကို ဆန်းစစ်သုံးသပ်ရာတွင် ပါတီဝင် စုဆောင်းရွေးချယ်မှုကို supply and demand model အပြင် feminist institutionalism တို့ကို အသုံးပြု၍ ချဉ်းကပ်ပါသည်။ သုံးသပ်ချက်များတွင် အလွတ်သဘောအရ supply and demand အတိုင်း ပါတီဝင် စုဆောင်းရွေးချယ်မှုသည်၊ အမျိုးသမီးများ ပါဝင်နိုင်ရေး မူဝါဒအရ (အမျိုးသမီး ဦးဆောင်မှု အနဲဆုံး ၃၀% ပါဝင်ရန်) စနစ်အတိုင်း စုဆောင်းရွေးချယ်မှုကို မည်သို့ ဆိုးကျိုးသက်ရောက်မှုရှိကြောင်း ဖော်ပြထားသည်။

သို့သော် ယခုအခါ အမျိုးသမီးများ အလုပ်အမှုဆောင်အဖွဲ့သည် အမျိုးသမီးများ ပါတီအတွင်း ပိုမိုပါဝင် ကိုယ်စားပြုနိုင်ရန် မူဝါဒများကို စနစ်တကျ ချမှတ်ပြီး၊ အမျိုးသမီးများပါဝင်မှုကို ကန့်သတ်နေသော အလွတ်သဘောဆောင်ရွက်နေမှုများကို တန်ပြန်ပြောင်းလဲရန် ကြိုးစားနေသည်။

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ဤစာတမ်းပြုစုခြင်းသည် ရံဖန်ရံခါတွင် မိမိသည် အထီးကျန် သကဲ့သို့ ခံစားမိသည်။ သို့သော် လက်တွေ့တွင် လူအများအပြားက မိမိအား ကူညီပံ့ပိုးပေးခဲ့ကြသည်။

ပထမဦးဆုံးအနေဖြင့် လူ့ဘောင်သစ်ပါတီအပါအဝင်၊ မိမိ တွေ့ဆုံမေးမြန်းခဲ့သော လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ် အားလုံးကို အချိန်ပေး ဖြေကြားပေးခြင်းအတွက် အထူးကျေးဇူးတင်ပါသည်။ မိမိ မေးခွန်းများအား ဖြေကြားရှင်းပြပေးသည့်အပြင်၊ လမ်းညွှန်ပေးခဲ့သော လူပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များအားလုံးကို ကျေးဇူးတင်ရှိပါသည်။

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ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY

ABSDF	All Burma Student Democratic Front
ABFSU	All Burma Federation of Students' Unions
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
DPNS	Democratic Party for a New Society
NLD	National League for Democracy
USDP	Union Solidarity and Development Party
WWC	Women's Working Committee
YES	Youth Empowerment School
YNS	Youth for a New Society
<i>Hluttaw</i>	Parliament in Myanmar

1. INTRODUCTION

With 10,5% women in parliament (GEN 2017: 10), which can be compared to the global average of 23,3%, Myanmar¹ ranks number 157 out of 193 countries regarding their rate of female representatives (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017). Women's political representation is included among the Sustainable Development Goals (UN 2018), and according to Phillips (1998: 224-237) equal representation is important for several reasons, with the key arguments being justice and interest. Myanmar has had a long-term military rule, but during recent years, vast political changes have taken place and the country now has a civilian government consisting of the party National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi as state counsellor, in place (Thawngmung and Robinson 2017: 237). However, through the constitution from 2008, the military still holds power with 25% of the seats in parliament reserved for them, as well as the control over the ministries of defence, home affairs and border affairs (Williams 2011: 1202). A male historical legacy may set the rules of the game in the political sphere and parties have historically been dominated by men (Kenny and Verge 2016: 359). In Myanmar the military has left its mark in society since it has made the public sector a male sphere (Maber 2014: 143) and few parties in Myanmar have policies that promote women's representation among candidates or in internal party structures (PTE 2016: 4). One party that do have this is the Democratic Party for a New Society, DPNS. The party has a 30% gender quota since the early 2000's which is aimed at both candidates and internal structures, but it has still not been reached in any of these instances. The newly organised Women's Working Committee, WWC is trying to change this (Interviews 3 and 7). After many years in exile the party is now back in Myanmar and is going through a process of organising itself in the country (Interview 1), and this process could be seen as a form of institutional transition. In such moments, there might be larger possibilities for gender reforms, but there is also a risk that old gender norms live on (Kenny 2013: 45-46).

To understand women's underrepresentation and men's dominance in politics, the party is an important unit of analysis. This is due to parties being the key gatekeepers to political office and candidate selection being an integral part of what parties do (Kenny and Verge 2016: 353).

¹ The official name Myanmar will be used in this thesis. The informants and the translators used both names and the name Burma will therefore be used in some quotes.

To analyse this, the supply and demand model of political recruitment², with a feminist institutional approach can be used. This model asserts the importance of factors both inside and outside of a party and their interaction for the representation of different groups of people in political bodies. The feminist institutional approach asserts a higher importance to the party and adds a focus on gendered formal and informal institutions³ within the supply and demand structure (Kenny 2013: 25-28). Both informal and formal institutions play their part in political recruitment and it is essential to see parties as gendered organisations (Bjarnegård and Kenny 2016: 370). However, little research has been carried out on the topic of political recruitment with a gender perspective and how parties thereby influence women's political representation (Kenny and Verge 2016: 353-354). Understanding gendered institutions is important to be able to work for a more gender equal political sphere (Lowndes 2014: 689).

This thesis aims at investigating the gendered institutions that influence women's descriptive representation in politics, with a specific focus on political recruitment and representation within the Democratic Party for a New Society and their youth wing Youth for a New Society, YNS. Descriptive representation⁴ refers to *who* is representing and which attributes this person has (Franceschet et al. 2012: 7-8).

² Three important concepts used in this thesis are candidate selection, party recruitment and political recruitment. I use them in the following manner: candidate selection, quite straightforwardly relates to the selection of candidates to stand in elections for political office. Party recruitment refers to the recruitment of more members to the party, and internal recruitment and representation. Political recruitment refers to both candidate selection and party recruitment.

³ Institutions are the rules of the game that structure political and social life. Formal institutions can for example be legal frameworks, whereas informal institutions among other things can be norms (Krook and Mackay 2011: 11). See an elaborated definition in the theory chapter.

⁴ Other types of representation are substantive representation and symbolic representation. Substantive representation treats whether or not women are able to represent the interests of women and achieve political results. Symbolic representation relates to how constituents' perceptions and beliefs are affected by women's presence in political office (Franceschet et al. 2012: 8-9). Henceforth when only representation is mentioned, this refers to descriptive representation.

Through a case study, using the theory of demand and supply for political recruitment with a feminist institutional approach, I seek to answer the following research question:

How is political recruitment to and within the DPNS and YNS gendered?

And the sub-questions:

In what ways are gendered institutions and their interaction limiting and enabling women's representation in the party?

How do actors within the party relate to and use institutions related to political recruitment?

1.1 DE-LIMITATION

There are of course many important aspects relating to political representation that do not fit within the scope of this thesis. Some intersectional aspects to look further into would for example be ethnicity, class and age. Also, the effect of gender quotas, and how women are able to influence the political agenda once they have entered the political sphere are aspects not covered in this thesis.

1.2 THESIS OUTLINE

This thesis starts out with describing women's political representation in Myanmar, how political parties in the country function and the background of DPNS. It continues with a theory chapter which describes feminist institutionalism and the supply and demand model of political recruitment and how this can contribute to the understanding of women's underrepresentation in politics. From these perspectives an analytical framework is developed to be applied in the analysis. Following the theory chapter comes a chapter on methodology describing the choices made during the research process. Thereby the analytical model is applied to the case in an analysis and this is followed by the conclusion and suggestions for further research.

2. BACKGROUND

This chapter starts out with a description of the environment for women in politics in Myanmar, and the factors that lead to few women being politically active. This is followed by a description

of the nature of political parties in Myanmar, and thereafter the Democratic Party for a New Society is presented in relation to the political history of Myanmar since 1988.

2.1 MYANMAR WOMEN IN POLITICS

There has been a deep-rooted idea of Myanmar being a gender equal country, a discourse emerging in the colonial Myanmar (GEN 2015: 8; Than 2014: 1-2). This is further elaborated on by Zin Mar Aung (2015: 536-537) who states that the status of women in Myanmar was used as an argument amongst Indian and Myanmar nationalists “to discredit the British colonial project”. However, this is a simplified description. Historically, women in Myanmar often took care of the household budget. Despite this economic power, women has not reached as much political power since women were, and are, expected to take care of the household and thus the private sphere, whereas men the public, and thus political sphere (Loring 2018: 74-75). The description of Myanmar as a historically gender equal country has also been challenge by Than (2014) who claim that this notion does not take into account the many barriers that women face in political, social and economic life. According to Maber (2014: 145) legal systems may seem to give women and men equal rights, but cultural practices undermine this.

