

# Peacekeeping: a choice between stability and peace?

A study on the effects of peacekeeping on peacemaking in  
the India-Pakistan Conflict

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# Abstract

This study has the ambition to illuminate the relationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking. J. Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl found in their study “Peacekeeping-Peacemaking dilemma” an interesting connection between the presence of a peacekeeping force and the failure of peacemaking process. This study will explore the connection between peacekeeping and a peace process through a qualitative case study of an enduring rivalry: the India-Pakistan Conflict. The two states have suffered four wars and multiple crises during a conflict starting since the independence of the two states. This study focuses on the role of UNMOGIP in the complex conflict to unravel its possible effects on the peace process. The study seeks to expand knowledge and unexplored dimensions of both of the India-Pakistan conflict and effects of peacekeeping

*Key words:* Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, India-Pakistan Conflict, UNMOGIP, United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

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# 1 Introduction

For over 70 years the UN has sought through peacekeeping to work towards a more peaceful and stable world by developing tools for helping countries in transitioning from war to peace. Peacekeeping has long been the most visible representation of the United Nations (United Nations peacekeeping,2018). Peacekeeping missions have earned the UN legitimacy and respect as an international actor, but they have also been heavily criticized for their lack of effectiveness and poor success rate (Paris,2001,32-33). The Efficiency of peacekeeping missions has been in the center of the academic debate. Are peacekeeping missions a good tool for achieving peace? Or are the goals simply too ambitious for the resources available (Jarstad&Sisk, 2008,39)? The UN is currently involved in 15 peacekeeping operations in conflicts around the world (United Nations peacekeeping,2018). Many people's lives are affected by these conflicts. However peacekeeping often fails to reach it's goals (Autesserre, 2014,249) Therefor it is important to study peacekeeping, to find answers to the challenges they face and discover possible indirect effect they might have on the dynamics of a conflict.

## 1.1 Research Question

My study seeks to explore an interesting dilemma that can be linked to different traditions in study of international relations. Peacekeeping is often seen as a manifestation of a world where international organizations can limit violence. This worldview is in line with cosmopolitan thinking that sees the world as guided by rules and norms (Diehl,1994,22). In their study the Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma Greig and Diehl found some support for a pessimistic logic of peacekeeping (Greig&Diehl,2005,646). Their study suggests that by limiting violence peacekeeping might prevent the conflict from "running its natural course" and therefore lead to negative consequences for the peacemaking process. Finding support for this theory would also support a more realist view of the world where wars are natural part of the international order.

The key academic debates on peacekeeping are concerning its legitimacy and effectiveness. One of the critiques are against liberal peace building, for trying to impose liberal values such as democracy and market economy as a solution for solving the conflict, while ignoring the local actors and the context. This makes the peacekeeping and -building efforts illegitimate in the eyes of locals and without the cooperation of locals the peace process is likely to fail (Richmond, Paris, Newman, 2009, 3, 13). Imposing democracy into an already unstable context is likely to further de-stabilize the state, even though it might prove beneficial in the long run (Jarstad & Sisk, 2008, 40). Scholars also criticize the way peace operations impose predefined templates to contexts where they are not suited while ignoring local knowledge. During the last 20 years this critique has been recognized and there have been increasing attempts in including local actors, however with poor success (Autesserrie, 2014, 4-14). Even though many scholars remain critical they still recognize the benefits peacekeeping has when performed appropriately (Fortna & Howard, 2008, 289). Peacekeeping literature has had a lack of theoretical debate trying to connect peacekeeping literature with general theories on international relations (Paris, 2000, 27). Greig's and Diehl's theory is a step in this direction, since the pessimistic logic is based on realist thinking.

In my study I will test Greig's and Diehl's (Greig & Diehl, 2005) Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma, which suggests that peacekeeping might have some unintentional effects and might risk the achievement of a peace agreement. The study will be a theory-testing case study of the India-Pakistan conflict that will make use of qualitative process tracing methods. The study will focus on UNMOGIP's operation and the working of mechanisms outlined by the theory. My aim is to explore and explain the possible effects of peacekeeping on peacemaking by testing the validity of Greig's and Diehl's theory. It will test theory generated from a statistical study, by the means of a qualitative process tracing analysis. Further my study will illuminate the effects UNMOGIP has had on the India-Pakistan conflict. My contribution to the debate over peacekeeping will be exploring the possible effects of peacekeeping on a peace agreement, hence my research question:

*Did UNMOGIP influence the failure of the peacemaking process in the India-Pakistan Conflict?*

## 2 Theory

The theoretical framework used in my study will be the Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma developed by J. Michael Greig and Paul.F Diehl. I will use it as a basis for a theory testing process tracing analysis. According to the dilemma the deployment of a peacekeeping force might have unintended negative consequences for a peace process and might ultimately prevent the signing of a peace agreement (Greig&Diehl,2005,642). If peacekeeping has a paralyzing impact on peacemaking in certain conflicts this could have serious implications for the justification of employing peacekeeping mission and the credibility of the UN's ability to solve conflicts (Greig&Diehl,2005,621-622). In their study Greig and Diehl studied the effect of peacekeeping on the instances of mediation and negotiation and their success or failure in both civil wars and enduring rivalries. In their analysis they employed both pessimistic and optimistic logics on peacekeeping, derived from peacekeeping literature. These logics generated hypothesis of both negative and positive effects of peacekeeping. Their study found empirical evidence, based on quantitative data, supporting the pessimistic logic but very little supporting optimistic logic. Mediation and negotiation efforts were fewer and failed more often when a peacekeeping force was present. Results supporting the pessimistic logic were stronger for enduring rivalries, than civil wars. Their findings suggest a connection between peacekeeping and peacemaking failure (Greig&Diehl,2005,636-641). In my study I will test the pessimistic logic and its mechanisms on the India-Pakistan conflict to see if the relationship and mechanisms are supported by qualitative evidence derived from a case study.

According to the pessimistic logic peacekeeping can hamper the success and rate of peacemaking effort through two mechanisms. The first is the mutually hurting stalemate concept originally developed by Zartman (Zartman,2000). Greig and Diehl suggest that peacekeeping trumps the developing of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) by limiting fighting and hence the costs and time pressure of the conflict for the parties (Greig&Diehl,2005,628-629). A mutually hurting stalemate develops when both parties experience costs of the conflict while not being able to overpower the other party. Without a mutually hurting stalemate the parties lack incentives and pressure to make the painful

concessions a peace settlement would require (Zartman,2000,225-230). The second mechanism is caused by the rational choice problem. This suggests that war is essentially an information problem. In war, parties gain information on each other's capabilities through fighting (Wagner,2000,472). When they possess sufficient information they can determine the likely outcome of the conflict and a settlement can be reached. Peacekeeping interrupts the flow of information by limiting fighting and thus preventing settlement (Greig&Diehl,2005, 627). In presence of information problem conflict parties are likely to miscalculate their chances to win a military confrontation and thus might seek to impose a unilateral solution instead of finding a negotiated settlement (Fearon,1995,390). When parties have misinformation on each other's bargaining positions they are unlikely to find a peaceful settlement (Centinyan,2002,646). In my study I will not examine the optimistic logic since the aim is to explore the validity of the pessimistic logic and finding of Greig and Diehl.

