



LUND UNIVERSITY

Here's What You Should Think About

Media Framing During The United Kingdom European Union
membership referendum of 2016

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Abstract

This thesis uses the United Kingdom's European Union membership referendum of 2016 to understand how, within the theoretical context of the hybrid media system, two prominent British media outlets framed their coverage for the British public. Using a typology of five news frames (attribution of responsibility, human interest, conflict, morality and economic consequences) the study applies a quantitative content analysis to a sample of 222 print news articles collected from The Guardian and The Daily Express newspapers and 209 online news articles collected from each media outlets official Facebook page, between the 9th June and 23rd June 2016. The results of the study found that both of the newspapers in their print coverage of the referendum framed news articles predominantly in terms of economic consequences and conflict. The findings also demonstrated that all five news frames displayed hybridity, and were reiterated across media platforms into the outlets online news articles. Lastly, the results then showed that frame salience differed between the media outlets print and online news articles, with the frames of human interest and attribution of responsibility the more prominent frames used in online news articles.

Keywords - European Union, Framing, Hybrid Media, Referendum, United Kingdom

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List of Abbreviations

CAP - Common Agricultural Policy

EC - European Communities

ECSC - European Coal and Steel Community

EMU - Economic and Monetary Union

EP - European Parliament

EU - The European Union

MEP - Member of the European Parliament

MP - Member of (British) Parliament

SEA - Single European Act

TCE - The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe

UK - The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

UKIP - United Kingdom Independence Party

SNS - Social Networking Sites

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1. Introduction

“I have invested the best part of my adult political life in helping to try to build up this movement and I am far from perfect but I do think I am able, through the media, to deliver a good, simple, understandable message”.¹

Nigel Farage - former Ukip leader and current Member of the European Parliament, on his media strategy to influence Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union

“If the media were honest, they would say, look, here are the interests we represent and this is the framework within which we look at things. This is our set of beliefs and commitments”.²

Noam Chomsky - scholar and social critic, on media ethics

After the Maastricht Treaty came into force on the 1st November 1993, accelerating both the depth and pace of European political and economic integration, Europe has witnessed a growing catalogue of highly mediatized, often extremely controversial referendums. To date, in respect to one of the European Union’s (EU) various incarnations, nation states from across Europe have held over fifty national referendums on multifarious issues related to a deepening of European integration.³ For example, across the space of four days in late May and early June of 2005 both the Dutch and French electorates chose to reject The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), bringing the European constitution's ratification process to a juddering halt. As such, some contend that the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the increase in national referenda enacted by nation states to decide questions over Europe, is indicative of how Euroscepticism has become mainstreamed and commonplace throughout Europe.⁴

In the case of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK), it is the only member state of either the European Communities (EC) or the European Union that has held

¹ Nigel Farage (2014) in Snippets of Nigel Farage by Dave Farnham (UK, Createspace Publishing, 2014)

² Noam Chomsky (1993) in The Power and the Story: The Global Battle for News and Information by John Lloyd (London, Atlantic Books, 2017)

³ Sara B. Hobolt (2009) Europe in Question: Referendums on European Integration (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009)

⁴ Cecile Leconte (2010) *Understanding Euroscepticism* (Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) pp.46

two referendums on whether to actually prolong its membership or not. The second more recent vote was held on the 23rd June 2016, where the British public were asked to go to the ballot box and decide on the issue of Europe by the Conservative government of David Cameron. The European Union Referendum Act of 2015 required that the public were to face a single question which on initial contemplation could be deemed as a relatively uncomplicated one, *Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?*⁵ Moreover the electorate had two alternative options with which they could respond to the question, respectively, to either *Remain a member of the European Union* or to *Leave the European Union*.⁶

Despite the unknown consequences for both domestic and European politics should a leave result materialise, it came to pass that 17,410,742 British citizens, 51.89% of the overall turnout, did in fact choose that very option. Meanwhile the remaining 48.11%, a total of 16,141,241 votes, decided instead that the UK would be better off continuing as a member state of the European Union.⁷ This referendum result therefore presents an interesting opportunity for research.

Throughout the whole campaign period the British media, in both its print and online configurations, had been the site where various actors backing the respective remain and leave groups had attempted to shape public opinion on the issue. This is important, as the media can be seen to perform a vital double function within democratic societies. Firstly, media organisations are the producers of political communication. That political information they produce is then disseminated to the public through various channels, print newspapers, TV news broadcasts or via social networking platforms for instance, all of which helps inform the public on important political processes. Secondly, the media also acts as a barometer for public opinion whereby it is able to reflect back public sentiment, surrounding particular political events, towards our political elites.⁸

⁵ The Crown (2015) 'European Union Referendum Act 2015 Chapter 36'. *TSO, The Stationery Office*, pp.1

⁶ *Ibid*, pp.1

⁷ Electoral Commission (2016) 'EU Referendum Results'. *electoralcommission.org.uk*.

⁸ Martin Wettstein and Werner Wirth (2017) 'Media Effects: How Media Influence Voters' *Swiss Political Science Review*, vol.23, iss.3 (2017) pp.262.

1.1 Aim and Research Questions

Using the United Kingdom as a case study, the aim of this study is to contribute to a body of research which attempts to understand how public opinion can be shaped by political actors through the media. It will apply a deductive content analysis to print and online news articles collected from two popular British newspapers, to understand how in the UK's contemporary media landscape, each newspaper framed the United Kingdom's European Union membership referendum of 2016. Three specific research questions are asked.

RQ1: Through the print media coverage of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum of 2016 in the Daily Express and The Guardian, which topics were framed as the most salient?

RQ2a: Do the salient print frames display hybridity and transfer across media logics into the online news coverage of the referendum, as posted in the media organisations official Facebook sites?

RQ2b: If so, are there significant similarities or differences between the salient frames identified in the print and online coverage of the media organisations?

1.2 Outline

Chapter two provides a literature review of Euroscepticism, beginning by showing how political and public concern over deeper European integration manifests itself through a range of typologies. Then, the UK as a case study is introduced. This section provides historical background to how both the dominant political party in the UK and the British media have framed the notion of Europe for the British public. In chapter three, the theoretical framework of the study is introduced where first, the hybrid media system is contextualised by demonstrating how various actors within the media exercise power in an attempt to further their interests and agendas. Furthermore, the effects of framing in political communication are also discussed, elucidating how media actors use frames of meaning to shape and influence public opinion around a subject. The chapter ends with a discussion on how the theoretical framework of the hybrid media system and media framing is relevant for the aim of this study and moreover, offers some empirical expectations. Chapter four presents the methodological

framework of the study, beginning by introducing and justifying why the particular media outlets in this thesis were chosen. Thereafter, a detailed explanation is given as to how the empirical data used in this study was collected. Closing chapter four, the methodology of quantitative content analysis and how it can be used to identify media frames is discussed, and a detailed description is provided as to how the deductive analysis was applied to the data. Respectively, chapters five and six present the results of the analysis conducted on the print and online news articles, whereby both chapters end with a discussion that places the results within the theoretical framework of this study. Finally, chapter seven offers some concluding remarks, addresses the limitations of the study, and offers some thoughts on how the results of this study could be used for future research.

2. Literature Review

This chapter discusses Euroscepticism. First, it demonstrates how scholars have attempted to understand why political and public sentiment towards the European Union has fluctuated over time. Then via a case study one of the most notorious cases of Euroscepticism is presented, the British variety. This section of the literature review provides historical context to the growth of Euroscepticism in Britain's dominant political party, and important to this study, describes how the UK's media have covered the topic of Europe for the British public.

Ultimately, this chapter endeavours to explain how and why the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum of 2016 came into realisation.

2.1 Euroscepticism and Public Opinion on European Integration

"They must go on voting until they get it right".⁹

Jose Manuel Barroso - former President of the European Commission, on Dutch and French voters rejecting the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005

May 2014 saw the European Union hold its 8th round of European Parliament (EP) elections, whereby citizens from across the institutions member states could decide on which candidates should represent them as a Member of the European Parliament (MEP). Unfortunately, at least for believers in Europe's political and economic project, these elections did not go according to plan. Various, anti-EU and anti-establishment parties swept to victory in Denmark, France, Greece and the United Kingdom, while other similar minded parties made huge gains in the likes of Austria, Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands. This substantial growth in persona non grata MEPs that would now enter the European Parliament subsequently led the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to bemoan the results as being both "remarkable and regrettable",¹⁰ while the French President Francois Hollande metaphorically compared the elections to an "earthquake".¹¹

⁹ Jose Manuel Barroso (2005) 'This broken promise is part of a wider fear of democracy'. *The Guardian*.

¹⁰ Angela Merkel (2014) 'Eurosceptic 'Earthquake' rocks EU elections'. *BBC News*.

¹¹ Francois Hollande (2014) 'Eurosceptic 'Earthquake' rocks EU elections'. *BBC News*.

In reality however, the reactions by the leaders of France and Germany to these latest European elections should not have been one of shock or surprise. Within academic circles serious investigations into the phenomena of what can generically be described as Euroscepticism, how it has grown, and how it informs the general public's opinion about the institution, have been ongoing since the 1980s.¹² Ultimately, these studies are attempts to understand the ideas that motivate either political parties, the media or sections of the European public, as Hooghe and Marks rather broadly elucidate, to express either a "doubt or disbelief in Europe and European integration in general".¹³

One of the most notable early attempts to understand the notion of Euroscepticism came from the British scholar Paul Taggart in 1998, with his two part comparative study on political parties located in western EU member states and Norway. Taggart first examined the diverse sources of Eurosceptic sentiment found across the region, and then, mapped how Eurosceptic positions arose by considering both the political parties ideology as well as their position within their own national system. Subsequently, Taggart's findings led him to propose that Euroscepticism should, at least in terms of a political parties sentiment towards Europe, be explicated to "the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration".¹⁴

Further studies on domestic political parties and their position towards European integration are numerous. In a more contemporary study from 2008, Hooghe and Marks take a post functionalist approach towards Euroscepticism within member states, whereby they identify how deeper European integration is more often than not constrained by domestic conflict patterns. The authors find that most mainstream political parties have in fact attempted to depoliticise regional integration policies within their own domestic arena, as generally, they are more supportive of European integration regardless of their position on traditional the left - right scale. However, the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and the controversial

¹² Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2008) 'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus' *British Journal of Political Science*, vol.39, iss.1 (2009) pp.9.

¹³ Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2007) 'Sources of Euroscepticism' *Acta Politica*, vol.42, iss.2 (2007) pp. 120.

¹⁴ Paul Taggart (1998) 'A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems' *European Journal of Political Research*, vol.33, iss.3 (1998) pp.366.

national debates and referendums that preceded it, saw non governing domestic parties seize their chance to create political conflict over Europe in their national arenas. This as the authors explain, meant that the European public had suddenly been very much awoken to an important issue, which was that deeper “European integration was diluting national sovereignty”.¹⁵

Leconte notes that the widespread public awakening to an increase in political integration that began during the Maastricht era, subsequently delineates the end point in the relationship that had previously defined the citizen - elite relationship regarding European integration.¹⁶ For example, one has to only look at the EU’s own twice yearly public opinion survey that has run since 1973, the Eurobarometer, to understand the real shift and dramatic drop in public support for the institution during the 1990s. When asked whether membership of the European Union was either a good thing, neither good nor bad, or a bad thing, between 1989 and 1991 an all time high in 71% of the respondents replied positively.

During the Maastricht negotiations however, and then continuing throughout the rest of the decade, support for membership among the European public steeply declined, whereby the end of century saw only 49% thinking that same way.¹⁷ Moreover, Boomgaarden et.al have also used public opinion survey data to map the multidimensionality of public support for the EU. They subsequently argue that there are five dimensions that affect public support for the EU; affection, identity, performance, strengthening and utilitarianism. According to the authors this means that the extent of support may indeed be strong in one particular strand of European integration, such as for the Euro, but much weaker in others, such as for intra EU migration,¹⁸ depending on which dimension the strand of integration falls into.

Others have tried to understand how an individual's own feelings of identity and attachment towards their national identity subsequently affects attitudes towards the EU and aspects of

¹⁵ Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2008) ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’ *British Journal of Political Science*, vol.39, iss.1 (2009) pp.21.

¹⁶ Cecile Leconte (2010) *Understanding Euroscepticism* (Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) pp.167

¹⁷ European Commission (1999) ‘Eurobarometer 51 Public Opinion in the European Union’. *European Union*. pp.25

¹⁸ Hajo G. Boomgaarden et al. (2011) ‘Mapping EU attitudes: Conceptual and empirical dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU support’ *European Union Politics*, vol.12, iss.2 (2011) pp.241-266.

European integration. Fligstein has used substantial Eurobarometer data to argue that the degree of an individual's positivity towards the EU is in fact checked by the level of interaction they have with other Europeans. He finds that the vast majority of Europeans have positive interaction all too infrequently with each other, especially those who socioeconomically would be considered as working class. This leads Fligstein to argue that, at least for this particular demographic, their own "national narrative still dominates".¹⁹ Alternatively, others have argued that when analysing Euroscepticism from the perspective of identity, the relevance of other temporal factors must be taken into account. Leconte for instance has noted that the strength and sense of national identity affects attachment to Europe, but not in the manner that one would expect. A strong national identity would suggest a more diluted attitude towards Europe, however, Leconte instead emphasises that instead the "probabilities of being Eurosceptic increase as attachment to region and nation decrease".²⁰

As such, Euroscepticism is a nuanced concept and the sentiment operates across a broad spectrum of typologies. Arguments against deeper European integration can be based on strict political concerns, such as delegating power away from the nation state to supranational institutions. Alternatively, reservations at a utilitarian level take issue with the EU's distributive nature and the impact that it has on certain national sectors and interests. Value and identity based concerns see a collective European identity threatening 'imagined' national identities. More recently, alter-globalisation and global justice movements have taken umbrage with the EU over its perceived neoliberal bias. Euroscepticism therefore is multifaceted and in practice should be about pragmatically evaluating the idea of European integration through its merits and consequences, and not as Leconte has rightly emphasised, just simply be based on "the 'dogma' of an ever closer union".²¹

¹⁹ Neil Fligstein (2009) 'Who are the Europeans and how does this matter for politics?' in *European Identity*, eds. Jeffrey T. Checkel & Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009) pp.155

²⁰ Cecile Leconte (2010) *Understanding Euroscepticism* (Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) pp.92

²¹ Ibid, pp.5

2.2 The United Kingdom and Euroscepticism - A Case Study

*“When I saw how the European Union was developing, it was very obvious what they had in mind was not democratic. In Britain, you vote for a government so the government has to listen to you, and if you don't like it, you can change it”.*²²

Tony Benn - the late left wing Labour MP, on the European Union's democratic deficit

The UK was not one of the original six members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Despite some arguing that Britain was incompatible with Europe and that it showed a deep seated hostility towards the European project,²³ the UK did eventually join the project on the 1st January 1973. Remarkably however, it took just two years for the United Kingdom to then hold the first of its membership referendums. In a case of history repeating itself, the 1975 referendum was borne out of domestic political conflict and an election manifesto pledge to renegotiate Britain's deal with Europe, this time from the incumbent minority Labour government.²⁴ Unlike the more contemporary referendum the general public overwhelming voted yes to remaining a member of the EC, a result which was widely assumed at the time by pro-European Britons as having finally put to bed the arguments over Europe.²⁵

2.2.1 The 1980's and 1990's - Rebates, Party Politics and Opt Outs

And indeed, for a time, it did seem that the question of Europe was off the table domestically in the UK. However, from 1979 to 1997 the UK sat under the governance of the Conservative Party. The era witnessed elite level internal party politics over European issues fought out by successive Conservative governments, as well as a national media who, virtually enmasse, took to taking a Eurosceptic position on any issue related to Europe. Moreover these actions filtered down to the general public and started to shape opinions on the institution. One ever

²² Tony Benn (2013) ‘Speech at The Oxford Union, 7th February 2013’. *Oxford Union*.