When women are politically active, they are often expected to take on a supportive role (Loring 2018: 76) and social norms regard women as unsuitable for leadership positions, lacking the qualities needed to be active in politics (Loring 2018: 80-81; Oxfam 2016: 5). Women that do engage in politics are in many ways challenged as it is a traditionally male sphere. They are questioned on behalf of their ability, and of not behaving in a feminine way. Women are taking part as leaders on community level and are involved in civil society, but it is harder for them to get access to formal and prestigious political roles (Maber 2014: 146-149). Furthermore, women may feel that they are unsuitable for positions of power as there is a lack of women in these positions (Oxfam 2016: 5).

As mentioned in the introduction only a few parties have concrete policies for women’s representation within the party and as candidates. But even among those parties that have this, they generally do not fulfil them. And although many politicians support having more women in politics and also see that women have more constraints to enter politics, they do not support measures such as gender quotas (PTE 2016: 45). Many parties claim to have difficulties finding women, as they have less time to be engaged in politics (Loring 2018: 80).

Although more women were elected to parliament in the 2015 than in the 2011 election, the number of women in the government formed after the 2015 election actually decreased compared to the previous government, with Aung San Suu Kyi being the only woman in cabinet. On state and regional level 2 out of 14 chief ministers are women (Thawngmung and Robinson 2017: 241-242). In the 2015 election 800 candidates out of 6039 were women. Although this is only 13%, it is still an increase from 2011 in which only 100 female candidates stood for election (The Carter Center 2016: 63). Although there exists a preference for male leaders in Myanmar (Loring 2018: 80-81), party preference is still stronger, and this voting behaviour leads to roughly the same percentage of women among the candidates as among the representatives (GEN 2017: 42). 13,6% of the elected seats were filled by women on union level and 12,7% on state/region level (GEN 2017: 11). However, as 25% of the seats are reserved for the military, the share of women as representatives sinks to 10,5% in the union Hluttaws⁵ and 9,7% in state and region Hluttaws when also these seats are included in the calculation. Out of the military MPs in union and state/region Hluttaws 4 out of 391 are women (GEN 2017: 11-12).

2.2 POLITICAL PARTIES IN MYANMAR

In 2015, there were 91 registered parties in Myanmar (Thawngmung 2016: 133), of which 13 are represented in the national parliament (Stokke et al. 2015: 29). They can roughly be divided into parties with connections to the military and pro-democracy parties. This last category constitutes both of nationwide and ethnic-centred parties (Stokke et al. 2015: 20-21). Parties in Myanmar are generally hierarchical. Top-down steering from the central part leads down to region/states and townships and information is transmitted from the top level in the form of instructions to the lower levels of the party. However, there is also a disconnect between central parts of the parties and their regional branches and difficulties to deal with different opinions within the parties which leads to fragmentation (Kempel et al. 2015: 16). According to Stokke et al. (2015: 22) the fact that many parties are new or have not been active within Myanmar for a long time during military rule leads to weak party structures.

⁵ A Hluttaw is a parliament in Myanmar. The union parliament is bicameral and consists of the Amyotha Hluttaw, which is the upper house, and the Pyithu Hluttaw which is the lower house. Together they form the assembly of the union: the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Open Hluttaw 2018).

Township party offices have a high autonomy concerning candidate selection. Normally the township office compiles a list of preferred candidates which is sent to the state/region who makes the final selection. The leadership of the party will then make the conclusive decision. There is a preference for educated people with knowledge of politics (Kempel et al. 2015: 27). Candidates in all parties must fulfil certain requirements, such as citizenship and age requirements. Also, the candidates must have been living in Myanmar for at least 10 consecutive years prior to the election and they must pay a registration fee of 300 000⁶ Kyat (The Carter Center 2016: 38-39). The registration fee is not always paid by the parties, which is problematic for candidates with low incomes and it may specifically be a problem for women as they generally have lower incomes than men in Myanmar (GEN 2017: 38). The 10-year requirement creates problems for DPNS, since many of its members spent much of the time from the early 1990's to 2013 in exile (Interviews 7 and 8).

2.2.1 Democratic Party for a New Society

The Democratic Party for a New Society (DPNS) does not have any representation in parliament, but it has adopted a gender quota of 30% (Interview 1), which only a few parties in Myanmar have done (PTE 2016: 4). The quota was adopted in the early 2000's and applies to both candidates and to leadership bodies within the party (Interviews 7 and 8). However, it has not been reached in any of these instances yet. In their central leading committee there is 1 woman out of 7 members which is 14%. In the central organising committee 8 out of 31 are women, or 26% (DPNS 2018a; DPNS 2018b). In the 2015 election 5 of their 21 candidates were women which is 24% (Interview 1). At the end of 2017, a women's working committee (WWC) was formed with the aim of creating a women's wing by the second half of 2018. This committee has come up with an array of suggestions on how the party can improve its representation of women (Interviews 1, 3 and 7).

The party has its background in the student movement of 1988 (Fredholm 1993: 233), in which students demanded that the one-party rule be replaced by a multiparty democracy (Kipgen 2016: 64). At this time also the now largest party of the country was formed: National League for Democracy, NLD (Fink 2001: 63), and one of the most prominent organisations at the time was the All Burma Federation of Students' Unions, ABFSU, which later was to form DPNS. A

⁶ Around 220USD in April 2018. The sum can also be compared to the salary of a member of the union parliament which is 1 000 000 Kyat (Egreteau 2017: 26).

crackdown on the movement in 1988 forced many of the students to flee to the border areas of Thailand, China, Bangladesh and India. There they formed the All Burma Student Democratic Front, ABSDF, which became a militant group, forming part of the armed struggle against the military regime. However, some stayed in Myanmar, among them Moe Thee Zun, leader of the ABFSU. He together with others from that organisation formed the DPNS on the 13th of October 1988 (Fredholm 1993: 231-233). The purpose of the party was to work for elections to be held. They also arranged political education and focused on farmers rights (Fink 2001: 64; Kipgen 2016: 129).

At the time of the 1990 election, DPNS was the second largest party in the country, but did not candidate and instead chose to support NLD (DPNS 2018c). In the aftermaths of this election, which was won overwhelmingly by NLD, the military ignored the results and imprisoned and forced the leaders of NLD into exile (Stokke et al. 2015: 13-14). Also members from other parties were affected, and the entire leadership of DPNS were imprisoned as well (Amnesty International 1990: 1; Kipgen 2016: 63) As some also went into exile, the DPNS-movement however continued in Mae Sot in Thailand on the border to Myanmar (DPNS 2018c; Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2004: 411). There, the party started to collaborate with ABSDF, and also the Network for Democracy and Development and among other things arranged political capacity-building and provided a forum for discussing the developments in Myanmar. DPNS, in contrary to ABSDF, dissociated itself from the armed struggle (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2004: 411-412).

Myanmar was ruled by a military regime until 2011, when the Union Solidarity and Development Party, USDP, which is a party with close connections to the military took over power. They won the 2010 election, which was boycotted by NLD (Croissant and Kamerling 2013: 119-121). However, after the 2015 election, in which NLD participated, NLD was able to form government (Thawngmung and Robinson 2017: 237). During these years, the political landscape eased up with increased political space (Thawngmung 2016: 133) and after DPNS was removed from the military's list of unlawful associations in 2013, the party returned and re-registered in Myanmar in 2014 (DPNS 2018c). They are currently working on formalising and developing the organisation of the party (Interview 1). In the 2015 election they participated with 21 candidates, but did not win any seats (DPNS 2015; Interview 1). They see themselves as a social democratic/liberal party, with its roots in the activist movement (Interview 1) and are collaborating with social democratic parties from other countries. Also, they have close ties

to a youth empowerment school in Yangon to which the Swedish Social Democratic Youth League⁷ are affiliated. This school informally functions as a recruitment base for the party, just as the school in Mae Sot used to do. The party also has a youth wing, Youth for a New Society, YNS, which was originally established in 2002, but was reorganised in 2012 (YNS 2015).

3. THEORY

This chapter starts out with describing the overarching theory guiding this thesis: the feminist institutionalism, and then continues by explaining how this theoretical perspective can be useful to add to the supply and demand model of political recruitment. The chapter ends with an elaboration of an analytical framework to be used in the analysis of this thesis.

3.1 FEMINIST INSTITUTIONALISM

Feminist institutionalism combines the fields of new institutionalism and feminist political science (Mackay 2011: 181). March and Olsen (1984: 747) made the case for a *new* institutionalism, arguing that to understand politics, the organisation of it matters. The new institutionalism asserts the importance of both formal and informal institutions, meaning that they and their interaction shape political life. The approach puts institutions at the centre of the analysis, seeing how actors relate to them (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 1-10). Institutions are the informal and formal ways in which politics is formed and they constitute rules which guide people's actions (Mackay 2011: 181-183). The informal institutions are in this thesis defined as rules that are recognized and collectively agreed upon, either explicitly or implicitly, but not formally. These rules, if broken are sanctioned in one way or another and thereby enforced (Lowndes 2014: 686) and could for example be norms and conventions (Kenny 2013: 36). Just as the informal institutions, formal ones are also enforced, but they are also formally agreed upon and in written language. These could for example be laws, regulations, standards and policies (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 52-53). However, instead of focusing on the distinction between formal and informal, it should also be acknowledged that there is a scale of how formal or informal an institution is. Informal institutions within parties may function as formal ones, and formal institutions are not automatically adhered to (Kenny 2013: 29), although there are enforcement mechanisms in place (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 46).

⁷ Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Ungdomsförbund, SSU.

