LUND UNIVERSITY
School of Economics and Management

Understanding Leadership and Decision-Making Practices by Managers in the Field of Crisis and Security-Risk Management

A Cross-Case Analysis of the Seven Sectors in the Industry

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"It is in times of crisis that good leaders emerge."

—Rudolph Giuliani

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Abstract

Title: "Understanding Leadership and Decision-Making Practices by Managers in the field of Crisis and Security-Risk Management. A Cross-Case Analysis of the Seven Sectors in the Industry."

Research Question: "What leadership competencies and decision-making practices do managers in the field of crisis and security-risk management have?"

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Thesis Purpose: This research project is intended to provide perspective on the role of leadership and decision-making of managers who are positioned in organizations that deal with crises and security-risks. By giving an insight to managers biographical accounts and combining it with previous leadership publications, this study has focused on what decisions such managers make, and the assessment of their responsibility to lead others and their organization. As such, the project is a qualitative study comprised of biographical accounts collected through interviews with participants from seven sectors of the crisis and security-risk industry. By doing so, the intention is that we will have created a deeper understanding of what crisis and security-risk management is, by considering the situations and issues the participants have faced. Our hope is that it will inspire others who are similarly interested in developing knowledge on the topic.

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1. Introduction

We live in a world of complexities. This is particularly true within the field of crisis and security-risk situations. Most often, these crises and security-risks are linked to people's livelihood, where under such circumstances people tend to look for a leader to provide a solution that will bring back normalcy. In Chinese, the word crisis is "危機," and when breaking down the word to its root characters "危" means "danger" and "機" means "opportunity". Therefore, within danger there is also opportunity as former Mayor of New York Rudolph Giuliani said, "It is in times of crisis that good leaders emerge" (Varghese, 2010). Moreover, due to a rapidly changing world (Rausch et al., 2001) and a closer connectivity of businesses and people in the seemingly borderless world (Rausch et al., 2001), globalization has granted us with better access to the amount of available knowledge on security-risks before an incident happens, crises while they are happening, and after they have happened. Naturally, this affects the way managers within crisis and security departments *manage* situations, tasks and the people within and related to their organizations. What is unclear, is whether there are traits, behaviors or practices that are common to those in charge of companies, organizations, departments or sectors of the industry and how they respond and essentially act in such climates. That is where research on managerial practices becomes essential.

What is even more a vital part of the understanding, is how such responses are made; essentially what decision-making is and means. It is also for that reason, we have been interested in seeing whether we could pinpoint traits, behaviors, practices or competencies that allows leaders to emerge through crises and security risks situations today. We have asked our study participants this and now we ask our readers, is it persistence, awareness, sense-making, collaboration and/or decision-making that describes a leader? We argue these concepts are neither one or the other. Instead, it is a combination of competencies that have allowed the researched managers to successfully manage crisis and security-risk situations. As such, with the manifold of crisis and security-risks that occur throughout the world today, it is important for us to understand how those who are responsible for handling and tackling these issues, they do so in a successful manner.

1.1 Purpose

This research has studied the concepts of leadership and managers in the field of crisis and security-risk management, and what this means in practical terms (i.e. what types of decision-making tools, traits, behaviors and competencies they have). This study will highlight the

purpose through the professional accounts described and provided by the participants of the study. While research on leadership is not something new, it has moreover in the past couple of years become a contentious concept that many scholars have embarked research on (Alvesson et al., 2017). In a practical sense, leadership as a personality and a practice has become a "hot topic" throughout most top-tier consultancy firms, all of which continue to advocate and promote research projects and workshops that seek to help organizations in building and implementing "capable," "agile" or "best-practice leaders." We believe such a generalized approach; taking for granted what being a leader is and how it is acted out, is not an adequate knowledge-base on leadership and decision-making. As mentioned, while it is not something new in research that managing an organization is only successful with a capable leader, it is moreover the generalization and normative usage of leadership that needs to be scrutinized (Alvesson et al., 2017).

It is possible to tackle the issue of generalization by looking at managers in different sectors within the same industry. As such, this study has challenged the generalized notion by using biographical accounts of managers within the same field and applying their experiences in a comparative matrix to showcase the results. Thus, an additional purpose has been to provoke a curiosity with our readers and to contribute to the knowledge gap of leadership's probable context and content-dependency. Overall, we expect this research will serve the purpose of informing and describing what leadership means according to the cases studied, and how it is factored in by decision-making.

1.2 Research Question

We have been interested in discovering how the participants practices differed or compared, to develop a more thorough description of leadership from the given cases. For that reason, we have formulated the following research question in line with the purpose of the study:

"What leadership competencies and decision-making practices do managers in the field of crisis and security-risk management have?"

This is the overarching research question the study has focused on. However, to concretize it even more, and to ensure that we have directed the reader's attention to the factors of decision-making and leadership as two core concepts in the management of various crises and security-risks, we have developed two supporting sub-research questions. The sub-research questions are:

1. **"Are there commonalities in the way the managers studied, perform their duties?"**

2. **"What factors have the managers studied, highlighted as their decision-making processes and practices?"**

1.3 Current State on the Research Topic

Despite the knowledge gap on what makes a "leader" in crisis and security-risk environments along with an in-depth analysis on these leaders' decision-making, it is nevertheless a growing field and an important one (Alvesson et al., 2017; Jacques, 2012). We have highlighted in our theoretical framework, the most relatable sources of work and studies that have been done in a similar fashion as ours and which have provided valuable information on the topic.

1.4 Limitations

We find it important to highlight the challenges we have faced while doing this study. While we were very fortunate to have participants that are high ranking within the armed forces, foreign services, private organizations and academia, it was difficult to get responses from a few other sectors that we wanted an insight from. This included our hopes of interviewing a fieldofficer from a non-governmental organization. We had tried to reach out to several, but with no avail. This study would have benefitted from a contrasting analysis of private, public, non-governmental and public-private security risk and crisis organizations, because the nature of these organizations internally and externally differ quite a bit.

Although we did get access to one, and in some cases two interviewee(s) from each sector, we recognize the data we collected is not exhausted. It would be impossible for us to provide information on all the experiences of all managers within the field to fully cover and thus justify every type of decision-making, behavior, trait or practice in crisis and security-risk organizations. Moreover, the managers we interviewed were at different managerial levels (i.e. political level, strategic level, operational level, tactical level) and therefore have different tasks and outlooks about leadership practices. Therefore, the findings we have provided can only give a view of the leadership and decision-making practices, thus competencies from these cases perspectives.

Furthermore, cultural and institutional background also poses a limitation to our research. As our interview participants came from countries ranging from Sweden, Catalonia, the UK and Taiwan, we certainly see a cultural difference in how they understand and practice leadership

and decision-making. Moreover, language was also a factor that influenced how the interviewees understood the terms and questions we asked. But also impacted the interviewees' choice of words and expressions. For example, the interview with Director-General Yang was conducted in Chinese Mandarin instead of English, whereas the rest of the interviews were in English. When doing translations, there are always certain ideas and connotations that are difficult to convert from the original language.

Apart from these challenges, another critical element and thus limitation of the study was unsurprisingly time. Unlike professional researchers who have devoted years to research on leadership and decision-making, time limitation posed a big challenge for us when it came to conduct all of the data collection, the research process and analysis within the given timeframe of the thesis.

2. Theoretical Framework

In this section, we have provided the best available knowledge on the research topic. This literature review will look in to the usage and descriptions of the terms that relate to the concepts of risk, crisis, security, leadership and decision-making, as outlined in our research question. However, we would like to point out initially when we embarked on this journey, we started by using public search engines (e.g. LUB, Google) and typed in keywords like, *security management; risk management; crisis, security-risk management; leadership; government programs on crisis management*. The results were somewhat distorting as the primary articles that came up were centered on data security management, IT-security management and financial risk management. This brings forward another vital aspect of the research topic, most often the concept of risk management is associated with financial and statistical risk analyses. Nevertheless, though some of these articles have relevant discussions to our topic, we have not used them. We believe bringing in financial discussions to the cases presented would deviate from our focus. The articles and pieces that were related and discussed the aforementioned "terms-of-interest" have been used here. We expect these sources will provide the reader with adequate information on crisis and security-risk management within the scope of our research. Some of these sources have contextualized our results and have provided us with a more objective interpretations and descriptions of leadership and decision-making.

2.1 Security-Risk Management

The expression "risk management" first came in to use by Professor Wayne Snyder at the North American Insurance Buyers Conference in Chicago (Drennan et. al, 2014). The term began to gain prominence in the 1960s when Doug Barlow of Massey Harris became world's first "risk manager" in Canada (Drennan et. al, 2014). The term gradually gained popularity throughout the British Commonwealth and then to the United States. At first it was predominantly used to describe industrial risks in the insurance sector and how to identify risks that people and businesses needed protection from such as, a fire or flood, safe working practices, and installation of security equipment. Building on this notion, Drennan et. al. (2014) argue the idea of "risk management" is "the identification, evaluation and control of treats to the enterprise" (Drennan et. al, 2014). Yet, it was not until the 1980s when the term was adopted by governments and the non-profit sector (Hopkin, 2013; Drennan et. al, 2014). According to International Standardization Organization (ISO), risk is defined as the "effect of uncertainty on objective" which could either be positive, negative, or both (ISO, 2018). However, in the field of security, a risk is commonly defined as the "combination of the probability of a hazard and its negative consequences" (Pursiainen, 2018). Already here, by gaining a clearer insight to how a risk is described and defined, can we understand the complexity of the research.

Moreover, when security and risk is combined it naturally gets another meaning, one that particularly relates to an organization, as the ISO document writes, Security-Risk Management is the "coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk" (ISO, 2018). The ISO 31000 Risk Management Guidelines also emphasizes the importance of context. The condition of every crisis risk is unique, in terms of risk source, potential event, consequences, and likelihood, "Risk management is the identification, assessment and prioritization of risks followed by coordinated and economic application of resources to maximize the realization of opportunity or address the impact and/or likelihood of adverse events" (Airmic, 2018). There are several versions as it is continuously updated. In the new ISO 31000 risk management framework, it provides a structure for the leader of an organization to base the risk management process on integration, design, implementation, evaluation, and improvement with the objective of ensuring policies that cover disruption to security (Pursiainen, 2018).

2.2 Crisis

Crises come in many ways and for that reason we use the word with different association, often it has a negative connotation. A crisis is typically characterized by the following characteristics, as a situation it 1) threatens the objectives, 2) retains time, and is 3) unexpected or unanticipated (Hermann, 1963). Additionally, a crisis can be classified as man-made crisis or a natural disaster (Hermann, 1963). Both types of crisis could constitute security risks. What is meant by this is, that it is based on the cause of the crisis. One may deem it as a fast-burning crisis, long-shadow crisis, cathartic crisis, and slow-burning crisis (based on the speed of termination and the speed of development of the crisis) (Rosenthal et al., 2001). Each types of crisis requires the crisis manager to take different maneuvers to take care of them, which brings us to the need for understanding the different phases of a crisis.

2.2.1 Phases of Crises

In addition to the classifications of a crisis, one must also grasp a picture its lifecycle to fully analyze the response to a crisis. If we would to draw a linear continuum of the evolution of a crisis, there would be at least three major phases of the development of a crisis: the incubation period (Turner, 1976), the critical period (Stein, 2004), and the aftermath (Boin, et al., 2008; Silveira dos Santos, et al., 2006). James and Wooten present a more comprehensive five phase model of the lifecycle of a crisis it includes, signal detection, preparation/prevention, containment/damage control, business recovery, and learning (Wooten & James, 2008). While there are several phases of a cycle and it allows us to see the "life cycle," ultimately adopting measures that manages whichever phase of a crisis is vital.

