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*“Spain’s lost generation”*

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Institutional study of  
employment training for unemployed youth

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## *Abstract*

This study contributes to the understanding of supply-side Training for Employment (TE) for the unemployed youth. The rates of youth unemployment in the European Unions have been matter of concern in the political agenda in the latest years, thus the European Employment Strategy has placed a particular emphasis in addressing this issue. As a result of the 2008 economic recession, the rates of youth unemployment increased significantly in most EU countries, but as the effects of the recession have lessened in most countries so it has youth unemployment. However, in countries like Spain, Europe's 5<sup>th</sup> largest economy, the rates of youth unemployment are far higher than the European media. Therefore, it is of crucial relevance to gain a better understanding of which factors might have an incidence in this phenomenon. This study has focused on the TE provision for the unemployed youth and the institutional determinants of its supply.

In order to investigate the institutional determinants of TE provision, this study focused on the subjective views of active social actors in neo-corporatists pacts. Through, the use of interviews and official document analysis, this research aims to answer how has the institutional environment influence the TE for the unemployed youth. The collected material was analyzed through a combination of Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional theory perspectives. The results of this paper indicate that the Spanish institutional environment is resilient to changes, despite the negative economic indicators and social turmoil. Furthermore, based on the VoC framework of analysis, it is argued that the Spanish regime of production and the social protection systems have failed to create adequate complementary processes to successfully implement the EES. Therefore, there is a discrepancy between the European Employment Strategy objectives and the national conditions, to make of the EU the most innovative economic area in the world.

*Key words:* Youth unemployment, training for employment, varieties of capitalism.

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## *List of Abbreviations*

ALMP	Active Labour Market Policy
CCOO	Workers' Commissions
CEOE	Spanish Confederation of Employer Organisations
CEPYME	Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
CES	Economic and Social Council
CME	Coordinated Market Economy
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
FORCEM	Employment Training Institute
FTFE	Tripartite Foundation for Employment Training
LME	Liberal Market
MME	Mixed Market Economy
NSQVET	The National System of Qualifications and Vocational Training
Plan FIP	Formation and Employability Plan
SME	Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
TE	Training for Employment
UGT	General Workers' Union
VET	Vocational Education and Training
VoC	Varieties of Capitalism

## *1. Introduction*

Eurofound's 2014 annual report revealed that for the first time since the advent of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the patterns of employment destruction and creation, within the European Union have converged. Accordingly, the EU finds itself on a slow path to employment recovery; nevertheless, the recovery patterns vary greatly between and within member states, thereby, threatening social cohesion and the future of the European project (Eurofound, 2015: 7-12). Though, as a direct consequence of the crisis, unemployment rates have risen in most member states, it should be highlighted that not all demographic groups have been evenly affected. Young Europeans have been disproportionately affected by the economic crisis, in most member states. The Spanish case is particularly worrisome; the EU's 5<sup>th</sup> largest economy has the second highest rate of youth unemployment, only after Greece, and its economic indicators remain stagnant (Bentolila *et al*, 2012c). Therefore, the current conditions pose a significant threat to a whole generation of young Spaniards and Europeans that are part of what has been labeled the 'lost generation' (ILO, 2012).

The future of the 'lost generation' is not only threatened in the short and medium term but potentially also into the longer term. Even as the effects of the economic recession might lessen in the short term, studies have shown that to enter the labor mark during a recession has negative long-term effects (Andersen *et al*, 2013; Orepoulos *et al*, 2012; Kahn, 2010). Those who enter the labor market during a recession a usually subject to long-term scarring effects, usually related to poor employment record and wage penalties (Dolado *et al*, 2013: 58; Bell & Blanchflower, 2010: 26-27).<sup>1</sup> Moreover, wage penalty effects are not restricted to those with low educational levels but it also affects those with higher levels of educational attainment. Traditionally education attainment has acted not only as shield against unemployment but also as means to secure and increase one's earnings, even during periods of economic recession. Hence, one of the effects of the last economic recession has been the increase of unemployment rates for all young people, disregarding of their level of educational attainment (ILO, 2012: 29). Thus, it

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<sup>1</sup> In regard to the effects of early unemployment on the future employment record of an individual, there are

is an increased concern for policy makers that one of adverse effects of the economic recession is to have removed or diminished the protective role that education has played against unemployment (Korpi & Tålin, 2009; Eurofound, 2012).

One significant matter of concern is young Europeans exclusion from labor market and society. As unemployment spells have increased in duration as a result of the economic crisis, the likelihood to be permanently disengaged from the labor market has increased, into what it has been labeled as: Not in Education, Employment, or Training (NEET) (Eurofound, 2012). Short unemployment spells or frictional unemployment are common phenomena among young workers, which are seen as an inevitable results from the transition from school to work and job search. Thus, they are not in itself a matter of deep political concern. Typically, in most European countries, the rates of youth unemployment tend to be higher than the one of other cohorts, which has been a cause of concern for the European Union since the 1980's (Scarpetta *et al*, 2010). Nevertheless, the last economic crisis has exacerbated the overall NEET indicators, in particular of young Europeans. Sectorial concentration of young workers partly helps to explain why they are overtly exposed to economic cycles; as young workers are over represented in: manufacturing, retail, hotel, restaurant, construction, social work and health (Eurofound, 2012). With the exception of health and social work, there has been a decline in the share of employment in the other sectors, in which young workers are over represented. As the unemployment spells for young workers have increased in duration, young workers are more likely to be discouraged from looking for new jobs. Thus, young workers are going back into education or permanently self-excluding themselves from the labor market (Knijn, 2012).

There is a great level of variation in the rates of youth unemployment across member states; nevertheless, it has been acknowledged the threat that it supposes for the future of the EU (Eurofound, 2012). Consequently, the EU has launched a series of measures and initiatives that aim to reduce youth unemployment and to increase their competitiveness. Both the European Commission and Council have strived to increase the efforts to foster the inclusion of the unemployed youth. The European Youth Pact adopted by the EU, in 2005, lies at the core of the EES, and the prevalence about the youth unemployment concern in the Agenda 2020 are indications of the EU commitment. Moreover, national Youth Guarantee's initiatives sponsored

by the EU have become the flagship programs in challenge against unemployment within the EU. The Youth Guarantee seeks to combat youth unemployment, inactivity and to improve school to work transitions (Cinally & Giugni, 2013).

It is important to signal that unemployment is a highly politicized concept; thus, it is subjected to contestation and change. Serrano *et al* (2012) suggests that the concept of unemployment has undergone a dramatic change in the past 30 years; however, the changes in its conceptualization and attributes have not challenged the underpinning elements of the liberal model of production. Previous views aimed to reconcile the contradictory premises of liberal model, political sovereignty and economic heteronomy, through mechanisms of social protection. However, changes associated with the political economy have challenged the mechanisms of protection sustainability; arguably, the result of these changes has brought the individual to the center of the model, replacing the previous collective actions responses (Miller & Rose, 1990). In the new model, self-management and personal responsibility are emphasized as the methods to achieve individual protection to be achieved through employment (Lope *et al*, 2013; Koch 2008, 268). Accordingly to the epistemic assumptions that surround the individual, *employability* becomes a core characteristic of the worker; furthermore, other terms such *flexicurity* and activation are now associated with it (Serrano *et al*, 2012: 42-44).

The new conceptualization of employment, which places the individual at the center of the model, is central to the European Employment Strategy (EES), now part of Europe 2020. The EES aims to transform the EU in the most dynamic economic space in the world, based on the knowledge-based economy. In the new knowledge and dynamic economy that is being promoted by the EU, unemployment is conceived to be the product of a mismatch of skills supplied and demanded. Given the constant and dynamic nature of the demanded skills, social protection cannot be achieved through passive measures; instead, active measures that procure the accumulation of skills are favored (Lope *et al*, 2013: 95). Therefore, individuals should seek to acquire the needed skills in order to respond to the changing nature of the labor market. On the hand, the state and other relevant social actors such employer and labor unions should enable the acquisition of such skills, which are required to maintain the desired levels of competitiveness.



The available skills in offer to be acquired by individuals in unemployment are the result of a complex system of concertation pacts between powerful social actors. The result of such negotiations of social pacts which guide the pattern of human capital accumulation within the national sphere are the subject of political tension and dispute between parties, often influenced by their perceived or actual political capital. Thus, individual's decisions to gain new knowledge is nested in a system of complex negotiation between social actor players, which in turn determine what knowledge should they access. Despite EU concern with future of its youth, the negotiation on the skills available for them to acquire and participate in the global market is decided at the national level, having large variation across countries despite benchmarking mechanism. In the case of Spain, the major social pacts have had a tripartite character, thus involving the major labor unions (UGT & CC.OO), major employer unions (CEOE & CEPYME) and the government. Therefore, it is important to ask what role do major social actors have in this model and its consequences for the field of Training for Employment (TE) given to this particular group, Spanish youth? As Schmid (2013) argues for a new conceptualization of markets, in which the new dynamics of change, characterized by transitions should empower the individual rather than subjugate him/her.

### ***Purpose and Research Question***

This research, aims to contribute to the emerging research field on TE for the unemployed youth in the EU. Moreover, it seeks to contribute to the overall understanding of modern capitalist societies and how they address particular societal issues, in particular the consequences of the 2008 economic crisis. This is particularly relevant as, while the economic crisis has severely affected the world economy, individual country responses both within and outside of the EU are diverse, and thus, should be examined. In order to do so, the research will ground its analysis on Institutional Theory and Varieties of Capitalism analytical body. There is a rich body of knowledge regarding the diverse forms of modern capitalism in the developed world; however, there are cases, which have attracted less attention, like Spain. Therefore, this research aims to explore and increase the stock of knowledge of the Spanish Variety of Capitalism and Mixed Market Economies, continuing on from the seminal work of (Molina and

Rhodes, 2007; Royo, 2007).

In order to achieve the aforementioned aims, this research will be guided by the following research questions:

*How do key institutional actors perceive of each other in regard to supplying TE for the unemployed youth?*

*How does TE, for the unemployed youth, work in the Spanish institutional context?*

## ***Limitations***

The study of the social world and in effect of modern capitalism is multifaceted and complex; therefore, the same social phenomena could be studied from diverse angles. In this section, the scope and limitations of this study will be presented.

This study will look into the supply side of TE, thus it excludes all of the diverse actors that operate merely on TE demand side and their subjective views. This research acknowledges the relevance that the views of those directly affected by TE have, but it takes a different approach. This research looks into the subjective views of the main social actors in neo-corporatist pacts in Spain at a national level, with the intention of understanding their role as social mediators (Avdagic *et al*, 2011). Therefore, the analysis of their roles as social negotiators and the institutional outcomes that are produced could be contrasted in future research with the social expressions of disagreement, like the *Indignados* movement. This study took place from January to May 2015, consequently limiting the study's scope. Therefore, it excludes the possible effects of a new legislation, regulating the provision of TE, enacted as this project was underway.

This research situates itself at the national level and it aims to understand how the national mechanism of negotiation and its outcomes are interrelated with both local and supranational spheres. The actors chosen and the level of study chosen are related to the cognitive lenses through which this social phenomena is examined; as all actors operate formally

in the same organizational field, embodied in the organizational structure of social neo-corporatist negotiation. Though other actors also have an influence in the aforementioned national organizational field, only the chosen actors do so formally. Furthermore, this research aims to explain how the interaction between the chosen and other influential actors affects the organizational field. Although, using the same cognitive lenses other organizational field such as the EU and Autonomous regions could have been examined, this research seeks to understand the tensions that might emerge between the different spheres, from a national perspective.

While relevant, this study does not evaluate TE and its perceived success or failure in itself, but rather aims to explore the subjective meaning given to it by the diverse actors. Therefore, the understanding of what role that has been given to TE, in the current institutional environment, has the potential to be used as the foundation to further examine its success of failure accordingly.

## *Outline*

This research paper consists of 6 chapters. In the first chapter the research aim and scope of the thesis is presented. In addition the first chapter presents the background in which this research has been developed, therefore, the study is related to previous research and current issues. In the second chapter, the analytical body that will be used to guide the analysis is presented, specifically institutional theory and VoC. Moreover, the use of the particular analytical body and its theoretical foundations are discussed. In the third chapter, the methodological process that guided this research is presented. First, it shows the research philosophical foundations and it argues for the choices that are made throughout the whole research process. The material collected is presented and how it will be analyzed. In the fourth chapter, the collected material is analytically discussed in relation to the theoretical framework presented in second chapter. In the final chapter, the conclusion from the findings is discussed and further research is proposed.

## *Previous Research and Background*

### *A brief history of Social pacts in Spain*

For a great part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the government has played a particularly strong role in socioeconomic regulation in Spain. The autocratic system of governance, during Franco's regime 1939-1978, excluded unions and other social actors from political participation, while providing practically employment security for life, for citizens based on a rigid Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) (Bentolila *et al*, 2008). The security of guaranteed employment throughout an individuals working life gave Franco's regime the necessary internal support to remain in place, despite the regime's civil right limitations and lacked the institutions of a modern welfare state (Mateos, 1997). Moreover, during Franco's protectionist regime the economy specialized in the creation of low value added goods, partly explained by the lack of external competition.<sup>2</sup> Further on the economy evolved into a mix of low value goods and services, with a focus on tourism, in order to attract the needed foreign capital. The democratic government that took over in 1979 inherited the Francoist sociopolitical institutions, which were facing a severe crisis, marked by unemployment, decreased competitiveness and inflation (Koch, 2006: 89).

In the post-Franco Spain a process of democratic stabilization took place, as the market was liberalized and moved closer towards its European counterparts. During this process, the forms of governance that were established opened new spaces for collective bargaining. Nevertheless, regulative frameworks, like the EPL, inherited from the Francoist regime remained in place. Spain was creating forms of governance, typical of a Fordist regime of accumulation, at a time when Fordist regimes of accumulation were facing a severe crisis in most developed countries (Rhodes, 2005; Koch, 2006). In order to maintain support for the democratization process and avoid social turmoil Francoist EPL's was maintained, as reaffirmed by the big social pacts that were signed in the early years of the democratization (Molina & Rhodes, 2011; Dubin & Hopkin, 2014).