The feminist take on the new institutionalism adds a gender perspective and examines how different formal and informal institutions are gendered, creating gendered outcomes and distribute power (Lowndes 2014: 685-686). Mackay (2011: 182) argues that “gendered institutions are crucial for understanding power inequalities and public and political life”. There are different versions of feminist institutionalism, but there are some common traits for the different approaches. Institutions are seen as inherently gendered, producing different outcomes for men and for women, and this also affects how power is constructed and how different institutions affect one another. Researching gender quotas, Freidenvall and Krook (2011: 50) argue that focus should be put on the interaction between different institutions as “the effects of one institution may depend on the shape of other institutions”. Informal rules influence the way formal rules are shaped, but they may also circumvent existing formal rules, such as gender quotas, and fill in the gaps where formal rules are missing (Mackay 2011: 181-183).

Institutions can be both directly gendered, such as gender quotas, or indirectly when they are influenced by informal gender norms (Lowndes 2014: 687), which for example can be seen in how first-past-the-post systems tend to favour men (Krook 2010a: 712). This is echoed in Beckwith’s (2005) definition of *gender as a process* as “[r]esearch employing gender as process centres on the idea that institutions and structures are themselves gendered and have differential implications for women and for men” (Beckwith 2005: 133). Gender as a process means that institutions that do not seem to be gendered still create gendered outcomes, but also that actors try to masculinize or feminize political institutions in a strategic way (Beckwith 2005: 132-133).

3.1.1 Change

Change is a central concept to feminist institutionalism. At times of transitions there might occur wider opportunities for gender reform, but old gender norms can also be cemented (Kenny 2013: 45) as new institutions are formed by previous ones, both through external and internal processes (Chappell 2011: 164-165). This means that the practical functioning of new formal institutions might not be aligned with the intentions of the creators of the institutions (Kenny 2013: 47; Thelen 2003: 230). The gender norms might be covert and both them and their enforcement can go unnoticed, but once noted they can be contested by formal means such as quotas and women’s policy agencies (Chappell 2011: 165). Although existing institutions

can be restraining, actors also use them to achieve change (Mackay 2011: 186). This is an ongoing process, which often include strategic actors that gather different interests in their reform proposals to attract more people (Kenny 2013: 47). The following sections explain how feminist institutionalism can be used to analyse political recruitment.

3.2 POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

3.2.1 The Supply and Demand Model

The supply and demand model of political recruitment first presented by Norris and Lovenduski (1995) and later critiqued and elaborated on by Krook (2010a; 2010b) and Kenny (2013), who both apply a feminist institutional approach to the model, will function as a foundation for the analysis. The original model makes a distinction between the *supply* of candidates and the *demand* of party recruiters. Supply of candidates relates to those who come forward as possible candidates and the demand of party recruiters relates to what the party recruiters are looking for at each stage in the recruitment process. Supply may be influenced by resources such as time and money as well as motivational factors that can influence people's willingness and possibility to put themselves forward as candidates. Candidate recruiters may hold prejudices about certain groups of people which influence the demand. These factors also relate to each other, party recruiters' prejudices may for example influence the willingness of people coming forward (Norris and Lovenduski 1995: 106-108). Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 15-16) also present the ladder of recruitment, which has been expanded by Lovenduski (2016), see figure 1. The ladder of recruitment shows the different stages at which the people that are formally eligible to become politicians can fall out of the process (Lovenduski 2016: 520-521). The actual candidate selection is thus embedded within a wider structure of party recruitment (Kenny 2013: 5), which is taken into account in this thesis, elaborated on in the section covering the analytical framework.

Extended Ladder of Recruitment




Figure 1. From Lovenduski (2016: 521).

Lovenduski (2016: 514) has later argued that the supply and demand model, although not explicitly, was institutionalist and that it could be improved by taking into account feminist institutionalism. In the next section this approach will be elaborated.

3.2.2 Critique of the Supply and Demand Model and Elaborations of it

Krook (2010a) provides a critique of the supply and demand model and argues that a feminist institutional approach should be used to analyse the lack of women as political representatives worldwide. The supply and demand model implicitly refers to the economic use of the model, with its assumption of a perfect market that leads to equilibriums. It fails to take into account the formal and informal processes that distorts this “market perfection”. Furthermore, it does not sufficiently incorporate a gender perspective and it can therefore not explain the extensive underrepresentation of women in political positions worldwide, as well as differences across countries and parties. A broader framework is needed, which regards the market imperfections and gender aspects of political recruitment (Krook 2010a: 709-711). Therefore, Krook (2010a: 711-713) presents three different forms of institutions to take into account in the analysis: systemic, practical and normative. Using this approach makes it possible to distinguish between different institutions that in the reality overlap, which also gives clarity as to which institutions

that influence “access to political office” (Krook 2010a: 711). Systemic institutions are formal and include the laws and organisations that structure the political landscape at large. This includes institutions such as electoral systems, number of parties and district size. Practical institutions are the procedures and criteria used by party recruiters and can be both formal such as requirements about age and citizenship, or informal such as family ties, money or experience. These institutions shape the opinions about who is suitable as a candidate, but the practical institutions are also formed by the values, or the normative institutions of the party. Normative institutions are the principles and values that guide recruitment. They can be formal such as party statutes, or informal such as public speeches and they can serve to justify gendered outcomes of seemingly gender neutral formal institutions. It is more common that parties on the left have normative institutions that serve the inclusion of women (Krook 2010a: 711-713). There are competing views on norms of equality which “involve a contrast between ‘equality of opportunities,’ focused on inputs, and ‘equality of results,’ focused on outputs” (Krook 2010a: 712). The different institutions interact and shape the selection of female candidates (Krook 2010a: 711-713).

Examples of Systemic, Practical, and Normative Institutions

Systemic Institutions

Electoral system: Majoritarian or proportional, candidate- or list-based vote, open- or closed-party lists, single- or multimember districts

Party system: One-, two-, or multiparty system

Practical Institutions

Formal criteria: Age, citizenship, party membership, term limits

Informal criteria: Ticket-balancing, skills, experience, prominence, party activism, family ties, money, insider or outsider status

Method of ballot composition: Centralized or decentralized, group rights to nominate or veto, primaries or nominations, secret or open ballots

Normative Institutions

Norms of equality: Equality of opportunity or equality of results (system or party level)

Norms of representation: Politics of ideas or politics of presence (system or party level)

Table 1. From Krook (2010a: 711).

Krook (2010a) uses this feminist institutional take on candidate selection to analyse gender quotas in different countries and argues “that quotas may reform gendered institutions in various ways and degrees, at the same time that they may shift and interact with the effects of the other two types of institutions” (Krook 2010a: 717). In a further elaboration by Kenny (2013), feminist institutionalism is applied to supply and demand relating to political recruitment in general. Kenny (2013) means that a specific focus should be put on the party, in contrast to Krook (2010a; 2010b) who puts equal emphasis on institutions both outside and

inside of the party. The main focus should thus be on practical and normative institutions, as the systemic institutions relate mainly to factors outside of the party. This is also the approach taken in this thesis, with systemic institutions only briefly touched upon.

Parties are gendered organisations and gatekeepers to political office (Kenny 2013: 27-28). The potential candidates and candidate selectors within parties operate within the party frame of norms, party organisation and rules and their attitudes and motivations directly affect the recruitment process (Kenny 2013: 15). The demand of party recruiters is shaped by both formal and informal criteria (Kenny 2013: 16), and these criteria tend to favour men (Kenny and Verge 2016: 359). These institutions shape the internal party dynamics, and discriminatory practices are not only present on the individual level between party gatekeepers and potential candidates, but also on the party level where both formal and informal rules are produced by these gender norms (Bjarnegård and Kenny 2016: 372). Discrimination of candidates by party recruiters may be both direct, for example by asking discriminatory questions based on judgement about the candidates due to belonging to a certain group, or imputed by supposing that candidates belonging to a certain group may lose votes (Kenny 2013: 16-17). Most candidate selectors being male further disadvantages women (Kenny 2013: 22). The impact of formal rules matter, gender quotas force parties to focus on finding suitable female candidates (Bjarnegård and Kenny 2016: 373). According to Krook (2010b: 161) the mobilisation of women within parties can push them to adopt quotas, however, research on quotas show that the effect of them varies, which shows that the demand factors are not easily changed, even with the introduction of the formal measure of a quota (Krook 2010b: 161).

Related to this, Kenny (2013: 23) also argues that a greater emphasis should be put on the demand side. Although it is important to investigate both supply and demand factors and their interaction, the “research evidence increasingly privileges demand-side explanations” (Kenny 2013: 23). There is normally enough of supply of female candidates to fill the positions within the party, if the party actually wishes to include women (Kenny 2013: 24; Bjarnegård 2013: 118). Demand factors may even shape supply as the parties’ activities can influence the will of potential candidates to step forward (Kenny 2013: 24).