2.2.2 Crisis Management Cycle

Drennan et al. (2014) developed a model on the four stages of crisis management cycle: *prevention*, *preparation*, *response*, and *recovery/learning (PPRR).* The crisis management cycle provides crisis managers an overview for managing the crisis is its different phases.

Drennan et. al.'s four stages (PPRR) crisis management model has been adopted in for example the Swedish and Australian emergency management agencies (Swedish National Audit Office, 2016; The State of Queensland, 2018). The *prevention* stage refers to imagine the unthinkable and taking steps to reduce the likelihood and effect of a crisis event. It includes activities such as assessing, evaluating, and communicating risks to stakeholders such as the public, clients,

colleagues, allies, etc. To properly assess risk, it also includes benchmarking risk management performance. It requires the crisis manager to first establish context to identify and understand the risk (Drennen, et al., 2014). Second, the *prevention* stage refers to taking steps to build up resilience to ensure an effective response and recovery during and after the crisis. It focuses on the contingency planning activities (Drennen, et al., 2014). Third, the *respond* stage is associated to the managing of the acute phase of the crisis. It includes activities such as coordinating first responders and resources to attend to the victims. Fourth, the *recovery/learning* stage concerns the reconstruction of the community after the crisis, as well as providing psychological support to the people involved in the crisis. Furthermore, the *recovery/learning* stage also deals in to investigating accountability for the cause and handling of the crisis. More importantly, how can the crisis management improve in the future (Drennen, et al., 2014) (Pursiainen, 2018). Based on Drennan et al. (2014) crisis management cycle, Pursiainen (2018) separated the combined recovery and learning stages and took out the risk analysis from Drennan et al. (2014) crisis prevention stage to make an independent risk assessment stage that also led to the development of a six stages crisis management cycle (Pursiainen, 2018).

The principle purpose of that model stays the same as to Drennan et al. (2014). First, the *risk assessment* stage correlates to the *ISO 31000 Risk Management Guideline*. This requires the crisis manager to first establish context to identify and understand the risk (Pursiainen, 2018). Second, there is a *prevention* stage, which includes being able to imagine the unthinkable and communicate the risk to stakeholders such as the public, clients, colleagues, allies. Third, the *response* stage, is about the overall crisis preparedness which includes contingency planning, staff training, and exercise. The fourth stage is also called the *mitigation* stage. It is about managing the acute phase of a crisis including coordinating first responders and resources to attend to victims. The fifth stage is the *recovery* stage and is concerned with the reconstruction of a community and providing psychological support to the people involved. The final stage is sort of a period of reflection or the *learning* stage. It requires investigating accountability for the cause and handling of the crisis, but most importantly, it is a stage that focuses on how crisis management can be improved in the future (Drennan, et al., 2014; Pursiainen, 2018).

2.3 Leadership skills, habits, behaviors, traits or practices?

Our understanding of leadership is evolving (Alvesson et al., 2017; Zaccaro, 2006). This is partly due to the complexity of the world with a growing amount of organizations and research

on them (Kotter, 2001), and results from fieldwork (Iszatt-White & Saunders, 2017; Kohn and O'Connell, 2005; Mintzberg, 2013; Zaccaro, 2006). Despite many attempts to define and describe leadership (Alvesson et al., 2017; Zaccaro, 2006), the understanding of what leadership encompasses within crisis and security-risk organizations requires more attention so that we can create a better framework of the different ways managers work. Despite the trend to generalize leadership, there are still several models (Iszatt-White and Saunders, 2017; Kohn and O'Connell, 2005; Joiner and Joseph, 2007; Logan et al., 2008; Collins, 2001) that can be used to enhance the understanding and practice of leadership within our focus area. However, what is interesting the approaches these scholars have taken to describe the variation of leadership.

Some models argue we can denote leaders by traits or the natural science approach (Collins, 2001; Joiner and Joseph, 2007), while others provide a behavioral and psychological aspect to the terms and conditions for being a leader (Logan et al., 2008). In "Highly Effective Bosses" by Stephen E. Kohn and Vincent D. O'Connell, have compiled a small "biblical reference" to what constitutes the foundations (or rather habits) of successful executives. It is rather within the social sciences in the sense that it is built upon the Theory X and Theory Y model, which was first coined by Douglas McGregor to study the relationship between leadership and organizations (Kohn and O'Connell, 2005). In very simple terms, Theory X "assumes a management approach characterized by [managers] who believe that:

♦ The average human being has an inherent dislike of work.
♦ People avoid work when they can.
♦ Because of their dislike for work, most people must be controlled and threatened before they will work hard enough"

…In its most extreme form, *Theory X* managers are extremely…suspicious. They are convinced the staff must be watched constantly" (Kohn and O'Connell, 2005, p. 23-24). On the other hand, Theory Y managers "assume that:

♦ The expenditure of physical and mental effort in work is as natural as play or rest.
♦ Control and punishment are not the only ways to make people work and that people will direct themselves if they are committed to the aims of the organization.
♦ The average person learns, under proper conditions, not only to accept but to seek responsibility.
♦ Under the conditions of modern industrial life, the intellectual potentialities of the average person are only partially utilized.

[As such] *Theory Y* managers insist that people are assets that can be nurtured for the talent they bring to the organization" (Kohn and O'Connell, 2005, p. 25-26). Theory X and Y

represent two ends of a management spectrum. Though it could perhaps be easier to relate to if management approaches were so categorical, it is the case that managers today, are a little bit of both (Kohn and O'Connell, 2005). The habits of effective leaders (Kohn and O'Connell, 2005) are more specifically delineated as "*expanding self-awareness, practicing empathy, following the 'Golden Rule' principles, maintaining proper boundaries, criticizing artfully,* and *flexing to different people styles*" (Kohn and O'Connell, 2005, p. 47). It is interesting because these habits particularly pertain to the tasks Mintzberg (2013) argues are the core things that managers (who are leaders) - do. For that reason, while Kohn and O'Connell (2005) have a more theoretical approach, combined with Mintzberg (2013) we can understand the practical discussion of leadership.

Mintzberg (2013) conducted fieldwork on managers in several types of organizations. Though this was all from government offices to NGOs (such as the Red Cross) and then private firms like Marsh, the whole idea is that both Plane and Mintzberg (2013) essentially argue the same conceptualization of the role of a manager to face a ubiquitous number of variable tasks, and complex ones for that sake. As Mintzberg writes, "Managing is almost as varied as life itself, because it is about so much that happens in life itself" (Mintzberg, 2013, p. 97). In relation to Kohn and O'Connell's (2005) argument, Mintzberg (2013) does not describe leadership as being habits. Instead Mintzberg (2013) focuses on the operational duties of managers, which are divided into five groups. First, there is the External Context, which consists of embracing national, sector, and industry culture, then there is the Organizational Context (such as age, size, and stage of development) that a manager accounts for when making decisions. Next, there is the Job Context, which focusses on the hierarchy and work function of those supervising and those being supervised; the Temporal Context (temporary pressures and managerial fashion); and finally, the Personal Context, which looks at the background of the incumbent (Mintzberg, 2013, p. 103). The latter practicality of the Temporal Context is one key practice we will refer to as it relates to self-reflection as a managerial practice (Alvesson et al., 2017). Fieldwork just like Mintzberg's (1990; 2013) and others such as Jacques (2012) show the operational practices are very much intertwined and are often dealt with simultaneously by a manager. If one deals with the all successfully, we can say he/she is a leader (Jacques, 2012).

In line with the operational personification of a leader, Aprille International Enterprises LC (Williams, 2013) has created a model called, the 5 C's of Leadership that include: Character; Commitment; Courage; Confidence; and Communication, which correlates with Collin's

(2001) "Five Levels of Leadership." For Level 1 Collins (2001) describes, this is a "Highly Capable Individual – [who] (m)akes productive contributions through talent, knowledge, skills, and good work habits." Level 2 is the "Contributing Team Member" where, the person "Contributes to the achievement of group objectives; works effectively with others." Level 3: the "Competent Manager," Level 4: "The Effective Leader," who "Catalyzes commitment to vigorous pursuit of compelling vision; stimulates the group to high performance standards." And finally, at the top of the levels, is the Executive who "(b)uilds enduring greatness through a paradoxical combination of personal humility plus professional will" (Collins, 2001). The 5-Cs are however, not just operational performances but characteristics.

Collins (2001) concentrates his discussion on leadership toward the fact of why some companies can outdo various types of challenges such as economic crisis and deficits, which is outside the scope of this research. However, what Collins (2001) did, was to research eleven major companies on the Fortune 500 list from 1965-1995, where they "picked fifteen years because it would transcend one-hit wonders and lucky breaks and would exceed the average tenure of most chief executive officers" (Collins, 2005, p. 159). The list of companies and executives the study had chosen included 3M, Boeing, GE, Coca-Cola, Merck & Co., Hewlett-Packard and Wal-Mart. These companies face exceedingly high amounts of risks and crises daily (see discussion in 2.1 Security-Risk Management and 2.2 Crisis). Thus, what is even more interesting in relation to our focus, is the nature of Collin's (2001) study and its design. It correlates with Mintzberg's (2013) study of managers. Both scholars embarked on the otherwise daunting task of creating a list of traits and characteristics that not only describe an organization but more specifically, managers.

According to three management and leadership scholars at Lund University in Sweden, leadership is a term that pertains more to skills and practice such as flexibility, agility and self-reflection (Alvesson et al., 2017). For that reason, leadership accordingly is a human-centric management approach, as opposed quantitatively oriented; i.e. fixed with results and statistics (like financial deliverables) of an organization. Alvesson et al. (2017) define leadership as, "*influencing ideas, meanings, understandings and identities of others within an asymmetrical (unequal) relational context*" (Alvesson et al., 2017, p. 3). But moreover, it is reflexive leadership that Alvesson et al. (2017) argue is the principle characteristic of contemporary leaders and managers; they are concerned with the practicality of their actions where to effectively and successful deal with complex crisis situations, leadership means "reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action (after the experience one analyses one's reaction to the situation

and explores the reasons around, and the consequences of, one's actions)" (Alvesson et al., 2017, p. 13). In that sense the Reflexive Leadership which Alvesson et al. (2017) have coined, is defined in the following way, "Being reflective essentially means that you are willing to consider what might be wrong with established ideas and beliefs, including your own. Thinking critically and considering alternatives is key" (Alvesson et al., 2017, p. 4).

Zaccaro et al. (2004) provide a supportive argument to Alvesson et al. (2017) and essentially Mintzberg's (2013) take on leadership as it has three key components, which are all-inclusive of traits, behaviors and practices. First, leader traits are not to be considered in isolation but rather as integrated constellations of attributes that influence leadership performance. As noted earlier, researchers in most prior studies simply tried to,

> "uncover the differences between leaders and non-leaders, or they focused on the independent contributions of each in a small set of personal qualities. Behavior, especially complex forms such as leadership, rarely can be grounded in so few personal determinants. Understanding leadership requires a focus not only on multiple personal attributes but also on how these attributes work together to influence performance. A second component in this definition of leader traits concerns the inclusiveness of a variety of personal qualities that promote stability in leader effectiveness" (Zaccaro et al., 2004, p. 111).

As such, we see the contemporary fashion for understanding what leadership means is embedded in the practicalities of skills, traits and behaviors that result in the decisions a leader makes and how such decisions come about (i.e. through inwards and outwards reflection) (Alvesson et al., 2017). Zaccaro (2007) became more popularly known for arguing that leadership traits are "relatively coherent and integrated patterns of personal characteristics, [yet] reflecting a range of individual differences, that foster consistent leadership effectiveness across a variety of group and organizational situations" (Zaccaro, p. 8, 2007). As such, though leadership traits are seemingly and accordingly very personal to the specific person.

