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Unpacking Counter-Terrorism Cooperation in East Africa

A regime theoretical analysis of East Africa's evolving counter-
terrorism framework

Misha Desai

Political Science
Department of Political Science
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Supervisor: Douglas Brommesson

Abstract

Recent developments on the African continent have indicated the emergence of a comprehensive security framework that has been developed to address the many security issues currently threatening peace and stability. A central pillar in this new framework has been the prominent role played by Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that have increasingly adopted peace and security goals as part of their mandate. This has been especially relevant in East Africa, a region with several active terrorist groups, which in turn has seen an increased role played by the regions two represented RECs. As such, the aim of this study is to gauge whether a security regime in East Africa has evolved in response to the regions terrorist threat. In doing so this thesis adopted a regime theoretical approach. An multivariant analytical framework, that combines power, interest, knowledge and context-based assumptions was employed to unpack the dynamics and circumstances that have facilitated and hindered cooperation in the region. By adopting a case study methodology that utilized process tracing, this thesis analysed official sources that included annual reports, documents, agreements and strategies that have a focus on counter-terrorism and are pertinent to the East African region. The results of this study show that the social factors of power, interests, knowledge and context have all had a significant influence on the formation of institutional arrangements and a comprehensive CT framework in East Africa. Furthermore, this study concludes that while a fully-fledged security regime has not formed in East Africa, the structure for one is very much in place. As such, the formation of a security regime is still very likely, maybe even at a sub-regional level instead.

Key Words: [African Union, East Africa, Regime Theory, Counter-Terrorism, Regional Economic Communities]

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List of Acronyms

ACSRT	African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism
AMISOM	The African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CENSAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force– Horn of Africa
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CT	Counter-Terrorism
DOD	Department of Defence
EAC	East African Community
EAJO	East Africa Joint Operations
EAPCCO	Eastern African Police Chiefs Organization
EASF	Eastern African Standby Force
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EWM	EAC Early Warning Mechanism
GWOT	Global War on Terror
ICPAT	IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IR	International Relations
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
ISSP	IGAD Security Sector Program
LRA	Lord’s Resistance Army
MCPMR	Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PREACT	Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism
PSC	Peace and Security Council
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UN	United Nations

1. Introduction

Confronting the security issues that have come to define the twenty-first century is a complex and multifaceted task. No more so has this issue become a reality than on the African continent, which has faced countless eras of fragility and insecurity spanning from early colonial expansion to the Cold War politicking of the late twentieth century. More recent developments, driven by the Global War on Terror (GWOT), have further complicated security dynamics, as the continent continues to function as a host for often competing interests from domestic, regional and international actors. Considering this context, generalizing about security issues on the African continent can be both difficult and potentially dangerous.¹ Despite this, recent developments on the continent have indicated the emergence of an African peace and security regime, aimed at confronting and remedying the issues threatening stability on the continent. Tackling this change is a necessary task, to fully grasp both the complex issues facing the continent, as well as the responses and strategies employed to meet them

1.1 Purpose

Shifting global dynamics have long had far-reaching effects on the Africa continent. This has been especially relevant with regard to security issues and how they have been met and addressed. Exactly how these dynamics have shaped the continent will be explored in the following section, but it can already be stated that the African Union (AU) has institutionalised an increasingly security orientated approach over the years. As such, the goal of promoting peace, security and stability in Africa has come to represent a central goal of the AU, which has led to the formation of an extensive and intricate security framework.

A significant step in realizing this goal was the drafting of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which serves as the principle framework to promote peace and security across the African continent. The formation and promulgation of APSA heralded an important step for the AU in establishing itself as an important and outright security actor.² Furthermore, the aim of APSA is to uphold a combination of shared norms and structures that should guide peace and security responses on the continent. Here, the adherence to ideals like multilateralism, democratic constitutionalism and the inclusivity of all stakeholders in the management and resolution of security-related issues, forms the common strategy that the AU has chosen to adopt.³

¹ James. J. Hentz, 'Introduction: African security in the twenty-first century ', in J.J. Hentz (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of African Security*, London, Routledge, 2013, p. 3.

² Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto, 'The African Union's New Peace and Security Architecture: Toward an Evolving Security Regime?', *African Security*, vol. 2, no. 2-3, 2009, p. 83.

³ African Union, *About Agenda 2063*, <https://au.int/agenda2063/about>, (accessed May 14).

An important feature of the APSA is the eight officially recognised Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that not only function in tandem with the AU but are often utilized to pursue the security-related aims of the APSA. From this, it can, and has been, argued that the African security strategy that has developed, is a result of several different actors that function in collaboration with one another, creating a shared understanding of security governance.⁴ Considering this, it is no surprise that responding to the current threat posed by jihadist groups has become a central task of the AU. While these groups affect continental peace and stability, they are generally located and function in regional hotspots. As such the RECs have increasingly been used as a tool to operationalize the security aims of the AU in their respective regions. This has been evident in East Africa, which is host to several active terrorist organizations. The global response towards countering the terrorist threat has reaped mixed results and it has tended to belie regional and local expertise. As such, examining regional efforts to the problem could prove significant in understanding how the issue is tackled.

Considering the above, understanding how and why states cooperate and collaborate is an integral part of International Relations scholarship. Cooperation on security issues is not a common phenomenon. Nevertheless, this has occurred in East Africa, especially in their response to terrorist threats. Two RECs have emerged, the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with both addressing, among other things, security issues in the region as part of their mandate. Fully understanding this process of cooperation and the dynamics that underpin it can be both complex and multifaceted. Regime theory, however, can prove a useful analytical tool to explain how and why this has occurred. The cooperative structures that are currently in place in the region reflect certain tenets of a regime, which begs the question of whether such a structure exists. Considering these indications, this thesis will aim to test this claim by asking the simple question; *how far has a security regime formed in East Africa in response to the regions terrorist threat?* While this question will form the basis for this paper's academic inquiry, several other questions will, in turn, be addressed, namely;

- How can this formation be understood?
- What are the circumstances that led to its formation?
- What are the main challenges to its formation?

⁴ Engel and Porto. (2009)

1.2 Relevance

The relatively recent developments within the AU and the promulgation and institutionalisation of several security apparatus on the continent has led to an increased academic focus in the field. Scholarship on the AU and how it is equipped to deal with contemporary security issues has become a vibrant field, that has focused on issues pertaining from security governance to norm diffusion. Nevertheless, the majority of research conducted in this field has tended to be overly descriptive, focussing on empirical accounts of the security issues faced by the AU and how APSA has been employed to tackle them. However, recent debates have intended to widen this debate by considering the nature and dynamics that define security engagement on the continent.

An increased focus on the institutional development of the African security architecture has attempted to unpack the dynamics that have led to today's framework. In line with this reasoning, an early discussion has begun to take hold within the field about the emergence of a security regime at the continental level. Engel and Porto have developed this idea by analysing the formation of norms, values and social processes that are evident within APSA and how this indicates the emergence of a regime.⁵ Malte Brosig has also addressed this dilemma but has distanced himself from the distinction of security regimes, focussing instead on 'security complexes'. In his research, he focusses not on the formation of a single coherent regime, but instead on overlapping and intersecting regimes, with the aim of understanding how different security regimes are interconnected within the Africa context.⁶ Despite this wide focus, tentative steps have also been taken to analyse the role of RECs within the broader continental security framework. Peter Arthur has addressed this issue but has focussed on how RECs have evolved to take on a role in conflict resolution with their neighbours. He argues that despite the many challenges, the AU has increasingly utilized RECs as intermediaries in conflict situations, as a tool to consolidate regional stability but also to reinforce conflict management mechanisms on the continent.⁷

While the above has described research that has focused on institutionalist understandings, cognitivist approaches have also been employed within the field. Central here has been Paul D. Williams who has developed the idea of a 'security culture' which he has applied to the African context. He argues the impact of cultural norms on security dynamics is underdeveloped as research has overly relied on neorealist and neoliberal assumptions. As such he endeavours to fill

⁵ Ibid., p.93.

⁶ Malte Brosig, 'Introduction: The African Security Regime Complex—Exploring Converging Actors and Policies', *African Security*, vol. 6, no. 3-4, 2013, p. 172.

⁷ Peter Arthur, 'Promoting Security in Africa through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)', *Insight on Africa*, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, p. 18.

this gap by considering two cases pertinent to the African context; unconstitutional changes of governments and humanitarian interventions. Through these examples, Williams highlights that the AU has established a unique security culture that has institutionalized specific norms and values that have in turn influenced how security challenges are met on the continent.⁸

Considering all of the above, this study will build off the current scholarship on the emerging security regime in Africa, but instead, limit the scope to a regional focus. By doing so, this study will contribute to not only the overall discussion on the emerging African security regime but more specifically the role of RECs and how they coordinate to tackle specific security issues. Furthermore, this study will also aim to provide useful insights into the East Africa region, which has been underdeveloped within scholarship on security governance and cooperation.

The current literature on regime theory and its application will be developed in section 3 of this thesis. However, through the application of a regime theoretical approach, this study will aim to contribute to the current research on the emerging African security paradigm but go beyond the more descriptive and evaluative work and instead focus on an aspect that is relatively under-researched, namely: understanding the processes that lead to this formation. Previous studies have failed to address the underlying analytical questions that underpin security cooperation, regime formation and the organizing principles that are central to AUs security architecture. As such, this thesis aims to fill in this gap, by focussing on how regional actors cooperate to deal with a specific issue and how different social factors have both facilitated and hindered this.

1.3 Thesis Disposition

This thesis is organized into 6 main sections. Following this introduction, section 2 will highlight the global dynamics that have come to shape the AU and how it has evolved into the security actor, with the purpose of situating this thesis within a contemporary context. Furthermore, this section will also explore how the principle of regionalism has developed in Africa and the role of RECs in the overall continental security framework.

Section 3 will consist of the theoretical framework that will be employed. Here, the central tenets of regime theory will be addressed as well as how the concept of regimes has been defined and conceptualized. This section will also provide an overview of the realist, liberalist and cognitivist strands that encapsulate regime theoretical assumptions. With the theoretical framework highlighted, section 4 will introduce the methodological choices that will be utilized in the thesis. Here, the merits of a case study and process tracing approach will be discussed, as well

⁸ Paul D. Williams, 'From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture', vol. 106, no. 423, 2007, p. 256-266.

as how they will be operationalized together with the analytical framework to tackle this studies research questions. The application of the theoretical and methodological approaches and the analysis of the chosen case will constitute section 5 of this thesis. Here, a regime theoretical analysis of the evolving security framework in East Africa will be conducted by applying the two frameworks highlighted below (Fig 2 & 3). The final part of this thesis, section 6, will critically discuss the findings from the previous section and attempt to address the central questions posed in this study. This section will also provide some concluding thoughts and avenues for further research within the field of regime formation and the evolving African security framework.

2. Background

In order to situate this study within the necessary context, it can be useful to provide a brief historical overview of the significant events that have shaped dynamics in Africa. As such, the following sections will aim to highlight the changing security landscape on the African continent and the institutions and structures that have evolved out of them. In essence, this section will aim to map the emergence of the AU as an outright security actor and the role RECs have come to play in the realization of continental security aims.

2.1 Changing Global Order

As touched upon above, the African continent has been confronted with a myriad of changing security dynamics that have been characterised by several global processes.⁹ Tracking these processes could prove helpful in understanding the dynamics that shape contemporary realities on the continent today. A cornerstone of Africa studies has been the legacy of colonialism and how it has impacted development on the continent. The late nineteenth-century saw a scramble for territorial gains on the African continent, which saw arbitrary borders drawn up that cemented territorial partitions that are still in place today. While controversial in their own sense, colonial powers in Africa rarely engaged militarily with one another and as such security issues stemmed primarily from pro-independence/ anti-colonial actors. This same trend was evident in the post-independent era, with very few interstate conflicts occurring on the African continent. The same however cannot be said about intrastate conflicts.¹⁰ The post-independence era was rife with internal conflicts, that stemmed out of a myriad of overlapping factors.

Much of the civil unrest in Africa continued and was exacerbated during the superpower politicking of the Cold War. The African continent was transformed into a geopolitical chessboard where proxy wars defined the security landscape and authoritarian strongmen were backed in an attempt to cement ideological authority.¹¹ With both the colonial and superpower control extinguished in the post-Cold War era, external factors played a minimal role in the security threats faced by African nations. Instead, the removal of the moderating role of external actors ushered

⁹ Kwesi Aning and Naila Salihu, 'The African Security Predicament', in J.J. Hentz (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of African Security*, London, Routledge, 2013, p. 10.

¹⁰ Hentz (2013), p. 4.