## 3 Research Design

The analytical framework of my study will be based on a detailed qualitative case study of the India-Pakistan conflict, analyzed by process tracing methods. My study will have both a theory testing and explanatory character. My aim is to both test the causality of a possible relationship between a peacekeeping operation and peace process failure, but also the mechanisms behind the relationship proposed by Greig and Diehl in their Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma.

### 3.1 Method

My study will employ process tracing as an analytical framework since it allows for a detailed within case analysis of a conflict. The benefit of the method is a deeper knowledge of the conflict and dynamics at interplay, allowing for a more complete picture of events relevant for the research question. The method enables establishing the causality of a correlation found in previous studies. Process tracing has been compared to detective work since it involves the close examination of evidence to support or reject a hypothesis (Bennet,2004,208-210). It involves the systematic analysis of selected evidence that are analyzed in light of hypothesis derived from theory (Collier,2011,823). My study will employ a theory testing analytical model of process tracing where both the independent and dependent variables are known and empirical evidence is examined to support or reject hypothesized casual mechanisms. The theory in question is broken down to smaller hypothesis of indirect and direct mechanisms, that theoretically bind the independent and dependent variable, and these are tested using empirical evidence (Beach&Pedersen,2013,56-59).

### 3.2 Case Selection



The case I have chosen to study is the India-Pakistan conflict. In case selection I have chosen to employ the typical case selection method. This method is appropriate when there remains ambiguity on the existence of a casual mechanism and the theory has not yet been well established. It also enables for cross-case interferences to be made, if no evidence is found for a hypothesized casual mechanism. In case the mechanism is not present in a typical case it is unlikely to be present in any of the case population (Beach&Pedersen,2013,151-152). The case is selected based on criteria where the theory in question is most likely to find support. In a theory testing process tracing study both the independent and dependent variable need to be present (Beach&Pedersen,2013,146-150). India Pakistan conflict is an unresolved conflict that has had a peacekeeping force present since 1948 (UNMOGIP,2018). The support Greig and Diehl found for the pessimistic logic was strongest for enduring rivalries (Greig&Diehl,2005,641). The India Pakistan conflict presents a classic case of an enduring rivalry with four wars and over 11 crisis (Paul,2005,27-29,163). The cases of peacekeeping studied by Greig and Diehl where mostly traditional peacekeeping missions and UNMOGIP presents a mission with a traditional peacekeeping mandate (Betterworldcampaign,2018). Greig's and Diehl's study also predict that the earlier in the conflict that peacekeeping is deployed, the stronger the support for the pessimistic logic (Greig&Diehl,2005,628). UNMOGIP was deployed in 1949 after the first Kashmir war and is still active today (UNMOGIP,2018).

### 3.3 Restrictions

My study will face some restrictions, firstly the external validity of my findings. Case studies often face problems with the generalizability of theoretical findings. The in depth analysis of one conflict, while granting higher internal validity, usually gives results that can be applied to other cases only in a limited manner (Halperin&Heath,2017,212-217). My results won't be able to make strong interferences across all peacekeeping operations. However it could serve to establish support for causality of a correlation found from quantitative studies. The study will be limited to testing only one theory on one case, since process tracing in a case study is unsuited for comparison. Firstly my study will test the validity of Greig's and Diehl's theory. Secondly it will contribute by operationalizing a logic derived from quantitative studies into one suited for studying a conflict in a qualitative context. If my study finds no support for

Greigs and Diehls Peacekeeping-Peacemaking dilemma, the theory could be seriously questioned on the basis of employment of the typical case selection method (Peach&Pedersen,2013,151-152).

The study of only one case by process tracing methods gives deeper insight and detail into one conflict, in this case the India-Pakistan conflict. It is a complex, multidimensional conflict, that started after the independence of the two states. It has prevented a normal relationship between the and it continues to cause significant human suffering (UCDB,2018). Both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons that have been on the brink of war multiple times after acquiring them (The Soufan Group,2018). This gives the conflict another possibly globally hazardous character. For these reasons there is a need to study the dynamics of the conflict further to gain insight into how it could be solved. My study will primarily focus on the peacekeeping missions present during the conflict and their impact on the conflict parties and the peace process. The peacekeeping efforts of UN in India-Pakistan have not gained much scholarly attention. An in-depth case study of peacekeeping in India-Pakistan conflict will contribute in filling this void.

### 3.4 Data collection

Data for the study will be collected from various secondary sources. In process tracing the quality is more important than the quantity of evidence (Bennett,2004,209). The types of evidence I need are specified by the mechanisms derived from the Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma. I will use literature and academic articles written by scholars, reports, official websites and publications. There are some limitations the data. Data on UNMOGIP has been limited since it is not a widely researched operation and the reports it submits are not published.

### 3.5 Operationalization

Below I shall operationalize the mechanism of pessimistic logic of peacekeeping that was hypothesized by Greig and Diehl in their study as having possible effects on a peace process.

### 3.5.1 Mutually Hurting Stalemate

Cause	Mechanism		Outcome
Peacekeeping sets up and monitors ceasefire	Prevents MHS →Less costs →Less time pressure	→Less mediation from third parties	Less mediation and negotiation attempts
Limits violence→		→Parties harden bargaining positions	Attempts to settle fail
		→Hope for better terms in future	

In Mutually Hurting mechanism the main effects of peacekeeping on peacemaking are caused by its ability to limits violence. By limiting violence peacekeeping prevents the formation of a mutually hurting stalemate that is seen as a necessary, but not sufficient condition for settlement of a conflict (Zartman,2000,226).