Nevertheless, despite the many takes on what constitutes a leader, we want to emphasize Mintzberg's (2013) "Managing" as a vital study towards the knowledge on the differences of being a leader. Mintzberg's (2013) contribution truly stands out because of the amount of collected data and analysis. This is vital to our understanding of how it is essentially difficult to argue definitions on what makes a leader *a leader*. Yet, to create a bit of confusion Mintzberg does highlight that within all these differences there are still some behaviors, traits or factors that are resonant with many managers across organizations.

2.3.1 Crisis Leadership

When a crisis occurs, people tend to immediately look for someone or something that can be held accountable (Boin et al., 2005). In organizations this is usually the manager, so that he or she can avert the threat or minimize the damage, and bring the situation back to normality (Boin, et al., 2005). In "Politics of Crisis Management" by Boin et al. (2005), crisis leadership is defined as a set of strategic tasks coordinated and facilitated by an authority. Accordingly, this figure handles a crisis through six activities: *sense-making*, *decision-making and coordination*, *meaning-making* (i.e. crisis communication), *terminating* (i.e. "accounting" and ending the crisis), *learning*, and lastly—*preparing* (Boin et al., 2005; Stern, 2013).

More specifically, the idea of *sense-making* means developing a clear interpretation to the severity and complexity of the crisis. This often poses a challenge as there is usually not enough information accessible to the leader. Decision making means acting and mitigating a crisis. Meaning-making involves crisis communication,

> "[b]ecause of the emotional charge associated with disruptive events, followers look to leaders to help in understanding the meaning of what has happened and place it in a broader perspective. By their words and deeds, leaders can convey images of competence, control, stability, sincerity, decisiveness, and vision…" (Stern, 2013).

Terminating refers to finding the appropriate means to an end of the crisis and so the organization can return to normalcy. However, leaders in a crisis should consider that "attempting to end a crisis prematurely can endanger or alienate constituencies who may still be in harm's way, traumatized, or otherwise emotionally invested in the crisis" (Stern, 2013). Lastly, *preparing* refers to building up organizational resilience for the crisis. It includes organizing, planning, educating, training, exercising, and cultivating vigilance.

2.3.1.1 Decision-Making in Context of Crisis Leadership

Decision-making is an important part in crisis leadership. There is naturally a difference between making decisions under normal and crisis situations. Under normal circumstances a decision regularly has an abundance of time, information and resources (James and Wooten, 2005; Rowe, 2016). However, in a crisis, decisions are usually "time sensitive, post significant risks, and require consequential decisions" (Oroszi, 2016). Moreover, in a security-risk environment the pressure increases as there are many stakes involved (Oroszi, 2016). The high potential cost of a wrong decision adds to the layer of complexity (Snyder and Diesing, 2015). Crisis leaders are thus constrained and influenced by the different contextual factors when making decisions. Bearing in mind the contextual factors of decision-making and relating this

to crisis leadership, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has published a meticulous protocol that stipulates procedures military commanders must base their decision-making processes on in the face of a crisis. The protocol is called the *Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD).*

COPDs directive has organized a crisis response effort into four different phases: 1) Initial situational awareness of a potential/actual crisis, 2) Operational appreciation of the strategic environment, 3) Operational estimate, 4) Operational plan development. In line with the arguments of James and Wooten (2005); Oroszi (2016); Rowe (2016); Snyder and Diesing (2015), the COPD also emphasizes that protocol considers time constraints and factors that pressure decisions. These factors include geographical characteristics, population demographics, political situation, military and security situation, economic situation, socio-cultural situation, health and medical situation, infrastructure situation, information and media situation (NATO, 2013). The COPD has been created to structure decisions in an otherwise tumultuous world of security issues, and at the same time it conveys expected practices of leaders in crisis and security-risk situations.

As such, there are many military commanders who use the COPD as a decision-making directive and a method for developing an analysis of the crisis or security-risk situation they face. This is based on deductive approach (NATO, 2013). The directive echoes with Boin et al. (2005) strategic coordination of crisis leadership and another contextual international risk assessment tool that has been created namely, the *ISO31000 protocol on risk management*. ISO31000 is in a similar fashion to the COPD, a document that lays out the foundations of making risk assessments and how to act in relation to a crisis or security situation.

3. Methodology

This research topic was chosen specifically because both authors have a background in political science and securitization. For that reason, we have underpinnings of theories from political science, but which we have evidently combined with the theories and analytical principles of management studies. That is because we have studied a Masters in Management (MiM) for the past year, where we have had several courses and seminar workshops and projects that focused on leadership, decision-making and the multifaceted entailments of management. For that reason, we found it interesting to connect our previous educational backgrounds and the theories we have been working with throughout our degrees as political scientists with a deeper

look into the patterns and practices of leadership and decision-making within the field of Crisis and Security-Risk Management.

There are several thematic aspects of crisis and security-risks that a managerial study must account for to create a comprehensive understanding of the field. We believe an inclusion of politics, context, security issues, communication and rhetoric, psychology, planning, devising strategies and protocols, and to a degree ethics is important to enable a growth mindset among managers. As such, leadership and decision-making are two very complex areas to research as there is an abundance of relatable concepts. However, we believe that by using a theoretical approach that centralizes the research towards experiential and practical knowledge, one that is human centric, it is possible to not only create a sound and informative methodology to answer the study's research questions, but it will most importantly use empirical data to provide discussions that can be validated through biographical accounts. As such, the research design is based on the **Interpretivist paradigm.** This approach has allowed us to concoct a research design where we use cases as the backdrop for the information that is described and analyzed based on our interpretation.

3.1 Research Approach – Interpretivism

Interpretivism is a paradigm that is often used with case studies (Bakker et al., 2010). And, "Case study research is often associated with an emphasis on the importance of interpretation of human meaning…[and] (u)tilizing an interpretive paradigm, can help reinforce the importance of attention to idiographic detail" (Bakker et al., 2010, p. 2-7). In other words, the approach emphasizes that we as researchers expand and develop the meaning of human tales and experiences as opposed to reducing it (Bakker et al., 2010; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2008). Nevertheless, it was not the immediate approach we had. While constructing and deciding on the research approach of this thesis, there were several options we considered before we decided to use interpretivism as our methodology.

We thought of using grounded theory (GT) since we mainly based the knowledge creation on interviews before choosing a method. However, grounded theory also has a main disadvantage that is tends to be time consuming both in terms of data analysis and for the researcher to fully grasp its application (Hussein et al., 2014). As we described in under the project's limitations, time was not in abundance. In addition to this, GT can also fall too quickly towards describing a phenomenon (nearly exhaustingly) purely to create a model, where the researchers own biases

may come about (Hussein et al., 2014). Nevertheless, though it may seem very fitting to use this approach, the key reason as to why we continued searching for another methodology was because of time and space limits. Thus, when we embarked on the research journey there was not much literature on the exact nature of our study and for that reason we knew we had to collect data that was specific to our subject matter, which was how we came to choose Interpretivism.

The participants of this study naturally had each their take on what managing a crisis meant, and how they dealt with security risks and issues within their respective organizations and positions. As researchers making observations and interpreting the statements and descriptions of each of the participants, we considered biographical research as a vital and viable approach to describing the data we collected and making interpretations to answer our research questions. This fit well with our decision to collect data through interviews of managers within various sectors of the crisis and security-risk industry, and it furthermore left an open spot with our interest to highlight the individual experiences of the managers. Nevertheless, before we chose to use Interpretivism we considered the frequently discussed disadvantages of Interpretivism. This includes the tendency for researcher bias or subjectivity, and study participants wanting to change their stories after debriefs of the researcher's results (Bakker et al., 2010; Bryman, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 2008; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010). To tackle these issues, Collins and Onwuegbuzie (2006) argue researchers should conduct pre-briefings to,

> "denote a form of debriefing that occurs before the study begins. Prior to conducting the study, a qualitative researcher could use prebriefing sessions to identify potential participants, to explain the study protocol, to reiterate the importance of full participation in the investigation, to reassure the participant that confidentiality will be maintained, or the like" (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2008, p. 5).

By being inspired by Onwuegbuzie's (2006) approach and to address the disadvantage of Interpretivism, we sent out a small summary of our study's purpose to the participants along with our semi-structure interviews to nearly all the interviewees. Furthermore, prior to each interview we informed all the participants of our interview protocol. This included how we had drafted questions, and how they would not be asked questions in any specific order nor would we stop the participant from adding information they felt was relevant. We also informed the participants that the interviews would take approximately an hour and that once we had written this study and prior to publishing it, we would send them each their individual quotations for their approval. However, we also emphasized that we would not change the phrasing since

everything had to be original – we could ensure this since all the interviews were recorded (also with the consent from the participants).

3.2 Research Design - Cross-Case Analysis

There is a good opportunity for field research and evidently, scholarly work on the topic that has been investigated in this paper. It is also for that reason we believe the best available knowledge in this project comes from the data collected in the interviews. Since the predominate amount of data collected has been through a qualitative approach (with interviews of selected candidates at a managerial level), the Cross-Case study has allowed us to portray the contents and context of each of these managers experiences to their individual accounts (i.e. biographical) and in contrasts to each other. It is an appropriate method to use as it is also a typical element of the interpretivist methodology (Bakker et al., 2010; Hussein et al., 2014; Bryman, 1993). And, because it describes and inform us what managers have done and what they believe they do when handling a crisis and security-risk situation.

Particularly, the Cross-Case Analysis is "An analysis that examines themes, similarities, and differences across cases…which is any bounded unit, such as an individual, group organization, or interaction" (Mathison, 2005, p. 96). Furthermore, we decided to use Cross-Case analysis, so we could address a concern we had with the ability to make contrasts and comparability of the interviews. There is no element of the Cross-Case Analysis that requires such a study to *only* draw similarities (Bryman 1993; Mathison, 2005; Miles and Huberman, 2008), which fits right in with our purpose to showcase differences in these managers' leadership and decision-making.

One key facet or rather component of the Cross-Case Analysis is again, highlighting individual accounts. It is particularly the deep insights of each managers' experiences that we have emphasized as a critical element in the creation of knowledge in the area. Accordingly, this element of Cross-Case Analysis gives research a level of reliability in terms of understanding and knowledge since,

> "life story interviews prove able to probe deep; perhaps because it is much easier to lie about one's opinions, values and even behavior than about one's own life. […] it takes a sociological eye – to look through an experience and understand what is universal in it; to perceive, beyond described actions and interactions, the implicit sets of rules and norms, the underlying situations, processes and contradictions that have both made actions and interactions possible and that have shaped them in specific ways. It takes some training to hear, behind the solo of a human voice, the music of society and culture

in the background. This music is all the more audible if, in conducting the interview, in asking the very first question, in choosing, even earlier, the right persons for interviewing, one has worked with sociological issues and riddles in mind" (pg. 92 Alasuutari et al., 2008).

The insights of the participants have given a very practical explanation and understanding of leadership and naturally, a more personal take on decision-making in its practicalities and in an empirical format. But moreover, using the Cross-Case Analysis has a vital part in interpretive paradigm as it allows us to outline and thus conceptualize the differences and/or similarities there are between cases and the people within them (Bryman, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 2008). This is also appropriate in relation to our main- and sub-research questions that circumvents what leadership and decision-making practices managers have in crisis and security-risk organizations. However, an important aspect of Cross-Case Analysis is rhetoric and phrasing and deciphering social orders and the environment of the persons we interviewed, based on what they described. Though neither of us are sociology or communication experts, there is a level of analytical and linguistic capacity we have used that comes from years of training of words, expressions, rhetoric and verbal definitions. This has allowed us to interpret what the participants' own accounts mean in the context of all these aspects.