¹¹ Crawford Young, 'The Heritage of Colonialism ', in John W. Harbeson and Donald S. Rothchild (eds), *Africa in world politics: engaging a changing global order*, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 2013, p. 29.

in an age of identity politics, where the artificial boundaries drawn up during the colonial era were increasingly contested and at times torn up.¹²

The post-Cold War era saw a shift in global dynamics, with processes like globalization increasingly shaping political, economic and security discourses. While this period saw an increase in democratic advancements and ushered in a hope for a new world order, the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks halted these ambitions. The GWOT has polarized global discourses in a way that is reminiscent of the Cold War ideological divide. Furthermore, it has thrust the African continent back into global strategic considerations, transforming the continent, once again, into a conduit for external actors to realize their interests through. This is most clearly demonstrated by the considerable increase in security-related aid that has been sent to certain 'anchor states' in Africa to bolster regional counter-terrorist (CT) capabilities. It is no surprise therefore that the African continent has emerged as a significant setting within the GWOT and continues to hold considerable strategic value for many external actors.¹³

2.2 Emergence as a Security Actor

These global processes understandably had a significant effect on security dynamics on the continent, but they did not occur in a vacuum. Evolving in tandem, and often as a consequence, of these global shifts was the formation of an African institution aimed at consolidating the political and territorial integrity of African countries. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU)- a precursor to the African Union- was established in 1963 with the aim of safeguarding hard fought for gains made during the decolonisation process. The Charter of the organization stressed the importance of preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states and to "fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms".¹⁴ While flawed in many ways, the OAU nevertheless provided a much-needed platform for African states to engage in political, economic and social dialogue and was designed with the goal of promoting peace and security on the continent. However, the OAU's steadfast defence of non-interference and state sovereignty, rendered it a redundant security actor, when faced with the many internal struggles for power that defined that period.¹⁵

As the Cold War waged on, the OAU was involved in several conflicts, both as intermediaries and as outright peacekeepers. Despite these efforts, the OAU was limited by their

¹² Francis Deng, 'Reconciling sovereignty with responsibility', in John W. Harbeson and Donald S. Rothchild (eds), *African in World Politics* Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 2013, p. 326.

¹³ Ibid., pp.33-35.

¹⁴ OAU (1963), *Charter of the Organization of African Unity*

¹⁵ Jonathan D. Rechner, 'From the OAU to the AU: A Normative Shift with Implications for Peacekeeping and Conflict Management, or Just a Name Change?', *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, vol. 39, no. 2, 2006, p. 544.

lack of logistical and financial resources which rendered many of their interventions ineffective. By rigorously enforcing the principle of non-interference, the OAU was reluctant to intervene in internal disputes, which aided in consolidating the power of several authoritarian regimes on the continent.¹⁶ The ending of the Cold War saw the introduction of the *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution* (MCPMR) which aimed to respond to the many shortcomings of the organisation's security capabilities. This new approach adopted a more interventionist stance, as the mechanism gave the OAU the power to deploy military missions in response to the security challenges in the post-Cold War era. Despite this, the power to intervene was still restricted and the mechanism functioned primarily as a tool to prevent conflicts rather than manage or resolve them.¹⁷

Considering these shortcomings, a growing consensus for the need for stronger institutions began to take hold on the continent. African leaders began discussing the possibilities of a total reformation of the OAU, to make it more effective at addressing peace and security issues. While the OAU was relatively successful in its initial goal of safeguarding the gains made during decolonization, it was not equally adequate in dealing with the other issues on the continent. As such the AU was established on July 11, 2000 and was designed to address many of the shortcomings of the OAU. A central goal of this new organization was to “promote peace, security, and stability on the continent”¹⁸ The transformation of the OAU embodied, among other things, a broader shift of the scope and capacities of existing security institutions. To achieve this the AU adopted the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*, which provided the basis for the new institutions and decision-making procedures that underpin the organisation’s peace and security strategy. Central here was the establishment of ‘pillars’ that include: the Peace and Security Council (PSC); the Panel of the Wise; the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund.¹⁹ Further institutional change took place with the drafting of APSA which has functioned as a comprehensive guide and framework for governing bodies on the continent to address and respond to pertinent security threats. This new approach also brought with it a stronger inclination towards the principle of regionalism.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp.553-554.

¹⁷ Ibid., p.555.

¹⁸ OAU (2000), *Constitutive Act of the African Union*,

¹⁹ African Union (2002), *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*,

2.3 Regionalism in Africa

Regional engagement on issues such as the rule of law, good governance and of course security did not come into the fray until the early 1990s. The initial mandate of these communities focussed primarily on economic integration, hence the 'economic' designation in RECs. This goal was not borne out of superfluous circumstances but was a product of the dependent nature of relations between the global South and global North at that time.²⁰ It was however after the adoption of the Abuja Plan of Action during the 1990s, that a continental blueprint for the creation of RECs was put in place, establishing regional groupings that would function as building blocks for an integrated African continent.²¹ Today there are eight officially recognized RECs on the African continent; the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the IGAD, the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the EAC.²² Considering that this thesis will focus on the two RECs operating in East Africa, it is necessary to define their membership. The EAC consists of six countries; Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, while IGAD has a slightly larger scope with eight members consisting of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda.

Emphasis on increased regionalism was further supported by the launch of the AU in the early 2000s. As noted previously, the transformation of the continental organ brought with it new considerations on peace, security and defence. In the era of globalization, however, regional integration has become an imperative for the AU, not only regarding maintaining global competitiveness in global trading, but also in addressing conflict prevention strategies. It is the aim of the AU, together with the RECs, to realize these new goals by bolstering the capacity of regional institutions, a feat that has increasingly been internalized by RECs on the continent.²³

²⁰ Daniel. C Bach, 'Regionalism in Africa', in J.J. Hentz (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of African Security*, London, Routledge, 2013, p. 181.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.185.

²² African Union, *Regional Economic Communities (RECs)*, <https://au.int/en/organs/recs>, (accessed 26 March).

²³ Aning and Salihu (2013), p. 17.

3. Theoretical Framework

Understanding the rules and procedures that govern state behaviour has long been a cornerstone of International Relations (IR) scholarship. Dominant conceptions of international order tended to overly rely on realist assumptions of a zero-sum state of anarchy, which proved inadequate in explaining the growing trend of interdependence experienced after the Second World War.²⁴ Borne out of dissatisfaction with this limited approach, regime theory has, since the mid-1970s, attempted to clarify this dilemma by addressing how and why cooperation between sovereign-nation states can be sustained in a divided world order. Furthermore, regime analysis aims to tackle the puzzle of international institution-building in a world of sovereign states by highlighting the conditions and mechanisms that permit such processes. In turn, this approach theorizes the formation, trajectory and lifespan of international regimes, in order to not only highlight their role in the international system but also how they influence and are in turn influenced, by the actors that exist and function in this same system.

The study of international regimes has therefore evolved into a detailed and rich field, encompassing not only the study of international politics but aspects of international political economy and environmental governance as well.²⁵ Consequently, in today's increasingly globalised world, there is no area of international discourse that is devoid of some form of regime formation, as regime structures have firmly embedded themselves in the contemporary global order.²⁶ The following section will aim to conceptualize the meaning of regimes as well outline the central tenets of regime theory. Following this, a theoretical framework will be presented, based on regime theory, which will serve as the analytical foundation of this thesis and will as such be employed in the analysis section of this thesis.

3.1 Regime Theory

Understanding state behaviour as rule-governed activity predates the emergence of the modern state. Nevertheless, it was first during the twentieth century that the concept of regime formation became a global phenomenon. As highlighted above, the globalization process has altered conceptions of global order and in turn how nation-states relate and interact with each other. Key here has been the nation-states immersion into increasingly complex institutions, rules and procedures that have regulated behaviour and as such international relations as a whole.²⁷

²⁴ V. Rittberger and P. Mayer, (eds), *Regime theory and international relations*, Clarendon Press, 1993. p. xii.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xiii.

²⁶ Richard Little, 'International regimes', in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens (eds), *The globalization of world politics: an introduction to international relations*, 5th ed edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 290.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

Notwithstanding this gradual shift in global order, it was first in the 1970s that IR scholars began to truly explore and theorize the rationale behind interstate cooperation and collective responses to issues at the global level.²⁸

Despite consensus over the importance of regimes within IR, the initial formation of a theoretical base left many scholars divided, specifically on exactly how and why regimes are formed and the consequences their formation would have on state behaviour. Three distinct *schools of thought* have emerged as essential components of regime theory. The *(neo)realist*, *(neo)liberal* and *cognitivist* approaches have come to inform much of the debate surrounding the formation, nature and consequences of international regimes.²⁹ However, it should be considered that while these three strands share the common understanding that regimes have a role on the international stage and do impact world politics, they differ markedly on the degree of this impact and what accounts for it. Central to this distinction is the assumptions each approach makes about the nature and motivations of state-actors.³⁰

3.1.1 Realist Approach

The realist account within regime theory structures its principal arguments around the issue of power, but more specifically the power capabilities of states in an international system. As with most realist approaches, there is a general scepticism about the prospects for inter-state cooperation in an anarchic international environment. Nevertheless, within the study of regimes, the power-based approach does acknowledge that regime-based inter-state cooperation is both a possibility and reality.³¹ While this may seem contrary to the basic assumptions of realist thought, neo-realists argue that the formation of regimes are a means to end too, with the absolute end being survival. The lack of a central agency in an anarchic system ensures that self-help is the order of the day.³² Therefore, the pursuit of absolute gains governs the behaviour of states in this system, as states seek to defend their own interests. This is where the factor of power is especially important.

Neo-realists argue that collective behaviour is shaped by the strongest country and as such regime formation will only emerge when a “systemic concentration of material power resources

²⁸ Volker. Rittberger, "Research on International Regimes in Germany", in V. Rittberger and P. Mayer (eds), *Regime theory and international relations*, Clarendon Press, 1993. p. 11.

²⁹ A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer, and V. Rittberger, (eds), *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge University Press, 1997. p. 1-2

³⁰ Ibid. p. 2-3.

³¹ Little (2014), p. 290.

³² Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (1997), p. 115.

exist”.³³ Simply put, this thesis posits that regimes are created and maintained by the strongest party (or hegemon) which in turn compels other countries to join and comply. In this case, states that cooperate are doing so based on the interests of the dominant country and as such the formation of regimes is seen as a means to promote the interests of particular actors. In this line of thought, a diffusion of international power will undermine a regime and if a hegemon's control over tangible resources declines a regime will eventually collapse.³⁴ So in essence, inter-state cooperation is more accurately considered inter-state coordination which is facilitated or enabled by regimes. This power-based approach argues that regime formation reflects power distribution in the international system and are as such merely conduits for hegemon's to extend their influence.

3.1.2 Liberal Approach

While realist approaches to regime theory focus predominantly on power, liberal accounts tend to instead favour an interest-based line of reasoning. Neo-liberal or interest-based theories have been exceedingly influential in the analysis of international institutions and as such regime formation at the global level. Despite borrowing heavily from essential realist assumptions, the neo-liberal approach diverges in its institutionalist perspective, namely its portrayal of regimes as both effective and resilient.³⁵ Nevertheless, the neo-liberal stance mirrors neo-realism in several ways. Both approaches acknowledge that states are the unitary actor in global politics and that their behaviour is shaped by the anarchic nature of the international system. Furthermore, both stances agree that states are rational actors and are as such driven by self-interest with the goal of maximizing positive outcomes.³⁶

Despite these shared understandings, neo-liberalism was developed in response to the perceived shortcomings of the neo-realist stance. Central here was providing a better explanation to the sustained influence of certain international institutions, that were able to persist despite redistributions of global power. Unlike the power-based approach, neo-liberalism argues that cooperation is very much a possibility in a state of anarchy, even without a hegemon.³⁷ The state of anarchy inhibits inter-state cooperation, which can be overcome through the formation of regimes. Here, the factor of interests is especially relevant. Robert Keohane has been a key supporter of this stance, with his contractualist (or functionalist) theory, forming what has become

³³ Peter M. Haas, 'Epistemic Communities and Regimes', in V. Rittberger and P. Mayer (eds), *Regime theory and international relations*, Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 181.

³⁴ Ibid. p. 181.

³⁵ Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (1997), p. 4.

³⁶ Ibid. p. 24-25

³⁷ Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 31.

synonymous with the study of international regimes. Keohane borrows from microeconomic theories to reason that while all states are driven by self-interest, they will sometimes sacrifice some autonomy to establish regimes where the gains of cooperation exceed the gains from unilateral action. Simply put, and in contrast to realist assumptions, rational self-interested actors can still be incentivised to form international regimes.³⁸

In the anarchic system that is characteristic of both the realist and liberal worldview, the ability for states to make agreements is hindered by uncertainties, mistrust and informational asymmetries. In such a system, it is unlikely that international collaboration will take place, which is why regimes arise to resolve these same problems.³⁹ This is achieved in three ways. Firstly, regimes reduce uncertainties, simply by providing states with information through monitoring arrangements. With this, the fear of 'defection' is reduced, as the probability of being 'caught cheating' is increased, which in turn decreases the overall risk to cooperate. Secondly, regimes also reduce transaction costs by institutionalizing cooperation which makes it cheaper to negotiate and enforce agreements. Regimes also link clusters of issues to one another, allowing for more streamlined strategies, while also making future cooperation more likely.⁴⁰ Thirdly, regimes influence state behaviour by changing beliefs, perceptions and expectations of each other's behaviour. By providing standards for behaviour through clear rules and procedures, regimes are able to define the appropriate action that is founded on the principle of reciprocity. As such, regimes are able to coordinate the interests of states to achieve mutually beneficial gains. All in all, neoliberalism navigates the obstacles highlighted by realist thought, by considering regimes as conduits, through which mutual interests can be realized through cooperation.