3.2.3 A Feminist Institutional Approach to Political Recruitment

Kenny (2013: 25) argues that the original supply and demand model did not sufficiently address the gendered processes of political recruitment and the complex way institutions relate to each other and influence political recruitment. Of the objections and elaborations explained in the previous sections there are four aspects that should be considered when applying a feminist institutional approach to the supply and demand model according to Kenny (2013: 27-32). Firstly, parties and their internal gendered dynamics are essential to study due to their important role as gatekeepers to political office. Secondly, the relation between formal and informal institutions should be studied, while acknowledging that there are no sharp distinctions between formal and informal but rather a continuum, and therefore it is helpful to look at processes of formalisation and informalisation. Lowndes (2014: 687) argues that it indeed is difficult to “identify the complex matrix of rules that produce gendered effects in politics” and that it therefore is useful to look at how formal and informal are mixed, and avoid making too distinct separation, which also is echoed in Kenny’s (2013) approach to feminist institutionalism. Third, the interaction between different types of institutions, systemic, practical and normative, presented by Krook (2010a) should be analysed and fourth, different forms of change should be taken into account. These can be gradual changes, internal pressure for change and specific moments which function as windows of opportunities (Kenny 2013: 27-31).

3.3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The foundation of the analysis lies in the supply and demand model and although the model is more focused at candidate selection, I broaden the perspective and investigate political recruitment in general, including both party recruitment and candidate selection. I thus both look at how women can enter the party, and how they are represented within different activities, leadership bodies and as candidates for election. I argue that it is still possible to use the model taking into account the ladder of recruitment presented above. In this we can clearly see that who is active within the party matters for the representation in parliaments. Furthermore, Lovenduski (2016: 519) claims “that the model, for all its apparent simplicity, has considerable capacity to carry ideas, concepts and methodological refinements. It was and is basically up to the researcher how to operationalize it”. Furthermore, in relation to applying the model to a party in Myanmar, Lovenduski (2016: 519-522) argues that the supply and demand model is flexible enough to be applied to different countries, parties and systems, also hybrid-

democracies. The ladder of recruitment could be applied, as the steps in it are alike across contexts, although the mechanisms are different (Lovenduski 2016: 522). I can thus fill this frame with the specific context of DPNS and Myanmar.

Although both supply and demand are analysed, the main attention will be on demand factors, and how supply and demand interact, as demand has been rendered more important (Kenny 2013). Out of the four perspectives of feminist institutionalism added by Kenny (2013), three will be considered in the analysis. The first perspective – the overall focus on parties and gender – is already covered for in the overall theme of this thesis. The other two perspectives covered are the formal and informal institutions and the gradient in-between as well as the different forms of institutions: systemic, practical and normative. As the focus is on the party, systemic institutions are only briefly touched upon. The interaction between informal, formal and the different forms of institutions are analysed. However, due to the limited time in the field, I am not able to analyse the fourth perspective concerning how institutions change over time.

Below is a schematic picture of the analytical framework. The analysis has the overarching division between supply and demand factors, and the analysis will be divided into two parts into accordance with this. Within these two sections, the different formal, informal, systemic, practical and normative institutions and their interaction is analysed, as well as the interaction between supply and demand.




Figure 2. Analytical framework.

4. METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the methodology of the thesis and the different choices that I made throughout the process. Following the theoretical focus, the thesis has taken a feminist methodological approach into account. This means that it has been important to establish non-exploitative relationship with the party and informants, reflect upon my own positionality to avoid objectification and to aim to do good with the research (Creswell 2013: 29). This approach as well as limitations and ethical considerations will be discussed throughout the different sections of this chapter.

4.1 REFLEXIVITY AND POSITIONALITY

Coming as a western master's student to a developing country to collect data for a thesis is not unproblematic as this may contribute to colonial-like relations. When western researchers tend to dominate research in and about developing countries, this undermines the possibility for "local people" speaking for themselves (Scheyvens and McLennan 2014: 5). To counteract this, some researchers mean that only people from a specific group could understand that group. However, it can also be argued that it is simplifying to state that only people with certain attributes can understand people with the same attributes. Also, there are different nuances of

being an insider or outsider (Scheyvens and McLennan 2014: 6-7), and although a researcher is from the same country as the informants, other barriers might exist (Sultana 2007: 377-378). Cross-cultural research can be positive and lead to increased understanding, but the researchers need to be aware of power relations, be reflective and seeing that the research is a two-way process (Scheyvens and Leslie 2000: 128-129). A drawback with the study is that it is only a partial description of a whole with limited data, but I have tried to stay true to the information that was shared with me (Sultana 2007: 378).

Also, representing “others” can be problematic. Mohanty (1988: 64-65) critically examines the way western feminist researchers represent women from “third-world countries” and argues that there is a tendency of lumping different women together as a group, presenting an “average third-world woman”. She argues that “[w]hat is problematical, then, about this kind of use of 'women' as a group, as a stable category of analysis, is that it assumes an ahistorical, universal unity among women based on a generalized notion of their subordination” (Mohanty 1988: 72). Instead researchers must make sure to analyse power and gendered processes within the local context and highlight contradictions (Mohanty 1988: 73-74). By looking at how actors in the party relates to gendered institutions, my aim is to emphasise how these institutions are both constraining and enabling, adhered to as well as challenged by different women (and men). Also, England (1994: 242-244) writes about the risk of, while representing “others”, fall into “patterns of domination”, and therefore argues that analytical reflexivity is important to gain insights, consider “the consequences of the interactions with those being investigated”, and seeing that researchers are not impersonal, detached from the research. Kobayashi (2003: 347-348) has questioned this approach, as it may become self-indulgent and “the very act that sets us apart”. However, Sultana (2007: 376) argues that the approach still holds validity as it can make power relations visible and that reflexivity therefore should be carried out throughout the research process. Therefore, during the whole process I have tried to be aware of how my own positionality can influence the way I form the research, what I ask during interviews and how I then analyse and present the material. I am not an impartial observer, and my own experiences have most probably affected the data and my analysis of it. Although I had been in Myanmar for 6 months when conducting the interviews, I was still very much an outsider and not being able to speak the language. As I interviewed both men and women of different ages, the power dynamics was probably different between the different interviews.

Although there are drawbacks with conducting research in developing countries, the possible positive aspects should also be considered, such as contributing to learning about issues which can lead to positive change (Scheyvens and McLennan 2014: 10-11). Hammett et al. (2015: 92) write that it is important to consider for whom the research is conducted and who has been involved in elaborating the research. In doing this I met with some different organisations working on women's political participation and representation in Myanmar to situate my study. I also asked the contact person in the party to give inputs on the research focus. My hope is that this thesis will be of some use for DPNS in their work towards a greater representation of women and that also local organisations might get some new insight from it. This is also related to ethical considerations which have been part of the research process, from start to hand-in. Research should not only aim to not do any harm, but to actually do something good (Banks and Scheyvens 2014: 160-161).

4.2 ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

As feminist institutionalism with its focus on norms, values and ideas is primarily constructivist (Mackay 2011: 182), this is also the ontological and epistemological standpoint taken in this thesis, meaning that social entities are considered constructed by actors and continuously reconstructed. There are different versions of constructivism and where some claim that there is no form of social reality, others have a more moderate approach where social entities such as organisations and culture are acknowledged as pre-existent, but at the same time continuously formed and understood by actors (Bryman 2012: 33-34). This thesis takes the latter ontological approach, seeing that formal political institutions are precisely pre-existent, but at the same time can affect, be understood and be used differently by different actors. Using a constructivist approach means from an epistemological perspective that the experiences and perspectives of different actors are important as there is no absolute truth when the world is filtered through the human mind (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 10-11). Therefore, it is important to be careful and critical when approaching knowledge, as it is always socially situated and closely related to power (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 200-201). With a constructivist perspective, I, as a researcher, must reflect upon my own role, as my personal background will affect my interpretations and analysis (Creswell 2013: 25), see above section.

4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design for this thesis is a case study, and studying a case is to study the particular and could constitute a single person or a “bounded system” (Stake 1995: 2). DPNS constitutes the case investigated in this thesis and could be argued to be an *instrumental case* as an instrumental case is studied to comprehend something else. The understanding of this case may contribute to the greater understanding of women’s underrepresentation. However, the focus is still on the specifics of this particular case (Stake 1995: 3-4). The case is bounded in time and space and cannot be generalised and should only function as a practical example. According to Flyvbjerg (2006: 221-228) context-specific knowledge is just as important as generalisation, and the potential lack of generalisability from qualitative case studies should thus not be seen as a problem.

Although I chose to do a case study, an ethnographic study might have been a more suitable design as this type of study investigates a group which shares a culture, such as a political party. The focus lies on behaviours, values and beliefs, and the study is conducted through extensive fieldwork (Creswell 2013: 90-92). Although the study of these factors would have been good and given a deeper understanding of the dynamics within the party, it was not possible due to access, time constraint and the language barrier. Doing a case-study was thus the second-best option as case studies contribute with examples to a field of research, and the approach I opted for (Flyvbjerg 2006: 219). This is important from a feminist perspective as documenting women’s situation in different countries through case studies and building increased understanding can make action to counteract gender injustices effective (Reinharz 1992: 168-171), such as ways to work against women’s political underrepresentation.

For the analysis, attention should be paid to details in a case study (Creswell 2013: 199). According to Flyvbjerg (2006: 238) one technic when describing a case study is to let the case develop in detail in the text and avoid making summaries. The case should tell the story itself, allowing for the different opinions and understandings uncovered in the research process to come forward and in this way making it possible for the readers of the case to create their own understanding of the it (Flyvbjerg 2006: 237-238).