A strength of the cross-case analysis is that it allows researchers to study several cases at the same time and over a varying time frame. In other words, research that handles cross-case work "must have a theory of social explanation that both preserves uniqueness and entails comparison" (Miles and Huberman, 2008, p. 173). Furthermore, the core idea of using the Cross-Case Analysis is,

> "to learn something about a concept, theory (or) social process…Cross-case or comparative approaches include functional analysis... In cross-case analysis, two central issues are the rationale for the selection of multiple cases in a single study and the procedures for analyzing data across the cases." (Schwandt, p. 56, 2011).

However, one of the main obstacles of using this theoretical framework was choosing the appropriate methods within cross-case analysis. Miles and Huberman (2008) describe there are two types of approaches: the variable-oriented analysis and the case-oriented. There is an obvious shortcoming with the variable-oriented analysis, which is that it focuses mainly on the vertical factors of a case, meaning it gives us only the sum of the total without considering the other factors in comparison. This approach shows the variables and their relationships to other cases but does not take into consideration the other factors of the single and rest of the cases in the table (Miles and Huberman, 2008). The case-oriented approach lets researchers do both a vertical and horizontal reading of the factors, granting them a larger interpretation of the case

and its factors due to a sum of the total collection, which Miles and Huberman (2008) call, "look(ing) at the full story of a case…" (pg. 173). To use either of the two, it is necessary to set up a table with chosen factors that highlight the research topic; i.e. leadership and decision-making, as we have done in our selected data analysis method of the Role-Ordered Matrix.

3.3 Data collection Method

We embarked on this research journey by deciding the nature of the research design as explained above. And, as described one of the main tools for conducting a cross-case analysis is by collecting data qualitatively. We did this by having interviews with managers within the seven predefined sectors of crisis and security-risk organizations (Please refer to 3.5 Validity and Reliability - Interview Participants and Sector Representation for more information on the sectors and the participants). The data collection was conducted through one of the following ways: face-to-face interview, Skype interview, or telephone interview. All the interviews lasted within +/- 15 minutes of the set one-hour time frame. Our data collection efforts yielded more than 8 hours of audio recording.

3.3.1 The Interview Questions

To avoid a stringent collection of information, we conducted semi-structured interviews with ten open-ended interview questions. Furthermore, to secure validity and reliability of our research purpose, all the interviewees were sent identical interview questions beforehand, but these were posed in random order during each interview. It was based on the flow of the dialogue. This was done to ensure the semi-structure but also to allow participants to give natural and genuine answers, thus biographical accounts. We recorded all the interviews, so we could conduct coding of the answers for further analysis, and so that we could authentically quote each representative.

3.4 Data Analysis

As described under section 3.2 Research Design - Cross-Case Analysis, a typical concern with using this type of design is not just that participants sometimes want to change their stories or accounts, but that especially for Cross-Case Analysis, interviewees may have very different personal interpretations of an interview question. This is also why having formal methods for analyzing the so-called choices of statements participants gave us during interviews, allows us to still be able to create a comprehensible structure for interpreting the results. For example,

we experienced that though we had semi-structured questions and had asked the participants the same questions in the exact same phrases (not following any order), some had understood the nature of the questions in very different ways. We asked all participants, "What would you identify to be the difference between working in a security-risk environment and a non-security risk environment?" For 4 out of the 9 interviews, the managers understood the question as relating to their job-specific risk mitigation responsibilities in a crisis compared to their tasks when there was no crisis.

Moreover, the four participants had specifically linked their answer to one of our other questions that had asked: "What factors impact your decision-making - under pressure and under "normal" circumstances? However, there was one participant who had an entirely different approach to the latter question and it was not linked to the first question either. This participant understood the latter question as how it was working in a volatile environment versus a low-risk environment (i.e. where there are no immediate threats, crises or similar risks). The participant compared his experience to working in a diplomatic office in Nairobi during civil unrest to presidential elections, where there were no sizable protests, civil unrests or high-level risks such as terrorism and crime. As such, structure for our data analysis was needed. We chose coding, the Role-Ordered Matrix and Choice Biographies, which will be elaborated in the following sections.

3.4.1 Coding
We conducted coding by carefully listening through the interview recordings and write down reoccurring themes that were mentioned by all the interviewees. This process of coding was outlined by David R. Thomas (2006). Furthermore, all sentences that mentioned our research topic and the concepts of our research questions were assigned a category label relating to a specific theme. The sentences were then transcribed with a description of the context and categorized under these themed labels. The sentences that were unable to be assigned a code were also transcribed under our general notes section and organized according to the different interviewee. There were 55 theme labels in the initial coding process, but after further analysis these 55 themes were eliminated and re-organized into 22 leadership and decision-making practices and competencies to link them to our research questions. We have done coding on all the interviews and found similar as well as very differing rhetorical responses, uses of terms and examples of experiences to the exact same interview question. Evidently, this makes up

for enough information to place in two tables. Therefore, the coding results is organized into Role-Ordered Matrixes to illustrate the result (e.g. a systematic data analysis chart).

3.4.2 The Role-Ordered Matrix

Particularly for studies such as ours, where there is an emphasis on interpreting each managers' decision-making practices and their positions as a leader while looking for differences and comparisons, require reflections not just analysis but a clear way to illustrate the understanding of the results. The most comprehensible and systematic method that sorts data is the Role-Ordered Matrix (Miles and Huberman, 2008). As described in the previous section, we supplied the use of the Cross-Case Analysis with the Role-Ordered Matrix to create a table that could more easily pinpoint our identified role behaviors and characteristics that were described by the participants. The Role-Ordered Matrix has a "within case" display of factors and descriptions meaning that though participants may have used the same terms or descriptions for a given interview question, the way it has been acted-out may very well differ. Nevertheless, using the Role-Ordered Matrix is a necessary component in the research on leadership as it highlights general differences and comparisons that we can use to decipher factors that led towards answering the overall research questions.

There are not many researchers who have ventured into this type of systematic approach to show behaviors and practices of research participants (Miles and Huberman, 2008). It is therefore an excellent way to "let us see how perspectives differ [and compare] according to [their] role" (Miles and Huberman, 2008, p. 125). By using the Role-Ordered Matrix we have been able to combine a cross-case analysis with concrete facts of each participant of the study using coding. At the same time, the Role-Ordered Matrix does not seek to generalize.

3.4.2.1 The Conceptually Clustered Matrix

There are several structural variations of creating tables to showcase data, where it is moreover the Conceptually Clustered Matrix: Motivates and Attitudes (Miles and Huberman, 2008) that is relevant for this study. This is because the Conceptually Clustered Matrix allows researchers to create a table that rooms several research questions into one matrix (Miles and Huberman, 2008). Yet, even within this category of the Role-Ordered Matrix Miles and Huberman (2008) argue, it is perfectly fine for a researcher to create his/her own topic at hand for the Conceptually Clustered Matrix with labels based on the given data that is, apart from using the

research questions as the bases for the entries in the table. This has given us the opportunity (as will be shown in the results section) to make several Role-Ordered matrices.

3.4.3 Choice Biographies

There were several instances where participants in their interviews would reply with a statement that did not specifically address the given question or, they would tweak an answer, so it addressed their intended way of wanting to be referred to. We discovered this as some participants had asked for the questions beforehand, so they could "prepare answers" and "prepare themselves." One of the more frequent questions where this occurred, was for the question: "Are there any challenges you could pinpoint are reoccurring?" Perhaps it was lack of clarification from our side or that the participants felt it was a question that related to a sort of vulnerability in their decision-making or authority. Nevertheless, when this occurred we would sometimes (and sometimes not) politely interrupted with a deeper cross-examination or follow-up question based on their statement. This was not done to *control* the interviewee, but to create a deeper context of understanding. Nevertheless, one could argue that some of the interviewees intentionally "did this" because of how they wanted to appear. This would still be a somewhat subjective measure to describe traits of managers because of the "choice biography" (Alasuutari et al., 2008). Choice biography stems from the individualization thesis (Alasuutari et al.,2008) and has been formulated by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995) in the following way:

> "…a 'standard biography' [has] be(en) replaced by a 'choice biography'…An individualization is said to take place, where people are forced to make *choices*... Individual choices become center stage and the characteristics form [the] systematic disparities in individuals…' If social scientists carry out empirical biographical research with this type of theoretical back cloth as the main conceptual apparatus, analyses are taken to a level of abstractions where indeed discourse and narratives are more meaningful starting points than the intersection of history and biography." (Alasuutari et al., p. 91, 2008).

Therefore, though Alasuutari et al. (2008) argue the individualization thesis gives a researcher a more informative background of interview participants at the same time researchers should not be naïve about the use of 'choice biography.' This is since participants may try to control (too much) what they want the researcher to hear and interpret of them as research subjects. What we were seeking to highlight through this type of data analysis, was how the dependency on context (of the participants and their environment), was not only variable based on the biographical account each manager gave, but moreover so we could use experiential data to

showcase the complexity in describing, even comparing, leadership traits as well as the decision-making processes.

3.5 Validity and Reliability - Interview Participants and Sector Representation

Considering the research aim and for the validity of the research, it is important to have participants who have been tested and tried in crises and security-risk situations. For the selection of participants, we identified leaders who have worked in managing security-risks and crises from seven different sectors that we identified directly involved the handling of crisis and security-risk situations. The seven sectors represent a private business, a government cabinet, the foreign services, an inter-governmental organization, the intelligence services, and the armed forces, and academia.

We have created this following table to provide a simple illustration of the background of the crisis managers we interviewed.

Table 1 Interview participants' background

Sector	Interviewee	Title/Role	Organization
Private Business	Ashley Plane	Insurance Officer for Kidnap and Ransom	Marsh
Government Cabinet	Meritxell Serret	Minister of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries, and Food*	Generalitat of Catalonia
Foreign Services	Jonas Hafström	Ambassador to Thailand*	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden
	Gabriel Linden	Consular Crisis Officer	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden
Inter-governmental Organizations	Håkan Malmqvist	Ambassador to NATO	Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden
Intelligence Services	Kuo-Chiang Yang	Director-General*	National Security Bureau of Taiwan
Armed Forces	Karl Engelbrektson	Chief of Army	Swedish Armed Forces
Academia	Ann Enander	Professor	Swedish Defence University
	Gerry Larsson	Professor	Swedish Defence University

*Indicates the title is a former position.

The private sector often provides tailored and prompt services when helping clients meet their security-risk challenges. To obtain a perspective from the private sector we interviewed Ashley Plane from the top-tier global security and risk insurance brokerage company, Marsh & McKlennan. Mr. Plane is a manager and specialist in the Kidnap and Ransom Department in Norwich, UK. Plane's formal responsibilities include assessing cases of kidnapping, providing security training and education to clients travelling and working in volatile environments (such as Kabul, Afghanistan), and coordinating kidnap and ransom negotiation efforts. Mr. Plane's case profile includes managing kidnaps in Nigeria, kidnaps of European banker, and express kidnaps in Latin America (Plane, 2018).

Often in the public sector, handling and managing a crisis or security-risk situation is highly politicized (Drennen, et al., 2014). To better understand and examine leadership and decision-making within this sector, we interviewed Catalan Government Cabinet Minister, Meritxell Serret. Minister Serret is on the frontline of the unfolding Catalonia call for independence. Furthermore, Serret holds the title of Minister of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Food of the Generalitat of Catalonia in the cabinet of President Carles Puigdemont who is the central figure in the fight for independence. The Puigdemont cabinet held the Catalan Independence Referendum on 1st October 2017 and subsequently presented the Declaration of Independence of Catalonia from Spain on the 10th of October 2017. This was declined by Spain and as a result those involved, including Minister Serret had to go into exile in Belgium with President Puigdemont (Boffey, 2017).