3.1.3 Cognitivist Approach

While the realist, and even more so, neo-liberalist schools of thought have dominated the study of international regimes since the fields conception, a third approach has developed to remedy perceived shortcomings of the aforementioned stances. The cognitivist point of view takes issue with several basic assumptions developed by neo-realists and adopted by the neoliberal approach. Firstly, is the notion that states are rational actors with pre-imposed exogenously given identities, powers and interests. Secondly is the limited static approach to the study of international relations, which disregards notions of learning and history. Thirdly and finally is the predisposition towards a positivist methodology that renders comprehension of factors like social norms almost

³⁸ Ibid., p.78.

³⁹ Robert O. Keohane, "The Analysis of International Regimes: Towards a European American Research Programme", in V. Rittberger and P. Mayer (eds), *Regime theory and international relations*, Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 35.

⁴⁰ Keohane (1984), p. 97.

impossible.⁴¹ As such, the cognitivist point of view accepts the relevance of interests and how they shape state behaviour but go further in that they focus on the origin of these interests and how or why preferences form.

While the neo-realist and neo-liberal stances favour power and interest-based approaches respectively, the cognitivist point of view considers knowledge and ideas as explanatory factors in regime formation. The cognitivist stance argues that state behaviour can be better understood by considering the normative beliefs that underpin the decision-making process. By focussing on this aspect and how knowledge is distributed, a better understanding of identities and preferences can be cultivated which in turn could shed light on state behaviour and as such regime formation.⁴² The cognitivist stance has two dominant strands that differ primarily in its critique of the rationalist nature of neo-realism and liberalism. This division is characterized by those that subscribe to a weak form of cognitivism and those that subscribe to a strong one.

Proponents of the weak cognitivist strand do not reject the interest-based approach, *per se*, but they do argue that it is somewhat incomplete. Weak cognitivists consider how actors perceive international problems and how these perceptions can lead to regime formation. As such, the focus is placed on actors' casual and normative beliefs, which, weak cognitivists argue, must be considered independently of material factors (i.e. the distribution of wealth and power).⁴³ Weak cognitivists make three central assumptions. Firstly, they do not consider interests as exogenously given, but instead a consequence of a body of knowledge that shapes the perceptions of states and informs "decisionmakers about linkages between causes and effects and, thus, between means and ends".⁴⁴ With this, weak cognitivists argue that actor preferences in global politics are contingent on the knowledge they carry and how they understand the world. Secondly, because of the increasingly technical nature of international issues, decision-makers are often faced with uncertainties about their interests and how to realize them. As such, weak cognitivists argue that for actors to make informed and intelligent decisions, a ready supply of high-quality information must be made available. Agents providing this expert advice are therefore able to exert considerable influence on the decisions made by policymakers. Finally, an important aspect of regime formation is that a shared understanding of the problem at hand exists between the relevant actors. Here, a consensus or minimum collective understanding must be reached about the scope and nature of the problem if any form of cooperation is to take place.

⁴¹ Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (1997), p. 5.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.137.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p.140.

Moving on, while weak cognitivists argue for a broadening of the rationalist stance, strong cognitivists claim that a rationalist perspective is altogether inadequate in explaining regime formation. As Strong cognitivists reject the rationalist ontology that is shared by the power and interest-based frameworks. Considering this and considering that this study will utilize a multivariant model that combines the previously named approaches, the strong cognitivist stance will not be considered here. This is because the strong cognitivist stance cannot be integrated with realist and liberal accounts due to their different ontological and epistemological positions.

The above section has provided an overview of the three main theoretical approaches that have come to underpin the study of regimes (summarized in Figure 1). While they provide insights into the nature of regime formation and the processes that determine their survival, they do not tackle the issue of clarifying the concept of regimes as a whole. As such, the following section will aim to conceptualize the concept, by outlining the definitional reflections that have been employed. With that done, I will then highlight a theoretical framework that will function as an analytical tool in this thesis.

Figure 1: Main theories in the study of international regimes

THREE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

REALISM	LIBERALISM	COGNITIVISM
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power as the central variable • Regimes established through collaboration • States are driven primarily by pursuing relative gains. • Institutions have no significant role in international relations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interests as the central variable • Regimes established through cooperation • States are driven primarily by the pursuit of absolute gains. • Institutions play an important role in lowering costs and facilitating agreements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge as the central variable. • Regimes are rule-driven entities • States function as 'role-players' • Norms and values underscored in institutions can alter how actors conceive their basic interests and thus constrain their behaviour

3.2 Conceptualizing Regimes

The study of regimes and the formation of the fields theoretical underpinnings evolved during the 1970s and has since become a source of inspiration for those interested in understanding the dynamics informing international cooperation. Before its conception, dominant approaches to the study of international organizations tended to be overly formalistic, focussing primarily on formal organizations while disregarding the societal shifts and growing interdependence that defined that period.⁴⁵ Regime theory attempted to fill this gap, by studying how norm-driven behaviour governs state interaction and as such the formation of international institutions and regimes in a seemingly anarchic environment. Several points can be made about the significance of the theory, its applications and how the field has grown and evolved over the years.

3.2.1 Defining the Concept

Like many other concepts in IR scholarship, 'regimes' have come to encapsulate a myriad of different meanings and denotations. At its conception, regime theory was faced with a volley of criticism, with detractors like Susan Strange vocal with their scepticism of what they saw as an ill-defined and unclear field of research. Strange argued that the study of regimes was doomed to fail due to the 'imprecision' and 'woolliness' of the regime concept.⁴⁶ These criticisms did not fall on deaf ears, as scholars within the field have made several attempts to clarify and modify a definition that is not only consensual but represents the central tenets of regime theory. Before turning to the definitions that are commonly accepted within regime analysis, it is important to clarify two points. Firstly, international regimes are institutions and should, therefore, be treated, considered and studied as such. Secondly, international organizations are not synonymous with international regimes, as the former's scope is not restricted to a specific issue area, while the latter are issue-specific institutions by definition.⁴⁷

When the concept of international regimes was first introduced in 1975 by John Ruggie, the working definition that was presented saw regimes as "a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states".⁴⁸ While this definition provided a useful starting point for analysis, its rather limited and vague nature highlighted the imprecision that was at the heart of Susan Strange's

⁴⁵ Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, 'Theories of international regimes', *International Organization*, vol. 41, no. 3, 2009, Cambridge Core, p. 492.

⁴⁶ Susan Strange, 'Cave! hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis', *International Organization* vol. 36, no. 2, 1982, Cambridge Core, p. 485.

⁴⁷ Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (1997), pp. 10-11.

⁴⁸ John Gerard Ruggie, 'International responses to technology: Concepts and trends', *International Organization*, vol. 29, no. 3, 1975, Cambridge Core, p. 570.

criticism. Therefore, a definition was later elaborated by Stephan Krasner and has become the most influential and widely accepted definition of regimes within the field. Krasner considers international regimes as;

“implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice”.⁴⁹

From these two definitions, it can be established that the common denominator of all international regimes is a degree of convergent expectations and a determined pattern of behaviour or practice. This definition is also in line with the sociological reasoning that underpins our understanding of institutions, which are seen as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”.⁵⁰ Despite the development of these definitions, there is still a degree of dissent within the field of regime theory about what should constitute a regime. Nevertheless, the stated definition is the most commonly cited example and the definition that has come to represent analyses of regime formation. In sum, despite disagreement, there are several defining elements that are at the heart of understanding regimes. Firstly, there must exist an interrelated collection of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. Secondly, this collection acts as a guide for behaviour for all states involved, determining expectations and reducing uncertainties. Finally, a regime must have an issue-specific focus, where the collection can be engaged and realized.

3.2.2 Significance of Regimes

With this definition in mind, another question can be tackled, namely; why do regimes matter?. Academics in this field, when addressing this question have looked at the often-underestimated influence that regimes have in governing state behaviour. Moving beyond understandings that see regimes as merely static summaries of rules and norms, academics have argued that regimes can

⁴⁹ Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables', *International Organization*, vol. 36, no. 2, 1982, p. 2.

⁵⁰ Keohane (1993), p. 28.

function as important agents, influencing behaviour through the development of coordinated and convergent policymaking that can facilitate reshuffles of power in a given area.⁵¹

Regimes have also shown to be conduits where cooperation and coordination can occur. This is made possible by the ability for regimes to reduce uncertainty and insecurity between interstate interactions, ultimately supplanting unilateralist motivations. As such regimes are often considered a form of regulated conflict management, as they improve the contractual environment, stabilizing cooperation and producing information that would otherwise be unavailable.⁵² As the world becomes increasingly interconnected and globalization continues to influence and govern global politics, unilateral action in response to specific issues has become increasingly rare. Considering this, regime formation has established itself as a capable tool for regulating global activity across a wide range of activities.⁵³

The current scholarship on regime theory has tended to focus on issues associated primarily with environmental governance and political economy. As global awareness of the damage being done to the environment has increased, so too has the formation of environmental regimes.⁵⁴ Economic regimes, arguably the most firmly entrenched of forms, have also featured heavily in the fields scholarship. A variety of economic regimes were established after the Second World war to boost economic growth through investments, trade and finance.⁵⁵ The formation of security regimes is a relatively new phenomenon within the field and as such it does not have the same empirical depth as the other two forms. Nevertheless, security regimes have previously formed around specific issues such as arms control, non-proliferation and drug trafficking.

3.2.3 Regime Theory's Application

As the previous section highlighted, single-factor analyses have long been employed to explain and understand the regime formation process. Rationalist perspectives and liberal accounts have proven useful in highlighting some of the central factors associated with regime formation but are nevertheless weakened by their somewhat broad assumptions. As such, a multifaceted approach, that also incorporates assumptions highlighted by the cognitivist approach, could prove more useful, as it allows for greater specificity and a more contextualized understanding of regime

⁵¹ Peter M. Haas, 'Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control', *International Organization*, vol. 43, no. 3, 1989, p. 378, 401.

⁵² Keohane (1993), p. 32.

⁵³ Little (2014), p. 294.

⁵⁴ Haas (1993), p. 171.

⁵⁵ Little (2014), p. 295.

formation.⁵⁶ Young and Osherenko have developed an analytical framework aimed at hypothesizing regime formation. They divide their model into four general explanatory variables that are situated within the theoretical underpinnings of regime theory. They include *power-based* explanations, which are based on neo-realist assumptions, *interest-based* explanations that borrow from the neoliberal tradition, *knowledge-based* explanations that are grounded in cognitivism and finally *context-based* approaches that consider exogenous factors in world politics (Figure 2).⁵⁷ Each factor-based explanation contains hypotheses that are in turn tested to determine the explanatory merits of each factor in regime formation.

The power-based explanation argues that hegemony in the form of either *benign hegemony* or *coercive hegemony* is necessary for regime formation. However other power-based explanations are also offered, in the form of *bipolar distribution of power*, the *degree of symmetry in power distributions* and the existence of a *directorate*, as possible explanations for regime formation. The interest-based approach contains ten hypotheses that have been created to explain regime formation. They include *Integrative Bargaining*, *Equity*, *Salient Solutions*, *Exogenous Shocks*, *Policy Priority*, *Common Good*, *Science and Technology*, *Relevant Parties*, *Compliance Mechanisms* and *Individuals as Leaders*. With regards the knowledge-based approach, two hypotheses have been developed, that argue that regime formation is contingent on *Scientific Convergence* and *Epistemic Communities*. Finally, the context-based approach does not have any specific hypothesis but argues that regimes formation is facilitated by unexpected national and international events.⁵⁸ While this four-factor analytical model is summarized in Figure 2 a more detailed description of each hypothesis can be found in the Appendix.

In their initial study, Young and Osherenko applied this framework to several regimes that were established to tackle various environmental problems. This same model has also been used in other studies focussed on tracking regime formation with regard to an array of global issues. As such, the framework has proven itself capable of providing an analytical basis for studies within the field of regime analysis. While its initial creation was aimed at explaining regime formation in response to environmental issues, its application to other issue-areas is still justified. In fact, Young


⁵⁶ O.R. Young and G. Osherenko, 'International Regime Formation: Findings, Research Priorities and Applications', in O.R. Young and G. Osherenko (eds), *Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes*, Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 246.

⁵⁷ Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko, 'Testing Theories of Regime Formation: Findings from a Large Collaborative Research Project', in V. Rittberger and P. Mayer (eds), *Regime theory and international relations*, Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 248-259.

