

**Shopping Experience in Central and Eastern
Europe: Second - class Europeans in a Union of
Equals?**

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Abstract

Over the past few years the EU has seen a surge in reports showing that analogical products of dual quality are being sold in different parts of the Union. An East – West divide has been noticed in the way that products of identical branding and packaging are of poorer quality in the Central and Eastern European shops, but not in the Western ones. The aim of the research is to investigate if the lack of EU's action in proposing legislation to cope with such division affects the sense of Europeanness of the Central and Eastern European citizens who may feel second-class when exposed to inferior goods. I aim to do that by checking whether such shopping experience in Lithuania indeed shapes a sense of Europeanness by triggering the memory of the shortage and the poor quality of goods that were available under communist regime. Discourse analysis is carried out of the way the dual quality of goods in the EU is discussed in the media and conclusions are drawn. It is found out that shopping experience of the dual quality goods in the Central and Eastern Europe indeed re-establishes a traumatic memory of communism in turn inflicting a sense of disappointment with the present, a feeling of inferiority in Europe and obstructing a genuine feeling of equality and belonging to the Union.

Key words: shopping experience, memory, identity, post-communism, East – West divide

Words: 17058

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1 Introduction

After the collapse of communism in the Central and Eastern Europe many citizens from these newly independent states rushed through the newly open borders to the neighboring Western countries in order to browse the shops filled with a diversity of high-quality foods as seen in the Western movies (Reuters, 2017)

Today, when the internationally available brands are plentiful in the markets of the Central and Eastern European states, it is not uncommon for these same – now EU – citizens to still make the same shopping trips westwards (ibid).

Over the past few years, there has been a surge in reports showing that consumers in Central and Eastern Europe have been exposed to inferior goods under the same brandings in comparison to the member states in the West (Boffey 2017).

The case of dual food quality has been recently addressed by the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker in his state of the Union speech where he stated that “In a union of equals, there can be no second class consumers. I will not accept that in some parts of Europe, people are sold food of lower quality than in other countries, despite the packaging and branding being identical. <...> East to West: Europe must breathe with both lungs. Otherwise our continent will struggle for air” (ibid).

The breathing of two lungs became possible with the Eastern Enlargement of the Union, which has been one of the most ambitious projects of the Union that finally unified the whole continent.

With the different backgrounds, mutual understanding between the Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe is not always a given. The reunification although cheered on both sides of the continent, did not mean a blank sheet of paper for the newlyweds. They both arrived with their own baggage, consisting of divergent historic experiences and consequently moral imprints. Bridging the differences and creating a genuine sense of unity and belonging became an important task to complete.

When purely political and economic integration does not always suffice to bring the both sides of the continent on the same page, Europe finds itself in sought for a deeper connecting fibre. Collective European Identity which entails a sense of belonging to Europe (Europeanness), solidarity, common cultural ground – is oftentimes expected to fill the void in times of doubt and adjustment.

Identity in the EU can be consumed directly through an orchestrated manner by, for instance, brochures or participation in certain cultural projects that are organised in order to cultivate it. However, it can also be consumed less directly as a by-product of more day-to-day citizen interaction and experience with the Union. The latter being less tangible tends to skip a scholarly eye, however is no less important in cultivating either a sense of togetherness and belonging or distance and even resentment.

The aim of my thesis is to investigate whether the EU shortcomings in granting equality to its Eastern citizens in the single market which lies at the heart of the idea of the Union has an effect on the region's sense of belonging, loyalty and identifying with Europe (Boffey 2017)

I do that by first laying a theoretical ground on how shopping experience could invoke and shape identity by triggering memory. Then I continue by introducing a possible memory of shopping experience under communism that could potentially be triggered in the Central and Eastern Europe when exposed to inequality in the single market. Finally, before carrying out the research, I speak about the historical East – West divisions as well as the level of success of the integration process of the two blocks in the European Union in order to provide ground for reference and evaluation when conducting an analysis of public discourse on the topic of the dual quality of goods in Lithuania.

By doing all of that I aim to answer my research question, which is: **how are shopping experiences in Central and Eastern European EU member states shaping the region's sense of Europeanness?**

2 The problem of dual quality of products in Europe

This introductory section will describe the context of the research content to bring the relationship between dual quality of products and a sense of identity into focus.

The question whether or not there is an actual problem of dual food quality as well as an East – West divide in how that duality comes to life has received a spectrum of reactions. It has been both argued for on the side of the Central and Eastern Europeans and almost written off to be an urban legend by the officials of the EU, calling the evidence “anecdotal” (Teffer 2017).

The issue has been initially raised by the Czech Member of the European Parliament Olga Sehnalova in 2011 (Euractiv 2018). She started arguing for the issue back then after a consumer association in Slovakia established that the well known instant coffee producer Nescafe used different recipes for the coffee sold in the Central and East and that of the West despite the branding and packaging being identical (Politico 2018). In addition to that, she learnt that peppers sold in Bulgaria by an international brand had less pepper extract than that sold in Austria and then brought the issue to the Commission only to be told that no laws were broken (ibid).

For years since the issue has been pushed into the agenda by the Central Eastern Europeans. However, the EU commissioner for the consumers had recently admitted that today with more evidence available to support the case made by the Central and Eastern Europeans (Teffer 2017).

According to the European Parliament briefing of June 2017, recently carried out examinations on branded foods in three Central and Eastern European member states and their comparisons with that of the Western member states have revealed that significant differences exist (European Parliament 2017 p. 1). Some of the foods were considered to be inferior in quality and less healthy while costing the same or in some instances even more (ibid). Although most of the cases concerned food, similar pattern was noticed with cosmetics and detergents.

Companies have the right in the EU to adjust their recipes according to the taste preferences of the consumers in different member states as long as they correctly list the ingredients on the packaging (ibid). Although producers themselves argued extensively that what they have been doing with the variations in the ingredients merely reflected the different tastes of the consumers in the Central and Eastern Europe, with research revealing hundreds of products involved in the practice, this line of argument has grown more difficult to maintain.

The responses on behalf of the Commission, maintaining that there is nothing illegal in the practice as long as the producers are transparent on listing the ingredients on the packaging and thus nothing to do on the harmonized level, to many in the Central and Eastern Europe has been often translated into indifference (Teffer 2018).

However, recently the position of Directorate – General for Justice and Consumers got a bit more nuanced, open to taking into consideration not only the legal, but also the ethical dilemma of the issue at hand (European Commission 2017). While something is legal, it does not necessarily mean that is ethical and if it is not, the trade in takes place between pursuing a legalist and technical approach and compromising at the price of shared values of ethics.

The problem with the dual quality of products in the single market of the EU is interesting due to it having a few important layers to it. It indicates the existing East – West gap not only on a political, but also on an everyday citizen level not only as being a consumer in the single market where equality is promised, but also as being a consumer of European identity where a sense of equality precedes a sense of genuine belonging. By going on a scientific venture to explore what identity implications shopping experience in Central and Eastern Europe has, it also has to be considered what role memory plays in attaching meaning to that experience today. It is expected that not only inequality in the single market per se, but also reemergence of the memory of communist past where the shortage and low quality of goods was inherent to everyday life that too shapes the sense of Europeanness of the region.

3 Why memory matters: how shopping becomes a meaningful experience

Shopping becomes a meaningful experience that is able to inform and shape our identities when certain memories are triggered through it.

The concept of memory is thus of key importance to this research and will be used throughout the thesis in order to bridge shopping experience in Central and Eastern Europe to the sense of identity and Europeanness.

Realising the complexity and fluidity of both the concept of identity (or a sense of self which I use synonymously) as well as memory, I will first depict their relationship in a very everyday type of light and only then move on to explaining it on a theoretic level only to facilitate the understanding of how prevalent the relationship of identity and memory is in our lives.

Losing a smartphone is never a nice experience. However, losing it without having pictures, videos or notes backed up makes the experience all the more unpleasant. It is not so much the material loss, but the loss of valuable, close-to-heart memories stored in it that is upsetting. At least that is how I thought of it after seeing a poster next to my house in Vilnius, offering to pay for a lost phone to someone who had found it due to 'having had all the memories stored on it'. Compared to that, the material loss of the phone in itself means much less.

In this instance, the lost phone was a carrier of memories. Losing it inflicted feelings that perhaps resembled a sense of shock, since - I imagine - in that person's mind, that phone, stored with many important memories, was almost an extension of himself.

Similar in nature, only much more poetic, connections between a sense of self or, in other words, identity and memory are depicted in Milan Kundera's novels. In 'The Book of Laughter and Forgetting', Tamina has an extreme fear of never getting to see the letters of her dead husband again which she had to leave behind when escaping the communist authoritarian Prague. Dreaming about getting them back so that she could hold on to the

memory of him had been her only wish for years and the only reason why she had her life worth living. It was not a promise for brighter days, but a mere memory of them that had the power to fill her existence with meaning.

Some identity-shaping memories we want to keep more than others. Memories can be both of transforming experiences and, inversely, sad and traumatizing ones that we wish we could just forget. However, removing certain memories from the consciousness does not mean undoing their footprint in our sense of self.

Memory could be thought of as being a highly malleable material that stretches out to different disciplines of social sciences. In this work a complementary approach will be taken and certain aspects of memory will be borrowed from different disciplines in order to shed light on a wider range of aspects of it that are important to this research, mainly both its individual and collective dimensions.

For psychologists and neuroscientists, memory is commonly understood as a mental function which enables ‘encoding, storing and retrieving information’ (Zaretsky 2015: p. 275). This is a rather instrumental treatment of the concept of memory and in itself is not necessarily helpful in understanding the deeper layers of how it operates. In contrast, the Freudian take on memory puts it in relationship with the unconscious – for him, memory is the building block of it and not merely helps to recollect events, but also to create a narrative (ibid). That narrative of one or multiple memories finds a home in the unconsciousness and becomes a shadow that falls over one’s sense of identity (ibid).