Apart from a government office perspective, we were able to interviews Gabriel Linden from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sweden (UD). Linden joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden with a keen interest in crisis handling and management as well as foreign affairs. Previously Linden has held positions as a Security Consultant for International SOS and Control Risks in the Middle East and been a diplomatic officer in The Hague. Currently, his primary responsibilities included preparing and updating contingency plans, protocols and routines, and providing education and training to the Swedish embassies for crisis situations, monitoring security situations that could potentially threaten the safety of Swedish nationals abroad (Linden, 2018). One of the main responsibilities of the foreign services is to provide consular protection to their nationals who are overseas during a crisis such as natural disasters or in any given security-risk situation like kidnappings, extortion, arrests, social and political unrests (Linden, 2018).

Additionally, within the foreign services, we interviewed former Ambassador Jonas Hafström. Hafström is currently Chairman of the Board of Lund University, and has previously held varies positions in the political and diplomatic sector. The ambassador is very known for his role as Swedish Ambassador to the United States (2007 – 2013) as well as, his role in handling the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami while he was the Swedish Ambassador to Burma, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, and Thailand between 2004 – 2007. Because of his handling of the Tsunami crisis, he ambassador was subsequently awarded The King's Medal for exceptional crisis management and leadership (Elhakeem, 2004; The Local, 2008).

We also had the honor of interviewing the current Swedish Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Håkan Malmqvist, and thus gained a clear insight to crisis and security-risk management within an intergovernmental organization (IGO). Ambassador Malmqvist represents Sweden's interests in maintaining peace through partnerships with other NATO members. Malmqvist officially joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1984 and has been in the foreign service for more than 30 years now. Previously Malmqvist worked as the Director General for the Americas and Deputy Director General for Global Security at the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, Ambassador Malmqvist has extensive experience in managing crisis as he was involved in coordinating the response effort during the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami crisis (Malmqvist, 2018).

The intelligence service plays a vital role in gathering information for public leaders to make decision in situations facing security-risks. An extensive part of their tasks also focusses on supporting the pre-emptive measures to prevent a situation from developing into a crisis. To dig into the role of leadership in the intelligence service sector, we interviewed the former Director General of the National Security Bureau of Taiwan (Republic of China), Kuo-Chiang Yang. Director General Yang currently holds the ranking of Lieutenant General, and has served three Taiwanese Presidents. Director General Yang reports directly to the President and has for that reason the main responsibilities of compiling top-level intelligence reports on national and international security and debriefing the President every morning. Director General Yang began his career in the Republic of China Army after graduating from the Republic of China Military Academy in 1972. Director General Yang has also served as Division Commander, Inspector General of the Military Discipline Division of the General Political Warfare Department and has been the superintendent for the Taiwanese Military Academy. Before his appointment to NSB, he was the Military Attaché to the United States (Yang, 2018).

The armed forces have a vital part in national security and defense. For the military sector, we were very fortunate to interview the Chief of Army of Sweden, Major General Karl Engelbrektson. Major General Engelbrektson joined the Swedish Army in 1981. He was appointed Chief of Army in June 2016. He has commanded at all levels of the army from the combat level to the strategic level of the Swedish army. Throughout his years, Major General Engelbrektson has commanded the Gotland Regiment, the Swedish battalion in the peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, and commanded the German EU Forces in Ulm, Germany. On top of his experiences of leading and commanding troops, he also has extensive experiences and knowledge in international security cooperation and negotiation. Engelbrektson was Force Commander of the Nordic Battlegroup and served as the Swedish military representative to the European Union and NATO and was also the Chairman of the NATO Connected Forces Initiative Task Force, which was in charge of negotiating interconnectedness and interoperability between the Allied Forces (NATO, 2016). Before his appointment as the Chief of Army, he was the Chief of Education and Training Development at the Swedish Defense Headquarters (Engelbrektson, 2018).

Finally, it was important to cover an academic perspective of the crisis and security-risk field. To this, Dr. Ann Enander and Gerry Larsson from the Swedish Defense University willingly agreed to be interviewed. Dr. Enander is an authorized psychologist and is a leading researcher in risk and security management from a psychological and social perspective, and a professor in leadership psychology at the Leadership Centre at the Swedish Defense University. Dr. Enander has done extensive research in risk in both civil and military contexts, including the involvement of leadership in civil emergencies and national crises on the local and regional level (Swedish Defense University, 2018). Dr. Larsson began his career as an Associate Professor in Psychology in 1993. Before joining the Swedish Defense University, he taught military and civil leadership under pressure and crisis management at various universities in Sweden and Norway and continues to teach and research these areas (Larsson, 2017).

4. Results and Discussion

In this chapter, we will present the research findings analysis of the leadership and decision-making practices and competencies commonly mentioned by the interview participants. The results will be presented in a discussion approach with reference to the concepts and finding correlations found in other relevant studies outlined in the theoretical framework chapter. The

presentation is structured in two sections in accordance to answering sub-search question one and two. In section 4.1, we will present the commonalities in the way the crisis mangers we studied practice leadership. In section 4.2, we will delve into the decision-making processes and factors that influenced these crisis managers in a security risk and/or crisis situation.

4.1 Leadership

> *"Heroes are created by situations; situations are created by heroes"*
>
> *– Chinese proverb*

While the concept of leadership tends to have a very positive connotation, where it is often intertwined with the notions of knowing how to do the right thing and having a positive outlook (Alvesson et al., 2017), it is important to dive deeper into the predicament. As Alvesson et al. points out, "In some post-heroic writings leadership is viewed as a process and refers to participants who 'temporarily performed leadership in specific moments'" (Alvesson et al., 2017, p. 60). This chapter of the results will not only highlight that this is true but extend the argument that the managers ability to reflect on their doings is the key to successful leadership. As such, the discussion will fall in line with the Chinese proverb that, "*Heroes are created by situations; situations are created by heroes."* This is particularly evident from the data we collected on the topic of leadership from our study participants. To create a comprehensive overview of the leaderships practices and competencies that the interviewed crisis managers discussed during the interview, we compiled the identified leadership practices and competencies as described and stated by the interviewees by using coding (Thomas, 2006) as described in our methods section.

From analyzing the interview results, we have identified the following leadership practices as important competencies with a crisis and security-risk manager:

- **Planning: exercising, training, drilling**
- **Communicate effectively**
- **Build trust and confidence**
- **Care for people and the greater good**
- **Prioritize and set agenda**
- **Dare to take responsibility and make decisions**
- **Flexible/Adaptable**
- **Foresee and anticipate the future**

For a better view of the results, they have been placed in the table on the following.

*Table 2 Role-Ordered Matrix: *Interviewee Stated Leadership Competencies and Practices*

Sectors / Themes	Private	Government Cabinet	Foreign Services	IGO	Intelligence Service	Armed Forces	Academia
Planning: Training, exercising, drilling	v	v	v	v	v	v	v
Communicate effectively	v	v	v	v	v	v	
Build trust and confidence/Trustworthy		v	v	v	v	v	v
Prioritize and set agenda		v	v	v	v	v	v
Care for people/Greater good	v	v	v		v	v	v
Dare take responsibility and make decision		v	v	v	v	v	v
Foresee and anticipate the future	v	v	v		v	v	v
Flexible/Adaptable	v	v	v	v			v
Drive and energy to be active			v	v		v	v
Moral Compass					v	v	v
Establish and enforce structures and standards				v	v	v	
Utilize talents			v		v	v	
Discipline		v			v	v	
Stay calm		v		v			
Balance between emotions and rationality		v					v
Understand the holistic view	v					v	
Proactive/Come up with things to do			v	v			
Influence others					v	v	
Attention to detail	v				v		
Analyze the situation		v					
Focused			v				
Make good judgement					v		

*Table 2 indicates the leadership and decision-making practices and competencies that was mentioned by the interviewees from the seven selected sectors. The "V" indicates the themes was being mentioned by the interviewee(s) in the indicated sectors

4.1.1 Planning: training, exercising, drilling

"The plan is nothing, planning is everything."

– President Eisenhower

This is a sentence quoted by Ambassador Hafström, Professor Enander, and Director-General Yang in the interviews with them (Enander, 2018; Hafström, 2018; Yang, 2018). But more importantly, the planning aspect in crisis management was discussed extensively by all the interviewees during the interviews. This activity is the crisis leadership activity Stern refers to as "preparing" (Stern, 2013). As according to his framework, it refers all the activities that associates to building up the organizational resilience for the crisis. It includes organizing and selecting, planning, educating, training, exercising, cultivating vigilance and protecting preparedness (Stern, 2013). The plan is no use if it is only dusting on the bookshelf, as Professor Enander said in the interview. Furthermore, Ambassador Hafström added in relation, "It's important that the people who are going to implement the plan are the ones who also do the planning. Because, making the plan is where you really learned the lesson." In relation to this both the Ambassador and Minister Serret noted the importance of being a part of the planning process (Hafström, 2018) and that,

> "Within the planning process, it is important to also include the different stakeholders in the society to take part in it. As sometimes when a crisis happened, the crisis response team might not have enough capacity to deal with the magnitude of the crisis. By including the different community actors in to the planning system, it can not only better utilize the resources of the different stakeholders, but also prevent the burden of responsibility all falling on to a single leader" (Hafström, 2018).

Moreover, by doing this, it could also more comprehensively cover and address the different security risk concerns of the different stakeholders (Yang, 2018).

Planning for a crisis must go hand in hand with exercising to endure the effectiveness of the plan. Exercise provides a base for one to act in an independent and oriented manner when a crisis happens. As Professor Enander put it, "Exercises are also extremely important. If you see exercise as a training opportunity, then you can certainly learn lot from the exercise" both about oneself and their colleagues (Enander, 2018). In addition, Major-General emphasized on significance of having a well-trained staff and a good relationship with them in a security risk and crisis. As training and exercising is a good way for the staff to understand the thinking of the crisis manager and where they are coming from and build up a trusting relationship. Thus, greatly reduce the decision-making time in a crisis situation (Engelbrektson, 2018).

For Director-General Yang, his focus is on the prevention and preparation phase (Drennen, et al., 2014) of managing a crisis situation. The Director General mentioned several times throughout the interview that he "lives on working hard and planning ahead, [instead of being] wit and clever" (Yang, 2018). At the NSB, there is a pithy formula for pre-emptive risk management measures against. It is made up of the following steps: Anticipate (Chinese: 預想 Yu Xiang), Rehearse/Exercise (Chinese: 預演 Yu Yan), Pre-examine (Chinese: 預檢 Yu Jian), Pre-treat (Chinese: 預治 Yu Zhi).

In the first step, one anticipates the different situations that could happen. Second step is about having a drill and rehearsing the emergency plan. In the third step, one examines the results of the rehearsal. For the last step, one takes comes up with solutions that "treat" the vulnerability(ies) discovered during the rehearsal (Yang, 2018). The meaning and purpose of this risk management exercise is precisely what Ambassador Malmqvist also discussed revolving around "…try(ing) to educate ourselves through exercise. After every exercise, there will be new information discovered. In terms, it feeds back to the system of managing a crisis in the future" (Malmqvist, 2018). According to Ambassador Hafström, a well-rehearsed emergency plan can reduce the uncertainty amongst the staff when crisis happened. In other words, it increases the spontaneity of the staff and reduces the reliance of the staff for directions from the leader. As Hafström said, "Only during the rehearsal, can one realize why didn't we do that or, [asking oneself] can we do it better this way? What is our capacity? What resources do we need?" (2018).

