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Expanding surveillance in the name of national security

An analysis of Finnish security discourses

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the Finnish government's and its agents' discursive justifications for the recently proposed civil and military intelligence legislation. In order to analyse the Finnish governmental agents' discursive practices, this thesis engages with two additional questions; how are threats to Finnish security constructed in media, and how is the concept of exceptionalism constructed in media. The analysis employs the Finnish government's Ministries of Interior and Defence's proposals for the new intelligence legislation, as well as written news articles by the Helsingin Sanomat subscription newspaper and radio broadcasts by the Finnish Broadcasting Company. This thesis' theoretical framework is predominantly based on the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory. The methodological framework is based on poststructuralist discourse analysis. The core argument of this thesis is that the Finnish government and its agents have justified the proposed intelligence legislation by discursively constructing threats to Finnish security. Furthermore, the findings of this study indicate that the threats named by the Finnish governmental agents have been discursively framed as exceptional.

Keywords: *intelligence legislation, surveillance, security, threat, media, securitization, exceptionalism*

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction.....	1
1.1. Aim and research questions	2
1.2. Outline.....	3
2. Literature overview	4
2.1 The Finnish foreign and security policy background	4
2.2 The Cold War and post Cold War eras	5
2.3 Finlandization	7
2.4 The Westernization of Finland	8
2.5 Government surveillance	9
2.6 Government surveillance practices in the modern context	11
3. Conceptual Framework.....	13
3.1 Threat	13
3.2 Securitization	14
3.3 Exceptionalism	14
4. Theoretical Framework.....	15
4.1. The Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory	15
4.2. Nonpoliticized, Politicized and Securitized	15
4.3. The concept of security	16
4.4. Widening the concept of security	17
4.5. Securitization as target of analysis	19
4.6. Desecuritization	21
5. Methodological Framework.....	24
5.1. Discourse Analysis	24
5.2. Poststructuralist discourse analysis as method	26
5.3. Case study	29
5.4. Material	31
5.5 Timeline of the media material	35
5.6 Limitations	35
6. Speech acts.....	36
6.1. Initial threat discourses	37
6.2. Initial threat discourses in media	39
6.3 The national Self against the foreign threatening Other	42
6.4 The logic of linking	44
6.5 Further remarks on exceptionalism	45
6.6 Public resonance in media	47
6.7 Implications of politicized discourses	49
6.8 Further remarks on desecuritization	51
7. Discussion.....	54
8. Conclusion	56
9. Bibliography	58
9.1. Primary Material	61

Abbreviations

CP – Centre Party

DF – Defence Forces

EEAS – European External Action Service

EU – European Union

FCMA – Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance

FSIS – Finnish Security Intelligence Service

HS – Helsingin Sanomat

MoD – Ministry of Defence

MoI – Ministry of Interior

NPC – National Coalition Party

PR – The Politics Radio

SDP – Social Democratic Party of Finland

US – United States

1 Introduction

On October 1st 2015, the Finnish government's Ministries of Interior and Defence designated two legislative working groups, whose task was to prepare the country's new intelligence legislation. The legislation proposal documents, *Civilian intelligence legislation* (Ministry of Interior 2017) and *Proposal for legislation on military intelligence* (Ministry of Defence 2017), were completed and released to the public on April 19th 2017. The proposed intelligence legislation stipulates that the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (FSIS) and Defence Forces (DF) would be permitted with an extended authorization for the purpose of information gathering in Finland as well as outside the nation's territory. The proposed legislation notes that in cases perceived as relevant for maintaining Finland's national security, the stated authorities could monitor, track and gather citizens' private information more efficiently, and without the currently mandatory juridical preparations obliged by the Finnish court system. Hence, in the name of national security, the government's surveillance practices would be freed from the existing legal framework. The intelligence legislation has turned out to be a burdensome reform; the implementation process requires a constitutional amendment, and a majority approval by the Finnish Parliament. In addition, since the release of the legislation proposals, Finland's national press has raised concerns about the government's extended surveillance practices and their impact on citizens' fundamental rights (Halminen & Kempas 2017). As a result, a range of Finnish governmental officials have appeared frequently in media during the period 2017-2018. They have commented on the details of the proposed legislation and the general necessity of adopting new intelligence measures. In the global context, the deployment of more far reaching government initiated surveillance practices has become a relevant and widely debated security policy related phenomenon. The worldwide intensification of governmental surveillance practices has been connected to the changes posed by the rapid development of information technology, as well as to the emergence of new and exceptional threats in the global security environment (Lyon 2004: 135, Coleman & McCahill 2011: 94). This thesis will critically investigate the complex nexus of government surveillance and national security prospects by focusing on the ways in which the proposed intelligence legislation in Finland has been justified.

1.1 Aim and research questions

The aim of this thesis is to investigate how the Finnish government and its agents have discursively justified the proposed intelligence legislation. While conducting this thesis, the legislation still awaits the Finnish Parliament's approval, and the Members of the Parliament will vote for it during 2018. Due to this, I will utilize the phrases *proposed intelligence legislation*, *proposed legislation* and *intelligence legislation proposal* in this thesis. Secondly, I will utilize the term *legislation* in this thesis, because it is the official translation used by the Finnish government in the aforementioned documents (Minister of Interior 2017: 7, Minister of Defence 2017: 5).

In order to conduct a deep analysis of the government's justifications, I will investigate how varying threats¹ to Finnish security, and the concept of exceptionalism², have been discursively constructed in the country's media. This thesis is informed by the three following research questions:

1. How has the Finnish government justified its proposed civil and military intelligence legislation?
2. How are threats to Finnish security constructed in media?
3. How is the concept of exceptionalism constructed in media?

In order to answer the stated research questions, I will focus on written and spoken discourses addressing the proposed intelligence legislation in Finland between 2017-2018. Thus, the methodological framework of this thesis is predominantly based on discourse analysis. In respect of the analytical aspirations guiding this thesis, the theoretical framework and the analysis engage with the Copenhagen School's Securitization³ Theory. The above mentioned *Civilian intelligence legislation*

¹ Security *threat* refers to an event or an issue that can endanger a state's sovereignty.

² *Exceptionalism* is a discursive practice used to frame a specific event or issue, such as an existential threat to national security. Exceptionalism can also refer to the actual policies and practices that are put forward as a response to extraordinary security political circumstances that have far reaching security implications.

³ *Securitization* refers to the process whereby an issue is moved out of the realm of normal politics into the realm of security politics. As argued in this thesis,

(Ministry of Interior 2017) and *Proposal for legislation on military intelligence* (Ministry of Defence 2017) will be deployed as the primary material in investigating the Finnish government's discursive justifications. In addition, written news articles by the *Helsingin Sanomat* newspaper and radio broadcasts by the *Finnish Broadcasting Company* have been selected as the primary media material analysed in this thesis.

The concepts of *threat*, *exceptionalism* and *securitization*, as introduced in this section, will be discussed more extensively in the conceptual framework chapter (see Chapter 3).

1.2 Outline

This thesis consists of nine chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. The second chapter provides context about the background of Finland's foreign and security policy-making. In addition, the second chapter looks more closely into the concept of government surveillance by overviewing previous studies' arguments and findings. The third chapter introduces some of the key concepts engaged with in this thesis, as stated in the aim section. The fourth chapter presents the theoretical framework applied in this thesis. The fifth chapter presents the methodological framework, and further addresses how the analysis of the Finnish case will be conducted. This chapter also presents the selected primary material. The sixth chapter presents the analysis and findings of the Finnish intelligence legislation proposal documents and selected media material. The seventh chapter highlights and further discusses the key findings. The eighth chapter provides a concluding summary of the whole thesis. The ninth chapter consists of the bibliography and the primary material used in this thesis.

securitization can occur when a new existential threat is declared by the state and its elites.

2 Literature overview

2.1 The Finnish foreign and security policy background

The following chapter aims to position Finland, as well as myself as a Finnish author, more comprehensively into this thesis. The purpose this section is to map out the field of security politics and national identity in the Finnish context, which will enable me to engage with Finnish security threat related discourses emerging from the proposed intelligence legislation. The literature overview begins by tracing a set of defining features in Finnish foreign policy-making during the Cold War but also in the post Cold War era. The discussion is followed by an account of the implications of the Cold War era for the Finnish national Self-narrative, and its reflections in the contemporary context. The Self-narrative discussion builds on a constructivist framework, which in this thesis is inspired by the edited volume by Lene Hansen and Ole Weaver's *European Integration and National Identity* (2002). I will return to the work of these scholars in the forthcoming theoretical and methodological framework chapters.

The second part of this chapter focuses on the field of government surveillance. The primary aim is to carry out a literature overview, with a more global perspective, on the development of government surveillance practices. The purpose of this is to provide context about the field of government surveillance as a wider phenomenon, and later contrast the presented arguments to my case study focusing solely on Finland.

Finland is often referred as a distinctive foreign and security policy actor in comparison to the country's Nordic and Scandinavian neighbours. Experiences from the World War II and the Cold War eras are, arguably, rooted in the Finnish national identity, and continue to appear in modern age foreign and security policy discourses. In the early 1900s, Finland was still under the Russian Empire. Although during this era, the idea of Finnish autonomy, as well as the significance of the national identity, language and political sovereignty, had started to gain higher momentum. In December 1917, after the Russian Revolution, Finland gained its independence. Thus, the year 2017 marked Finland's 100th anniversary as an independent nation from the Swedish and Russian regimes. As a part of the anniversary celebration, the Finnish news and entertainment media reminisced more notably over the 'journey' as an independent nation. In this context, themes such as the World War II as well as Cold

War experiences were central factors. Both of these topics were also retrieved into security related debates that were conducted as a part of the Presidential election at the turn of 2017-18.

2.2 The Cold War and post Cold War eras

During the World War II, Finland fought in two separate wars against the Soviet Union, the Winter War (1939-40) and the Continuation War (1941-44). In the aftermath, Finland withheld its independence, although by ceding some of the Eastern and Northern borders' territories. After the war, Finland increasingly searched opportunities for international bridge building, yet during the following decades, the country's foreign policy proved to be limited to other developments except for managing its relationship with the Soviet Union (Palosaari 2013: 360). Previous studies addressing the history of Finnish foreign and security policy frequently focus on the Cold War and immediate post Cold War eras. Undoubtedly, a closer assessment of foreign and security policy during these periods is justified in order to comprehend Finland's eventual membership in the EU.

Between the 1950s and 1980s, the Presidents Juho Paasikivi (1946-56) and Urho Kekkonen (1956-81) strove for disassociating Finland from any great-power conflict (Henriksson 2007: 529). In 1948 Finland and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), whereby Finland guaranteed its neutral position between East and West, but also committed to a trade agreement with the Soviet Union and obliged to resist all NATO operations in the Finnish territory (Henriksson 2007: 529, Palosaari 2013: 360). In Anders Henriksson's article (2007: 530), which is developed from the analysis in *The Soviet Union, Finland and the Cold War* (Kähönen 2006), Finland's policy-making is similarly portrayed as limited as in Palosaari's study (2013: 360). Henriksson (2007: 530) argues that during the Cold War, the Finnish government was essentially balancing between the management of the Soviet relations, including the ideological pressure posed by the leadership in Moscow, and the establishment of political and economic ties with Western Europe. Here, the notion of ideological pressure comprises the Soviet Union's public, dissatisfied statements about the Finnish government's efforts for formulating economic relations outside the friendship treaty's trade sections. As a result, the Soviet Union, on a few occasions, viewed the

leading actors of the Finnish Social Democratic party as “hostile”, and tried to influence Finland’s domestic relations via the Communist Party of Finland by publicly questioning the Finnish policy of neutrality (ibid). Thus, Finland’s geopolitical positioning defined the government’s foreign and security policy-making during the Cold War, which was, above all, characterized by tension and prudence. During the Cold War era, the circumstances whereby a smaller nation organizes its policy-making to accommodate a neighbouring great-power regime’s interests attracted its own term - ‘Finlandization’.

2.3 Finlandization

The concept of Finlandization, or as described by Tapio Juntunen (2017: 56) the “Finnish model” during the Cold War, has been assessed varyingly. Some scholars have referred to the Finnish introverted foreign policy approach as a necessary and thoroughly thought out policy that guaranteed the nation’s sovereignty during the time of uncertainty. As an example, a statement from the 1980s presented in the introduction chapter of *Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis: A Case Study of Finland* (Jakobson 1980 in Browning 2008: 9) follows this narrative: “*Finland’s security policy is not ‘based on historical ties and affinities or shared values, but on an unsentimental calculation of the national interests’*”. Palosaari (ibid) also contends that the President Kekkonen’s policy (1956-81) towards the Soviet Union has been explicated as systematic “bridge-building”, whereby avoiding taking any clear stances, Finland was able to retain cohesive relationship with both, the Soviet Union and Western countries.