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<sup>2</sup> See table 1 For a detailed view on workers productivity in Spain

The social pacts that were made in the early post-Franco era included diverse social actors that had been previously excluded from such agreements including the main labor unions CC.OO. & UGT.<sup>3</sup> In negotiating these pacts, the civil actors were arguably in a weaker position *vis-à-vis* the government after years of exclusion (Molina & Rhodes, 2011). Nevertheless, the tripartite pacts, (labor unions UGT, CC.OO; employer unions CEOE & CEPYME<sup>4</sup>; and, the government) *Pactos de la Moncloa* in 1977 and “Workers’ statute” *Ley del estatuto de los trabajadores* in 1980, were the most relevant pacts signed during this period. The pacts aimed to maintain economic control by reducing inflation and avoiding wage increases, while creating a collective bargaining system similar to those in other European nations (Molina & Miguélez, 2013; Koch, 2008). In particular, the mechanism adopted was designed to operate at different levels. Central/national agreements that governed wider socioeconomic policy would then be used as guidelines at the diverse sectoral and regional levels. However, a distinctive feature of the system was and still is the legally binding and encompassing character of the decisions made at the national level; therefore, they guide the processes at sectorial and regional levels (Koch, 2006).

The Spanish experience with tripartite collective bargaining is a recent phenomenon. Spain developed its collective bargaining later than most European countries, during the critical period of democratic transition. UGT and CC.OO emerged as the two main labor organization and have consolidated their roles as social interlocutors ever since; however, their articulation into the mechanism of collective bargaining has distinctive features, in comparison with other European models. Unions in Spain bargain for both members and non-members, which in turn has decreased the incentives for workers to affiliate (Dubin & Hopkin, 2014). Nevertheless, those traditionally working under permanent contracts lie at the core of unions’ constituency. Another feature that hinders the cohesive functioning of unions is the great deal of freedom that

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<sup>3</sup> CC. OO. *Comisiones obreras*, Workers Commissions; UGT *Unión General de Trabajadores*, Workers General Union.

<sup>4</sup> CEOE *Confederación Española de Organizaciones Industriales*, Spanish Confederation of Employer Organizations; CEPYME *Confederación Española de Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas* Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

firm work council enjoys in relation to the union leadership, which is not the case in countries like Germany or Sweden, denominated in the academic literature as Coordinated Market Economies; I will further discuss the implications of this label in the theory section. Thus, individual firm work councils have the freedom to operate against the union sectorial defined strategies, which creates a scenario of partially decentralized and overlapping collective bargaining (Wöfl & Mora-Sanguinetti, 2011: 16; CCOO, 2010). Based on a functionalist account, Molina & Rhodes (2011) suggest that unions had previously gained bargaining power as a result of their early participation in the concertation pacts. Although, labor unions received significant concession by the government during the democratic transition period, it did not translate into a wide expansion in union representation. As a result unions in Spain are considered to be weaker in the organizational structure and in terms of representation, in comparison with other European nations (Molina & Rhodes, 2011).

Prior to that, in the 1980's concertation pacts declined in most countries, a phenomenon that was partly attributed to the changes in the Fordist model of accumulation. As the European economies moved towards the internationalization of their national markets, which has fostered patterns of deregulation; large social pacts appeared to be contradictory with this tendency. Therefore, the revival of social concertation in the 1990's has attracted significant attention in academia (Avdagic, 2010; Rhodes, 2001; González & Luque, 2014). Arguably the need to conform to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) provided the necessary incentives for the diverse social actors to re-enact previous experiences of social pacts, as seen in the case of Spain (Royo, 2002). The current model of skill formation in Spain has its roots in the social pacts made in during this period. In second period of large social pacts in Europe dealt with a diverse set of areas such as: employment policies, labor market flexibility, new organizational frameworks of social Concertation.<sup>5</sup> As part of the negotiations, the Economic and Social Council (CES) was created in 1991, in Spain. The creation of the CES saw the development of an organizational framework that would guarantee the diverse actors participation in socioeconomic policy-making (Royo, 2002). However, no formal normative regulation was created to establish the precise roles and capabilities of the social actors involved in policy making at the national level (González &

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<sup>5</sup> See table 2 for a historical view on the different corporatist pacts made in Spain

Luque, 2014). Furthermore, the social actors involved<sup>6</sup> were also committed to improving the stock of skills and the systems of life-long learning, seen through the establishment of FORCEM<sup>7</sup> and the Plan FIP<sup>8</sup>. FORCEM aimed to improve training for those already employed, while the Plan FIP aimed at improving the likelihood for unemployed individuals to re-enter the labor market (Homs, 2008).

The 2008 economic crisis has presented a great challenge to the European and the Spanish socioeconomic model.<sup>9</sup> Royo (2014) argues that in the case of Spain, the longstanding effects of the crisis are better explained by its institutional arrangements than by the failure of the banking system or the country's adherence to the EMU<sup>10</sup>. In this paper I will further look into the institutional arrangements that characterize the Spanish and its relation with TE subsystem.

### *Labor market characteristics*

Since the transition to democracy, there have been several attempts to reform the Spanish socioeconomic model. As a result of the Spanish socioeconomic model functional institutions, a dualist labor market emerged. In the Spanish dual market those working in permanent contracts enjoy of high level of protection in comparison with those working under other types of contracts<sup>11</sup> (Wölfl & Mora-Sanguinetti, 2011; Bentolila *et al*, 2012b; Dolado *et al*, 2013) Dualism and other labor market characteristics have particularly affected the youth performance in the labor market. During the current economic recession youth unemployment was far higher

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<sup>6</sup> CC. OO. Workers Commissions; UGT, Workers General Union; CEOE's, Spanish Confederation of Employer Organizations; CEPYME Spanish Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

<sup>7</sup> FORCEM, *La Fundación para la Formación Continua*, Employment training Institute

<sup>8</sup> Plan FIP, *Plan de Formación e inserción laboral*, Formation and Employability Plan

<sup>9</sup> See No3. Summary of the social dialogues and unilateral reform in Spain since the advent of the economic crisis.

<sup>10</sup> Large part of the debate is centered on the impact on the international landscape to understand the impact of the crisis in Spain. Although, the international financial crisis has had a great deal of influence in the economic downturn in Spain, other authors have focused in the domestic institutional landscape as the key determinant factor to explain the longstanding effects of the crisis. Various explanations included: Seen the Spanish crisis as a byproduct of the failure to integrate into the global/EU market, as it eliminated exchange rate risk, hence investors accepted lowers yields. (Cameron, 2013; Bermeo & Pontusson, 2012; Armigeon & Baccaro, 2013). Resulting in massive capital inflows which in turn fuelled sector bubbles; real state bubble in Spain caused by this process. Another strand of research has sought to explain the crisis as a result of the mismanagement banks and other financial institutions, loss of competitiveness, failure to innovate, and bubble in the real state sector. (Ortega & Pascual-Ramsay, 2013; Royo, 2013; Royo 2014; Quaglia & Royo, 2013; Molinas, 2013; Barrón, 2013).

<sup>11</sup> See table No.4 for an summary of legal measures on permanent and temporary contracts in Spain, 1980-2006

than the median for other age groups (22% youth unemployment, compared to 11% for other age groups) (Bentolila, 2011).

Strong employment protection is still part of the legacy of the Franco era. It was not until 1980's that temporary contracts were introduced into the Spanish labor market, in what was planned to be only a temporary measure (Bentolila *et al*, 2012b). As a result of unsuccessful changes to the economic model, the labor market has become increasingly polarized, with a high level of specialization in non-routine tasks at the end of the wage distribution, in areas such as construction and tourism (Anghel *et al*, 2014).

Youth employment in Spain is characterized by involuntary part-time and temporal employment. It also does not act as a stepping-stone into more secure forms of employment; Spain has one of the lowest rates of transition between temporary to permanent employment in the EU (García *et al*, 2014). In the Spanish case, part-time and temporary employment carries a wage penalty, contrasting other EU countries (Fernández & Rodríguez, 2011). In addition, employees working under temporary contracts are less likely to receive on the job training, so they can improve their employability and productivity (Cabrales *et al*, 2014). As a result of the gap between permanent and temporary contracts, employers lack the incentives to convert unstable contracts into stable ones, which in turn increases the turnover of employees (Bentolila *et al*, 2012a). In this context, employers have fewer incentives to provide on the job training for the temporary employees, as they are not guaranteed to directly benefit from workers' increased productivity (Cabrales *et al*, 2014). In consequence, the aforementioned characteristics associated with temporary employment have a detrimental impact on the overall stock of skills available in the labor market. Moreover, the institutional mismatch has had in consequence a drop in the wage premium for educated people, which have significantly deterred levels of human capital accumulation at the top (Felgueroso *et al*, 2011a).

Another characteristic feature of the labor market is the high degree of qualifications mismatch. Spain has one of the highest rates of skills mismatch in the EU; thus the process of skills accumulation does not act as a guarantor to attain a certain level of employment. A large number of individuals that have invested to obtain a tertiary level of education are currently



working in jobs most suitable for individuals with an upper-secondary level of education. The spillover effect also means that people with an upper-secondary level of education are in turn working in jobs below their level of qualification (Dolado *et al*, 2013).

There are also deficiencies on the supply side of qualifications. Spain has one of highest school dropout rates in the EU and shares with the UK the largest rates of youth in NEET (Dolado *et al*, 2013) It is not only the high rates of academic desertion that have shaped the supply side of skills; it is also the lack of Vocational Training (VoT) (Planas, 2005)<sup>12</sup>. Therefore, there is a significant gap between those with tertiary education and those that only finished the basic level of compulsory education. In other countries, like Germany and the Netherlands, there is a highly developed system of vocational training that covers the gap between compulsory and tertiary education (Bentolila, 2011). Thus, the introduction of a developed system of VoT would be a significant step forward, narrowing the current skill gap thus facilitating the likelihood of change in the productive model.<sup>13</sup> Accordingly, it would facilitate an increase in labor productivity and allow greater levels of specialization in the creation of high value added goods (Andrés & Doménech, 2010; Lope *et al*, 2010; Bentolila, 2011; Homs, 2008).

Employment has become increasingly polarized in Spain in comparison to other EU countries, which is particularly worrisome. The labor market has taken the shape of an hourglass, in which opportunities are being created at the top and bottom end of the market, while the distribution of employment in areas related to middle income are being destroyed (Anghel *et al*, 2014) In addition, the poor housing rental market has also hindered geographical mobility of individuals, preventing them from taking advantage of better employment opportunities (Ramos *et al*, 2010; Bentila *et al* 2012b). Finally, the public employment service at both the national and autonomic regional level has not acted as an efficient mediator in the employment procurement process (Alujas, 2009; Suárez *et al*, 2012).

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<sup>12</sup> See Table No5. For a comparison between the levels of educational attainment in Spain and other EU countries

<sup>13</sup> See Figure No2. The figure shows the percentage of jobs requiring a certain level of qualification in the EU. It is possible to observe that in the Spanish case there a high level of jobs that do not required high educational level, in comparison with major European economies.

## *Labor market policies*

Spanish labor market policies are highly influenced by the method of open coordination, which aims to identify the best practices among EU members, so that these can be adopted by all of its members. Labor market policies are also directly influenced by the European Employment Strategy (EES), which is part of Europe 2020. Europe 2020's agenda aims to make Europe an area characterized by the growth of high innovation, high job quality and to address issues of social inclusion and inequalities (European Commission, 2015). Furthermore both the EU and the OECD have promoted a shift towards more active labor market policies (ALMP) than in the past, in which citizenship is closely related to active labor market participation (Serrano *et al*, 2012). Among other measures the OECD has suggested decentralizing the systems of collective bargaining to the firm level, relaxing restrictions on employment contracts and allowing downward flexibility in wage levels (Ashiaghor, 2005). The key areas of ALMP intervention are: job training, job rotation and job sharing, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job creation, and, start-up incentives (Escudero, 2014).

In most developed countries expenditures on ALMP has continuously increased since the 1990's, which has also been the case for Spain. However, Spain is still far behind the countries most committed to ALMP in Europe (García, 2007; Cueto *et al*, 2010). In the case of Spain, training policies constitute the main share of the expenditure accounting for 39% in 2010. This expenditure is also shared in a number of other areas including employment incentives 22,2%, direct job creation 16,8%, supported employment 15,7%, start-up incentives 6,2%, meanwhile the share for job rotation schemes is negligible (Escudero, 2014).

Employment policy elaboration, administration and negotiation are influenced by three different levels of organizational fields, including the European, national, and autonomous communities. In the case of TE in Spain the system is influenced by the Europe 2020 agenda, which subsequently provides the framework for the national employment plans. Carvajal (2013) suggests that each level has its own role; the EU level facilitates the exchanges of information and constructs the epistemological foundations on which policy is grounded. The central administration designs and approves the regulative guidelines and budget as well as defines the

national catalogue of professional qualifications<sup>14</sup>. Finally, at the autonomous regional level, administrations are responsible for the direct contact with the training centers and also have the responsibility to approve the curriculum and courses given by them.

Historically it was not until 1986, when Spain became a member of the EU that the TE for the unemployed began. It arguably was developed by EU initiative. As Spain became part of the EU, it gained access to the European Social Funds, which have partly financed the TE subsystem until today (Homs, 2008). In order to provide the necessary TE to the unemployed population, the EU promoted the creation of Educational Workshops and Trade Schools, which rapidly expanded all over the country (García, 2007; Homs, 2008).