⁵⁸ Oran .R. Young and Gail. Osherenko, (eds), *Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes*, Cornell University Press, 1993. P. 263-266.

and Osherenko argue of the importance to “engage in systematic studies of additional cases using the theoretical template we have devised”.⁵⁹

Figure 2: Analytical Framework



⁵⁹ Young and Osherenko (1993), p. 244.

4. Methodological Framework

When choosing the methodological approach of this thesis several considerations must be made regarding the empirical data used, how it will be analysed and how the theory will be operationalized. While these questions will be addressed in short order, it can already be stated that the primary approach this thesis will adopt is an in-depth case study analysis. The case in question is the larger APSA in general but more specifically the two East African RECs; EAC and IGAD. The reasoning here is that while the two RECs are the focus objects in this paper, they do not exist, nor function, individually, but instead are part and parcel of the overriding APSA. As such, an analysis of one will inevitably reflect on the other. The following section will highlight the merits of this choice of approach and how it will be operationalized to achieve this paper's aim.

4.1 Case Study

Considering that the central aim of this thesis is to track regime formation in East Africa, the choice of a case study approach is both useful and appropriate. While there are many methodological strategies one could employ in the study of Political Science, case studies are useful because they provide valuable insights into the substantive, real-world importance of the case in question.⁶⁰ A common criticism generally aimed at case study analysis, focuses on the approaches weakness in producing generalisable findings. While this is indeed a well-founded argument, the purposes of this paper, is not to produce generalized conclusions that can be applied broadly, but instead to generate a thorough analysis of a specific case through a particular theoretical lens. As the aim of this paper is to *explain* a specific process and not merely *describe* it, a case study analysis alone will not be sufficient. Instead, observations made from the case must be accompanied by a theoretical basis that can provide hypotheses that help explain these case-specific observations.⁶¹ The research question of this paper requires a close reading of contextual factors pertinent to East Africa, generated from a regime theoretical approach. As such, while not generalizable, the conclusions derived from this study will nevertheless contribute to existing regime formation scholarship and a better understanding of African security issues and their approaches and capabilities in meeting them. Contemporary academic research has increasingly adopted an interdisciplinary approach as the boundaries between the scientific fields become more perforated.⁶² Addressing the broadening of the research agenda of IR has led to the borrowing and adoption of

⁶⁰ Dimiter Toshkov, 'Research Design', in V. Lowndes, J.G. March, and G. Stoker (eds), *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, Macmillan Education UK, 2017, p. 234.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² J. Blatter and M. Haverland, *Designing Case Studies: Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research*, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012, p. 6.

a larger set of concepts, theories and frameworks. Case studies in this scenario are especially well-suited, because “the diverse set of information necessary to test complex theories can very often be collected only for one case or a few cases”.⁶³

The choice of case also requires some explanation. As previously mentioned, the significance of RECs within considerations of peace and security has increased considerably over the years. APSA specifically notes the role played by RECs as vital to realizing the security goals of the AU. As such, analysing the role played by regional actors can prove interesting in understanding the dynamics of the continental security framework and how security threats are addressed. Furthermore, East Africa is especially relevant within discussions of peace and security, as the region plays host to several active terrorist groups. The nature of the threat has taken many forms, with terrorist acts being perpetrated by both internal and external actors. The Horn of Africa has been particularly volatile, with instability there often spilling over into neighbouring regions, especially East Africa.

Nevertheless, when it comes to terrorist organisations, there are two groups that have posed the most serious threat in the region. Al-Qaeda has had a long history of activity, with the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Uganda highlighting their firm hold in the region. In the post-9/11 era, the group has been establishing safe havens in countries like Sudan and Somalia, used primarily for recruitment, financing and to bolster their ability to launch attacks.⁶⁴ Al-Shabaab, an organisation affiliated with al-Qaeda, has grown in prominence within Somalia and poses the most serious threat to countries like Kenya and Uganda. The group has launched several devastating attacks in neighbouring countries and due to Somalia’s fragile statehood, the group has managed to establish several strongholds in the country.⁶⁵ With all this in mind, the contextual dynamics of the region provides the basis for potential cooperation, especially with regard to meeting the terrorist threat that is very real in the region. Considering all this, the case study in question provides a perfect opportunity to apply a regime theoretical approach to assess this cooperation and how far a security regime has formed.

4.2 Operationalization

With the choice of methodological approach highlighted above, further elucidation is required with regard to how the analysis will be structured and conducted. Considering then the two cases that will be analysed and the central questions that will be tackled in this paper, it can be argued

⁶³ Ibid., p.7.

⁶⁴ David H. Shinn, 'Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: An Overview', *Journal of Conflict Studies*, vol. 23, no. 2, 2006, p. 86.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p.87.

that, notwithstanding the case study approach, an exercise in ‘process-tracing’ is also useful. Process training, very simply put, is a tool used to “search for necessary and sufficient conditions that lead to a specific type of outcome” or to “closely understand the theory-based ‘mechanisms’ that actually link causal factors to outcomes”.⁶⁶ Process tracing subscribes to the basic premise that social outcomes are the result of a combination of causal factors and that the effect of these causal factors can differ due to contextual heterogeneities. This approach is especially well suited to understanding the many and complex causes of a specific outcome, rather than gauging the causes effectiveness.⁶⁷ This approach is well-suited for this paper as I am interested in the pressures, motivations and decision-making mechanisms and processes that lead to an outcome, which in this case is the formation of a security regime.

As noted above the ‘regime perspective’ has proven to be a useful analytical tool that has strived to theorize and hypothesize international cooperation and the driving forces behind it. Regimes have grown to tackle a wide variety of issues within the study of international relations, which merits its further analysis. This thesis will focus solely on the emergence of security regimes with a specific focus on the African context. In order to achieve the goals of this paper, the central tenets of regime theory will be drawn upon and utilized. Using a regime theoretical framework, the analysis of this paper will be conducted in two parts. In order to track the formation of a regime, one must understand the different phases this process goes through. As such, this thesis will borrow from Levy et al. who argue that there are at least three stages present in regime formation: *agenda formation*, *institutional choice* and *operationalization*.⁶⁸ This first stage considers the emergence of a specific issue on the political agenda. On the international stage it is not unusual for several issues to compete for a place at the top of the agenda, but for this to happen three regulatory factors are often used to prioritize a specific issue.⁶⁹ The first factor consists of activities by actors or organizations that serve as gatekeepers in the political system. The second type considers the nature of the issue and the significance it poses to society. In this case, an issue with a large societal effect will place higher on the agenda. The third and final factor considers the cultural norms associated with the issue. Exogenous events or crises often cement these values and norms which in turn increases the issues importance.⁷⁰ Following on, the second stage of regime formation spans the whole negotiation period. This process begins with the initiation of

⁶⁶ Blatter and Haverland (2012), p. 80.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ M. Levy, O. Young, and M. Zürn, 'The Study of International Regimes', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 1, no. 3, 1995, p. 282.


⁶⁹ Helmut Breitmeier, 'International Organizations and the Creation of Environmental Regimes', in O.R. Young (ed.), *Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1997, p. 92.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

focused negotiations and ends with the signing of an agreement. Here, hard bargaining dictates much of the progress made during this process, as the end goal is to seek mutually acceptable terms. The third stage, *operationalization*, spans the period from signing the agreement to its entry into force and also considers when the agreement is transformed into practice. Simply put, this stage considers the implementation of the agreement, in that the rules and provisions are brought to bear on those party to the agreement. Indicators for this stage include ratification of relevant agreements by member states, but also the establishment of relevant institutions and structures to help implement the provisions. While these three stages may seem to have a linear quality about them, it is important to state that there is often a significant amount of overlap between the phases.

This model (Figure 3) will be applied to the case in question and will form the first phase of the analysis. By tracking the three stages in the chosen cases, we will have begun to answer the central question of this thesis.

Figure 3: Stages of Regime Formation



However, this will not shed light on the circumstances or dynamics that have led to the formation or how it can be understood. As such, the next phase of the analysis will employ the analytical framework (Figure 2) developed by Young and Osherenko. Though this application, a better understanding of contextual factors as well as the underlying processes of regime formation can be unearthed. The aim here is not to necessarily provide a definite answer of whether a security regime has formed, but instead to evaluate if this process has occurred (and why), how far it has come and the conditions that may have not yet been satisfied. It is important to note that these two frameworks are not disconnected from each other. In fact, they are closely linked analytically,

in that the social factors of power, interests and knowledge are both present and influential in the three stages of regime formation.

4.3 Empirical Material and Limitations

Considering the above, it is now appropriate to turn to the empirical material that will be used in this paper. Both primary and secondary sources from the case study will form the empirical basis of this study as the main focus is on interpreting information through the theoretical perspective I have highlighted above. The material that will be utilized will be pulled from official sources and will include annual reports, documents, agreements and strategies that have a focus on CT and are pertinent to East Africa and the two chosen RECs. As such, documents that have been drafted by the OAU and AU, as well as IGAD and the EAC, will constitute a significant part of the empirical material used. However, the material analysed will not be limited to only expansive reports and documents but will also include meeting protocols, summary reports, summit agendas and other relevant sources that once again take up the issue at hand. Considering that the process tracing approach will be utilized, books, journals and articles will also be drawn from to provide a better understanding of the historical context of the case study but also the decision-making processes and that underpin it.

This thesis will apply a relatively broad focus as the historical context of the region is an important factor that cannot be discounted. As such, the time period that will be covered in this study spans from 1990 to 2018. The start date of the study period was chosen for several reasons. While this thesis focuses on present CT security frameworks in Africa, due regard must be given to the founding documents that were drafted under the auspices of the OAU, which still hold contemporary significance. Furthermore, CT strategies on the African continent during the Cold War were largely non-existent and only came into being in the beginning of the 1990s.

5. Analysis

With the theoretical and methodological frameworks contextualized above, an analysis aimed at tracking potential regime formation in East Africa can now be carried out. The analysis will be conducted in two stages. The first phase will apply Levy et al. model (Figure 3) to track/test which stages of regime formation have been fulfilled. The second phase will then apply the analytical framework (Figure 2) which will aim to highlight the interactions, motivations and processes that have led to institutional arrangements. In short, the first phase will aim to test if and how far regime formation has come, while the second phase will aim to explain it. When considering the African peace and security framework, one must take into account the operational nature that drives it. What distinguishes this framework from other strategies adopted in Europe and Asia is its decentralized nature. Central to the AU's security policy is the strengthening of security structures at the regional level, which are to function as pillars to support the maintenance of peace and stability on the entire continent. Simply put, regional strategies and approaches are largely reflections of plans made on the continental level.⁷¹ As such when discussing CT approaches in East Africa, it is worth considering broader continental strategies as they invariably influence each other due to their symbiotic nature.

5.1 Three Stages of Regime Formation

5.1.1 Agenda Formation

Considering the first stage of regime formation, it is not surprising that the issue of CT has dominated international discourses and has become a matter of global concern. Despite this, tracking this process and seeing how the issue of terrorism has evolved on the continent is a necessary step in fulfilling the agenda-setting phase of regime formation. Like most discourses in Africa's history, the issue of terrorism and how the continent was introduced to and engaged with the global threat was influenced by exogenous events. The post-Cold War era saw little security-related interests in Africa. This position was underscored in the 1995 U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa which considered the African continent a low priority as it offered "little traditional strategic interests".⁷² This was also reflective of regional sentiments as the majority of strategies that were implemented at that time sought to consolidated developmental and economic gains, instead of security-driven ones. While considerable focus was placed on stabilizing fragile states after the proxy wars of the Cold War era, the issue of terrorism was largely non-existent.

⁷¹ Angela Meyer, 'Regional Intergration and Security in Central Africa-Assessment and Perspectives 10 Years After the Revival', *Egmont Papers*, no. 25, 2008, p. 10-11

⁷² Department of Defence (August 1995), *U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*, Washington DC.