As mentioned earlier – some transforming memories we find dearer than others, thus can willingly replay them in our minds or, in contrast, try to suppress them hoping for forgetting to come about. However, welcome or not, they find their way to the unconsciousness and affect our identities in both personal development and a socio-historical sense (ibid p. 277). The latter means that memories, even if unconsciously, shape the way we perceive ourselves or things we identify with in societal (collective) and historical senses.

According to both Sigmund Freud and Carl Gustav Jung (as discussed by Assmann 2008: p. 109), not only personal, but collective memory too circulates in the unconscious psyche and surfaces in a great variety of social interactions and everyday situations. They can do so in the most subtle forms such as references to experiences or memories slipping off tongue without explicit notice.

Freud argued that transforming and especially traumatising events in the past such as the writing of new moral codes or the witnessing of mass violence sets in in the psyche of human beings (Zaretsky 2015: p. 276). Upon doing that, they become integral parts of the unconscious and ‘escape the constraints of logical thought’ (ibid). According to Zaretsky’s analysis, for Freud the footprints of memory brings about sociocultural transmission which happens in an unconscious way (ibid). Thus, deep traumatic memories have a long term shaping power that is often unconscious yet omnipresent in the way we perceive ourselves and the world. Here again, the memories of the traumatising experiences tend to return and manifest themselves in a form of behavioral symptoms (ibid: p. 277).

Analogically, but transferred to the state level, Becker explained that when states go through traumatising experiences, these painful events often leave wounds from which it takes a long time to recover from. Thus, these experiences create memories that sink in in the people’s sense of identity much more substantially than non-traumatic experiences (Becker 2014: p. 57). In addition, trauma shapes memory in a way that under triggering circumstances the trauma can be re-experienced over and over again in varying intensities (ibid).

Ricoeur (2004) too speaks about the reemergence of memories and places their ability to do so as being at a very heart of the concept of memory by definition. He frames memory as an ability of people to ‘turn absence into presence’ (Ricoeur 2004 Memory, History, Forgetting, cited by Marcoux 2016: p. 951). The quality of reemergence thus is inherent to the very existence of a memory. When memories reemerge, despite being recollections of events that took place some time ago, they constitute presence in a sense that they feel very real again. By shaping the present, they also shape the way we feel about it and ourselves within it.

If to Ricoeur memories by definition have a quality of reemergence, to Assmann (2008: p. 13), a simple knowledge about the past becomes a memory only when the remembering has a relationship with identity (ibid). The memory’s relationship with identity is a two-way street – a memory becomes a memory when it shapes identity and identity becomes identity when it is enacted by memory. His perception of identity of human beings is diachronic (ibid: 109p.), thus accumulation of memories through time has a special role in identity formation and enactment.

Memory, according to Assmann, is the faculty from which a sense of self is derived on both personal and collective levels (ibid).

In order to make important conceptual distinctions between different degrees and intensities of collective memory, Assmann introduced the notions of communicative memory and cultural memory (2008). For Assmann, communicative and cultural memory are two distinct forms of collective recollection of the past (ibid: p. 110).

Communicative memory does not have an institutional character and is not preserved by any type of institutionalised processes of transmission, learning as well as its symbols are not commemorated on special occasions (ibid: p. 111). It is not formalized in forms of physical symbolism (ibid). It instead finds home in everyday forms of interactions and experiences as well as has a limited life cycle. This life cycle, according to Assmann, should be expected to last up to 80 years – an interval of time in which three generations are interacting (ibid).

Cultural memory, in contrast, is a much more solidified and objectified form of memory than that of communicative memory. It is stable and transferred from generation to generation, informing a cultural identity of the society as a whole. In addition, it is commemorated or celebrated, institutionalised and embodied in different material and non-material symbols (ibid: p.111-112).

The divisions between different types or sides of memory may give an impression of a formal structure, however, there's much more of a dynamic in the way they relate to each other (ibid p.113). There's a transitional aspect between the different sides of the communicative versus cultural continuum and it's difficult to pin point when exactly does one become another (ibid). However, what is important to bring out of Assmann's distinction is that collective memory can take a form of communicative memory and if forgetting does not occur, it will in a sense upgrade itself and become a cultural memory that sink in in identities in much more rooted forms. If there is an absence of forgetting and a certain collective memory does transform from being communicative to being cultural, it becomes much more difficult to extract it.

Forgetting can only come about if memory does not reemerge. Memories reemerge if they are invoked. Jelin's framing of memories (2003) helps to ascribe a source to them: 'memories are to be understood as subjective processes anchored in experiences and in symbolic and material markets' (Jelin 2003 as cited by Becker 2014: 61). In other words, people stumble upon memories through symbols, materials and experiences that reference the memory.

Assmann too maintains that 'there are always frames that relate memory to specific horizons

of time and identity on the individual, generational, political and cultural levels' (Assmann 2008: p. 113). Similarly, in order to show how collective memory influences the way in which meanings to things are attached, Halbwachs in his seminal work "On Collective Memory" suggested to imagine a world in which only the sensory and physical qualities of things could be observed (Halbwachs 1950: p. 7). Halbwachs maintains that such perception would be completely unnatural. Even the most mundane things and everyday experiences can carry sources of memory.

References to events that are charged with a certain memory affect identity construction – it shapes it or alters in intensity (Neumayer, Mink 2013: p.5). Such references can be both verbal and non-verbal. Although the social aspect of memory is perhaps the most thoroughly studied one, it is brought to life by interactions not only with people, but also with things and experiences (Assmann 2008: p. 111). As Assmann (ibid) puts it, memory exists by means of 'material contact between the remembering mind and the reminding object'. This object can be filled with meaning, symbols and the substance that drives the memory to surface both intentionally and inadvertently.

A variety of different power structures can affect how both individual and collective memories are shaped and framed (ibid). These power structures than also can influence how symbols, actions or lines of policy reference certain memories. When these power structures change the framing of memories, they can either strengthen them and integrate culturally or, inversely, bring about forgetting (ibid). In this sense, these power structures have an important say in whether or not a certain memory will recede in the background of the collective recollection of the past or whether it will set in in the identities of people and become a cultural memory.

Identity building process can happen via different experiences without explicitly thinking about them as long as memory consciously or unconsciously is triggered. Without memory being triggered, there is no point of reference for the sense of identity to be invoked. To awaken the memory, words, actions, symbols, experiences or any other material or immaterial triggers need to belong to a historic discourse that in itself carry references to past (Saint Laurent 2018: p. 151). Then, for two different groups of people, doing the same everyday task of shopping can have different identity outcomes depending on whether or not they have deep-seated memories attached to the act of shopping itself, availability or quality of goods, or anything than involves the overall experience of the seemingly mundane task.

In consumer research studies, which are important due to the shopping experience element of this study, it is established that market is a resource for identity formation too (Brunk et al 2017: 1325). Halbwachs introduction of the concept of economic memory (Halbwachs 1950: p. 10) is useful in bringing to light that consumers remember the values of things they purchase (ibid). Remembering informs their present and future expectations for shopping experience. In addition, what is important to bring out from his work is the claim that ‘these remembrances are superimposed on the immediate objects by a series of social decrees’ (ibid p. 10). What Halbwachs has established here is important in two different aspects. First, the value is remembered (and in turn pleases or upsets the consumer) and second, the value is constructed by those having a say on how much an object costs and what it consists of – these people or groups could be considered to be the already mentioned power structures.

Shopping experience could be thought of being a source for identity formation as long as it carries references to past that triggers memories. Then, even such a very day-to-day practice that often slips out of explicit notice is able to ground an overall sense of self. Such sense of self or in broader terms – identity - is shaped in large part by bringing to mind past experiences. Whether or not they reach our consciousness directly, they do accumulate in the psyche and shape identities.

Does it matter then if the memory that is being triggered by a symbol or an experience is individual or collective? For political outcomes yes - When collective memories are triggered or reinforced, they are expected to produce political consequences (Becker 2014: 61).

The sociology’s contribution to a study of memory is crucial in making certain distinctions between collective and individual memory (ibid). The links between the individual and the collective are important in this study since identity consumption via shopping experiences happen at the individual day-to-day level, nevertheless at the same time informing a collective outlook on the societies relationship with Europeanness.

Halbwach’s work brings to daylight the complexities of the relationship between individual and collective memories by establishing that a collective body of people can ultimately be boiled down to individuals. Thus, while treating collective memory of a society as a whole, it has to be bore in mind that it is the individual who experiences. The sum of those individual experiences later on becomes a coherent collective experience of the past (Halbwachs 1992:

22 as cited by Becker 2014: 61). When it does – as mentioned by Becker (ibid 61), political outcomes should be expected since the identity – shaping degree too acquires a collective character. If these processes happen on a collective level within a society, it means they involve a group of people large enough to shape the political leanings, preferences and behaviour in varying intensities.

To conclude, memories, when triggered, have a way of reemerging and infusing presence with meaning. It shapes our sense of self and feels very real when reemerged. It comes to surface when triggered by symbols, materials and experiences. Those who are at least in some way responsible for either triggering or bringing about the symbols, materials and experiences that call out memories to surface are the so called power structures. In the case of shopping experience in Central and Eastern Europe today, such power structures could be both the producers who decide the quality of the products that are being sold there and the EU, which is responsible for ensuring equality in the single market as well as technically has power over the producers and hence consumers due to its regulatory capacity. When certain collective memories are not allowed to be forgotten by the power structures, they can transform from a flexible communicative form to a cultural form that marks identities in a much more significant way. In addition, the existence of a memory gives itself away by enacting behavioral symptoms which come to life in involuntary forms such as slips off tongue and mentioning references to either past or views on presence that are informed by past experiences, however these references may just as well appear and disappear unnoticed due to them often being subtle and even masked. In order to pick them up from public narratives, discourse analysis which is also going to be carried out in this thesis, become a useful choice.