Originally the provision of TE for both unemployed and employed groups was through separate systems, though with a similar source of financing. In the case of those employed, a share of financing came from the European Social Fund and the rest came from a tax collected directly from the pay role. Thus both employees and employers co-financed the system (Carvajal, 2014; Homs, 2008; FTFE, 2105a) The resources collected from the tax and the European Social Fund was administrated by FORCEM<sup>15</sup>, and organizational mechanism formed by unions, employers and the state to promote TE. In 2004 FORCEM was transformed into the Tripartite Foundation for Employment Training (FTFE), and through this the government gained considerable control over the funds and its allocations, to the detriment of labor and employers associations (Ibid). The organizational changes also included the merger of both TE for unemployed and employed individuals under the same system, and the same source of financing. Thus employers and employees now co-finance TE for the unemployed.<sup>16</sup> Under the current system, the TE made by firms for their employees, the TE for both employed and unemployed, apprenticeships and complementary actions are grouped under the same subsystem (Planas, 2005).

The FTFE decentralized the approval and allocation of the TE to the autonomous level. The regional occupational councils, linked to the FTFE, now administrate the provision and

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<sup>14</sup> NSQVET The National System of Qualifications and Vocational Training

<sup>15</sup> FORCEM Fundación para la formación continua *Continuous*

<sup>16</sup> See Figure No1. For a description of the TE subsystem configuration

regulation of TE, managing training centers and the kind of training that is being provided. The TE provision is made by a wide range of organizations, which includes social actors like UGT, CCOO, CEOE and CEPYME, but also other civil society organizations like NGO's, alongside a plethora of private providers (Serrano *et al*, 2012; Carvajal, 2014). Thus, the role UGT, CC.OO, CEOE and CEPYME is not merely limited to negotiation and planning but it also includes TE direct provision. When acting as direct providers, negotiating social actors also directly benefit economically from the TE provision, as all providers are economically compensated. Finally, the system is based on two-axis decentralization and the participation of civil society. The training provided has to be part of the NSQVET (Homs, 2008); thus the NSQVET operates as a guiding framework for the different administrations (Planas, 2005).

The diverse strategies promoted at the European level, and then adapted into the national employment are interconnected with the supply-side of TE<sup>17</sup>. The Youth Guarantee Programs use the previously described TE formation system to enhance young people employability. In the case of the youth guarantee program, the employment services should provide a coach or counselor to its participants, so that they can create an action plan, and subsequently choose appropriate training (Malo & Cueto, 2014). Thus, registered unemployed individuals can get access to the training supplied by the diverse training centers that the regional councils have designated. This can be done through the different programs available to improve people's employability, like the PIF or the youth guarantee.

There has been some criticism to the current organizational system. At the regional level, different councils manage TE and VoT, which have not lead to its proper articulation between the two types of training; thus, the training system is currently fragmented (Homs, 2008). Arguably, the lack of coordination might generate additional costs that could be possibly avoided. Moreover, it has been argued that the training provided should relate or guided by the actual needs of the labor market but it rather obeys to the capability of the formation centers to deliver. Therefore, the training courses that require the lesser investments by formation centers

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<sup>17</sup> See Figure No3. This figures shows how the diverse national policies are articulated in both the supply and demand side of the labor market

have been given priority, in detriment of the labor market needs (Carvajal, 2014). Finally, there is an arguable systematic lack of data and adequate evaluations in most cases (Cueto *et al*, 2010).

According to the FTFE, courses in the fields of marketing, management, and, technology and communication are the ones that have attracted the most participants within the TE (2014). One significant feature of the TE for the unemployed is that it does not offer the possibility to take training in an online basis only; it demands that the participants should either be present at times, or to used other means like communication via phones. Other fields that are also in offer in the TE include: Socio cultural services, agriculture, security and the environment, transport, tourism and restaurants, and health.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> See table No6. For a view of the main courses by area that are being supplied

## *2.Theory: Institutional theoretical perspectives.*

This chapter outlines the analytical foundations that this thesis draws upon. In the first section, institutional theory underpinning analytical features and core assumptions are presented. The second part introduces Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) analytical features and its relevance for the Spanish case. In the last section the chosen theoretical approaches are discussed.

### *Overview*

During the past three decades, institutional theory has gained relevance as a suitable analytical perspective in order to understand the different features of capitalist economies. The increased popularity of institutional analysis came from the field of economics, as fundamentally held assumptions failed to capture the changes occurring in the world. The idea long held by economists, that national development was fundamentally a process of capital stock accumulation, has been challenged by different approaches that favor the fundamental role that institutions have in the process (North, 1990; Hoff & Stiglitz, 2001: 389) However, from an analytical and conceptual perspective, the richness brought by the multiple and diverse institutional analyses have become a double-edged sword; as the theoretical conceptual richness has been combined with an analytical fragmentation. Furthermore, institutional approach popularity, grounded on the aforementioned assumptions, has encouraged its expansion towards diverse fields of analysis without previous analytical considerations. The desire to have an all-encompassing cognitive approach that would help to elucidate larger segments of the social world has reshaped the fundamental definition of institutions (Portes, 2010: 49). As a result, the institutional analysis explanatory mechanism has been at times hampered by its lack of conceptual clarity. Therefore, this chapter aims to account for the choices of the institutional theoretical framework as the cognitive lens that will guide this research, and, secondly, the choice of Varieties of Capitalism to better understand the relation between skill formation and the labor market.

## *What is an institution?*

There is a lack of consensus around the concept of institutions, which itself has been continuously nurtured by diverse analytical approaches grounded on it, thus, broadening its conceptual repertoire. There are significantly encompassing definitions such as North's (1990:3) in which institutions are defined as 'any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction'. As Portes (2006: 234) suggests, in the spirit of expanding the realm of institutional analysis, its analytical value might have been compromised, therefore, it is needed to analytically and conceptually define the capacity and limits of institutions. Currently, the key features that constitute the institutional repertoire, that are shared by most of the different approaches include: normative, cognitive and regulative activities that underlie social relations and behavior, thus, providing a common ground to stabilize the aforementioned social relations (Amenta & Ramsey, 2010: 16; Scott 2008: 48). Most institutional analyses are based on the three fundamental pillars, mentioned above, though the degree of emphasis on each varies accordingly. Based on its constitutive elements, normative and regulative frameworks have been analytically developed, thus, becoming the most salient approaches in institutionalism. All three institutional fundamental features have in common their need for a common agreement or acceptance between different actors; furthermore, these agreements only exist in as much as the different actors interact with each other. The existence of institutions is conditioned by social interactions and the subjective assignation of meaning and its respective acceptance (Frödin, 2012: 276).

Regulative based approaches emphasize the role that formal and informal regulative elements play in defining or constraining to some degree the interactions between different actors, thus they constitute the rules of the game. A significant feature of this approach is that the regulative elements tend to be clearly defined or even expressively codified, which in turn facilitates its surveillance and enactment (North, 1990: 3). Normative approaches conceive the institutional foundation to be grounded on the repertoire of norms and values shared by the different actors. From this perspective, the political and economical behavior of actors cannot be explained as being guided by a profit-maximizer or rational choice underpinning logic. Rather, their behavior is best understood as being guided by the normative socio-cultural environment in

which they are embedded (Granovetter, 1985). Nevertheless, normative approaches do not neglect the influence that self-interest has on an actor's behavior, however the actor's interest is also influenced by identities they embody. Cultural-cognitive approaches focus on the beliefs that constitute part of the actor's repertoire at different levels, which operates at two different levels: one that could be understood as the series of beliefs that are active in our everyday life and guide actors' actions; these are constantly adaptable. The second level is constituted by the deep-rooted cultural beliefs that are not necessarily activated in a noticeable and regular manner, but they nevertheless constitute the deeper and fundamental guiding tools (Scott, 2010: 7). Cognitive and cultural beliefs are conceptually different, the former refers to the templates guiding actors' decisions; the latter refers to symbolic representation that they imply, and are commonly shared and constructed.

The three pillars are not exclusive and operate on diverse analytical levels of abstraction; furthermore, institutional analyses have conceptualized them in a manner that they can be gathered in clusters according to their area of influence. Thus, organizations that operate in certain institutionalized environments are clustered in organizational fields that in turn might operate at diverse analytical levels; thus allowing bridge conceptual analyses (Scott, 2010: 7-8).

### ***Stability and institutional change in Institutional approaches***

Underpinned by the aforementioned institutional pillars, three distinct approaches have emerged and gained relevance in the New Institutional field: Historical (*HI*), Sociological (*SI*) and Rational Choice (*RI*)(Hall & Taylor, 1996).

Historical Institutionalism argues that current and future decisions and choices are conditioned by past decisions; thus, early decisions play a mayor role in shaping the institutional field. Historical institutionalism stresses institutional continuity over change, which is seen as the result of specific critical junctions in time and space; therefore, large periods of stability coexist with punctual influential periods of change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010:6). Continuity, in this approach, is conceptualized and empirically analyzed as patterns of path dependency (Hall &



Taylor, 1996: 942). Sociological institutionalism, focuses on the normative and generally informal set of conventions that regulate social interaction, thus, the actions and behavior of actors are embedded in the normative structure. Furthermore, institutional analyses are influenced by the analytical concept of isomorphism. Isomorphism is understood as the tendency of actors to replicate or reproduce the same institutional logic across different organizational fields, even though, they might not be efficient for the specific organizational field. The emphasis on the logic of institutional reproduction leaves negligible space for the analytical understanding of endogenous change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 5; Scott, 2010: 9; Hall & Taylor, 1996: 946). Rational choice institutionalism focuses its attention at the instrumental capabilities that institutions have; thus, individual and collective actions are engaged and guided by a profit maximizer underpinning logic (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 942). Each one of the actors' actions is characterized as being their best response given the organizational field situation; therefore, exogenous actors and factors are responsible for institutional change (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010: 6).

### ***Framework for institutional analysis, Varieties of Capitalism (VoC).***

Underpinned by the aforementioned features of institutional analysis, VoC has emerged as one of the most influential analytical bodies to explain the diverse arrangements in modern capitalist societies, along with Regulation theory and Employment regimes. One of VoC's distinctive features is its integrated view of the diverse institutional arrangements that characterize the national political economy, which is composed of: Industrial relations, financial system, systems skill formation and training, ne--corporate governance, and social policy regimes (Hall & Soskice, 2001). VoC's distinctive capability to capture cross-national diversity in organizational arrangements is main reason to been used in this study (Royo, 2014). The VoC challenges the assumption that the arrangement of national institutions is converging into a single or isomorphic model, due to the pressure of political and economical international processes (Iversen, 2007). Instead, the VoC originally proposes two opposite ideal models of capitalism institutional organization, Coordinated Market Economies (CME) and Liberal Market (LME) economies, each one of them guided by its own underpinning logic.

Based on the idea of institutional complementarities, arrangements made in one organizational field would enhance results achieved in others, according to their guiding logics (Hall & Thelen 2009: 8; Hancké *et al*, 2007). Thus, the institutional complementarities confer each ideal model a comparative institutional advantage, which are intrinsically intertwined and dependent on each other. In this way, each institutional cluster equips firms with advantages to engage in particular kinds of economic activities (Hall & Soskice 2001: 32). However, in mixed models, it appears to be more than a single underpinning logic, given their high degree of fragmentation (Molina & Rhodes, 2007).<sup>19</sup>

VoC conceptual framework places firms at the core of its analysis, which are understood, partly, as rational actors guided by a rationalist functionalist underpinning logic. However, institutions in this view are not conceived merely, as constraints for the rationalist guided behavior of the actors, but as also as resources that enable action to collective dilemmas (Hall & Thelen, 2009: 10). Moreover, the environment in which firms navigate is constituted by multiple institutions that at times might find themselves cluster within one another, and occasionally operate as substitutes. Actors' behavior is thus conditioned not by one but by multiple institutions that operate in different organizational fields, which might take the form of norms, regulation or cognitive templates (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 23-36). Nevertheless, actors' behavior is not seen from a merely deterministic perspective, as actors might chose to defect from institutionally agreed frameworks (Hall & Thelen, 2009: 10).

Institutional stability and change is underpinned by the dependent ontological existence of institutions and a non-deterministic view of actors. Though firms are the primary unit of analysis in the VoC literature, other actors such as labor and employer unions or the government are considered equally relevant in sustaining or changing institutions. The interaction between these actors is seen as part of a dynamic process that is guided by a rationalist underpinning logic. The desire is to improve one's position relays on active rather than passive actions. Consequently the assumption that stability is grounded on the idea of institutional inertia is challenged; instead institutional stability is seen as to be dependent on its functional capability to

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<sup>19</sup> See table No.7

serve the diverse interests of actors involved (Hall & Thelen, 2009: 11). However, to the extent that a specific institution is or stops being of functional interest for an actor, involves a diverse series of complex factors and calculations. On the other hand, patterns of stability are reinforced by the institutional interaction, as the comparative advantages are nested not in one but in the intertwined relation between different institutions. In consequence, a rationalist account of institutional change would need other complementary institutions to be also changed, as part of intertwined and complex process (Hall & Thelen, 2009: 12).

The establishment of new institutions is complex, given its rationalist guided actor perspective. Therefore, social actors are unlikely to activate or bring to existence a new institution that has not yet proved its resource capacity, even in the potential case of a Pareto-improving scenario. Thus, uncertainty becomes the underpinning feature of institutional stability; in such scenarios, powerful external actors play a crucial role affecting both the stability and prospects of change, given their capacity to influence a given organizational field despite the uncertainty that it might cause for less powerful actors embedded in it (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 10-12).

### *VoC ideal models and the skill nexus*

The ideal models of coordination at each end of the analytically devised spectrum are LME and CME. Within each model's underlying logic, there are a series of intertwined institutional relations in which skill formation is embedded, thus welfare state is complementary to the production regimes (Huber & Stephens, 2001: 119; Rhodes, 2005). Furthermore, in VoC not only firms but also individuals are recognized as rationalist actors; thus individual's skill investment is not only dependent on the skill-training that is being offered but also on the complex rational and cognitive process of each individual. Therefore, it is important to assess the crucial link between skill formation and protection in the different systems (Estevez-Abe *et al*, 2001: 150). Skills investment are intertwined and protected by other institutions such as: employment protection, unemployment protection and wage protection.<sup>20</sup> As a result three kinds of skills are produced. Each one is different in terms of portability: Firm specific skills, industry

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<sup>20</sup> See Table No. 8

specific skills, and general skills (Estevez-Abe *et al*, 2001: 150). However, all production systems include the three different sets of skills, though they differ in their skill profiles.