There were, however, initial indications of terrorist activity that began to manifest in the beginning in the 1990s. Central here was Sudan, which not only hosted notable figures like Osama bin Laden but grew to become the epicentre of the militant Islamist world.⁷³ During his time in Sudan, bin Laden was able to recruit members, obtain financing and establish cells, all of which contributed to al-Qaeda's growth, in turn, awakening external interests in the region. This ultimately culminated in the in the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar e Salaam, which thrust the region into global discussions of the threat of terrorism and its transnational implications.⁷⁴ This was further exacerbated by the simultaneous attacks on an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya and an Israeli commercial airliner in 2002, both of which were claimed by al-Qaeda. The US response to the attacks was obviously swift, with then-President Clinton denouncing the acts as 'inhuman' and vying to use all means to "bring those responsible to justice, no matter what or how long it takes".⁷⁵ The attacks also drew condemnation from the wider international community, with the United Nations (UN) releasing a statement denouncing the incident and claiming that the suppression of acts of international terrorism was essential for the "maintenance of international peace and security".⁷⁶ Similarly, statements by Kenyan and Tanzanian leaders underscored the need to address the issue of international terrorism as the attacks "exemplified the expanding reach and growing menace of the perpetrators of terrorist acts".⁷⁷

The Embassy bombings proved to be a starting point for America's intolerance of terrorism that would define the tenure of future presidents. However, the real catalyst proved to be the 9/11 terrorist attacks which drastically altered how the world dealt with the terrorist threat. The African continent was drawn into the GWOT relatively early as demonstrated by several US national security strategies. In 2002, a link between the weak states in Africa and terrorist activity was highlighted in their national security strategy, which argued that the US, with their "European allies we must help strengthen Africa's fragile state [...] to deny safe haven to terrorists".⁷⁸ Susan Rice, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, underscored these claims arguing that terror groups "take advantage of Africa's porous borders, weak law enforcement and security

⁷³ Peter Pham, J, 'Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Africa', in J.J. Hentz (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of African Security*, London, Routledge, 2013, p. 45.

⁷⁴ J. Howell and J. Lind, *Counter-Terrorism, Aid and Civil Society: Before and After the War on Terror*, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2009, p. 136.

⁷⁵ International Information Program, *U.S. Embassy Bombings*, <http://archive.li/ccAvu>, (accessed 10 April).

⁷⁶ United Nations (1998), *Security Council Strongly Condemns Terrorist Bomb Attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam*, Press Release SC/6559

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ White House (2002), *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* White House, Washington, DC, .p 10.

services [...] to move men, weapons, and money around the globe”.⁷⁹ By framing specific regions of Africa as potential incubators to a very serious threat, the US was also aware that their security interests were contingent upon “partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies”.⁸⁰ As such, African counterparts also played a role in the framing of the issue. Central here has been the AU, which was established shortly after the 9/11 attacks. As a more security orientated actor, the AU has repeatedly highlighted terrorism and extremism as “new security threats” that “remain a major concern”.⁸¹ Similarly, the AU 2063 Agenda, that sets out the ultimate vision of the organization, considers a peaceful and secure Africa as one of its aspirations, with the “eradication of terrorism”⁸² one of its specific goals. More recently the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smaïl Chergui, echoed these concerns by stating that “Terrorism and violent extremism remain major sources of concern to the African Union, which is convinced that countering these phenomena must underlie the efforts aimed at putting an end to the factors favouring their spread”.⁸³

While the threat of terrorism has been clearly highlighted by both international and continental actors, specific focus on regions in Africa have also been emphasised, namely East Africa. At the 2014 Peace and Security Council meeting, it was noted that the spread of terrorism in Africa to areas “that previously did not perceive the seriousness of the threat” has become a reality. As such, the “terrorist threat in Africa has been shaped by activities in North, West, East and Central Africa”, with Al Shabaab constituting the main threat for countries in East Africa. Furthermore, Al Shabaab's “ability to expand its terror campaign beyond the Somali borders” has increased insecurity in the region, with all neighbouring countries vulnerable to attack by the terrorist group.⁸⁴ This focus on East Africa as a focal point in discussions of international terrorism is also evident in the security strategies adopted by the US. Kenya has been singled out as an important ally in America's fight against terrorism, with the country being considered an “essential sub-regional linchpin”.⁸⁵ This sentiment has been repeated, with Kenya encompassing a role as

⁷⁹ Susan Rice, E. (2001), *Testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa of the International Relations Committee*, United States House of Representative, Washington.

⁸⁰ White House (2006), *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* White House, Washington DC.

⁸¹ African Union (2013), *Strategic Plan 2014-2017* African Union Commission, p. 2, 45 & 70.

⁸² African Union (2014), *Agenda 2063; The Africa We Want*, African Union Commission, p. 71.

⁸³ Institute for Security Studies, *26th AU Summit: Why isn't the AU's counter-terrorism strategy working?*, <https://issafrica.org/pscreport/on-the-agenda/26th-au-summit-why-isnt-the-aus-counter-terrorism-strategy-working>, (accessed 11 April).

⁸⁴ African Union (2014), *Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa*, Peace and Security Council, p. 1 & 3.

⁸⁵ White House (2010), *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* Washington DC.p. 45.

“an active and critical partner in the war on terrorism” that continues to be a “strong ally of the United States”.⁸⁶

The above highlights some important points. It is quite clear that the issue of terrorism in Africa has not only taken its place on the global agenda but that the East African region has come to play an important role in the wider GWOT. Notwithstanding this, East African has also featured prominently in continental peace and security considerations, due to the regions terrorist activity, but also because of its geostrategic relevance. Furthermore, the matter of combating terrorism has evolved over many years, as the issue has gained differing levels of prominence on the global agenda. Gatekeepers in the form of the US as well as regional actors like Kenya have played an important role in driving the issue to prominence. The issue has also evolved intact with exogenous events, like the 1998 embassy bombings and the more recent 9/11 attacks, which have both conceptualized the threat as well as highlighted the shortcomings of the region in dealing with it. Nevertheless, the issue has clearly influenced policymakers on the ground which has led to an array of explicit negotiations on the matter.

5.1.2 Institutional Bargaining

Considering the above, the issue of terrorism has obviously evolved over several decades, due in large part to contextual factors that occurred both internationally and locally. The development of a CT framework in Africa, but more specifically East Africa, has in turn evolved intact with these contextual factors. As such, much of the institutional bargaining that constitutes the second phase of regime formation took place and was a reflection of, local and wider happenings within CT discourses. Tracking this evolution is important to gauge the nature and dynamics that shaped this process.

While the post 9/11 era has widely been considered the defining landmark in the fight against terrorism, global and regional CT efforts can nevertheless be dated back to an earlier period. With regard to African responses, a framework aimed at addressing terrorist threats on the continent came into force already at the beginning of the 1990s. The *Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States* was a landmark document aimed at fighting the phenomenon of extremism and terrorism through, among other things, strengthened cooperation and coordination.⁸⁷ This initial response was further strengthened in 1994, by the adoption of the *Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations*. This declaration was clear in stressing the

⁸⁶ United States Department of State Publication (2005), *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005*, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism,

⁸⁷ OAU (1992), *Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States*, AHG/Res. 213 (XXVIII),

unequivocal denunciation of all forms of extremism and terrorism “whatever their nature, origin and form, especially fanaticism and extremism based on religion, politics and tribalism”.⁸⁸ Despite the promulgation of these two documents, proactive responses to the threat were few and far between, as they not only lacked legal authority but they were vague in their definitions of terrorist and extremist behaviour.

This changed with the drafting of the 1999 *OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*. The drafting of the so-called Algiers Convention so close to the 1998 embassy bombings was by no means incidental, as the attacks highlighted severe inadequacies that demonstrated the far-reaching effects and damage that terrorism posed to the continent.⁸⁹ The document aimed to address these inadequacies by providing a comprehensive and binding framework for CT activity on the continent. The Convention provided specific measures that signatories were required to undertake that included the enforcement of legislative frameworks aimed at punishing terrorist acts and the implementation of CT instruments and measures.⁹⁰ More importantly however, the Convention provided an operational definition of what constituted a terrorist act. Included in this definition were identifiable actions and activities, the motives and aims that drive them and their intended targets.⁹¹ The Convention was however clear in noting the exclusion of ‘freedom fighters’ from the terrorist designation.⁹² This specific clause was due, by in large, to African historical experiences, where Western colonial actors frequently used the terrorist label to delegitimize resistance and liberation movements.

The promulgation of the 1999 Convention foreshadowed a significant development on the continent, namely the institutional shift away from the OAU and establishment of the AU. As previously noted, the formation of the AU saw a concerted effort to bolster the continent's peace and security framework, resulting in APSA. Central to this new strategy has been the incorporation of CT measures that have come to define security concerns on the continent. This endeavour has been realized through several different initiatives. The drafting of the APSA also saw the formation of the PSC, which functions as an enforcement organ and has as one of its key objectives to “coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects”.⁹³ Similarly, The *Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy* considers “international terrorism and terrorist activities” as a threat that poses “challenges

⁸⁸ OAU (1994), *Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations*, AHG/Del.2 (XXX),

⁸⁹ Martin Ewi, 'The role of regional organizations in promoting cooperation on counter-terrorism matters', in L. van den Herik and N. Schrijver (eds), *Counter-Terrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal Order: Meeting the Challenges*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 136.

⁹⁰ OAU (1999), *Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*

⁹¹ See OAU 1999: Article 1(3) for full definition of terrorist acts.

⁹² OAU (1999).Article 3

⁹³ African Union (2002).

to Africa's continental security".⁹⁴ In 2004, the AUs CT framework was further bolstered by the adoption of the Protocol to the 1999 Algiers Convention. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, this protocol aimed at further enhancing the effective implementation of the Convention.⁹⁵

Following on, while driving forces on a continental level have advanced counter-terrorism measures, similar endeavours have been undertaken at the regional level in East Africa. Here the two RECs have played a central role in shouldering much of the CT activity in the region, with both actors drafting their own respective strategies to meet the threat. IGAD has dealt with security issues since 1996 with the drafting of the IGAD Agreement that stipulated the communities commitment to the "maintenance of regional peace, stability and security".⁹⁶ In 2003 the Draft Implementation Plan to Counter Terrorism in the IGAD region was drafted, indicating the communities increasingly proactive role in bolstering cooperation and CT capabilities in the region. This was further strengthened in 2006 with the launch of the IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), which aimed to "improve border control, step up legal support, enhance interdepartmental involvement, provide training to those to educate against terrorism and to also provide alternative cooperative method solving".⁹⁷ Despite operating for five years, ICPAT was later replaced with the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) in 2011 as it was unable to meet the evolving security challenges in the region.

Moving on to the other REC in East Africa, the EAC has also drafted several CT strategies in their efforts to meet evolving threats. Already in the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC was terrorism noted as a particular threat to the region's security, which necessitated cooperation between Partner States.⁹⁸ The imperative to address the threat of terrorism was further strengthened in 2006 with the implementation of the Regional Strategy on Peace and Security, which functions as a guiding document that encouraged enhanced regional security cooperation through, among other things, information exchanges, law enforcement coordination and tighter border controls.⁹⁹ Similarly, EAC Member States have also signed a Protocol on Cooperation in Defence Affairs, which promises collaboration around four pillars, including military training, joint operations, technical cooperation and exchange of information.¹⁰⁰ The EAC has also implemented

⁹⁴ African Union (2004), *Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy*,

⁹⁵ African Union (2004), *Declaration of the 2nd High Level Intergovernmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa*, Algeria.

⁹⁶ IGAD (1996), *Agreement Establishing the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)*,

⁹⁷ IGAD, *Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT)*, <http://www.igadregion.org/icpat/>, (accessed 6 April).

⁹⁸ EAC (1999), *The Treaty for the Establishment of the East Africa Community*, Article 124(6).

⁹⁹ EAC, 'Regional Strategy for Peace and Security (adopted by the 13th EAC Council of Ministers meeting, Arusha, Tanzania)', 2006, p.

¹⁰⁰ EAC, *Protocol on Cooperation in Defence Affairs*, https://www.eac.int/rmo/index.php?option=com_content&id=154%3Aregional-integration-support-programme-risp&Itemid=1, (accessed 7 April).

in 2013 the Protocol on Peace and Security, which notes combating terrorism as a central goal of the community that requires member states to “develop common measures, strategies and programmes”¹⁰¹ to meet. This protocol has functioned as a steering document that informs many of the strategies developed by the EAC with regard to peace and security in the region. However, more specific institutions have also been introduced in the region. The EAC Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) and the Eastern African Standby Force (EASF) have been set up to bolster proactive action against terrorist activity in the region.

The above demonstrates two important points. Firstly, is that the issue of terrorism and violent extremism is an important problem that does not lie at the periphery of both continental or regional security strategies, but instead often shapes and dictates the security policies mandated. Secondly, due to the importance of the issue, combating terrorism has become heavily codified in conventions, protocols, strategies and roadmaps at the continental and regional level. It is also clear that while an African CT framework can be traced back to the early 1990s, strategies and policies introduced have evolved to deal with contextual realities on the ground. This has been evident by the plethora of strategies adopted after the 1998 terrorist attacks and the more recent 9/11 attacks.

5.1.3 Operationalization

Moving on, the last stage of regime formations considers how the provisions and rules of the drafted agreements have been brought to bear on the party states. Essentially this stage considers how the agreements have been implemented into practice. Here, the dynamics of this stage involve efforts to ratify treaties, pass legislation and assign responsibility and programs for implementation. International efforts also contribute to this stage, as financial and expert support can be offered to realize the goals of the agreements signed. When considering this phase, it must be stated that the security framework being developed by the AU and relevant RECs is very much still evolving and as such full conceptualization is not necessarily present. Nevertheless, highlighting the efforts that have been taken so far to operationalize CT strategies can provide insights into the level of regime formation that has occurred in East Africa.