On the other hand, Finlandization has also been criticized. In a more recent study, the author Juntunen (2017: 56) highlights that Finland’s abidance to the Soviet Union has been posited as “shameless and embarrassing concession” of sovereign liberties (Juttila 1983 in Juntunen 2017: 55). Interestingly enough, the criticism in Juntunen’s (ibid) study does not reflect the Finnish political leadership or the President Kekkonen, but the arguments are rather targeted separately on Finlandization as something that merely existed during the time. As of my own interpretation, the concept of Finlandization rarely appears within modern Finnish political discourses, although when mentioned, it is condemned and generally addresses in a negative tone when referring to actors that refuse to express their clear stance on a specific issue. However, the discussions on Finlandization have re-emerged since the Russian

occupation in Ukraine (Inboden 2014: n.p. and Juntunen 2017: 56). In this context, the criticism is rather targeted towards the international community, as Juntunen (2017: 56) elaborates that such “neutralisation” of a conflict should not be accepted by outside actors, e.g. the EU and its member states.

2.4 The Westernization of Finland

Chris Browning has studied more extensively the linkage between the Finnish foreign policy-making and national identity formation (see Browning 2002, 2003 & 2008). Browning (2002: 49) states that since the end of the Cold War, Finland’s foreign policy has “increasingly oriented towards the ‘West’”, of which its EU membership acts the clearest example. However, according to Pertti Joenniemi (2002: 183), the idea of the EU membership was initially considered as “inconceivable”. Finland’s Prime Minister at the time, Harri Holkeri, stressed that EU membership would endanger the neutrality policy, which at the late 1980s was still perceived as “the corner stone” for the nation’s existence (ibid). In the early 1990s, the prospects of the EU membership became fully added into the Finnish political debates, and the initiative for the entrance application was announced in 1992 (ibid). Finland joined the EU on January 1st 1995.

Joenniemi (ibid) emphasizes that “rationalist and interest-based arguments” are often used in the context of analysing Finland’s foreign and security policy. From this perspective, the reverse in the 1990s policy-making has been regarded as surprising, because the Cold War era’s prudence, self-reliance and patience suddenly “vanished into thin air” (ibid). Browning (2002: 49) and Joenniemi (2002: 183) provide similar explanations for the ‘Westernising’ process of Finnish foreign policy and national identity. Since the break up of the Soviet Union, Finland strove for liberating itself from the dependency of the Soviet Union and Russia, and thus substituted the “wait-and-see attitude”, as described by Joenniemi (2002: 183), with a strong interest in the EU. Moreover, Joenniemi (ibid: 182) states that Finland is the only Nordic country, which in principal has had a positive orientation towards European integration, “without triggering the response that national identity is being threatened”. Later on, Kristi Raik (2015: 440-42) has pointed out that smaller northern European countries that in the past collided with the Soviet Union, such as Finland and Estonia, have been exceptionally “firm supporters of more unified foreign policy and a strong EEAS” (European External Action Service). Although, considering the rising popularity of

the EU resistant Finns Party since the 2010s (similarly as in many other EU member states), Joenniemi (2002: 182) might have altered his perception about the generally positive orientation towards the EU in Finland.

Browning (2002: 50) argues that the political tensions and feeling of uncertainty experienced in the past highly impacted Finland's so-called Westernization process. Moreover, in regards of the national identity, the Finnish foreign policy discourses have since radically differentiated its national 'Self' from Russia (ibid). Browning (ibid: 51) calls this process as "the Westernising narrative of Finnish foreign policy", which the author perceives as a result of a deliberately architected policy, similarly as the formerly addressed Finlandization. In a further study, Browning (2003: 66) strengthens his argumentation about Finland's othering efforts towards Russia. Based on late 1990s and early 2000s foreign policy discourses, differentiating Russia from Finland and from "European values", have been distinguishable themes within Finnish foreign policy-making (ibid).

By drawing upon Browning's (2002, 2003 & 2008) work, it is possible to conclude that after the tension from the 20th century conflicts eased off, Finland's foreign policy has inclined towards radical 'othering' and disassociation from what is widely perceived as a threat to self-reliance and sovereignty. This argument can be supported by the previously recognized features in Finnish foreign and security policy-making, which has been commonly characterized by "unsentimental calculation of national interests" (Browning 2008: 9). On the other hand, similarly to Browning's (2002: 5) argument, due to the decades of restricted policy-making in the Cold War era, the othering of the East was later adopted in Finland as a prominent discursive practice for constructing a Westernized national identity, which, arguably, had developed more subtly and over a longer period of time elsewhere in Northern and Western Europe. However, it can be argued that in the modern and globalized context, the positioning of the Finnish national Self should be further investigated. By cutting into the construction of threats in contemporary Finland, this thesis aims to add to the series of findings that have been previously observed about Finland's East-West relations. Thus, the juxtaposition of national 'Self' and foreign, threatening 'Others' will be applied as a central analytical component in this thesis, as noted in the methodological framework chapter (see Chapter 5).

In the following sections, the focus will be shifted from Finland into a wider context by addressing the concept of government surveillance in a contemporary setting.

2.5 Government surveillance

By addressing the concept of government surveillance more broadly, the aim here is to position the Finnish intelligence legislation proposal into a broader international debate. As stated in the introduction chapter 1, the Finnish legislation in question attracted the national media's attention essentially due to the paragraphs proposing extended authorization of the military and civil surveillance operators. Similar tensions deriving from governments' information gathering practices have been a longstanding social and political problem, because of surveillance's possibly restricting impact on the citizens' privacy rights (Newell 2014: 422). It is possible to argue that in the contemporary context, and due to the nature of information gathering and monitoring enabled by the modern information technology, the tension and controversy around the concept of surveillance have scaled up notably (Moore 2010: 141). In order to investigate the Finnish government's justifications for the proposed legislation that enables intensified surveillance practices, the following literature overview focuses on the development of government surveillance in a wider context.

The concept of government surveillance

Here, I will begin by defining varying practices and actors related to the field of government surveillance so as to contextualize the Finnish experience. The author of *Citizenship and Identity in the Age of Surveillance* (Nayar 2015: 3) elaborates that government surveillance constitutes social relations and complex networks of both governmental and private sector actors. Currently, these networks of actors are primarily structured around varying technological products and services, which are commonly managed by the private sector. Although, the services used for many day-to-day tasks by the public are, in principal, commercially owned, the digitalized communication networks have simultaneously enabled numerous new methods and platforms for governmental authorities to access information (ibid). Thus, it is possible to argue that one of the clearest differentiations between the public and private sector led surveillance is the *purpose* that it is meant to serve. Generally, the private sector strives for growth and profitmaking for their stakeholders, whereby the information managed by them is used to serve commercial interests. Where as in the

governmental sphere, surveillance is commonly linked to security authorities' operations, such as criminal investigation and military institutions (Lyon 2004: 135, Moore 2011: 142, Newell 2014: 422). Due to these varying purposes, the relationship between public and private actors in the field surveillance has also been under tension. As an example, David Cameron announced in 2015 that the UK will "prohibit all messaging services that are beyond the reach of security services" (Pullinen & Teivainen 2015: n.p.).

On the other hand, in *Globalization and Surveillance* (2012: 333), David Wood refers to the concept of government surveillance as "the control mechanism" of the national economy. In other words, in Wood's (ibid) study, surveillance is perceived as the fundament of the modern neoliberal state, which essentially seeks to maintain its position within the competitive global market-economy. In this thesis, however, I will focus on surveillance merely in the context of *security politics*, because in the selected case study, intelligence and surveillance practices are discussed against the backdrop of varying existential security threats. Further discussions on the distinctiveness of security politics, as well as on existential threats, are conducted in the theoretical framework chapter (see Chapter 4).

As stated, in the governmental sector, surveillance and security are interlinked. The policies, practices and technology mobilized in surveillance are generally accounted as "security enhancing" (Newell 2014: 422). This presumption stated by Newell (ibid) reflects upon one of the main contradictions embedded in the unit of surveillance and security: surveillance equals enhanced security, and because "security trumps" all other societal problems (Moore 2011: 142), surveillance is always needed and justified. Moreover, considering the possibility that the prospects of security change and evolve, hence security becomes threatened in new and unconventional ways, surveillance practices will exponentially evolve as well. It is possible to argue that due to this described scenario, the tension between surveillance and the existing legislations and citizen rights, is, most likely, an inevitable outcome. In this thesis, one of my main arguments is that the Finnish government pursues to intensify its military and civil surveillance practices due to an allegedly 'changing' security environment. In the following section, I will continue the discussion by reflecting on previous studies that have addressed the intensification of surveillance practices in the 21st century.

2.6 Government surveillance practices in the modern context

In previous studies, two main themes are commonly recognized as the main causes of intensified government surveillance practices in the 21st century;

1. The development of digital communications technology
2. Changing global security environment

These themes are, to a certain extent, interrelated, and as will be demonstrated in the analysis chapter, these topics also appear as central for the discursive practices used in the Finnish case (see Chapter 6).

In *Globalizing Surveillance* (Lyon 2004: 135), David Lyon argues that monitoring of citizens' information has become widely expanded due to the wide digitalization experienced in most social sectors. Jeffery Vagle (2015: 133) elaborates that the widespread of online and digital communications has created both, transformational means for accessing citizens' information, as well as new demands for the governments to practice surveillance in an even broader scale. More particularly, by drawing upon Vagle's (2015: 133) analysis, the drastic development of the communication technology has simultaneously created an opportunity for more inconspicuous surveillance, as well as challenges for the existing control mechanisms.

The authors of the chapter *Globalisation, Surveillance and the 'War' on Terror* (Coleman & McCahill 2011: 94) argue that "the rapid increase in 'new surveillance' technologies" has essentially been a result of the policy-making adopted since the September 11 2001 attacks in the United States (US). In this setting, the authors (ibid) conclude that discourses around surveillance, in a global context, are connected to the responses for "political violence" and "new terrorism". Furthermore, according to Coleman and McCahill (ibid), the governmental spokespersons in the US and within the EU, alongside the mainstream media, have increasingly invoked to the narrative of "exceptional circumstances" while seeking "legitimacy and wider public support for a range of new surveillance and security measures". Here, the authors (ibid) touch upon the use of *exceptionalism* as a justification in security policy-making. In respect of my study, the construction of exceptionalism in media constitutes one of the set research questions. The concept of exceptionalism, as further investigated by Andrew

Neal (2010 & 2012), will be discussed more extensively in the conceptual framework chapter (see Chapter 3).

Adam Moore (2011: 147) explicates the contemporary surveillance practices through the described interrelation with security politics. Thus, whenever the question of citizen rights, such as privacy, and the prospects of security collide with each other, “security wins” (ibid). Here, Moore’s (ibid) interpretation of the distinctiveness of security politics corresponds with the definition presented in the forthcoming theoretical framework chapter (see Chapter 4).

As my final point, I will turn to Matthias Schulze’s (2015: 201) study, which addresses the securitization theory’s and modern surveillance practices’ relationship. As can be noted, this approach corresponds accurately with the chosen theoretical framework and overall analytical aspirations of this thesis. Similarly as pursued in my case study, Schulze (ibid) reflects upon surveillance against the discourses emphasizing existential threats, where he also highlights counterterrorism policy, similarly as pointed out by Coleman & McCahill (2011: 94). Here, Schulze (ibid) states that according to constructivist international relations scholars, government surveillance and the modern “instruments” applied within it “are a result of a process called securitization”. Thus, by declaring a new existential threat posing the designated object of security, surveillance as a counteraction, despite including “transgressions” or violations of privacy, can gain the required legitimacy (Schulze 2015: 201).

3 Conceptual Framework

This chapter's aim is to introduce a set of key concepts frequently used in this thesis.

3.1 Threat

The concept of security threat, or an *existential threat*, as often accounted in this thesis, is defined as follows by the founders of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory; all actions that endanger a state's sovereignty, hence the survival of a state (Buzan et al. 1998: 22). As will be elaborated further in the forthcoming theoretical framework chapter, depending on the designated object of security, existential threats can vary and be affiliated with other social sectors, such as economics and environment (Weaver 1995: 47).

While focusing on Finland in this thesis, it is useful to review how the Finnish government has defined an existential threat. The Finnish government's report, *Safe?* (orig. *Turvassa*) (Kekki & Mankkinen 2016: 8), presents a detailed and thematic description of threats that, allegedly, pose Finland's national security. According to the report (ibid), contemporary security threats and risks are diverse and human activity led, such as: strategic use of armed forces, terrorism, organized crime or information network disturbance. In addition, various "non-intentional" phenomena are also categorized as security threats by the Finnish government, such as: natural disasters, dysfunction of the electrical grid and disease epidemics (ibid). Furthermore, the Finnish security authorities have stated that foreign companies' operations in Finland can also be threatening to national security (Berglund 2018: n.p.).

3.2 Securitization

In this thesis, the concept of securitization is addressed according to the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory (in Weaver 1995 & Buzan et al. 1998). Securitization constitutes the process whereby an authority responsible for the designated object of security declares a new security problem, hence an existential threat (Weaver 1995: 54). The declaration of an existential threat indicates that the issue is moved out of the realm of normal politics and into the realm of security politics. The realm of security politics constitutes issues that are relevant for maintaining national security, and thus characterized by priority and urgency. The process of securitization comprises that the state gains a legitimacy to handle threats and to mobilize counteractions.

The analysis of securitization calls for investigation of language and discourses surrounding the declaration of security threats, as well as how the securitizing actor breaks free of the binding societal rules as a result of the discursively constructed threats. Securitization is carried out by a securitizing actor, which in this thesis is defined as the Finnish government and its agents. The public, however, is a mutually important actor in securitization, as it is argued that securitization can successfully occur only if the public accepts it (Buzan et al. 1998: 25).