In LME the main set of relationships between actors takes place at the market, thus there is also a level of coordination. Intra firm coordination within the hierarchy and inter firm relations in the form of formalized contracts characterize the methods of coordination. Furthermore, LME have large and highly developed stock markets in which investor's decision-making is characterized by short term calculations; thus market coordination is continuous and dynamic in nature. LME are associated with general skills systems; thus there are high incentives to obtain a tertiary education level and pervasive incentives to accumulate skills for those academically weak, in the lack of a vocational system. As a result, LME labor markets are highly segmented with high rewards at the top end (Estevez-Abe *et al*, 2001:157) The LME model confers a comparative advantage in quick changes which is related to sectors that evolve around radical innovation, thus short-term investment allows a great deal of flexibility for firms and investors.

In CME there is a high degree of coordination that is made outside of the market via different institutional commitments, which in turn allow a longer-term perspective in terms of investments (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 8). The character of long-term investments is grounded on the support of diverse groups including workers; however, this system should not be seen as the result of workers' high bargaining power, as employers also have a vested interest on this system (Thelen, 2012: 138). CME is associated with Industry and firm specific skills that are largely created through vocational training, thus it requires an extensive commitment on both the employers and employees part. Moreover, it requires the recognition and coordination by different firms in the same sector to maintain a high degree of inter firm trust. Therefore, there are incentives to develop different sets of skills through both vocational and tertiary training, that are secure because of both unemployment protection and wide skills recognition (Estevez-Abe *et al*, 2001:157). The CME model confers advantages in sectors where investments are incremental and related to the development or enhancement of existent products. Traditionally in CME's social actors such as labor unions and employer confederations play a key role in corporate governance and diverse spheres of policy making.

## *VoC and the Spanish case*

The original formulation of VoC has been criticized as it failed to incorporate the institutional arrangements of diverse countries such as Spain and others in the Mediterranean (Royo, 2007). Nevertheless, there have been some attempts to develop a conceptual framework that addresses this issue, though it is still in its infancy.

According to Molina and Rhodes (2007), Spain can be described as a Mix Market Economy (MME) in which coordination remains unstable and problematic. In a MME there is a mix of both market and non-market coordination which coexists in an unstable pattern. Social actors in MME's, such as labor unions and employer confederations, are generally stronger than in LME's, which explains the degree of concertation outside of the market; however, the nature and forms of negotiation are different than in CME's, as key social actors in MME's are weaker than in CME's. In MME's, the state plays a pivotal role in the forms of political Concertation, in which the other social actors that participate in neo-corporate governance negotiations, are engaged in a diametrically weaker position *vis-à-vis* the government. Unlike in the traditional CME's model, employers and unions lack the political capital to force the government into concertation pacts.

The concertation mechanisms tend to be less formalized in MME's than in CME's and are generally only activated by the government. Thus, the participation of unions and employers is instrumental, when invited, as their representativeness or role as interlocutors is related to their active participation in the diverse concertation mechanism. Another particular feature of Concertation in MME's is its fragmentation, which usually takes place in diverse fields such as: big and small firms, public and private; and, territorial divides (González & Luque, 2014; Dubin & Hopkin, 2014). Allegedly the greater fragmentation is associated with coordination issues, given the increased plurality of interests; thus the government has played a crucial role as both regulator and producer of goods (Molina & Rhodes, 2007: 225).

In order to build large class-coalitions, which would facilitate the capability to make

long-term investments, one needs a proper articulation of social interlocutors, unions and confederations, across different business sectors and at the different levels of representation. In the case of MME's, the fragmentation and loose articulation of unions and confederations has hindered the development of a framework that would facilitate long-term investments. Furthermore, unions and confederations' failure to develop their representativeness has limited their capability to influence government decision-making, as key social players in corporate negotiations. Likewise, the use of state regulation as means of coordination has also hindered the expansion of unions and confederations' capabilities. Moreover, the lack of consistent mechanisms of negotiation in addition to the aforementioned issues has inhibited the creation of complementarities between the production regime and the social protection system (Royo, 2014; Molina & Rhodes, 2007).

Firms in MME's are less likely to engage in high technological activities in the absence of framework that provides the necessary skills and security for the long-term investments required in such endeavor. Instead, firms in MME's, generally SME's are more likely to engage in activities in which they would be able to use price as their comparative advantage to secure short-term gains. Moreover, firms are less likely to invest in their employees' skills in the absence of a guarantee that would protect such investments, like the mechanisms in CME's. Instead of facilitating the solution of collective dilemmas, the mechanisms of concertation in MME's serve the investments in political power and clientelism (Royo, 2014; Molina & Rhodes, 2007).

### *3. Methodology*

#### *Overview*

In this chapter, an overview of the research design, methodology and the chosen methods employed in this paper is presented. In the first section, knowledge claims on which the study is grounded are discussed. Second, the research strategies employed in the forms of study design and data collection methods are presented. Finally the study limitations are presented and choices made are briefly discussed.

#### *Knowledge claims*

Bryman (2012: 619) argues against the belief that research methods are clustered within a series of ontological and epistemological assumptions; in contrast, he argues for a view that sees methods as ‘Free-floating’. Though, this research does not align itself with a deterministic view on the correlation between ontological and epistemological assumptions, it acknowledges the influence that they have on the researcher’s cognitive perspectives. Thus, ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinned the overall researcher choices.

The chosen cognitive framework to guide this study focuses on institutions, which are viewed as being ontologically dependent on the interactions of social actors; thus, institutions lack an inherent independent nature. Despite the dependent and subjective ontological nature of institutions, institutional outcomes have independent consequences that affect all social actors differently (Frödin, 2012: 276). Moreover, the epistemological assumption is in line with a critical realist view, which considers certain elements of the social world to be unobservable and still effecting influence over the observable elements (Jackson, 2010: 11). Therefore, social world ontology is not only dependent but also stratified in different layers (Sayer, 2000: 11). Furthermore, based on the above-mentioned stratified ontology, the social world is to be understood as an open system. In open systems, multiple variables can have an effect on each other or activate accordingly to the context in which they are embedded; thus, the context plays a fundamental role in activating observable and unobservable variables. Furthermore, causality

cannot be understood on a one-to-one basis but rather as multiple and complex patterns, which in turn limit the capability to generate general laws (Sayer, 2000: 14).

### *Research strategies, methodology and research design*

As mentioned above, the aim of this research is to explore the influence that the Spanish institutional environment has on TE. Therefore, the main goal of the design and research strategy is to enable an in-depth exploration and better understanding of the social phenomenon under scrutiny. The aim of the study and the underpinning knowledge claims that guide it, direct it towards a method that focuses on depth rather than breadth.

The strategy selected for this study is based on a case study design. Case studies require the detailed and in detail examination of a specific single case, thus it aims to cover as many features as possible (Bryman, 2012: 66). Moreover, case studies are sensitive to the context in which the social phenomenon is embedded, which in turn might hinder the possibility to make generalizations. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, the understanding of social reality is underpinned by a stratified and dependent ontology; in consequence, the study of social phenomena should be sensitive to the diverse contextual dynamics that might activate both observable and unobservable variables. Therefore, it is relevant as case studies seek to examine both the context and the specific social phenomenon. For the purpose of this study the case will allow the close and in-depth examination of the different variables that might have an effect on the TE institutional environment. The process of inquiry would be sensitive to the particularities of the case and its main features such as: context, key actors actions and social interactions (6 & Bellamy, 2012: 104; George & Bennet, 2005: 19).

In the particular case of Spain, a case study design will enable to gain an in-depth understanding of the institutional influences on TE, which would be addressed by the guiding research questions. Moreover, the understanding of processes is adequately captured by case studies, which is of significant value, given the dynamic view on institutions that guide this study (6 & Bellamy, 2012: 104).



Based on the previously introduced ontological and epistemological claims that will guide this study, it is intended to contribute to the emerging research field on TE for the unemployed youth in the EU. As knowledge is part of a cumulative and dynamic process, therefore, the empirical testing might allow new features to emerge or validate previous findings. The aim of this study is to contribute to the stock of knowledge regarding youth unemployment, particularly in the countries more severely affected by the crisis. In order to do so, the inductive characteristics of the approach chosen in this case allow the researcher to identify the current stock of knowledge in a particular field of inquiry and to elaborate on its findings. Consequently, researchers are equipped with a set of analytical tools that can be subjected to empirical scrutiny via deductive hypothesis generation and continued testing (Bryman, 2012: 24; George & Bennet, 2005: 21).

For a series of diverse reasons this case was chosen. Arguably, it represents a *typical* case, as unemployment indicators remain stagnant in most MME's, thus, the Spanish case is part of the trend. However, VoC literature regarding MME's is less developed in comparison with the other models, and the representative size of the Spanish case makes of it a *critical case* as well (Bryman, 2012: 70). Moreover, the choice of the particular approach is based on the two considerations. As the actors who have been chosen play a key role in the intended institutional field. Secondly, though actors are able to operate in diverse organizational fields and levels of analysis, for the purpose of this case, the actors operate at the same level of analysis.

### ***Data Collection***

Two diverse methods of data collection were employed for the development of this research in a strategy that is referred to as triangulation. Sources of data triangulation enable the researcher to verify or contrast the different information gathered and to observe the possible patterns of convergence or divergence (Bryman, 2012: 392). The cross match between the different material will then enrich the data analysis and provide a higher and more varied degree of observation into the social phenomenon.

The data collection consisted of two main stages. During the first stage, secondary data, in the form of official documentation was collected. In the second phase, primary data, in the

form of semi-structured interviews was collected. Document or archival research offers a rich set of information about an intended phenomenon, which could be practically compared and analyzed. Official document analysis offers an insight into the organization agenda within given organizational field (Bryman, 2012:550). The intrinsic freedom that semi-structured interviews offer to both the interviewer and interviewee are a perfect complement to the previous method of material collection. As they enable, the researcher to gain in depth knowledge in particular areas deemed relevant for research, while enabling the interviewees to address areas of the phenomenon, which they consider relevant and might have or not been neglected by official documentation.

### *Sampling official documents*

Given the nature and scope of the study, only official documents were collected and taken into consideration. In order to do so, all official websites of the actors engaged in the corporate governance of TE (UGT, CC.OO, CEOE, CEPYME, SEPE and the *Tripartite Foundation*) were thoroughly examined (Punch, 2005: 185). Guided by previous literature research, a deductive/theory-driven approach was used to sample the material; therefore, the themes analyzed were identified from the relevant literature in the field, before the material was screened. The selection of the documents accounted for various elements such as authenticity, accuracy, representativeness and meaning (Punch, 2005). It is assumed that the documents collected were produced for different purposes or audiences, both internal and external, and they reflect the different actors positions and preferences (Punch, 2005: 227). Every time an item was identified as relevant, it was noted and added to a matrix for further examination. The data selected include reports, speeches, statements, legislative documents and press releases.

A total of 52 documents from the all the aforementioned institutions were collected. A list of all of the analyzed documents can be found in the section Electronic Sources. The collected material was thematically grouped in four sub-topics, which were guided by previous academic research (Flick, 2009: 376). The aim of the thematic grouping is to both capture the main themes within the material collected and theory chosen to analyze the given phenomenon, and investigate its connection. The data collection continued until all public data was scrutinized

and further selected to be analyze it (Punch, 2005: 159).

## *Interviews*

In order to collect this set of data, a series of semi-structured interviews were conducted. Semi-structured interviews allow a great deal of freedom, for both interviewee and interviewer, to explore different dynamics and features of the object of study. Furthermore, they enable a fluid dialogue between both parties, balancing the position, which was of significant relevance for this case. Given the relevant position that interviewees have in the specific organizational field, a fluid dialogue would enable the researcher to gain in-depth knowledge and possibly elucidate hidden variables. In addition to its aforementioned flexibility, the semi-structured character of interviews enables the research to address specific issues that would otherwise be neglected (Bryman, 2012, 471). The analytical framework motivates the specific criteria upon which the interview is based. In this case, the question addresses the position that organizations have vis-à-vis other influential actors, taking into account the different organizational fields they operate in.

The interview guide that is used for the interviews (See appendix) consists of four main thematic questions and 12 questions that address the sub topics within them. The diverse questions, which compose the main thematic, aim to address the complex causality relation between diverse actors and variables. The questions address on the one hand, the relations between diverse actors, including those operating in diverse organizational fields but that have influence the processes in the particular field, according to the analytical framework. On the other hand, questions address processes of decentralization and Europeanization with the purpose of better understanding the context in which the case is embedded.

### *Sampling semi-structured interviews*

A purposive sample technique was used with the intention to address the actors considered relevant accordingly to the study design (Bryman, 2012: 418). The sampling was guided by academic literature on the topic and it is aligned with the research design. Therefore, all the interviewees are official representatives of the key organizational actors.

For the purpose of data collection, I traveled to Spain in April of 2015 and contacted all

major labor and employer unions, at both national and regional level. The case selected for the interviews were those located in Madrid and Barcelona respectively. The organizations included in the interviews include (CEOE, CEPYMES, UGT, CCOO)<sup>2122</sup>

### ***Translation***

The interviews were all conducted in Spanish, which is my mother tongue; therefore, there are no significant considerations or biases that could affect negatively the quality of the material. All the interviews were recorded with the express accord of the interviewees and they have expressed their full agreement for the material to be used for this research. Furthermore, in order to ensure the quality of the material gathered, all the interviews were transcribed in Spanish and then translated into English, using both recording and transcripts for this purpose.

All the material collected was produced in Spanish, which as it was previously mentioned is my mother tongue; therefore, there are no significant consideration or linguistic biases affecting its interpretation.