A mutually hurting stalemate is a situation when both conflict parties experience substantial costs from ongoing fighting and neither can gain military victory. Fighting and violence cause casualties and loss resources to both parties, that build up over time (Greig&Diehl,2005,628). The amount of costs necessary for a MHS is not objective, but is formed by the sense of parties that they can no longer bear them (Zartman,2000,229). Combined with a situation where neither party is able to unilaterally impose their conditions and, a sense of urgency by an impending or past catastrophe, it creates incentives for the parties to find a “way out” or a negotiated settlement and the conflict becomes “ripe” for resolution. The costs of the conflict need to be higher then costs of settlement to incentivize parties to seek peace (Zartman,2000,228-230). When peacekeeping prevents fighting it may also prevent the formation of MHS. It lessens the costs for conflict parties by limiting fighting and time pressure. This can have the effect of lessening third party mediation attempts, when the

human suffering and casualties do not create international pressure for solving the conflict. It also has the effect of making parties harden their bargaining position since there is a lack of pressure to make painful concessions. When the time pressure and costs are low parties might hope for better terms in the future (Greig&Diehl,2005,628).

According to the Mutually Hurting Stalemate mechanism we should observe less frequent mediation and negotiation attempts and failure of any such attempts when peacekeeping is present.

### 3.5.2 Rational Choice

Cause	Mechanism		Outcome
Peacekeeping sets up and monitors ceasefire	Interrupts flow of information →	Uncertain outcome→	Parties unlikely to accept negotiation
Limits violence→		Uncertain bargaining positions→	Attempts to settle fail
		Willingness to fight in future →	

According to the rational choice logic war can be seen as an information problem. When parties fight they gain knowledge of each other capabilities and can then determine what the likely outcome will be. Knowing the outcome of future fighting and each others bargaining positions, leaves no need for continued fighting and the parties can find a settlement (Wagner,2000,472). Greig and Diehl propose that by limiting fighting peacekeeping creates an information problem, where the likely outcome is uncertain, and both parties view their chances of imposing unilateral settlement as optimistic. In this way neither party is likely to want to settle the conflict peacefully and attempts to settle fail (Greig,2005,627).

The main mechanism by which peacekeeping impacts the failure of peacemaking is by limiting violence. In war conflict parties gain information of each others military capabilities, bargaining positions and preferences trough fighting (Centinyan,2002,647). Through this information parties can calculate, and alter their calculations of who is likely to prevail in

armed conflict. However in war parties often have incentives to misrepresent information and to overestimate their chances of victory leading to the information problem (Fearon,1995,381,390-401). This also leads to bargaining breakdown when parties try to impose a solution that is unacceptable to the other (Centinyan,2002,646).

Peacekeeping interrupts fighting via establishing and monitoring a ceasefire. This separates the parties, limits violence and hence gives rise to the information problem by creating uncertainty of outcome and bargaining positions. When there is a lack of information parties are unlikely to propose negotiation in a fear of signaling weakness to the other party. The negative effect on mediation is not as strong, since mediator might have the ability to provide some information (Greig&Diehl,2005,627). Any attempts at mediation or negotiations are likely to fail since both parties believe in their chances of imposing their own agenda and disagree on each other's relative power. Hence their goals tend to be incompatible when bargaining positions and preferences are unclear. Parties also don't know the costs and outcome of trying to impose own goals on the other party and hence see continued fighting as a more attractive option to peace (Fearon,1995,390).

## 3.6 Definitions

### 3.6.1 Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping refers to operations usually deployed by the UN. In my study I often use the term traditional peacekeeping. By this is referred to peacekeeping forces with mandates usually of monitoring, setting up and reporting on ceasefire. These troops are commonly unarmed and impartial in the conflict with no mandate to use force (UN,2008,20-21). UNMOGIP is an example of traditional peacekeeping.

Modern peacekeeping operations are often multidimensional. All UN peacekeeping operations are guided by the three main principles: consent of parties, impartiality and non use of force (UN,2008,23,31). Studying a case of traditional peacekeeping will pose restrictions on making interferences across multidimensional missions.

### 3.6.2 Peace process

In this study when referring to a peace process mean attempts at mediation and negotiation aimed at finding a peaceful solution to a conflict. The main reason for this is that this was also the focus of Greig's and Diehl's study. To achieve settlement a conflict must reach solution to core issues of a conflict, the issue of Kashmir in case of India-Pakistan conflict.

## 4 Conflict Background

In this section I will summarize the wars and other important events affecting the conflict between India and Pakistan. I will also outline the main dimensions and issues of the conflict.

### 4.1 The India Pakistan Conflict

The conflict between India and Pakistan started soon after the independence of both countries and their partition from British India. The first Kashmir war (1947-1948) was fought over the accession of the Kashmir region to either India or Pakistan. The accession of Kashmir was to be decided by the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh of the Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir. In the accession of other states the norm had been for majority Muslim states to join Pakistan and majority Hindu to join India. In days leading to accession a tribal rebellion broke out that was quickly joined by Pakistani supported infiltrators over the border. The Maharaja of Kashmir was forced to accede Kashmir to India in exchange for military aid. India quickly mounted a counterattack and broke the lines of Pakistani and tribal troops. At this point regular Pakistani troops were involved to prevent defeat. However the Indian side kept advancing and Pakistan asked UN for help in mediating the dispute. After a year, hostilities were brought to an end and a ceasefire monitored by UNMOGIP established. Two thirds of Kashmir was left on the Indian side while what came to be called Azad Kashmir (“Free Kashmir”) was left on the Pakistan side (Ganguly,1995,169-171;Narasingha,2009,10). The ceasefire line established has become the unofficial border between India and Pakistan (Wirsing,1998,62).

The Second war between India and Pakistan in 1965 broke out after Pakistan’s operation Gibraltar where Pakistani forces infiltrated Kashmir and instigated and supported a Muslim insurgency against Indian rule. India retaliated with military force launching full scale attack towards Pakistani military forces in West Pakistan, lasting for 17 days and resulting in

thousands of deaths. Again the UN mediated negotiations between the parties. The war came to an end in the Tashkent declaration mediated by Soviet Union and USA (Pariona,2017).

The third war in 1971 resulted in the division of Pakistan and the birth of the Bangladesh state. Internal political unrest between East and West Pakistan resulted in atrocities in Bangladesh and a flood of Pakistani refugees to India. Consequently India intervened in the conflict by supporting the Bangladesh liberation movement. In light of previous hostilities and tense relation Pakistan made a preemptive strike that started full scale fighting between India and Pakistan. India was the militarily stronger party and quickly made territorial gains. Pakistani forces were forced to surrender to the Bangladesh and India, leading to the creation of an independent Bangladesh. The Simla agreement established the Line of Control (LOC) that largely followed the old ceasefire line (Hashim,2014:Narasingha,2009,11-12).