3.3 Exceptionalism

In this thesis, the concept of exceptionalism is a central analytical component while investigating the Finnish threat discourses emerging from the proposed intelligence legislation. I will base my conceptual framework for exceptionalism on Andrew Neal's (2010 & 2012) theoretical development. According to Neal (2010: 2, 2012: 260), exceptionalism is a discursive practice that appears increasingly within the contemporary global security politics, and it is used to frame a specific security politics related event or issue. The concept of exceptionalism implies to notions of urgency, emergency and extraordinary dangers. Exceptional practices comprise the countermeasures taken as a response to the framed events, such as raising preparedness or mobilizing the national armed forces. Thus, exceptional circumstances legitimize exceptionally harsh countermeasures, as stated by Neal (2010: 2). In respect of this thesis, Neal's (2012) study *Normalization and Legislative Exceptionalism* illustrates how the concept of exceptionalism appears as a justification while reforming the existing legislative framework. Due to this, I have decided to draw upon the concept of exceptionalism, as investigated by Neal (2010 & 2012), while investigating what type of discursive practices the Finnish government officials' have used in relation to the declared security threats.

4 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this study is predominantly based on the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory (by Ole Weaver 1995, and Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde 1998). In addition, the theoretical framework will combine a set of components from the theory of desecuritization, as introduced by Weaver (1995) and refined by the work of Lene Hansen (2012). The purpose of my theoretical choices is to enable me to answer my research questions and to meet the general, analytical aspirations underpinning the thesis introduced in the chapter 1, most of which are in line with the work by Weaver (1995), Buzan et al. (1998) and Hansen (2012).

4.1 The Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory

The Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory (from this point onwards referred as the Copenhagen School) primarily addresses the process by which issues are moved out of the realm of normal governmental policy-making, into the area of security politics, where notions of emergency and mobilization of special practices are the governing themes. These main characteristics of the Copenhagen School will be explored more extensively in the following parts. However, in order begin the discussion on the process of securitization, I consider it as important to clarify how the different realms of public and social issues have been conceptualized.

4.2 Nonpoliticized, Politicized and Securitized

Nonpoliticized represents the spectrum of issues, which "the state does not deal with", nor does the governmental sphere necessarily possess the public assent and legitimacy to address them (Buzan et al. 1998:23).

Where as the realm of politics consists of issues that depend on the governmental sector's decision-making and resources. Issues that are *politicized* constitute the main purpose and operations of the public sector, and a broad range of governmental agents are thus expected to speak out on them (ibid). According to Hansen (2012: 528), politicizing implies that a specific issue is "of significance for the society in question", and the subject is thus exposed to engagement and debate.

The realm of security politics is at the centre of this thesis. *Security* represents special kind of politics, which comprises issues that are considered as the utmost priority, and where the previously described realm of politics and the agents operating within it are not considered as sufficient or applicable. The notions of emergency and

exceptionalism are embedded in security, which is why *securitized* politics refer to practices that exist “outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). In contrast to politics, security does not allow public engagement, deliberation and “normal bargaining” (Hansen 2012: 528). The process of moving issues from politics to the realm of security will be discussed throughout the sections addressing the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework. The section 4.6 dedicated for the concept of desecuritization will return to this chapter, as it explores the prospects of moving from security back to the realm of normal politics.

4.3 The concept of security

Having reflected on the themes mentioned in the previous part, the founders of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory (Buzan et al. 1998: 21) elaborate further in the chapter “Conceptual Apparatus”, on why security, especially in the context of international relations, differentiates itself from what would be considered and treated as normal politics. The distinctiveness of security derives from a traditional military-political understanding, which comprises security as a matter of “survival” (ibid: 21). More clearly, security encompasses a specific designated object’s – traditionally a state, nation or territory, but can also be applied to other entities – survival over various posing existential threats. In this thesis, I have chosen to adhere to the Copenhagen School’s traditional understanding for security politics: the survival of the state.

The Copenhagen School explicates that when invoking to security, the state gains a legitimacy to “handle existential threats” and defend sovereignty (ibid). However, as will be elaborated on further below, the concept of security as well as the understanding of existential threats have become widened and attracted alternative approaches.

4.4 Widening the concept of security

An essential component within securitization is associated with the acknowledgement of broader sectors that become affiliated with the concept of security, including the designated objects of security and the existential threats / risks posing it. The conceptual widening of security is primarily considered as a negative development by the founders of the Copenhagen School (Weaver 1995: 47, Buzan et al. 1998: 22). In

order to gain clearer perception of how securitization emerges and where it originates from, it is useful to begin by assessing the effects of widening.

According to Weaver (1995: 47), since the 1980s, the concept of security has witnessed a general widening from the strictly *state* focused perspective. The introduction of the broadened understanding has streamlined the conceptualization of security towards universal, collective and global issues, as well as towards individual levels that address material and ideational human needs. In a thematic sense, this development comprises a rather broad assembly of societal sectors; economics, culture and environmental concerns have increasingly become established as urgent security related concerns, and thus embedded within security politics (ibid).

For example, the recent developments in Finland suggest that aspects such as the energy industry, communication networks and general economic ties have become affiliated with Finland's security authorities' agenda. Particularly, Finland-Russia trade relations are publicly labelled as an issue of national security by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (FSIS) (Berglund 2018: n.p.). The FSIS has justified this by stating that foreign corporations, especially in the case of Russia, can be used as a channel for governmental intelligence gathering (ibid).

The wider conceptualization of security is problematic when looking from the Copenhagen School perspective, which considers security merely as a matter of sovereignty and survival. Critically assessed, the broadened conception of security increases the need for acknowledging a wider realm of security threats, such as in the Finland-Russia trade relations example: the main governmental intelligence authority has established a security threat on the basis of foreign direct investments. Thus, it is appropriate to question whether new sectors should be placed in the same category as the threats defined by the military-political understanding. Moreover, would the new sectors embedded within security become more substantially addressed by the correct actors, if rather considered as their own political fields instead of added into the realm of security?

Weaver (1995: 48) touches upon these questions by stating that the widening of security makes "everything a potential security problem". Furthermore, when security becomes acknowledged as more all-inclusive, the *distinctiveness* of what is collectively considered as the object of security and as existential threats, disappears or becomes "emptied of content", as illustrated by Weaver (ibid). Moreover, it is

possible to argue that the widening constitutes, although not necessarily on purpose, a baseline where security requires constant new and intensified counteractions, such as extending the legislative framework. Here, Weaver (ibid) sees other sectors as important external “dynamics”, which influence the security of a state, although he contests the efforts of multiplying the definition of security.

Criticisms of state centred perspectives

The state centred understanding for security, which is also followed in this thesis, can be interpreted as contradicting within the modern structures for multilateral cooperation and globalized forms governance. In most cases, domestic and foreign policy, whether addressing economy or security, cannot be considered as immune to outside influences, but rather as interlinked to international shifts, and as dependent on the consensus within a collective and assembly of states. For example, as a EU member state, Finland supports further security integration within the EU, and adjusts its security policy-making according to these aspirations. By acknowledging this, the definition of security and threats merely at the national level simply appears as limited.

However, as a response to the limitation elaborated above, authors Buzan and Weaver (2009) have reconstructed the Copenhagen School by introducing the concept of ‘macrosecuritization’. In summary, macrosecuritization assess the “scaling-up” of security from “middle level” (state centred perspective) to global level. Macrosecuritization is applied to studies, where the aspiration is to demonstrate a case of securitization that emerges in a global context, against the backdrop of universal threats (ibid: 253). In regards to macrosecuritization, it can be argued that due to increased global interdependence, security and certain existential threats have become universally unifying concepts, whereby the international community or even the humankind become the designated object of security (ibid: 260-61). Nevertheless, the aim of this thesis is not to pursue the study through the concept of macrosecuritization. Rather, the discourses surrounding the proposed intelligence legislation in Finland formulate the main unit of the analysis, whereby I consider the traditional Copenhagen School framework as the primary approach, because it delivers an opportunity to focus on the notions of security and threats in a nation specific context.

Although, Buzan and Weaver's (2009) analysis on macrosecuritization will be absorbed as a complimentary addition to the theoretical framework, which enables the analysis to delve into the discourses that refer to globalization of threats, and to the international community's security in addition to the main designated object, the Finnish nation and state.

4.5 Securitization as target of analysis

This section aims to further specify the focus of my analysis. I will demonstrate some of the key aspects linked to the 'act' of securitization. The purpose of this is to clarify how actors, such as the state and the public, make securitization possible, and should thus appear as central targets while studying securitization.

The initial theoretical development by Weaver (1995: 54), argues that issues ultimately become associated with security when defined so by "the state and its elites". Thus, the state and its agents are considered as the main securitizing actors in this thesis. Buzan et al. (1998: 24) emphasize the role of language and textual analysis while observing how issues become publicly defined as security related:

"'Security' is thus a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such threat".

The discursive framing of an issue as a security problem formulates the key *act* of securitization. Moreover, Weaver (1995: 55) explains that the utterance, or naming of security by the governmental authorities, is what "makes it reality" (Weaver 1995: 55). The naming of a security problem is formally categorized as *the speech act*. According to the Copenhagen School, the speech act can be designated as the primary target of analysis while looking at the initial phases of securitization: moving an issue out of politics, into the realm of security. However, an important consideration is brought up in Buzan et al. (1998: 27), as the authors state that the speech act is not necessarily defined by the word *security*, but by the logic of requiring exceptional counteractions.

In this thesis, I will focus on the construction of speech acts by analysing how the Finnish government officials have declared security problems - constructed threats - in relation to the proposed intelligence legislation. The speech acts will be monitored

in all of the documents used for the analysis: the legislation proposals, as well as the arguments appearing in media. The studied material is discussed more comprehensively in the method chapter (see Chapter 5).

Securitization case

In order to study securitization fully, as envisaged by Buzan et al. (1998: 25), the analyst should explore the discursive practices and “wider patterns” that the utterance of security constitutes. By referring to ‘wider patterns’, Buzan et al. (ibid: 26) point to the securitizing actor, as well as to its audience, which together formulate a societal “unit”. The mutual interaction within the unit eventually forms a “successful securitization”, which according to Buzan et al. (ibid), consists of three main steps:

- 1) Declaration of an existential threat
- 2) Legitimization of emergency measures as a response to threats
- 3) Effects on the unit by breaking free of binding rules

By analysing the used language, the analyst should aim to encompass both how security is declared, and what type further mobilization the declaration constitutes. A case of securitization can be witnessed and “studied directly” by examining the broader discursive practices and fulfilment of the above described components – language based on an existential threat, followed by the process where a state “has managed to break free of procedures or rules” that are traditionally bound by (ibid: 25).

Securitization and public acceptance

It is important to clarify the role of the public in the process of securitization. The mentioned concept of ‘unit’ primarily refers to the relations and unilateral dialogue between the securitizing actor and the public. In this context, the word public refers to the audience of the governmental sector’s discourses, which essentially includes all non-governmental actors. In order for the state to gain the required legitimacy for the sought counteractions, such as strengthening the capacity of military and security authorities, it has to enjoy the acceptance of the public (ibid). Buzan et al. (ibid) emphasize that “securitization can never only be imposed”, but rather emerges as a result of discussion that “rests on coercion as well as on consent”. In the process of analysing securitization, one should acknowledge the difference between cases where

signs of public acceptance do not exist (securitizing move), or where they indeed become observable (securitization).

In this thesis, the public's acceptance will be looked at essentially through the media discourses.

Concluding remarks on securitization

Existential threats become recognized and labelled as the topmost priority through discursive practices. The declaration of a security problem, hence the speech act, initiates the mobilization of extraordinary countermeasures. Although, in order to grasp this process adequately, the founders of the Copenhagen School do not encourage the analysts to evaluate that to what extent the declared threats endanger a state's sovereignty (ibid: 26). Rather, in order to analytically demonstrate a case of securitization, one should focus on the interunit understanding towards the threats. The described guidelines of the Copenhagen School compliment the methodology and analytical goals of this thesis, because an evaluation of various threats is outside the scope of my research. Rather, I will aim to present findings of the speech acts in the Finnish case, of the threat discourses that are used to justify the proposed intelligence and surveillance practices, and of the public's impressions towards the legislative reform.

4.6 Desecuritization

This part of the chapter will turn to the practice and theory of *desecuritization*. The aim is to provide a theoretical overview of the concept of desecuritization, and to demonstrate how it will be applied in this thesis.

The author Diskaya (2013: n.p.) concludes in his securitization theory review, *Towards a Critical Securitization Theory*, that the Copenhagen School “prefers desecuritization, whereby issues are moved out of the sphere of exceptionality into the ordinary public sphere”. The concept of desecuritization, launched by Weaver (1995: 46-86) alongside the broader ensemble of the Copenhagen School, focuses thus primarily on the prospects of moving out of security. According to Hansen (2012: 526), desecuritization is a “conceptual twin to securitization”, which by its definition assesses how the dialogue and operational practices could be shifted from the sphere of emergency back into the mode of normal political decision-making. To retrieve my previous point from the section 4.2, as an opposite to securitization, desecuritization

comprises the process of *securitized* becoming *politicized*. Desecuritization is included into this thesis' in order to formally acknowledge the Finnish media discourses that possibly criticize, question or propose alternatives for the state's ways of invoking to exceptional and urgent security threats. This choice is motivated by Hansen (2012: 546), as the author emphasizes the usefulness of desecuritization for questioning whether specific issues should be looked at through the lens of danger and exceptionality, or whether it is possible to conceive the objects of securitization through less intimidating terms.