²³ Charles De Gaulle (1967) ‘1967: De Gaulle says ‘non’ to Britain - again’. *BBC News*.

²⁴ Chris Gifford (2008) *The Making of Eurosceptic Britain: Identity and Economy in a Post-Imperial State* (Hampshire, Ashgate Publishing, 2008) pp.10

²⁵ Julie Smith (2016) ‘David Cameron's EU renegotiation and referendum pledge: A case of déjà vu?’ *British Politics, vol.11, iss.3 (2016) pp.325*.

present figure regarding the debate over Europe was Margaret Thatcher, who as Prime Minister led the Conservative's from 1979 to 1990. As such, the late Prime Minister has been described as having something approaching a "schizophrenic attitude"²⁶ towards Europe, notable through two specific events during the decade.

In 1984, Thatcher took the EC to task over its redistributive methods relating to a controversial policy, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). She believed, correctly, that an all time high in 72% of the EC's budget was being used to fund the policy,²⁷ and as the UK's own agriculture section had shrunk over time, that Britain was contributing more money than it was receiving back. Demanding at a European Council meeting in 1984 that she wanted her money back,²⁸ Britain subsequently received a rebate in perpetuity, a decision that has been seen by British Eurosceptics as a symbol of their influence in Europe ever since.

However, demonstrating that the Conservative Party at that time and Margaret Thatcher were not as fundamentally Eurosceptic as legend supposes, 1986 saw the signing of the Single European Act (SEA). The SEA was a deeply integrationist proposal, in essence committing all EC member states to creating the single market we know today, and which was in fact willingly signed by Thatcher.²⁹ So, although Thatcher could be seen to take a tough stance on Europe, it was actually after the end of her time as Prime Minister that a decisive split in the Conservative Party took place, and its Eurosceptic stance was seen to harden.

The early 1990s witnessed a generational shift in the Conservative Party. As European integration started to deepen in a number of new areas, the previously influential pro Europeans and Euro pragmatists in the party became ever more marginalised at the expense of their Eurosceptic colleagues, specifically on issues related to socio-economic European integration.³⁰ One example occurred during 1992 and 1993, with the newly elected Conservative

²⁶ Oliver Daddow (2013) 'Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair and the Eurosceptic Tradition in Britain' *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, vol.15, iss.2 (2013) pp.217.

²⁷ European Commission (2012) *The Common Agricultural Policy - A story to be continued*. (Belgium, European Union, 2012) pp.9

²⁸ Margaret Thatcher (1984) 'Thatcher and her tussles with Europe'. *BBC News*.

²⁹ Oliver Daddow (2013) 'Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair and the Eurosceptic Tradition in Britain' *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, vol.15, iss.2 (2013) pp.217.

³⁰ Cecile Leconte (2010) *Understanding Euroscepticism* (Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) pp.127

Prime Minister John Major facing something close to a civil war within his party over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Rebels, as the dissenting Conservative Eurosceptics were labelled by the press, were refusing to support the government as it sought to get the treaty implemented into British law, instead demanding that a national referendum be held on the issue.³¹ Ultimately though, the Eurosceptics failed in their objective. The Maastricht Treaty was ratified without ever being referred to a referendum, despite legal challenges being launched by the dissenters, but the events of this period nonetheless signify the beginning of the internal party politics played out during following years over Europe.

There were also notable, almost antithetical divisions in the Conservative Party on the position it should take regarding the Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union. The EMU is a three tier stage of policies which converges the economies of the EU's member states, and ultimately, leads to a member state adopting the Euro currency. The pro European Conservatives took a utilitarian stance on the single currency, essentially arguing that by not participating in the EMU the UK would in fact be both diplomatically and economically damaged. Alternatively, the hardline Eurosceptics had other, more deeply principled concerns over the EMU.

This is because they believed that the EMU was comparable to the creation of a single European superstate, which in turn struck at the very core of the Conservative Eurosceptics ideology, UK parliamentary sovereignty. As Matthew Sowemimo observed at the time, the Eurosceptics belief was that nationhood should always take a "precedence over economic interdependence".³² To that end such was the influence of the Eurosceptics within the governing Conservative Party, that any British cooperation when it came to negotiations with the European Union regarding the EMU were, as Gifford emphasises, wholly "conditional on agreeing opt outs, and 'red lines' were publicised before negotiations were entered into".³³

³¹ Andrew Glencross (2014) 'British Euroscepticism as British Exceptionalism: The Forty-Year "Neverendum" on the Relationship with Europe' *Studia Diplomatica*, vol.LXVII, iss.4 (2014) pp.2.

³² Matthew Sowemimo (1996) 'The Conservative Party and European Integration 1988-95' *Party Politics*, vol.2, iss.1 (1996) pp.94.

³³ Chris Gifford (2010) 'The UK and the European Union: Dimensions of Sovereignty and the Problem of Eurosceptic Britishness' *Parliamentary Affairs*, vol.63, iss.2 (2010) pp.322.

2.2.2 The Referendum - Renegotiations, The Populist Press and Euro Myths

On the 20th February 2016 David Cameron announced to the British public a finalised set of renegotiated concessions, concerning British membership of the European Union. The British PM had been obliged to tour EU member state capitals in the latter part of 2015 to renegotiate Britain's terms, because earlier that year the Conservative Party General Election manifesto had pledged to hold an in-out referendum on British EU membership, based on the terms of the new deal, should they win re-election.³⁴

However, the bartering between Cameron and his European colleagues was not simply just about getting a better deal for the UK, because the manifestos renegotiation and referendum pledges were primarily motivated by two other factors. Firstly, the manifesto pledge was an attempt by the Prime Minister to appease the Eurosceptics within his party who had stimulated decades worth of internal fighting over Europe, as previously discussed. Secondly, as Sara Hobolt has noted, the renegotiations were also a tactical piece of electioneering to avoid losing Eurosceptic Conservative voters to Nigel Farage's surging United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) during the upcoming 2015 General Election.³⁵

The official referendum campaign period ran from the 15th April 2016 right up until polling day, the 23rd June 2016, with the Electoral Commission designating two campaigns the status of officially representing either side of the debate. Both campaigns contained MP's from across party lines, with the group Britain Stronger in Europe chosen to present the case for remaining in the EU, whilst those advocating to leave the EU were officially represented by the Vote Leave campaign. Moreover, there were a plethora of non-official campaigns both for and against leaving the EU, formed at both national and regional levels. Subsequently, it was within the British media, that the respective actors and their campaigns sought to influence public opinion regarding the vote on the UK's continued membership of the EU.

³⁴ Julie Smith (2016) 'David Cameron's EU renegotiation and referendum pledge: A case of déjà vu?' *British Politics*, vol.11, iss.3 (2016) pp.331.

³⁵ Sara B. Hobolt (2016) 'The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent' *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol.23, iss.9 (2016) pp.1261.

Dovetailing with the shift in power dynamics within the dominant political party of the 1980s and 1990s however, whereby opinion altered from a predominately pragmatic position on Europe to one of hard Euroscepticism, large sections of the British media have also changed the manner in which they cover European politics. This shift diverted the coverage from being one of impartial, principally fact based reportage, to a media which now as Oliver Daddow has argued, displays a “vigorously partisan hostility bordering on a nationalist and in some arenas xenophobic approach to the coverage of European affairs”.³⁶

As a result of this shift in tone within large sections of the media, a substantial amount of the British public during the last three decades have been informed of sensitive decisions taken regarding European integration through a myopic, sometimes hysterical, lens. This is particularly the case when considering the UK’s print media. Many of the national daily newspapers are still hugely popular and maintain significant circulations running into the millions and, as Hawkins suggests, prove “to be of enormous significance both politically and within broader societal debates”.³⁷ As such, an important consideration relative to the how the media in the UK talks about issues of European integration, is found within a pair of two dimensional axes.

Axis one broadly splits the print media down the traditional left - right political spectrum, with newspapers such as The Daily Express occupying the right while outlets such as The Guardian sit more to the left. The second axis then delineates the tabloid - broadsheet split, defining the tabloids as the popular press, whilst the broadsheets are subsequently considered as the quality press. These axes are important for two reasons, as Copeland and Copesey have suggested. Firstly, the authors note that within the diverse landscape of the British press, it is the tabloid newspapers that are seen to have a broader, more populist reach, in comparison to the broadsheets who aim their coverage at mainly the middle classes and the political elites. Secondly, they argue that while the left wing press does attempt to challenge the popular press and their Eurosceptic narratives, by offering a more balanced coverage through the inclusion of both pro European and Eurosceptic voices, they are in fact adding to the already

³⁶ Oliver Daddow (2012) ‘The UK media and ‘Europe’: from permissive consensus to destructive dissent’ *International Affairs*, vol.88, iss.6 (2012) pp.1219.

³⁷ Benjamin Hawkins (2012) ‘Nation, Separation and Threat: An Analysis of British Media Discourses on the European Union Treaty Reform Process*’ *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.50, iss.4 (2012) pp.564.

overwhelmingly Eurosceptic discourse found in the UK's media by doing so. Conversely, by taking a polar opposite position on their own coverage of Europe, the populist Eurosceptic press essentially choose to expunge from their coverage, and therefore from the public debate altogether, any vaguely pro European actors or voices.³⁸

To that end, it is important to emphasise that the way the populist British media talk about Europe, does in fact have a concrete impact on public opinion and perceptions towards the EU in the UK.³⁹ Alongside the growth of hard Eurosceptic discourse in much of the UK's popular media, there have also been a diffusion of falsehoods perpetuated, both about the European Union and its legislation specifically, or about European integration more generally. These recurrent misperceptions are often referred to as Euro myths, whereby their frequency within the British media has even led the European Parliament to set up its own webpage as a way of rebutting their veracity. As such, these enduring Euro myths rely on a fairly simple set of logics to ensure that they resonate with the public.

Initially, certain keywords such as federalist or superstate are used in news articles to summarily introduce and describe the European Union to the reader, with codewords such as bureaucratic and technocratic used as a way to deride fastidious EU legislation or decision making. Furthermore, ideals such as sovereignty or independence are also invoked, to highlight the perceived threat of diminished British self determination in the face of meddling politicians and officials in Brussels. As such, the multifarious ways in which the British tabloid press have perpetuated these half truths means that, as Simon Usherwood emphasises, large sections of the British public have been left with “a media that is structured to be unwilling to engage with EU issues in general and which consequently stripped back its ability to produce in-depth analytical journalism”.⁴⁰

In fact, the scholars De Vreese and Boomgaarden have found, through their cross country study on the effect the media has on public support for the EU, that Europeans who are regu-

³⁸ Paul Copeland and Nathaniel Copsey (2017) ‘Rethinking Britain and the European Union: Politicians, the Media and Public Opinion Reconsidered*’ *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.55, iss.4 (2017) pp.714.

³⁹ Cecile Leconte (2010) *Understanding Euroscepticism* (Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) pp.205

⁴⁰ Simon Usherwood (2013) ‘The power of Euromyths shows that there needs to be a more substantial effort to change the debate on the EU’ *The London School of Economics and Political Science*.

larly exposed to a higher amount of positive news about the institution are far more likely to be benevolent towards the institution.⁴¹ However, as demonstrated above, the political actors campaigning in the United Kingdom's European Union membership referendum of 2016 found themselves navigating a complex, highly partisan British media system, all the while attempting to communicate their agendas and influence public opinion during the ten week campaign period.

To conclude, this case study demonstrates that large sections of the British political elite and the UK media have played influential and divisive roles in shaping the discourse on European integration, over an extended period of time. Placed within the context of a referendum on the UK's continuing membership of the European Union, both the political actors and the British media should therefore be seen as playing critical roles throughout the campaign period. Both sets of actors were uniquely placed, to affect both a direct, and an indirect influence, on public opinion. Unfortunately for rational, reasoned debate, Martin Moore and Gordon Ramsay from King's College in London have argued in their report entitled '*UK Media Coverage of the 2016 EU Referendum Campaign*' that the referendum was in fact the most negative and hostile in recent history, whereby the rhetoric and approaches taken by both political campaigns were subsequently then "encouraged and enflamed by a highly partisan national media".⁴²

⁴¹ Claes H. de Vreese and Hago G. Boomgaarden (2016) 'Effects of News Media Coverage on Public Support for European Integration' in *(Un)intended Consequences of EU Parliamentary Elections*, eds. Wouter van der Brug & Claes H. de Vreese (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016) pp.250

⁴² Martin Moore and Gordon Ramsay (2017) 'Acrimonious and divisive: the role the media played in Brexit' *The London School of Economics and Political Science*.

3. Theoretical Framework

The forthcoming chapter contextualises the theoretical framework used to guide this study. First the idea of the hybrid media system is introduced, providing an understanding of how within the interrelated spheres of older and newer media logics, power is exercised by various actors to advance their interests and values. Secondly, the effects of framing are brought into the conversation. This is done to demonstrate how the aforementioned actors use frames, communicated through media communication, to provide meaning for the general public regarding a particular political event and to shape public opinion regarding it. The end of the chapter offers a summary as to what empirical expectations I expect to find in relation to the research questions asked at the beginning of this study.

3.1 Hybrid Media System

As noted in the introduction, there have been over fifty referenda held in EU member states that relate to aspects of European integration. Moreover, these referendums are often highly politicised media events and played out within their own, unique, national settings. As such, Van Der Brug and De Vreese have argued that in terms of the effect a media can have on its public, regarding either changing public opinion about the EU more generally or influencing the outcome of referendum result more specifically, that “European citizens are responsive to the ways in which the mass media cover EU politics and policies, and their responsiveness translates into changes in attitudes”.⁴³

Bearing the previous statement by Van Der Brug and De Vreese in mind, 2013 saw the Professor of Political Communication at Loughborough University Andrew Chadwick release *‘The Hybrid Media System - Politics and Power’*. The analysis within the book sees Chadwick rethinking how, through the lense of hybridity, new communication technologies have reshaped the environment of political communication in both the UK and the United States. As such, with the hybrid media system Chadwick examines a distinctly interdependent and complex relationship that exists between political actors, the media and the public, as well as the conflict, competition and interaction between older and newer forms of media. To that

⁴³ Wouter van der Brug and Claes H. de Vreese (2016) ‘Effects of News Media Coverage on Public Support for European Integration’ in *(Un)intended Consequences of EU Parliamentary Elections*, eds. Wouter van der Brug & Claes H. de Vreese (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016) pp.237

end, the notions of hybridity and power are seen as fundamental to the idea of a hybridised media system.

In its most rudimentary sense, hybridity implies that a particular object has been created through the combination of once independent elements. For Chadwick, political communication within many Western media systems encapsulates this combining of once distinct entities, whereby he suggests that once separate spheres of the media are now coming together to “create something new that nevertheless has continuities with the old”.⁴⁴ What Chadwick means by this is that the older, more traditional mainstream media logics such as print and TV broadcast news, still play a pivotal and important role in the public’s life in terms of their access to political information. However, the rising popularity and influence of newer media logics with the public, such as social networking platforms and political blogs, has meant that they have begun competing with and challenging the once dominant older logics for their audience share.