What I would add that will later on be found useful in explaining the spectra of emotions the reemerging memories inflict: if a certain memory was filled with disappointment and expectation for change, when it reemerges feeling real and informing the sense of present, the disappointment about a lack of change can be inflicted.

4 The memory (of shopping) under communism

When writing the headline for this section, I put shopping in brackets for two reasons. First, the research depicts a case of shopping, thus, ultimately I will put it at the centre of attention when considering memory of it and how it is enacted today. However, the overall memory of communism also plays a great role in the way certain recollections are triggered in post – communist societies that are now member states of the EU. Thus, merely extracting the shopping memory from an overall collective memory of communism would be counterproductive in feeling around the subtleties of how recollections interact with present and shape the current sense of self of these societies.

Communism in the Central and Eastern Europe can be seen as a purely failed experiment that ended, however, at a closer look, its effects are much deeper than that. It aimed to create a fundamentally new society, based on essentially different construction of the sense of the world than that in the West. Consequently, this experience inflicted a mark so deep in the consciousness of the societies under rule that the recollection of that point in history encodes an inherited social knowledge and moral order of the populations (Schopflin 2000: 172). That inherited knowledge and a way the moral compasses work can come to life in behaviors and choices that might look foreign for those who had not gone through a similar experience and even seem irrational.

Although the communist regime in the Central and Eastern European member states was imposed on them and never consensual, it did not make it a less real experience to the societies under rule (ibid 176). Albeit being traumatising, it was still the only available political and social reality to these societies. Thus, the identities of the citizens of the Central and Eastern Europe, memories and senses of selves are derived from these experiences and to a significant extent are still living mental, social, cultural and habitual fossils that continue to shape their world today despite being mixed with new experiences of democracy and the EU. In this sense, new and diversified spectra of social experiences of the membership in the

Union are nevertheless viewed in light of the criteria formed back in the communist regime (ibid 177). And departing from an earlier established relationship with memory and identity, I would argue that when memories of communist experiences are triggered, the parts of identity that were formed under communist regime become all the more grounded and expressed.

Although democracy can be imported and put into effect, but the analysis of post-communism has to take into account that the non-consensual past regime has left its living cultural legacy. This legacy comes to life in forms of expectations, ways of thinking, attitudes that all come out of the memory of the regime. These things do not decay as quickly as was assumed by the West in 1989 (ibid 173). Instead, they continue to exist and inform the outlook on presence in increased intensities when memories are triggered to reemerge.

Remembering the earlier mentioned Ricoeur's definition of memory is useful now in order to highlight the immediacy of memory's connection with Europeanness. As he put it, memory has the ability to 'turn absence into presence' (Ricoeur 2004 cited by Marcoux 2016: 951). In line with that, when memories of communism are enacted in present EU, whether with or without explicit notice, the presence is perceived in light of that memory. Thus, the underlying layers of a sense of Europeanness are shaped and altered if or when memories of communist experiences reemerge.

Consumer and shopping experiences are especially charged with memory baggage and sensitive to those European citizens who began their consumer lives under communism and thus their experiences are engraved with remembering the fantasies, unfulfilled expectations and disappointments that took place in their reality of communist shortages and low quality of products in comparison to that brought from the Western Europe (Hovart 2010: 28). Kovacs calls the somewhat habit of Central and Eastern Europeans meditating on the East-West exchange of goods an "eternal pastime" (Kovacs 2005: 57) in that it is something that has been much coveted for decades when under communist rule.

For the post-communist societies triggered memories of consumer experience brings about a recollection of systematic shortages of goods and desires to have a chance to tourist-shop in the West (Švab 2002 as cited by Hovart 2010: 27).

When or if the societies of the Central and Eastern European member states of the EU today

have their memory of consumer experience under communism triggered via being exposed to products of dual quality, since memory is translated to presence as drawn from the theory, we should expect that these recollections also consciously or unconsciously shape their understanding of Europeanness as well as what it is like to belong to a community of Europe. (Hovart 2010: 28). Whether this understanding strengthens or weakens the sense of identifying and belonging to Europe, depends on what connotations and references the re-emerged memory carries.

5 The gluing power of European identity

European identity in broader terms can be referred to being a case of a collective identity. Collective identity - already touched upon earlier in the text in relation to collective memory – refers to an idea of a group of people accepting their key similarity which in turn serves as a bridge to their sense of solidarity towards each other (Thernborn 1955, CH 12, Brubaker and Cooper 2000 as cited by Fligstein et al 2012: 108). This sense of collective identity is a social construct, meaning that it can be created, shaped and altered both intentionally and not (Fligstein et al 2012: 108). Since it is informed by collective memory, as established earlier, re-emerging memories can also reflect on the sense of collective identity or so can forgetting if it occurs since then the memory that is being forgotten (truly forgotten and not merely suppressed into the unconscious) seems to stimulate identity.

I use terms of identity and collective identity interchangeably due to a feeling that a very precise separation would bring extra complexity while adding little. If aiming to outline the collective aspects of identity such as political implications, I will simply put extra emphasis on it in the text where such outlines occur. Otherwise, there is no fundamental difference in my references to these concepts. In addition, the concept of sense of self is also used as a synonym which I use interchangeably with the concept of identity due to its colourful and in a way a bit more human linguistic character.

Similarly, European identity, a sense of Europeanness and belonging to Europe are also used interchangeably and treated as synonyms. Although scholars have been attempting to untangle the ambiguities of understanding identity in the European Union's context, the concept of it is still unresolved (Schilde 2014: 650). The causal mechanisms and relationships between identification with the EU, with Europe and support for the European integration and overall European identity are conflated and in need of constant clarification (Schilde 2014: 650). While recognising that some scholars do differentiate between certain dimensions and aspects of these concepts, I find the trade-in between the illuminating power of precise differentiation

and added complexity to the text not benefiting this specific research to a sufficient extent. However, one aspect needs to be clarified – when speaking about Europe, I do link it with the European Union.

As a consequence, I will discuss what I mean by European identity, however, all of that is going to be considered transferable to what I mean by Europeanness and a sense of belonging to Europe too.

In line with this way of flexible thinking, the broad understanding of European identity will be drawn out from the conclusions of Schidle's work (2014). She establishes that European identity should be understood not in rigid inclusive or exclusive terms, but instead as a 'raw category of reference available to the entire public' (Schidle 2014: 664). The content of European identity is context dependent, meaning that when citizens from different member states and different historical background approach the question of identification with Europe, they may have different notions, experiences and cultural references that they fill the idea of Europe or Europeanness with.

Following from here it could also be expected that the content that one's idea of European identity is filled with will also inform the intensity of the individual's relationship or affiliation with it.

Similarly, there is no universally accepted understanding of what constitutes the idea of Europe which would hold true at any point in time. The discourse of Europe is understood as a set of symbols and perceptions which are selectively used by different actors to make sense of Europe. In addition, just as the idea of Europe is selectively put together by different actors out of a set of symbols and shared references, it is also done so differently depending on a point in time (Rovisco 204 -205). This both shapes not only different understandings, but also expectations of different actors, especially when thinking of Europe as a political unit.

In a sense, Europe in itself is an empty concept that is filled with meaning which carries national and cultural underpinnings (Breakwell 2004, Rise 2010, Marcussen et al. 1999, Brewer 2001 as cited by Schilde). Thus, when referring to a sense of Europeanness or what constitutes being European can mean different things in different parts of Europe where societies were exposed to different experiences. In addition, as argued by Bruter (2003),

different European citizens can have divergent ideas of what is their imagined community of Europe (Bruter 2003 as cited by Schidle 2014: 652). What attachments, expectations and ideas are glued to an idea of Europe in Vilnius may not at all or only in part be true in Berlin.

With the expansion of the EU governance into a higher number of new sensitive domains, the issues of European identity are growing in salience (Fligstein et al 2012: 108).

Identity can be both produced and consumed via symbols and experiences. On a theoretical point of view, the existing literature on European integration and Europeanisation is largely focused on the production level of identity (policy-makers) and less so on how it is consumed by the citizens (Horvat 2010: 27) albeit that being just as important for a successful cultivation of it.

The content and degree of political European identity is traditionally linked to instrumental top-down outcomes of the EU's actions (Delors 1999, Laffan 2004 as cited by Schilde 2014: 650). Principally it is framed to work in a way that the EU creates endearment in its citizens through their experience of civic participation as well as exposure to cultural symbols (Schild 2014: 650).

The most apparent examples of the top – down identity building projects are the European hymn, the European flag and the European day (ibid 652). Such identity production is a bit hegemonic in a way that it is intentional and structured with a clearly desired goal of creating loyalty to the community.

In social theory as well as political discourse when questions of European identity or collective memory surface, they are most often perceived as notions that are predominantly formed at high European levels (Billig 1996 as cited by Horvat 2010). Schidle also underlines that the European identity creation does not rest in solo autonomy of direct EU's actions to produce it by means of top – down instrumental actions such as hymn or flag creation (Schidle 2014: 664). However, identity can be also both strengthened and weakened as an unintentional by-product of EU's overall political success.

A great part of the literature is focused on decision-making level and thus evaluates the integration process solely on the level of the policy-makers instead of the level of the actual citizens which are at the receiving end of the integration process. They are also the consumers of the common united European identity which is the glue of a successfully functioning

Union.

Instead of seeing the European identity or the sense of Europeanness as something cultivated in a top – down approach to fill the European project with meaning, this thesis aims at looking at the consuming stage of the European identity.

6 How a sense of Europeanness matters today

For some time it was believed that since the integration has been spreading to more and more political venues, the citizens of the EU would naturally begin seeing the Union as their main subject of political loyalty (Haas 2004, 1968 p. 13-14 as cited by Fligstein et al 2012: 107). From there, according to Haas (1968), the convergence of values would stem naturally and create a sense of commonness and identity as well as even produce a ‘new nationalism’, directed towards Europe. For Haas (1968), the faith of the EU depends greatly on whether or not the citizens of the member states are able to identify themselves as being the citizens of Europe in a broader sense (Fligstein et al 2012: 107).