Desecuritization as the preferred option

As mentioned, the theoretical background on desecuritization derives from Weaver's (1995: 56) arguments on the relationship of security and insecurity, which "do not constitute a binary opposition". Here, Weaver (ibid) implies that insecurity refers to an existing security problem, which the government has not yet responded to with exceptional counteractions, although as a condition, insecurity still shares the problematic of security. Alternatively, without security problems, societal conditions are not defined according to security, whereby security simply becomes an irrelevant concern (ibid). Based on this, Weaver (ibid) proposes that the overcoming of security problems can be achieved only by moving away from the discourses of security, hence by *politicizing*.

Furthermore, by drawing upon the previous argument, one can gain a better understanding of why the Copenhagen School prefers desecuritization. The authors (Weaver ibid, Buzan et al. 1998: 29) consider desecuritization as "the optimal long-range option", which implies that securitization and the acceptance of it are political choices, and not inevitable outcomes. Thus, while analysing a case of securitization, it becomes plausible to ask that "whether it is a good idea" to add and broaden the agenda of special security politics, which create the need for rapid counteractions, or would it be more productive remain at the ordinary realm of politics (Buzan et al. 1998: 34).

When referring to these stated arguments on behalf of desecuritization, my analysis aims to, most importantly, grasp the questioning arguments presented in media towards the proposed intensified intelligence and surveillance practices. Furthermore, even though the authors of the Copenhagen School perceive desecuritization as the preferred approach, the practice of desecuritizing appears as less explored. Arguably,

it is an analytical challenge to demonstrate implications of desecuritization within the national security discourses. As stated by Hansen (2012: 530), desecuritization does not occur through speech acts, hence by declaring that an issue is no longer a threat. Rather, desecuritization is “performative”, where the role of the public acceptance is, again, crucial: “it must instantiate the non-threatening identity of the Other for desecuritization to be possible” (ibid: 533). It is possible to argue that also in the Finnish case, the discourses around the proposed intelligence legislation lack notions of desecuritization. Due to this, by applying desecuritization, and by investigating the prospects of politicizing instead of securitizing, this thesis enhances its potential as a valuable empirical and theoretical contributor.

In the next chapter, I will introduce the methodological framework of this thesis, which is mainly based on discourse analysis. As has been mentioned in this chapter, in order to study securitization, the analyst has to focus on discourses. Discourse analysis as a method, however, cannot be fully detached from its theoretical foundations (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 4).

5 Methodological Framework

This chapter's aim is to present the methodological framework applied in this thesis. Firstly, it is important to point out that the primary material and data used in the selected case study are qualitative. Due to this, I have chosen a methodology that corresponds with my aspirations for a qualitative analysis. Below, the section 5.4 provides a more detailed description of the case study's selection process.

Secondly, as stated in the chapter 1, the research questions and the sought outcomes of this thesis are pursued through a text and language based analysis. The theoretical framework chapter argued that according to the Copenhagen School, there is an inherent relation between discourses and construction of securitization. Due to this, my primary choice of method is *discourse analysis*, which allows me to make findings over the key discursive justifications presented on behalf of the proposed intelligence legislation, as well as how the Finnish media has addressed the topic.

This chapter will begin by assessing how discourse analysis can be seen as an extension for the theoretical underpinnings discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, the aim is to highlight how the authors affiliated with the Copenhagen School have addressed discourse analysis (Buzan et al. 1998, Weaver 2002 and Hansen 2006). Moreover, the following parts will essentially present and define such arguments about discourse analysis as a theory and method, which constitute the framework for the subsequent analytical chapters.

5.1 Discourse Analysis

The authors of the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al. 1998: 25), argue that “the way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations”. By adopting discourse analysis as the primary method, the analyst gains the required tools for investigating the argumentation surrounding security problems, and acceptance / mobilization of extraordinary counteractions.

However, as was pointed out in the end of the previous chapter, according to the authors of *Discourses Analysis as Theory and Method* (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 4), discourse analysis is not perceived merely as a method of data analysis, but rather referred as a “complete package” of theory and method. Here, it is argued that an analyst has to acknowledge and accept discourse analysis' theoretical foundations in order to apply it as a method (ibid).

In the following section, I will elaborate on the theoretical foundations of discourse analysis, as well as on its applicability with this thesis' theoretical focus. The discussion will, more specifically, draw upon Hansen and Weaver's (2002) theoretical positioning for discourse analysis, as I have decided to follow the scholars' approach in this thesis. The focus will then be turned to other methodologically relevant insights, drawing on Hansen's analysis as developed in *Security as Practice* (2006). However, before starting the assessment of Hansen and Weaver's collaboration in the edited volume (2002), it is important to point out that in regards to the process of securitization, Hansen does not fully subscribe to the theoretical underpinnings of the Copenhagen School. Rather, as presented in Hansen's desecuritization study (2012: 545), the scholar's assessment on the Copenhagen School emerges from an outside perspective. As an example of Hansen's (ibid) considerations on the Copenhagen School, the scholar questions whether it is possible to differentiate between the sphere of politics and security in all governmental settings, and how to perceive the possible shortcomings of the normal governmental sphere while engaging with the Copenhagen School. However, in respect of the applied discourse analytical methodology in this thesis, the scholars' differing theoretical development on securitization does not constitute a notable contradiction.

Poststructuralist discourse analysis theory

In *European Integration and National Identity* (2002: 23), edited by Lene Hansen & Ole Weaver, Weaver describes the background of his and Hansen's understanding for discourse analysis, which has been applied in the scholars' security and foreign policy related research. The scholars (ibid: 23) draw upon "early poststructuralist" discourse analysis, largely influenced by the work of Michael Foucault, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. A clearer explanation of how the poststructuralist understanding sets itself apart from other discourse analytical approaches can be found in Hansen's analysis (2006: 1). Here, Hansen (ibid) perceives the study of foreign policy as series of discourses, which "articulate and intertwine material factors and ideas to such extent that the two cannot be separated from one another". Moreover, the poststructuralist discourse theory argues that language is not only used for reflecting the world, but rather actively creates and changes new social relations and identities (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 9). Developed from this, Hansen and Weaver's (2002: 23) approach understands political discourses as ideas that determine the actual

policy-making. Furthermore, in Hansen and Weaver's (ibid: 24) poststructuralist discourse analysis, the state and nation are central objects. Weaver (ibid) argues that when studying discourses in the context of international relations, the state and nation formulate an identity of 'we'. In this thesis, the identity formulation becomes an important methodological tool, which derives from the described theoretical underpinnings for language's role in foreign policy. The identification of identities in discourses will be discussed in a more detailed manner in the following section.

5.2 Poststructuralist discourse analysis as a method

Here, my aim is to focus more precisely on the discourse analytical procedures applied in this thesis. The following discussion will briefly refer to the material selection process, but a more detailed description of the primary material is carried out in the section 5.4.

Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 27) point out that the foundations of the poststructuralist discourse theory, developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, has aimed at theory development, and thereby does not include "many practical tools for textually oriented discourse analysis". Due to this, I make use of Hansen's (2006: 2) discussion on the applicability of the poststructuralist perspective as an actual method, which argues; "if the link between methodology and positivist epistemology is loosened [...] then a poststructuralist methodology is not only possible, but also desirable". Hansen (ibid) continues by stating that the methodological questions posed in poststructuralist discourse analysis are similarly faced by other academic studies as well, such as: what should the analysis more specifically focus on, and what type of material would facilitate the desired research outcomes? Thus, by treating the poststructuralist discourse theory as a series of practical procedures and analytical choices, it becomes feasible to formulate a research design (ibid).

In this thesis, I have formulated a case study on the basis of the previously discussed targets of the analysis emerging from the Copenhagen School's framework (see Chapter 4), alongside with the range of analytical procedures linked to my discourse analysis approach. In the following parts, by drawing upon Hansen and Weaver (2002, 2006), I will present the discourse analytical procedures and choices applied in this thesis.

Selection of material

First, the selection of data and material is one of the main methodological considerations in poststructuralist discourse analysis (Hansen 2006: 2). I have decided to follow Weaver's (2002: 26) material selection approach, as the author stresses that his and Hansen's discourse analysis method is particularly applicable for studying public texts and documents. Similarly as described by Weaver (ibid), the aim of my discourse analysis is not to contest motives, or search for hidden intentions and messages in the selected material, but rather to "stay at the level of discourse". By staying committed to the studied language, the logic of the made arguments remain clear and traceable to the studied material (ibid). Furthermore, while focusing on public documents in this thesis (openly available government documents, newspaper articles and radio broadcasts), the analysis will treat the material and the arguments drawn from it as they are (ibid). This removes the need of studying other indicators than language. Weaver (ibid) emphasizes that while analysing foreign policy, it is a "huge methodological advantage" if the research does not try to elaborate on hidden rhetoric or beliefs. In this thesis, I consider the advantage especially relevant for the validity of the findings, because by adopting the discourse analytical focus and the related choices about the material selection method, as described by Weaver (ibid), this study will not present arguments on the basis of factors that are not observable in the selected material. Furthermore, as was emphasized in the theoretical framework chapter, when studying securitization, the language itself is considered as the key factor for demonstrating a speech act. Here, the theoretical framework and the method of 'staying at the level of discourse' together cooperate with each other.

Discourse and identities

Moreover on poststructuralist methodology, Hansen (2006: 2) presents a particular method for reading texts, which comprises the identification of different identities in spoken or written language. The assumption in poststructuralist discourse analysis is that foreign policy represents identities, where a juxtaposition of 'Self' and 'Others' becomes always formulated (ibid: 6).

As stated above, Hansen and Weaver's (2002: 23) approach identifies the state and its 'we' identity as a key element in the analysis. Conversely, the identity of 'Others' constitutes of the oppositional actors that the 'Self' (= we) faces within international relations. More particularly, security discourses traditionally constitute "a national

Self facing one or more threatening Others”, where the identity of Others is radically differentiated from Self (Hansen 2006: 2). Although, as noted by Hansen’s (ibid: 12), the degree to which othering takes place can vary, ranging from “the radically different to the familiar”. Consequently, the identities of Self and Other can simultaneously emerge through two different logics: the logic of radical ‘othering’ or the logic of linking (ibid).

The identification of Others will be considered as an important analytical goal in this thesis, because when examining the material through the lens of the Copenhagen School, it becomes crucial to identify how the layout of Self versus Others is part of the construction of threats. By exploring the logic of ‘othering’, the analysis can gain a perception of the actors and objects that the Finnish government unifies with or radically differentiates from.

Intertextuality

In this thesis, the concept of intertextuality is a central methodological consideration. A clear definition for intertextuality can be drawn from Jørgensen and Phillips (2002: 65), who argue that; “intertextuality refers to a condition whereby all communicative events draw on earlier events”. When allocating intertextuality into the context of this thesis, it becomes productive to refer to Hansen’s (2006: 8) security studies related work. Hansen (ibid) argues that in foreign policy, language and arguments are built on references to other texts, either “by making direct quotes or by adopting key concepts and catchphrases”. New arguments and texts can thus be seen as dependent on the previous ones. Although, discourses are rarely reproduced identically, but more often adapted “into the present context and arguments” (ibid). Furthermore, Hansen’s (ibid: 55) discussion about the intertextual link between different genres of texts in foreign policy compliments this thesis’ approach of analysing both, official policy documents and media discourses. Intertextuality enables an analysis that does not view foreign policy discourses merely as official government documents, but rather as relational to a “wider textual web”, including media articles and journalism (ibid).

Thus, intertextuality enables me to carry out two analytical objectives: firstly, to compare, in a systematic manner, the linkages between the governmental legislation proposals and the language used in media. More particularly, by utilizing intertextuality, I will investigate how the discourses reflecting threats and exceptionalism are brought from the governmental documents into the media articles,

and thereby exposed to mass audiences in Finland. Here, intertextuality serves accurately the sub research questions set for this thesis: how are threats and exceptionalism constructed in media?

5.3 Case study

This study is a qualitative case study. Bryman (2012: 66) emphasizes that in order to fulfil the requirements for a case study, the research should focus on a single object. As an example, Bryman (ibid) specifies that a community, a location or a single event can act as the target of a case study. In this thesis, the main object is the intelligence legislation reform introduced by the Finnish government in April 2017. Rather than considering this thesis as a case study of the Finnish nation or government, it is more suitable to perceive it as a case study of a specific event, which investigates the notions of securitization occurring as part of the legislative reform. In order to demonstrate how a formerly studied event appears in this specific context, the role of the secondary and theoretical literature is essential. However, the selected primary material - media contents and the governmental legislation documents - do appear at the centre of the analysis, and facilitate the outcomes of the research. Due to the recent emergence of the selected case study, the primary material still remains unstudied by other scholars.