### ***Reliability and Validity***

A significant issue in regard to the material collected is the understanding that it has its own constructed meaning and it is intended for particular audiences. One significant issue in regard to the collection of official documents is assessing its representativeness, as it is hard to know for the researcher to what amount of the total documents it has gained access. In order to mitigate the possible issues around representativeness, the documents will be contextualized and contrasted with the theoretical framework (Punch, 2005: 185; Bryman, 2012: 550). The interviews with organization officials are likely to be biased by organizational goals. Nevertheless, it is the official statements and subjective meaning of institutions that this research aims to capture.

### ***Method of analysis***

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<sup>21</sup> In the case of CCOO and CEPYME both Catalonia Regional Office and Madrid central office were interviewed.

<sup>22</sup> Interview Index on table

The material collected has been thematically coded and analyzed through the analytical lens of institutional and VOC theory with the main the main purpose to expand the existing stock of knowledge (Bryman, 2012: 19, 567). Though the generation of universal explanations is not within the reach and scope of this research, it does intend to elucidate the explanatory capacity of the chosen analytical framework in regard to the scrutinized phenomenon.

A process of data reduction in the form of thematic coding guided by a deductive/theory driven approach started as the material began to be organized (Punch, 2005: 198). The first set of data collected was thoroughly examined and as its themes converged with the themes already found in the literature review and theoretical framework. A second round of data collection followed in the form of semi-structured interviews, which were grounded in the themes already found in the theoretical framework. From that point on, the both sources of material were cross-examined, looking for patterns of convergence or divergence that haven't already been identified in the literature and first examination of the collected material, guided by the underpinning theoretical framework (Punch, 2005: 213). The cross checking of the different data sources was a crucial step for this research, as it showed the ambiguous relationship between the different social actors, which had already been noted in the theoretical framework.

### *Limitations*

Every method has inherent strengths and weaknesses, which in turn might limit its breadth and depth. There are other types of limitations not inherent in this method; instead they have an external nature. Given the impossibility to gain access to a governmental representative, the triangulation of methods in data gathering was employed as a means to enhance the validity and reliability of the findings.

Moreover, as the research was being conducted, the Spanish government issued the latest reform to the system of employment formation (Royal Decree 4/2015). Therefore, the effect of this particular Royal Decree is beyond the scope of the study, but it is of great relevance to future studies.



## ***4. Analysis***

### ***Introduction***

In this chapter the analysis of the collected material is presented with the intention to provide an answer to the research questions that have guided this research. In order to do so, the perceptions of the main social actors are explored. The analysis will start by exploring the key actors' perceptions of the diverse changes in the organizational field of decision-making. It then addresses the perceptions of mutual actor interaction within the particular organizational field. Finally, it addresses actors' perception of the interaction between the TE offered and the Spanish economic model.

### ***Perceptions of employers' representatives CEOE & CEPYME***

#### ***Decision-making at both European and autonomous region level***

The decentralization of decision-making is a key feature of the Spanish landscape according to the employer union. In the particular case of Spain, the transfer of responsibilities from the central government towards the autonomous regions has been characterized by tensions with pro-independence movements (Valls, 2012:4). Moreover, the process of decision-making has been complemented with the creation of a large bureaucracy at both national and Autonomic regional levels seeking to improve their activity coordination (CEOE, 2015a). But the creation of an extensive and at times overlapping bureaucracy has increased the fragmentation of regulation, which has also increased the cost and obstacles for firms' activities (CEOE, 2015: 25; Garamendi, 2015: 25-27; Molina, 2007).<sup>23</sup>Firms are now confronted with a diverse set of both

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<sup>23</sup> Interview with CEPYME national representative

national and regional regulations to which they have to comply (CEOE, 2014). For instance, the representative of CEPYME commented:

*“At the end, the decision-making transfer towards the regions, it only hampers firms’ performance. There are some absurd cases but in general firms have to comply with diverse legislative framework as if they were in different countries, like Sweden and Germany. As a result there is more bureaucracy and increased cost for them. In most cases, a bureaucrat without real life knowledge of the market has drafted the legislation.”* (CEPYME, personal interview, April 9, 2015)

The isomorphic pattern of organizational reproduction at diverse levels has failed to recreate similar organizational forms and institutional regulative outcomes. In this case, the organizational replication has had as a consequence increased fragmentation of regulation, which negatively affects the optimal development of the economical activity. Organizational reproduction is arguably guided by normative patterns of isomorphism but the institutions that have emerged and their outcomes, contradict this underlying purpose. It rather seems that the underlying logic that guides institutions and its outcomes are related to contextual functional dynamics, based on the contextual cognitive actors’ repertoire. The organizational overlapping and regulative fragmentation corroborates the suggested features of MME’s, in which organizational overlapping hinders firm competitiveness.

Employers have argued that the transfer of decision-making to the European Union has been significantly beneficial for them and for Spain (CEOETV, 2015; CEOE, 2015). They argue that it offers the opportunity to learn from other member states and includes the use of practical benchmarking processes. However, CEPYME<sup>24</sup> representatives suggest that the goals within the EU need to be grounded on state capacity. Despite, the potential and attractive advantages that implementing the German training and skill formation model would have in Spain, the current budget constraints limit state capacity (FTFE, 2015b; CEPYME, 2014: 14-16). Therefore, the EU should take such differences into consideration and have tailor made goals. Nevertheless, the implementation of the EU benchmarking in social and other policy realms has brought crucial initiatives that have the potential to make significant changes (Garamendi, 2015: 25). The

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<sup>24</sup> <sup>24</sup> Interview with CEPYME national representative



importance of supra actors with the capacity to enforce and propose new institutional arrangements are of significant relevance as they have the capacity to overcome actors' uncertainty over new institutions. Given the limited budget and organizational constraints, for the actors, it is rational to maintain an institutional *status quo*, in as much as the institutions continue to fulfill their functional resource distributive role.

### *Mutual perception and the state*

As Juan Rossell, CEOE president, has indicated, the CEOE role as a social actor in negotiations only takes places when they have been called. Despite the fact that they are on the board of organizations like the *Tripartite Foundation*, their role is limited at most times (Molina & Rhodes, 2007). Moreover, when called, the social dialogue is not always easy with the other social actors, and within the CEOE as an organization. CEOE represents diverse opinions from the different industrial sectors, which at times has had conflicted opinions, thus some of CEOE social pacts agreements have been highly controversial among its members (CEOETV, 2015).

CEPYME's<sup>25</sup> representative recognizes that social agreements founded on social dialogue are a complex process, but there are past successful examples in Spain. Furthermore, the activation of institutional social dialogue has had many tangible results for the Spanish population such as minimum wage agreements or skill and training strategies (CEOE, 2014a; CEPYME, 2013; Valls, 2012). Thus, the outcome of social dialogue has real consequences on people's lives. However, employers suggest that the use of organizational tools that have been designed to activate social dialogue has declined (CEOETV, 2011). The government has the power to activate social dialogue but it has not done so in the recent past, they said (CEPYME, 2015). CEOE's president Juan Rosell has called for an increased and improved space for social dialogue. Moreover, it is suggested that previous patterns of social pacts have been inverted. Before, social dialogue used to precede the drafting and enactment of legislative measures, but more recently the patterns have changed and social actors are called when measures have been

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Interview with CEPYME national representative

already drafted. Therefore, social actors' influence is limited and their role becomes merely consultative. This is partly based on the subjective meaning of institutions; thus the interpretation of norms, both formal and informal, in this case by the government in order to modify the institutional landscape, to better serve their interest (CEOETV, 2015)<sup>26</sup>.

CEOE has criticized the continuous governmental intervention in the form of formal normative actions, thus the continuous legislative enactment overrides the possibility to improve the patterns of social dialogue. Moreover, the government tends to enact several and continuous reforms that show, according to the CEOE, the lack of long-term planning on the part of the government.

*“There are too many laws in this country that the law enactment is unnecessary, in fact we believe that laws should last a longer time. If we compare our legislation with the American one, we can see how many laws we have here”* (CEOETV, 2015).

The crucial role that the government has in the case of the Spain relates to the weak and less established institutional coordination, partly due to the statist model that dominated the socioeconomic landscape during large part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In MME countries the state complemented the weak in-and-off market coordination via formal regulative mechanisms. Unlike countries, like the United States a LME, in which the role of the state as an actor and regulator is limited given the high levels of market coordination. Therefore, the CEOE's comparison between the Spanish and American model is complex given the different natures of coordination.

In addition, employers do not agree with the current and past administrations in the way they are administrating the funds for the employment formation sub-system, including both the current party in power the PP<sup>27</sup> and the previous one PSOE<sup>28</sup>. In their view, their co-financing role, via off the pay roll contributions, should guide the final destination of the funds. Originally the TE sub-system was designed to address the deficits of on-the-job training but the government to include the attention to the unemployed population, unilaterally changing the system

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<sup>26</sup> Interview with CEPYME and CEOE Catalunya

<sup>27</sup> PP Partido Popular *Popular Party*

<sup>28</sup> PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero Español. *Spain Socialist Workers' Party*

(CEPYME, 2013).<sup>29</sup> Therefore, funds that were originally intended to train those formally employed have been curtailed to address the problems of the unemployed population, not only in the financing of formative programs but also other active labor market policies (FTFE, 2014). Moreover, the government and social pacts investments have been characterized by a short-term perspective, and have been subject to constant revision, which has allowed the government to change the organizational rules, as the social pacts enactment had expired.

Employers are not only in disagreement with the government decision to change the final destination of the funds but also on the government view on the different social actors. There are significant issues of mistrust between the diverse social actors and particularly coming from the government. Employers suggest that after some alleged cases of corruption in the centers that provide the service of employment training, the government has begun a smear campaign against employers and the labor unions. In particular, the government, according to a CEPYME<sup>30</sup> representative, has accused labor unions of being accountable for the alleged corruption cases. However, the same institutional framework that governs employment formation at the national level has been replicated at different sublevels. Therefore, if corruption is occurring, it is not possible to deem only one actor as responsible but all three. Furthermore, in their view this is the result of the decentralization process. Despite the highly bureaucratic nature of the system and sub-system forms of governance, there is a lack of control, thus, hampering the environment in which firms operate. The employers do not support the smear campaign from the government against the labor unions and calls for them to acknowledge their share of responsibility.

For the employers' representatives they acknowledge the crucial role that the labor unions have in the system of social negotiation; however, they consider that the relationship between the UGT and PSOE is somehow complex<sup>31</sup>. Therefore CEPYME<sup>32</sup> suggest that UGT has been at times, too close the power, when it should have been closer to the other social actors. Nevertheless, the labor unions play an important role that should be acknowledged, though, they suggest that the labor unions should understand how hart has the crisis been for the employers.

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<sup>29</sup> Interview with CEPYME national representative

<sup>30</sup> Interview with CEPYME national representative

<sup>31</sup> The UGT and PSOE share common historical origins, and for many years their membership was interrelated.

<sup>32</sup> Interview with CEPYME national representative

## *The economic model and the role of the TE for the unemployed youth*

The CEPYME suggests that there is great deficit of skills in the labor market that the traditional formation system has not been able to supply. They argue that the main issue is the significant skills gap in the system with too many people that have tertiary education in one extreme; and at the other extreme, many people who did not finish school or that lack any certified skills (CEOE, 2015).<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, the system is characterized by the formation of general skills, which are not updated regularly (Valls, 2012: 15) SME's often struggle to find people with technical skills in order to further develop their activities. For employers, in the current model there is no real relationship between the school and the needs of the labor market, which in their view has a visible effect not only for us but also for the society as a whole (CEPYME, CEOE, 2014b; FTFE, 2015c). As a result of the lack of cohesion between the education provided and the needs of the labor market many people have opted out of it (FTFE, 2014b). Furthermore, the boom in the construction sector and the changes to the minimum wage regulations by the government stimulated the rates of school dropouts. A representative of CEOE commented:

*“There is no relationship between school and the firms. In our view, we should be listened in the school, as we are the ones who can tell what firms need. We are in a changing world... in a changing model that is increasingly innovative. So, today we cannot be teaching which were the Visigoths Kings, it might be relevant but we should rather address the market needs”* (CEOE, personal interview, April 10, 2015)

The combination of high employment security and lower levels of competition faced by SMEs', which generate 90% of the employment in Spain, has lowered the incentives for continuous skills accumulation (CEOETV, 2011a). However, the low level of intermediary formation or technically formation cannot be fully explained by employment security in the form of wages or job protection. Actors' decisions are embedded in cultural and cognitive templates that do not necessarily correlate with *pareto optimal* outcomes, in this particular case the

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<sup>33</sup> Interview with CEPYME national representative

embedded cultural assumptions that relate technical formation with regular academic formation failure have hindered the development of technical skills. As suggested by a CEPYME representative, in some cases people with a technical formation make more money than many with a tertiary and highly socially prized formation:

*“In Spain for many years, there was the perception than those who received a formation either at the employment offices or had a technical formation, did it as they have failed in the regular academic system...But many people in their 20’s were dropping out of school and working in construction and making more money than someone with law degree”* (CEPYME, personal interview, April 9, 2015)

A particular effect of the economic crisis was the loss of many jobs in the construction sector, which had offered high salaries and incentives for people to join the sector during the expansion period (Valls, 2012) Therefore, the current rates of school dropouts have decreased as an intended effect of the crisis; however, people have not been redirected towards the vocational system.<sup>34</sup>

According to the employers, the TE was created with the goal to improve the skills of those employed and its financing was made through contributions of both employers and employees. Moreover the system was designed with the intention to promote the continuous formation in the SME’s, which had limited resources (CEOETV, 2011a). The TE is on the right track as it offers in many cases professional certification, which allow us to get closer to the EU media. However, the TE is just one component of skill formation system, thus all sectors need to be reformed in order to change the skills that firms can use.