The first concrete effort to provide a framework for implementation came with the drafting of the 2002 Algiers Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa. This plan of action was geared towards implementing the provisions of the Algiers Convention by providing concrete steps that member states could take to bolster their CT capabilities. Specific provisions included enhancement of border control and surveillance, digitized

¹⁰¹ EAC (November 2013), *Protocol on Peace and Security* ; Article 6.

immigration records to track movement, biometric passports and the introduction of a framework to regulate financing of terrorism. The plan also requested that all members states report the steps they have taken to prevent and combat terrorism on an annual basis.¹⁰² The above mentioned IGAD ISSP is another mechanism that was introduced to implement CT strategies in East Africa. The programs central goal is the fostering of peace and security in the IGAD region, with CT being one of four main pillars to its strategy. The program, through workshops, seminars and training, aims at aiding CT measures by addressing issues such as countering radicalization, violent extremism and the financing of terrorism, as well as establishing best practices for effective CT and bolstering intelligence and legal assistance and cooperation.¹⁰³

While many of the agreements that have been signed, outline strategies and obligations to be implemented, they do lack necessary guiding mechanisms. In order to address this issue and provide the necessary technical coordination, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in 2004. The aim of the Centre is to strengthen the capacity of member states to address issues relating to terrorism by providing guidance, expertise, training and research-driven information and data.¹⁰⁴ The centre provides a forum for interaction and cooperation among member states and RECs, to develop viable strategies and foster CT best practices. Similarly, in a bid to harmonize legal approaches to CT on the continent, the *African Model Anti-Terrorism Law* was introduced in 2011. The law will serve as a legislative blueprint that member states can draw from to strengthen and update their own national CT legislation.¹⁰⁵ Recently and in a bid to better understand the drivers of extremism in East Africa, the *Centre of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism* was set up with the simple vision of reducing violent extremism in the region. The centre aims “to bring together State and non-State actors involved in preventing and countering violent extremism to develop and implement coherent strategies to build resilience against violent extremism in the Horn and Eastern Africa”.¹⁰⁶ Once again, the centre functions as a mechanism for the implementation of the many of the CT strategies that have been implemented at the continental and regional level.

While policy formation to develop a CT framework as well as the establishment of institutions to ensure its implementation have proven successful, the operationalization of many

¹⁰² African Union (2002), *Plan of Action of The African Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on The Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa*, Algeria.

¹⁰³ IGAD, *Security Sector Program (ISSP)* <https://igadssp.org/>, (accessed 6 April).

¹⁰⁴ African Union, *The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)*, <http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/2-3591-static-about-african-centre-for-study-and-research-on-terrorism-ACSRT>, (accessed 4 April).

¹⁰⁵ African Union (2011), *The African Model Anti-Terrorism*

¹⁰⁶ IGAD, *Centre of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE)*, <http://www.icepcve.org/mission.html>, (accessed 6 April).

of the CT strategies drafted remains inadequate. While the AU has developed a progressive CT framework, that has also influenced similar regional initiatives, implementation remains the biggest challenge. This is further exacerbated by the low level of ratification by member states of principle conventions and treaties as well as an, at times, apparent lack of political will.

5.2 Factor-based Approaches

With the three stages of regime formation highlighted above, we can now apply the analytical framework presented previously in order to critically assess the driving forces behind the formation of a security regime in East Africa. The application of the framework will aim to highlight the explanatory merits of the four factor-based arguments and whether they can help in understanding the dynamics that have led to security cooperation in East Africa (see Appendix for a full description of the framework).

5.2.1 The Power-based Argument

The power-based argument, that is situated within the realist IR tradition, considers the central role of a hegemon in the formation of a regime. In this case, it is useful to consider whether this argument holds sway within the context of East Africa and whether it can shed some light on the dynamics behind a security regime formation. The central argument raised by the power-based approach posits that the emergence of international arrangements is reliant on power being concentrated in the hands of a single dominant actor. This position argues that the spread of power between too many actors drives up transaction costs, thus reducing the chance for interstate cooperation. The hegemonic stance can be divided into two schools of thought; *the benign hegemon* and *coercive hegemon*. The former considers a leader that exercises positive leadership to influence other actors to adopt its preferences, shouldering most of the transactional costs in the process. The latter on the other hand refers to an actor that uses its power to impose the institutional arrangements it prefers on a group.¹⁰⁷ As such, in the context of East Africa, this position would argue that the presence of a hegemon is a necessary requirement for the establishment of institutional arrangements that could lead to a security regime. When testing this argument, however, it can from the offset be established that there is no one outright hegemon in East Africa. Despite this, the merits of the power-based approach can still be tested by critically analysing the power dynamics that characterize CT strategies in East Africa.

¹⁰⁷ G. Osherenko and O.R. Young, 'The Formation of International Regimes', in O.R. Young and G. Osherenko (eds), *Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes*, Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 10-11.

As the previous sections have already highlighted, the US has had a significant role in lifting the issue of terrorism onto the global agenda. Furthermore, with East Africa's geopolitical significance within the GWOT, the US has vested interests in the development of a CT strategy in the region. As such, the role of the US in influencing the formation of such a framework in East Africa cannot be discounted. The US has held a position of a global hegemon for most of the post-Cold War era, and despite the rise of other actors on the global stage, within security matters, the US holds unparalleled strength. Their influence in East Africa has been plain, but US engagements in the region have largely taken the form of economic or capacity related assistance. Both Kenya and Tanzania have been heavy recipients of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA), which has provided considerable training and equipment to law enforcement agents with the aim of developing and bolstering a wide spectrum of CT skills in both countries. This initiative also organized the East Africa Joint Operations (EAJO) exercise, which brought together law enforcement officers from Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda with the aim of testing and enhancing the participants' responses to terrorist attacks.¹⁰⁸ Following on, the US has also initiated two regional partnerships; the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT) and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). The former, funded by the US and established in 2009 is "designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa to counter terrorism in a comprehensive fashion".¹⁰⁹ The latter program has represented America's most militarized response to terrorism in the region, as thousands of US troops have been deployed to provide support for CT related operations in the region. The Task Force has used its "strategic location as a critical power projection platform" to "prevent violent extremist organizations from threatening America".¹¹⁰

With this background in mind, applying the power-based approach does have some merit. While it is irresponsible to claim that the US embodies a position as an outright hegemon in the region, its status as a *benign hegemon* may provide some credence to this claim. The US, since 2015 alone, has delivered hundreds of millions of security-related aid to several countries in East Africa, with the specific aim of reducing violent extremism. As such, the US has managed to assert its authority, not through coercion, but by adopting a positive leadership approach which aims to influence other actors to adopt its preferences. In short, it can be argued that the US has influenced the promotion of a security regime in East Africa as a public good, in order to consolidate their

¹⁰⁸ United States Department of State (2016), *Antiterrorism Assistance Report*, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, p. 9 & 11.

¹⁰⁹ United States Department of State, *Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT)*, <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#PRACT>, (accessed 20 April).

¹¹⁰ United States African Command, *Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)*, <http://www.hoa.africom.mil/about>, (accessed 20 April).

own intangible long-term gains; in this case, protecting its own national security from terrorist groups that are active in the region.

Moving on, while there is no one single hegemon in East Africa, there are nevertheless two countries that have emerged as regional leaders; Ethiopia and Kenya. Both countries have experienced considerable economic growth in the past decade and have also evolved as prominent security agents in the region. Similarly, both countries are closely allied with the US within the GWOT and both are important figures in maintaining peace and stability in the region. This dynamic has led to regional divisions with both countries looking to assert their position, which has understandably affected security cooperation. It has been argued that Ethiopia has used IGAD as a conduit to exercise its own power. Here, it has been noted that Ethiopia has on several occasions, acted through IGAD as an indirect means to address its own security matters, which has driven concerns about the representative nature of the REC.¹¹¹ As such this has led other countries like Kenya, to focus its interests instead on the EAC. Kenya has long had strong economic ties with its fellow EAC members and as such has tended to align itself stronger with the EAC on security matters. The construction of a cohesive East African CT strategy has therefore been hampered by the conflict over regional hegemony between Kenya and Ethiopia. As such the hypotheses that a *bipolar distribution of power* or the existence of a *directorship* do not provide much explanatory value. It seems that both countries have sought to opt for sub-regional arrangements to realize their goals, to the detriment of the formation of a singular East African CT security regime.

Considering these arguments, applying the power-based approach in the strictest sense does not explain regime formation. Nevertheless, the power dynamics that have been highlighted do raise some interesting points that cannot be discounted. The benign power exerted by the US in the region could explain why the issue has received the attention it has, as US economic assistance could be contingent on the countries in East Africa investing in CT strategies. As such, the US as an external actor could be credited with pushing the agenda forward but also operationalizing the CT frameworks in the form of capacity building trainings and large sums of investment. Following on, the relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya, while not strained in the political sense, does affect power dynamics in the region. As both countries seek to establish some form of dominance, the formation of a representative and effective CT framework, can be severely hindered. However, considering that the underlying interests of the two countries on this issue are

¹¹¹ Camilla Elowson and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, 'Challenges to Peace and Security in Eastern Africa: The role of IGAD, EAC and EASF', *Swedish Research Agency*, 2016, p. 4.

relatively similar, the above-mentioned argument may not be relevant. The following section will delve deeper into this idea.

5.2.2 The Interest-based Argument

The power-based approach highlighted above sheds some light on how power dynamics have shaped interactions on security matters in East Africa. However, the neo-liberal driven school of thought is equally useful. The interest-based approach considers the underlying constellation of interests as a central driving force in the formation of institutional arrangements. At its most basic, this position holds that regimes arise from the interactions of self-interested actors that coordinate their behaviour to ensure joint gains. In the context of East Africa, the joint gain in question can be considered overall peace and security in the region, as it would push states to cooperate to address specific threats that jeopardize it, i.e. terrorism. The interest-based approach lists several explanations that explain regime formation. By critically considering these arguments we can evaluate the explanatory merits of this approach, and also highlight the shortcomings of institutional arrangements in place.

When considering the issue of state interests with regard to terrorism in East Africa one has to consider how the states are impacted by the problem at hand. Interests in the issue have both wavered and grown over the years which has, in turn, affected the level of cooperation witnessed. As highlighted previously, terrorism as an act was not properly defined until the drafting of the Algiers Convention. Interests in forming a CT framework were low before this, but the 1998 embassy bombings thrust the issue into global and regional considerations. At that time, there was a collective call for a comprehensive framework to deal with the new threat of terrorism, which culminated in the Algiers Convention and the operationalization of a working definition of a terrorist act. This mentality for the need for a collective agenda on the issue of CT came to define security considerations in the subsequent years.

The merits of joint action in the fight against terrorism in East Africa have been highlighted in several strategies and policies drafted in the region. The EAC Protocol on Peace and Security underscores the need to “cooperate in counter-terrorism measures within the Community”,¹¹² while the Regional Strategy for Peace and Security mirrors these sentiments but specifies cooperation through information exchanges, law enforcement coordination and tighter border controls.¹¹³ Similarly, the several strategies adopted by IGAD in response to security matters have

¹¹² EAC (November 2013).

¹¹³ EAC, 'Regional Strategy for Peace and Security (adopted by the 13th EAC Council of Ministers meeting, Arusha, Tanzania)'.¹

all underscored the significance of collective action, as the member states have agreed that no individual member is able to single-handedly deal with the issue effectively.¹¹⁴ Here, the hypothesis of *policy priority*, that considers that a regime forms only when an issue has a high priority status, is confirmed by the above examples. Security issues, and especially terrorism has created an imperative for East African states to adopt an organized response. Both RECs have therefore pursued strategies based on achieving collective gains in terms of a better CT framework to bolster regional peace and stability. Here, the hypothesis that regimes form when there is a willingness to set aside narrow national interests in favour of some broader conception of the *common good* is also satisfied. Once again, the notion of collective action in response to security issues has been prominent in East Africa, as the member states have functioned in favour of promoting overall regional stability. An example that highlights this stance has been the EACs leading role in attempting to resolve the instability in Burundi. By taking on this role as lead mediator to the conflict, the EAC has underscored its support for a collective security approach, understanding the potential spill-over effects of instability in Burundi. Furthermore, this engagement also highlights the increasingly decentralized nature of the AUs security approach, which favours the principle of regional subsidiarity.¹¹⁵

Moving on, the hypothesis that *integrative bargaining* is necessary for regime formation to occur is also a relevant factor in this context. What is important here is the form of bargaining that sees states collaborate to find win-win solutions, in that they are mutually beneficial for the actors involved. The institutional arrangements that are in place in East Africa in response to the issue of terrorism, have not evolved out of unitary actions, but are a result of coordinated efforts by the member states of the region. These efforts have almost exclusively taken place at organized summits, which have functioned as meeting places for heads of state to hold talks on specific issues. The 35th ordinary session of the OAU summit held in Algiers saw a large turnout from African leaders and also saw the adoption of the Algiers Convention. Similarly, the Protocol to the Algiers Convention was adopted in 2004 by the 3rd ordinary session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Addis Ababa, after a proposal was made by 28 heads of states that met in Dakar three years earlier.¹¹⁶

This same trend has also been evident in the two RECs in East Africa. With regards to IGAD, the first articulation of a CT agenda was broached at the 2002 9th IGAD Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Khartoum, which eventually led to the

¹¹⁴ IGAD, *Security Sector Program (ISSP)*

¹¹⁵ Martin Welz, 'From Non-interference towards Non-indifference: An Ongoing Paradigm Shift within the African Union?', in J.G. Porto and P. Engel (eds), *Towards an African Peace and Security Regime: Continental Embeddedness, Transnational Linkages, Strategic Relevance*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013, pp. 21-23.