In order to design a case study, the researcher needs to distinguish and select the specific actors or components targeted in the study (de Vaus 2001: 220). As was demonstrated in the previous sections, the research design is formulated according to the composite of the theoretical framework and the poststructuralist discourse analysis. Thereby, the analysis focuses on the following: governmental and non-governmental actors' discourses reflecting threats and exceptionalism, the formulation of 'Self' and 'Others' in the discourses, and the intertextual linkages and reproduction of arguments. Although, in regards of the first research question - how has the Finnish government justified its proposed civil and military intelligence legislation? - the Finnish government and its agents become the main actors under observation, as it is these actors' discourses which allow me to answer the research question.

Selection of the case

The most relevant consideration while selecting this case study has been its correspondence with my research objectives; it enables me to delve into the

intersection of government surveillance, securitization and desecuritization in a specific nation's context. Moreover, it is possible to argue that both, in the case of Finnish surveillance practices and government surveillance as an international phenomenon, the probability to contribute with theoretical and empirical findings seems promising. I base this argument on two issues; firstly, the proposed intensification of the Finnish intelligence and surveillance practices is a recent phenomenon, and while conducting this thesis research, this specific topic still remains unstudied by the academia. Secondly, as was argued in the literature overview chapter, the field of surveillance has raised its significance during the recent years, and the field tends to develop alongside the new information and communication technology. Due to this, it is possible to argue that new research efforts are required in order maintain an updated comprehension of how the governmental sector adjusts and changes its policy-making in relation to surveillance. Furthermore, the timing has, undoubtedly, influenced the process of selecting this case study; as will be described in the upcoming material section, the media coverage concerning the intelligence and surveillance reform in Finland has been distinctively intense since 2017. Although, it is crucial to point out that in Finland, the journalistic content addressing foreign and security policy is concentrated among few major media actors. Despite this, the media coverage by these prominent actors has facilitated the required material for a language and text based case study. Moreover, the media coverage can be interpreted as a signal of rather strong societal interest and demand for pursuing a case study over the proposed intelligence legislation. This has been acknowledged while selecting the focus of the case study.

5.4 Material

It is possible to argue that in regards to the material, the selection of this specific case study has a bilateral effect: the publication of the Finnish intelligence legislation proposals has provided the required material for pursuing a discourse analytical study. Although, by focusing only on Finland in my case study, the scope of the potential primary material is narrowed. All of the written and spoken discourses analysed in this thesis have been translated from Finnish to English. Undoubtedly, the translation adds an analytical component that should be addressed. I have aimed to translate all the citations and references presented in the analysis as accurately as possible, and word by word to the equivalent meanings in the English language. Although, in order

to present the text in a clear manner, the structure of the sentences has been occasionally refined. This has been an inevitable procedure due to the rather different grammatical features and structuring of sentences between the two languages. As will be described in further below, the analytical challenge became essentially evident while analysing the spoken discourses of the Politics Radio broadcasts, where the used language consists of longer spoken-language monologues instead of clearly structured and concise newspaper articles. Thus, it can be remarked that the analysis and findings presented in this thesis are mediated through my own reading and interpretation of the media discourses, and not a claim of truth.

The following parts will introduce the selected material, starting with a brief discussion on the governmental legislation documents. The latter sections will focus on the selected media sources.

Civil Intelligence Legislation & Legislation on Military Intelligence

On April 19th in 2017, the Ministry of Interior published its legislation proposal document, titled as *Civilian intelligence legislation* (452 pages). On the same day, the Ministry of Defence published its own proposal, titled as *Proposal for legislation on military intelligence* (394 pages). The documents provide detailed descriptions of the legal technicalities that the extended authorization of the Finnish civil and military intelligence authorities would require and entail. The documents include summary chapters in three different languages: Finnish, Swedish and English. Most importantly for the scope of my research, both of the documents include, although only in Finnish, a chapter titled as “General justifications”. These chapters summarize the government’s legislative working groups’ official stance and reasoning behind the legislations, which on the contrary to the juridical jargon and technicality discourses, serve most accurately this study’s theoretical, methodological and empirical aspirations. Digital versions of the legislation proposals became publicly available on the Finnish government’s website on the release date (April 19th 2017). The sources are listed in the chapter 9 on the primary material page.

Media

In the Finnish media scene, the reporting of wider domestic and foreign affairs is centralized among few major actors. Considering this aspect, the sample of potential media sources from Finland is, arguably, rather narrow. I have decided to focus on

two prominent Finnish journalistic sources, which will be introduced in the following sections:

1. Written news articles by the largest subscription newspaper in Finland, *Helsingin Sanomat* (HS)
2. Radio broadcasts by *The Finnish Broadcasting Company* (Yle)

Helsingin Sanomat newspaper

The HS newspaper belongs to the *Sanoma* media group, which is a private company. The HS is a significant actor in the Finnish media scene, and due to its 679 000 daily newspaper and online subscribers, it is also the largest Nordic newspaper (Lounasmeri 2013: 385, Manninen & Hakkarainen 2017). Lotta Lounasmeri elaborates in her study (2013: 385), which also focuses on the discourses of the HS, on the newspaper's background in a detailed manner. Since the newspaper's early years (founded in 1889), the HS has remained at the centre of Finland's public debate, and been a "general agenda-setter for other Finnish newspapers, defining what is significant in politics and society even beyond its own readership" (ibid). The success of the HS has been traced to its "early disengagement from party politics", whereas its writings have been characterized by "bridge-building between the political left and right" (ibid: 386). Due to the HS' dominant position, the public has traditionally expected that the newspaper's reporting would act as a "watchdog over power", instead of supporting a specific political agenda (ibid).

A relevant example in relation to the watchdog argument can be drawn from an incident affiliated with the topic of this thesis. On December 16th 2017, the HS published an article that revealed confidential information about the Finnish military intelligence practices targeted towards Russia (Halminen & Pietiläinen 2017). The HS journalists, Larua Halminen and Tuomo Pietiläinen, who previously during 2017 had been central actors in the HS' intelligence legislation reportage, received a series of confidential military intelligence documents by an anonymous source. After the publication of the article, the President of Finland, Sauli Niinistö published a press release stating that the National Bureau of Investigation will start an investigation towards the actions of the HS (Mäkinen 2017).

However, regardless of this rather unconventional conflict between the HS and the Finnish government, previous studies have, in fact, demonstrated that the HS' editorial staff possesses close ties to Finland's political elites (Kunelius et al. 2009 in

Lounasmeri 2013: 386). These relations have been used to explain why the newspaper is considered as particularly “well informed” of the Finnish domestic and foreign policy (ibid). Although, as stated above, the publication of the confidential military documents by the HS, and the President’s public outcome on the national press, are both widely unconventional events in the Finnish context. Thus, this controversy can be used to highlight the proposed intelligence legislation’s significance for the HS, and the commitment that its journalists have had for the topic during the period 2017-18. The HS’ reporting on the intensification of surveillance practices and on the prospects of the new legislation can be traced back to January 2015 (Pullinen & Teivainen 2015). As can be noted, this was prior to the date when the current government appointed the intelligence legislation working groups, but indicates that already during this period, the dialogue around the subject had started to gain momentum. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated in the analysis chapter, I have chosen to focus on media articles that specifically name the target of my analysis, hence the proposed intelligence legislation introduced in April 2017. The purpose of this is to avoid argumentation on the basis of discourses, which connection to the case study could be perceived as hypothetical.

The Finnish Broadcasting Company

The second media source analysed in this thesis is The Finnish Broadcasting Company (*Yleisradio*, from this point onwards: Yle). Yle is equivalently modelled as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and thus largely owned by the Finnish government and financed through a so-called ‘Yle tax’. Yle provides a broad variety of visual and audio media content in Finland by operating four television channels and 24 radio stations. In this thesis, I will only focus on one *Yle Talk* radio station’s programme: *the Politics Radio* (PR) (orig. *Politiikkaradio*). The PR is hosted by two journalists, Sakari Sirkanen and Tapio Pajunen, and the programme focuses on current, domestic and international, socio-political topics. Each broadcast includes one or several guest discussants, which, depending on the topic, vary from Members of the Finnish Parliament and government officials to academic scholars. All of the broadcasts are carried out in Finnish, and the average length of a broadcast varies approximately between 30-60 minutes.

Due to the frequent guest appearances by the Finnish political leadership in the PR (including the President Niinistö on January 25th 2018), this specific programme is a

distinctive socio-political media platform in Finland. It is possible to describe the programme as a unique source of in-depth dialogue about the Finnish politics, and thus provides as a desirable access to the Finnish political elite's extended spoken discourses. As an example in respect of my case study, on April 26th 2018, the chairmen of the intelligence legislation working groups from the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice participated in a 55-minute discussion about the prospects of the proposed legislation. While analysing the discursive the Finnish governmental agents' discourses, the PR has proven to be a highly productive source.

However, as was mentioned above, the PR broadcasts consist rather long spoken monologues, and the spoken language used in the programme is more informal by nature in comparison to written newspaper articles. Thus, the varying discussants' statements analysed in this thesis appeared to be, at times, imperfect and incoherent, whereby the translation and assessment of the discourses in English added an analytical challenge.

5.5 Timeline of the media material

It has been suggested that while pursuing discourse analysis on the basis of national media's representation over an specific issue, which has evolved over several months, years or is still on going, the analyst would "take samples of particular periods of time" in order to clearly delimit the focus of the research (Hodgetts & Chamberlain 2013: 382). In this thesis, I have selected a series of news articles and radio broadcasts within a specific timeline: April 19th 2017 - January 25th 2018. The starting point of the timeline marks for the day when the intelligence legislation proposals were released and first addressed in media. The ending point marks for the day when the proposed legislation was assigned to the Finnish Parliament.

In all, the timeline consists nine (9) HS newspaper articles, and four (4) Politics Radio broadcasts. All of the news articles are also written in Finnish. The sampling of the newspaper articles was carried throughout the year 2017 while following mediation of the intelligence legislation, and by extracting the articles from the HS' online archive. In addition, the sample was later refined while mapping out articles containing the phrase 'intelligence legislation' (orig. *tiedustelulainsäädäntö*) on the same online archive. The original sample contained 15 articles, of which the final assemble was appropriated according to the stated timeline. The PR radiobroadcasts' sampling

process was conducted similarly; while following the PR's broadcasting during the year 2017, I had marked the relevant broadcasts' dates and headings in order to expedite the sampling process while conducting my case study. The sample was also later reinforced through the Broadcasting Company's open online archive by using the 'intelligence legislation' as the search phrase. The selected PR broadcasts were transcribed in their original language, Finnish. The cited discourses from the broadcast transcriptions were translated directly into this thesis' analysis chapter. Issues concerning the translation process were assessed above in the sections 5.4. The selected media material, including the names of the journalists, headings and dates of publication, are listed in chronological order in chapter 9.

5.6 Limitations

In the theoretical framework chapter, the public resonance and acceptance in the process of securitization, as well as desecuritization, were determined as important analytical considerations (Buzan et al. 1998: 25, Hansen 2012: 533). In this thesis, I set out to explore the public's acceptance essentially through the selected media material. Thus, it is possible to note that the findings concerning the public's perception of the intelligence legislation is limited to these specific media sources' discursive representations. However, the aspect of public acceptance has not been determined as a main indicator while answering to my research questions. Rather, it comprises one specific analytical consideration emerging from the theoretical framework of this thesis.

6 Speech acts

As was argued in the theoretical framework chapter, the analysis of a particular case of securitization commences with a close scrutiny of the speech act in question, hence the declaration of a security problem by the authorities responsible for the designated object of security. In this case study, I have divided the examination of speech acts into three different sections. In this chapter, I will start the analysis by focusing on the initial speech acts observable in the legislation proposal documents (Ministry of Interior 2017 & Ministry of Defence 2017), whereby I will move forward to the Finnish governmental agents' speech acts in media. In the third section, I will focus on the speech acts constituting the Self vs. Other juxtaposition. The following research questions employed here are formulated to correspond the previously described intelligence legislation proposals:

1. How has the Finnish government justified its proposed civil and military intelligence legislation?
2. How are threats to Finnish security constructed in media?
3. How is the concept of exceptionalism constructed in media?

Even though one of the selected media articles indicates that the preparations of the intelligence legislation started already in 2013 (Halminen 2017), I have decided to start my analysis from the day when the intelligence legislation proposals were first published on April 19th 2017. The purpose of selecting this date as the starting point of the analysis is simply to remain committed to the scope of the research questions, as well as for the chosen methodology, which also entails avoiding making arguments on the basis of indicators that are situated outside the scope of the study (Weaver 2002: 26).