This challenge has led the older media into a series of adaptations and evolutions, whereby through the co-opting of new digital affordances brought about by Web 2.0, they have diversified and expanded their political coverage through the provision of their content on websites and social media platforms. This leads Chadwick to suggest that political communication within the UK’s contemporary media system displays hybridity in nature, due to its intermingled mixture of older and newer media logics which simultaneously interact with each other and compete for power within it.⁴⁵ Moreover, through the older media co-opting the platforms and technologies predominantly used by the new media logics, this has meant that both media logics have undergone a period of co-evolution together, and can now be seen to overlap one another in the manner with which they produce and distribute political information to the public.

This evolution in the UK’s media system means that the public now has multiple sets of channels, as well as multiple sets of actors, with which to access their political information from. To that end, these rapid adaptations and evolutions have also meant that for mediated

⁴⁴ Andrew Chadwick (2013) *The Hybrid Media System Politics and Power* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) pp.9

⁴⁵ Ibid, pp.59

politics, as Chadwick notes, a new form of mainstream media is being constructed which is subsequently being “pushed and pulled in multiple directions by multiple actors. Some of these forces are contradictory, some are integrative; all are generative of systemic hybridity”.

⁴⁶ However, to conceptualise the hybrid media system is not just solely to emphasise these new technological affordances and the subsequent renewal of the older media who have embraced them. Power, and specifically how political actors within the hybrid media system traverse both the older and newer media logics to forward their particular agendas, values and interests, is also of fundamental concern.

For Chadwick, achievement of power within the hybrid media system is afforded to those that are able to “steer information flows in ways that suit their goals and in ways that modify, enable, or disable others’ agency”.⁴⁷ This means that power, and the shaping of power relations within the hybrid media system should be seen as being relational, and very much dependent on which actors are most successful at embedding the norms and practices of both the older and newer media logics. One such practice is temporal in nature, and suggests that any political actor that wishes to exercise power within the hybridised system should continually act with regularity and timeliness. This is because the traditional news cycle, the 24 hour period of time that occurred between the production of print newspapers, has largely dissipated. Instead, Chadwick contends that gradually replacing the old news cycle, in how important political events are mediatized, is the political information cycle.⁴⁸

Political communication actors within the old news cycle such as journalists used the 24 hour period to conduct research, investigate events or scrutinise claims by politicians. Alternatively, politicians also enjoyed this extended period of grace, whereby they could use it to formulate adequate responses to new developments and exercise power through the effective management of a problem. Instead however, within Chadwick's political information cycle, new technology and the speed at which news outlets can now disseminate news, as well as the competition between the outlets to be the first to break the news, has led to what the au-

⁴⁶ Andrew Chadwick (2013) *The Hybrid Media System Politics and Power* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) pp.59

⁴⁷ Ibid, pp.207

⁴⁸ Ibid, pp.62

thor notes as being a “compression of news time”.⁴⁹ This compression of time therefore means that media actors, who wish to exercise power within the hybrid media system and influence the political information cycle, according to Chadwick, Dennis and Smith, will in fact “try to master time: they often shock and surprise to get ahead of the game, or they deliberately delay, or drag information from the archives and give it new life”.⁵⁰

Moreover, Chadwick has further emphasised that political information cycles, in terms of creating interpretations and frames of meaning around a political event within the hybrid media system, are seen to “work on the basis of cross-platform iteration and recursion”.⁵¹ A worthwhile example of this from the UK came in 2009, whereby a scandal broke regarding a number of MP’s who had been fraudulently claiming public money through their expense accounts. A prominent newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, purchased a leaked set of data from a whistleblower and then analysed exactly what the MP’s had been claiming for. After finding the data leaks most damaging revelations, the media outlet then stage managed the release of the information over a period of days, via extracts in both its printed format and the papers online platforms. These concurrent serialisations across the media logics were also accompanied by its journalists giving regular interviews on rolling TV news broadcasts.

According to Chadwick, what this meant in terms of the power that an actor can wield within the hybrid media system, is that the news outlet had successfully “accelerated and amplified the news and distributed the information across all platforms”.⁵² As such, the way in which the Daily Telegraph handled the MP’s expenses scandal succinctly demonstrates how older media have co-opted newer media’s technologies and practices, as a way of reaching new audiences that they may not have reached in just their printed format.

⁴⁹ Andrew Chadwick (2013) *The Hybrid Media System Politics and Power* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) pp.62

⁵⁰ Andrew Chadwick, James Dennis & Amy P.Smith (2016) ‘Politics in the Age of Hybrid Media. Power, Systems and Media Logics’ in *The Routledge Companion to Social Media and Politics*, eds. Axel Bruns, Gunn Enli, Eli Skogerbo, Anders Olof Larsson & Christian Christensen (New York, Taylor & Francis, 2016) pp.10

⁵¹ Andrew Chadwick (2013) *The Hybrid Media System Politics and Power* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) pp.64

⁵² *Ibid*, pp.46

3.2 Media Framing

Subsequently, actors within the hybrid media system who successfully traverse the older and newer media logics to exercise power during the political information cycle, therefore place themselves in a unique position to frame a political event in a certain way, such as the British referendum on EU membership. Lecheler and De Vreese have defined media frames as being the cognitive result of “patterns of interpretation that are used to classify information and process it efficiently. Frames thus stress certain aspects of reality and push others into the background, they have a selective function”.⁵³

Moreover, the way framing works within political communication is evidenced by how frames shape and alter audiences interpretations of an event, whereby a narrative is assembled by media actors as a way to raise the salience of an issue and to activate schemas which attempt to encourage the public to think or make decisions in a certain way.⁵⁴ As such, the process of framing is constantly at work within the context of political news production, whereby both conscious and unconscious choices are being made regarding what should be emphasised, or not, within communicative text. Media actors will consciously use frames as invaluable tools at a macro level, whereby frames are used to communicate, present and give meaning to often complex political information. Conversely, the public at a micro level will then unconsciously take this information which has been framed for them, interpret it, and then subsequently come to an understanding as to what it means for them.⁵⁵

The process of framing therefore has a consequential impact on the public and the formation of public opinion, whereby information given to them through the media allows the public to form opinions around a subject that they may not be knowledgeable in. This also means, as Strömbäck and Aalberg have stressed on the issue of frames found within media coverage

⁵³ Sophie Lecheler and Claes H. de Vreese (2013) ‘What a Difference a Day Makes? The Effects of Repetitive and Competitive News Framing Over Time’ *Communication Research*, vol.40, iss.2 (2013) pp.149.

⁵⁴ Robert M. Entman (2007) ‘Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power’ *Journal of Communication*, vol.57, iss.1 (2007) pp.164.

⁵⁵ Dietram A. Scheufele and David Tewksbury (2006) ‘Framing, Agenda Setting and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models’ *Journal of Communication*, vol.57, iss.1 (2006) pp.12.

and their effect on the general public, that the way the “media frame politics is able to have profound effects on how people perceive what it is that is being reported”.⁵⁶

The previous statement is even more salient when it comes to media framing during EU referendums, and the lack of knowledge found in many European citizens regarding EU related matters. McCormick has surmised through the use of survey data, that over half of the British electorate have admitted to not understanding how the European Union works or exactly what it is that the institution does.⁵⁷ Moreover, Dvořák has noted that during referendum campaigns, the effects of framing usually occur during “circumstances of a generally rather low awareness about the issue”.⁵⁸ To that end, this would summarily suggest then that a lack of political awareness, among what is a predominantly uninformed British public regarding the EU, could lead to them taking their cognitive cues and opinions from campaign actors such as political leaders or the media. This could then lead to, as McCormick goes on to suggest, a situation whereby large sections of the voting public are in fact “swayed in their opinion by elites and media with narrow interpretations of the EU”.⁵⁹

As an integral facet of the hybrid media system, the effects of framing should also transfer across to political communication that is disseminated by media organisations online, which is then read, shared and liked by the public. Chadwick notes that almost all of the national news organisations now distribute their content widely across multiple online platforms, a development which means that there are now “new opportunities for citizens to engage in political debate and express their opinions in new environments”.⁶⁰ Through socially engaging with one another on political developments via social networking sites (SNS) such as Facebook, citizens now have ever increasing “access to political information, either through

⁵⁶ Jesper Strömbäck and Toril Aalberg (2008) ‘Election News Coverage in Democratic Corporatist Countries: A Comparative Study of Sweden and Norway’ *Scandinavian Political Studies*, vol.31, iss.1 (2008) pp.94.

⁵⁷ John McCormick (2014) ‘Voting on Europe: The Potential Pitfalls of a British Referendum’ *The Political Quarterly*, vol.85, iss.2 (2014) pp.212.

⁵⁸ Tomáš Dvořák (2013) ‘Referendum Campaigns, Framing and Uncertainty’ *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, vol.23, iss.4 (2013) pp.370.

⁵⁹ John McCormick (2014) ‘Voting on Europe: The Potential Pitfalls of a British Referendum’ *The Political Quarterly*, vol.85, iss.2 (2014) pp.213.

⁶⁰ Andrew Chadwick (2013) *The Hybrid Media System Politics and Power* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) pp.47

direct subscription to political and media sources or through exposure to political content published by peers”.⁶¹ This means that news articles posted online by major newspapers now receive hundreds of thousands of views from the public per month, a direct consequence of these organisations adaptation to the new digital environment. Through disseminating their political information via these networked public spheres, SNS have thus afforded media outlets a new realm within which they can increase their audience reach and in turn, have created what Hermida et.al label as a “networked means of communication”.⁶²

Subsequently, the way in which media actors communicate and frame a political event is important, and as the previous literature suggests, can be seen to exert both a direct and indirect influence on how public opinion responds to a highly mediatized event. McCombs has argued that when the media places such a degree of importance on a subject that the “agenda of the news media becomes, to a considerable degree, the agenda of the public”.⁶³ This means that for media actors who traverse the hybrid media system, seeking to steer information which is on the political information cycle in ways that suit their specific agendas, they can now combine the use of older and newer media logics as a way to further increase the salience of an issue to the public.

3.3 Empirical Expectations

In terms of empirical expectations, I now refer back to the three research questions that were posed during the introduction;

RQ1: Through the print media coverage of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum of 2016 in the Daily Express and The Guardian, which topics were framed as the most salient?

⁶¹ Michael Bossetta, Anamaria Dutceac Segesten and Hans-Jörg Trenz (2017) ‘Engaging with European Politics Through Twitter and Facebook: Participation Beyond the National?’ in *Social Media and European Politics. Rethinking Power and Legitimacy in the Digital Era*, eds. Mauro Barisione and Asimina Michailidou (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) pp.54

⁶² Alfred Hermida, Fred Fletcher, Darryl Korell & Donna Logan (2012) ‘SHARE, LIKE, RECOMMEND’ *Journalism Studies*, vol.13, iss.5-6 (2012) pp.816.

⁶³ Maxwell McCombs (2014) *Setting the Agenda: Mass Media and Public Opinion, 2nd Edition* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014) pp.21

RQ2a: Do the salient print frames display hybridity and transfer across media logics into the online news coverage of the referendum, as posted in the media organisations official Facebook sites?

RQ2b: If so, are there significant similarities or differences between the salient frames identified in the print and online coverage of the media organisations?

As the preceding discussion on the effects of framing demonstrates, through conducting a frame analysis on print media coverage of the EU referendum in the two newspapers, I expect to be able to identify a number of salient frames which have been communicated to the public by various political and media actors. Secondly, in line with Chadwick's assertion that political communication in the UK is in fact shaped by its hybrid media system, and that media actors use interrelated older and newer media logics in an effort to advance their interests and agendas, it is expected that prominent frames identified within each news outlets print media coverage should then transfer across the media logics. As such, salient frames in each news organisations print media coverage, should also become evident in the news stories posted on their Facebook page. Lastly, it should be expected that if these frames do transfer between print and online media, that a significant degree of homogeneity will be able to be perceived between the frames suggested to the public through each of the media logics.

4. Method and Data Collection

This chapter is dissected into three parts. In the first section the two UK media outlets that are the subject of this study are discussed, whereby the focus is to reason for their inclusion. Secondly, an explanation is then given as to exactly how the data that is used in this study was collected. Following on from the discussion regarding the empirical material, the third section discusses the methodology of quantitative content analysis and how it can be used to identify frames within media communication.

4.1 The Media Outlets

The two media outlets chosen for this study are The Daily Express and The Guardian. Both have daily Monday to Saturday editions as well as sister Sunday versions, respectively The Sunday Express and the Observer. Also included in the study are their most engaged with social networking sites, their official Facebook pages. This section gives an overview of each outlet in terms of ownership, level of print circulation, size of their online presence, and specifically, each outlets tone of coverage when it comes to matters about the European Union.

The Daily Express has been a consistently popular newspaper in the UK since its inception in 1900, with the further introduction of a Sunday print version launched in 1918. The newspaper has changed ownership numerous times during its life and in 2000 was acquired by its present owner, the publisher Richard Desmond. In terms of print circulation, as of January 2017 the daily version of the paper sold 392,526 copies per day while the Sunday edition had 335,772 unique readers.⁶⁴ Furthermore it has a substantial online presence, as during the same period the *express.co.uk* website received 1,637,521 unique views per day,⁶⁵ while its official Facebook page has at the time of writing 1,252,422 users following a mixture of news story posts and videos.

In terms of the media outlets stance on the European Union, it can be considered as having consistently taken a hardline, eurosceptic position. Well predating David Cameron's mani-

⁶⁴ Dominic Ponsford (2017) 'National newspaper print ABCs for Jan 2017: Times and Observer both boost print sales year on year' *Press Gazette*.

⁶⁵ Dominic Ponsford (2017) 'Mail Online hit new traffic record in January with 15.6m daily and 243m monthly browsers' *Press Gazette*.

festive pledge of 2015, the conservative outlet launched in late 2010 its own campaign named Get Britain out of Europe. The campaign encouraged readers to sign a petition which demanded Britain's withdrawal from the EU, which the media outlet promised to then present to the UK government. In the statement that accompanied the petition, the newspaper argued that while it has always expressed hostility towards British EU membership over how the institution had diluted the UK's national sovereignty, it had also "acknowledged that economic arguments were key",⁶⁶ for remaining a member of the institution. However, through the continuation of the Eurozone crisis which had emerged in 2008, the case for Britain remaining in the EU had now collapsed.

Others however have taken a different stance on the motives behind the 2010 campaign, with Oliver Daddow claiming that the financial crisis had actually enabled the media outlet "to be seen to lead the way in opposing the EU to attract readers who might find the hopes that Britain can reform the EU from the inside fundamentally flawed".⁶⁷ Moreover, the media outlets owner has a strong financial relationship with Ukip, the anti EU political party. Richard Desmond, who owns the Northern and Shell Media Group which publishes the newspaper, has twice made substantial donations to Ukip. The latest donation came during the election campaign for the 2015 British General Election whereby Desmond gifted Ukip £1.3 million pounds towards their campaign, claiming that he wanted to back "Daily Express readers, who believe in many of Ukip's common-sense policies on the EU and immigration and taxation".⁶⁸ In fact, it is widely considered that the rise and upsurge in popularity across Britain for Ukip, who despite only being formed in 1993 currently have nineteen MEP's within their party, was the key factor that provoked David Cameron into committing himself to a referendum on continued British EU membership.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ The Daily Express (2010) 'Get Britain Out of Europe' *The Daily Express*.