But according to Fligstein et al, the EU can successfully proceed with a high level of integration despite the lack of its citizens’ identification with the Union (Fligstein et al 2012: 108). It is their expectation that the economic and political pressures are too high for the member states to even consider slowing down the integration process, thus identity issues although important, will not create legitimate ground for the member states to consider withdrawing (Fligstein et al 2012: 108). However, these expectations and projections were carved out in 2012, meaning that many more turbulences were yet to take place and six years later we happen to be at the point where what was considered unthinkable have found its way into everyday affairs. With the UK leaving the EU, the migrant crisis and the democratic turbulences in parts of Eastern Europe (Hutton 2018), the need for a common identity that infuses citizens with a willingness to belong to Europe can no longer be taken for granted or outweighed by a presupposed pressure to stay in and play by the rules.

Thus, although economic and political pressures to stick together remain high, it is becoming increasingly clear that when politics become sensitive, there is a need to feel this connection to Europe and to each other on a deeper level in order to be able to project a common future together. There is a direct relationship between the future of the EU and the degree at which the European citizens accept or deny the European identity (Fligstein et al 2012: 118).

It is highly challenging for a supranational community such as the EU to create a greatly needed cultural fiber as embroiled in shared history or a feeling of continuity between different parts of the continent and generations within it (Horvat 2010). And the reunification of Europe that happened with the 2004 enlargements only made the task all the more challenging.

The EU's Eastern - Central enlargements are often said to be one of the most ambitious projects of the EU so far not only in terms of territory and numbers, but also and more importantly in terms of the political, economic and identity transformation required for these states to acquire membership status (Epstein, Jacoby 2014: 1). It is challenging in not only bridging the mentioned political, economic and identity gaps, but also in addressing the baggage of the newcomers that were inflicted on them by a communist regime such as different historic backgrounds and memories. It is highly important to keep revisiting the differences and similarities between the two blocs with a critical and observing eye in order to create a more genuine sense of belonging together. Turning a blind eye, in contrast, would contribute vastly to alienating.

One problematic aspect of the research in the field of unification of the two blocs is how to address and investigate the possibility or the extent of the disparities without pre-assuming or even furthering their existence (Epstein, Jacoby 2014: 4). However, the question of a possible East – West divide with regards to consumer equality is a common and almost ever-present narrative that is depicted when the problem is spoken of (European Parliament 2017). Thus, the possible divide and implications of it will also be further discussed here.

7 Bridging the East – West divide in Europe

It is important to establish a deeper and more nuanced context of the East and West relationship within the European Union not only to shed light on the aspects of memory re-emergence and common identity formation, but also in order to be able to frame the references from the public discourse that will be picked out in the study later on.

The accession of the Central and Eastern European bloc was in many ways seen as a reunification of Europe - part of the continent was finally allowed to join the family of Europe, realising that now what it means to be European will be challenged or rethought (Nougayrede 2015). The allowing into the club was seen as a gesture of great importance having in mind the historic unjust that the Central and Eastern European states went through over the times of the iron curtain (ibid). At the time of accession, these states were poorer, more vulnerable and a view was commonly shared among them that the better off Western Europe almost owed a helping hand in the catching up process. The need for a greater or even an ultimate equality between the two blocs, if they are to coexist and to blend in with each other in the continent, was recognised.

As Nougayrede notes, the Central and Eastern countries on their part did make a great effort to reach a political and economic level of development to qualify for getting in and they were rightly welcomed by the old member states to do so, however, they joined not only having a baggage of political and economic shortcomings, but also specific historic memories that retained and distinguished them from the old member states and in turn led to be perceived as the 'other' (ibid).

The need to reunite the two blocs, integrate the new into the old was addressed by the EU not only by fostering political reforms and economic development in the Central and Eastern bloc, but also by realising that the two Europes have to find a common ground on what it means to be European. It was being increasingly recognised that a significant part of a

successful integration of the two Europes into one is to foster a common identity, to the cultivation of which culture and memory plays a great role (Horvat 2010: 27).

In a study, requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Culture and Education, it was established that European policies are making an effort to reunite and advance a common European historical memory, not only because it gives legitimacy to the Union, but also fosters a common European identity (Prutsch 2015: 5). It is also spelled out that two competing historic memories exist in the Union – the trauma of the Holocaust that has greatly influenced the development of the post World War II culture of the Western Europe. In parallel to that, Eastern – Central European nations are still coping with the traumas that the communist regimes inflicted on them (Prutsch 2015: 6).

In line with Prutch's note on two competing historic memories – that of the East and that of the West – circulating in Europe, Mink and Neumayer argues that they are not only competing, but that competition is also asymmetric with the memory of the Western European one being predominant. To many political figures as well as populations in Europe it appears that the common history of Europe has been written solely in the Western part of it (Neumayer, Mink 2013: 12).

The recurrent comebacks of memory issues in European politics are explained by Mink and Neumayer in light of three consecutive memory regimes that could be viewed as three dominant phases of remembering.

The first memory regime that still influences the way many Europeans think about European history was especially predominant up to the 1970s with the commonly shared view that Germans alone were responsible for atrocities of the Second World War (Naumayer, Mink 2013: 3). Such way of remembering had been later on replaced by the memory of the Holocaust as the embodiment of the evil against which the European Community situates itself (Naumayer, Mink 2013: 3). This Holocaust - centric approach was found instrumental also in offsetting the national narratives imprinted in the identities of the European societies. In other words, if the EU as a political community is unable to provide a nationalist memory of the shared history which grounds the sense of belonging and loyalty, then you have to look for alternative ways of handling history so that it would not turn against you. The narrative of post-1945 stability and cooperation of the continent in contrast to the atrocities of the Second World War thus helped strengthen the political ground for cooperation as well as produce a

level of loyalty to the Community on behalf of the societies of the then-member states (ibid).

The third phase of remembering came along with the collapse of the Soviet Union when the long standing walls between the Western and Eastern Europe fell apart and the Community was exposed to a competing memory regime of the other side of the Iron curtain (Naumayer 2013 p.3). This development put the commonly accepted prior representations of European history to question and shed light on the existence of a certain memory gap in the Western Europe (ibid).

This so called memory gap, according to Naumayer and Mink, comes to life in three forms. It is embodied in a deep seated ignorance of a number of atrocities committed by the communist regimes in the East. In addition, some people in these post - iron curtain societies have memories of extremely violent episodes of the Stalinist regime which are, according to Naumayer and Mink, at least comparable to that of the Holocaust which brings to question the construction of European identity as solely in opposition to Holocaust experience (ibid, p.4). Finally, a highly complicated issue of memory is the date of the 1945. While for the Western part of Europe it embodies the coming back to democracy and building prosperity, for the Easterners this date brought about yet another occupation (ibid).

Today the European Union has moved past the question of Germany as the only resource to fill the memory space of Europe with (ibid). However, no post-communist state of the EU has yet moved past the memory of the regime and are unlikely to in the near future (ibid). Thus, precisely because these experiences as well as moral and socio-political questions of the past have not been resolved, they continue to increasingly infuse the political realities of Europe with pressing questions and challenges (ibid).

The collapse of Soviet Union and perhaps more importantly, the 2004 Eastern enlargements have reactivated a number of memory realms in Europe (ibid).

European integration began with economy, however, today, its success depends on how well it establishes a working political dimension. Along with that, the cultural challenges arise that go much further than policies and instead poses questions such as where do we come from and where are we going as a collective unit (Geremek B. 2005: 5). Thinking about Europe as a political union means considering its common values and differences, culture, a sense of solidarity and memory too.

After the important turning point in the European Union's history which took place after the enlargement with the EU expanding to the Central and Eastern Europe in 2004, it became clear that many of these things as well as what Europe represents will have to be directly and indirectly be renegotiated over time. In addition, the Union's institutions have to be adapted and feeling of belonging to the Union had to be cultivated on both sides (Geremek 2005: 5).

According to Neumayer and Mink, the principle of conditionality which laid down in the Unions policy of enlargement having been instrumentalised in the process of Eastern Enlargement problematised the merging of memories, cultures and values since it in effect produced a hegemonic historical narrative of Europe (Neumayer, Mink 2013: p. 12). They argue that the instrumental application of it produced a dominator versus dominated relationship between the two blocs which deepened the complexities of memory questions and in turn a sense of unity (ibid).

Neumayer and Mink refers to the argument of historic debt that has been extensively put forward by the Central and Eastern member states during their accession negotiations as to a form of a memory game (ibid). According to them, in the 1950's and the 1970's the European Economic Community invested themselves substantially into fostering a common European Identity with a common memory being at the heart of it (Neumayer, Mink 2013: 3). Inspired by the example of nation-state formation, the European Economic Community too perceived and positioned the past as a highly important and necessary point of reference or even a building material for a shared sense of belonging as well as collective identification with Europe (ibid). However, with the enlargement of the 2004 while still recognising the need for a common European identity, which could be argued to have even grown in necessity, the role of memory within it has grown in complexity.

After the Eastern Enlargement, instead of aiming to solely unify the sense of past in its citizens' minds, the EU had to introduce another task which was to also integrate considerably different memories that were being brought about with the accession of the Central and Eastern European member states (ibid).

In addition to having to make these different recollections of the past meet, the EU up to today is facing a task of addressing the demands for the recognition of memory and past experiences that the post-communist now-member states have gone through as well as facing

the expectations for making up for the injustices (ibid). The acceptance of the Central and Eastern European region to the European family (as phrased by Jacques Delors 1999) is often rationalised as a fulfillment of a historic duty too.

Delors 1999:

It would merely be a matter of opening our arms to our Eastern and Central European brothers who are ending up by doubting our political will. I will conclude by repeating that the reunification of Europe is our primary historic duty.