In 1999 Pakistani forces infiltrated over the ceasefire line and occupied positions of the remote Himalaya peaks. This allowed them to threaten the supply routes of India to the Siachen glacier that had been under dispute since the 80s. India first tried to push-off Pakistani troops with conventional forces but battles in the mountains resulted in high casualties. After Indian airstrikes and US threatening sanctions Pakistan backed down and withdrew its troops. This war became center for international attention for creating nuclear war tensions. Notably it occurred right after an ease in tension between India and Pakistan. Other notable incidents happened after 2001 terrorist attack on Indian parliament leading to troops facing of along the LOC and brought the countries close to war. Again tensions were relieved by intense third party diplomatic pressure and troops later withdrawn (Leng,2005,114-122). The 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack and militant attack on Indian army base in Uri 2016 lead to a similar situation (Narasingha,2009,12-13:ACLED,2017,11-12 ).

In most of the wars and crises Pakistan has been the instigating party while India has been the reactive party. This is due to Pakistan being the militarily weaker party and seeking to change the status quo, that is currently favoring India. The trend has been Pakistan using asymmetric warfare tactics like terrorism and supporting Islamists, giving India an excuse for hard handed anti-terrorist tactics, especially in the climate after 9/11(Leng,2005,111:Noor,2007,66-68:Diehl, et al. 2005,38-39).



## 4.2 The Peacekeeping Mission

The first peacekeeping mission in the India-Pakistan conflict was established after the first Kashmir war by UN resolution 39 in 1948. United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was put in place to investigate and mediate the conflict. After a few months it was enlarged with unarmed military observers that arrived in January 1949 and came to monitor the ceasefire line established in July 1949. These observers would later form the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), the main peacekeeping force of the conflict. In my study I will focus on UNMOGIP since it is the most significant and longest peacekeeping force during the conflict. UNMOGIP's mandate is to observe and gather information in collaboration with local authorities and file reports of ceasefire violations to UN headquarters. They are not to take any action in regard to ceasefire violations and had to remain strictly impartial. UNMOCIP was terminated in 1951 but UNMOGIP would remain to supervise the ceasefire. After the 1971 war UN Security Council adapted resolution 309 stating that parties should withdraw to the lines of the previous ceasefire. In 1972 India and Pakistan signed an agreement creating new line of control and stating that all conflict should be dealt with bilaterally. India interprets the Simla agreement as overruling the Karachi agreement and therefore eliminating UNMOGIP's mandate. Pakistan however still saw UNMOGIP's mandate as operational. The Security Council has not terminated UNMOGIP's and it continues its duties, even though there remains disagreement over its status between India and Pakistan. Pakistan has continued to report ceasefire violations to UNMOGIP but India has not reported any since 1972 and limits UNMOGIP's activities on its side of the LOC (UNMOGIP,2018).

## 5 Results

In this section I will explore, based on empirical evidence, whether the rational choice and mutually hurting stalemate mechanism can be observed functioning in the India-Pakistan Conflict as predicted by theory. I will focus on each part of the mechanism separately.

### 5.1 Rational Choice

#### 5.1.1 Cause

To start I will identify if peacekeeping, the independent variable in the mechanism, succeeded in setting up and monitoring a ceasefire and if this has had the predicted outcome of limiting the violence. According to Greig's and Diehl's theory this should consequently create an information problem. The theory is somewhat counterfactual since comparing the levels of violence without a peacekeeping force isn't possible. Hence any observed effect should be taken only as a prediction.

Has UNMOGIP been able to limit violence between India and Pakistan? There does not exist any accurate numbers on ceasefire violations and levels of violence along the LOC of the whole duration of the conflict. However the general picture derived from various sources points towards that during the 70 years UNMOGIP has been operational, it has failed multiple times to prevent hostilities and violence on the border and to maintain the ceasefire (Wirsing,1998,189-190:Blixt,1994,50:Diehl. et alt,2005,45:ACLED,2016,13:Jacob,2017,131). The levels of violence have been high not only along the LOC. This is evident from the four wars fought during that period and frequent firing and shelling across and around the border (Shucksmith&White,2015,135-140:Khan,2005,163). In table made by Vasquez is his chapter in the book *The India-Pakistan*

*Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*, shows 36 instances when at least one of the parties have either: 1:displayed use of force, 2:actually used force or 3:used force that leads to war, during the period 1942-1996 (Vasquez,2005,64). There were some calmer periods in the 50's but again in 60's and escalating during 90's levels of violence rose (Blix,1994,20-22,41).

UNMOGIP's mandate was never to enforce the ceasefire, but there was hope this would to some extent encourage the parties to respect the ceasefire (Blix,1994,15). Its ability to do so has been questioned by many who have studied the conflict

(Diehl,2005,45:Blix,1994,50:Wirsing,1998,74) (Shucksmith&White,2015,140).

However some see that it has had some limiting effect on the parties

(Lourie,1955,30:Jacob,2017,5).

Has UNMOGIP been able to monitor the ceasefire and could this have had a limiting effect on violence? UNMOGIP's main task has been to observe, report and investigate in cooperation with local authorities ceasefire violations and bring them to the attention of UN security council (Better World Campaign,2018). However since the Simla agreement after 1971 war, its ability to fulfill its mandate has been crippled. Simla agreement is a purely bilateral agreement with no mention of UNMOGIP, leaving its position uncertain. India interprets the mandate given by Karachi agreement as no longer in force. UNMOGIP has become unable to fulfill its mandate on the Indian side of the LOC. After 1972 India has not brought any ceasefire violations to UNMOGIP's attention. Pakistan interprets UNMOGIP's mandate as still in force and has continued to cooperate with the mission, however in recent years it has only reported ceasefire violations it considers serious (Wirsing,1998,68-73:Blix,1994,29-30). India no longer cooperates and even obstructs the mission (Blix,1994,38-40) while Pakistan tolerates the mission, since it validates Pakistani argument of Kashmir as disputed territory (Wirsing,1998,75). This could point towards lack of respect and even weaker influence of UNMOGIP on the parties. In conclusion UNMOGIP's ability to limit violence was from the beginning only limited since its mandate allowed only for an observer role, not being able to enforce the ceasefire (Shucksmith&White,2015,141). Some have seen even an observer role as serving a function limiting the escalation of the conflict, since it has brought UN attention to conflict (UN information center Islamabad,2016). Most scholarly publications before Simla considered the operation a success (Wirsing,1998,74:Lourine,1955,30). However since 1972 this limited function has been crippled when India no longer cooperates and Pakistan sometimes uses the operation to

serve its own purposes. For example there have been incidents of Pakistan using peacekeepers presence as cover for bringing arms to positions on the LOC (Blixt,1994,37). Similarly they have scheduled the visits of UNMOGIP after firing at Indian positions, so that Indian retaliation end up on the ceasefire report (Jacob,2017,14). Their work is further obstructed by limited amount of observers and resources at its disposal to monitor a 740km LOC (Shucksmith&White,2015,139). Hence the reports sent to New York hardly give an accurate picture of the ceasefire violations. Other evidence supporting this is that in 2011 authorities found mass graves suggesting massive human right violations the peacekeeping force had been unable to discover (Shucksmith&White,2015,141). In conclusion the level of violence and CFV has been high and UNMOGIP has been unable to stop them or even record them sufficiently.