⁶⁷ Oliver Daddow (2012) 'The UK media and 'Europe': from permissive consensus to destructive dissent' *International Affairs*, vol.88, iss.6 (2012) pp.1226.

⁶⁸ Richard Desmond (2015) 'Express Newspapers Chairman Richard Desmond: Why I'm giving £1.3m to Ukip' *The Daily Express*.

⁶⁹ Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin (2017) 'Britain After Brexit: A Nation Divided' *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.28, iss.1 (2017) pp.23.

The Guardian and its sister Sunday edition the Observer are owned by the Scott Trust, which was founded in 1936 to ensure that the newspapers editorial independence was maintained in perpetuity from any commercial or political pressures. The Guardian print edition has a national circulation that in January 2017 stood at 156,756, while the Observer had 185,752 readers.⁷⁰ Interestingly, although both of the newspapers have a smaller market share in terms of news print circulation, they have a far bigger presence online than The Daily Express does. According to the Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC) during the same time period, January 2017, theguardian.com received a daily average of 9,296,081 unique browsers,⁷¹ over five times the amount of The Daily Express. Moreover, The Guardian's official Facebook page has 7,702,736 subscribers following its social media updates, which again, significantly dwarfs its tabloid competitor.

As for the media outlets tone on issues related to the European Union, it can be seen to take a comparatively more measured approach in the manner to which it covers Europe. Mark Shaw has argued that The Guardian has a more pragmatic approach towards the institution. The scholar, whereby after analysing discourse on European integration in the UK press in relation to the UK potentially joining the Euro currency in 2001, subsequently found that the Guardian sought to construct the Euro as being representative of “a means to improve trade, increase investment, and strengthen the economy. The advantages of the Euro and European integration in general were also stressed”.⁷² Moreover, Benjamin Hawkins has noted that found within the Guardian's coverage of the EU there is distinct “evidence of a counter-discourse that challenges the Eurosceptic narrative and the assumptions on which it is based”.⁷³

That is to say, The Guardian can be seen to place focus on the more positive aspects of European integration, such as the EU's efforts to spread democratic standards or the relative peace and stability in postwar Europe that the institution is credited with helping engineer.

⁷⁰ Dominic Ponsford (2017) ‘Mail Online hit new traffic record in January with 15.6m daily and 243m monthly browsers’ *Press Gazette*.

⁷¹ GNM Press Office (2016) ‘Guardian reports strong print and digital ABC figures’ *The Guardian*.

⁷² Mark Shaw (2015) ‘Discourses on European integration in the UK press: an assessment of the New Labour era’ *Political Studies Association Conference Paper (2015) pp.20*.

⁷³ Benjamin Hawkins (2012) ‘Nation, Separation and Threat: An Analysis of British Media Discourses on the European Union Treaty Reform Process*’ *Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.50, iss.4 (2012) pp.570*.

Interestingly, the manner in which The Guardian presents its coverage of European matters can also be seen as having largely translated itself into its readers voting behaviour. A study undertaken by NatCen Social Research after the EU referendum found that, through a cross sectional survey conducted with 30,000 members of the voting public, just 9% of respondents who regularly read the newspaper voted to leave, compared to 70% who voted leave that read The Daily Express.⁷⁴

So, each media outlet can be found to have distinct, contrasting positions on matters that relate to the UK's relationship with Europe and as such, they fit neatly into a comparative research design. This particular research method allows the analysis of multiple contrasting cases through the use of the same methodological approach. As Bryman notes, the comparative research design provides the researcher with the ability "to allow the distinguishing characteristics of two or more cases to act as a springboard for theoretical reflections about contrasting findings".⁷⁵ This suggests that certain social phenomenon can be better understood when they are compared and tested through the logic of comparison. As such, through the logic of comparison I will first be able to highlight the similarities and differences between how each of the media outlets framed the EU membership referendum within their print and online coverage. Secondly, through the synthesis and comparison of each outlets print and online coverage, I will be able to test whether the frames identified do indeed display hybridity, or not.

4.2 Data Collection

In terms of data collection, there were two different samples collected from each media outlet during one specific time period, the 9th June 2016 up to and including the 23rd June 2016. This period during the United Kingdom's European Union membership referendum of 2016 is important because, as according to research conducted in early June 2016 by the London School of Economics, up to 30% of people who were eligible to vote in the referendum had

⁷⁴ Kirby Swales (2016) *Understanding the Leave vote* (London, NatCen Social Research, 2016) pp.10

⁷⁵ Alan Bryman (2012) *Social Research Methods, 4th Edition* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) pp.75

either still not made up their minds, or, were instead thinking of changing the way they intended to vote.⁷⁶

The first sample collected was from each media outlets print articles, including both the daily and Sunday editions of each newspaper. The aim of the sampling was to collect every single news article, opinion piece and editorial that related to the upcoming EU membership referendum. To do this, two separate databases were utilised; LexisNexis and UKPressOnline. The reason why two databases were used instead of one is because both The Daily Express and The Sunday Express only make their print editions available through UKPressOnline, via a subscription fee. Therefore, LexisNexis was used to gather the articles from The Guardian and the Observer, whilst The Daily and Sunday Express articles were retrieved from UKPressOnline.

Five search words; *EU, European Union, Remain, Leave* and *Referendum* had been deliberately identified before searching both databases. By choosing these five key words it therefore ensured that a broad range of articles, covering various aspects of the referendum debate such as economics, politics and culture for example, would end up being included in the study. After the initial search had been completed and to clean up and refine the sample, all the articles that had been collected were then scrutinised carefully to ascertain that they did have a direct relevance to the referendum. For instance, articles that contained the search words *EU, European Union* and *Referendum*, during the time period that they were collected, had undoubted relevance. However, on closer reading a number of articles that contained the words *Remain* and *Leave* were in fact related to matters other than the EU referendum, so were summarily discounted from the analysis. After discounting these irrelevant articles the sampling of print media coverage totalled 222 articles across both media organisations; The Daily Express (n = 82), The Sunday Express (n = 16), The Guardian (n = 114), Observer (n = 10).

The second sample was collected from each media outlets official Facebook page. On this particular social networking site both media organisations subsume all their online news coverage into one official page, each of which is named after the daily newspapers titles.

⁷⁶ Toby Helm (2016) 'Third of EU referendum voters won't make up their minds until week before poll' *theguardian.com*.

Between the same fourteen day period used for sampling the print media articles, a technique called data harvesting was used to collect every single news article posted by each media outlet. The software tool used to harvest the articles was VoxPopuli, developed by Dujе Bonacci and his colleagues at the University of Zagreb. As a big data tool VoxPopuli was designed to harvest data from any digital news portal around the world and subsequently, enables the user to automatically and systematically capture issues, or in the case of this study news articles, that are published on daily news web portals.⁷⁷ Using this tool, 1098 news articles were collected across both pages; The Daily Express (n = 467), The Guardian (n = 631). Again, as with the print media coverage, many articles were not relevant for the purposes of this study. To clean up the sample each article was manually checked to ensure that it contained at least one of the five key search words and was related to the referendum. After completing this process, the sample of online media coverage left 209 articles across both media outlets; The Guardian (n = 92), The Daily Express (n = 117).

4.3 The Content Analysis of Media Frames as a Methodological Strategy

As mentioned within the introduction, a paramount function that the media plays in democratic societies is informing the public of political processes. Bernard Cecil Cohen wrote as far back as 1963, on how the media can direct public attention towards specific issues through the degree of focus that it places on them, that the press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling readers what to think about”.⁷⁸ Having previously demonstrated how various actors within the media frame politics through communicative text, this section enunciates the method of content analysis. Utilising the method of content analysis has particular benefits to this study as it will allow both the identification and quantification of the news frames, as presented to the British public within The Daily Express and The Guardian’s online and print news coverage of the EU membership referendum.

⁷⁷ Dujе Bonacci, Antonijab Jelinić, Jelena Jurišić and Lucijaa Alujević-Vesnić (2016) ‘Quantifying and comparing web news portals’ article salience using the VoxPopuli tool’ *First International Conference on Advanced Research Methods and Analytics, CARMA2016 (2016) pp.34.*

⁷⁸ Bernard Cecil Cohen (1963) *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963) pp. 13

Content analysis is classically a quantitative technique, whereby in terms of analysing media communication texts scholars have employed the methodological approach to label, or code, the frequency with which specific words or phrases appear within a piece of communicative text.⁷⁹ However, as a method to empirically analyse human communication through text, content analysis is now applied both quantitatively and qualitatively, across many disciplines. According to Hsieh and Shannon if used qualitatively content analysis is, in its most elementary sense, a methodological approach that can be defined as being the “subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns”.⁸⁰

Alternatively the scholars Touri and Koteyko have noted that the method when used quantitatively, to identify frames present in media communication, enables the researcher to systematically focus on “measuring the frequency with which certain frames occur in a given text”.⁸¹ However, irrespective of whether the approach is conducted qualitatively or quantitatively, Bryman comments that for a content analysis to display both reliability and validity it is important that the method is applied in both a systematic and objective manner, meaning that predefined criteria is applied consistently and that no personal bias becomes evident in the analysis.⁸² As such, this study applies a quantitative content analysis to the empirical data that has been collected and the following outlines the steps that were undertaken to ensure reliability and validity.

To apply content analysis to a media text in an effort to both interpret and identify frames within the communication, one must firstly decide whether to take an inductive or deductive approach to the task. The inductive approach to the content analysis of news media frames is situated within the qualitative paradigm of research, whereby studies typically make use of relatively small data samples. However, this approach can lead to questions over a studies

⁷⁹ Florian Kohlbacher (2006) ‘The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research’ *Forum: Qualitative Social Research*, vol.7, iss.1 (2006) pp.37.

⁸⁰ Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah E. Shannon (2005) ‘Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis’ *Qualitative Health Research*, vol.15, iss.9 (2005) pp.1278.

⁸¹ Maria Touri and Nelya Koteyko (2015) ‘Using corpus linguistic software in the extraction of news frames: towards a dynamic process of frame analysis in journalistic texts’ *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, vol.18, iss.6 (2015) pp.603.

⁸² Alan Bryman (2012) *Social Research Methods, 4th Edition* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) pp.289

objectivity, because frames are only uncovered as the researcher works through and analyses the text. This has led Matthes and Kohring to suggest of an inductive approach that researchers subsequently “run the risk of finding frames they are consciously or unconsciously looking for”.⁸³ Moreover, in terms of the reliability and replicability of inductively extracting frames from media text, different researchers will naturally have different world-views. This means that, as the scholars further note, an inductive analysis of the same news text, by different researchers, will not always extract the same frames.⁸⁴

To avoid the pitfalls Matthes and Kohring previously highlighted this study takes a deductive approach, and moreover, makes use of a predefined typology of media frames as set out in a seminal study by Semetko and Valkenburg. The scholars, after conducting a literature review of media framing, proposed a typology of five news frames most commonly used within the production of political media communication. They then applied the typology in a deductive content analysis of news frames found in print media and television news broadcasts, related to the highly mediatized Amsterdam meetings of European heads of states in 1997 which finalised negotiations over creating the EMU. The predefined frames that Semetko and Valkenburg proposed are *conflict; human interest; economic consequences; morality; and attribution of responsibility*.

According to Semetko and Valkenburg, in political media communication the conflict frame emphasises to the public how “individuals, groups, or institutions”⁸⁵ are seen to be in conflict with each other, a method which is used to capture the interest of the reader or viewer. The human interest frame identified by the scholars brings an emotional angle into how the event is framed for the public, and as such, makes an “effort to personalise”⁸⁶ the frame for the viewer. Thirdly, in terms of the economic consequences frame, the media will commonly use this to report an event as potentially having dramatic economic repercussions for individuals, groups or the state. The frame of morality prescribes an indirect moral judgement to an event,

⁸³ Jörg Matthes and Matthias Kohring (2008) ‘The Content Analysis of Media Frames: Toward Improving Reliability and Validity’ *Journal of Communication*, vol.58, iss.2 (2008) pp.259.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, pp.259

⁸⁵ Holli A. Semetko and Patti M. Valkenburg (2000) ‘Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News’ *Journal of Communication*, vol.50, iss.2 (2000) pp.95.

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, pp.96

and is usually placed within the context of a journalist quoting a person or interest group. Semetko and Valkenburg have noted that media actors use a morality frame to ensure that their story contains “moral messages or offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave”.⁸⁷ Lastly the attribution of responsibility frame seeks to determine blame. This attribution can be applied to either an individual, group or government, in respect to either the causal effect of an event or how to solve a problem. Ultimately however, as the scholars note, the frame seeks to shape public understanding as to who is responsible for causing or solving the particular social problem.⁸⁸

Having discussed the selection of frame typology, I now outline some further operational considerations. According to Bryman the method of content analysis “offers the prospect of different kinds of ‘units of analysis’ being considered”,⁸⁹ which is to say, a unit of analysis in a piece of media text can be either words, a paragraph, or indeed, whole news articles. For the purposes of this study the whole news article is the unit of analysis. The reasoning for this decision is motivated by the results of a 2005 deductive content analysis by Dimitrova and Strömbäck, which investigated framing of the 2003 Iraq War in Swedish and US elite media. The authors results found the co-presence of both primary, and interestingly, secondary frames contained within the same news article.⁹⁰ What this essentially means is that a dominant, or primary, frame will always be the central organising theme for any news article. However, supporting that dominant frame a secondary theme can sometimes be identified, which then seeks to supplement it.⁹¹

After ensuring that potentially enlightening secondary frames were not discounted from the study, another important consideration is how to measure both the presence and strength of a frame within a news article. To do this, a series of framing measures have been utilised from

⁸⁷ Holli A. Semetko and Patti M. Valkenburg (2000) ‘Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News’ *Journal of Communication*, vol.50, iss.2 (2000) pp.96.

⁸⁸ Ibid, pp.96

⁸⁹ Alan Bryman (2012) *Social Research Methods, 4th Edition* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) pp.295

⁹⁰ Daniela V. Dimitrova and Jesper Strömbäck (2005) ‘Mission Accomplished? Framing of the Iraq War in the Elite Newspapers in Sweden and the United States’ *Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies*, vol.67, iss.5 (2005) pp.409.

⁹¹ Margaret Linström and Willemien Marais (2012) ‘Qualitative News Frame Analysis: A Methodology’ *Com-munitas*, vol.17, iss.1 (2012) pp.30.

the previously mentioned Semetko and Valkenburg study (see appendix A). These framing measures take the form of a coding sheet, which contains twenty questions. Each question was developed by the scholars to help ascertain whether one, or more, of the five previously mentioned news frames are identifiable in a piece of media communication. The purpose of the coding sheet is to enable the researcher to accurately assess whether or not a frame is present by answering yes or no, to each question on the sheet, after careful reading of the text.⁹²

Moreover, the coding sheet also enables the coder to measure the strength of a frame, if identified. For instance, there are five specific questions which relate to the human interest frame, so after reading the text if a coder can only answer yes to one or two of the questions the strength of the frame, whilst present, is somewhat weak. As such, on the substance found within Semetko and Valkenburg's coding indicators, Dirikx and Gelders have noted that in efforts to perform a systematic analysis of news frames many other studies have subsequently “applied this question sheet and found that the twenty questions reliably reflect the underlying frames”.⁹³

⁹² Holli A. Semetko and Patti M. Valkenburg (2000) ‘Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News’ *Journal of Communication*, vol.50, iss.2 (2000) pp.98.