It could be drawn from here that in order for the two blocs to reach a deeper reunification on an identity level, their historic memories have to be reunited or at least integrated with each other to a sufficient extent. In the literature it seems that the process of integrating the post-communist Central and Eastern part of the Europe into the EU has been predominantly analysed from quantitative perspectives with a lack of focus on less tangible identity – reunification related analysis, which might be a direct outcome of a lack of EU's effort in the field.

The East – West divide in Europe had long predated the Cold War and thus after the World War Two it seemed almost natural for many that the Central and Eastern Europe would be cut off due to a commonly shared sense of this region being not only politically and economically different, but also culturally distinct and more importantly – inferior to that of the West (Epstein, Jacoby 2014: 3). Thus, overcoming the divides that have been present for centuries is a complex and difficult task.

Despite the merging of identities and memories being at the heart of the success of a complete and sustainable integration, the EU's enlargements to the Central - East have been evaluated mostly in terms of the economic growth as well as political development of the new member states (Epstein, Jacoby 2013: 31).

One of the most feared outcomes of the expansion of the Union was that the Central and Eastern member states would form a bloc and oppose policy initiatives laid down by the old member states which would seriously challenge the ability of the Union to sustain order and functionality both internally and externally (Toshkov 2017). According Toshkov, despite several politicised cases, research has shown that this was not the case in systematical terms

(Toshkov 2017). In addition, case studies conducted by Copeland have shown that the new Central and European states are likely to be less significant negotiators and influencers than their old Western counterparts (Copeland 2014: 482). Thus, departing from that it could be established that the new Central and European member states were seen as benign newcomers and had not lived up to the pre-accession fears of the old members. However, recent developments of euroscepticism and anti-democratic tendencies in Hungary and Poland shown that there are deeper identity – related issues and grounds on which the positions of the EU and that of these member states do not agree (Gocłowski, Than 2018).

Rachel A. Epstein argues that EU membership had reduced the levels of vulnerability among the Central and Eastern European states in the international system, however had not completely closed the division (Epstein 2013: 31). According to her, at the center of the attempts to close such divisions lies the need for equality of the Western and Central and Eastern member states in the single market where the distinction between the two would be completely abolished (Epstein 2013: 31).

In the literature it is pointed out that although the EU membership economically was wealth enhancing for the Central and European member states, it was not wealth equalizing (Epstein, Jacoby 2014: 2). Significant divides between the new and the old remain to exist.

An important question raised in the literature is whether and to what extent the EU has helped to reduce or abolish the long lived disparities between the East and the West within Europe (Epstein, Jacoby 2014: 4). Again it is important to emphasize that although economic and political differences and inequalities matter, behind them often rest much deeper layers – the mentioned attachments of inferiority and perceived ‘otherness’ towards the Central and Eastern European bloc take complex measures to overcome and it is challenging to even identify them.

Drawing from theory on links between memory and identity that were established earlier, the necessity to make the different recollections of the past meet in order to secure a coexistence between the two blocks becomes clearer.

In creating an inclusive approach to establishing a new sense of commonness and Europeaness on both Central and Eastern and Western parts of Europe, cosmopolitan ideas and values came to help. As argued by Rovisco (2014: 205), they have emerged at the core of

the notion of Europeanness in order to bridge the growing diversity of the cultures within the EU that has taken place with the Eastern Enlargement. This narrative of Europe being cosmopolitan – meaning tolerant and inclusive - is built on the development of European solidarity, which is argued to facilitate empathy between geographically and culturally distant people (Rovisco 2014: 206). Thus, solidarity is a key component of a binding European identity, since it facilitates acceptance of cultural differences and empathy as well as a certain willingness to coexist together.

8 Different understandings of solidarity as an obstacle to unity

I am convinced that it is our historic mission to reunite Europeans in a single political entity, but I should like us to agree on the content of the marriage contract before choosing its general form. <...>

Do we want to be faithful to the European contract which I would sum up as follows: competition which stimulates, cooperation which strengthens and solidarity which unites?

Jacques Delors speech 1999

Solidarity is one of the key components of a working sense of collective belonging, identity or metaphorically speaking – a contract that brings people together as Jacques Delors put it.

Cosmopolitan solidarity, which infuses European solidarity, is translated as ‘solidarity among strangers’, where it acts as a glue connecting people both mentally and experimentally and rests on general willingness of people to accept if not to embrace otherness (Rovisco 2014: 203). All this provides a fertile soil for EU’s attempts to integrate an open-ended cultural space for member states of all walks of life – the ‘traditional’ European peoples and the Central and Eastern European ‘newcomers’ (Rovisco 2014: 204). These cosmopolitan values are what informs the discourse of Europe and are often framed as an embodiment of Europeanness (Rovisco 2014: 205). This value engraved in the European spirit should allow the Western Europe to accept the historic and moral differences of the other side of Europe. And a certain expectation of such understanding definitely exist in the Central and Eastern Europe.

It is important to acknowledge that many of the EU citizens from the Central and Eastern European member states have gone through decades of oppression by the Communist regime and that they’re ways of thinking and values are deeply engraved with these experiences (Bidenkopf et al 2004; 5, 10 as cited by Rovisco 2014: 207). As Bidenkopf puts it,

acknowledging these past traumas requires a level of understanding and solidarity on behalf of the long-time EU citizens that had not endured these experiences (Bidenkopf et al 2004; 5, 10 as cited by Rovisco 207). Solidarity not only in feeling for each other, but also in willingness to open one's wallet (ibid).

Lech Kaczynski argues that the Central and Eastern European community has been neglected for a long time by its Western counterparts and refers to it as a forgotten "Other Face of Europe" (Kaczynski 2005: 131). He claims that over the years of communism in the region, the West has ignored or denied the mutual belonging of people in both parts of Europe (ibid). The argument goes that although now it appears that the division has been formally erased with the Eastern Enlargement and reunification of Europe, it remains unlikely that the Central and Eastern European countries or – in his words- "the other Europe" would gain full access to the European solidarity (ibid: 132). Such negative outlook is likely an outcome of high expectations for European solidarity or a possible misunderstanding of what it truly consists of.

Janos Matyas Kovacs states that there is a certain degree of a dialogue of the deaf when the two halves of Europe talk about solidarity and this in turn shapes their expectations for each other (Kovacs 2005: 54). He makes a distinction of the concept of the Eastern solidarity which is considered to be much more romanticised than that of the Western solidarity, which, according to him, is stripped off any emotional attachments and in turn highly pragmatic (ibid 54). The underlying differences in understanding the concept of solidarity thus significantly affect the expectations of both parties for what kind of relationship between the Old Europe and the New Europe should take place now that they are together in one political body of the EU.

According to Kovacs, there are two conflicting understandings of solidarity on both sides of the Union which frankly happen to reinforce each other and result in a loop of misreadings and misunderstandings (ibid: 56). He maintains that the competing narratives of solidarity enforce "rhetoric of resentment" on the Eastern part of the former Iron Curtains and "rhetoric of indifference" on the Western part of it (ibid: 57).

It is difficult to pinpoint when exactly and how did these rhetorics on both sides originate. To present a simplified picture of the two rhetorics, as Kovacs puts them - the Westerners

maintain that they are fed up with the Easterners' always complaining while the Easterners contend that the Westerners' promises are constantly failed to be fulfilled (ibid 57).

Kovak maintains that in the English language, the notion of solidarity does not entail altruism and support that is provided by the stronger part to the weaker, but instead puts common interest and mutual dependence at the centre (ibid 59). In contrast, in the Central and Eastern European traditions one can not express solidarity without entailing complete unselfishness and commitment to assisting the weaker with some level of sacrifice being expected (ibid). There is no material reward in being solidaristic for the stronger party which gains nothing but moral gratification out of the relationship in the way the Central and Eastern Europe understands solidarity (ibid).

If there is hope for mutual understanding and the end of the rethorics of both resentment and indifference, depends on whether or not the dominant understanding of solidarity in the West can meet that of the East (ibid). Without a sense of solidarity – a key aspect of collective European identity – a sense of belonging can not function effectively.

Sharing a sense of solidarity is crucial for both the Central and East Europe's and the Western Europe's identities to align. However, it appears that the regions have different notions of what it means and in turn different expectations for how the unified co-existence should look like.

9 Expectations of Central and Eastern Europe for belonging to Europe

Democrats in the Central and Eastern European states who took power from the communists after the fall of the communist regimes were feeling confident that they would receive undivided attention and support from the West (Schopflin 2000: 204). It is easy to accuse these post-communist states of naivety, however, their idealism was not out of a thin air. For decades the Western statements have fueled hopes that the end of communism and transition to democracy would mean pro-active support on the Western side (ibid). According to Schopflin, the Central and Eastern Europeans were hoping that they would almost immediately be welcomed to the EU, receive large sums of financial support in their transition as well as be provided with the Western security umbrella (ibid). Even though the Eastern enlargement did take place, for some in the Central and Eastern Europe it appeared that the West approached the question of accession with a certain reservation which was met with skepticism and disappointment in the region.

With the Eastward enlargement finally happening, the structural obstacles that previously made comparisons between Western and Central – Eastern Europe difficult, had now been largely diminished (Biedenkopf 2005: 20). After joining the EU, people of Central and Eastern Europe have begun using the example of Western Europe as their yardstick for development and equality (ibid). However, with their accession to the EU and the comparison with the Western European living standard having immediately grown from nearly unthinkable to fairly natural, an issue of expectation management has arisen.

With borders being gone and media continuously reporting the differences of living conditions, the inequalities have started to be perceived as injustices (Biedenkopf p.20). With comparisons (which relatively recently had been almost unthinkable), having started to be made, it was important to realise that the road towards evening out the living standards between the Central and Eastern and Western Europe is still long and will require patience (Biedenkopf p.20).