4.4 DATA COLLECTION

4.4.1 Sampling

The interviews were conducted in Yangon between the 23rd of January and the 5th of March 2018, for list of interviews see the appendix. I had an idea on who I wanted to talk to and at the same time I used the contacts I established to find more people of interest, which could be seen as combination of purposive and snowball sampling (Bryman 2012: 418). A contact person in the party functioned as a gatekeeper and arranged five interviews with people active within the party, which I had requested. One of these informants arranged three interviews with people I asked for. I was also advised by two different persons outside of the party to talk to a specific person and I contacted this person myself. Working with a gatekeeper to the party might however be problematic as gatekeepers might steer the research by choosing who the researcher can interview (Banks and Scheyvens 2014: 172-173). I hope to have avoided this by specifically ask for certain people and also finding others to interview through other contacts. However, the analysis would probably have become different if I had interviewed other people in the party. As I also wanted to find out about formal institutions within the party, the party's policy on political attitudes and a folder from YNS⁸ are included in the analysis, but constitute only a minor part of it.

5 women and 4 men were interviewed and I have chosen to interview both women and men within the party due to two reasons. Firstly, studying gender does not equal studying women and “a gendered analysis is as much about men and masculinity as it is about women and femininity” (Bjarnegård 2013: 1). A feminist perspective provides a critical way of studying men in politics, without taking men and masculine practices as implicit norms (Bjarnegård 2013: 16-17). Second, I have set out to understand gendered institutions relating to political recruitment within the party, and as the party includes both women and men, I wanted to get insights in how women and men respectively understand the party dynamics to get a fuller picture of them.

⁸ The folder from YNS is in English. However, the text about political attitudes is in Myanmar language. I therefore used Google translate to see which parts of the text that seemed interesting. The translations of these parts were checked by a Myanmar speaking person.

4.4.2 Semi-structured Interviews

I used semi-structured interviews with DPNS party members to collect data. As the research is conducted from a constructivist perspective the informants own versions of the situation within the party is of great importance. Therefore, the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way to give some freedom to follow up on unexpected areas of interest, but to still have some structure to depart from. In such an approach, not all the questions in the guide will have to be asked if other areas are more interesting (Bryman 2012: 470-471). This enhances the opportunity to understand what each informant thinks of the situation. To understand how candidate selection is happening and how gender influences parties it is necessary to talk to the actors themselves, and interviews are therefore a suitable method to investigate these processes (Kenny 2013: 61). Furthermore, interviews provide a useful way to understand “informal interactions and behaviors that can be...important to political outcomes” (Kapiszewski et al. 2015: 190). I also aimed at having an open approach during the interviews, such as being open to answer questions asked by the informants, in the hope to establish less hierarchical interview relations in line with the feminist approach (Bryman 2012: 491-492). Furthermore, I tried to constantly reflect how my own positionality may have influenced the answers I was given.

In-depth interviews can be conducted with one or two persons at the time (Kapiszewski et al. 2015: 194). 9 people were interviewed and all except one interview were conducted individually. This interview was out of convenience conducted with 2 men simultaneously. This was positive in that they could interact, add and contrast their experiences with each other (Bryman 2012: 501). However, it could also affect the things they said as “participants may be more prone to expressing culturally expected views” (Bryman 2012: 518). A possible limitation with interviews generally is that informants may exert power by withholding or sharing certain information (Scheyvens and McLennan 2014: 9). It could also be so that the informants did not share their exact opinions during the interviews due to party policies and loyalty to the party. Relating to this is the location of the interviews. All, except one interview, were conducted at the DPNS office in Yangon. One interview was conducted at a café. As it is important that the informants feel comfortable, to the extent possible I let them choose the locations. The location can also provide important insights about the informants’ reality (Hammett et al. 2015: 157- 158), and seeing the DPNS office made me better understand the preconditions for DPNS and its members. However, as a gatekeeper arranged 5 of the interviews it is possible that the decision of interview space was a way of directing the research.

Formal spaces, such as a party office, may lead to informants not saying things opposed to the official party line (Hammett et al. 2015: 157-158).

The informants were all active party members within the central part of the party. As the interviews are anonymised I will not account for the informants' exact positions in the party. Anonymity is important to consider in order to protect informants. Disclosing too much information could make identification possible (Banks and Scheyvens 2014: 168). As it is important that participants in research projects are aware about the purpose, what the interview material will be used for and that participation is entirely voluntary (Banks and Scheyvens 2014: 164; Brinkmann and Kvale 2015: 93), I explained this orally in the beginning of the interviews and also gave them written information in English or Myanmar language. When giving this information I also asked if I could record the interviews, which all informants consented to.

Three expert interviews were also conducted with two representatives from Phan Tee Eain, one representative from Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy and one representative for Triangle Women Support Group. In addition to the three expert interviews I also met with three different organisations, Oxfam, Gender Equality Network and International Women's Development Agency, and a research consultant for informal discussions on how to situate my study before I started doing interviews.

4.4.3 Translating

For five interviews a translator was present. The two informants that were interviewed together spoke some English, but were more comfortable in Myanmar language. They mixed the languages and the translator thus translated parts of this interview. As these informants spoke English they also listened to the translations and seemed content with how she transferred the messages. Four interviews were translated fully by the translator. Although the translations seem to have been accurate the use of a translator can still affect the quality of the data obtained as there is a greater gap between me (the researcher) and the informants. The translator might not translate exactly what the informants are saying (McLennan et al. 2014: 156-157). For the last interview an English-speaking party member translated. This of course may influence the answers in a negative way, as the informant may have answered differently than if it was not someone from within the party. Also, the translations may have become more biased, with the

translating party member's own thoughts mixed in with the translations (McLennan et al. 2014: 153-157). Therefore, I have handled the data from this interview sparsely and with more care.

4.5 TRANSCRIBING AND PRESENTING

I transcribed the interviews manually word by word and due to the differences between oral and written language, quotes in the analysis section have been changed to a correct written language, both for readability and out of respect for the informants and translators (Brinkmann and Kvale 2015: 213-214). In other aspects, the quotes are presented as the informant or translator said it. The translators mixed first and third person in the translations and keeping this in original makes the translators visible in the research and allows for greater awareness of the impact translations may have on the meaning of what is said (Edwards 1998: 202-203). Transcribing can be difficult, and different persons may write the same spoken sentences in different ways (Brinkmann and Kvale 2015: 211-212), I therefore tried to transcribe the interviews as soon as possible, when I still had them fresh in mind.

4.6 CODING AND ANALYSING

To analyse the data, I followed Creswell's (2013: 182-188) approach, which he describes as a data analysis spiral, as different steps are going at the same time, and already in the field. It is thus not a linear process, although some steps follow each other. After transcribing I entered the data into the software programme NVivo. Working within NVivo is positive as it makes the coding of the material effective. However, there are also concerns that these types of software programmes, among other things, fragments the material (Bryman 2012: 592-593). I have tried to counteract this by reading the transcripts in their full version several times and taking notes. I classified the material into many specific categories, or codes (Creswell 2013: 183-184). The women's and men's answers were coded separately as I wanted to easier distinguish patterns in the responses, but they are presented within the same structure. I also divided the codes between supply and demand factors in accordance with the analytical framework. Therein, I arranged the codes that shared similar ideas into themes. I interpreted the data, reading my coding a few times and identified within these different themes the different forms of institutions at play (Creswell 2013: 185-187), thus the different formal and informal as well as the systemic, practical and normative institutions.

5. ANALYSIS

In this chapter the interview data and the textual material is analysed in accordance with the analytical framework presented in the theory chapter. Supply and demand are analysed separately, but their interaction is treated throughout the two sections. Focus is laid on formal and informal institutions and the different types of institutions: systemic, practical and normative, as well as their interaction.

5.1 SUPPLY

This section describes how different institutions affect the supply of people to be engaged in the party, and how this relates to the demand of party recruiters. Below is a table where the different institutions that came up during the interviews can be seen in relation to degree of formality as well as whether the institution were systemic, practical or normative.

	<i>Informal</i>	<i>Formal</i>
<i>Systemic</i>	Education system	
	Constitution	
<i>Practical</i>	Lack of money	
<i>Normative</i>	Women's obligations in the home	
	Women as unpolitical	

Table 2. Institutions relating to political recruitment within DPNS - Supply.

In this section on institutions relating to supply, firstly some informal normative institutions are presented, which is followed by a presentation of an informal practical institution and formal systemic institutions that limit women's representation.

5.1.1 Informal Normative Institutions

Conservative normative institutions limit women's political representation. Although there are no such formal institutions neither in the party or in the country⁹, there are informal ones. Mentioned by all of the women, and one of the men, was the double obligation women have, both for the household and to provide an income (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7). Four of the women mentioned their own experiences, with parents expecting them to take care of them when they grow old, parents who think that the right place for women is in the home and husbands who do not share the responsibility of the household (Interviews 2, 3, 5 and 7). However, the opinions about these practices seemed to differ, where one woman mentioned that time management therefore was a challenge, as she really wanted to devote time to the party, but at the same time she did not seem to think that the unequal division of household labour needed to change (Interview 2). On the other hand, one woman had challenged her husband concerning this division of work – basically stopping to do some household tasks she was expected to do. First her husband had asked her why she was not doing it, but after a while he had accepted it (Interview 7). She challenged the informal norm that she should take all the responsibility for the home and succeeded – thus managed to change to way things in the household were done. One informant said that if a woman goes into politics she would worry and look back at her family much more than a man would (Interview 5). This could mean that women also take a larger emotional responsibility for the household, and not only concerning the practical aspects. The same woman also said that:

[h]er father also thinks that women should stay at home and cook and do household tasks, get married and have children. That's the idea that they still have in their mind. But she said still I want to be a politician so I will do what I want to (Interview 5).