4.1.2 Communicate Effectively

When a security threat or crisis arise, it requires several people to fix all the issues surrounding the situation. Therefore, a leader's ability to communicate effectively to prepare, engage, and mobilize other people is of vital importance, and the expectations as to how the situation will be handled and what should be done, is set by what is being said. Furthermore, ensuring that the stakeholders' understanding of the potential risks associated with the solutions or actions is a task that also falls on to the shoulders of the leader. The concept of risk communication came up several times during our interviews where for insurance Officer Plane this meant, ensuring there was a transparent and collaborative dialogue between the manager of Marsh's Kidnap and Ransom Department, their risk-strategy specialists, and evidently the clients involved (Plane, 2018). Consular crisis management Officer Linden also highlighted risk

communication as a significant part of his responsibility. Particularly on issuing destination safety advisories for Swedish nationals travelling abroad (Linden, 2018). But, risk communication does not only involve clients or the public, it is also about whether the security-risk and crisis manager is able to communicate the situation clearly to his/her subordinates thus internally and within the organization to amend the security-risk situation they face.

Chief of Army, Major-General Karl Engelbrektson said that he has been in situations where the success of a mission lies within his ability to translate military language into political language so politicians give him the mandate to act. As Major General, Engelbrektson said in the interview, the key to success lies in "How would I, as a general, communicate this so it makes sense to the political leaders?" (Engelbrektson, 2018) But also vice versa, how to translate fluffy political language in to applicable military language and practice so his staff knows what to do. As he pointed out, senior military leaders need to be fluent in translations both ways, they need to translate political language to military actions, and military actions to political language.

The success in communication is also about whether a leader can explain their point-of-view and the reality of a crisis or security-risk situation into a language the receivers can relate to, thus achieve the objective. This is also particularly important and challenging on a multilateral environment that deals with security risks such as for Ambassador Malmqvist who serves as a link between Sweden and the other NATO members. As different countries in NATO face different security reality, the perceived risks and their solutions have varying priorities. For instance, many of southern European ambassadors to NATO express a desire to concentrate on issues relating the Middle East and failed states in Northern Africa (e.g. due to the mass flow of migrants). Whereas, Sweden and the several of the other northern European ambassadors want to focus on the aggression from Russia. Therefore, according to Ambassador Malmqvist, his role is to try to understand the other NATO members' perspectives and then effectively communicate the Swedish "view of the world" and the proposed solutions (2018).

4.1.2.1 Balancing Risk Communication

As Ambassador Malmqvist and Director General Yang both pointed out, crisis communication in the public sector is both very political and strategic. With Malmqvist we discussed the recent decision by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency to issue a pamphlet titled "If Crisis or War Comes" to every household in Sweden. Ambassador Malmqvist said, "As a leader, you

want to raise the awareness but not being an alarmist" (2018). Thus, this could potentially create some divergence of the public's reaction of the severity of security related risks they currently face. Yet, as both Enander and the ambassador said, as a political decision-maker, one must find a balance in the opposing views otherwise society will find itself in a never-ending discussion based on varying threat perceptions.

Professor Enander also raised the example of a recent discussion regarding how much the Swedish Security Service (SAPO) should inform people about a potential terrorist threat (Enander, 2018). On the one hand, there is a concern about public panic and unrest. On the other hand, there is also a concern about public safety that needs to weigh in to the consideration. The key challenge both participants identified, is to be able to engage people in crisis preparation but at the same time not present elevate a potential threat and thus be alarmist. For that reason and according to Ambassador Malmqvist, there needs to be a two-track approach in crisis communication (Malmqvist, 2018).

4.1.3 Build Trust and Confidence

As previously mentioned, a crisis often entails the lack of information, time, and resources, which often leads to a great degree of uncertainty. Trust and confidence becomes the foundation and currency during crisis management operation. In six out of the seven managers we interviewed, emphasis was placed on the importance of having a trusting and confided relationship with the people they interact with (See Table 1 for illustration). As Professor Gerry Larsson pointed out, the key aspect in crisis leadership is trust because with trust, crisis handlers can "act first and ask for permission later" (Larsson, 2018). When there is enough trust between the top and mid-level managers, it gives the mid-level managers who are handling the crisis a greater mandate to have more room for maneuver, thus speed up the crisis response process.

In a democracy, the mandate of a politician coms directly from the people just as Director-General Kuo-Chiang Yang said, "When the public doesn't have confidence in the government, people could easily go in to a riot even for a price rise in petroleum" (Yang, 2018). The importance of a leader is therefore to build trust and confidence with the people. This was also particularly emphasized by Minister Meritxell Serret during the interview as Minister Serret argued, "the way you build trust with your partner when you are doing a job or working on a project… is the same rule [you apply] when you are in the government, or when you are

managing a (crisis) situation - you must build trust because then people feel you are honest and can rely on you" (Serret, 2018).

According to Minister Serret, it is important for a political leader to be honest and open about their objectives to accumulate trust. With reference to the referendum and declaration of independence of Catalonia Minister Serret said, "If you make people co-participant and responsible in the political situation, you will be able to invoke people's feeling and attitude to find the solution together and to act with responsibility…[and] through trust, comes solidarity" (Serret, 2018). Minister Serret further elaborated on this point that if a leader has a trusting working relationship with people before the crisis, if leader has created a common vision and culture of working together, then when there is a crisis, it will be much easier to manage because people will recognize you as the manager in the crisis (Serret, 2018).

According to the findings from the interviews, building trust and confidence for crisis and security-risk managers is however, not just about delivering what is being promised, it is also about managing the realistic perception of the public. An effective leader knows how to not just communicate internally but also externally, e.g. what clients/public can expect from crisis assistance and management. In the interview with Swedish foreign service crisis management officer Gabriel Linden said that a frequent challenge in his work, is to manage people's perception so they have a realistic idea about what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can do and cannot do for them in a crisis situation (Linden, 2018).

4.1.4 Care for People and the Greater Good

The third finding on leadership practice, is to care for the people and the greater good. According to Director General Yang, one of the criteria for a great leader is having a genuine heart and caring for your staff. As Yang further elaborated, "Charisma comes from a humanitarian heart. If one has a humanitarian heart that cares for the mass, then it will make them respectable, loveable, and approachable" (Yang, 2018). Throughout the years, Director General Yang has served three Taiwanese Presidents, where Yang accounted his biggest challenge was dealing with the Presidents. This was since, as a civil servant his loyalty is to the people and the constitution rather than personal and political interests of the presidents. Director General Yang emphasized as a leader, one should always place the public interest before one's own political interest for the greater good (Yang, 2018).

Director General Yang's statement echoes with Minister Serret's argument that "the most important thing (in leadership and decision-making) is to take care of people, because what crisis managers deals with at the end of the day all comes down to people" (Serret, 2018). However, crisis and security-risk situations are often charged with emotions" (Stern, 2013). So, to effectively manage a security-risk and/or crisis, the leader also needs to effectively overcome people's feeling of defeat, frustration, and anger, and canalize these emotions into hope and motivation moving forward, according to Serret. In addition, when the crisis leader is taking care of the people who is affected by the crisis, the leader must also not forget to take care of the emotions and distress level of the crisis response team who are on the front line dealing with the crisis (Serret, 2018).

Yet, this also goes for managing emotions within an organization. Officer Linden argued one of the important leadership roles in a crisis and security-risk environment is to make sure the team is doing fine and having the ability to deal with the emotional pressure that comes with a crisis (Linden, 2018). The practice to care for people and the greater good is a leadership aspect, where we see there are overlapping qualities with that of decision-making, which will be discussed in the second chapter on the results of our findings.

4.1.5 Prioritizing and Setting an Agenda

In the chaotic environment which a crisis is often characterized by, people tend to look up to the leader for directions. Prioritizing and setting an agenda to tackle a given crisis or security-risk situation is another key leadership practice outlined by an overwhelming majority of the crisis managers we interviewed. According to Director General Yang, "As a leader, one must have the cognitive understanding of what is and what is not important and urgent (Chinese: 輕重緩急) of the development of the situation" (Yang, 2018). The need to prioritize was also highlighted in our interview with Engelbrektson. Engelbrektson discussed that, "When it comes to the military (leadership on a strategic level), you need to close as many doors as possible, so you know where to concentrate as it is important for leaders in a crisis situation to focus and signal to their staff about what is the most critical issue at hand" (Engelbrektson, 2018).

Ambassador Hafström described in his interview how leaders must lead by being an example and setting the tone (i.e. risk communication) to signal to the staff about the severity of the situation. As he said,

> "If the leader is active then everyone around the leader will get active. And then they understand that this is serious. I think that is probably the most important thing. That they clean the table and tell everyone that this is the most important thing we really have to deal with, is the only thing you have to deal with" (Hafström, 2018).

For Ambassador Hafström, focusing on the most critical issue during a crisis, is being able to clearly set an agenda so the staff knows how to act. Structure is thus, a key aspect in leadership and crisis and security-risk management. Furthermore, this leadership practice directly reflects and echoes one of the crisis leadership competencies proposed by Jacques (2012): to prioritize and set an example (Jaques, 2012).

4.1.6 Dare to take responsibility and make decisions

It is a central leadership practice as well as competency for the crisis manager to have the courage to take on responsibility, but more importantly to have the confidence to make decisions. In comparison to this statement, Ambassador Hafström described how leadership is truly tested when a crisis occurs. As the ambassador explained, "…in a crisis, there are people who always take a one step back and trying to not be part of it and there are people who say: 'yeah, I have to be much more active and take a step forward'" (Hafström, 2018). It correlates with what James and Wooten proposed as one of the crisis leadership competency to "take courageous actions" (2005).

As leader, one often needs to act promptly, and this means they do so on their own, as Ambassador Malmqvist said, "If you are afraid of doing the wrong thing, then you probably end up doing nothing" (Malmqvist, 2018). In an acute crisis, the leader needs to constantly make decisions in a race with time. Ambassador Hafström continued to accentuate the importance of having the courage to make decisions even if there are several obstacles in doing so as the ambassador said,

> "The most important you do when there is a crisis, is that you make a lot of decisions. If you make the wrong decision in a crisis situation, you can always reverse it if it's a wrong decision. But if you don't take any decisions at all then you are in deep…deep trouble. Because if you are not taking decision, someone else's taking decision. Reality for example" (Hafström, 2018).

This argument was further supported by an argument presented by Major General Engelbrektson when the Major General was referencing to Swedish government's response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami Crisis. Engelbrektson stated, "You need to find people who

dare to make decisions just like the ambassador (Jonas Hafström) – even without knowing every detail. You need to put people at work [and] in the right direction" (Engelbrektson, 2018).

Further in the interview, Major General Engelbrektson mentioned that one way he trains his staff to become leaders, is by working with building their confidence to make decisions and act independently. As he further elaborated, "If there is a strong leader who dares to take initiative outside of their mandate, not breaking the rules, not breaking the laws, not breaking any of the articles in the Geneva Convention, but taking a risk for the greater good then things happen" (Engelbrektson, 2018). However, Professor Enander pointed out, the drive to be prompt in decision-making during a crisis sometimes leads to the inability of making sense of the situation (Enander, 2018). Again, this is another aspect of leadership that we see an overlapping with the decision-making role within leadership, and it will therefore be further elaborated in the coming chapter on decision-making.

4.1.7 Flexible and Adaptable

As every security-risk and crisis is different, there is no "one size fits all" solution for managers to follow. Therefore, being flexible and adaptable is another identified practice and characteristic the interviewees pointed to as leadership. Professor Enander mentioned she has a "good leader wish-list," where she added the ability to switch or balance the purely bureaucratic practices with flexibility to the top of her list (Enander, 2018). Enander described, for each crisis, the leader needs to make new assessments and judgements. One of the leadership dilemmas is to "balance between following rules and regulations - the bureaucratic side of crisis management with contingency plans or flexibility and being able to see when you have to go outside normal rules and protocol" (Enander, 2018).