First, however, I will revisit the theoretical framework, as developed in chapter 4, by further clarifying my approach to the analysis of speech acts. In *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Buzan et al. 1998: 32), the authors further elaborate on the analytical guidelines for recognizing a “successful speech act”. These guidelines comprise the so-called internal and external conditions, which are considered as relevant in order to avoid misusing or misinterpreting a speech act while conducting the analysis (ibid). The internal conditions refer to the specific linguistic qualities and characteristics embedded in a speech act. Thus, by following the language, it is feasible to construct a linguistic speech act “plot”, constituting “existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out” (ibid: 33). The external conditions refer to

the societal position and authority of the actor(s) behind the language, hence the securitizing actor. In order to create a speech act, the securitizing actor “must be in a position of authority”, hence enjoy the trust and legitimacy of the public in order to carry out such a process (ibid). Thus, a successful speech act is a combination of language (internal conditions) and actors (external conditions) (ibid: 32). As for the internal conditions, my aim is to identify the discursive ‘plot’ by drawing upon the three discursive components defined by Buzan et al. (ibid: 33). I will trace how threats to Finnish security have been declared (“existential threat”), how the current security environment has been defined (“point of no return”), and how the proposed intelligence legislation has been portrayed as a necessary and urgent counteraction to handle the threats (“a possible way out”). The actors that in this case study possess the required societal authority for conducting and recognizing the speech act are the Finnish governmental officials affiliated with the proposed legislation, and the journalists, academics and other actors who have addressed the topic in media.

6.1 Initial threat discourses

I will begin the analysis by investigating speech acts in the *Civil Intelligence Legislation* (by the Ministry of Interior 2017, from this point onwards: MoI 2017) and *Proposal for legislation on military intelligence* (by the Ministry of Defence 2017, from this point onwards: MoD 2017) documents. I will continue the analysis through the method of intertextuality by investigating how the meanings emerging from the documents are created across texts. Here, I will make use of the selected media content emerging from the legislation proposals’ release date and onwards. Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the speech acts are not limited to the release date of the government documents, but as will be demonstrated, security threats are named and reinforced throughout the timeline designated for this study. Thus, the method of intertextuality will be applied throughout the analysis, and not delimited into a specific section.

As was stated in the method chapter, both key documents (MoI 2017: 19, MoD 2017: 25) studied here include introductory chapters, “General justifications”, which straightforwardly corresponds with this thesis’ first research question. In the case of the proposed civil intelligence legislation (MoI 2017: 19), the justification chapter begins by defining the current security environment in Finland: “*The Finnish security*

environment has changed and digitalized during the recent years". This is followed by a declaration of security threats that, allegedly, are a result of the current security environment: *"The internal and external security is posed by threats that ever more closely overlap with each other"* (ibid). In principal, the MoD (2017: 25) document's opening justifications are identical. In relation to the changes in the security environment, the MoD (ibid) refers to *"General internationalization and technical development"*. Here, it is stated that Finland's security environment has *"changed"* due to *"the international nature of threats"*, and the threats that are posed to Finland have become *"intensified"* due to *"communication technology's rapid development"* (ibid).

These opening statements in both documents constitute two of the internal, language and grammar affiliated conditions included in a speech act, as was determined above according to the analytical guidelines in Buzan et al. (1998: 33). The documents declare simultaneously an existential threat and a point of no return by invoking to *"digitalization"* and *"internationalization"* as inevitable and constitutive factors for the Finnish security environment, although by defining them also as threats. Furthermore, the differentiation of the Finnish national Self from a foreign other is embedded in the threat narrative; *"The most serious threats posing the internal security are nearly without exception foreign origin or they [threats] are connected to factors outside of our country"* (MoI 2017: 19).

As has been stated previously, the MoI document addresses essentially the operations of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service (FSIS). The FSIS' operative role in Finland has been, allegedly, limited according to the existing criminal investigation jurisdiction (Majuri in PR April 26th 2017). However, in the MoI (2017: 19), the FSIS is stated to have *"a significant role in defending from threats that are posing the national security"*. The main purpose of the proposed civil intelligence legislation is to amend the jurisdiction by enhancing the FSIS' *"information gathering authority"* (ibid). Thus, in order to fulfil its operative role as a security actor, the legislation would free the FSIS from the restrictions posed by the existing criminal investigation jurisdiction (ibid). Here, it is productive to look at the discourses around the FSIS through the Copenhagen School's framework. Arguably, the MoI (ibid) document constitutes a securitizing move, because the fundamental role of the FSIS as an institution, and information gathering as its practical responsibility, are redefined and

moved from the field of criminal investigations to “*defending from threats that are posing the national security*”. The threat narrative in relation to the proposed civil intelligence practices is, again, used as the source of legitimacy for carrying out this process. This reflects both, the analytical framework for securitization, as described in Buzan et al. (1998: 25), as well as the relationship of government surveillance and the process of securitization, as explored in Schulze’s study (2015: 201).

Nevertheless, in respect of the first research question, (*how has the government justified the proposed legislation?*) the following statements in the MoI (2017: 20) concerning the extended authorization of the FSIS become highly relevant: “*according to the Prime Minister Juha Sipilä’s governmental programme, increasing risks and new threats demand new kind of preparedness and anticipation by the whole society*”. In the MoD (2017: 26), the previous statement appears identically within the “General justifications” chapter. Moreover, both documents (MoI 2017: 20, MoD 2017: 26) further specify on the threat narrative: “*new and pervasive threats such as hybrid influencing, cyber attacks, terrorism*”. The MoI (2017: 20) continues that the proposed legislation’s purpose is to “*respond to the changes within the security environment and to the new threats relevant for Finland*” (ibid: 21). Thus, through the MoI (ibid: 20-21) document’s discourses, the third linguistic component constructing the speech act becomes evident; the discourses portray the proposed legislation as a response to “*new threats*” and alterations in the security environment, thereby constituting ‘a possible way out’ for the previously constructed ‘existential threat’ and ‘point of no return’. In the next section, I will focus on the selected media material in order to investigate the reproduction of the described discourses in the public sphere.

6.2 Initial threat discourses in media

Firstly, regarding the media discourses investigated here, the aforementioned civil intelligence and military intelligence legislation proposals are both constructed as expressions of ‘the intelligence legislation’. Although, these pieces of legislation are occasionally differentiated from each other when referred to the FSIS’ extended authority in the name of national security (civil intelligence legislation) or the Defence Forces’ mandate gather information internationally (military intelligence legislation). Thus, the following arguments presented on the basis of the selected

media contents, by and large, refer to the proposed civil and military intelligence legislations as one unit.

On the release date of the previously described legislation proposals, the HS newspaper took an active role in the reporting and published three different articles about the proposed intelligence legislation (Halminen 2017, Halminen & Pietiläinen 2017, Halminen & Kempas 2017). The latter two articles are narrated from the reporters' and one non-governmental actor's perspective (Professor Martin Scheinin in Halminen & Kempas 2017). Because of this, I will return to them below when I focus on the public's acceptance over the suggested extended surveillance practices and the justifications presented for them. The first article (Halminen 2017), however, is based on comments from a press conference given by Paula Risikko (Minister of Interior), Jussi Niinistö (Minster of Defence) and Jari Lindström (Minister of Justice) on April 19th. Arguably, by naming security threats and invoking to the changed security environment narrative, the stated ministers' discourses and the previously presented justifications from the legislative documents formulate an intertextual link: *"Cyber threats have changed and they [threats] are ever more dangerous"*, *"The most serious threats are nearly without exception foreign origin and moved over to the information networks"* (Risikko in Halminen 2017). The reporter Halminen (ibid) writes that during the press conference, *"the ministers were unanimous about implementing the legislation as soon as possible"*. This statement can be noted as the first notion of urgency in the studied material in respect of the legislative process. Halminen (ibid) concludes the article by reflecting on Risikko's and Niinistö's justifications on behalf of the proposed legislation: *"According to the Interior Minister Risikko, during the past two years, the feeling that the security environment has changed, has become confirmed. According to the Defence Minster Niinistö, in addition to digitalization, the occupation of Crimea in 2014 has been a central factor"* (ibid).

On the legislation proposals' release date (April 19th), the PR broadcasted a discussion with the two Members of the Parliament (MP) in charge of the so-called parliamentary control group for this specific legislation, Tapani Tölli (Centre Party (CP)) and Pertti Salolainen (National Coalition Party (NCP)). The reporter Pajunen opened the discussion with two questions: *"Why does Finland need an intelligence*

legislation? Why now?”. The chairman Tölli responded first: *“Laws are made when the time is right [...] the situation is such that the necessity has become so obvious that now is the time to legislate. In principal, we [the Finnish state/nation] do not have intelligence legislation, which is why this legislation is essential. Our government absolutely needs information about those actors who are threatening our national security”* (Tölli in the PR April 19th). According to the course of this statement, Tölli’s first justification is based on the absence of the proposed legislation in the existing jurisdiction, although simultaneously by invoking to the current *“situation”* as the dependent factor. Secondly, Tölli declared that the proposed legislation is necessary in respect of *“our national security”*, thereby constituting the representation of the national Self against the foreign Others. Tölli concluded his first statement by clarifying the linkage between the current security environment and threats: *“Now the world’s situation has changed and the threat situation developed so much that the legislation is necessary”* (ibid). Included into further statements, the threat of terrorism and implications of exceptional security conditions can be observed: *“The threat of terrorism is real”* (ibid). As a difference to threat of terrorism during the past decades, Tölli points out that *“[terrorism] has not been as rapidly functioning as it is now”* (ibid). Tölli’s argumentation (ibid) in respect of the emergency of the current situation reinforces the Minister of Interior Risikko’s statements from the government officials’ press conference (Halminen 2017). Tölli’s usage of exceptionalism, although, appears essentially by emphasizing the distinctiveness of modern age security conditions, and in the form of the so-called ‘new terrorism’.

The vice-chairman Salolainen’s discourses were focused on digitalization and communication networks, which he portrayed as threatening and exceptional, as well as security enhancing. Salolainen continued the previous terrorism statement by Tölli: *“This is totally true what Tölli says, although one could add that this whole communication world and network has changed its structures [...] In Finland there are multiple cyber attacks on daily basis and our society has become more vulnerable than it has been before [...] Especially these information networks construct such channels that can be used in before hand for gathering information about those threats that are posed to the Finnish society”* (Salolainen in the PR April 19th). Here, on the basis of Salolainen’s argument, it is possible to construct a concise speech act plot: first, Salolainen refers to Tölli’s threat of terrorism argument, continuing it by

declaring the modern communication network system as a cause of additional threats. Salolainen constitutes ‘the way out’ by concluding that on the grounds of the proposed legislation, the information networks also provide security enhancing information.

6.3 The national Self against the foreign threatening Other

As was pointed out in the previous section, the representation of the ‘we’ identity, hence the national Self, has been embedded in the Finnish government officials’ discourses. This aspect becomes evident in the discourses reflecting upon the current security environment (MoI 2017: 19, Risikko in Halminen 2017, Tölli in PR April 19th). In order to deepen the understanding of how threats to Finnish security are constructed in media, I will continue the analysis by examining the interconnection of threat and identity discourses.

The chairman of the Ministry of Defence legislative working group, Hanna Nordström, emphasized the proposed intelligence legislation’s significance for the Defence Forces as follows: *“In order for the Defence Forces to respond to threats that are relevant for us [the Finnish nation/state], we are about to have a legislation that enables targeting intelligence on these foreign armed organisations [...] this type of information gathering is important in order to be self-sufficient”* (Nordström in PR April 26th 2017). The chairman of the Ministry of Interior working group, Kauko Aaltomaa, reproduced Nordström’s statement by arguing that the current jurisdiction *“limits significantly”* the FSIS’ investigations on *“high risk threat situations”*, which Aaltomaa then defined as *“threats that come from abroad [...] such as terrorism”* (Aaltomaa in PR April 26th 2017). After naming the threat of terrorism, Aaltomaa stated: *“often when you concretize that what this is about [the legislation] then this [terrorism] is easier to notice by us regular people [...] From Finland’s and our interests’ perspective, the situation is not completely similar as it was 5-10 years ago”* (ibid).

Drawing upon these statements, which represented the FSIS’ and Defence Forces’ operations, the declared security threats are framed by clearly differentiating between the designated object of security (the Finnish nation) and foreign, although left unknown and unspecified in this context, threatening others. Furthermore, the chairman Aaltomaa’s discourses imply, although rather incoherently, that the threat of

terrorism encapsulates efficiently the purpose of the proposed legislation for the public. Thereby, it is possible to draw the argument that even according to the chairman Aaltomaa (ibid), the utterance of terrorism entails a distinctive notion of emergency and mobilizing influence within the society. This adheres to the Copenhagen School's framework concerning the utterance of security threats, and its legitimizing impact for mobilizing extraordinary counteractions (Buzan et al. 1998: 26).

The Minister of Interior Risikko has remained committed to the changed security environment narrative as a justification; when transferring the legislative process to the Finnish Parliament, Risikko declared: "*We have a lot more threats than in the beginning of the governmental period [2015]*" (Risikko in Pietiläinen & Kervinen 2018a). As a response to questions about the proposed FSIS' extended information gathering rights, and their implications on the citizens' privacy, Risikko stated: "*It is often so that the information comes from abroad [...] Finland needs this*" (ibid). Here, Risikko reproduces the discursive justifications from the release date of the legislation proposals, although by emphasizing that the FSIS' information gathering would be mainly targeted on actors outside Finland's borders.