The responsibility for the household makes it difficult for the women to enter politics, but also to stay active. As also mentioned in the background section, women in Myanmar often are expected to take care of the household. This issue is theorized by Chant (2007) who in her

⁹ There is however an article in the constitution (and thus a formal systemic institution) which states that “[t]he Union shall, upon specified qualifications being fulfilled, in appointing or assigning duties to civil service personnel, not discriminate for or against any citizen of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, based on race, birth, religion, and sex. However, nothing in this Section shall prevent appointment of men to the positions that are suitable for men only” (The Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2008: Article 352).

research on The Gambia, The Philippines and Costa Rica concludes that there is an ongoing feminisation of responsibility and obligation. This meaning that women put increasingly time into paid labour, but at the same time maintain the responsibility of the unpaid household work. The increasing responsibility of women as bread-winners to the family does not seem to give any power in renegotiating the responsibilities in the home with men, neither is there any other rewards to this increased responsibility, such as increased freedom. Especially young women may face these difficulties with increasing education levels and higher earning capacity (Chant 2007: 333-337). However, as described above, one of the interviewed women had actually been able to renegotiate these responsibilities.

In general terms, the informants mentioned other conservative normative institutions that make it more difficult for women to travel (Interviews 3 and 5), stay away from home (Interview 4b), and that assert women as non-political (Interviews 1, 3 4a, 4b, 6 and 7) and unsuitable for leadership (Interviews 3 and 4). One woman put this in relation to the role of Aung San Suu Kyi as:

[t]hat kind of thinking still exists in our society. Even though they let Daw Aung San Suu Kyi be the leader, they don't think all females have that capacity. They still feel that female is the, I don't know, the second sex (Interview 3).

5.1.2 An Informal Practical Institution

An informal practical institution that seems to influence both political participation and representation, but not have any direct gendered effects is the difficult financial situation for both individuals and for the party. Three women and three men expressed that the economic situation affects the possibility for people to be active in politics and they spoke both in general terms and shared their own experiences of this (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4a, 4b and 5). One woman said that to be a good politician you would need an economic income, such as a supportive family or a union in the back (Interview 5). The role of the parents for young people is also important as parents might not want their children to participate as it is not a good future in politics since it does not provide a good income (Interviews 3, 4a and 4b). This could be seen as an informal normative institution, with values about what things parents believe are good for their children. The lack of money also affects the party at large, as it is difficult for it to find

funding. This is easier for bigger, more established parties such as NLD and USDP (Interview 1).

5.1.3 Formal Systemic Institutions

To change the informal normative institutions that assert that women should stay in the home, one informant believed education to be essential as “education or maybe capacity building programmes, that's the only way we can change Burma” (Interview 3), and another informant claimed that the poor education system is a direct cause for people thinking that men are more worth than women, and that the education system therefore needs reformation (Interview 4a). To this the informant in the same interview added that “there are two matters. One is education and one is politics. You cannot completely change the people if your education system is always like this. [-] You cannot change the education if you don't change the politics” (Interview 4b). In relation to this, one woman said that people do not understand that what they do is actually concerned with politics, such as cooking, and that this limits political participation. Villagers, especially women do not know that they can contribute to the country, or how (Interview 2), and according to Kempel et al. (2015: 20) there are low levels of awareness of politics among the poor rural population, especially among women. The educational system is a formal systemic institution, which in this case according to the informants forms the way people think, and thus the informal normative institutions. This necessarily does not only relate to supply factors, but could also affect demand and the way party recruiters think. It is also, according to the last informant, linked to the whole political system. In general, people do not understand why political parties are important, or appreciate the work they do (Interview 1), which limits political participation. Furthermore, due to the military history and that some parties have strong connections to the military there is a lack of trust among people for political parties (Interview 1). The way the systemic institutions relating to the military affect political participation is elaborated on in the next paragraph.

Two women and two men mentioned fear for reprisals as a hinderance towards participating in politics. The system with the 2008 constitution and the power still hold on to by the military was seen as a problem, either because parents fear for their children that are active in politics, or for the politicians fearing that the military would punish their family members for them being active. One woman only spoke in general terms (Interview 2), while the others mentioned how this affected them (Interviews 3, 4a and 4b). The constitution is a formal systemic institution

and it guarantees power to the military (Williams 2011: 1202). It does not only affect the recruitment to the party due to fear, but it also makes it difficult to find candidates that want to stand for election as many that sympathise with the party have their roots in the activist movements and do not want to work within the existing structure (Interview 1). Also, the oppressive laws make it difficult to work as a political party (Interviews 1 and 8), although it has become easier (Interview 8). However, there did not seem to be any gendered differences in relation to this institution. In this section on supply some different formal and informal institutions that limit women's, but also men's political representation, as neither the practical or the systemic institutions presented seem to have any direct gendered effects. The analysis now moves on to focusing on institutions on the demand side.

5.2 DEMAND

This section treats the institutions relating to demand. Below is a table that shows the degree of formality and the different types of institutions just as in the supply section. However, as the focus is on the party, systemic institutions are not included in the analysis.

	<i>Informal</i>	<i>Formal</i>
<i>Practical</i>	Lack of money	
	Recruitment Criteria	
	Organising Trips	
	Election Committee	
	Quota	
	Recruitment Guidelines	
	YNS policy of one woman and one man on highest positions	
	Asking for women	

	Women recruiting other women
	Lack of implementation on township level
	Women's agenda last priority
	30% quota as a ceiling
	Not following guidelines
	Favouring men
<i>Normative</i>	Equality in Party Policy
	Women's rights in YNS folder
	Why informants believe women are important in politics
	Women are only members as support

Table 3. Institutions relating to political recruitment within DPNS - Demand.

In the below analysis, there is first a description of the general aspects of recruitment to the party. Thereafter the formal and informal normative institutions that guide the actions of the party are presented, followed by the formal and informal practical institutions that can contribute to women's representation in the party. However, there are also informal practical and normative institutions that undermine them, which are presented, followed by a presentation of formal practical institutions that the WWC has suggested and demanded should be implemented to ensure women's representation within the party. As these are not yet in place, they are not presented in the above table.

5.2.1 Party Recruitment and Candidate Selection

DPNS now has around 15 000 members and part of formalising the party in the country is to recruit new members (Interview 1). Both DPNS and YNS are recruiting and use some different ways of doing this such as organising trips, through the Youth Empowerment School, YES, and by approaching certain people. However, several of the informants mentioned that it is difficult to recruit people due to both the party's economy and the economy of the people they target, as mentioned in the supply section. The supply factors are then perceived as limiting the possibility of the party to recruit. One woman expressed how the economic situation affected not only the possibility to recruit people, but also how it affected her feeling to recruit people to be active in the party "I feel very you know uncomfortable to persuade them, [-] because I cannot pay them" (Interview 3). The same informant also considered recruitment the most difficult thing about being an active politician (Interview 3). One man also connected the difficulty to reach the 30% quota directly to the economic problem, and that both men and women have to work both for their family and for the party but that "[f]or the women the situation is more difficult" (Interview 1). One woman said she enjoyed recruiting new members, since this is very important for the party. However, she also said it was difficult due to the many barriers, but that "especially those who have a lot of opportunity, they don't want to work for the politics. But in the local area, people really good to, wanted to be, willing to be a politician. Interesting huh?" (Interview 7). People need convincing though, and for example farmers think that:

[w]e are like farmer, we do not really know everything. Oh no, you know a lot of things. You're a farmer, I don't know about the farming. But you know better than me. So you have to teach me about that. So I will share something that I know. This is really important. Otherwise if you don't share that you have a difficulty I don't know, ok, and the government don't know. So how can the government solve it for you? (Interview 7).

It is thus important to convince people that politics is important, and as also mentioned in the supply section, people might not know that many everyday things can be political (Interview 2). As stated in the background chapter, the party has a strong foundation within different activist movements and this is one recruitment base (Interview 1). Although it is difficult to recruit people who identify as activists, as mentioned in the supply section, one informant said that "we like to be a party of activists, activist farmers, activist workers, activists, student activists, youth activist. So we try to recruit, we target theses activists to be our active members"

(Interview 1). Other traits that were mentioned by the informants as important that the new members to the party should possess were having the time to be engaged (Interviews 5 and 8), being devoted to politics (Interviews 2, 4a, 5 and 6), agreeing with the party values (Interview 1) and listen well to the people (Interview 5). One woman also said she especially wanted more young women in the party (Interview 3). These are informal practical institutions or criteria for party recruitment.