¹¹⁶ Aning and Salihu (2013), p. 19.

development of the Draft Implementation Plan to Counter Terrorism in the IGAD Region at a 2003 IGAD conference held in Addis Ababa, that was ultimately approved during the 10th IGAD summit in Kampala a year later.¹¹⁷ Similarly, within the EAC the Protocol on Cooperation in Defence Affairs was adopted at the 10th Head of State Extra Ordinary Meeting held on April 28th, 2012. This agreement came about after an elaborate process of negotiation between the individual member states about the legal and administrative grey zones associated with defence cooperation. The EAC Protocol on Peace and Security also followed a similar process, as it was only after years of lengthy negotiations that the EAC member states signed the Protocol in 2013.¹¹⁸

These summits have proven useful in bringing together the member states to discuss a specific issue in order to find equitable solutions. The hypothesis that *relevant parties* have to be involved is also satisfied here as well as the issue of *equity*. These summits provide all member states with a platform to articulate their interests and negotiate a consensual solution to the problem. The countries in East Africa are represented at these meetings and are able to articulate their interests when drafting the strategies that have come to define the regions CT framework. Here, the hypothesis of *individual leadership* would also be relevant, but it is difficult to determine the exact role played by specific actors during this process.

Considering the argument of *salient solutions*, which states that the adoption of equitable and simple solutions to the issue at hand facilitates institutional arrangements, several examples can be highlighted from the East African context. The Eastern African Police Chiefs Organization (EAPCCO) is one such initiative that has been introduced to bolster regional integration and facilitate a more streamlined approach to dealing with transnational crimes in the region. The EAPCCO highlights a concerted effort by the regions member states to coordinate their efforts, which has achieved through, among other things, joint exercises. The organizations first joint exercise was held in 2013 in Kampala and focussed specifically on counterterrorism.¹¹⁹ The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) is another good example of the adoption of a joint effort by the East African states. The EASF has established itself as a multi-national structure committed to “act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability in the Eastern African region”.¹²⁰ The EASF has worked actively with member states to bolster the capacity of their armed forces through military exercises and trainings. The significance of the force is twofold; firstly, it marks a positive step towards a fully integrated regional response to security matters and secondly it provides a

¹¹⁷ CGCC and ISSP, *Fighting terrorism through justice: Implementing the IGAD Legal Framework for Cooperation against Terrorism*, edited, New York and Addis Ababa, 2012, p. 33.

¹¹⁸ EAC, *Overview of Peace and Security Strategy*, <https://www.eac.int/security>, (accessed 7 May).

¹¹⁹ Lawrence E. Cline, 'African Regional Intelligence Cooperation: Problems and Prospects', *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, vol. 29, no. 3, 2016, p. 455.

¹²⁰ East African Region (2014), *Agreement on the Establishment of the East African Standby Force (EASF)*,

unique setting for member states to build trust and a shared understanding of the threats they face. As such, several initiatives have been adopted in the East African region, with the understanding that a shared approach based on collaboration is necessary for creating effective solutions to the terror threat. These institutions also function as *compliance mechanisms*, which is an argument that will be further addressed in the next section.

Exogenous shocks or crises, which are important events that can mobilize political will to address a specific issue, can also be useful in explaining regime formation. This argument will, however, be analysed in section 6.2.4 (Context-based argument). All in all, it can be surmised that the CT framework that has developed in East Africa has evolved out of the consensual pursuit of collective security in the region. Within the EAC and IGAD, collective concerns of the vulnerabilities against terrorist groups have pushed forward strategies to increase cooperation and collaboration. Furthermore, it was established relatively early that an effective CT framework required a joint effort, as there is no one country in East Africa, with the resources or political sway, to shoulder the responsibility on its own. *Science and technology* is also offered as an explanation for regime formation. The hypothesis here states that increased considerations of the problem at hand through scientific or technological perspectives and not political ones can facilitate the formation of a regime. In the context of this thesis, the issue of terrorism is not one that requires a technical response and as such this hypothesis is not very relevant. However, while not technical or scientific, the responses to the terrorist threat can nevertheless be formed from within the academic world. This point will be elaborated on in the following section.

5.2.3 The Knowledge-based Argument

Moving on, the Knowledge-based approach borrows heavily from the cognitivist school of thought that emphasises the role of knowledge, norms and values and how they shape state preferences and as such state behaviour. Normative changes, especially with regard to security issues, have been evident on the African continent. Understanding and assessing these shifts can help determine their role in shaping state behaviour and how it has influenced responses to security issues.

A central normative shift has been witnessed with regard to how African states have engaged with security issues on the continent. This shift coincided with the transformation from the OAU to the AU, where a norm of non-interference was replaced with a norm of non-indifference. This normative change was principally initiated at the AU level, but it has nevertheless come to inform regional initiatives as well. The East African region has played a significant role in

this paradigm shift. Not only has it illustrated the entrenched nature of non-interference within the OAU, but it has also functioned as the site for the AU to enforce the norm of non-indifference.

As has been highlighted in previous sections, the formation of the OAU was borne out of the need to consolidate gains made during the decolonisation process. It is therefore not surprising that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference were treated with deference and came to colour the future actions of the OAU. This stance is most clearly portrayed in the 1963 OAU Charter, which lists its guiding principles as “the sovereign equality of all members” and “non-interference in the internal affairs of states”.¹²¹ This strong stance against violations of sovereignty was especially problematic for the OAU’s ability to address conflict and security threats. This was most clearly illustrated during the 1978 Uganda-Tanzania conflict, which highlighted the entrenched nature of the norm of non-interference. The conflict escalated, with acts of aggression on both sides, eventually resulting in regime change and the ousting of Ugandan leader Idi Amin. The OAU, during this process, was largely silent except for a few half-hearted diplomatic efforts. The inaction can be explained by the apparent unwillingness of the OAU to circumvent principle of sovereignty to intervene.¹²²

The transformation of the OAU to the AU saw however a shift in. The new rational saw the need to evaluate the way conflicts and threats were handled. This saw the introduction of a new norm of non-indifference, which emphasized a new responsibility to take action in the name of safeguarding peace and security. This sentiment is reflected in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which provides for “the right of the Union to intervene in a member state [...] in respect to grave circumstances”¹²³ with threats to peace and stability included here. This has especially been relevant in the East African region, which has in recent times been the site of AU interventions that has cemented the new norm. Conflicts in Burundi, Sudan and Kenya have all elicited a response from the AU, which has mandated peacekeeping forces, pursued diplomatic talks and enforced legal proceedings with the aim of restoring peace and stability. The case of Somalia has come to represent AU initiatives that would not have been possible if the normative change away from non-interference had not been widely accepted on the continent. Somalia’s case is especially significant within the context of this thesis. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a regional peacekeeping mission that is made up of contingents from the East African states. One of its central aims has been to support the restoration of stability in the country

¹²¹ OAU (1963).Article 3.

¹²² George Roberts, 'The Uganda–Tanzania War, the fall of Idi Amin, and the failure of African diplomacy, 1978–1979', *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, vol. 8, no. 4, 2014, p. 698-699, 702-703.

¹²³ OAU (2000). Article 4(h).

by, among other things, aiding in the fight against the al-Shabaab terrorist group.¹²⁴ What this highlights, is a shift away from the norm of non-intervention and the embrace by many East African countries of the principle of non-indifference, especially when it comes to issues of regional peace and stability.

The knowledge-based approach also considers the value of shared understandings of beliefs, values and ideas, which is possible through the promotion and spread of knowledge. Here, the formation of *epistemic communities*, which are a collection of individuals with shared understandings and common views on an issue, is central to creating the necessary conditions for this common stance. This approach argues that with a shared understanding of the issue at hand, cooperation is more likely and as such the formation of a regime is made easier. When it comes to the region, the spread of knowledge has been a primary function of research institutes that have come to represent an important tool within the CT framework. Several institutes have been formed with the specific aim of producing knowledge on the issue of terrorism and how to counter it. On the continental level, the ACSRT has taken on this role and has worked to help assess the threat of terrorism in the different countries, produce information and raise awareness on these issues and develop strategies to address them.¹²⁵ At the regional level, this imperative has also been adopted by the Nyerere Centre for Peace Research and the Centre of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, which have both focussed on producing timely research on the driving forces behind instability and extremism in East African and how to better integrate regional responses to them. Furthermore, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) is another actor in Africa that has taken on the charge of producing and spreading knowledge. The Institute has collaborated with actors at the continental and regional level to organize trainings, summits and conferences. It has produced a plethora of research and policy-based information that has advised and guided measures taken on the continent in response to violent extremism and terrorism. The Institute has a significant role in the formation of CT strategies as it is one of the only African organisations with a seat at global counter-terrorism forums and has collaborated with governments through training to bolster their capacity to meet the threat of terrorism.¹²⁶

It can, therefore, be argued that an epistemic community of like-minded actors has formed, through the adoption and promotion of research and policy orientated institutions. Moving on to the other hypothesis of this approach, namely that *Scientific convergence* about relations and responses to this issue is a necessary requirement for regime formation. It was argued above

¹²⁴ African Union, *African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)*, <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-background/>, (accessed May 8).

¹²⁵ African Union, *The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)*.

¹²⁶ Institute fo Security Studies, *How We Work*, <https://issafrica.org/about-us/how-we-work>, (accessed May 8).

that scientific responses to terrorism are few and far between. But while there may not be a degree of scientific convergence, there is a significant level of ‘knowledge convergence’. There is consensus within the research community described above about the importance of understanding the drivers and root causes of terrorism and therefore how to respond to it. As such, this convergence, while not scientific, is nevertheless significant in this context as it shapes the views of the epistemic community also present.

This approach considered the direct role of shared knowledge and values in regime formation. It can be argued that the research and policy orientated activities present, constitute an epistemic community, that is a network of individuals that create a shared understanding of the issue of terrorism. This network functions as a conduit for integration, through the promotion of common views and values that links actors and states in the region. Furthermore, the embrace of a norm of non-indifference within the East African region has highlighted the willingness to intervene when faced with issues that threaten regional security.

5.2.4 The Context-based Argument

Finally, the last factor-based argument considers contextual dynamics and how they influence and shape state preferences. The role of exogenous events, both national and international, are central here, as it is argued that they could promote regime formation by catalysing state interaction and regional integration. Many of these external events have already been highlighted in the previous sections, but further elucidation can help in gauging their effect on the formation of a CT framework in East Africa.

The formation of today's CT framework in East Africa has gone through several phases, but major policy changes have tended to come off the back of major international and regional events. The 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi and Kampala is a significant starting point that began discussions about the nature of the terrorist threat in Africa and the strategies needed to deal with it. The attacks highlighted several important points. Firstly, it underscored the dangers and reach of extremist groups in the region and the toll they were able to exert if left unchecked. Secondly, it highlighted to the internal community and especially the US, that their national security interests could be threatened even beyond their borders. Thirdly and finally, the attacks highlighted the glaring inadequacies in, at that time, the OAU's capabilities in addressing and dealing transnational threats like terrorism. As such, the drafting of the Algiers Convention in 1999 aimed to address these specific issues. While this document was built on, supplemented and amended only a few years after it was drafted, it was still one of the first strategies adopted to meet the

terrorist threat and has functioned as a framework for ensuing treaties and conventions that were subsequently drafted.

The next important event that has shaped security discourses in Africa was the September 11 terrorist attacks. The 9/11 terrorist attacks and subsequent GWOT has been used by the US as a pretext to wage a 'global war', far outside the borders of the American homeland. The Africa continent since 9/11 has become an increasingly important arena in the fight against transnational terrorist threats, with East Africa holding especially significant geopolitical value. The US, which has dominated global discourses on the issue of terrorism, has long framed areas in East Africa as 'ungovernable' and 'fragile' which could function as incubators for terrorist groups. As such, interest in bolstering CT capabilities in the region has grown exponentially and has become a vital pillar of US security policy. This same trend has also seen the formation of an extensive CT framework that we see today in East Africa. Due to the transnational nature of terrorism and the East African regions, geopolitical significance within the GWOT, countering terrorism and violent extremism has become a central goal in both the EAC and IGAD.