⁹³ Astrid Dirikx and Dave Gelders (2010) ‘To frame is to explain: A deductive frame-analysis of Dutch and French climate change coverage during the annual UN Conferences of the Parties’ *Public Understanding of Science*, vol.19, iss.6 (2010) pp.736.

5. Analysis - Print Media Frames

This chapter presents the findings of the deductive content analysis performed on the first sample of empirical material. Noted in section 4.2, this first sample relates to the print media coverage contained in The Guardian / Observer and The Daily Express / The Sunday Express, which was published by each media outlet between the 9th June 2016 and the 23rd June 2016. To systematically identify the news frames within the media communication, each article was carefully read twice. Due consideration was also given to both the article headline and any images which accompanied the news story, as secondary frames can often be constructed within them. During the coding process both Semetko and Valkenburg's typology of five common news frames and the scholars predefined framing measures coding sheet of twenty questions were utilised. To code and identify the frames, a frames presence was coded as 1 if one of the framing measures was identified. If a framing measure was not present in an article, it was coded as 0. After identifying the frames and presenting the findings, the end of this chapter addresses the first research question asked at the beginning of the study. Moreover, the findings of this study are also compared to what the previous literature on media framing has uncovered.

5.1 The Guardian - Identifying the Frames

Table 1 displays the frequency in which each of the five common news frames were identified, within the collected sample of The Guardian print articles. The left hand column in the table labelled ‘appearance in each article’ indicates the number of times a news frame was used in an article, and therefore the strength of each of the news frames.

Table 1. The Guardian print news articles (n = 124) and the appearance of each type of media frame (number of occurrences in each article and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

Appearance	Attribution of Responsibility	Human Interest	Conflict	Morality	Economic
Not Used	21 (17%)	9 (7.3%)	10 (8%)	88 (71%)	64 (51.6%)
One items	6 (4.8%)	20 (16.1%)	13 (10.5%)	5 (4%)	1 (0.8%)
Two items	25 (20.1%)	29 (23.3%)	19 (15.3%)	31 (25%)	2 (1.6%)
Three items	17 (13.7%)	25 (20.2%)	43 (34.7%)	0 (0%)	57 (46%)
Four items	30 (24.2%)	28 (22.6%)	39 (31.5%)	-	-
Five items	25 (20.2%)	13 (10.5%)	-	-	-
Total	124 (100%)	124 (100%)	124 (100%)	124 (100%)	124 (100%)

The attribution of responsibility frame was found to be relatively well used within the papers print coverage, whereby significant responsibility for an issue was placed onto either the government or a particular campaign actor. In total seventy two stories, 58% of the 124 articles published by The Guardian, used three or more of the five measures used to identify the frame. Shown in table 2, The Guardian suggested in eighty six of the 124 articles sampled that an individual or group, other than the current government, were to blame for the issue the article was focusing on. Moreover, in 61.3% of the print coverage an identical amount of emphasis was placed on firstly suggesting to the reader that the issue required urgent resolution, and secondly, that the problem could in fact be alleviated if only the action prescribed in the article was taken.

Table 2. The Guardian print news articles (n = 124) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Attribution of Responsibility Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 124)</i>
1. Does the story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate the problem?	49 (39.5%)
2. Does the story suggest that some level of government is responsible for the issue / problem?	65 (52.4%)
3. Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem / issue?	76 (61.3%)
4. Does the story suggest that an individual (or group of people in society) is responsible for the issue / problem?	86 (69.4%)
5. Does the story suggest that the problem requires urgent action?	76 (61.3%)

The analysis found that The Guardian placed a high importance on stressing the human interest frame within the articles sampled. As table 1 demonstrates, in only nine of the 124 sampled articles was the the human interest frame not identifiable. Conversely, this means that in 92.7% of the articles The Guardian brought an emotional angle into a story regarding the referendum, personalising the frame for the reader. The emphasis placed on emotional framing is best exemplified by framing measure question eight, which asks if the story emphasises how individuals and groups are affected by the issue or problem. As table 3 shows, in all but thirteen of the 124 news articles sampled, this measure was coded positively.

Table 3. The Guardian print news articles (n = 124) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Human Interest Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 124)</i>
6. Does the story provide a human example or “human face” on the issue?	74 (59.7%)
7. Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy, caring, sympathy, or compassion?	86 (69.4%)
8. Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the issue / problem?	111 (89.6%)
9. Does the story go into the private or personal lives of the actors?	45 (36.3%)
10. Does the story contain visual information that might generate feelings of outrage, empathy, caring, sympathy, or compassion?	14 (11.3%)

The Guardian placed a similar focus in terms of utilising the conflict frame as it did with the previous human interest frame, whereby as table 1 demonstrates 8%, or just ten of the 124 articles, did not frame a story within disagreement of some sort. The same table elucidates how the conflict frame was particularly strong in the outlets coverage, due to the fact that in 66% of the articles sampled either three or four, of the four framing measures used to identify the frame, were coded as present. This is perhaps one of the least and most surprising findings as referring back to Moore and Ramsay’s assertion earlier, the scholars argued that the partisanship of the British media encouraged and enflamed the hostile and negative rhetoric of the respective campaigns. However, and countering what Copeland and Copsey suggested previously that the left wing press provide a more balanced coverage of European matters by including both pro European and Eurosceptic perspectives, the results in table 4 suggest otherwise. Framing measure 13 shows that in under only half of the articles sampled in The Guardian, 48.4%, did the outlet refer to the perspectives of both the remain and leave campaigns when discussing a problem or issue.

Table 4. The Guardian print news articles (n = 124) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Conflict Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 124)</i>
11. Does the story reflect disagreement between parties / individuals / groups / countries?	96 (77.4%)
12. Does one party / individual / group / country reproach another?	77 (62.1%)
13. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue?	60 (48.4%)
14. Does the story refer to winners and losers?	103 (83.1%)

The morality frame was found the least likely to be used, whereby in 71% of the articles analysed none of the three framing measures were identified, and no single article in The Guardian focused on all three of the morality frames measures within the same text. As table 5 demonstrates, no single article made reference to God or other religious tenets. A number of articles did however offer explicit moral messages or infer that people should behave in a certain way. These centred around both the behaviour and the claims made by certain actors within the referendum campaign, most notably prominent leave actors Michael Gove and

Boris Johnson, or indeed, how other media outlets were choosing to report on the referendum and the claims they were making.

Table 5. The Guardian print news articles (n = 124) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Morality Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 124)</i>
15. Does the story contain any moral message?	32 (25.8%)
16. Does the story make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets?	0 (0%)
17. Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave?	35 (28.2%)

When framing the economic consequences of the referendum The Guardian took an all or nothing approach to how it framed the issue, as tables 1 and 6 demonstrate succinctly. Table 1 shows that the economic consequences frame was either coded as being entirely present through the identification of all three framing measures related to the frame (46%), or entirely absent (51.6%). This therefore left only three articles where the frame appeared once or twice. The results in table 6 further underline this circumstance. Of the three framing measures used to identify the economic consequences frame, all three were applied in fifty eight out of fifty nine articles, with only a single article not referring to the third and final framing measure.

Table 6. The Guardian print news articles (n = 124) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Economic Consequences Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 124)</i>
18. Is there a mention of (financial) losses or gains now or in the future?	59 (47.6%)
19. Is there a mention of the costs / degree of expense involved?	59 (47.6%)
20. Is there a reference to (economic) consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?	58 (46.8%)

5.2 The Daily Express - Identifying the Frames

Table 7 below applies the same criteria as table 1, displaying the frequency in which each of the five common news frames were identified. This table reflects the frames identified within the collected sample of The Daily Express print coverage of the EU referendum.

Table 7. The Daily Express print news articles (n = 98) and the appearance of each type of media frame (number of occurrences in each article and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

Appearance	Attribution of Responsibility	Human Interest	Conflict	Morality	Economic
Not Used	34 (34.7%)	37 (37.8%)	37 (37.8%)	78 (79.6%)	56 (57.1%)
One item	3 (3.1%)	5 (5.1%)	6 (6.1%)	4 (4.1%)	1 (1%)
Two items	6 (6.1%)	5 (5.1%)	6 (6.1%)	15 (15.3%)	1 (1%)
Three items	14 (14.3%)	10 (10.2%)	43 (43.9%)	1 (1%)	40 (40.9%)
Four items	19 (19.4%)	19 (19.4%)	6 (6.1%)	-	-
Five items	22 (22.4%)	22 (22.4%)	-	-	-
Total	98 (100%)	98 (100%)	98 (100%)	98 (100%)	98 (100%)

The findings show that framing an article in terms of attributing responsibility was often either never used, or alternatively, completely focused on the frame. Table 7 demonstrates that of the five framing measures used to identify the frame, in 57.1% of the articles sampled the frame was either completely present (22.4%) or entirely missing (34.7%). The attribution of responsibility frame was used less in The Daily Express coverage compared to The Guardian. Framing measures 1 through 5 were coded as present 352 times within The Guardian sample, however, as table 8 shows the same framing measures were only coded present 243 times, a 31% drop in use. The frame was still relatively well utilised by the media outlet though. Many of the articles used the attribution of responsibility frame as a way of attacking their *bête noire*, the incumbent Conservative government, and in particular David Cameron for backing the remain campaign or the Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne for his economic warnings should Brexit materialise.

Table 8. The Daily Express print news articles (n = 98) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Attribution of Responsibility Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 98)</i>
1. Does the story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate the problem?	28 (28.6%)
2. Does the story suggest that some level of government is responsible for the issue / problem?	47 (48%)
3. Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem / issue?	54 (55.1%)
4. Does the story suggest that an individual (or group of people in society) is responsible for the issue / problem?	58 (59.2%)
5. Does the story suggest that the problem requires urgent action?	56 (57.1%)

The human interest frame in The Daily Express placed much less of a focus on how individuals stood to be affected than its competitor. Compared to The Guardian where framing measure 8 was coded as present 111 times (89.6%), table 9 shows that the media outlet only emphasised how people or groups would be affected by the issue the article was addressing fifty five times (56.1%). The fact that The Daily Express focused less on the societal effects of a possible Brexit than The Guardian should be considered as unsurprising, given that both editions of the paper have consistently taken Eurosceptic positions for many years and that both took editorial stances early on in the campaign which encouraged their readers to vote leave.

Table 9. The Daily Express print news articles (n = 98) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Human Interest Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 98)</i>
6. Does the story provide a human example or “human face” on the issue?	56 (57.1%)
7. Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy, caring, sympathy, or compassion?	50 (51%)
8. Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the issue / problem?	55 (56.1%)
9. Does the story go into the private or personal lives of the actors?	28 (28.6%)
10. Does the story contain visual information that might generate feelings of outrage, empathy, caring, sympathy, or compassion?	42 (42.9%)

When framing an article in a conflictual context, coding of The Daily Express sample shows in table 7 that three or more out of the four frame measures were recognised in 50% of the articles. What is surprising though is the degree of difference between the two outlets non usage of the conflict frame. As mentioned previously, the conflict frame was not detected in only 8% of The Guardian articles sampled. However, the results in table 7 show that the conflict frame was not present in 37.8% of The Daily Express, a difference of 29.8% in terms of the frames usage / non usage. Less surprising was the finding that The Daily Express almost exclusively framed news articles from the partisan perspective of the leave campaign. When coding for framing measure 13 the results in table 10 show that the outlet only made reference to alternative perspectives on nine occasions, fifty one less times than The Guardian. In turn this result succinctly accentuates the argument put forward earlier by Copeland and Copsy, in which they noted that the populist British media essentially expunge from their coverage of European issues any alternative, pro-European perspectives.

Table 10. The Daily Express print news articles (n = 98) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Conflict Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 98)</i>
11. Does the story reflect disagreement between parties / individuals / groups / countries?	55 (56.1%)
12. Does one party / individual / group / country reproach another?	50 (51%)
13. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue?	9 (9.2%)
14. Does the story refer to winners and losers?	57 (58.2%)

Surprisingly, as demonstrated in table 11, one of The Daily Express articles managed to make reference to framing measure number 16 whereby an explicit mention of God was referenced once. However, reflecting the findings found within the The Guardians print coverage, the morality frame was the least used news frame by The Daily Express whereby 79.6% of the ninety eight articles sampled contained no reference to one of the three framing measures, as highlighted in table 7. There was a perceptible difference between how often the two media outlets used the morality frame in their coverage though. Framing measures 15 and 17 were respectively coded as present within The Guardian coverage 25.8% and 28.2% of the time.

However, analysis of The Daily Express articles shows that the frame was employed less often, only 20.4% and 16.3% in total.

Table 11. The Daily Express print news articles (n = 98) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Morality Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 98)</i>
15. Does the story contain any moral message?	20 (20.4%)
16. Does the story make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets?	1 (1%)
17. Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave?	16 (16.3%)

As with The Guardian print coverage if an article within The Daily Express discussed the economic consequences of the EU referendum, it was consistently found to include all three framing measures used to identify the frame. Table 12 demonstrates that of the ninety eight articles coded, all three economic framing measures were found together on forty one occasions. Naturally, given the stance of the media outlet regarding the EU referendum, the focus was on the positive economic aspects of leaving the European Union. In particular, many articles focused on the cost to the UK of contributing to the EU's budget and the financial gains that would be reaped if a leave vote should conspire.

Table 12. The Daily Express print news articles (n = 98) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Economic Consequences Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 98)</i>
18. Is there a mention of (financial) losses or gains now or in the future?	41 (41.8%)
19. Is there a mention of the costs / degree of expense involved?	41 (41.8%)
20. Is there a reference to (economic) consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?	41 (41.8%)

5.3 Discussion - Print Media Frames

Through the use of Semetko and Valkenburg's typology of five common news frames, and by applying a deductive content analysis to print articles collected from The Guardian and The Daily Express coverage of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum of 2016, the following section presents the empirical conclusions drawn from the results. As a reminder, the first research question this study asked was -

RQ1: Through the print media coverage of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum of 2016 in the Daily Express and The Guardian, which topics were framed as the most salient?

The results show that in The Guardian and Observer the most salient frames found in the media outlets print sample focused on economic consequences, conflict, and then to a lesser extent, attribution of responsibility. The human interest frame was recognised less than the three previous frames, but still relatively regularly. Unsurprisingly, the morality frame was the least consistently recognised. Likewise, in The Daily and Sunday Express coverage, the most salient frames were found to match the same pattern as its competitor. Additionally, and aligning with the findings of the content analysis conducted by Dimitrova and Strömbäck on the Iraq War coverage discussed earlier, the results of this study also demonstrate the co-presence of secondary frames in many of the articles sampled. Of the 124 articles sampled in The Guardian and Observer, one or more of the framing measures used to identify a frame were coded as present on 428 occasions. While The Daily and Sunday Express sample was smaller in size, just ninety eight articles in total, secondary frames were still identified on 248 instances.

The morality frame was more notable for its non usage than for its appearance, a conclusion which can be extrapolated across both of the media outlets coverage. Its non usage within The Daily Express covered 79.6% of the ninety eight articles in the sample, while The Guardian did not employ the frame in eighty eight of the 124 articles collected, 71% in total. The results of this study show that, to a significant extent, both media outlets when discussing the EU referendum did not focus on prescribing either direct or indirect moral judgement. Discussed previously, while the human interest frame was found to be present in more of The Guardian sample than The Daily Express, particularly when it came to framing measure eight

(does the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the issue / problem?), the variance in frame strength between the two media outlets was found to be negligible. When an article was coded as containing three or more of the five framing measures to identify the frame, and thus indicating the article was strongly focusing on the frame, it was found that 53.3% of The Guardian articles and 52% of The Daily Express articles did so.