A sense of resentment began stemming from the reality check when the region of Central and Eastern Europe had to realise that no huge check will be arriving for free anytime soon and that the integration will be gradual, requiring the already mentioned patience and effort (Kovak 2005: 63). There was this prevailing hope in the East that the membership in the EU was something that the region is naturally entitled to as a moral compensation for the comfortable ignorance of the West when the Central and Eastern European countries were oppressed by communism (ibid). Since these hopes were infused by claims of high ranked Western politicians over the years of the Cold War, it came as an unpleasant surprise when the Central and Eastern Europe have learnt that along the way to the EU, the Easterners were treated as any other newcomers, without any special exceptions (ibid p. 64-65).

For the Central and Eastern Europe, the decade after 1998 has been imprinted with the complex task of both national self-determination and forming a relationship with Europe which is sometimes referred to as a return to the continent (Schidle 2014 653).

10 The importance of equality (in the single market)

One of the imprints in the Central and Eastern Europe made by the communist regime, along with the different understanding of solidarity, was a certain desire and expectation for equality when entering the European Union.

Formally, the communist regime was fully committed to establishing equality, however in reality it did not at all live up to the declared standards (Schopflin 2000: 175). The equality aspect of the system was publicly communicated as one of the key values of the regime, which had created a sense of a cognitive dissonance, since the actual access to various resources was contingent and hierarchical (ibid: 176). Large portions of societies were denied goods and services with no reasonable explanation for selection to access.

If communism was heavily hierarchical in effect, a promise for equality is an integral part of a democratic regime such as the EU, meaning not only equality before law, but also equality for any social chance (ibid).

The EU is built on the value of solidarity which entails not only equality, but also rejection of hegemony and hierarchy (Kaczynski 2005: 133). Thus there was and still is a legitimate expectation that inequality, especially in domains of key importance to the Union such as the single market, will not be encountered by the Central and Eastern Europe upon joining the EU.

When rejecting the current system, a sought for a desirable version of life elsewhere occurs naturally. In the case of the Central and Eastern European states, they turned their heads towards the West in their search for answers and meanings (Schopflin 2000: 177). The solace in the West was found with some great mythologized value attached to it. The comparisons of their communist experience with the West were so deeply taken to heart that the West had

become a true yardstick (ibid). Hence the expectation that the traumas such as farce solidarity and equality will not be encountered upon joining the EU.

Thus, experiencing inequality in a domain of a single market of the EU which promises equal chance could not only infuse a sense of othering and inferiority, but also re-establish past traumas and obstruct the progress of divergent understandings of solidarity matching, expectations aligning and in turn strong sense of belonging and mutual understanding.

11 Consuming Europeanness

Practices of consumerism are recognized as having important dimensions of our social, political and cultural presence as both individuals and parts of groups within societies, thus routine actions such as certain shopping habits and experiences can also shape or reaffirm identities (Miller, 1998) Consumerism has a mass dimension of routines of Europeans, however, is barely taken into account as a site of theoretical discussion when European integration and Europeanization comes to play (Horvat 2010: 28).

The equality of the member states in the single market lies at the heart of the EU and, as was previously mentioned when reviewing the literature, is a key starting point when closing the disparities between the East and the West.

Thus, there is a legitimate expectation that these post-socialist societies of the Eastern – Central and European states once joined the EU, will no longer have to encounter the sense of inferiority in their consumer experiences as the equality of consumers in the EU is an integral part of the equality of the single market.

As a consequence, an examination of consumer experience in a post-socialist Central and Eastern member states could reveal that memory plays an important role in consuming European identity too (Horvat 2010).

12 Shopping experience and identity as portrayed in Lithuania

By asking how are shopping experiences in the Central and Eastern European EU member states shaping the region's sense of Europeanness I aim to look at whether certain inequalities in the single market of the EU could affect the identity integration progress of the Central and Eastern European EU member states, obstruct a sense of equality and belonging which are crucial for the Union's functioning.

Since I am interested in the outcomes of the day-to-day citizen-level identity consumption, general public discourse and opinions that entail the publics' feelings are the materials I expect to find my answers in.

Discourse analysis seems to be the most appropriate method to extract the essence of the publics' feelings about Europeanness since it examines how language represents social and cultural mindsets and identities (Gee 2014)

Language is used to take on or build a certain identity (Gee 2014: 33). Through language we also ascribe certain identities to others or compare them to ourselves (ibid). The comparison sometimes takes place in order to illuminate certain aspects of our own sense of self, to ascribe ourselves to certain groups or, in contrast, show how and when we are different. Discourse analysis also helps to look into how we produce and reproduce as well as consume identities (ibid: 28). This being at the core of my research aim, discourse analysis seems to be a helpful way to approach the task.

Selecting data samples for research

It is important to establish a structured way of collecting data samples so that they are not only systemised but also representative of what I am looking for. Since I am interested in the opinions of the general public, I intend to analyse how the topic of consumer inequality within the EU, shopping experience of getting inferior goods to that of the Western Europe is

discussed in the media of the Central and Eastern European member states by selecting online articles which are read (by the citizens) the most.

Picking cases

Since the case of inequality in the single market was pushed through by most of the Central and Eastern member states, there is no crucial difference in that which one I choose for my analysis. Due to a knowledge of language which is important for sensing the peculiarities of discourse and access to resources I chose Lithuania.

Collecting Data

When approaching the task of data collection, first I collected all the articles that were published on the topic in the most read and visited news website in Lithuania¹ delfi.lt. Then I reached out to the editors of it with an inquiry to provide data on how many times all of these articles were read. When they sent me the data, I was able to see which articles out of all of the published ones were the most read by expecting that they have had both reflected and informed the general public opinion on the topic. I picked out nine the most read ones for my analysis.

In order for the data to represent a wider spectrum of opinions, I also reached out to a more of a niche news website, which most often publishes news on business and politics and targets people who are likely to be opinion shapers: those from academia, policy-makers, businessmen and so on. Since the target audience of this news outlet – www.vz.lt - is smaller and the overall amount of articles published on that topic is also not as high as that of the most popular news website, I selected three most read articles on the topic of dual quality of goods in Europe for my analysis.

Data evaluation

When doing a discourse analysis each case is different in a sense that the researcher has to adapt or create the tools that are the most appropriate to answer their research question (Gee 2010 : 1). Research tools in discourse analysis are the questions that we ask the data we collected. In my case I have five different, but related, categories of questions or, in other

¹ According to published numbers by <http://www.gemius.lt/visos-naujienos/id-2017-m-pradzia-augino-svetainiu-populiaruma.html>

words, four different, but complementary angles of approaching the data in order to extract the most nuanced aspects of the pieces of language analysed.

Questions I plan to ask the data are left rather loose in order to stay open minded about ideas and concepts that will be stumbled upon in the language as well as in order to be able to stretch them in varying contexts.

The narratives that are important in relation to the discourse questions which are asked the language will be depicted and analysed as motifs (occurring several times throughout the pieces of language) as borrowed from Gee (Gee 2014: 186). The articles will be referred to in numbers attached to them in the annex (1.1 to 1.9 and 2.1 to 2.3). Numbers 1.1 to 1.9 are ascribed to the texts published in delfi.lt – the most popular online news website in Lithuania and numbers from 2.1 to 2.3 are ascribed to vz.lt – a more of a niche website targeting the opinion elites – politicians, businessmen, academicians and so on. Next to each motif the articles in which they occurred will be listed.

When quoting an excerpt from a certain article, a letter will be attached to its number for further reference (for instance, 2.2 A), so that there is no need to quote the excerpt again if I want to refer to it in the future. To sum up, when referring only in numbers, for instance, to 2.2, the whole article will be had in mind. In contrast, if there is a letter to that number, a reference is made only to a specific excerpt that is being or had been quoted earlier in the analysis.

My goal was not to establish a ratio or an exact comparison of what arguments surface the most often, but instead to check if the memory of shopping experience under communist regime is triggered in the Central and Eastern European member states nowadays through facing the issue of dual quality of goods and if that shapes their sense of Europeanness – belonging to Europe.

Now five different categories of inquiry will be introduced and data analysis results presented.

Category 1: Significance

When information is presented, it is important what levels and layers of significance are attached to it (Gee 2014: 32). Looking for signs of significance helps identify what feelings

and connotations are attached to the language (ibid 32). These signs often come in forms of adjectives or adverbs that sometimes adds specific colour to the language and marks even in in very subtle forms, which aspects of the discussed or presented event or piece of news are more important than others.

In this category it will be evaluated whether the topic in the public discourse is treated in purely technical terms as well as if it's treated as merely one of many things on the agenda reported without any emotional attachments. In contrast, it could also be found out to be treated with high levels of significance attached. Additionally, it is also important to evaluate which moments in the language are treated as more significant than others (for instance, to evaluate if the re-established memory of the Iron Curtain when these states used to get inferior goods in comparison to the rest of Europe is presented as more/less or equally as significant in the data as the purely material/economic loss of getting inferior products?).

Discourse analysis question: Which things are made more or less significant via language in these texts and how? (ibid 32)

Things I will be looking for in the language to evaluate the degree of significance: signs of emphasis, repetition, emotionally-charged adjectives or adverbs.

Motif 1: The cultural and memory – related connotations of the existence of the East – West inequality in the single market are deemed more significant than the economic damage inflicted. (1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.9, 2.1).

What becomes clear when analysing the pieces of text is that the East – West divide is not only signaled but also done so in a manner that puts it at more of an emphasis than the dual quality of goods in itself. Such added significance is illuminated by the way upsetting feelings are reasoned.

In one of the articles the experience of a Slovak woman who regularly goes cross-boarder to Austria to do her shopping is depicted:

<...> *The woman was in awe, not only the range of products there (in Austria – ed. note) was much wider, but the quality of them was also much higher: “Not only the detergents are more*

effective, but the ketchup we purchase there has more tomatoes than that sold in Slovakia". We have been members of the Union for 13 years now, however, that did not help. Recently the feeling of resentment has been growing in the Central and Eastern Europe: the citizens got fed up with being treated by their well-off neighbors as if they were second-class (1.4 A).