In regard to the productive model, there is substantial need to increase the level of technical formation in Spain, according to the employers. This is partly the role of the VET but it is also necessary to effectuate an overall change in the general educational system as employers believe that there is an over supply of tertiary educated people. Moreover, the change should be complemented with a change in mentality; the perception of technical formation needs to be culturally and cognitive addressed. Institutional change is a complex multi-causal and dynamic

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<sup>34</sup> Interviews with CEOE and CEPYME national representatives

phenomenon. As suggested by the employers, the destruction of employment in the construction sector and increased rates of unemployment have failed to increase the demand for technical formation.<sup>35</sup> It shows how cognitive and cultural institutional features are intertwined with rational actors' responses. Therefore, institutional change often entails the change of more than one institution, which is a complex and case dependent matter. As a result, the EU isomorphic organizational reproduction in the form of benchmarking processes is challenged by the local institutional complexity, thus yielding different institutional outcomes.

### *Perceptions of employees' representatives CCOO & UGT*

#### *Decision-making at both European and autonomous region level*

CC.OO considers that the process of decentralization has been generally positive, in particular, as it has brought the decision-making closer to those directly affected by the policies.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, those governing the system are closer to the market and the people; which in turn would help them to identify particular needs. However, they are critical of the lack of resources at the regional level in many cases and the lack of cross-country coordination (CCOO. UGT suggests that, despite the fact, many organizational structures have been created at the different levels, the objectives have a national character; therefore, cooperation between the regional and national government is needed (Forem, 2010). The lack of adequate coordination has been a source of tensions between local and national governments (Muñoz, 2013). UGT suggests that a national common framework is essential for the success of any initiatives, particularly of a formative character. Thus, the training systems in the regions should share similar characteristics, in order to be recognized in the whole Spain and the EU (CCOO, 2015).<sup>37</sup>

The changes in the governance system have opened the door for new organizational scenarios and the creation of new institutions at the regional level in Spain. The creation of new

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid

<sup>36</sup> Interviews with CCOO national representatives

<sup>37</sup> Interviews UGT national representatives

organizational spaces for institutions to inhabit could potentially reshape actor's preferences and goals, thus changing the rational and functional role of institutions. As a result, the creation of new spaces, even if guided by an isomorphic underlying logic, would create institutional contestation and possible conflict. Thus, actors' actions would seek to accommodate their interests in the new spaces, rather than follow a predetermined pattern engrained in past historical grievances.

In the case of the new spaces opened in the EU sphere, UGT and CCOO agree that this has been positive for the Spanish institutional landscape. For them it has not only opened a new space of negotiation, but also added a new actor within the local landscape that has the capacity to bring new inputs into the system (UGT, 2013c; Muñoz, 2012). As a CCOO representative expressed:

*“It has been positive for us to belong to the EU, it is also positive that there is an EU body in charge of employment relations. Over there, new and goals have been established, that were not previously taken into consideration in Spain, so now we can demand them or bring them up during the social dialogue.”* (CCOO personal interview, April 13, 2015)

In regard to the TE, there has been an ambiguous institutional outcome, according to both of the labor unions. In the opinion of both labor unions, the underlying ideology that guides an institution has a crucial effect that further influences its priorities, goals and methods (UGT, 2014f). As a result, since the advent of the economic crisis macroeconomic policies have been at the center of concern. Thus, other socioeconomic policies have been neglected, including employment and training. It is necessary, according to the labor unions, to take the influence of the EU into consideration for any kind of policy. In the particular case of the TE subsystem, the budgets cuts have significantly curtailed the advances made in Investigation and Innovation, which in turn are interrelated with the country's prospected capacity to innovate.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, budget cuts in Investigation and Innovation would, over time, determine the direction the economic model could possibly follow and the skills that would be necessary to complement it (UGT, 2014c). CC.OO representatives suggest the EU influence, referring to the economic

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<sup>38</sup> Interviews with CCOO and UGT representatives

deficit goals in the local organizational and institutional environment, has at times been detrimental to fulfilling previously established goals.<sup>39</sup>

It is important to understand the complex dimension of EU institutional arrangements, and how they interact with those of the member state. In particular the EU normative methods are guided by an underlying logic of convergence, thus the normative reproduction of the best practices, in consequence, undermines the local dynamics (CCOO & UGT 2103). CCOO suggest that the neo-classical imperative ideology that currently guides the EU has hampered the country's capacity to make the necessary adjustment to overcome the crisis (Fernández-Toxo, 2013).<sup>40</sup> However, the MME's institutional arrangement, in the case of Spain, has failed to create positive complementary for the EU guided macroeconomic policies.

### *Mutual perceptions and the state*

In the view of the labor unions, the EU and its diverse bodies of governance have positively influenced the channels of social dialogue in the national context, as many of EU designed policy tools included an active participation of the local social actors.<sup>41</sup> However, as previously mentioned, the current EU priorities have shifted from the social policy realms towards the macroeconomic realm (CCOO, 2014a). Thus, in order to fulfill the prioritized economic deficit rates, the Europe 2020 agenda and other social programs have been given a secondary role.

Both labor unions argue that social dialogue is crucial for any significant pact or reform in the country; therefore, the interests of both employer and employees need to be represented (UGT, 2013b). However, in the view of the unions, the social dialogue is currently broken, as the government has not been willing to activate the channels for formal dialogue to take place (CCOO & UGT, 2009; Muñoz, 2015).<sup>42</sup> One significant feature in which both employers and employees disagree is on the financing of TE for the unemployed (FTFE, 2015a). For employers,

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<sup>39</sup> Interview with CCOO Catalonia representative

<sup>40</sup> Interview with CCOO representative

<sup>41</sup> Interviews with CCOO and UGT representatives

<sup>42</sup> (Ibid)



the funds-raised by both employers and employees should not be allocated to finance the TE of the unemployed population, which has been a matter of disagreement with labor unions (CCOO & UGT, 2012; UGT, 2014a). Instead, labor unions advocate for the right of people to be trained and gain the necessary skills to join the labor market; nevertheless, they disagree with the government budget allocation of originally intended TE funds (Muñoz, 2014). In their view, the funds are not always allocated to fulfill their *raison d'être* and have instead financed other active labor market policies, such as employment subsidies. As a representative of CCOO clearly expressed:

*“There is a council in which all of the matters regarding the TE are discussed, but the council has not been called in the past year, which reflects the state of social dialogue in the country.”* (CCOO personal interview, April 13, 2015)

Labor unions have a similar view to the employer in regards to their role within the social dialogue. Thus, the organizational spaces exist but the government has not activated them. This could be understood in relation to the fragmented character of social dialogue in MME's. In this particular case, the organizational features exist, but they do not embody the institutions that they are supposed or intended to, according the codified normativity. Instead the institutions that govern TE in Spain are characterized by the limited role that social actors have, mainly a consultative role, and the continuous and unilateral role of the government as decision-maker. Despite the fact that both labor unions and employers are not satisfied with their role, they continue to be part of the institutional pattern and in both its formal and informal representations. Arguably, both labor unions and employers still benefit from the current institutional patterns, and there is little or no significant gain that could be made from defecting such institutional arrangements. On the other hand, they lack the capability to influence or create another possible set of institutions, and in the lack of such prospects they should secure their resources by maintaining the current institutions.

Despite, the low rates of union density in Spain, the labor unions argue that they are a representative social actor, whose role has been shaped by the character of the national negotiations. Therefore, social pacts have a national and sectoral character, including all workers,

notwithstanding their labor union membership status. Under these circumstances, workers do not have the necessary incentives to join the unions. In their view, the representativeness of labor unions as rightful social actors is anchored in two different processes. The first one is based on the democratic election of workers' councils in the different firms around the country, in which both UGT and CCOO have obtained the larger rates of representation. The second one is related in itself to their representative function as a social actor, thus, as the agreements have an all-inclusive character, the labor unions represent even those who are not affiliate. Moreover, they argue that in the case of CEPYME and CEOE, they have not been elected by the democratic means and they lack real representativeness.

### *The economic model and the role of the TE for the unemployed youth*

The labor unions are diverse in regards to their opinions of the current TE in the country, but they argue that, without a doubt, the country has a skill deficit, mainly in VET. The polarization of the labor market has resulted in the level of employment being below workers skills (Muñoz, 2012). In their view the current TE model has offered some efficient and non-efficient programs to the population, partly due to the lack of control at the regional level. In some cases, the TE supply has been conditioned by supplier's capabilities rather than by market needs (UGT, 2013a). Therefore, cost benefit concerns on the part of the organizations that provided the training influenced the TE supply (CCOO, 2014: 91). As a result the courses did not align to market needs but instead to the interest of private actors, although, in recent years there have been some improvements in the controls.<sup>43</sup> Nowadays, the regulation of TE provision has increased, which has had more positive outcomes (UGT, 2012). Another issue that has affected the TE system is the lack of adequate coordination in its methods of TE delivery. As an example, young unemployed workers were given the possibility to choose the courses that they would like to take without proper guidance or counseling.

The lack of proper counseling is a factor of significant concern for the labor unions as people lack, in many cases, the knowledge to make complex investments.<sup>44</sup> It is complicated for an individual to recognize which markets will grow in the future and to obtain the right set of

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<sup>43</sup> Interviews with CCOO and UGT representatives

<sup>44</sup> (Ibid)

skills to be able to compete in it for it. Instead, employment centers should provide integrated services for people, which is of particular relevance in Spain given the lack of technical skills (UGT, 2014d). Therefore, the current model should adapt itself to the changing environment (UGT, 2014e; Muñoz, 2012).

*“The current model, which is based in social dialogue.... has been valid for the more than 20 years now. The economic model has changed, the main change in the system is the unemployment rates; the rates are substantially higher than before.... Therefore we need to adapt to the new realities”* (CCOO personal interview, April 13, 2015)

*“We should have used these years of crisis and high unemployment to transform the skills of the people through training, so that when the economy recovered and new jobs were created, the required skills would have been available. But all of this requires big investments and we have not done it.”* (CCOO personal interview, April 13, 2015)

Arguably there is a significant lack of positive complementarities between TE system and the labor market. Despite, the serious skill deficit that Spain faces, the actors involved in the political negotiation of skills supply should address the issue and foster the acquisition of desired skills sets (UGT, 2014g; FTFE, 2015b). If seen merely from a rational perspective, this process should imperatively involve adequate counseling; thus channeling the people towards the sectors in which skills are need in the short, medium and long-term (Jiménez, J, 2015). Moreover, the activities would require a substantial change in deep and complex cultural cognitive elements. The mentality regarding TE needs to be addressed as part of such a big commitment, so that people would be willing to create and obtained the desired skills and that the market would be willing to integrate them. Moreover, Spain is already part of a big commitment, as the Europe 2020 agenda wants to make Europe the most dynamic and innovative economic space in the world (CCOO, 2010). Therefore, it is relevant to examine how that commitment has been adapted into the national contexts. As suggested by both labor unions:

*“We need a new training model to get out of the current situation and Leave our shameful backward position in Europe, in terms of certified skills levels”* (UGT, 2014).

*“The current TE offered addresses mainly the needs of the current economic model and it does little or nothing in favor of changing our productive model towards something more efficient and based in other sectors of the economy”* (CCOO personal interview, April 13, 2015) 2015).

The need for long-term commitments and investments is of crucial relevance for the Spanish case; however, the current institutional model does not seem to support the necessary institutional environment for them to be made (UGT, 2013). As suggested by Molina & Rhodes, in MME’s models there is no precise logic of investments, which creates uncertainty for most actors (UGT, 2014b). Thus, these assumptions support the pattern of institutional stability suggested by Hall & Thelen (2009). Despite punctual moments that arguably have called for a change, like economic crisis, no major changes to the Spanish institutional landscape have been made, particularly not in the direction that Europe 2020 has normatively intended.

## ***Discussion***

In the analysis section a wide variety of phenomena has been discussed with the goal to address the research question that guided this research. One of the most salient discussions has evolved around the influence that the EU has had over the national organizational field, and how have the different social actors perceived it.

On the one hand both employers and unions agree that the participation and influence from the EU is important, as it has allowed new inputs into the national organizational field. However, the EU influence has been colored by its priorities, mainly focused on the macroeconomic performance, which has been characterized by convergence to the EMU criteria. Therefore, the institutional relation between national and supranational organizational fields has been characterized by the top down reproduction of normative organizational forms at the national level. In this way acceptable patterns of macroeconomic policy have been reproduced all over the EU, which has hampered the development of the European social agenda, at least in the particular case of Spain. Thus the finding supports the view that the consolidation of fiscal goals has had a detrimental effect for the governance of social pacts, which partly helps to explain the decline of social dialogue (Molina & Miguélez, 2013).

From the unions' perspective, they find particularly relevant the fact that they are able to access other organizational fields at supranational level, the EU, in which they are able to access new resources, previously unavailable to them. Thus, from their view, they are able to challenge the position that they have in the national organizational field in which their power relation *vis-à-vis* the state does not leave enough room for maneuver. At the European level features from other systems in which unions play a pivotal part in the institutional system have enabled Spanish union to strengthen and bring back such features into the Spanish institutional arrangements. At the European organizational level, the role of the state as guarantor and compensator is disrupted, and the institutional features of the national organizational field that have limited unions actions are absent. From the employers view, the opportunity to gain access to wider variety of resources at the European level has also implied to challenge their advantageous position in regards to the unions at the national level. The new resources and changes in resource dynamics might enhance future cooperation and challenge the pre-existent power resource constraints.

The perception of both social actors is based on a functionalist view, which favors the reinforcement of social dialogue, guided by EU normative views on agreements. However, using the same underlying view, actors have a less favorable perception on the EU influence, grounded on the macroeconomic guidelines. Thus, the resources that the EU offers represent a paradox from a functionalist perspective. Moreover, functionalist perspectives are also useful to understand the tensions between the national and regional organizational fields. Thus, local actors have accommodated to a new organizational space, which provides new resources and in consequence generates different regulative outcomes. Therefore, the lack of TE national coordination could be explained by local actors instrumentalization of organizational fields, and lack of new mechanisms to create the alleged desired coordination. At the same time it corroborates the assumptions made in the MME model, as it shows a clear fragmentation both vertically in the structure of the TE governance and horizontally, across the different autonomous communities.