### 5.1.2 Mechanism

The parts of the mechanism that I will analyze here are: 1:Was there an interruption in flow of information, 2:Did this create uncertainty in outcome, 3:Uncertain bargaining positions and 4: Willingness to fight in future.

Has the India-Pakistan conflict showed signs of an information problem? To examine this mechanism we first need to define information. The study will use Centinyans definition of information gained trough fighting as military capabilities, bargaining positions and preferences (Centinyan,2002,646-647).

The information on military- and economic capabilities is on a face value quite clear and points to a superiority of India. Both countries have been secretive about their nuclear programs, but even here estimates favor India as the stronger party. Classically nuclear weapons would serve as deterrence against war. However there exists dilemma in this deterrence. By believing the other party will not retaliate any military action in fear of escalation to nuclear war, a party is able to pursue more risky tactics. However this could lead to the overestimation of the other tolerance for such actions and a nuclear confrontation could be the result (Geller,2005,91-99). Hence nuclear weapons could constitute an information

problem since parties can't be sure of the reaction of the other to any military provocation. The Kargil war serves as an example for a miscalculation by Pakistan based on nuclear deterrence. Pakistan provoked India by infiltrating across the LOC and expected India would seek de-escalation. There loomed a risk of nuclear war if India had responded with all out assault over LOC. Thankfully Indian airpower and US diplomacy was sufficient to deter Pakistan. Had India tried to invade Pakistan as a response the risk of nuclear war could have been real (Leng,2005,114-121;Khan,2005,166).

For both India and Pakistan their respective bargaining positions and preferences are quite clear to and should not pose an information problem in bargaining situations (Wirsing,1998,198-199;Mohan,2013,51). In general Pakistani goals in the rivalry with India has been gaining entirety of Kashmir and Jammu state. They see the accession of Kashmir to India as illegal (Cohen,2002,46). Further they believe that if India were to arrange the plebiscite as it promised, Kashmiris would vote for accession to Pakistan (Vaish,2011,18-20). Hence its goal has been throughout the conflict to pressure India into arranging plebiscite or manage to organize a revolt on the Indian power in Kashmir (Saideman,2005,218-219;Wirsing,1998, 63). Pakistan believes Kashmir to be an integral part of its Muslim identity and it can't fulfill its role as the home for "Indian Muslims" as long as Kashmir is a part of India. The Indian goal in the dispute has largely been the maintenance of status quo and integration of Kashmiris to rest of India (Vaish,2011,57-59). It also sees the Pakistani support for terrorism as one of the main tensions in the conflict (Misra,2007,516). In their view Kashmir is legally part of India and acceding it to Pakistan on basis of religion would go against Indian secular identity. India believes letting Kashmir join Pakistan or become independent would open the floodgates for other regions in India to demand independence on basis of religion (Paul,2005,9;Saideman,2005,215-217). India has been ready to recognize LOC as its the official border to Pakistan (Wirsing,1998,62)

A potential information problem could be the unclear asymmetry between India and Pakistan. India is stronger on all traditional sections measuring a nations capabilities such as military assets, GDP, and population size. However Pakistan has been able to challenge India by acquiring powerful allies such as the US, developing nuclear weapons and using asymmetrical warfare tactics such as supporting terrorism and the Kashmir insurgency. This has made the seemingly weaker party able keep up the rivalry and inflict costs on India. This could constitute a information problem where Pakistan overestimates its strength while India

underestimates the ability of Pakistan to challenge it (Paul,2005,12-19). The rational choice theory suggests that when there exists an information problems parties have incentives to overestimate their own capabilities and hence make miscalculations that could result in war (Fearon,1995,390-392).

Evidence pointing against an information problem is the existence of a hotline and informal communication channels between the Indian and Pakistani government allowing them to avoid misunderstandings. For example the Indian retaliation after 2008 Mumbai terrorist was averted since Pakistan managed to convince India of its innocence through careful use of indirect communication channels (Pavri,2009,480). However the evidence that Pakistan has repeatedly overestimated its chances for military success in its provocations on India, hint of an information problem. In the 1965 war Pakistan miscalculated India's willingness for war, their support among locals and India's unhesitancy in crossing LOC (Ganguly,1995,172-173).

The mechanism predicts that in presence of an information problem parties should perceive the outcome as uncertain. Both India and Pakistan have shown confidence in their ability to reach their goals unilaterally and neither has been ready to make significant concessions (Leng,2005,110-114;Vaish,2011,65;Cohen,2002,50-52). Both seem to believe they can force their solution on the other and have not adjusted their goals that remain incompatible, pointing towards uncertainty of outcome (Mohan,2013,55). India seems to believe that status quo, where it controls Kashmir, will prevail and some day Kashmir will become fully integrated with it, in a similar way as the Muslim majority Punjab (Cohen,2002,41). Pakistan predicts that the Muslim insurgency in Kashmir or its other asymmetrical tactics will cause enough costs on India, pressuring it into arranging the plebiscite. Alternatively the insurgency will pressure India into giving up Kashmir through negotiations (Wirsing,1998,63). Both seem to believe they can win the conflict. This supports the evidence for information problem where both overestimate chances of success based on faulty information of own or the others capabilities (Reiter,2003,29)

As discussed in the information problem section there is no evidence supporting uncertain bargaining positions since both parties are aware of the others goals. Parties have conducted multiple negotiations that have given many opportunities of discussing wide array of issues and to present preferences and positions. For example negotiations on the Siachen glacier

conflict gave both parties a clear picture of how incompatible the positions of the parties are, even on a issue over a glacier without strategic value (Wirsing,1998,195-214).

Have parties demonstrated willingness to fight in the future? This part of the mechanism is troublesome to measure since we remain unable to make predictions of future events. The most likely outcome predicted by some scholars is continued stalemate (Cohen,2002,56). This part of mechanism might be a sign of unfalsifiability of the theory.