We can see from here that after presenting the problem of dual quality of products, what follows up is the signaling of the East – West divide being the focus of the discontent with the situation.

Similar patterns, only varying in intensity reoccur in four more texts: 1.5 and 2.1. In 1.5 too the problem is framed in a way that after stating it, there's an immediate follow up with a rhetoric question, asking why the East is where the compromised/experimental quality occurs. The same pattern of added significance of the East – West divide (as an immediate follow up to the presented problem) is seen in 2.1A where the minister of Agriculture of Lithuania is cited:

It is no secret that products under the same brandings that are sold in Lithuania and in other states are of different quality. Even though the brand is the same, the product bought in Austria or Germany of course will be of a higher quality. Today this problem is being raised at high levels in the EU. 80% of Lithuanian consumers think that they're not receiving goods as good as the Germans, the Austrians and others do. It is a bit of a shame that after all this time in the EU we have this situation. In practice the EU does not deliver its values. The EU should regulate this on the European level.

Although implicitly not referred to as a West vs. East issue, from this piece of language and references made in it what becomes apparent is that the issue is framed to be more significant in a way that it causes the Central East to feel different than the Western Europe

Motif 2: The issue with the dual quality is blown out of proportion (1.1, 1.2, 2.3)

Just as in some articles the main narrative that is being developed through the text is that of the dual quality of products being an important symptom of the still present East – West divide, in others the issue is downplayed as being insignificant to varying extents. While in article 1.1 and 1.2 it is suggested that perhaps there should be more investigations done with examining the quality of products in order to establish whether or not the allegations of dual

quality are true, in 2.3 those who accuse the producers and the EU of mistreatment are openly criticised: ‘To scream that everyone is mistreating us is very immature’.

This shows that not in all articles the dual quality issue is depicted as upsetting. In most of them, both views are presented as possible, however the leanings and framings in most do constitute an image of the issue being important with regards to memory and East vs. West divide.

Category 2: Identities

Evaluation of identity-related attachments in the language are crucial in order to examine how shopping experience in the Central and Eastern member states affect their sense of Europeanness or, inversely, otherness.

Discourse analysis question: What identity or identities do these pieces of text enact? (Gee 2014: 33)

Sub-question 1: What identity or identities (if any) are these pieces of language attributing? Is this used in order to differentiate between the identity of the speaker and that of the other (e.g. Western Europe)?

Motif 1: Identity of being inferior in Europe. (1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 2.2)

In an overwhelming majority of the articles the feeling of inferiority surfaces when speaking about the shopping experience in the Central and Eastern Europe. In 1.3 the connotation is already sensed in the headline which reads ‘Lithuanians are being sold second-class goods’.

In 1.4 the the headline is even more dramatic and reads ‘The quality of goods in the Eastern Europe are forcing the citizens to shop elsewhere’. In the article Central and Eastern Europeans are being referred to not only as being treated as second-class in Europe, but also as being considered as merely poor relatives in the family of the EU. The Slovak prime minister is also cited stating that the Commission will be asked to adopt regulations as soon as possible, which would put an end to such practice, humiliating to the citizens.

In 1.5. the feeling of being ignored by the West is briefly picked up, while in 1.6 it is depicted how Czechs go cross border in order to shop for higher-quality goods in Germany and said that this should not be happening in Europe as well as how upsetting such experience is.

Similar narratives that depict the upsetting and humiliating experiences come to surface in other mentioned articles too. In 2.2 the upsetting feelings of inferiority are truly shining through by the sarcastic character of the language:

2.2 A: The investigation has shown that the recipes of goods sold under the same name and packaging in Lithuania and in Germany are differing not only in the amounts of chocolate or preservatives – the problem is much more serious: to most of the products that end up on the tables of Lithuanians palm oil - called the killer oil - is added instead of a healthier seed-oil such as sunflower oil which is used for the German foods. <...>

It sounds ridiculous when the company “Henkel” which produces the popular detergents “Persil” explains itself to the Slovak portal “Slovak Spectator” that the quality of their produced detergents is different due to different habits of consumers. They are saying that Czechs and Slovaks usually wash clothes in higher temperatures, hence there the detergents are weaker than those sold in Germany. They also argue that the dominating types of stains are different. How come Germans’ clothing stains are different than that of Czechs’, Slovaks’, Lithuanians’? Perhaps due to the amount of palm oil...

Making a reference to clothes being stained with palm oil in Eastern Europe is a masked by sarcasm way of saying how unpleasant it is to be sold inferior products.

Motif 2: Identity of being a post-socialist society. 1.4, 1.5, 1.6

1.5 It’s a shame that the post-socialist states which are now members of the family of the European Union are still being ignored.

In 1.5 the post – socialist baggage is directly depicted in the quote by the representative of the State Food and Veterinary Service. It is not elaborated on what the representative explicitly means by picking up such reference to the past, however looking back to the theoretical part of this thesis helps to provide the quote with some cultural context. Knowing the overall level of sensitivity of that memory as well as a general feeling in Eastern Europe that the history of

Europe was written in the Western part of it, the reference could be decrypted as pointing out to the historic ignorance on behalf of the European Union which is now translated into neglect of the Central and Eastern Europe in the single market.

A similar reference to the post-socialist identity as well as a memory of consumer experience under communism is made in 1.6 where a highly interesting framing of that memory is witnessed:

1.6A Although in Czech Republic and Slovakia the shelves in the shops are full of goods, but the citizens are again travelling (cross-border to Germany – ed. note) to, as they claim, shop for higher-quality goods.

Just one word in this quote serves as an indicator of the presence of the underlying memory of shopping experience under communism re-emerging. That word is ‘again’. Nowhere in the text is it further explained to what that ‘again’ refers to, however, to most of the Easterners this reference is automatically translated to a memory of tourist-shopping under communism.

The 14A excerpt that was already quoted earlier is also of significance here due to the depicted lack of change: “We have been members of the Union for 13 years now, however, that did not help”. The quote was made in the context of having to shop for higher-quality goods abroad. Similarly, as in 16A, the reference in the quote to *what* it is that the 13 years of belonging to the Union did not help is not explained. The reason of why the reference is not explained can be twofold: it is either assumed that the reader will immediately pick up the reference and there is no need to explain it or the reference was made unconsciously – in a manner of language slipping off the tongue and revealing a suppressed memory (in line with Freud’s reasoning). Either way, the presence of a re-emerging memory of shopping under communism and drawing a parallel to doing that now in the EU is clear and it does enact an upsetting feeling.

Category 3: Relationships

Language is used to establish what relationship a group of people have with other groups or institutions about whom they are communicating (Gee 2014: 34). In analysis of this category I will look at how the relationship between Central and Eastern Europe and the EU is portrayed.

Discourse analysis question: What sort of relationships are enacted in these pieces of text? (Gee 2014: 34) **Sub-question:** Is this relationship considered to be in-group (existing within Europe as a whole) or is it considered to exist between two or more different groups.

Motif 1: East vs. West. The distinction is outlined in articles 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 2.2

The dual quality of products is explained in the context of East West division in most of the articles examined. The relationship overall is considered in-group, however, often with a vocal expectation for more equality within this relationship or explicitly depicting how upsetting it is that the relationship is not symmetrical yet. The expectation aspect of this relationship will be discussed in more detail at the last category of inquiry dedicated to expectations.

Motif 2: Citizens vs. EU 1.3, 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, 2.2

In many of the articles a very personal relationship between the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe and the EU is portrayed, mostly to show that the citizens do not deserve to be treated worse or that they are upset about feeling inferior:

1.4A The citizens of the EU say that the situation should be different. They are part of the European Union so they should be able to expect the same quality of products in all the 28 member states. "We can not allow our citizens to be treated as some second-class",- said the Slovak minister of Agriculture.

2.2B We have not only a two speed Europe, we also have second-class citizens who consume second-class products.

This excerpt reveals a very important line of thinking: difficulties and turbulences of European integration that come to life in two-speed integration processes (two speed Europe) where part of the continent is considered to be lagging behind in comparison to other part is connected with the existence of two-class citizens. This connection reveals that inequality of citizens as consumers in the single market of Europe is considered to be a contributing part to integration challenges which throw shadow on the future of the European Union. Such link

between equality of citizens and the well-being as well as unity of the EU is of crucial importance in illuminating the way in which equality matters to the Eastern part of Europe when considering a sense of belonging.

Motif 3: Dominated vs. dominant 1.4, 1.5, 1.6

A relationship between the Central and Eastern Europe and the EU in some articles is portrayed as that of a dominated vs. dominant with the EU being the latter.

As mentioned in the theory, it is sometimes considered that the EU has been in charge of choosing which moments from history as well as memories to include in the formation and production of the collective identity in Europe with the Central and Eastern Europe being historically more left out in the process than Western Europe (Mink, Neuman). Such view could be recognised in the articles when references were made to the EU *still* treating the Central and Eastern Europe in a certain way (as second-class citizens as depicted in 1.4 or discriminated as depicted in 1.6). The reference to the continuity of treatment could be decrypted in many ways though, but what surfaces is the perception of a certain power relationship in which the Central and Eastern European member states feels dominated. It is strengthened by a sense of inferiority and a lack of equality or symmetry which comes to life by a different treatment of the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe as consumers in the single market.

Category 4: Connections

We often use language in order to create or break certain connections (Gee 2014: 35). In this case I am interested in how shopping experiences in Central and Eastern Europe are connected to the sense of belonging to European market and Europe itself. Do these connections entail a sense of inclusion or rather a sense of exclusion? How material experiences of shopping in the Central and Eastern Europe are connected and translated to emotional experiences (satisfaction or dissatisfaction) ?

Discourse question: How does this piece of language connect or disconnect things? **Sub-question:** How does this piece of language connect shopping experience with a sense of self and a sense of Europeanness?