The view of the EU as a powerful actor that is capable of changing the playing field in which national actors are embedded, shares a similar approach to institutional change by Hall &

Soskice (2001: 10-12). Therefore, it opens possibilities for new institutions or institutional arrangements that might be represented in organizational forms that are being established, in an environment that would not have otherwise consider them, given the uncertainty that it might cause among actors. Thus, the EU resources and capacity disrupts the national playing field and its institutional actors preferences, which leads to a new power resource reconfiguration.

Employers emphasize the difficulty to introduce EU organizational models, such as the German trainee programs, under the current budget constraints. In their perspective, despite the desirability to introduce such model into the country, it is the monetary constraints that posed the biggest challenges to make the necessary commitments. However, employers seem to disregard the different institutional arrangements, in which the two models are grounded, thus limiting the possibility to emulate the German institutional outcomes. Despite budget constraints and patterns of convergence that the EU has favored; the responses created by the Spanish institutional architecture challenge the EU normative isomorphism. For instance, Spain has failed to redirect the bulk of youth unemployed into new training programs that could have an overall impact in the national stock of knowledge. In consequence, addressing deep-rooted acknowledge problem in the Spanish productive model. Instead, the different sets of responses and the institutional resilience to change suggest that in the case of Spain there has not been an isomorphic institutional reproduction guided by EU references, which is partly explained by functionalist accounts.

Given the inherently institutional differences among the EU members, the economic crisis has not affected the different economies in the same manner, which in turn has been a challenge for the collective goals stated in the 2020 Agenda. As a result the macroeconomic goals of the EU have hindered the development of the European social agenda, in the Spanish case.

Employers' unwillingness to co-finance the TE programs for the unemployed with the current funds could be partly explained by the characteristically short-term investment logic, predominant in MME's countries. Given the current rates of unemployment in Spain, and its structural foundations, the investments made in the unemployed youth would yield a medium

and long-term impact on firm competitiveness. Unlike, TE provision for those currently employed, which would have a more immediate return for the firms, thus, explaining their likeliness to favor this option. Nevertheless, employers understand the future benefits that a better-trained population might have on their performance, but the nature of short-term commitments that is characterize MME's country hinders the necessary cooperation among the different actors for this desirable end. Furthermore, it is not clear for employers, who would benefit from up-skilling of the unemployed, given the fragmentation among firms in Spain. The support for up-skilling policies is significantly affected by the composition of the employers sector, which is fragmented between SME's and large firms; therefore, the different kind of firms would have different need in regard to skills. In this scenario, the different employers cannot be guaranteed that their support, political and economic would yield direct benefits for them, in the absence of mechanism of concertation. The aforementioned feature of the Spanish employer sector, partly explains the divergence in support for training between the Spanish and German model. In the case of Germany, the existence of diverse coordination mechanism guarantees that the investments made would generate a return for the firms, making them more likely to support up-skilling policies.

Unions like employers disagree with the current financing regulation in TE subsystem model. But from the union perspective, the system of TE co-financing had the specific goal to provide training for those in employment, which respectively supported by all actors. Therefore, the unilateral change in the financing rules made by the government has affected negatively social partner trust. Arguably, those in unemployment are less likely to be union members than their employed counterparts; thus, unions' support for the unemployed should be rather low. Nevertheless, unions support the provision of TE for this cohort. Union's reasons to support TE for the unemployed could be explained by diverse perspectives, such as normative, cognitive and instrumental. From a normative perspective, unions occupy the role of social interlocutors for all workers, in Spain, disregarding of their status; therefore, unions should be likely to support any beneficial measures for them, disregarding of their current status. Cognitive accounts would make an emphasis on the core belief that underpins the unions; thus, unions should always be supportive for all initiatives that benefit the workers and improve their bargaining power *vis-à-vis* the employers. From a functionalist view, unions' support for policies that target the

unemployed could be explained by their desire to exercise and strengthen their position as social interlocutors. Moreover, if the policies are successful and more people would get a job, they are more likely to become a union member, thus, expanding union's social base and increasing unions' bargaining capacity.

In regard of the respective perceptions that social actors have about each other, both unions and employers agree that their current role is merely consultative and limited. From their perspective, both unions and employers have a crucial role to play in social concertation and policy-making. Nevertheless, in the recent past, the mechanism of social dialogue have not been activated until the legislation had been enacted; thus, limiting the capacity to influence the outcomes. The aforementioned phenomenon corroborates the model of social dialogue in MME's, which is characterized by the pivotal role of the government and the weak position of social actors'. However, unions and employers are not willing to defect from the mechanism of social concertation, which lack of a regulative institutionalization. From a path dependence perspective, actors' earlier decision to participate in the mechanism of social dialogue under such conditions has limited their capability to change. For the government, under the current circumstances, there are no incentives to alter the institutional landscape, and for the social actors', the continuity provides not only stability but it also reaffirms their role as social interlocutors.

In regard to the productive model, both social actors recognize there is a profound need to change the productive model towards high valued added goods. However, such a change would not be possible with the current skills repertoire available in the labor market. In this context, it is imperative to address the current skills deficiencies in the market that the current institutional framework has failed provide. In spite of the changes that could be made in the TE system, institutional change is a multi-causal dynamic phenomenon. Therefore, in order to change the Spanish economic productive, model more than one institution needs to be changed, as institutions are often interrelated and embedded within each other. It is not apparent which kind of factors would be able to create the necessary conditions for institutional change in Spain. Despite, the effects that the 2008 global recession has inflicted to the Spanish national economy, its national institutional arrangements appear to be resilient to change. Arguably, the



instrumentalization of the current institutional framework by the diverse social actors does not provide the necessary incentives for them to defect from it. Though, it is beyond the limitations of this research, the current social movements that have emerged in Spain pose a significant challenge to the current institutional arrangements, as they have challenged, the channels of social actors representation. Thus, it would be relevant to analyze how possible future electoral changes might affect the current institutional balance.

## *5. Conclusion*

During this study it has been elucidate that the issue with TE for the unemployed youth goes beyond a simply skill and demand mismatch in the labor market. In order to analyze the obstacles that TE is facing, it is necessary to broaden the scope of analysis to include the key institutional influences on the TE subsystem, which are embedded in historical institutional configuration marked by a disjointed logic. The features of the Spanish institutional arrangement have determined actors' role in the TE subsystem, in which social actors have been marginalized. The pivotal role of the state in the TE subsystem has limited social actors' role and it is part of the overall failure to provide the necessary skills to the labor market. However, the TE is just one part of the overall qualifications supply-side, thus its apparent failure to address the structural deficiencies is embedded in the large structural arrangements. The overall institutional deficiencies have created a context in which the desired positive complementarities between the protection system and the regime of production have not been created. Instead, a dual and deficient labor market have emerged, in which youth employment is not only precarious but also far more exposed to the economic cycles than the other cohorts. As a result, the rates of youth unemployment are far higher than the EU media, threatening the future of a whole generation.

The mechanism created to foster social dialogue have failed to stabilize and routinize it, as a result social dialogue continues to be characterized by its volatility. Thus, it hinders the development of trust among social actors and the state. Even though, the participation in the EU has opened the doors to new organizational fields for the social actors, the national organizational field is resilient to change.

Arguably, macroeconomic pressures to comply with EMU criteria have hindered the blossoming of social dialogue and narrowed the space for maneuver for all actors, at the national organizational field. However, the institutional architecture of social dialogue and its mechanisms has not facilitated its activation, despite high levels of unemployment and the contraction of the economy. Under such critical circumstances, it could have been expected that social dialogue would have emerged as a tool to ease the harsh impact of the economic crisis. The current institutionalization of social dialogue, in which social actors have a mere consultative role, hinders the prospects of long-term commitments that are necessary to foster a well-developed TE. These features have created an environment in which not only actors but also the civil society does not trust the TE subsystem. The significant skill mismatch in the market reduces the incentives for both employers and the unemployed youth to invest in the acquisition of skills, given the uncertainty of the returns that they might yield. Moreover, as social actors have argued, there are not positive complementarities between the educational system and the labor market, which are seen as necessary to transform into a high value added economic model.

Both social actors have argued for the need to address the deficiencies in the system. However, they both continued to be part of the social mechanism concertation, which have produced deficient institutional outcomes, in terms of complementarities. In this context, it does not appear clear what factors would lead to a substantial institutional change, as actors continue to perceive the institutions as beneficial for them; despite, the high levels of unemployment and economic contraction. Though, an instrumental account offers an insight into the underlying reasons for actors not to defect from the institutional arrangements; it is vague, as to what factors would eventually affect the actors' perception to defect from the current arrangements. Despite social actors' positive opinion towards change in the TE subsystem and the economic model, the

analysis suggests that there are no clear indications for changes for institutional model, at least in the short-term.

### *Theoretical contributions*

On a theoretical level, this research corroborates that Spain's institutional framework corresponds to the MME model, developed by Molina & Rhodes (2007). It shares the many of the archetypical features, such as the underdeveloped mechanisms of social concertation, and the pivotal role of the state as legislator. Furthermore, there is a mix of market and non-market coordination that are intertwined in an unstable pattern. In Spain, low levels of union density and its vertical fragmentation typified the weak state of social actors in MME's. Social actors fragmentation has inhibited the development of large class-coalitions, which are seen as necessary to make long-term investments or to create the conditions for dynamic create destruction. MME's underlying mixed logic between the two archetypical models, appears be deficient in order to foster positive complementaries. The systematic failure to create positive complementaries is matter of concern for the EU normative institutional reproduction, which has failed to yield similar institutional outcomes.

One possible contribution of this research to the VoC literature is the integration of different levels of analysis into the national organizational field. In particular, the integration of the diverse organizational field is of great relevance for the European countries, as the EU plays a significant influence in the national agendas. Thus, the resources and dynamics from the supranational field are influencing national organizational actors priorities, as its actors have gained access to other organizational fields and resources, from which they were previously deprived. In the future, it will be relevant to analyze the patterns of negotiation and mutual influence between the two organizational fields, and how the role of its actors might evolve over time.

### *Future research*

The regulations governing TE changed during the elaboration of this research and all social actors were expectant of the new implications that the change in legislation would have. Therefore, it will of particular interest to better understand in which ways has the new legislation affected TE and the mutual actors perception.

This research could be also conductive for the elaboration of TE evaluation, as it provides the institutional foundation in which the programs are embedded. Therefore, it would help to frame the programs within the overall institutional goals and expectations of the diverse social actors. Thus, it would help to explain the diverse institutional outcomes that might have emerged from isomorphic EU initiatives.

Finally, the rise of the grass root movement in Spain such as the *Indignados* movement and its articulation into the political party *Podemos* could possibly change the Spanish institutional environment. A shift in actors' power resource could be conductive to trigger a change within the Spanish socio political institutions, as *Podemos* popularity is based on its rejection to the current institutional arrangements. However, it is still to early to estimate what kind of impact this might have on the overall institutional arrangements and in the TE subsystem.

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## Tables and figures

**Table No. 1.**

**GDP growth, labor productivity growth, real unit labour cost, real wages per head, unemployment rate: 1961-2005**

Year	GDP growth	Labour Productivity growth	Real unit labour costs	Real wages per head	Unemployment rate
1961-1973	7.2	6.5	0.5	7.6	0.8
1974-1985	1.8	3.2	-0.6	2.4	8.2
1986-1995	3.0	1.4	-0.1	1.6	16.6
1996-2005	3.2	0.6	-0.6	0.6	12.9

**Source: Koch, 2008**

**Table No. 2.**

Social pacts during the period of macro Concertation (1977-1986)

Outcome	Nature of the agreement	Signed by
Pactos de Moncloa (1977)	Political	Government and political parties. Later support from all social actors.
Basic inter-confederal agreement (1979)	Bipartite	CEOE/ UGT
Inter-confederal framework (1980-1981)	Bipartite	CEOE/ UGT/ USO
National agreement on employment (1982)	Tripartite	Government/ CEOE/ UGT/ CCOO
Inter-confederal agreement (1983)	Bipartite	CEOE/ UGT/ CCOO
Social and economic agreement (1984-1986)	Tripartite	Government/ CEOE/ UGT

Social pacts during the period of fragmented Concertation and competitive orientation (1992-2002)

Outcome	Nature of the agreement	Signed by
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<b>Agreement on professional and continuous training (1992), which is to be renewed every four years 1996, 2002 and 2006</b>	Bipartite/ Tripartite	Government/ CEOE-CEPYME/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Inter-confederal agreement over rules and legislation (1994)</b>	Bipartite	CEOE-CEPYME/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Agreement over the consolidation of the welfare system (1996)</b>	Tripartite	Government/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Agreement over employment and social protection in the agricultural sector (1996)</b>	Tripartite	Government/ CEOE-CEPYME/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Tripartite agreement over conflict resolution (1996)</b>	Tripartite	Government/ CEOE-CEPYME/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Inter-confederal agreement over employment stability (1997)</b>	Bipartite	CEOE-CEPYME/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Agreement over coverage (1997)</b>	Bipartite	CEOE-CEPYME/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Inter-confederal agreement over collective bargaining (1997)</b>	Bipartite	CEOE-CEPYME/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Agreement over part-time employment (1998)</b>	Tripartite	Government/ CEOE-CEPYME / UGT
<b>Agreement over the increase on pensions (1999)</b>	Bipartite	Government/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Agreement over the creation of an organization that would prevent labor risks (2000)</b>	Bipartite	Government/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Agreement over improvements on social security policies (2001)</b>	Tripartite	Government/ CEOE-CEPYME/ CCOO

Social pacts during the period of re-centralization and re-establishment of social dialogue