Officer Linden also mentioned being flexible as a desirable crisis leadership quality. As Linden explained, it could be demonstrated in two aspects. First, being able to adapt one's workload is important as a crisis situation develop, which also relates to the discussion on prioritizing and setting an agenda. Second, Linden argued that being able to reconsider the choices one has already made is the right way to show flexibility as a leader (Linden, 2018). To Minister Serret, her main decision-making tool is also about "having the capacity and the will to adapt to a new situation," and that "in every situation you have to adapt your tool differently to minimize cost and maximize the benefit" (Serret, 2018). According to Plane, the importance of being adaptable was also highly emphasized. Especially during kidnap negotiations, Plane explained

that a leader needs to be 'strategy specific' where solutions are profiled based on the criminal group they are dealing with. Often it requires the crisis manager to think outside-of-the-box (Plane, 2018).

4.1.8 Foresee and anticipate the future

To anticipate and foresee the future is yet another critical aspect of leadership within the field of crisis and security-risk management, and that was mentioned by most of the managers we interviewed. Major-General Engelbrektson spoke about how "a leader should travel on a timescale" on both a strategic and operational level. Moreover, Engelbrektson argued, "The trick to being a [successful] senior leader is to identify the future and how to bring the current stance to the future as it is easy to get caught up in short-term decision-making. [But if a leader does so] then the entire organization will be reactive rather than proactive (Engelbrektson, 2018). To a certain extent, it also includes the crisis leadership competencies of "Identifying the (not so) obvious firm vulnerabilities" proposed by James and Wooten (2005).

Monitoring the development of a security-risk and/or crisis, is an activity that managers use to foresee and anticipate the future, and something that is outlined in the *ISO31000 Risk Management Framework* (ISO, 2018). Monitoring security-risks is a routine activity consular crisis management officer Linden and kidnap insurance officer Plane perform on a daily basis. Throughout the interview with Director General Yang, he continuously stressed the importance of setting indicators, so a leader has pre-emptive measures against a crisis or security-risk situation from happening. Particularly in the intelligence services, Yang argued that monitoring and setting indicators is the first step before one can properly allocate the human resources and plan for an operation. It is also a way to set out objectives and identifiers for staff to know what to monitor or look for.

Furthermore, Director General Yang also stressed conducting wargaming exercises to anticipate the different scenarios that could threaten national security. As Yang said, "if one has already anticipated all the different scenario of how things could go wrong, then if something actually goes wrong, it wouldn't be a surprise but rather something that is already thought of and planned for" (Yang, 2018). The Director General believes a security-risk and crisis manager needs to have the ability to foresee future crises and lay-out pre-emptive arrangements in order to manage them successfully. That is, unless it's natural disaster. However, Yang mentioned that even if it is natural disaster, if you prepare ahead by taking out

the surprise element it will make it much easier for the crisis manager to counter act against elevation and severity of the crisis (Yang, 2018). This bring us to the second element of understanding crisis and security-risk management and the concept of planning that every single interviewee talked about, namely making decisions.

4.2 Understanding Decision-Making in Crisis and Security-Risk Management

Conflicts, crisis, security risks and foreign relations. What happens when "sh*t hits the fan?" It is quite a vulgar expression but one that many leaders especially within business and risk firms can relate to. When things go wrong, people's initial reactions are usually to take immediate action to address the situation. As we previously mentioned, *dare to take responsibility and make decisions* is one of the common key leadership practices and competencies outlined by the majority of our interview participants. As in an acute crisis situation, it is often a race between the crisis manager and reality for them to be able to put out the crisis before it evolves into another one. Nevertheless, within all this, Professor Enander made it very clear that before decision-making can occur, before we even begin discussing the notions behind leadership, the critical element in all types of handling of crises and security-risk situations is the sense-making. For that reason, before decisions can be made and are made, before we dedicate leadership to the handling of a difficult situation, we need to understand the underlying reasons and factors behind it all.

4.2.1 Sense-Making

In our interview with Dr. Enander, we had asked her what kind of tools managers use when making decisions. Dr. Enander pointed out, what is most important for a leader is their ability of capture the sense of what is going on before they even consider making a decision. According to Enander, every crisis is context and content dependent, and there no "one size fits all" for the way a leader manages a crisis, but what is key to making the right decisions is sense-making or rather, reflecting on the variables of the situation. As Dr. Enander described, "sense-making of a situation is absolute crucial and often determines a lot of the decision-making afterwards. Because, from a psychological perspective, once you've started [an action], it's difficult to go back and change. Therefore, having a little reflection in the initial phases of the crisis is important." Furthermore Dr. Enander added, "Leadership is about making sense of what is going on and giving it a meaning. [On the downside] this is perhaps also the ultimate

leadership challenge." However, this is not always the ultimate 'go-to' protocol from managers in crisis situations, as Dr. Enander acknowledged that taking time to thoroughly reflect is usually very difficult during a crisis where every minute counts. This brings forward a critical element of the results, namely the influence of time on the managers and how this impacts their decision-making during a security-risk situation or a crisis. We will retrieve the essence of time in later discussions.

Dr. Enander's reflection and sense-making as a focal point prior to making decisions is an important part of the way other leaders from our study responded to the questions on leadership and decision-making tools. Within the foreign services Linden argued, "in many situations, regardless where you are, you will have to take the same actions but in different ways." When we asked Linden specifically, *what do you think makes a good leader?* Linden answered,

> "Yeah, a good leader is clear [i.e. in communication] and should not be commanding or should not show uncertainty – so clarity; being able to make the right priority, being flexible, adapting the work, tackling when the situation changes – being able to **reconsider** the choices that you have already made. Looking forward is very important – try to foresee if this is happening today, what can we expect tomorrow. And most of all, making sure the team and the colleagues are doing fine, and that they, that they are doing their job and are able to do so. Not everyone deals with crises well. It puts a lot of memories and traumatic experiences in front of you."

As such, Linden was pointing to a further breakdown of sense-making. Namely, Linden brought the practical usage of sense-making further, by arguing it is a preemptive stage of decision-making. One could also see this as a "security measure" or similar to a children's lock on car doors. Since most automakers have car doors that close automatically and are made somewhat heavy so it is difficult for a toddler to open without assistance, the button at the driver's seat that allows parents to lock passenger doors nevertheless, is a preemptive safety measure. Hence, carmakers have thought that the situation may well be that toddlers do not think of the consequences of opening car doors while they are on the highway, it has happened before that the heavy doors have still been opened, and so for that reason the primary control should be in the hands of parents who can make the decision on whether enacting the child lock is necessary. Linden thus described that we move sense-making's boundaries from in-the-moment to prior-to situations and succeeding decisions.

The need for reflection prior to making decisions, can be seen in many ways as we discovered in our interviews. Another way to conduct sense-making prior to acting out a decision, is to be aware and show awareness to the environmental context or rather, people's emotions. Minister Serret emphasized that in a given crisis, it is impossible for a leader not to account for the

human-aspect of managing a situation. Minister Serret said, before decisions were made towards the Catalonian Referendum, the Cabinet knew they had to take care of the Catalonians and the Spanish people's emotions, thus in that way make sense of the situation before deciding on an action. According to Minister Serret they did so with speeches and campaigns on hope and optimism, and in that way, gain momentum that influenced their approach to the next steps towards gaining independence. As Minister Serret said, "A political leader needs to create a culture [where] people feel confident and at the same time [showing] responsib(ility) for the common fate of the community."

The principle essence of insurance brokerage and risk mitigation is the same concept of sense-making, particularly in such firms that specialize in crisis and security-risk management. During our interview with Plane there was a very practical approach to such sense-making. In contrast to Minister Serret's description, Plane argued appropriate and bespoken solutions needed a degree of emotionlessness as this usually, in a crisis "was a truly effective tool." It was an interesting perspective to gain in comparison to some of the other interviewees who discussed intuition, gaining momentum from colleagues and using a more personal touch towards the creation of sense-making to form decisions and show leadership skills. Furthermore, according to Plane this take on handling security-risk situation was in fact, the best way to act on behalf of a client and commend a mitigation of further issues. When we asked Plane how this approach had been shaped, Plane discerned it was a combination of previous experiences from (even from the banking industry) - with great insurance knowledge that he had gained throughout the years, which brings us to the next facet of the unclosing of the practical approaches and thus actions managers have taken, essentially their decision-making.

4.2.2 Making Informed Decisions

In the further discussion about decision-making factors for these leaders during crisis, Dr. Enander mentioned that the central question to all the decision-making and actions taken by these leaders is, balance. Whether to follow the bureaucratic rules versus flexibility. "Being able to see when to go outside of normal rules, normal regulations." she said. The inability to manage the flexibility aspect of crisis management during the aftermath of the 2014 Indian Ocean Tsunami was one of the main criticism to the Consulate General of Phuket in Thailand.

We asked Plane if he had a set of tools that he used when making decisions (i.e. whether he first starts looking at the external context of the client's destination(s), or the Organizational Context of the client). Plane answered Marsh's policy is to collect all possible data, infer, and then decide on an action by using a collective analysis of all these parts. This seemed to reoccur throughout the statements from our interviewees for specifically interview question 7 and 11. According to Director-General Yang a successful crisis manager must have the ability to analyze and identify the roots of the cause and the consequences (Chinese: 本末先後) of the situation (Yang, 2018). To do so, the manager also must have the ability to successfully manage social psychology in face of a crisis. Politics and economy are the two key factors. As a public servant in a democratic political system, one must also understand the political will and repercussion when making the decisions. Lastly, the national financial stability also has an important impact on national security. Because it has the most direct impact on the livelihood of the citizens. If the public has no faith in the government, even trivial matter such as rising of petroleum price could cause public unrest.

Complexity and being informed was a critical – and reoccurring element in our interview with Plane. Plane specifically addressed this complexity with manager's pallet of tasks and responsibility within specifically risk management, thus discerning the complexity of how managers make decisions. As Plane noted, "In terms of [our understanding of] risks, I see them as very different. Risk management decisions that are made in the banking industry are based on the risks associated with the client's wishes - you need to structure it and understand what the client's needs are in relation to what's available in the market. This is very different to organizing a trip to Nigeria for example." Furthermore, it also supports what another of our participant-interviewees (Gabriel Linden) said, managers and those working in these types of organizations (and the foreign services), "*...are trained to be generalist: knowing a little bit about a lot of things.*" What we can infer from this is, decision-making on behalf of a client within the insurance field of security-risk management, is therefore very much reliant on a manager's knowledge and being able to decipher a complex set of data and having previous background knowledge on "at lot of things." Plane furthermore added, "The idea is to make sure that there is control of the situation; being informed; avoid jeopardizing a worsening of any situation such as a PR [Public Relations] scandal or a press domain issue. Remaining on the right side of the law is critical towards these risk mitigations."

4.3.3 Working with Limited Information

What happens when manager is faced with unforeseen circumstances that are not practiced for preemptive purposes and have no protocol to follow? For Ambassador Hafström, this became an essential factor in making decisions and handling the crises of the Tsunami both at a local level and in relation to Swedish foreign affairs. The distance between Bangkok and Phuket was one and a half hours ride by plane, or nine hours' drive by car. However, after the tsunami happened, both the roads to Phuket and Phuket airport was completely flooded. No one knew when the airport will be able to reconvene service. As Ambassador Hafström recalled, he had a lengthy discussion with the British Ambassador to Thailand about how to get to the disaster site in Phuket. At the end Ambassador Hafström decided to go by plane, the British Ambassador decided to go by car. It was a decision that needed to be taken promptly when there is only very limited information to support either of their decisions to go by plane or by car. In a crisis, there is no way a decision can be absolutely 100% certain. But decisions still need to be made. At the end of the day, Ambassador Hafström arrived nine o'clock in the evening, and the British Ambassador arrived four hours later at one o'clock in the morning.