Although this is an overall research question, asking the texts merely that would only give us a fragment of an answer. This question only depicts parts of language that directly addresses the question, however indirect yet meaningful references are also expected to be made and in turn have to be analysed with differently framed questions.

Motif 1: Buying products of dual quality in Central and Eastern Europe grounds a sense of inferiority in the European Union. 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 2.2

The headline of 1.4 reads: “The quality of goods in the Eastern Europe forces the citizens to shop elsewhere”. It could already be read from the headline that the word *forces* signal of a traumatic experience. Later in the text it is emphasised how Central and Eastern Europeans are part of the same Union and the same market thus should be treated equally, but are not yet. A sense of having been fed up with being the inferior is also described. Similar, only a bit more moderate connections between belonging to the European Union however being inferior within its surface in the majority of other texts too.

Similarly, the headline of 1.9 reads ‘It is still legal to feed Lithuanians with inferior food’ or consider the powerful quotes of 2.2 B which emphasises the link between the inequality of the Central and Eastern consumers and the two-speed Europe. The narrative of a sense of mistreatment is generally highly prevalent in most of the texts.

Category 5: Expectations

This category was introduced later on in the research, since quite a few points of discontent were noticed in the way it was spoken about shopping experience in the Central and Eastern Europe, however, reading in the expectations for the membership would help better pinpoint and clarify the source of the discontent. For instance, there is a difference if discontent is stemming from material expectations or identity, value related expectations.

Discourse question: What expectations does this piece of text reveal of membership in the EU?

I will be looking for language depicting expectations on both tangible and value-related levels. Expectations for participation in the single market, equality, solidarity, since that would help to identify where the discontent comes from mainly.

Motif 1: Expectation to be treated equally. 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, 2.1

Expectation of equality in the European Union is a highly prevalent motif in all the majority of the texts analysed. Most often it is spelled out very openly and framed together with the problem of dual quality of products in the European Union:

1.3 If the consumer is buying a product that is well known in the whole European Union, he naturally expects it to taste the same from Vilnius to Lisbon and the producers should make sure they do. <...> We really hope the regulations will pass and producers will be forbidden to export different quality products to different states.

1.6 Some feel resentment: dual standards are reasoned by stating that they do not breach any laws as long as all the ingredients are listed on the labels. So technically the consumer is not misled. But this does not go in line with ethics.

In 1.6 although equality is not explicitly mentioned, it is implied with the expectation to be treated ethically. Ethics is an interesting and important concept that surfaces as an expectation for a membership in the European Union. It in a way refers to equality, solidarity and respect that is desired in the relationship with the European Union in order to cultivate a more genuine sense of belonging.

Conclusions

As portrayed in the public discourse in Lithuania, the shopping experience of dual quality products in the Central and Eastern Europe shapes the way the citizens of these member states of the EU feel about belonging to Europe or, in other words, Europeanness. After analysing the texts it becomes clear that such existence of inequality in the single market obstructs the Central and European societies' ability to feel equally as important as not only consumers, but, more importantly, citizens as that of the Western member states.

In line with that, the shopping experience in Central and European member states also grounds the historically developed sense of inferiority and adds to the perception that the region is the lagging part of the two-speed Europe.

Additionally, via shopping experience traumatising memories of communist regime where the societies were exposed to inferior goods reemerge. As it is portrayed, the trips that some Central and Eastern Europeans choose to make westwards in order to get access to goods that are of higher quality painfully resemble the similar trips that used to take place when under communist rule due to local shortcomings of goods.

By reacting too technically and not sensitively enough as perceived by the Central and Eastern Europe, the EU also creates this image of trying to dominate history by overlooking the post-communist past of the Central and Eastern European member states. Such perceived ignorance also contributes to the regions' perception of the EU not living up to its values of equality and solidarity.

Although in some of the articles it is suggested that the case of dual quality of products may be oversensitized, as it appears from the majority of them, for the Central and Eastern Europeans this issue informs a sense of self and a relationship with Europe to an important extent.

13 Conclusions

Shopping experience as any other everyday experience along with symbols and materials can inform people of their identity when memories are triggered and in turn reference to present is created. In that way, reemerging memory charges present with a certain feeling associated with the past being remembered and shapes people's sense of self.

Day-to-day life is filled with references to fragments of history and memory that usually are unnoticed (Saint Laurent 2018: 148). Hence, unfortunately, despite being significant in the formation of our senses of self, they often lack in being studied too (ibid).

Memory is a highly valuable ingredient of collective identity construction which helps to legitimise a formation of political community (Neumayer, Mink 2013: 3). The same holds true for the EU where memory questions are of key importance in the construction of the European identity the sustainability of which is perceived to be as one of the key deciding factors for both legitimizing the current degree of supranational integration and projecting that for future.

This work aimed at revealing how everyday shopping experience in Central and Eastern Europe shapes the citizens' sense of Europeanness by checking whether the case of the dual quality of products in the European Union triggers a memory of communist past in the region. It was found out that the memory indeed is triggered and a sense of inferiority inflicted.

Through shopping experience of being exposed to inferior goods than those in the Western markets in the EU, Central and Eastern Europeans feel that the EU lacks in living up to both their expectations and its own declared values of solidarity and equality. It could be concluded that the case of dual quality of products in Central and Eastern Europe infuses the sense of Europeanness of these citizens with disappointment and confusion as well as puts to question their genuine feeling of belonging.

The inequality of Central and Eastern European consumers in the single market strengthens the divisions between the Western and the Eastern parts of the continent. After the Eastern enlargement in 2004 this division has been formally closed with political and economic measures taken in order to equalise the two sides of Europe. However, by joining the European Union, the Central and Eastern part of the continent has brought its history and memory with it, which seems to be in need of a better integration with that of the Western side of Europe. The lack of sensitivity on the EU's part to the post-communist memory dimension of its Central and Eastern European citizens may contribute to a growing alienation of them in the future.

The EU is considered to be a memory - power structure that has an ability of either bringing about the memory of communist past or facilitating forgetting. By not granting equality in the single market to its Central Eastern citizens, the EU allows for the memory of traumatic communist past to reemerge. Reemerging memories shape identity and keep wounds open as well as may lead to communicative memory transforming into cultural memory which leaves a much deeper mark in cultural identities of people. Such marks could even deepen the already existing identity – disparities between the Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe which become truly problematic at times of turbulences.

By overlooking the effects that certain policies have on shaping identities, the EU puts itself at a risk of increased inner fragmentation which might in turn contour its own faith.

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15 Appendix

The list of articles used for the research in numbers they are referred to in the text:

1.1 Žemės ūkio viceministras režė: Lietuvoje gaminami dvigubos kokybės produktai
2017 10 18

Views: 19964

Available from: <https://www.delfi.lt/verslas/verslas/zemes-ukio-viceministras-reze-lietuvoje-gaminami-dvigubos-kokybes-produktai.d?id=76086783>

1.2 Skirtingos kokybės maisto skandalas: įtarimų netikrino 6 metus
2017 11 22

Available from: <https://www.delfi.lt/verslas/verslas/skirtingos-kokybes-maisto-skandalas-itarimu-netikrino-6-metus.d?id=76422841>

Views: 12155

1.3 Tyrimas parodė, kad lietuviams parduodamas maistas – antrarūšis
2017 09 19

Available from: <https://www.delfi.lt/verslas/verslas/tyrimas-parode-kad-lietuviams-parduodamas-maistas-antrarusis.d?id=75800635>

Views: 48858

1.4 Produktų kokybė Rytų Europoje gyventojus verčia apsipirkti svetur
2017 04 16

Available from: <https://www.delfi.lt/verslas/verslas/produktu-kokybe-rytu-europoje-gyventojus-vercia-apsipirkti-svetur.d?id=74365560>

Views: 30325

1.5 Tyrimas įrodė, kad naujasis ES šalis iš Vakarų pasiekia prastesnės kokybės maistas
2011 05 15

Available from: <https://www.delfi.lt/verslas/verslas/tyrimas-irode-kad-naujasias-es-salis-is-vakaru-pasiekia-prastesnes-kokybes-maistas.d?id=45519423>

Views: 23490

1.6 Rytų europiečiai piktinasi dėl dvigubų standartų
2017 03 07

Available from: <https://www.delfi.lt/verslas/verslas/rytu-europieciai-piktinasi-del-dvigubu-standartu.d?id=73972100>

Views: 10175

1.7 Lietuvių pirkiniai – antrarūšiai?
2017 09 17

Available from: <https://www.delfi.lt/verslas/verslas/lietuviu-pirkiniai-antrarusiai.d?id=75757269>

Views: 41483

1.8 Lietuva – antrarūšių prekių šalis?

2011 05 23

Available from: <https://www.delfi.lt/verslas/verslas/lietuva-antrarusiu-prekiu-salis.d?id=45788947>

Views: 44701

1.9 Lietuviai vis dar teisėtai maitinami prastesniu maistu

2013 08 25

Available from: <https://www.delfi.lt/verslas/verslas/lietuviai-vis-dar-teisetai-maitinami-prastesniu-maistu.d?id=62157777>

Views: 20136

2.1 Tyrė produktus Lietuvoje ir Vokietijoje: kokybė skiriasi akivaizdžiai

2017 09 19

Available from: <https://www.vz.lt/agroverslas/maisto-pramone/2017/09/19/tyre-produktus-lietuvoje-ir-vokietijoje-kokybe-skiriasi-akivaizdziai>

Views: 5387

2.2 Koks maistas, tokios ir dėmės

2017 09 20

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Views: 1332

2.3 Snarskis: nebrandu rekti, kad gamintojai skriaudžia, jei nėra mokslinio pagrindo

2017 09 20

Available from: <https://www.vz.lt/agroverslas/2017/09/20/snarskis-nebrandu-rekti-kad-gamintojai-skriaudzia-jei-nera-mokslinio-pagrindo#ixzz5EKoJp4Y1>

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