### 5.1.3 Outcome

The predicted outcome of an information problem is that parties would be unlikely to accept negotiations and efforts to settle fail. When there exists a lack of information accepting negotiations would signal weakness. As we concluded in last section peacekeeping was unable to limit violence and hence we should observe no information problem, but evidence points toward the opposite. In the presence of an information problem parties should neither accept negotiations and efforts to settle should fail. During the conflict quite many negotiations have taken place, since the whole peace process has been mostly characterized by bilaterality. This has been evident especially after the Simla agreement stated that any conflict should be dealt with bilaterally (Misra,2007,508). There has been 28 rounds of negotiations covering multiple issues such as Kashmir, other territorial disputes, CBM, trade and communications, to name a few (Wirsing,1998,267-270). However most negotiations, especially those focusing on territorial issues, and all of the negotiations focusing on Kashmir have failed (Wirsing,1998,193-195). Only success has been in building communications and limiting weapons use misunderstanding, by confidence building measures(Misra,2007, 519) It would suggest these are issues both have low on their preference list, while territorial disputes are high.

## 5.2 Mutually Hurting Stalemate

I will analyze each part of the Mutually Hurting Stalemate mechanism separately based on empirical evidence. I will analyze both the potential effect of peacekeeping on each mechanism and whether the mechanism works as predicted.

### 5.2.1 Cause

Has peacekeeping been successful in limiting violence and hence preventing the formations of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) and have the costs and time pressure of the conflict been severe enough to cause a MHS? According to theory costs are causing a MHS when the parties perceive they can no longer bear them and are not based on any objective measures of casualties. This makes the determination of a MHS challenging. The time pressure is based on the sense of parties of a previous or impending catastrophe that compels them to find a way out. A third requirement for MHS is that there needs to be a sense of a “way out”, meaning a negotiated solution should be seen as better option to continued war. These factors make the identifying of MHS challenging since it can only lead to settlement when the cost of conflict outweigh those of a negotiated solution. The costs of conflict can be very high but if cost of settlement are higher and there does not exist a sense of a way out, the criteria for MHS are not fulfilled (Zartman,2000,227-234).

As concluded in the previous rational choice mechanism UNMOGIP has not been very successful in limiting violence. The conflict has resulted in many casualties due to ceasefire violations and the parties have fought four deadly wars. Only between 2001-2017 has there been 14 915 ceasefire violations. Ceasefire violations have been most prominent triggering of tensions between India and Pakistan (Jacob,2017,5-9,22). Hence the presence of UNMOGIP has not had a significant role in limiting hostilities and use of violence between parties (Shuchsmtih&White,2015,139-141)(Blixt,1994,30-31)(Wirsing,1998,192). One factor lessening the effect of UNMOGIP has been its limited and sometimes unclear mandate. It is only able to act in cooperation with parties and investigate violations brought to its attention by the parties. Hence there exist incentives for parties to selectively only bring violations by the other party to the attention of UNMOGIP (Blixt,1994,29,34,52). Further their capacity to investigate all of the violations brought to their attention has been limited due to insufficient manpower (Shucksmith&White,2015,139). After the Simla agreement UNMOGIP has been inhibited from fully carrying out its tasks (Blixt,1994,27-31,35-39).



Scholars characterize the conflict as a stalemate, but not necessarily a MHS (Cohen,2002,18). The conflict inflicts high costs for both parties but both parties have been able to bear them over the years (Vasquez,2005,75). The costs of the conflict could have prevented India from taking its place as a major regional power and caused significant suffering both to India and Kashmir people through terrorism and Indian violent suppression of the insurgency (Cohen,2002,32). Pakistani national identity and economic development has been crippled by the conflict. It has led to an oversized military budget due to arms races and a Islamic identity focusing on the two-nations theory (Cohen,2002,53-54). Both India and Pakistan spend huge amounts of money on their military budget while the living standard for majority of their citizens are lacking (Mohan,2013,12). However this might have been in the interests of the army of Pakistan enabling them to hold large political power and direct attention from many internal problems (Paul,2005,11). Social and economic development has been delayed and tension between different ethnic groups has been ignored by using an external threat to create unity (Cohen,2002,39). The domestic costs of making concessions needed for settlement could have inhibited the MHS mechanism from leading to a peaceful solution. Any politician on both the Indian and Pakistani side would quickly find significant opposition if it were to suggest the major concessions a settlement would require. Some politicians moving towards peace have even faced risk of assassination (Vasquez,2005,66;Diehl et al.,2005,52;Cohen,2002,35). In conclusion we can observe that UNMOGIP has largely failed to maintain ceasefire, the conflict has had high costs for both parties, but the cost of settlement is higher for the politicians than continued rivalry.

### 5.2.2 Mechanism

There has been several third party mediation attempts during the course of the conflict, most notably the UN in the beginning of the conflict resulting in the Karachi agreement and by the US and Soviet during the cold war in the Tashkent declaration ending the 1965 war (Narasimha,2009,10-11). Both India and Pakistan have sought to ally themselves with third parties, India primarily with the Soviet during the cold war and Pakistan with China and the US (Cohen,2002,44). This demonstrates that major power have interests in the conflict (Kapur,2005,134-137) Pakistani aim has been to make third parties pressure India into

negotiations while India has sought to deal with the conflict bilaterally (Vasquez,2005,72;Wirsing,1998,191). Bilateralism has been the trend after the Bangladesh war (Misra,2007,508). India seeks to avoid major power or international involvement, especially US involvement, since it seeks to balance Indian power in the region (Kapur,2005,149-154). The US has had interests in the conflict even after Simla but involves itself only when it deems necessary, for example when nuclear tensions rose during the Kargil war. Pakistan calculated that the risk of nuclear war could make US intervene and maybe force India to negotiate on Kashmir (Sridharan,2005,107). An urgency compelling third party mediation has been most evident during wars since both agreements ending the first and second Kashmir war were mediated by third parties (Diehl,et al,2005,46). However the peace process has been characterized by bilateralism. Most of the success achieved, the confidence building measures (CBM) in reducing nuclear tension, were negotiated bilaterally (Misra,2007,507,517-518;Hussain,2006,413). The mediation from third parties has been evident recently mostly when there exists a threat of nuclear war (Better World Campaign, 2018).

UNMOGIP has had the effect of keeping UN tied to the conflict although at a powerless position. One example of UN mediation was the Karachi agreement that brought the first Kashmir war to an end and led to the establishment of UNCIP that would evolve into UNMOGIP (Wirsing,1998,62-68) India seeks to deal bilaterally with Pakistan and resents UN involvement since it serves as a reminder of its promise for plebiscite (Wirsing,1998,75). The UN faces serious limitations in its power to act. It can't withdraw UNMOGIP since it would be seen as acting in favor of India. If it were to make UNMOGIP more functional by enlarging it, this would signal support for Pakistan (Wirsing,1998,193). Even though after the first India-Pakistan war UN has served a very limited role, UNMOGIP has still kept the UN bound to the conflict.