4.4.4 Time is of Essence

Going back to the example of the 2014 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the first decision Hafström made was to gather resources by calling back all the embassy staff from holiday. The second decision was to report back to Stockholm on what happened. However, he soon realized that Stockholm was not responsive. In fact, Stockholm didn't make their first response until two days later Tuesday the 28th of December. In the tsunami investigation report published by the Swedish government nine months after the catastrophe, it was made clear that Hafström had been able to make appropriate and quick decisions despite the unforeseen circumstances he faced. In the case of Minister Serret and her government, the biggest challenge in managing the Catalonia crisis has been to ensure the political movement remain in a peaceful way, without provoking violence. Another challenge is to continually assert and restore confidence to all the stakeholders, bargaining the goal at the face of an adversary with the Government of Spain in a very short amount of time.

4.5.5 The Moral Compass

What is a good leadership in crisis? This is one of the "evergreen" questions on leadership within defense and security, as Dr. Ann Enander stated in our interview. It is one of the

fundamental psychological issues on how people react to danger and threat, and how people take responsibility or don't in crisis. She said that most of the leadership tools today could easily weed out who is a bad leader, but it is difficult to define who is a great leader in a crisis. Since often the crisis is contextual based. However, she said, if there is a "good leader wish list", the following ability and character are what she would define as a good leader in a crisis "ability to switch or to balance the bureaucratic and the flexible" and "a strong moral foundation and moral compass" The issue of balance in decision making of the leader is central to these "evergreen" issues in leadership research in crisis management.

Particularly in terms of providing solutions to client programs and risk management, Plane emphasized the importance of constant personal development and evaluation. He mentioned that managing crises situations and handling the cases of the Kidnap and Ransom Department, required most importantly due diligence. Within private organizations such as Marsh, the Chartered Institute of Insurance (CII) promotes best practice, to make sure people act in ethical ways at all times and that people get greater information on the wider insurance market to provide the best crises and security-risk management. Plane has acquired the first levels of the certification. As Plane discussed, "The whole idea is to avoid loss. To prepare before things go loose." Plane also went into detail on how it is caveat that taking responsibility and making decisions as a leader is not opposite to ensuring that you work in collaboration with others. In his case, such as the Response Consultants.

In the question to Director-General Yang about his biggest challenge at work, he said dealing with the President. The motto for the National Security Bureau is "Unsung hero: loyal and selfless (to the country) (Chinese: 英雄無名 忠誠無私). The NSB is loyal to the constitution and politically neutral according to the Director. Director-General Yang suggested, as a leader and decision-maker in security risk and crisis situation, one must be able to put the public interest before self-interest and ego. As such, the mandate is that they make decisions and act for the greater good.

In relation to being public servants, Hafström argued in line with Director-General Yang that a leader in a crisis should "as much as possible try to do by the book." He further elaborated, "you should not try to invent something new when the storm is raging outside the window because it's too late. You have to believe in what you have decided once upon a time." This presents another perspective to the paradox in crisis management on whether to "follow the book" or not. It ties back to one of Dr. Enander's central arguments to appropriate actions in a

crisis, which is ensuring there is a balance between making prompt (perhaps somewhat rogue) decisions and orthodoxically following protocol. The following table (Figure 2) essentially shows the characteristics that were stated by the study's participants in form of a Role-Ordered Matrix to clarify the ways each manager as such, balanced their decisions by using sense-making.

Table 3 Role-Ordered Matrix: Reactions to Sense-Making and Key Factors

*Participant / Sector-Role	+Sense-Making	#Emotions	@Time	^Relevance
Academic (Dr. Enander)	Yes -Every leader does this before taking action	No / Yes -This is very situation-dependent	Balanced	Indicates the level of severity
Foreign Services (Linden)	Yes -When protocol does not cover a circumstance, it is always necessary	No	Allowed to be timely	Used to determine how many Swedes are involved
Private Firm (Plane)	Yes	No	No – there are too often short deadlines	Degree of insurance needed
Government Cabinet (Serret)	Yes -This is also part of understanding the task and the environment	Yes	Yes	Indicates political approach
Armed Forces (Engelbrektson)	Yes -This is the core of all leadership training in the military – otherwise subordinates cannot and will not follow	No	Yes and No	An absolute factor and process before taking action

*Participant / Sector Role = The interviewee.
+Sense-Making = Indicates whether the interviewee described that they use sense-making and reflection prior to making decisions.
#Emotions = The interviewees description on emotions in decision-making and thus sense-making.
@Time = Reflects the interviewees noting on time as a factor for allowing sense-making.
^Usage = Refers to what the interviewees described sense-making was used for.

Throughout all the cases, there was a common and distinctive feature, where all participants indicated the importance of "making sense" of a situation or crisis before acting or that reflection was needed to make appropriate decisions.

We determined "making sense" and "reflection" were under these circumstances used by participants as similar phrases and the step prior to deciding on an action. Here we noticed

there was conceptual reoccurring phrases that highlighted the usage of sensemaking namely, **emotions**, **time**, and the overall **relevance** for sense-making prior to decision-making. The column on Emotions, clearly shows there is a difference between whether representatives or managers of the public sector (i.e. government cabinet) and the private sector believe emotions are valuable in "making sense" of a crisis in order to make a good decision on what to do. Furthermore, the analysis on Time, indicated varying answers. Dr. Enander who represents the academic sphere of crisis and security-risk management noted it was a balance, sometimes a manager should and could take time to make sense of the situation, and at other times, there was no time to do so.

The remaining data within that section, had answered both Yes and No to the fact that time should be given to make sense of a situation and as Dr. Enander had said, sometimes this was not possible because an action had to be taken. Here, we see a clear relationship between the variable of time and that it is according to all the participants, very context-dependent. Finally, in terms of the Relevance of sense-making, the participants once again showed varying answers or rather, approached the issue under different terms. For example, according to the foreign services, Linden had said that the relevance of sense-making depended on the severity of the crisis – i.e. the number of Swedes involved in a crisis or a security situation. So, if there were several hundred Swedes in dire need of consular assistance such as during the Tsunami in 2004, sense-making was necessary so that they could take the right steps towards assisting the large group of people. Therefore, uncovering the factors behind decision-making paves a clearer way to the minds and actions of the managers that were studied.

5. Conclusions

What did Giuliani mean by "It is in times of crisis that good leaders emerge"? What practices did they do, what was in their decision process that allow them to lead their people rise out of a security risk and crisis? That is exactly what we have uncovered in this thesis by presenting the statements and discussions with experts and leaders in the field of crisis and security-risk organizations. While there are many perspectives as to what makes a good leader (Alvesson et al., 2017), we have discovered that what commonalities in leadership practices that made these crisis mangers a good leader are first and foremost being well prepared for the crisis to come by involving all the stakeholders in to the *planning*, training, and exercising process to build up resilience for the crisis to land. In connection of doing so, the crisis manager needs to also

be able to *communicate effectively* to engage the stakeholders to address the situation together. Communication is the first step to *building trust*. Trust is the currency and foundation for the crisis manager to lead effectively in a security risk and crisis situation. But also, in a chaotic situation, the crisis manager will need to *prioritize and set agenda* to put people to work. Since if the crisis manager does not take these actions, the reality will take over. Therefore, it is also important for the crisis manager to *dare to take responsibility and make decisions*.

However, before rushing in to these decisions, it is also important to take a step back to make sense of the situation (Boin et al., 2005). The factors could include emotions, time, and/or relevance of the situation. Afterwards, while making these decisions, the manager should always try to *care for people and the greater good* and put the public interest before their self-interest with a sense of morality. While making these decisions, the crisis manager should also be standing on a timescale to try to *foresee and anticipate the future* to create a holistic view of any given crisis and security risk situation. Lastly, what allowed these crisis managers to emerge as good leaders is *having the flexibility to adept* to a constantly changing environment, and also to have a balanced two-track approach to address the situation.

While the literature on leadership and decision-making is wide and varied, our study has provided a unique insight and understanding of the practices and competencies that crisis and security-risk managers do and have as leaders. We have shed a light on this through the biographical accounts of the interview participants who have all been tested and tried in security-risk and crisis management situations. As we stated earlier, leadership is more tested in the face of security-risks and crises. We hope our research could serve as an initial attempt to identify the leadership and decision-making practices and competencies of security-risk and crisis managers.

6. Appendix

1. Can you briefly explain your career path and the positions you've had?

2. How do you define Security Risk Management?

3. Can you explain a bit about your responsibilities and what a traditional work- week looks like?

4. Who are the people you interact with daily for your job? (i.e. in terms of colleagues, partners, stakeholders etc.)

5. Are there any challenges you could pinpoint are reoccurring?

6. What was the most challenging project you've encountered?

7. What you do believe is the role of leadership and management in crisis-risk and security situations?

8. What are the leadership characteristics that define your line of work?

9. Do you believe there is a difference between leadership and management? How/ how not does this affect Security-Risk Management (SRM)?

10. What factors impact your decision-making - under pressure and under "normal" circumstances?

11. Do you have a tool-box that structures or directs your decision-making?

12. What would you identify to be the difference between working in a security-risk environment and a non-security risk environment?

6.2 Definitions of Key Concepts

6.2.1 Leadership

The concept of leadership is according to The Oxford Dictionaries defined in three-ways, "1. The Action of leading a group of people or an organization. 1.1 The State or position of being a leader. 1.2 The leaders of an organization, country, etc." (Oxford University Press, 2018). Whereas, the official U.S. Government Business Dictionary provides the same definition, but further extends the description that, "Leadership involves: 1. Establishing a clear vision, 2. Sharing that vision with others so that they will follow willingly, 3. Providing the information, knowledge, and methods to realize that vision, and 4. Coordinating and balancing the conflicting interests of all members and stakeholders" (WebFinance Inc., 2018)

Business Dictionary.com describes that, "A leader steps up in times of crisis, and is able to think and act creatively in difficult situations" (WebFinance Inc., 2018). It is specifically the final point of the definition as provided by BusinessDictionary.com that has been used throughout this research paper. At times, the concept of leadership and its understanding will

be taken as implicitly understood by the reader, whereas at other times it will be analyzed through the context of the cases presented. This has been done to highlight the complexity of the word and its application.

6.2.2 Management

Management is a multifarious term. Moreover, there is a strong debate among researchers and scholars on the definition and description of management (in relation to leadership). Famous management scholar and Professor Emeritus of Harvard Business School, John P. Kotter. Kotter (2001), continues to argue there is a distinct difference between the two, and it applies in all organizations. To understand the process and the development, management should be understood as a *functional tool* to "cope with complexity" (Kotter, p. 4, 2001), while leadership is about: "setting a direction; aligning people; motivating and inspiring" (Kotter, p. 4, 2001). Figure 1 below highlights Kotter's (2001) distinction:


Figure 1
John P. Kotter's Distinction between Leadership and Management (Kotter, 2001)

Both Kotter (2001) discern the separation was not deemed as important previously as it is today. The world today is according to both scholars more complex world, thus calling for the division (Kotter, 2001). The complexity has moreover risen during the latter part of the Twentieth Century since, it has brought us with amicable but challenging advancements in the way organizations and businesses, even people are lead. This is due to a growing population;

a larger group with higher education; and IT-infrastructure. As such, the presented research will also dive into the distinction and showcase it by presenting biographical accounts from selected interview participants, who have all advanced the division.

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