Similar to the findings of the human interest frame, the results of the analysis for the attribution of responsibility frame show a significant degree of homogeneity between the two media outlets. It was found that both newspapers used attribution of responsibility to frame news articles more regularly than the human interest frame. In the case of The Guardian, the framing measures used to identify the responsibility frame were coded as present 352 times compared to 243 for the human interest frame. Meanwhile, The Daily Express results show that each frame respectively coded positively on 243 and 231 occasions. Moreover, when measuring the strength of the frames, both media outlets articles used three or more of the five attribution of responsibility framing measures more frequently than they did with the human interest frame. In total three or more framing measures related to the responsibility frame appeared in 58.1% of The Guardian sample and 56.1% of The Daily Express articles.

Interestingly, the findings of this study are similar to that of Semetko and Valkenburg, whereby in their study the scholars also found the economic consequences, conflict, and attribution of responsibility frames to be the most predominantly identifiable in media coverage.⁹⁴ As such, and contrary to the convergence seen between the previous three weaker frames discussed, when the results of each media outlets usage of the conflict frame are placed side by side they elicit some interesting empirical observations. Firstly, they indicate towards confirming the argument put forward earlier about how the populist British press refuse to countenance the inclusion of alternative pro EU perspectives or arguments within their coverage. The fact that a Eurosceptic media outlet who have long previously campaigned for the UK's withdrawal from the European Union should frame its coverage in a conflictual context is not unsurprising, however the extent to which it did is noteworthy. The results of The Daily Express analysis succinctly demonstrate that whilst the conflict frame

⁹⁴ Holli A. Semetko and Patti M. Valkenburg (2000) 'Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News' *Journal of Communication*, vol.50, iss.2 (2000) pp.106.

was coded as present on a 171 occasions, in only nine articles did the story provide the public reading them two or more sides to the debate on the EU referendum.

Moreover, what the results of the study further indicate is that The Guardian, from the supposedly quality press, employed the conflict frame far more regularly than its populist rival. Non usage of the conflict frame in The Daily Express was 26.5%, compared to just 8% in The Guardian articles sampled. Moreover, the strength of the conflict frame was higher in the quality newspaper than in the tabloid. Three or more of the four framing measures were coded as present in 66.2% of The Guardian articles, in comparison to 57.3% found in The Daily Express. Additionally, while the conflict frame was strongly identified in The Guardian, previous literature has argued that as a quality broadsheet it would be expected to provide readers with alternative views and opinions when discussing EU related matters. However, while not displaying the level of partisanship as The Daily Express did in its coverage, The Guardian only offered its readers a pro leave perspective in 48.4% of the 124 articles analysed.

Finally, the results of this study demonstrate how often both media outlets used the economic consequences frame. The findings show that The Guardian referred to the economic consequences of leaving the EU in 46% of its articles. Many of the articles centred around debunking the various claims that actors in the leave campaign were making, most commonly, claims regarding how much it costs the UK to contribute to the EU's budget. Moreover, in editorials and opinion pieces the media outlet framed the economic consequences of Brexit in a manner which positively highlighted the economic benefits British businesses reap from access to the EU's single market, or stressed the potential damage that would occur to the British economy should the UK leave the EU. The Daily Express was as one sided in its use of the economic consequences frame too. Overall, 40.9% of the articles sampled contained all three of Semetko and Valkenburg's framing measures used to identify the frame. Naturally, given the stance of the media outlet these articles and editorials were instead framed around what the UK economy would stand to gain from leaving the EU. Many placed a focus on the economic benefits British citizens stood to reap, in terms of the perceived strain EU migrants were inflicting on the UK's public services. Moreover many articles framed leaving the EU in terms of economic opportunity, whereby the UK would finally be free to strike out on its own

and negotiate new, bigger and better trade deals, which had been constrained by the EU's institutional bureaucracy in the past.

6. Analysis - Online Media Frames

Following on from the previous chapter which presented the print media frames, this chapter contains the results of the content analysis on the second sample of empirical data. As noted in section 4.2, this second sample related to online media coverage of the EU referendum, posted on the official Facebook pages of The Guardian and The Daily Express, which was published by each media outlet between the 9th June 2016 and the 23rd June 2016. Again, during this process Semetko and Valkenburg's typology of five common news frames were applied, and the scholars framing measures coding sheet of twenty questions was utilised to identify the frames. The same systematic process to identify the news frames within the online articles was used as it was with the print coverage, whereby each text was subjected to close reading twice over. The concluding section in this chapter addresses the final two research questions posed at the beginning of the study, and moreover, places the findings of this research within the context of the hybrid media system.

6.1 The Guardian - Identifying the Frames

Below, table 13 presents the results in which the frequency of the five common news frames appeared within news articles, posted on The Guardian's Facebook page, during their coverage of the EU referendum.

Table 13. The Guardian Facebook news articles (n = 92) and the appearance of each type of media frame (number of occurrences in each article and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

Appearance	Attribution of Responsibility	Human Interest	Conflict	Morality	Economic
Not Used	6 (6.5%)	2 (2.2%)	26 (28.3%)	65 (70.7%)	57 (62%)
One item	8 (8.7%)	13 (14.1%)	8 (8.7%)	5 (5.4%)	4 (4.3%)
Two items	14 (15.2%)	8 (8.7%)	20 (21.7%)	22 (23.9%)	18 (19.6%)
Three items	28 (30.4%)	8 (8.7%)	20 (21.7%)	0 (0%)	13 (14.1%)
Four items	26 (28.3%)	25 (27.2%)	18 (19.6%)	-	-
Five items	10 (10.9%)	36 (39.1%)	-	-	-
Total	92 (100%)	92 (100%)	92 (100%)	92 (100%)	92 (100%)

Non usage of the attribution of responsibility frame was more common in the The Guardian online coverage of the EU referendum, than in its print coverage. Referring back to table 1, of the five framing measures used to identify the frame, none were subsequently recognised in 17% of the print articles analysed. Non usage of the frame in the online coverage however saw this figure drop to just 6.5%. Moreover, there is a significant difference seen when examining whether an article contained reference to all five framing measures. In total, twenty five articles in the print coverage used all five framing measures, which amounted to 20.2% of the sample. Alternatively in the online articles, use of all five framing measures dropped to 10.9% of the sample, only ten articles in all. However, as table 14 demonstrates and coinciding with the results previously noted in the print analysis of the attribution of responsibility frame, framing measures three (76.1%), four (73.9%) and five (67.4%) were once again by far the most widely identified in The Guardian online coverage.

Table 14. The Guardian Facebook news articles (n = 92) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Attribution of Responsibility Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 92)</i>
1. Does the story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate the problem?	31 (33.7%)
2. Does the story suggest that some level of government is responsible for the issue / problem?	44 (47.8%)
3. Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem / issue?	70 (76.1%)
4. Does the story suggest that an individual (or group of people in society) is responsible for the issue / problem?	68 (73.9%)
5. Does the story suggest that the problem requires urgent action?	62 (67.4%)

It was noted in the results of The Guardian print analysis that the human interest frame was one that was widely employed. In the media outlets online coverage the results show that the usage of the frame became only further amplified. As shown in table 15, framing measure 8 was coded as present in 92.4% of the articles analysed. In comparison, the same framing measure in the print analysis was present in 89.6% of the articles. As such, across both The Guardian's print and online coverage of the EU referendum, this particular framing measure was the most extensively employed. Moreover, while identification of the human interest frame through its five framing measures was spread relatively equally across the print articles, analysis of the online articles reveals a perceptible difference. Online articles were found to be heavily biased towards four or five framing measures being coded within the same article. As shown in table 13, online articles that contained only one, two or three items accounted for just 31.5% of the sample, whereas the appearance of four or five items within an article occurred in 66.3% cases. Conversely, this is compared to 59.6% of the print sample (see table 1) that used between one and three items in an article, and only 33.1% of the print articles that subsequently contained four or five items.

Table 15. The Guardian Facebook news articles (n = 92) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Human Interest Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 92)</i>
6. Does the story provide a human example or “human face” on the issue?	65 (70.7%)
7. Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy, caring, sympathy, or compassion?	73 (79.3%)
8. Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the issue / problem?	85 (92.4%)
9. Does the story go into the private or personal lives of the actors?	52 (56.5%)
10. Does the story contain visual information that might generate feelings of outrage, empathy, caring, sympathy, or compassion?	57 (62%)

The use of the conflict frame in The Guardians print coverage was particularly evident, and as noted previously, 66% of the articles sampled were found to contain either three or four, of the four framing measures used to identify the frame. Moreover, only 8% of the articles did not frame a news story within some sort of conflict. However, the results of the analysis conducted on the online news stories revealed that the frame was far less prominent. Table 13 shows that only 41.3% of the online articles were coded as containing three or four of the framing measures relevant to the frame, a 24.7% drop in usage. Moreover, the same table also demonstrates how often the frame did not appear in online articles with 26 news stories, 28.3% of the sample, not making any reference to disagreement at all. Underlining the difference between the presence of the conflict frame across media logics, table 16 shows that in online articles framing measure 14 was only coded as present 46.7% of the time. Alternatively, in the print sample the same question was recognised affirmatively in 83.1% of articles.

Table 16. The Guardian Facebook news articles (n = 92) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Conflict Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 92)</i>
11. Does the story reflect disagreement between parties / individuals / groups / countries?	52 (56.5%)
12. Does one party / individual / group / country reproach another?	52 (56.5%)
13. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue?	33 (35.9%)
14. Does the story refer to winners and losers?	43 (46.7%)

Again, as with The Guardian print coverage, the findings in table 13 show that the morality frame was the least relevant frame used in online articles. Sixty five of the articles made no reference at all to any of the three framing measures, and echoing the results of the print analysis, not a single article was coded as containing all three measures at one time.

Table 17. The Guardian Facebook news articles (n = 92) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Morality Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 92)</i>
15. Does the story contain any moral message?	24 (26.1%)
16. Does the story make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets?	0 (0%)
17. Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave?	25 (27.2%)

The results of economic consequences frame, alongside the previously discussed conflict frame, provided evidence of the clearest and most obvious divergence as to how The Guardian framed the EU referendum through its print and online coverage. As noted in the previous chapter, in print The Guardian took an all or nothing approach to framing an article as having economic consequences for the reader. All three framing measures in the sampled articles were either completely present (46%) or alternatively entirely absent (51.6%). The findings in table 13 show that in the media outlets online coverage, the economic consequences frame was not present in 62% of articles. However, unlike the print coverages all or nothing approach, the majority of the remaining articles in the online sample did not code as containing all three framing measures, whereby just 14.1% did. Instead, referring back to table 13, more

online articles were only coded as containing one (4.3%) or two (19.6%) of the framing measures, because, as table 18 shows, framing measure 19 was found far less than the other two measures used to identify the frame in the online articles.

Table 18. The Guardian Facebook news articles (n = 92) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Economic Consequences Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 92)</i>
18. Is there a mention of (financial) losses or gains now or in the future?	30 (32.6%)
19. Is there a mention of the costs / degree of expense involved?	18 (19.6%)
20. Is there a reference to (economic) consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?	30 (32.6%)

6.2 The Daily Express - Identifying the Frames

Table 19 below shows the results within which the frequency of the five common news frames appeared in news articles on The Daily Express Facebook site, in relation to their coverage of the EU referendum.

Table 19. The Daily Express Facebook news articles (n = 117) and the appearance of each type of media frame (number of occurrences in each article and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

Appearance	Attribution of Responsibility	Human Interest	Conflict	Morality	Economic
Not Used	22 (18.8%)	16 (13.7%)	31 (26.5%)	99 (84.6%)	89 (76.1%)
One item	10 (8.5%)	19 (16.2%)	6 (5.1%)	4 (3.4%)	0 (0%)
Two items	10 (8.5%)	10 (8.5%)	13 (11.1%)	11 (9.4%)	1 (0.8%)
Three items	23 (19.7%)	15 (12.8%)	44 (37.6%)	3 (2.6%)	27 (23.1%)
Four items	30 (25.7%)	17 (14.6%)	23 (19.7%)	-	-
Five items	22 (18.8%)	40 (34.2%)	-	-	-
Total	117 (100%)	117 (100%)	117 (100%)	117 (100%)	117 (100%)

The results of the analysis on The Daily Express online articles show that the attribution of responsibility frame was found far more online, than in its print coverage of the EU referen-

dum. Referring back to table 7, in 34.7% of the articles coded in the print sample the frame was not present, however, the analysis on the online articles show that the frame was not identified in only 18.8% of cases. Moreover, the strength of the frames presence online is demonstrated in table 19 above, whereby of the five framing measures used to identify the frame, three or more were used in 64.2% of cases. Again, as with the print coverage, the most widely identified framing measure was number four. Compared with the print articles where this framing measure was coded as present in 59.2% of the articles, table 20 below shows that online it occurred in 74.4% of the cases sampled.

Table 20. The Daily Express Facebook news articles (n = 117) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Attribution of Responsibility Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 117)</i>
1. Does the story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate the problem?	43 (36.8%)
2. Does the story suggest that some level of government is responsible for the issue / problem?	70 (59.8%)
3. Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem / issue?	67 (57.3%)
4. Does the story suggest that an individual (or group of people in society) is responsible for the issue / problem?	87 (74.4%)
5. Does the story suggest that the problem requires urgent action?	62 (53%)

The human interest frame provides two further anomalies in terms of a frames transfer between print and online coverage by The Daily Express. Table 7 demonstrates that the frame was not coded as present in over a third of the outlets print articles, 37.8% in total. However, the results of the online analysis in table 19 show that non usage of the frame subsequently dropped to just 13.7% of the articles sampled. Moreover, when looking at the presence of all five framing measures used to identify the frame, the results show that the strength of the human interest frame increased in online news stories, up to 34.2% when compared to 22.4% in the print articles. Subsequently, this means that the human interest frame became the strongest frame used by The Daily Express when taking into account usage of all the measures used to identify it. This is best demonstrated by the increased prevalence of framing measure eight seen in online articles, when compared to its use in print articles. The measure

only appeared in 56.1% of print articles but positive coding for the measure increased to 82.1% online.

Table 21. The Daily Express Facebook news articles (n = 117) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Human Interest Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 117)</i>
6. Does the story provide a human example or “human face” on the issue?	64 (54.7%)
7. Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy, caring, sympathy, or compassion?	79 (67.5%)
8. Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the issue / problem?	96 (82.1%)
9. Does the story go into the private or personal lives of the actors?	49 (41.9%)
10. Does the story contain visual information that might generate feelings of outrage, empathy, caring, sympathy, or compassion?	64 (54.7%)

In online articles the conflict frame saw a marked increase in use when compared to the results of the analysis on the The Daily Express print articles. Table 19 shows that the frames non usage dropped from 37.8% in print articles (see table 7) down to 26.5% in online articles. Secondly, the same respective tables show that the use of all four framing measures within a single article increased from just 6.1% in print communication, up to 19.7% within the online articles. This meant that all four of the framing measures used to identify the frame were increasingly coded as present in online text, which is surprising. The results of The Daily Express print analysis largely confirmed the argument that the populist press expunge any pro European perspectives from their coverage. However, after coding framing measure 13, this measure rose from occurring in just 9.2% of print articles up to, as table 22 shows, 21.3% in the media outlets online sample.