During the organising trips, DPNS and YNS meet with people in different parts of Myanmar and explain about the party (Interviews 3, 4b, 5, 7 and 8). YNS has a strategy that they do an activity with the youth they meet, and then they try to recruit the youth that participated. But it is difficult as they have to explain things many times to be able to convince the youth, and they rely on support by DPNS (Interview 5). The YES is also a base for recruitment, but it is sometimes troublesome as the youth come from different parts of Myanmar and once they have returned it might be difficult to keep their engagement up (Interview 3). Several informants said that the recruitment of new members is the duty of every member of the party (Interviews 2, 3, 4a and 4b), however two women also mentioned that the Central Organising Committee holds most responsibility (Interviews 3 and 5). Also, YNS should take more responsibility to recruit youths (Interviews 4a and 5).

The candidates for election are according to one informant chosen by an election committee that is formed prior to the election (Interview 8). The selection process thus seems to be centralised, in contrary to how the selection process often function within Myanmar parties with township officials making the initial selection of candidates (Kempel et al. 2015: 27). The selection of candidates is guided by recruitment guidelines, of which the 30% quota is part (Interview 1). For the next election the party will focus on six stronghold areas, and then try to expand that (Interview 1).

5.2.2 Normative Institutions Enabling the Representation of Women

As mentioned in the supply section, informal normative institutions assert women as unsuitable for politics, however, there are both formal and informal normative institutions within the party that go against this. The four party values are freedom, equality, solidarity and democracy and the party also states that it supports the women's rights movement (DPNS 2018e). The programme of YNS states that they should “[d]evelop the status of women through their

empowerment and participation in the political sphere” (YNS 2015). These are formal normative institutions, but these values are also reflected in informal normative institutions among the informants. They unanimously disagreed on the perceptions that asserts women as unpolitical and should stay in the home. Instead they gave some different reasons as to why women were needed in politics and in the party. One way of looking at gender equality is equality of opportunities (Krook 2010a: 712) and this argument was used by two men who mentioned justice as an important factor (Interviews 1 and 8), and one of them put it in connection to the party’s political standpoint about equality, as “if you do not take the issue [of women’s representation] I think the party will never be equal” (Interview 1).

Another way of looking at women’s representation is to see “politics of presence” as important, as a certain group’s representation may lead to different political outcomes (Krook 2010a: 712). This was highlighted by one of the men and several of the women. One woman put her political beliefs of social democracy in relation to the need for women in politics and meant that women are needed as they know how to manage the household budget, and therefore would have valuable knowledge to contribute with to welfare policies (Interview 3). Another woman meant that although men and women are equal “women can do better than men” as “they focus on what they are going to do and they do it” in comparison to men who are not as focused (Interview 5). Two persons thought that there would be a softer climate with more discussions and dialogue if more women were politically active (interviews 7 and 8), and one of them also thought it would become more inclusive as women think more about this (Interview 7). A third perspective was mentioned by a man who said that since half of the voters are women, which is a lot of votes, it is important with women as representatives from an election perspective (Interview 1). Including women as a strategy to look modern and progressive and to gain votes has been found common among socialist parties (Dahlerup 2006a: 295).

Two of the informants used the arguments of a “politics of ideas”, which asserts that it is not *who* presents the ideas, but rather *what* ideas that are presented that matter (Krook 2010a: 712). However, these informants believed this with the precondition that conservative gender norms no longer would be at play. One women expressed that “if you are really devoted, passionate for the country then it doesn't matter if you are a man or a woman, then you are suited for politics” (Interview 2) and one man hoped that in the future people would “look to the quality, qualifications, what the person can do, not the gender” (Interview 4a).

The institutions presented in this section are all normative and should be promoting women's inclusion in politics. They are also reflected in some practical institutions that are presented in the next section.

5.2.3 Practical Institutions Enabling the Representation of Women

As earlier mentioned there is one formal practical institution in place within DPNS aimed at increasing women's representation in the party: a 30% gender quota. This quota refers to both the selection of candidates and to representation within internal party structures (Interview 7). It was adopted in the early 2000's (Interview 8), but has still not been reached in any body within the party. If recruitment happen without this quota in mind, it will not be fulfilled and the party will not accomplish equal representation of women and men. Parties are shown to be conservative regarding change, which gender quotas bring along (Kenny and Verge 2016: 360), and "changes in the formal rules of the candidate selection process – including the introduction of gender quota measures – may not necessarily translate into changes in the day-to-day practices of recruitment" (Kenny 2013: 32). It is common that although the party complies with the quota formally, informal mechanisms are at play that actually limit women's equal representation, such as placing female candidates in constituencies with unwinnable seats (Kenny and Verge 2016: 363), and findings related to such informal processes are elaborated on in section 5.2.4.

The quota was adopted while the party was in exile in Mae Sot. One man said that the party members there participated in trainings organised by, among others, Burmese Women's Union. However, it took some time to understand what gender and the quota system entail (Interview 8). ABSDF did also organise women's empowerment trainings at the Thai-Myanmar border (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2004: 409). Three of the men and one woman linked the importance of a quota to the barriers women face (Interviews 1, 4b, 7 and 8). This argument is what could be called a "fast-track argument", in comparison to an incremental argument. The fast-track argument asserts the importance of affirmative action to counteract gender discrimination (Dahlerup 2006b: 8). To counteract informal normative institutions on the supply and the demand sides, a formal practical institution is adopted on the demand side. Several of the informants expressed that it would be good to have a quota at the national level (Interviews 3,4a, 4b, 6, 8), which would be a formal systemic institution.

Within YNS there is a semi-formal practical institution in place which states that the chairperson and the general secretary in YNS always should be one woman and one man. The policy is not formally described in any policy, but seem to be agreed upon informally (Interviews 3 and 4b), and could thus be seen as a semi-formal institution. There are also some semi-informal practical institutions that promote the representation and recruitment of women to the party. During the organising trips, it is important to ask especially for women to come to their meetings, as it otherwise only would come men due to normative institutions on the supply side:

they will ask the captain to gather more women than men. Usually the men will be the one who go and women will stay at home and cook or do whatever they ask them to do, so now for them they always tell the captain to send more women. If the men can come it is ok, but they want more women. That's how they recruit women members (Interview 5).

As mentioned, YES is an unofficial place for recruitment, and when finding participants to their youth course, they also specifically ask for women (Interview 3). Some of the informants also thought that it was easier for women to recruit other women to the party (Interviews 3, 4a, 5, 7). One of them, a woman, in relation to this also said that they recruit women through building relationships over some time and visiting people's houses (Interview 7). However, she also thought it was important that men also take responsibility for the recruitment of women:

men always think that we are very responsible person. Something like that, so it is good that we say that we all have responsibility, we will work together. Not only the women's group is working for that (Interview 7).

This section has shown some practical institutions already in place that should favour women. However, as the next section shows, there exist some institutions that limit their effect.

5.2.4 Practical and Normative Institutions Limiting the Representation of Women

Although there are normative and practical institutions stating that women's representation is important, other informal practical and normative institutions lead to few women being represented within different parts of the party. WWC is trying to counteract this and from a theoretical perspective, the women act in a window of opportunity as times of transitions makes gender reforms possible (Kenny 2013: 45-46), but according to one woman the formalisation of the party is used as an excuse not to work on the issue, as the main priority now is to get

more members generally. Because of this, the quota is not communicated well to all levels of the party. When the central part of the party organises activities and trainings, she said that the township level “most of them, they only send two men. Always two men” (Interview 3). When she had wondered about why there were only men in the activities, “they reply me, no they didn't get any information from their leader. [-] So that they only sent, they just give the information to men and they just decide to send two men. Not two women” (Interview 3). Another problem with the implementation of the quota on township level was according to the same woman that “some leader in the township level they don't really understand what gender equality is” (Interview 3). Another woman also said that people are interested in the quota in the cities, and less so in villages (Interview 5). A third woman said that some men in township level think that the women only become members as support (Interview 7), which is an informal normative institution. The underlying factor that there are not many women would in this case be on the supply side, a normative informal institution that oblige women to stay at home, while men can take part in political activities. That the quota is not implemented on the other hand, relates to the lack of communication about gender policies from the central to other parts of the party. This could be seen as an informal practical institution about how things are done. According to one woman there is not enough focus on reaching the quota aim (Interview 3). Although leaders saying it is important, they do not talk about how to implement it, and in general, the women agenda is always the last priority (Interview 7). As mentioned in the background chapter, many parties in Myanmar have weak party structures (Stokke et al. 2015: 22) and a disconnect between central and regional parts of the party (Kempel et al. 2015: 16), which is also influenced by parties being new within Myanmar (Stokke et al. 2015: 22). According to one man, it was easier for the party to implement the quota in the border area:

So like the difficulties for DPNS is not in border line, but when we enter to Burma and when we organise the people here. So it was a very very new idea for the people so when we organise them we have to explain them but even so there are so many people who oppose it (Interview 8).

One woman reflected upon the gender quota, and how men relates to this, stating that:

[w]e said that at least 30% quota mean, at least mean, you can have more. Not only 30. So men always think that at least 30% means that 30% is enough. We say more than that. So start for 30 (Interview 7).

Few parties globally have adopted internal gender quotas for leadership positions, and when they actually exist they tend to function as ceilings, not starting points for equal representation. Parties tend to be resistant in working for gender issues without outside obligations imposed (Cornwall and Goetz 2005: 788). The same woman also mentioned some different countries as sources for inspiration for gender equality measures, among them the Philippines and Sweden, and also reflected upon why DPNS were not having a 50% quota, as they are stating that it is a *gender* quota, it is 30% reserved for both women and men, which means that they could be 70% women (Interview 7).