As stated in the previous section, the Minister of Defence Jussi Niinistö advocated on the proposed legislation by referring to the Russian occupation in Crimea (Halminen 2017). The HS articles (Palojärvi & Pietiläinen 2017, Pietiläinen & Kervinen 2018a) show how Niinistö's responses in media to questions concerning the proposed intelligence legislation are intertextually linked: "*A chain of events has started since the occupation in Crimea, which have proven an old wisdom: one cannot take strategic breaks while maintaining the defence capacity*" (Niinistö in Palojärvi & Pietiläinen 2017). In January 2018, Niinistö reproduced this argument at an additional press conference: "*Niinistö emphasized the changes in the security environment since the occupation in Crimea and war in Georgia*" (Pietiläinen & Kervinen 2018a). The article (ibid), however, does not name Russia in this context, and solely refers to the stated conflicts. Following the previous statement, the HS article (ibid) cites the words of the Defence Minister: "*I want to emphasize that this law is intended to act on behalf of all Finnish people, not against any Finnish people.* On the grounds of Niinistö's comments (in Palojärvi & Pietiläinen 2017, Pietiläinen & Kervinen 2018a),

the proposed intelligence legislation's purpose reappears in the context of changed security environment, and by specifically referring two Russian military interventions. Even though Niinistö's discourses do not directly name the opposing or threatening identity, he does specifically identify the "*Finnish people*" as the object of security (Niinistö in Pietiläinen & Kervinen 2018a). In addition, Niinistö (ibid) concludes by linking the Finnish government's legislation proposals to a Western national identity: "*For a long time already, we have been behind other Western countries in terms of developing our intelligence legislation*". However, the former Minister of Interior and currently active Member of the Parliament, Päivi Räsänen's (Christian Democrats), threat declaration in the PR proves a specific othering of Russia: "*[...] threats and the operational environment have changed due to terrorism but also due to the Russian military operations [...] These are the environmental changes that have led to the fact that the intelligence authorization has to be updated*" (Räsänen in PR December 20th 2017).

6.4 The logic of linking

The discourses linking Finland with a Western and European identity reappear throughout the selected material. In respect of the applied methodology, the logic of linking alongside the logic of othering, as illustrated by Hansen (2006: 12), is also apparent in the media discourses explored here. The logic of linking, in this specific case, was first initiated in the MoI (2017: 23) and MoD (2017: 27) documents. In both documents (ibid), changes in the security environment are defined according to a European identity: "*[...] from a European perspective, security conditions have deteriorated significantly during the past years*". Since the release of the legislation proposals, the declarations of security threats that simultaneously unify Finland with the EU reappear across texts. The reporter Liiten (in HS 2017) has referenced the Prime Minister Sipilä's discourses as follows: "*He [Prime Minister Sipilä] hoped that all parties at the parliament would strive for the legislation reform so that it could be implemented as soon as possible [...] according to Sipilä, information exchange within the EU has to be increased in order to guarantee security and counteractions to terrorism*". The chairman of the Ministry of Defence's legislative working group (Nordström in PR April 26th 2017), followed the statement observed in the legislation proposal documents, and reinforced the European identity narrative: "*New kind of terrorism has arrived to the European surroundings*". Nordström's (ibid) further

stated that terrorism has indeed existed in Europe before, although “*such [terrorism] that originated from Europe. We remember the actions of the IRA and the events in the Basque region in Spain [...] But now there are totally new kind of terror attacks in Europe, and like I said, right near us [...] This is what Kauko Aaltomaa meant by the changed security environment*”. Here, by naming the “*new kind of terrorism*” and “*right near us*”, the discourses regarding the security environment merge with the concept of exceptionalism, and simultaneously portray the changed security environment as significant for the national Self (ibid). The most distinct example, however, can be observed in Nordström’s differentiation between terrorism that is of European origin and the exceptional, “*totally new kind of terror attacks*” (ibid). The “*totally new kind*” is also defined as the dependent factor in the current security environment, hence as the justification for implementing the proposed intelligence legislation (ibid).

6.5 Further remarks on exceptionalism

In order to support the analysis in respect of the third research question (*how is the concept of exceptionalism constructed in media?*), this section further focuses on the notions of exceptionalism in the selected media sources. I will draw upon to the concept of exceptionalism as discussed in the conceptual framework chapter (Chapter 3). By following Andrew Neal’s (2012: 260) example, the concept of exceptionalism, in this case study, is distinguishable essentially in the changed security environment narrative. As demonstrated above, this narrative has appeared as a frequent discursive practice by the varying governmental agents. Particularly, discourses of exceptionalism can be recognized in the statements that refer to the current security prospects as unordinary, different and changed in comparison to the past. Thereby exceptionalism is constructed in the language constituting *new* threats that are caused by e.g. *new* terrorism and *new* technology. Furthermore, it is possible to argue that exceptionalism is also embedded in the narrative familiarizing with the national Self and differentiating between others. Similarly as noted in Neal’s study (2010: 2), the framing of the current security environment as distinctively threatening due to the new and extraordinary circumstances, which are connected to an identity that is foreign or originates from abroad (e.g. Aaltomaa in PR April 26th 2017), indicate that exceptionalism as a discursive practices is, in fact, applied as a part of the speech acts.

In the conceptual framework chapter, exceptionalism was argued of comprising both, the discursive framing of a specific event or issue, as well as the practices put forward as a counteraction. In respect of my case study, Neal's (2012: 265) analysis on "Legislative Exceptionalism" provides a useful example; the scholar argues that in practice, hastiness, urgency and "Speed" are characteristic features for exceptional lawmaking. As has been highlighted in the previous sections, the Prime Minister (Sipilä in Liiten 2017), Minister of Interior (Risikko in Halminen 2017) and chairman Tölli (in PR April 19th 2017) have all pleaded urgency, and suggested expediting the implementation of the legislation. In addition, the current Minister of Justice, Antti Häkkänen's statements are largely characterized by the notion of urgency (Häkkänen substituted the previously mentioned Minister of Justice, Jari Lindström, on May 5th 2017). Urgency as a discursive practice formulates an intertextual chain through three different HS articles (Silfverberg 2018, Pietiläinen & Kervinen 2018a, Kervinen & Pietiläinen 2018b): "*Minister of Justice Antti Häkkänen (NCP) wants to implement the intelligence legislation urgently*" (Silfverberg 2018). The reproduction of urgency can be observed in the subsequent articles by Pietiläinen & Kervinen, which, in addition to the minister Häkkänen, also include the ministers Risikko and Niinistö: "[...] *Häkkänen (NCP) has stated that he wants the constitution amendment to come into effect urgently*" (2018b), "[...] *Häkkänen (NCP) repeated that he wants that the constitution amendment would be approved urgently [...] The ministers Risikko and Niinistö also emphasized the urgency of the legislation*" (2018a). As a clarification, the constitution amendment stated here is a mandatory procedure in order to implement the intelligence legislation as proposed in the assessed documents (MoI 2017 & MoD 2017). The previously mentioned parliamentary control group, led by the chairman Tölli, is in charge of supervising the constitutional changes. Furthermore, in addition to the demonstrated threat declarations by Tölli in the PR on April 19th, the chairman later commented on the work of the parliamentary control group: "*I have not faced disagreements in respect of the necessity of this legislation*" (Tölli in PR December 13th 2017). I will return to Tölli's arguments (in PR December 13th 2017) in the forthcoming section below. However, the presented discourses underlying urgency, and Tölli's statement about the lack of disagreement among the authorities supervising the constitutional changes, touches upon an conjunctive contradiction raised by both, in relation to the concept of exceptionalism (Neal 2012:

265-66), as well as the Copenhagen School's theoretical underpinnings (Buzan et al. 1998: 29).

Neal (2012: 266) problematizes essentially on the normalization of exceptionalism in governmental decision-making, whereby irreversible legislative changes, as in the case of Finland, are driven by “in heat of the moment” rhetoric, constituting “symbolic” significance and “political pressure” for acting rapidly on the verge of the constructed emergency. As a result, the pressure of urgency, according to Neal (ibid), decreases the possibility of conventional and critical parliamentary debate. Prior to the presented ‘lack of disagreement’ statement by Tölli (in PR December 13th 2017), in PR on April 19th the chairman referred to the need of the legislation as follows: *“the pressure has increased so much that now is the time to grasp [...] This is about Finland’s national security, not about party politics”*. Here, the main concerns of securitization theory (Buzan et al. 1998: 29) and exceptionalism (Neal 2012: 266), become closely related to each other; in both contexts, the omission of normal political bargaining due to the discursively constructed emergency is perceived as a negative and defective mode of decision-making.

However, in contrast to the Finnish governmental agents’ discourses, the non-governmental actors’ representation over the proposed intelligence legislation proves examples of critical argumentation and normal political bargaining. By diving into the criticism observable in the selected media material, this analysis can move forward to a necessary analytical segment while investigating the constructions of speech acts. Thus, in the next section, I will explore how the public’s resonance comes into sight in this case study.

6.6 Public resonance in media

As was argued in the theoretical framework chapter, in order to study a full case of securitization, the analyst has to take into account the wider patterns and social implications initiated by the speech act (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). More particularly, the interunit understanding and public’s acceptance over the existential threats and the proposed counteractions determine whether the securitizing actor has successfully broken free of the binding rules. Furthermore, similarly in relation to the described process of desecuritization, shifting the public dialogue back to the normal political

sphere and the instantiation of a non-threatening Other are the grounds for successful desecuritization (Hansen 2012: 533).

While observing the initial HS writings published on the intelligence legislation proposals' release date (April 19th) (Halminen 2017, Halminen & Kempas 2017, Halminen & Pietiläinen 2017), it is possible to recognize a distinct cross text meaning: instead of focusing on the government executives' threat discourses, all of the articles are, by and large, grounded in the practical changes that the proposed legislation would entail. This unifying meaning of the above stated articles can be observed through the similarly formulated headings: "*Secret visits to work places and the secrecy of correspondence could be broken: The legislation drafts suggest new extensive intelligence practices*" (Halminen 2017), "*The legislation draft would bring new extensive intelligence practices to the FSIS and Defence Forces*" (Halminen & Pietiläinen 2017), "*According to experts, the intelligence drafts should be revised: 'Even though they repeat that it is not about mass surveillance, it still is that'*" (Martin Scheinin in Halminen & Kempas 2017). The first two articles (Halminen 2017, Halminen & Pietiläinen 2017) highlight the possible implications of the existing privacy rights: "*The new intelligence practices comprise breaking of the secrecy of correspondence, among other things [...]*" (Halminen 2017), "*In theory, the legislation would give the Defence Forces and FSIS the right to monitor a large amount of people living in Finland, and with even less restrictions, the people living abroad*" (Halminen & Pietiläinen 2017). Although, these articles do not critically speak out on the threat narrative as a justification for the proposed legislation, as declared by the governmental authorities. Following these discourses, the third article (Halminen & Kempas 2017) based on Martin Scheinin's (Professor of International Law at the European University Institute) commentary, dives into the proposed legislation and its justifications with straightforwardly criticizing counter arguments: "*It has not been shown in Finland that the police's, custom's or FSIS' authority would be insufficient [...]* Even though if the surveillance is done with technology and algorithms, it still interferes with the privacy rights" (Scheinin in Halminen & Kempas 2017). Here, it is possible to argue that the article (Halminen & Kempas 2017) based on an outside expert's commentary, as stated in the heading, confirms the previous articles' message concerning the changing privacy conditions. Scheinin does not represent the Finnish media scene or the government, but, arguably, the

Professor's societal position gives him some legitimacy to speak out on the securitizing actor's speech acts. Furthermore, the article (ibid) does reproduce the initial justifications observed in the legislation proposals (MoI 2017: 20, MoD 2017: 26): *"The increased intelligence is specifically justified with new and pervasive threats [...] in many other countries, a similar legislation is already in force"* (Halminen & Kempas 2017). On the contrary to the government documents, these justifications are targeted with criticism: *"That is not a sufficient justification, according to Scheinin"* (ibid).

Thus, on the basis of the HS' writings, the immediate media response does not indicate to a highly favourable or even neutral public stance towards the proposed legislation. In other words, in contrast to the formerly presented governmental officials' statements, media discourses show that criticism of the necessity and broader social effects of the speech acts have been publicly expressed. Thereby, it is possible to argue that the media's representation has, in fact, contested the securitizing actor's liberation from the currently binding rules.