Table 22. The Daily Express Facebook news articles (n = 117) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Conflict Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 117)</i>
11. Does the story reflect disagreement between parties / individuals / groups / countries?	77 (65.8%)
12. Does one party / individual / group / country reproach another?	81 (69.2%)
13. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue?	25 (21.3%)
14. Does the story refer to winners and losers?	73 (62.4%)

As within the print sample, the morality frame was rarely used within The Daily Express online articles. Of note however, the online sample did contain three articles whereby a reference was made to God, as shown in the results in table 23. Overall, the morality frame was coded as not present in 84.6% of the sample, which was more than The Guardian who employed the frame in 70.7% of cases. Moreover, there was no perceptible difference between the use of the frame across the media logics. The coding results in table 23 show that the frame was recognised in 35 separate articles online, whereas in the print format the frame was present in 37 articles.

Table 23. The Daily Express Facebook news articles (n = 117) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Morality Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 117)</i>
15. Does the story contain any moral message?	15 (12.8%)
16. Does the story make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets?	3 (2.6%)
17. Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave?	17 (14.5%)

The economic consequences frame was less present in online articles than it was within the print edition of the newspaper. Table 19 shows that the frame was undetected in 89 of the articles sampled (76.1%), whereas in print coverage the frame was only not present in 57.1% of cases. Whilst the frame was far less evident in online coverage, if an article did talk about economic consequences, it followed the same pattern previously identified in the print com-

munication. Table 24 shows that of the three frames used to measure the frame, in all but one of the articles online the framing measures were coded positively.

Table 24. The Daily Express Facebook news articles (n = 117) and the occurrence of framing measures (number of times used and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

<i>Economic Consequences Frame</i>	<i>Usage (n = 117)</i>
18. Is there a mention of (financial) losses or gains now or in the future?	27 (23.1%)
19. Is there a mention of the costs / degree of expense involved?	28 (23.9%)
20. Is there a reference to (economic) consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?	28 (23.9%)

6.3 Discussion - Hybrid Media Frames?

This thesis has conducted a deductive content analysis on print and online news articles from The Guardian and The Daily Express, regarding each media outlets coverage of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum of 2016. Through the identification and quantification of the most salient frames used across both media logics, it has attempted to test the theory of the hybrid media system outlined in chapter three. To underline the notion again, after a period of necessary evolvement and to continue to compete for audience share, older media logics such as traditional print newspapers co-opted and now utilise popular digital platforms like the social networking site Facebook to distribute their political coverage. As a result of these older and newer media logics intersecting, interacting and competing for power within this contemporary media landscape, the hybrid media system proposes that political communication which is disseminated to the public today displays systemic hybridity. This means that during the information cycle of an important political event, such as the build up to the vote on the British EU membership referendum, media outlets as actors within this hybrid system are able to advance their interests and agendas on a particular subject, through the process of cross platform recursion and iteration. As such, this would suggest that the way the media outlets framed the EU referendum within their traditional print coverage should also transfer across into their online coverage, demonstrating hybridity. As previously mentioned, this study sought to answer two further questions -

RQ2a: Do the salient print frames display hybridity and transfer across media logics into the online news coverage of the referendum, as posted in the media organisations official Facebook sites?

RQ2b: If so, are there significant similarities or differences between the salient frames identified in the print and online coverage of the media organisations?

To begin with, all five of the popular news media frames proposed by Semetko and Valkenburg transferred across media logics, and were clearly identifiable within both the media outlets print and online news articles sampled. Tables 25 and 26 below show that, when both media outlets print and online coverage are combined together, no single frame identified in the print coverage failed to subsequently then appear in the online articles. Whilst particular frames were more prominent and others less so across the two media logics, this result nevertheless demonstrates the reliability and replicability of the typology produced by the scholars when looking to identify frames commonly used in the production of political media communication. As previously expected, these results demonstrate hybridity in terms of the cross platform reiteration of news frames, whereby the usage of the frames in the media outlets coverage of the referendum transferred across media logics.

Table 25. Combined print news articles across both media outlets (n = 222) and the appearance of each type of media frame (number of occurrences in each article and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

Appearance	Attribution of Responsibility	Human Interest	Conflict	Morality	Economic
Not Used	55 (24.8%)	46 (20.8%)	47 (21.2%)	166 (74.8%)	120 (54.1%)
One item	9 (4%)	25 (11.2%)	19 (8.6%)	9 (4%)	2 (0.9%)
Two items	31 (14%)	34 (15.3%)	25 (11.2%)	46 (20.7%)	3 (1.3%)
Three items	31 (14%)	35 (15.8%)	86 (38.8%)	1 (0.5%)	97 (43.7%)
Four items	49 (22.1%)	47 (21.1%)	45 (20.2%)	-	-
Five items	47 (21.1%)	35 (15.8%)	-	-	-
Total	222 (100%)	222 (100%)	222 (100%)	222 (100%)	222 (100%)

Table 26. Combined Facebook news articles across both media outlets (n = 209) and the appearance of each type of media frame (number of occurrences in each article and then the representative value percentage in parentheses)

Appearance	Attribution of Responsibility	Human Interest	Conflict	Morality	Economic
Not Used	28 (13.4%)	18 (8.6%)	57 (27.3%)	164 (78.5%)	146 (69.9%)
One item	18 (8.6%)	32 (15.3%)	14 (6.7%)	9 (4.3%)	4 (1.9%)
Two items	24 (11.5%)	18 (8.6%)	33 (15.8%)	33 (15.8%)	19 (9.1%)
Three items	51 (24.4%)	23 (11%)	64 (30.6%)	3 (1.4%)	40 (19.1%)
Four items	56 (26.8%)	42 (20.1%)	41 (19.6%)	-	-
Five items	32 (15.3%)	76 (36.4%)	-	-	-
Total	209 (100%)	209 (100%)	209 (100%)	209 (100%)	209 (100%)

However, during the discussion in section 5.3 surrounding the print media frames it was demonstrated that the frames of economic consequences, conflict and attribution of responsibility were in that order, the most commonly used in both newspapers print coverage. Thereafter, the human interest frame was identified less often, whilst the morality frame was largely irrelevant in the majority of news articles. The results of the analysis on The Guardian online sample however show that in fact the human interest frame became the most salient, followed overall by attribution of responsibility. Thereafter, the conflict frame was followed by the economic consequences frame as the most predominant, with the morality frame again least used. Moreover, the results of The Daily Express analysis saw the same pattern broadly emerge, only in this particular case the order of frame salience ran; attribution of responsibility, human interest, conflict, economic consequences and morality.

As table 27 demonstrates, the economic consequences frame which was identified as the most commonly used frame across both outlets print coverage, subsequently became the least identifiable frame if the largely irrelevant frame of morality is discounted. Moreover, the human interest and attribution of responsibility frames, least utilised in the media outlets print coverage, to a significant extent became the most salient frames used by the media outlets online.

For example, in The Guardian print articles all three of the framing measures used to measure the economic consequences frame appeared in 46% of the articles, while this figure dropped to just 14.1% online. Similarly, The Daily Express usage of the frame dropped from 40.9% in print to 23.1% in online articles. Moreover, tables 25 and 26 above show that non usage of the human interest frame across both media outlets print coverage was 20.8%, compared to just 8.6% online, while the non usage of the attribution of responsibility frame decreased from 24.8% of print articles, to not appearing in online articles in only 13.4% of cases.

Table 27. Overall frame salience across both media outlets print and online news articles

Order of Frame Salience	Guardian Print	Daily Express Print	Guardian Online	Daily Express Online
1	Economic	Economic	Human Interest	Responsibility
2	Conflict	Conflict	Responsibility	Human Interest
3	Responsibility	Responsibility	Conflict	Conflict
4	Human Interest	Human Interest	Economic	Economic
5	Morality	Morality	Morality	Morality

Therefore, in respect to how both of the media outlets framed news articles related to the EU referendum, across their print and online coverage, the results of this study show that there were significant differences and a fragmentation between the two media logics. This finding therefore runs contrary to the expectation suggested earlier, which was that the news frames used in print articles would be significantly hybrid and therefore homogeneous across media logics. A content analysis of news frames in newspapers, on social networking sites, network and cable television, and radio in the US found results similar to this study. That study also found that overall, although there was a strong correlation in the frames that were used across all the media platforms, the topics and frames in social media news articles were “sharply distinct”⁹⁵ from those that were used in the other forms of media.

The similarities between how both of the media outlets framed their coverage of the EU referendum differently across print and online communication is an interesting result. It has been suggested that the hybrid media system requires actors to constantly judge which medi-

⁹⁵ Scott Maier (2010) ‘All the news fit to post? Comparing news content on the web to newspapers, television, and radio’ *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, vol.87, iss.3/4 (2010) pp.558.

um, or combination of media, is most appropriate to enable them to shape a political process or event.⁹⁶ Both the human interest and attribution of responsibility frames place a higher degree of emphasis on appealing to an individual's emotion, than the conflict or economic frames do. Moreover, the conversation on media framing earlier showed how media actors use frames of meaning as a way to communicate often complex political information to the public.

It could be that the media outlets attempted to personalise news stories more online, in an effort to attract and then engage with individuals when explaining the complexities of the referendum. Alternatively, a notable study has argued that personalised political news coverage which comes in the form of human interest frames, both attracts a wider audience to them which then leads to an increase in advertising revenues.⁹⁷ Cynically therefore, it could be that the media outlets consciously personalised the news frames they shared on their social media platforms about the EU referendum, in a bid to attract more traffic to them and boost revenue.

The concluding section now outlines what this thesis has attempted to achieve, offers some remarks as to the limitations of the study, and furthermore, suggests future avenues of research in the subject area.

⁹⁶ Andrew Chadwick, James Dennis & Amy P. Smith (2016) 'Politics in the Age of Hybrid Media. Power, Systems and Media Logics' in *The Routledge Companion to Social Media and Politics*, eds. Axel Bruns, Gunn Enli, Eli Skogerbo, Anders Olof Larsson & Christian Christensen (New York, Taylor & Francis, 2016) pp.5

⁹⁷ Mark Boukes, Hajo G. Boomgaarden, Marjolein Moorman, and Claes H. de Vreese (2015) 'Political News with a Personal Touch: How Human Interest Framing Indirectly Affects Policy Attitudes' *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, vol.92, iss.1 (2015) pp.122-124.

7. Conclusion

This thesis has endeavoured to test two objectives, within the context of the United Kingdom's European Union membership referendum of 2016 campaign period. First, it applied a deductive content analysis to print news articles collected from two British newspapers, The Guardian and The Daily Express. This was done to identify how they each framed the referendum, for what is a relatively uninformed British public on what the European Union actually does. Secondly, by using the same methodological framework, it then tested whether those salient print frames transferred across media logics and into online news articles posted by the same media outlets on Facebook. Moreover, the theoretical framework of this study, the hybrid media system, suggests that in the UK's contemporary media landscape actors compete for influence during a political events information cycle across multiple settings, in an effort to advance their own interests and values. With both media outlets as actors taking highly specific positions on the referendum, it was expected that the salient frames would display hybridity and that the media outlets would frame their print and online communication similarly.

After utilising a typology of five common news frames found in political media communication, the results found that both newspapers predominantly framed their print articles on the referendum within the contexts of economic consequences and conflict. Moreover, the findings also demonstrated how the frames were hybrid, whereby they were reiterated across media settings by both of the media outlets. However, contrary to the expectation that the media outlets would frame their referendum coverage homogeneously across both media logics, that was not the case. The findings showed that in both media outlets online coverage the salient print frames of economic consequences and conflict were less predominant. Instead, both newspapers framed their online news articles on Facebook predominantly in terms of human interest and attribution of responsibility frames.

As the literature review demonstrated, the reasons for a European citizen to elicit Eurosceptic sentiment are manifold, many of which are justifiable. In the case of the UK, the review also demonstrated how a dominant political party can shape the discourse on Europe, often aided in their agenda by a highly competitive media with its own interests and values. This thesis

does not pretend to make any assumptions as to why the British public chose to vote in the way that it did. Instead it sought to examine how, through interrelated media logics within the hybrid media system, the media can be seen to frame political communication which it provides the public. The limitations of this study can be found in the recommendations for further avenues for research. For instance, rather than limiting the study to a comparison of two media outlets coverage, further research could expand the analysis to cover all major British newspapers which would provide a clearer indication as to how the media framed the referendum for the public. Moreover, analysis across other media platforms, which incorporated TV broadcast news and radio would provide further illumination in respect to the hybrid media system.

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8.1 The Guardian and Observer Print Articles

“CBI projects 1m fewer jobs post-Brexit with young worst hit; Employers group says apprenticeships and graduate jobs will suffer badly and that its Commonwealth partners have said they will reduce investment” Anushka Asthana (2016)

“George Soros warns Britain leaving could be end of EU; Financier says Brexit could unleash an exodus but believes remain camp will see support rise leading up to polling day” Phillip Inman (2016)

“It's a cruel deceit to blame all our problems on immigration; Brexiters cynically attribute social ills to incomers. Those who believe them may soon face a harsh truth” Owen Jones (2016)

“Narrow, nasty, unprincipled: whatever has happened to Michael Gove?; The justice secretary is fronting a campaign at odds with his previous backing for open-door immigration. One wonders what his real motivations are” Martin Kettle (2016)

“No 10 dismisses voter registration challenge by Leave.EU founder; Replying to criticism by Arron Banks of referendum deadline extension, David Cameron says change is legally watertight” Rajeev Syal and Matthew Weaver (2016)

“PM urged to reopen free movement discussion if UK stays in EU; Pro-European ministers are determined European commission does not see remain victory as endorsement of status quo” Patrick Wintour (2016)

“Tony Blair and John Major: Brexit would close Irish border; Former prime ministers stress impact of leave vote on Irish and Scottish relations with UK after referendum” Heather Stewart (2016)

“You're wrong Michael Gove - experts are trusted far more than you; When it come to the EU referendum, academics offer research-based evidence so people can make a well-informed choice. We don't tell them how to vote” Anand Menon and Jonathan Portes (2016)

“Brexit will be Cameron's demise and usher in Tory hard right, says Tom Watson; Labour deputy leader says Boris Johnson, Michael Gove and Priti Patel pose greater risk to workers' rights and public services” Rowena Mason, Heather Stewart and Severin Carrell (2016)

“EU referendum: did Boris Johnson or Nicola Sturgeon sway undecided voters?; When it comes to the EU referendum, 15% of voters are still undecided. We asked five of them whether the latest TV debate had helped make up their mind” Sarah Marsh (2016)

“No single market access for UK after Brexit, Wolfgang Schäuble says; In Der Spiegel interview German finance minister rules out Britain's chances of enjoying bloc benefits from outside EU” Philip Oltermann (2016)

“Which would you rather, President Trump or Brexit? It's no contest; If Britain votes leave on 23 June it will be a hammer blow to the last 70 years of peace in Europe” Jonathan Freedland (2016)

“Black tie and Brexit: Osborne takes the Remain case to Mansion House; The chancellor and Bank governor Mark Carney have a chance to put the pro-EU position to the City this week - but have few new cards to play” Phillip Inman (2016)

“Bunting is out but in Barking people are leaning towards Brexit; In safe Labour seat, working-class voters say they feel abandoned, know little about Jeremy Corbyn and want to get out” James Tapper (2016)