Did India and Pakistan harden bargaining positions? As concluded previously the conflict brings significant costs to both sides, but the costs associated with lightening bargaining positions could be even higher. Parties have during the whole conflict made very little concessions on significant issues. Some of the success made in negotiations are the Confidence Building Measures (CBM) building transport and people-to-people contacts but also conventional and nuclear weapon limitations in addition to a hotline between Islamabad and New Delhi for preventing misunderstandings. These measures have succeeded in building

some limited trust between parties (Misra,2007,515-518). During the 21st century there have been positive signs towards peace but these have often been followed by immediate setbacks either in form of terrorist attacks or increased violence along the LOC (Misra,2007,510). One example is the Lahore negotiations that achieved nuclear confidence building measures but were quickly followed by Kargil war. Just a few months after negotiations had achieved some significant success, Pakistan infiltrated over the LOC leading to war and thousands of casualties. After this India suffers from severe distrust of any peace attempts made by Pakistan (Khan,2005,173-174). However lately there are some signs that Pakistan begins to realize that its strategy to use asymmetrical warfare doesn't yield results and that it needs to take steps towards a peaceful settlement (Misra,2007,508). The impact and longevity of this is still undetermined. There are some signs that parties realize neither can overpower the other by force and there needs to be peaceful settlement (Misra,2007,524). Continued cross border firing along LOC and recent military and civilian deaths don't give reason to believe the parties have the will needed to move towards settlement (Council on foreign relations,2018)

Did parties show signs of waiting for settlement in hope for better terms in the future? There are some clues that India lives in a belief that over time Pakistan will collapse or simply abandon its Islamic identity by the influence of Indian "civilization" (Cohen,2002,55-56). After 70 years the hope of India has not materialized and Pakistan shows no signs of collapsing, surviving even the partition of Bangladesh. Alternatively India seems to hope that some day Pakistan would seek friendly relationship with it after realizing India is the stronger party and dominant force on the subcontinent (Cohen,2002,41). The inability of both parties to change their behavior from the use of realpolitik tactics and acts as evidence for no MHS (Vasquez,2005,73). The realpolitik thinking leads to view the conflict in a zero-sum setting and guiding to use tactics where parties unilaterally try to impose own solution on the other. So far neither has been able to overpower the other. The realpolitik thinking awards the politics of domestic hardliner making concessions impossible (Mohan,2013,52-56)

### 5.2.3 Outcome

According to the MHS mechanism we should see few mediation and negotiation attempts and their failure when the MHS is not present. So far the evidence doesn't clearly support the

existence of MHS and the evidence for no MHS are stronger. The conflict has seen many negotiation attempts succeeding to solve some of the issues on agenda, one good example being the Indus water crisis (Misra,2007,506). However the underlying issues, especially Kashmir have yielded very little progress (Hussain,2006,418). Lately India has refused to even put Kashmir on the agenda of negotiations until Pakistan is able to quell its support for insurgency in Kashmir and terrorism. This however is unlikely since asymmetric warfare has been the tactic of Pakistan for most of the 21st century to pressure India (Cohen,2002,45). Deep mistrust that have been institutionalized by the rivalry seems to indicate little hope for solving the underlying issues an finding settlement (Geller,2005,80-82).

# 6 Analysis

## 6.1 Rational choice

Was there an information problem in the India-Pakistan conflict, that inhibited peacemaking and was this information problem caused by peacekeeping? According to theory we should observe no evidence of an information problem since parties have been able to gain information through fighting. However the nuclear weapons and unclear asymmetry pose an information problems. Pakistan's overestimation of its own capabilities points towards the same. Neither party has been able to adjust their goals and bargaining positions to more compatible positions which is evidence of the existence of an information problem. Only evidence against an information problem is the existence of good communications. The prediction that fighting between parties should mean no information problem has not been supported. There are two possible explanations. One is that the mechanism and rational choice theory is flawed. The second is that the fighting has not been significant enough to alleviate information problem and peacekeeping has managed to limit it just sufficiently. In this case the prediction by Greig and Diehl of peacekeeping causing information problem, would find support. However we are unable to determine what the levels of violence would have been without the observer group and hence can't state unequivocally that peacekeeping was the cause of information problem. Neither does the theory specify the needed levels of fighting to eliminate the information problem. Rather the evidence on the types of information problems suggests that they are not affected by the peacekeeping group. For example the nuclear deterrence dilemma is unrelated to peacekeeping. As concluded the role of peacekeepers has not functioned as predicted by mechanism since they have not been able to limit fighting. This questions the theory of Greig and Diehl where peacekeeping is seen as having significant effect on the peacemaking process.

How well did the evidence examining mechanism function support or discredit an information problem? The results aren't fully conclusive, since some of the evidence support information problem some point against one. There existed evidence of an uncertain outcome since both parties stubbornly cling to their realist tactics and tired to impose a unilateral solution, pointing towards an information problem. Both seem to believe they can win the conflict. This supports the evidence for information problem where both overestimate chances of success based on faulty information of own or the others capabilities (Reiter,2003,29). This could indicate insufficient levels of fighting as predicted by theory or alternatively other factors such as domestic hardliners resisting concessions. Certain groups benefiting from the conflict and making solution to conflict unattractive could lead to uncertainty of outcome (Cohen,2002,38-39). When it comes to uncertain bargaining positions evidence seems to indicate that both have good knowledge of each other's goals and preferences, discrediting an information problem. Frequent negotiations point towards source of information on bargaining positions. The information problem seems more severe when it comes to military capabilities such as nuclear weapons and unclear asymmetry.

The mechanism predicts that in presence of an information problem parties should not accept negotiation out fear of signaling weakness to the other party. Further a settlement should be unlikely since both see fighting as a more attractive option. The results indicate that parties had plenty of negotiations during the conflict however very little success in moving closer to settlement. The outcome is only partly supporting the mechanism by predicting failure of settlement but failing to predict frequent occurrence of negotiations on various issues. It could serve as indication of the partial absence an information problem, driving parties to negotiate. The high costs of concessions revealed in negotiations could lead settlement attempts to fail.

The study found some support for existence of an information problem and some support against. It could be argued peacekeeping could have limited fighting just sufficiently to cause an information problem. However this remains unable to be verified. Most of evidence point toward dynamics unrelated to peacekeeping causing the information problem. Even here the main mechanism by which peacekeeping is supposed to cause information problem does not function since UNMOGIP has been unable to prevent wars between the parties and ceasefire violations have been frequent. Further the case was selected on a most typical basis. The

results supporting Greig and Diehl remain insufficient to for a typical case and can thus discredit some of the value in their theory. The results gained some support for the rational choice logic, since some of the mechanism supported the existence of an information problem. However the peacekeeping and peacemaking dilemma is discredited since the effect of UNMOGIP remained low on the behavior of conflict parties and levels of violence.