The quota is also part of the guidelines for the selection of candidates. On being asked whether the party follow its own guidelines most women said that they were followed. However, two of the men expressed that this was not always possible. One said that:

let's say like 80% we follow the guidelines yes. Because like mostly the DPNS wants to follow its guidelines but when we collect, when we get the candidates maybe it is not 100% perfect. That is what we hope for or maybe that 80% they have that kind of capacity (Interview 8),

and another said that "I think sometimes we have to negotiate. Even our guideline. So I mean, nobody can, how to say, sometimes guidelines are quite hard. It is difficult to fit everyone, so sometimes you have to negotiate" (Interview 1). Thus, there is awareness, but also seems to be acceptance that the guidelines are not fully adhered to. This related to the guidelines in general and thus include more than the gender quota. However, there is a risk that traditional gender norms influence these processes, and as one woman stated about the situation in Myanmar in general women have to be better as if a man and a woman with the same talent would apply for a position "they will choose men" (Interview 5).

As this section shows, there is a mismatch between the normative institutions and practical institutions that should lead in a positive direction and the mostly practical institutions that undermine this. Implementation is a key issue here and as one woman expressed it "The party leaders have very progressive views. It is a very progressive view, and they talk. It is very open. Interesting is like, they are not really implementing for them" (Interview 7). According to her, now the leaders of the party needs to talk of these issues to be able to implement the gender quota.

5.2.5 Formal Practical Institutions as a Strategy to Increase Women's Representation

As there are problems with the recruitment of women, the WWC now has been formed (Interviews 3 and 7). One woman said that although WWC would work to get more women into and active in the party, their aim is not to find women that only want to work for gender issues, but for “the whole Burma” (Interview 2).

Where the men mentioned the importance of equal representation, most of the women also elaborated on how this could be achieved, and the difficulties women face within the party. Several strategies had been suggested by the WWC, or demanded as one of the women described it (Interview 3), to the leadership bodies of the party. These suggestions all constitute practical ways to get more women involved, but also strategies to change the underlying problem of conservative gender perceptions. The WWC is thus by formal practical institutions trying to counteract the informal practical and normative institutions that hinder women from entering the party.

To counteract the problems with township levels only sending men to trainings and activities, the WWC has now demanded that they have to send one man and one woman (Interview 3). They have called for that there should always be 50% women and 50% men in trainings and activities (Interview 3). Also, they should go around and talk to both men and women about gender equality. One woman mentioned explaining this issue for men as a solution to the implementation at township level (Interview 3), and another woman also said that they have to convince women and explain to them why they work for women's rights, as also women think that their task is to support the men to be able to do politics. Therefore, they tell them that “I can also be in the front. So sometimes you can be a bit back. So we will support each other” (Interview 7). This would also function as a solution to the problem that there are men at the township level that think women only are members as support (Interview 7).

Another practical measure is that at least two women should be part of the organising trips the party makes to recruit new members and organise the party in different parts of the country. There seem to be a tendency that only men go and these trips, and that male leaders think that “this person important, that person important, but women are not there” (Interview 7). She however also said that the leaders thought the idea of at least two women joining the organising trips was good, but that they also were concerned about the money as it is expensive to go on

these trips. This woman therefore thought it was important to prioritise where they should go, and divide people up, and although some people were really important and should go, they also needed to remember that women should go as well (Interview 7). Other things WWC is planning to implement in order to enhance women's opportunities in the party is to have more activities directed toward women, a women youth group, as well as elaborating a vision and mission for WWC (Interview 3) and establishing it as a women's wing of the party (Interviews 3 and 7). Some of the most visible activities of the party during the spring of 2018 relate to women's representation and rights. On 5th of March the WWC arranged an appeal and a press conference, urging the government to sign article 29 of the CEDAW. In April the party arranged a women's leadership training, and also participated in a conference on women's participation in the peace process. Both which are highlighted at prime position on their website (DPNS 2018d).

Several of the informants mentioned that female candidates need and should get more support than male candidates. One man said that women should be supported financially, and that in comparison with other parties it would still not be very much, so it was important to especially focus on women (Interview 8). Two women stated that it is good that party members give kind gestures and words as support (Interviews 2 and 5), whereas one woman elaborated on a more practical measure, as the WWC wants to start trainings only for the female candidates, as they have less time, less possibility to get information and less skills as their chances of improving their skills not are as good as for men (Interview 7). The WWC had suggested this to the party leaders, but the woman explaining this remained doubtful as to whether the party would accept it or not. Although they had said it was a good idea, they are concerned about the cost (Interview 7). This measure is directed to the supply factor that women lack possibilities for education and therefore have less skill, which in this way is counteracted through a measure on the demand side. Cornwall and Goetz (2005: 795-798) argue that spaces for political learning, or political *apprenticeship* outside of the formal political spaces are essential to engender democracy, and not only making sure there are women in politics, but that these women also have the tools to act and achieve change. There is a risk that women's wings in parties merely become "tea-making brigades", with no real power to influence, and other spaces for political learning are often patriarchal and traditional (Cornwall and Goetz 2005: 795).

This section has described the ways in which women in the party are trying to get more women involved. Although there are institutions that limit women's participation, some institutions are already in place that should favour women, and more seem to be coming. According to one woman, the gender quota in itself function as a support for them to work on the issue (Interview 7).

6. CONCLUSION

This thesis has aimed at investigating the gendered institutions that influence women's descriptive representation in politics, with a specific focus on political recruitment and representation within the Democratic Party for a New Society and their youth wing, Youth for a New Society. The overarching research question of the thesis is: *how is political recruitment within the DPNS and YNS gendered?* and the sub-questions are: *in what ways are gendered institutions and their interaction limiting and enabling women's representation in the party?* and *how do actors within the party relate to and use institutions related to political recruitment?* The data was analysed according to the supply and demand model of political recruitment, with a feminist institutional approach. The analysis shows that institutions relating to supply, but mainly demand, limit women's representation within the party, as several of the institutions on the supply side do not seem to have gendered effects. This is in line with previous research which asserts demand factors as more influential (Bjarnegård 2013: 118; Evans 2008: 591-592; Kenny 2013: 21). There are informal institutions within the party, such as a practice that township level tend to only send men to trainings and activities, that limit the effect of institutions that are supposed to enable women's representation. It is not easy to change existing demand institutions, and effects of formal institutions such as quotas therefore vary (Krook 2010b: 161). However, women in the party have now gathered to achieve a positive change and increasing women's representation. They are trying to do this through formal practical institutions within the party and thus on the demand side, aimed at counteracting institutions on both supply and demand sides.

By investigating a single case my aim has been to provide an example to the field, and by understanding how different institutions affect the representation of women in politics, effective policies can be designed to counteract this. This example asserts the importance of the party as

a unit for intervention and also indicates that a gender quota not automatically will improve the representation of women. Women should be presented to the same extent as men in the political sphere, as there is nothing to justify the current state of affairs with men overrepresented. Also, since it is not clear exactly what women's interests are, this "strengthen[s] the case for more women as representatives" (Phillips 1998: 224-237). Times of transitions can open up for gender reforms, but also cement existing norms (Kenny 2013: 45-46). As DPNS is going through a process of organisation itself in the country, this provides an opportunity to challenge existing norms. That institutions from both supply and demand sides are important and that changes are needed and wanted, is clear in this quote, which was the answer to a question on why there are fewer women than men in parliament: "party policies, that is one thing. The second thing, in our political history women are always in the back. They stay in the back. That's a main problem. We have to change that culture" (Interview 1).

6.1 FURTHER RESEARCH

The analysis gives rise to further areas of interest to be researched. As the WWC now is working to involve more women in the party, an interesting study would be to follow up on this work in relation to the next election in Myanmar in 2020. Also, since the party is planning to focus on some stronghold areas in this election (Interview 1), it would be interesting to see if women or men are placed on the seats that are most likely to win, since research has shown that it is common that parties place women at unwinnable seats (Kenny 2013: 97; Kenny and Verge 2016: 360; Piscopo 2016: 490). For a deeper insight in the particular topic which is the focus of this thesis, a longer time in the field could have enabled an analysis of change within the party through an ethnographic research design. This would be interesting to investigate in this party and in others. Another research design that could be of value is to do a comparative study, as there, according to Bjarnegård and Kenny (2016: 388), is a need for more comparative studies concerning these aspects, "as well as more in-depth case studies that situate their findings in relation to the findings of other cases". It would be interesting to look at other parties in Myanmar as it in some countries where one party adopted gender quotas, other parties then followed after, for example in Norway in the 70's and 80's and Germany in the 80's (Phillips 1998: 224-225).

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8. APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interview	Sex	Length of interview	Place for interview
Interview 1	Man	31 minutes	DPNS office
Interview 2	Woman	1 hour	DPNS office
Interview 3	Woman	55 minutes	DPNS office
Interview 4a	Man	1 hour, 27 minutes	DPNS office
Interview 4b	Man	1 hour, 27 minutes	DPNS office
Interview 5	Woman	1 hour, 25 minutes	DPNS office
Interview 6	Woman	35 minutes	DPNS office
Interview 7	Woman	1 hour, 13 minutes	Café
Interview 8	Man	42 minutes	DPNS office