Moving on, more recent attacks have also influenced policy formation and cooperation in the region. in Kenya/Uganda. The 2010 bombing at the Kampala Rugby Club and the Westgate terrorist attacks in Kenya in 2013, once again highlighted inadequacies in states response to such attacks. As such, several joint exercises, such as the EAJO, have been introduced with the aim of bolstering the capabilities of law enforcement officers from East Africa, to meet and address terrorist attacks. What the above has highlighted is the impact exogenous events have had on the formation of a comprehensive CT framework in East Africa. These events have stimulated the emergence of a political will needed to deal with a specific issue, in this case, terrorism. As such, it can be argued that in the absence of these events, the degree of cooperation and collaboration witnessed today in East Africa with regard to the issue of terrorism could have been considerably lower.

6. Conclusion & Discussion

Global understandings of security issues and how they best can be addressed is a multifaceted task that requires close readings of the dynamics that shape them in the first place. Processes like globalization have blurred the lines between national and international demarcations and as such security threats that were once restricted by territorial borders have evolved to possess a transnational reach. This has been especially relevant to the African continent, which has seen many changes in the past decade. The AU has established itself as a security actor, with issues like counter-terrorism, no longer solely dictated by external forces. This security framework that has been developed by the AU has adopted a unique approach that has increasingly subscribed to the principle of regional subsidiarity. As such RECs have evolved as tangible agents that are able to realize overall peace and security goals on the continent. It is from this position that this study has evolved, with the central goal of understanding how far and why regional cooperation to address the issue of terrorism has taken hold in East Africa.

In order to achieve this, a regime theoretical perspective was employed that incorporated neorealist, neoliberalist and cognitivist approaches that provided explanations to how and why regimes form. As such, to answer the central question of this thesis, namely *how far has a security regime formed in East Africa in response to the regions terrorist threat*, two analytical models were applied. Firstly, a framework (Figure 3) that tracks the three stages of regime formation (Agenda setting, Institutional Bargaining and Operationalisation) was employed, which was then supplemented by a multivariant model (Figure 2) based on power, interest, knowledge and context-based assumptions. Each factor-based approach provided interesting insights into the degree of regime formation and also highlighted the dynamics that have led to institutional arrangements and cooperation within the East African region. Furthermore, the four social factors provide insights into the dynamics that shape the three stages of regime formation

Beginning with the power-based approach, hegemonic dynamics have had a significant role in security cooperation in the region. On the one hand, the US has exercised considerable influence as a benign hegemon, in facilitating and financing capacity building strategies aimed at strengthening the regions CT framework. This dynamic has been especially influential on the agenda-setting phase of regime formation, as it is clear that the issue of terrorism holds a central place on both the international and African agenda and has become an issue that has necessitated a concerted response. On the other hand, the lack of a clear hegemonic power in the region has led to a discord between Kenya and Ethiopia, with both states vying for the dominant position. As such, a fully integrated regional response in the form of a security regime is somewhat hampered, as both countries have tended to exert their influence in their respective RECs. Here

the issues that have hampered the operationalization phase of regime theory are especially relevant, as the lack of political will to operationalize certain strategies may be borne out this conflict. In light of this, it could be interesting to consider the sub-regional formations, in the form of IGAD and the EAC alone, as the necessary conduits for effective cooperation and as such regime formation.

Moving on to the interest-based factor, I argue that one of the most important factors associated with the formation of a comprehensive CT framework has been the high level of integrative bargaining that has preceded institutional arrangements. The inclusive nature of the summit meetings where these frameworks have been drafted indicates that CT cooperation in East Africa is very much a negotiated process. This has inevitably affected the institutional bargaining phase of regime formation, as has been highlighted by the plethora of policies, strategies and treaties that have been drafted in response to the terrorist threat. Furthermore, member states in East Africa have been driven by the consensual pursuit of collective security. As such, security interests in the region have very much aligned, which has facilitated cooperation between the member states.

The role of knowledge and norms has also proven important in the formation of a CT framework. Central here has been the adoption by member states of the norm of non-indifference, which has made collective action more viable and has proven to be an important principle in maintaining peace and stability in the region. Furthermore, the presence of an epistemic community has also been noted which has also facilitated cooperation. The promotion and spread of knowledge has been important in the framing of the terrorist threat during the agenda-setting phase but it has also shaped the policies and strategies adopted in the institutional bargaining phase, as well as the mechanisms, developed to implement them in the operationalization stage of regime formation. Finally, the context-based approach has not only proved influential at all three stages of regime formation, but it has highlighted the unique contextual dynamics that has bolstered the formation of institutional arrangements in the region. As has been stated previously, I argue that in the absence of these events, the issue of terrorism would not have gained the political agency needed during the agenda-setting phase, nor would it have been addressed in the institutional bargaining and operationalization stages of regime formation.

The multivariant model that has been applied in this thesis has highlighted the significant effects of power, interest, knowledge and context-based approaches to interstate cooperation and regime formation. The power dynamics have highlighted both how cooperation has been facilitated but also how it can hinder the full regional integration in East Africa. The interest-based assumptions have nevertheless underscored the consensual pursuit of collective security and how

it has established cooperation and collaboration as central strategies in realizing security goals. The spread of knowledge has proven useful in understanding the normative shifts that have governed contemporary security policies and how the promotion of knowledge through research and epistemic communities has established mechanisms needed to implement and monitor CT strategies. The East African context is complex and therefore necessitates a multidimensional approach. As such, I venture to say that fully understanding the dynamics that have led to this cooperation, requires the application of the multivariate model, as applying a single factor analysis, would be inadequate in realizing this papers goal.

At its most basic, this thesis has strived to contribute to the existing literature within IR that focuses on understanding inter-state cooperation and the driving forces that influence state behaviour. More specifically though, this study has aimed to build from, and contribute to, existing regime theoretical findings, by applying them to East Africa context. By studying these dynamics through a regime theoretical perspective, I argue that interesting insights can be gleaned about security cooperation in Africa and how continental security goals can be realized through RECs. If we were to revert to the definition used for a regime, namely “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations”. From the analysis and subsequent discussion, it can be established that many of these characteristics have been fulfilled within the CT framework present in East Africa. However, I concluded that a fully-fledged and effective security regime is not currently formed, but this may not hold true for much longer. As stated above, sub-regional cooperation within the EAC and IGAD may prove more effective in dealing with the terrorist threat. An effective institutional framework exists, a myriad of vital resources have been harnessed and security interests align between member states in the region. As such, more effective implementation procedures and better control mechanism remain the final hurdles to overcome. Nevertheless, the capacity deficits and lack of resources that has halted full operationalization of CT strategies is an issue that the AU is currently focussed on remedying. The AU has already introduced a 0.2% levy on imports which will help towards financing central institutions within the organization; including the Peace Fund which oversees the implementation of peace and security goals. Similarly, EU, UN and US security interests in the continent are not going to diminish anytime soon, and through external financing (itself a noted aspect of fulfilling the goals of APSA) the issues currently hindering the formation of an effective regime may be rectified.

The regime theoretical approach used in this thesis, which has predominantly been applied to environmental contexts, can only be strengthened by its application and use within security orientated cooperation. As such, further research should aim to utilize this approach to understand

institutional arrangements in other regions and contexts, as it has proven useful in unpacking the dynamics and processes that lead to security cooperation. Furthermore, an aspect that is missing from this thesis is the micro-level perspective, that fully considers the individuals that are part of the process of institution building. Further research will benefit significantly by unpacking the bureaucratic culture within the AU as well as IGAD and the EAC, to better understand the day to day routines and culture that may influence decision-making processes. This can best be achieved through interviews with key players within the relevant institutions. All in all, this thesis has aimed to provide a framework for analysing regional cooperation within a specific security issue. Further research should consider whether this can be replicated with a focus on other threats, such as piracy or organized crime in Africa. Furthermore, a very interesting avenue that can be pursued would see this framework applied to other RECs in Africa. This could not only provide interesting insights into the dynamics that govern cooperation in other regions but also highlight the necessary conditions needed for the overall realization of the goals and vision of the AUs security architecture.

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Appendix

The framework is borrowed from Young and Osherenko 1993: 263-266.

A. Power-based hypotheses

Basic Premise: Institutions, including international regimes, are structured by and reflect the distribution and configuration of power in international society.

1. Hegemony. The most widely discussed hypothesis in this set, which arises from hegemonic stability theory, states that the presence of a hegemon (that is, an actor possessing a preponderance of material resources) is a necessary condition for regime formation in international society. a. Benign hegemony: the hegemon, functioning as the dominant member of a privileged group, supplies institutional arrangements to others as public goods. b. Coercive hegemony: the hegemon exercises structural power to impose institutional arrangements favourable to itself, regardless of the consequences for others.

2. Other power-based hypotheses are possible. Here are some examples to consider. a. A bipolar or bimodal distribution of power (producing a balance of power) is necessary for success in regime formation. b. The greater the degree of symmetry in the distribution of power, the more likely efforts to create regimes are to succeed. c. The existence of a small group of great powers in a given issue area (that is, a directorate) enhances prospects for regime formation.

B. Interest-based hypotheses

Basic Premise: Social institutions, including international regimes arise from the interaction of self-interested parties endeavouring to coordinate their behaviour to reap joint gains that may but need not take the form of public goods. It follows that the availability of joint gains or, in other words, a contract zone or zone of agreements constitutes a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for the formation of international regimes. There is, however, no need to assume that the parties possess full or complete information regarding the extent or precise nature of the feasible or joint gains at the outset. (In some situations, parties dispute or disagree regarding the existence or scope of joint gains.) Efforts to construct theories about the resilient interactions address the following question: Why do actors in international society succeed in forming international regimes to reap feasible gains in some cases but not in others? The processes leading to success or failure are ordinarily conceptualized as bargaining or negotiation; the hypotheses of interest to us identify determinants of success or failure in the resultant institutional bargaining.

- 1. Integrative bargaining and a veil of uncertainty.** Institutional bargaining can succeed only when the prominence of integrative bargaining and/or the presence of a veil of uncertainty make it easy for the partners to approach the problem under consideration in contractarian terms.
- 2. Equity.** The availability of institutional options that all participants can accept as equitable (rather than efficient) is necessary for institutional bargaining to succeed.
- 3. Salient solutions.** The existence of a salient solution (or focal point describable in simple terms) increases the probability of success in institutional bargaining.
- 4. Exogenous shocks or crises.** Shocks or crises occurring outside of the bargaining process increase the probability of success in efforts to negotiate the terms of international regimes.
- 5. Policy priority.** (a) Success in regime formation can occur only when the issue at stake achieves high-priority status on the policy agenda of each of the participants. (b) Alternatively, it is easier to form a regime when the subject matter is not high on the political agendas of the parties.
- 6. Common good.** A willingness to set aside narrow national interests in favor of some broader conception of the common good is necessary to achieve success in regime formation.
- 7. Science and technology.** (a) The greater the tendency for parties to concentrate on scientific or technical considerations as opposed to political issues, the greater the likelihood of successful regime formation. (b) The greater the role of negotiators with scientific or technical competence in relation to those with political credentials, the greater the likelihood for successful regime formation. (c) It is easier to form a regime when the issues at state are highly technical.
- 8. Relevant parties.** All parties with an interest in the problem must participate in the negotiations for regime formation to succeed.
- 9. Compliance mechanisms.** The probability for success in institutional bargaining rises when compliance mechanisms that the parties regard as clear-cut and effective are available.
- 10. Individuals as leaders.** Institutional bargaining is likely to succeed when individual leadership emerges; it will fail in the absence of such leadership.

C. Knowledge-based hypotheses

Basic Premise: Shared perceptions, beliefs, and understandings of causal mechanisms among the relevant parties as well as identifiable communities, including epistemic communities and advocacy organizations, that arise to propagate this knowledge are important determinants of regime formation. Some would argue that cognitive considerations - including ideas, values and learning shared through transnational alliances, nongovernmental organizations, and groups of experts - constitute a more significant factor in regime formation than power or the interests of states. Two alternative accounts of how cognitive concerns influence regime formation are identifiable in the literature.

1. Scientific convergence. Agreement or consensus within the scientific community regarding causal relations and appropriate responses is a prerequisite for regime formation. (Values are less important, though not irrelevant, to this hypotheses than to the next hypothesis.

2. Epistemic communities. A group of individuals (whose membership usually transcends national boundaries and includes both scientists or experts and policy makers) who share a common view regarding causal mechanisms and appropriate responses and who have a common set of values emerges in conjunction with the issue in question. For a regime to form some mechanism (possibly an international organization but in some cases a less formal network) arises to link the members of this group. The resulting epistemic community is able not only to promote its own preferred arrangements but also prevent opposing views and values from becoming influential or dominant at the domestic level in each of the relevant states.

D. Contextual factors National and world circumstances and events seemingly unrelated to the issue area under consideration play a major role in determining if and when international cooperation to address a particular problem or issue area occurs and in shaping the content of any regime that forms.