Greig and Diehl also predicted in their rational choice logic that failed peacekeeping might promote settlement. When peacekeeping has failed to keep the ceasefire the information problem should be alleviated and parties move towards settlement. UNMOGIP failed largely to keep the peace but there still was some evidence for information problem and not settlement suggesting the information problem mechanism working independently from peacekeeping.

## 6.2 Mutually Hurting Stalemate

Did the conflict fail to develop into a MHS because of the presence of UNMOGIP? Results are unable to flawlessly identify the presence of a MHS, since it can't be measured objectively but is based on how parties perceive the costs. The India Pakistan conflict clearly causes costs for both parties and UNMOGIP's ability to limit violence seems not to have been significant. The conflict has been described as highly costly but still not ripe for settlement (Cohen,2002,48,56:Khan,2005,176:Misra,2007, 507). Could UNMOGIP have limited violence just sufficiently to stop a MHS from forming? It would be speculative to predict a MHS would have formed without UNMOGIP. This makes the theory unable to be falsified questioning its validity. According to theory peacekeeping also prevents MHS by lessening time pressure caused by a fear of an impending or previous catastrophe. UNMOGIP was not able to prevent the 1971 war that presented a catastrophe for Pakistan or Kargil war from escalating close to nuclear confrontation. The third factor constituting a MHS is that parties need a sense of a way out, a possible negotiated settlement (Zartman,2000,299). There is no evidence of UNMOGIP having a negative effect on negotiation. Rather evidence suggests it having a positive effect towards settlement by tying the UN to the conflict and leading to UN mediation. The bilateral character of the peace process could have prevented UN from getting more involved. Cohen believes the parties would need the help of a third party to find a

negotiated settlement they themselves can't find due to mistrust (Cohen,2002,54). In conclusion UNMOGIP's negative effects on peacemaking did not work as predicted by Greig's and Diehl's theory since peacekeeping did not manage to limit violence.

The results indicate somewhat stronger support of the absence of a MHS. The mechanisms indicating support for presence of MHS where: high levels of hostility and violence, many mediation and negotiation attempts and mediation from third parties. The results also indicate the absence of MHS: absence settlement, no concessions in negotiations and parties hoping for better terms in future. The conflict could be seen close to a MHS but the costs of settlement are higher and hence peacemaking fails. There does not exist a sense of way out, a necessary condition for MHS to lead to settlement, according to Zartman. Even though the costs of the conflict are high, both India and Pakistan have been able to bear them and the rivalry has kept politicians in power (Diehl,et al.,2005,52,66:Wirsing,1998, 212). Greig's and Diehl's theory predicted that the main cause of peacekeeping preventing settlement would be through limiting violence. This part of the mechanism did not work as predicted, questioning the validity of Greig's and Diehl's theory.

The theory also predicts that in presence of no MHS we should observe very little third party mediation and limited negotiations. Results indicate some third party mediation coming both from major powers such as US and Soviet during cold war but also the UN. UNMOGIP could be seen as contributing to bringing UN mediation. However after 1972 conflict been characterized by bilateralism. Here the mechanism indicates support for a MHS since we observe mediation and but also bilateral negotiations, the negotiations being somewhat more frequent than mediation. This could imply high costs of the conflict again indicating peacekeeping failure to prevent them.

The mechanism also predicts that parties hardening bargaining positions, indicating a lack of MHS. Here the mechanism gains support since neither party has shown signs of giving concessions on core issues of the conflict. During the 21st century there are some small signs of relieving bargaining positions but it remains undetermined how genuine these are.

According to the mechanism, when no MHS present, parties wait for settlement in hopes of better terms in the future. This part of mechanism found some support since India has previously demonstrated belief that Pakistan would not be able to keep up the competition and



collapse. However recently this belief could be changing, when both parties have shown signs of recognizing a peace process as the way to solve differences (Misra,2007,524) The mechanism does not gain complete support either for or against but since no significant progress towards settlement has been reached, this would indicate mechanism supports Greig's and Diehl's theory of no MHS.

The outcome is again only partly supporting the mechanism. According to theory in presence of no MHS we should observe only few negotiations and mediation attempts and no settlement. However result indicate frequent attempts at negotiations but little success towards settlement. Third parties have mediated many of the agreement ending the wars. The results are unclear and mechanism works only partly in predicting failure of settlement. This would suggest high costs of conflict that push parties towards attempts to settle, but the even higher costs of concessions and no possibility of a negotiated settlement or sense of way out prevent any progress. In conclusion it seems peacekeeping did not prevent the parties from experiencing costs and time pressure of the conflict, but the lack of a sense of a way out, needed for pushing parties toward settlement prevents the peacemaking process from succeeding.

UNMOGIP has not been able to limit violence successfully and levels of hostility have remained high. Still most of the mechanisms show results supporting the absence of MHS are stronger. Hypothetically UNMOGIP could have limited violence just sufficiently to prevent a MHS, but this can't be measured accurately. Saying the conflict would have reached MHS without peacekeeping would be speculation. The lack of MHS might be due to other factors unrelated to peacekeeping. This study is thus not able to conclude causality between the peacekeeping force and failure of peacemaking process. Even if the result remained inconclusive there was indication for low effect of peacekeeping. The main mechanism of Greig's and Diehl's theory, according to which peacekeeping limits violence and prevents a MHS was not present. Greig's and Diehl's prospect of MHS is based on Zartmans notion of ripeness. For mutually hurting stalemate to lead to a settlement there needs to exist negotiated solution that is more favorable then continued conflict. Greig's and Diehl's theory does not take this function sufficiently into account when predicting that peacekeeping will prevent MHS. My study was conducted on a typical case, the lack of overreaching support questions the validity of the theory of peacekeeping-peacemaking dilemma.

## 7 Conclusions

Both the rational choice and mutually hurting stalemate mechanisms found some support for both for the existence of these states, but also some against, leaving the results somewhat inconclusive. The evidence supporting the existence of an information problem was somewhat stronger than those discrediting it. The existence of no MHS also found stronger supporting evidence. Still the effect of peacekeeping remained minimal and any causality of the effect remains unproven. The more likely reason for failure of peacemaking seems to be high domestic costs for making concessions. The validity of the theory can be questioned since evidence found remain insufficient for a typical case. The mechanisms of MHS and Rational Choice found some support meaning the logic behind them is not largely discredited. However the indication that peacekeeping might prevent peacemaking remains a presumption and highly unlikely.

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