6.7 Implications of politicized discourses

In the Politics Radio, the reporter Pajunen's (in PR April 19th & 26th 2017) immediate response to the proposed legislation indicates, to a certain extent, distinctive arguments in comparison to the above discussed HS reportage. Pajunen (in PR April 19th) focused particularly on questioning the aspects of *new* threats in a *new* security environment, as was implied in the government officials' speech acts: *"Why is this necessary right now? How has the world changed during the past years? [...] Why haven't they been applied earlier even though Finland was part of the Cold War for 50 years between the East and West [...]"* (ibid). The questioning of the speech acts becomes more blatant in the latter broadcast carried out with the legislative working groups' executives: *"It is proposed now that a severe threat to the national security would be a sufficient justification [...] Tuula Majuri, [Ministry of Justice] justify for a regular citizen that why it would be quote kosher unquote to bend the citizens' fundamental rights in the name of national security?"* (Pajunen in PR April 24th 2017). Considering the method of intertextuality, Pajunen's (ibid) questioning over the stated executives' speech acts formulates an intertextual chain, although the reporter has developed his discursive practices throughout the broadcasts: *"How have*

we been able to live until this? Why right now? [...] The world has always been a dangerous place, the Cold War in the 1950s and in the 1970s terrorist attacks were frequent in Europe [...] At what point did the world change? [...] What would be the concrete reasons for the argument that the world has changed?''. As a result of the PR (ibid) discussion, it becomes feasible to argue that the reporter Pajunen has not fully assented the described urgency of the proposed legislative reform. Similarly as the Professor Scheinin (in Halminen & Kempas 2017), Pajunen clearly contests the securitizing actor's exceptional security environment narrative. While referring to the amount of terror attacks in the modern age, Pajunen even expressed an evaluative stance on the declared security threats: *"The absolute amount of terror attacks is lesser today than it was for example 40 years ago"* (Pajunen in PR April 24th 2017). As was stated in the theoretical framework, my aim is not to evaluate to what extent the declared threats endanger the state's sovereignty (Buzan et al. 1998: 26). Thus, by avoiding the evaluation aspect, Pajunen's counter argumentation (in PR April 19th & 26th) can rather be absorbed as relevant in respect of desecuritization. As stated, Pajunen questioned whether the current security environment should be perceived through the lens of emergency and exceptionalism. While engaging with the concept of desecuritization, it becomes possible to ask whether we should "treat this as a matter of danger and exceptionality or is it [...] better dealt with if we conceive it through less harmful terms?" (Hansen 2012: 546). Even though the presented discourses from the PR (Pajunen in PR April 19th & 26th 2017) do not clearly propose alternative discursive practices for conceiving the contemporary security environment, as implied by Hansen (2012: 546), the discussion can be interpreted as an effort for interactive dialogue about the declared threats, and as an deliberate comparison of security policy prospects between the past and the modern age. Thereby, it is possible to argue that the above stated arguments appear as features of normal political bargaining and critical debate.

As the prospect of party politics and disagreements towards the proposed intelligence legislation was introduced in media (in PR December 13th 2017 and Kervinen & Pietiläinen 2018b), the view of politicized instead of only securitized public dialogue gains support. In the selected media material, the prospects of differing views among the parties can first be observed, again, in the discussion between the reporter Pajunen and two members of the parliamentary control group, Tapani Tölli (CP) and Krista

Kiuru (Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP)) (in PR December 13th 2017). Here, Pajunen (ibid) first named the CP's and SDP's general disagreements concerning the Finnish domestic affairs, and linked it to the proposed legislation: “[...] *do you disagree steeply on the FSIS' spying rights or on the necessity of this legislation?*”. As was pointed out earlier, the chairman Tölli denied the existence of disagreements, and stayed committed to the discursive practice characteristic for the realm of security politics: “[...] *the government-opposition perspective should not exist here [...] the main question is not whether the FSIS gets the authorization [...] but whether the authorization is enough in respect of our national security*” (Tölli in PR December 13th 2017). The vice-chairman Kiuru's discourses, however, resonated with the more deliberative tone set up by the reporter Pajunen. Kiuru responded: “*It remains to be seen*” whether disagreements will arise, and “[...] *there are many kind of issues that still have to be resolved*”, by referring to the actual implementation of the legislation (Kiuru in PR December 13th 2017).

Furthermore, Kiuru's (ibid) statements prove that reconsiderations over the previously demonstrated threat declarations and of the proposed extended intelligence authorization have existed within the political elites: “[...] *a central topic of discussion has been that how to define a threat to the national security [...] we have struggled with this concept [...] We [the SDP party] are not going to be part of anything that seems like mass surveillance*”. In addition to previous, Kiuru further differentiated the SDP from other parties in the legislative process: “*That type consensus will not exist in the Parliament that we would start building a world where the Finnish people are surveilled extensively, the SDP will not be a part of that*”. Even the chairman Tölli responded to Kiuru's previous statement by representing Centre Party party instead of repeatedly emphasizing the former national security narrative: “*The Centre [party] is not part of that [mass surveillance] either*” (Tölli in PR December 13th 2017).

6.8 Further remarks on desecuritization

While considering more specifically the concept of desecuritization on the grounds of the previous sections' analysis, it is possible to recognize similarities between the presented discourses affiliated with normal political bargaining, and the Copenhagen School's (Buzan et al. 1998: 29) deliberations on desecuritization as the “preferred

long-term option”. The media content analysed in the previous section proves a clear initiative for politicizing the discussion in respect of the declared threats, the changed security environment narrative, as well as the securitizing actor’s liberation from the currently binding rules. Moreover, by recognizing the vice-chairman Kiuru’s more deliberate approach towards the security threats, it becomes feasible to argue that notions of questioning and criticism are not only limited to the non-governmental actors’ discourses, but also existed within the parliamentary control group. The divergent views on the legislation within the Finnish Parliament are similarly brought up in the HS’ writings (Kervinen & Pietiläinen 2018b), as the article confirms that the SDP and other oppositional parties have expressed “*extensive suspicion towards the legislation*”. The article quotes Antti Rinne, the SDP’s party leader: “*How are the citizens’ fundamental rights and the intelligence practices balanced?*” (Rinne in Kervinen & Pietiläinen 2018b). In other words, the debate between governmental authorities indicates that the public discussion has emerged outside the mode of emergency. Shifting the dialogue “out of the emergency mode”, and the expansion of the public dialogue to a broad range of political agents, correspond with the process of desecuritization, as defined in Hansen’s (2012: 526) analysis.

Furthermore, in order to fully engage with Hansen’s (2012: 533) position that “desecuritization is performative”, it is necessary to see whether discourses indicating to an altered “friend-enemy distinction” are observable in this case study. In addition to the critical arguments and contestations presented above, the HS article citing the Parliamentary ombudsman, Petri Jääskeläinen, further shows that “*national security*” as a discursive justification for expanding the intelligence authorization has been perceived as “*very loose*” and “*unpunctual as a concept*” within the Finnish Parliament (Jääskeläinen in Pietiläinen 2017). More importantly, Jääskeläinen (ibid) argues that it is “*very problematic*” if the actors targeted by the FSIS’ or the Defence Forces’ surveillance are not protected by the currently exercised jurisdiction. Arguably, Jääskeläinen’s discourses (ibid) problematize on the legislation from the previously established threatening other’s standpoint, because he states that the intensified surveillance practices endanger the targeted actors’ fundamental rights.

The unifying theme in the critical discursive practices appears to be the absence of Self versus threatening Other juxtaposition. Instead of merely identifying with the

designated object of security (Finnish national Self), the criticizing arguments demonstrated above, identify with the identity initially determined as foreign and threatening to Finland's national security. It is possible claim that even though the existence of security threats has not been disclaimed, the demonstrated critical contestations and the features of politicized discourses, nonetheless, do remark for a loosened friend-enemy distinction in media. Alternatively put, the demonstrated politicized discourses indicate that the juxtaposition's significance as a discursive meaning and source of legitimacy has been, in these specific instances, disregarded. Here, my intention is not to argue that the public dialogue in Finland has been desecuritized. Rather, on the grounds of the critical and questioning discourses mediated by the HS and the PR, it is possible to argue that variations of the Self versus Other identities' representation do exist.

7 Discussion

On the grounds of the presented findings, it can be argued that the Finnish government and its agents have justified the proposed intelligence legislation through multiple speech acts, and in so doing discursively constructed existential threats to Finland's national security in order to enable the proposed legislation to handle the threats. The declared threats have been named in the context of 'changed security environment' narrative, and by invoking to e.g. new kind of terrorism and cyber threats. After having applied the method of intertextuality, the initial speech acts identified in the legislation proposal documents have been since reinforced in media. Moreover, the speech acts have been broadly located in the political leadership's discursive practices, having been initiated by actors in the position of societal and political authority. In addition, my analysis has demonstrated how the speech act plot - *existential threat, point of no return and a possible way out* - was constructed across the studied material. Thus, the demonstrated discourse analysis was able to locate the internal and external conditions within the speech acts, as was defined by drawing upon Buzan et al. (1998: 33).

The findings concerning the second and thirds research question became, to a certain extent, interrelated, because the carefully explored discourses analysis indicated that security threats were often constructed by invoking to exceptionalism, such as to the identity of foreign threatening Other operating within the changed security environment. Thus, in respect of the construction of threats, the representation of the Finnish national Self against the foreign Other constituted a distinctive discursive practice. In addition, the notion of urgency as a discursive practice reappeared across the studied material, which enabled me to further account how the concept of exceptionalism was constructed in media.

Interestingly, in the process of identifying identities within the Finnish threat discourses, the findings appear to be in line with Chris Browning's (2002: 50) study concerning the "Westernising narrative of Finnish foreign policy" (Browning 2002: 50), as discussed in chapter 2. In my case study, the language in the legislation proposals and the Finnish political leadership's media discourses, in the same manner, linked Finland to a 'European perspective', invoked to the existence of comparable surveillance practices in 'other Western countries' and isolated the actions of Russia and non-European identities as exceptionally different. Furthermore, the Prime

Minister's (Sipilä in Liiten 2017) and the Defence Forces' representative's (Nordström in PR April 26th 2017) statements indicated that the EU was framed as the designated object of security. Widening the designated object of security from the context of Finnish national security to European level is in line with Buzan and Weaver's (2009: 253) development on macrosecuritization (see Chapter 4). Although, the findings, in principal, indicated that the Finnish nation and state were referred as the primary object of security. Moreover, declaration of universal threats, or responding to threats in a global level, did not appear as repetitive discursive practices in this case study.

The non-governmental actors' discursive deliberations in media showed that alternative narratives and critical arguments towards the proposed legislation have existed. Although, these arguments primarily questioned the proposed legislation's possible wider social implications, such as extended monitoring of citizens' private information. As the expressions of diverse opinions towards the proposed legislation within the Finnish Parliament was observed in the studied media material (in Kervinen & Pietiläinen 2018b), it became possible to argue that the public dialogue had emerged in the spectrum of normal politics as well. On the contrary to the threat naming discursive practices, the demonstrated oppositional and critical discourses did not name nor constitute the juxtaposition of national Self against threatening Others. Rather, the oppositional discourses in media emphasized and defended the fundamental rights of the actors that could be targeted by the Finnish security authorities, hence the identity that was previously named as foreign and dangerous to the designated object of security.

As was argued in the literature overview chapter, the intensification of governments' surveillance methods is a globally relevant phenomenon. A core argument pursued in this thesis is that the discursive use of threat narratives employed while seeking legitimacy for extended surveillance methods has been utilized in a global scale. Here, the presented arguments on the grounds of the Finnish government's threat declarations, and the public's critical response to them, could be further engaged with in a broader context by comparing and contrasting other national cases with the Finnish one. Also, the acceleration of information exchange enabled by the new communication platforms provides openings for investigating subjects of

securitization, and the shifts between the spectrums of politics and security, in a more extensive manner in line with the key contentions of this thesis.

8 Conclusion

In this thesis, I commenced by asking the following questions: how has the Finnish government justified its proposed civil and military intelligence legislation? How are threats to Finnish security constructed in media? How is the concept of exceptionalism constructed in media? By conducting the literature overview in chapter 2, I aimed to situate Finland and the concept of government surveillance more substantially into this thesis. I then discussed the key insights of the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory, where I aimed to set out how the theoretical framework enables me to fulfil the analytical aspirations for studying the Finnish threat discourses. In the theoretical framework chapter, I highlighted the process comprising the securitizing actor's liberation from the binding rules as a result of discursively constructed security threats. In addition, the role of the public resonance in securitization, and the refined discussion on the spectrums of politicized and securitized while overviewing the theory of desecuritization, appeared as key components for the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis. As I had decided to approach my case study and the set research questions by focusing on written and spoken discourses, I adhered with poststructuralist discourse analysis. By applying the methodological choices covered by poststructuralist discourses analysis, this study was able to formulate a research design that was in line with the selected primary material, as well as with my initial theoretical and analytical aspirations underpinning this thesis. Here, the specific methodological choices, such as the selection of public documents as the primary material, intertextuality and identification of identities in written and spoken discourses were designated as the main methodological components of my analysis.

In the analysis chapter, I focused on exploring the Finnish government agents' speech acts in three different sections. The discursive practices in the Finnish government's legislation proposals indicated that the proposed intelligence legislation has been justified by declaring existential threats to Finnish national security, and by contrasting the threats to the necessity of the proposed extended surveillance and intelligence practices. The carefully explored discourse analysis based on the selected

media material demonstrated that certain Finnish governmental executives, such as the Prime Minister, Minister of Interior and Minister of Defence had reproduced the threat narratives while commenting on the proposed legislation in media, and utilized similar discursive practices as was articulated in the legislation proposals. Furthermore, my findings indicated that the discursive practices relevant for the second and third research question were often interrelated, because threats to Finnish security were constructed by invoking to a changed security environment, in which the declared threats were framed as exceptional in comparison to the past. Moreover, in regards to the construction of threats, I identified that the Finnish national Self against threatening Others juxtaposition constituted a distinctive discursive practice. In regards to the concept of exceptionalism, my discourse analysis demonstrated how the notion of urgency formulated an intertextual chain and reappeared across the selected media material, and therefore became a key feature for the construction of exceptionalism in this case study.

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