<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Nature of the agreement</b>	<b>Signed by</b>
<b>Declaration for social dialogue 2004: Competitiveness, stable employment and social cohesion</b>	Tripartite	Government/ CEOE-CEPYME/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Declaration over social dialogue in public administrations (2004)</b>	Bipartite	Government/ / CCOO/ UGT / CSI-CSIF
<b>Agreement over the policy to protect individuals in dependent situation (2005)</b>	Tripartite	Government/ CEOE-CEPYME/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Agreement over employment creation and growth (2006)</b>	Tripartite	Government/ CEOE-CEPYME/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Agreement over social security measures (2006)</b>	Tripartite	Government/ CEOE-CEPYME/ CCOO/ UGT
<b>Agreement over rules</b>	Bipartite	Government/ / CCOO/ UGT /

**Table No. 3**

<b>Social dialogue and unilateral reforms in Spain, 2008-2012</b>		
<b>July 2008</b>	Memorandum of Understanding for the Recovery of the Economy, Employment, Competitiveness and Social Progress	Signed by CCOO (Comisiones Obreras), UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores), CEOE (Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales) and the Government
<b>September 2009</b>	Agreement for the public sector between trade unions and the Government 2010-2012	Signed by CCOO, UGT, CSIF (Central Sindical Independiente y de Funcionarios) Confederación Sindical and the Government
<b>January 2010</b>	Inter-confederal Agreement on Employment and Collective Bargaining 2010-2012 (AENC-I)	Bipartite agreement signed by CCOO, UGT and CEOE containing guidelines for collective agreement
<b>January 2010</b>	Plan for Immediate Action 2010	There was neither consultation nor negotiations between the social partners and the Government.
<b>May 2010</b>	Austerity Plan for the Public Sector 2011-2013	There were neither consultations nor negotiations between the social partners and the Government.
<b>June-September 2010</b>	Labour Market Reform	Tripartite negotiations failed. The Government ruled unilaterally.
<b>December 2010</b>	Industrial Policy Programme - PIN 2020	The Government consulted social partners about some of the contents, but their involvement was limited.
<b>January 2011</b>	Social and Economic Agreement on pensions, the labour market and collective bargaining	Tripartite Social Pact signed by CCOO, UGT, CEOE and the Government.
<b>March 2011</b>	Law for Sustainable Economy	The Government consulted the social partners about some of the contents, but their

		involvement was limited.
<b>June 2011</b>	Reform of Collective Bargaining	Bipartite agreement providing guidelines for collective agreements
<b>January 2012</b>	Inter-confederal Agreement on Employment and Collective Bargaining (AENC-II)	There was neither consultation nor negotiations with the social partners. Unilateral approval by the Government
<b>March 2012</b>	Labour Market Reform	Tripartite negotiations failed. The Government ruled unilaterally.

**Table No. 4**

#### Summary of legal measures on permanent and temporary contracts in Spain, 1980-2006

Legal measures	Permanent Contracts	Temporary contracts
<b>Workers' Statute (1980)</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Individual dismissals: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-For objective reasons.</li> <li>-For economic, organizational, or technological reasons.</li> <li>-For disciplinary reasons.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Ruling by labor courts upon appeal: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Unfair: 45 days' wages per year of seniority (maximum 42 months's wages) + interim wages.</li> <li>-Fair: 20 days wages per year of seniority (maximum 12 months' wages) + interim wages.</li> <li>-Void: reinstatement.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Collective dismissal: Administrative approval. Same dismissal costs as fair individual dismissals</li> </ul>	<p>Minor incidence.</p> <p>Only seasonal jobs (under stringent regulation).</p>
<b>Law 32/1984</b>		Employment promotion contract (EPC) ( <i>Contrato temporal de Fomento del Empleo</i> ): For any type of job. Minimum length, 6 months; maximum length, 3 years.
<b>Decree 1/1992</b>	Social security contributions rebates for hiring permanent employees	EPC minimum duration raised to 12 months and maximum duration raised to 4 years (under certain circumstances)
<b>Law 11/1994</b>	<p>New definition of collective dismissal</p> <p>Extension of the definition of fair dismissal</p>	<p>EPC abolished. Temporary contracts only allowed for fixed-term duration jobs.</p> <p>Legalization of temporary work agencies.</p>

<b>Law 63/1997</b>	Permanent Employment Promotion Contract (PECP) (Contrato de Fomento de la Contratación Indefinida). Severance pay for unfair dismissals for objective reasons lowered to 33 days' wages per year of service (maximum 24 months' wages), only for targeted groups	Strengthening of causality principle in the applicability of temporary contracts
<b>Law 12/2001</b> <b>Law 45/2002</b>	Extension of coverage of PECP.  Elimination of interim wages when dismissal is acknowledged as unfair by the employer and severance pay deposited in court	Severance pay for 8 days' wages per year of service in some temporary contracts
<b>Decree 5/2006</b>	Extension of coverage of PEPC  New tax deductions for hiring permanent employees.	Restrictions on continuation of temporary contracts to same employee.

Source: Bentolila *et al*, 2008

## Table No5.

Educational attainment of 25-64 year-olds (2011)


	Educational attainment	25-64 year olds				25-34 year olds			
		2000	2005	2008	2011	2000	2005	2008	2011
<b>27France</b>	Below Upper Secondary	38	33	30	28	24	19	17	17
	Upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary	41	41	42	42	45	42	40	40
	Tertiary education	22	25	27	30	31	40	41	43
<b>Germany</b>	Below Upper Secondary	18	17	15	14	15	16	14	13
	Upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary	58	59	60	59	63	62	62	59
	Tertiary education	23	25	25	28	22	23	24	28



<b>Italy</b>	Below Upper Secondary	55	50	47	44	41	34	31	29
	Upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary	36	38	39	41	49	50	49	50
	Tertiary education	10	12	14	15	11	16	20	21
<b>Spain</b>	Below Upper Secondary	62	51	49	46	45	36	35	35
	Upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary	16	21	22	22	21	24	26	26
	Tertiary education	23	28	29	32	34	40	39	39
<b>United Kingdom</b>	Below Upper Secondary	37	33	28	23	33	27	20	16
	Upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary	37	37	36	37	38	38	37	37
	Tertiary education	26	30	35	39	29	35	43	47

Source: (OECD 2013a)

**Table No. 6** Main areas of TE provided



5. Los datos de la convocatoria de jóvenes menores de 30 años que se presentan sobre acciones formativas y modalidad de impartición de esta iniciativa se han calculado a partir de la información facilitada por las entidades beneficiarias de la subvención en 2014 (según ejercicio presupuestario 2014), por tanto se trata de cifras provisionales.

Source: FTFE, 2014

**Table No.7**

<b>The Three varieties of capitalism</b>			
	<b>CMEs</b>	<b>LMEs</b>	<b>MMEs</b>
<b>Dominant form of coordination of micro-interactions</b>	Autonomous coordination	Market; arms-length interactions	Mixed (autonomous + market) with higher impact of regulation and state mediation
<b>Source of complementarities</b>	Bottom-up induced	Market induced coherence across policy arenas	State regulatory changes aimed at correcting coordination failures may be dysfunctional
<b>Re-enforcing mechanism (mechanism of stability)</b>	High permeability of political system to domestic coalitions	High penetration of policymaking by exogenous forces	Gate-keeping role of the state: veto power of domestic actors
<b>Time horizons</b>	Long-term	Short-term	Medium-low
<b>Investments in particular assets</b>	High	Low	Employers: fragmented
<b>Organizational characteristics of interest associations</b>	Employers: strong and well organized sectors	Employers: fragmented	Employers: fragmented.
	Unions: politically strong and well articulated organizations	Unions: strong firm level, but fragmented and politically weak	Unions: politically strong but fragmented and weakly articulated
<b>Role of the state</b>	Enabling: protects collective goods	Minimum state: guarantees the effective functioning of the market	Pervasive state: direct production and regulation + correction of coordination failures
<b>Expected reform coalitions</b>	Cross-class	Producer groups, multinational industrial, and financial groups	Class conflict; fragmented cross-class coalitions (sectoral reform coalitions)

Source: Molina & Rhodes, 2007

**Table No. 8**

<b>Employment protection</b>		
	<b>Low</b>	<b>High</b>
<b>High</b>	Industry specific skills	Industry specific skills

**Unemployment protection**


	Example: Denmark	Firms specific skill mix Example: Germany
<b>Low</b>	General skills Example: United States	Firm-specific skills Example: Japan

**Social protection and predicted skill profiles**

Source: Estevez-Abe *et al*, 2001

**Figure No. 1**

Formation for Employment (ET) subsystem




Source: Homs, 2008

**Figure No2.**

■ Figure 4.24 ■

**Workers in high-skilled and unskilled jobs**

Percentage of workers in jobs requiring primary education (ISCED-1) or less and in jobs requiring tertiary education (ISCED-5 or higher)



1. See notes at the end of this chapter.

Note: Required education is the qualification the worker deems necessary to get his/her job today.


Countries are ranked in ascending order of the percentage of workers in jobs requiring tertiary education.

Source: Survey of Adults Skills (PIAAC) (2012), Table A4.24.

Created with Tableau Software, version 10.1.7017/0000015001712

Source: OECD (2013b, 168).

**Figure No3.** Supply and demand side policy articulation



Source: Ministry of Employment, 2012

## INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. *How has both the process of Europeanization and decentralization changed the institutional framework of negotiation in which you, as a social actor, participate?*
  - a. *Has your capabilities being enhanced or rather restricted?*
  - b. *Has the participation in a single market affected the cohesion within large social actors, given the different degrees of sectorial exposure to international competition.*
  - c. *Do Spain main social actors have the capability to enforce neo-corporatist pacts among its constituency given the current composition of the industrial and labor market landscape? (being dominated by small size firms)*
  
2. *How does the change in productive model is understood from your position?*
  - a. *Does the different dynamics in terms of both geographical, sectorial and firm size hinders or enables the processes?*
  - b. *What are the challenges for large social actors to represent the diversity of interest that compose it?*
  
3. *Given the dimension of the Unemployment phenomenon among the Spanish youth, how do understand the training services provided by the PES?*
  - a. *How can the training be understood within the EES and its aim to promote innovation and job creation?*
  - b. *Does it address the needs of the current model, or are they aimed to change the productive model? Do they address youth employability within these models? Do they change in the different autonomous regions*
  - c. *What other possible focus should they have, why is this path not being taken?*
  - d. *How should employability be understood given the sectorial composition of the Spanish labor market? (high degree of mismatching)*
  - e. *How can increased employability be understood between the current economic productive model and the EES?*
  - f. *How can social actors provide incentives for*
  - g. *Does increased employability within a single market and the current composition of the Spanish productive model be contradictory? (Brain drain)*
  
4. *How do you understand the role that PT has in Spain?*

## Guía

1. De que manera los procesos conjuntos de descentralización y integración a nivel Europeo han cambiado el marco institucional en el cual los mayores actores sociales, asociaciones de Empleadores y Trabajadores, participan en conjunto con el gobierno?
  - a. Las Capacidades institucionales se han visto restringidas o mejoradas?
  - b. La participación en el mercado único Europeo, ha tenido algún impacto en la cohesión interna dentro de las asociaciones gremiales, debido a los diferentes grados de exposición sectorial al mercado internacional
  - c. Ha cambiado capacidad institucional de los grandes actores sociales para refrendar los pactos sociales neo-estatistas, en el contexto actual?
2. Como se entiende el modelo productivo impulsado por la comunidad Europea y el Estrategia para el Empleo Europea desde su posición?
  - a. De que manera las diferentes dinámicas en términos sectoriales, geográficos pueden afectar este proceso?
  - b. Qué desafíos enfrentan los actores sociales en una creciente diversidad de interés dentro de sus elementos constitutivos?
3. Dada la dimensión del desempleo juvenil en España, como se puede observar la labor de las formaciones ocupacionales que ofrece el SEPE a los desempleados?
  - a. Como se puede entender la oferta formativa ocupacional del SEPE, dentro de la Estrategia de Empleo Europea y su deseo de convertir a Europa en un centro económico innovador y la promoción de nuevos empleos de calidad?
  - b. La oferta formativa ocupacional atiende las necesidades del modelo empresarial actual o se enfoca a cambiar el modelo productivo, basado en las iniciativas Europeas? Las formaciones ocupacionales incrementan la empleabilidad, de los jóvenes, en relación al modelo económico y las necesidades del mercado laboral? De que manera se entiende las formaciones ocupacionales desde las diferentes necesidades de las regiones Autónomas?
  - c. Como se debe entender el incremento de empleabilidad, en el caso de los jóvenes, dada la composición sectorial del mercado laboral Español? Se puede interpretar de otra manera dentro de la promoción de la Estrategia de desarrollo Europeo? Es decir la modelo de empleabilidad es compatible en ambos modelos?
4. Como se entiende el déficit de formaciones profesionales dentro del modelo productivo Español y su repercusión en el desempleo juvenil?

**Table 9**

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Interview Index	
Foment (CEOE & CEPYME) Catalonia	<b>Miereia Recio</b> <i>Tecnica, Departament de Relacions Laborals i Afers Socials (Labor and Social Affairs Department)</i>
Cepyme	<b>Gabriela Urirarte</b> <i>Directora de Relaciones Internacionales, Empleo y Formación (Head of International Relations, Employment and Training)</i>
CEOE	<b>Carmen Sanchez</b> <i>Coordinadora tecnica planes de formación (Technical training plans coordinator)</i>
CCOO	<b>Javier Pueyo</b> <i>Secretaria Confederal de Juventus de Comisiones Obreras (Youth Affairs Department)</i>
CCOO (group interview)	<b>Pilar Recio</b> <i>Secretaria de Accion Sindical de CCOO (Union Affairs Department)</i>
	<b>Hortensia García</b> <i>Secretaria Confederal de Proteccion Social y Politicas Publicas (Social Protection and Public Policy Department)</i>
	<b>Mercedes González</b> <i>Secretaria confederal de Protección Social y Políticas Públicas (Social Protection and Public Policy Department)</i>
UGT	<b>Teresa Muñoz</b> <i>Secretaria de Formación (Training Department)</i>

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