“David Cameron says state pensions could be at risk if Brexit becomes reality; Exclusive: Prime minister claims protected NHS cash may have to go as he cautions voters on possible consequences of voting to leave” Toby Helm and Andrew Rawnsley (2016)

“Third of EU referendum voters won't make up their minds until week before poll; London School of Economics research suggests knife-edge referendum vote may be decided at the last minute” Toby Helm (2016)

“Brexit voters don't listen to elites. But they might listen to Labour; Economic discontent over globalisation leaves many voters wavering. Corbyn and McDonnell could make a decisive intervention for Remain if they chose” William Keegan (2016)

“Labour needs to seize the day and make a powerful case for Remain; Opposition voices against Brexit have been drowned out by the Tory-on-Tory slugfest. It's time to speak up” Andrew Rawnsley (2016)

“The Observer view on immigration and the EU referendum; The Remain campaign needs to develop a more proactive message on immigration” Observer Editorial (2016)

“Brexit supporters have unleashed furies even they can't control; A leave vote will not solve people's problems, and those feeling betrayed will lurch even further into racism and xenophobia” Polly Toynbee (2016)

“Brexit would not mean big drop in immigration, Hilary Benn says; Shadow foreign secretary also urges leave campaign to be more honest about necessity of immigration” Rowena Mason and Heather Stewart (2016)

“Britain's ethnic minorities are better off staying in the EU; Claims that Brexit would benefit non-European migrants are absolutely false - as we black and minority ethnic Labour MPs know only too well” Seema Malhotra, Chuka Umunna and Keith Vaz (2016)

“Cameron should let new voices make case for remain, says Labour; Emily Thornberry calls for PM to take step back as Angela Eagle says Cameron's input does 'not help with Labour vote”” Jessica Elgot and Anushka Asthana (2016)

“EU cash flows to Cornwall, but many want to leave; As seen in Falmouth, Euroscepticism runs deep despite region apparently benefiting from EU more than any other. Why?” Steven Morris (2016)

“Fear and loathing in Brexit's heartland - and that's just in the out camp; The EU referendum has divided east Kent, with voters split by generation and class and leave campaigners at war with one another” Ben Quinn (2016)

“Greece has its problems with the EU, but we would never leave; Despite frustration with Brussels-imposed austerity, Greeks see the EU as a essential to strengthening their democracy and ensuring peace on the continent” George Kyris (2016)

“The leave campaign doesn't want to talk about the environment. Here's why; Climate has barely been mentioned during the EU campaign. But there will be grim tangible consequences for our air, sea and wildlife if we vote to exit” Craig Bennett (2016)

“We're just 10 days from making the most terrible mistake on Europe; The leave campaigns arguments on immigration may successfully exploit voters' fears, but they are not only objectionable - they're absurd” Matthew d'Ancona (2016)

“What has the EU ever done for my ... education?; British universities benefit from the EU in the form of foreign students, research grants and access to capital finance” Richard Adams (2016)

“Brexit would help UK manufacturing survive in a global market; The challenge posed by low-cost producers such as China will continue, whatever the EU referendum outcome” Gerard Lyons (2016)

“Focusing on immigration from the EU is hopelessly simplistic; The leave camp's one-sided campaign is distressing - we can't turn the clock back to a time that never existed. A crash course in GCSE geography is required” Heidi Alexander (2016)

“FTSE 100 hits three-month low as Brexit fears grow; Shares suffer fourth day of heavy losses, while sterling and oil prices also fall” Phillip Inman and Graeme Wearden (2016)

“Housebuilder says leaving EU would harm British construction; Stephen Stone, chief executive of Crest Nicholson, says Brexit would disrupt imports of building materials” Julia Kollwe (2016)

“Ignoring immigration doesn't work. Here are five reforms remain can sign up to; This angry debate is damaging, whichever way the EU vote goes. We must build on the common ground, and restore public confidence in the system” Yvette Cooper (2016)

“Immigration could overwhelm Britain, says pro-Brexit minister; Andrea Leadsom claims immigration enriched British society only until 2002, when east European countries joined EU” Anushka Asthana and Rowena Mason (2016)

“Osborne predicts £30bn hole in public finance if UK votes to leave EU; Chancellor delivers stark warning of £15bn tax rises, increase in fuel and alcohol duties and £15bn cuts to health, education and defence” Anushka Asthana, Rowena Mason and Phillip Inman (2016)

“Remain needs to change tack on immigration - or risk Brexit; The hour is very late, but Labour remain campaigners need to address the number one concern of people who will vote to leave Europe next week” Jonathan Freedland (2016)

“University chief rejects claim that Brexit would not deter EU students; Leave campaign claims universities would not lose out but head of UCL says UK may become unaffordable to many Europeans” Sally Weale and Matthew Holmes (2016)

“Vote Leave attacks European commission spending on jets and hotels; Brexit campaigner Priti Patel says commission officials 'getting away with living the high life at our expense'” Rowena Mason (2016)

“Why the markets' Brexit-induced bumpiness is good for remain; This turbulence reinforces the in camp's message about the economic risks of leaving the EU” Larry Elliott (2016)

“Bank shares would fall sharply after Brexit, City analysts warn; Barclays will be hardest hit if Britain votes to leave EU and all dividend payouts will be axed, say bank experts at Bernstein” Jill Treanor (2016)

“Berkeley reports 20% fall in reservations for new homes; Housebuilder has also not launched any new schemes blaming EU referendum and changes in government policy” Julia Kollewe (2016)

“Brexit: how a fringe idea took hold of the Tory party; Two decades ago the idea of Britain leaving the EU was almost unthinkable. How did a generation of Tory Eurosceptics bring it back?” Matthew d'Ancona (2016)

“Brexit is a 'huge negative' for Japanese companies in the UK; With Japanese companies employing 140,000 people in the UK, business chiefs from Hitachi, Fujitsu and Nissan are united in warning against leave” Justin McCurry (2016)

“Brexit is the only way the working class can change anything; Working-class people are sick of being called ignorant or racist because of their valid concerns. The EU referendum has given them a chance to have their say” Lisa Mckenzie (2016)

“EU referendum: what's on the minds of voters?; Focus group research shows voters see immigration as the centre of the argument and people are confused and frustrated” Heather Stewart and Anushka Asthana (2016)

“Facebook denies pro-Brexit bias; If you were 'in favour of leaving the EU', Facebook wanted you to tell people. Remaining, not so much” Alex Hern (2016)

“Immigration is key issue with EU referendum voters, according to Google; Google Trends data shows number of economy-related searches come only third behind immigration and NHS” Pamela Duncan (2016)

“Osborne: keeping Britain in EU is more important than my career; Chancellor says 'it's not about one politician' after 58 Tory MPs indicate his position would be untenable if leave wins” Rowena Mason, Jessica Elgot and Rajeev Syal (2016)

“Rolls-Royce backs remain in EU vote; Aircraft engine maker says company's customers, suppliers and workers benefit from Britain being in European Union” Angela Monaghan (2016)

“The European Union is the worst choice - apart from the alternative; The EU is a festering cesspool. But it's a crystal spring compared with what the outers want to do - surrender Britain's sovereignty to the United States” George Monbiot (2016)

“Unlike life and the universe, Europe has no simple answer; There'll be a yes/no option on the ballot paper, but the only honest assessment of where Britain stands now is one nobody wants to hear: 'It's complicated...’” Rafael Behr (2016)

“Bank of England: economy will be hit hard if Britain leaves EU; Central bank's monetary policy committee says pound likely to tumble and markets would react erratically to Brexit, as interest rates remain at 0.5%” Katie Allen (2016)

“Boris Johnson dismisses Bank of England's Brexit warning; Former London mayor suggests Mark Carney was talking economy down by warning that pound could fall” Rowena Mason (2016)

“EU referendum: newspapers revel in blue-on-blue battle; As 65 Conservative MPs threaten to vote down a Brexit budget, it is George Osborne's turn to take the national press heat” Roy Greenslade (2016)

“EU referendum: what's on the minds of voters?; Focus group research shows voters see immigration as the centre of the argument and people are confused and frustrated” Heather Stewart and Anushka Asthana (2016)

“Farage's poster is the visual equivalent of Enoch Powell's 'rivers of blood' speech; This picture, filled with non-white faces, makes explicit the racism in Ukip's vision of leaving the European Union” Jonathan Jones (2016)

“FTSE slips again on Brexit fears but gold climbs and housebuilder Berkeley rises; Investors remain concerned over Brexit and state of global economy” Nick Fletcher (2016)

“I fear German dominance. That's why I'm for remaining in the EU; In the end, this referendum is about politics not economics. And a Britain that votes to stay in the club will wield serious clout” Simon Jenkins (2016)

“I’ve seen what can go wrong, says war veteran author of pro-EU letter; Franklin Medhurst, 96, hopes his letter to the Guardian, widely shared online, can make a difference in referendum” Haroon Siddique (2016)

“Norwegian model: realities for country Brexiters want to follow; Some in Norway are unsure why the UK would opt to join it in Europe’s in and out club, though others think it might help Oslo stand up to the EU” Patrick Wintour (2016)

“The Rock of remain: why Gibraltar is rejecting Brexit; Territory’s voters, who have right to take part in EU referendum, are terrified of leaving the single market - and of new disputes with Spain. What’s the mood like in Gibraltar?” Jon Henley (2016)

“What has the EU ever done for my ... security?; The European arrest warrant has cut extradition times while the sharing of data has helped prevent money laundering and stopped criminals at the border” Alan Travis (2016)

“Britain is in the midst of a working-class revolt; Across the nation this past week I’ve heard the same refrain: ‘No one listens to us, no one cares.’ Now those ignored for so long are demanding a voice” John Harris (2016)

“If you inject enough poison into the political bloodstream, somebody will get sick; Contempt for politicians has been on the rise for years. But this EU referendum campaign has torn away at the veil that divides civility from mayhem” Jonathan Freedland (2016)

“If you think the UK will be in control after Brexit, dream on; It’s a fantasy that the EU will trade with us on our terms. Only by remaining will we have any clout” Andrew Graham (2016)

“IMF chief urges Britain to stay in Europe; Praising British openness to other nationalities, Christine Lagarde warns of a worrying rise in economic nationalism” Katie Allen (2016)

“Merkel urges EU in/out campaigns to moderate language after Jo Cox death; German chancellor calls on all involved in UK referendum debate to respect beliefs and opinions of others in wake of killing” Jon Henley, Philip Oltermann and Angélique Chrisafis (2016)

“The EU referendum is a battle of the press versus democracy; The question of who runs Britain is not just about Europe but about a right wing media that craves power” Martin Kettle (2016)

“UK stock market rebounds from four-month low; With EU referendum campaigning suspended and Brexit fears somewhat abated, investors end week in calmer mood” Katie Allen and Nick Fletcher (2016)

“EU referendum: reject division, isolation and blame. Choose co-operation; There is a fundamental principle to defend - a democracy where debate is not used to divide our communities” Guardian Editorial (2016)

“EU referendum splits Britain down the middle as battle resumes; Polls predict a dead heat with voting less than a week away but teams pledge sober campaign after death of Jo Cox” Toby Helm and Daniel Boffey (2016)

“EU referendum voters unconvinced by scare tactics: 'I just want to do what's right'; With the latest Observer/Opinium poll showing a dead heat between leave and remain, residents of Tyneside are still split as the big decision looms” Toby Helm Political and Daniel Boffey (2016)

“Rupert Murdoch's newspapers in two minds over EU referendum; Sun backs Brexit but Times editor opts to support remain despite Murdoch's views and divisions among his staff” Daniel Boffey (2016)

“Senior politicians back EU membership: 'We must reject division and isolation'; Tony Blair, Michael Heseltine and Nick Clegg among those signing joint letter calling for vote against Brexit in referendum” Daniel Boffey and Toby Helm (2016)

“What would British business be like after Brexit?; With the referendum approaching, we round up experts' opinions on what effect they think a Leave vote would have on the economic landscape” Phillip Inman (2016)

“Boris Johnson tries to calm immigration row with call for amnesty; Former London mayor attempts to change leave campaign's rhetoric amid row over Nigel Farage's poster” Rajeev Syal, Peter Walker and Rowena Mason (2016)

“David Cameron says he must do more to make case for staying in EU; Prime minister says referendum may be confusing voters and that he has four days left to successfully pitch remain arguments” Rowena Mason, Anushka Asthana and Peter Walker (2016)

“EU referendum: how pro-Europe Labour red-tops argue their case; Few surprises in positions adopted by most of the Sunday national press, but the Sunday Mirror and Sunday People editorials are fascinating” Roy Greenslade (2016)

“Nigel Farage's anti-immigration poster splits leading Brexit campaigners; Leading anti-EU campaigner Gove says he shuddered when he saw poster showing queue of refugees” Rajeev Syal (2016)

“Referendum jitters hit value of UK stock market flotations; British market slowdown is in contrast to global IPOs, which have hit \$22.7bn so far in the current quarter” Sean Farrell (2016)

“The Guardian view on the economics of Brexit: running wild risks is not British; Economists are agreed, as they never were on the euro, that quitting the EU will make Britain poorer. How strange, in an economically conservative country, that many are refusing to listen” Guardian Editorial (2016)

“The progressive argument for leaving the EU is not being heard; Europe, with its austerity programmes and its drift towards neoliberalism, has been moving in a direction that rightwing Conservatives would tend to support” Larry Elliott (2016)

“Attempts to elevate the Brexit debate following MP's death begin to fray; The tone of an 'ugly' debate temporarily softened after Labour MP Jo Cox was killed, but David Cameron soon faced hostile questions on immigration” Michael White (2016)

“Brexit is a fake revolt - working-class culture is being hijacked to help the elite; Leaving the EU won't guarantee a rise in wages, a cap on rents, or a fall in NHS waiting times and class sizes. The only thing it guarantees is more right wing Tory control” Paul Mason (2016)

“Britain's young people will suffer most from an EU divorce; The older generation is swinging towards Brexit - but the outcome will affect us the most. We have to make our vote count” Rhiannon Lucy Cosslett (2016)

“EU referendum: issues savers and homeowners need to consider; With economists warning Brexit could cause the pound tumble and interest rates to rise, here are some of things worth considering before you vote” Hilary Osborne, Patrick Collinson, Rupert Jones and Jill Treanor (2016)

“EU referendum: now it's Ukip Lite versus Ukip Heavy; As Leave campaigners fall out, newspapers choose to report David Cameron's TV appearance through the lens of their own European Union stance” Roy Greenslade (2016)

“European neighbours want Britain to remain - but only just; Survey of almost 11,000 Europeans found support for continued British membership at 54%, according to Bertelsmann Foundation” Philip Oltermann (2016)

“Leave or remain? The impact Brexit would have on UK jobs; We asked our experts what the real impact of a leave vote in the EU referendum would be on employment” Emma Sheppard (2016)

“London and the EU: how Brexit could damage Remain City; The British capital is strongly in favour of staying in the European Union and strongly connected with it too” Dave Hill (2016)

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“The EU referendum is a battle of the press versus democracy; The question of who runs Britain is not just about Europe but about a right wing media that craves power” Martin Kettle (2016)

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“A Brexit Britain would be down to the prime minister's fuelling of anti- immigrant sentiment and his impossible promises on targets” Owen Jones (2016)

“EU bureaucrats want your tea and toast. Arm yourself with a Dyson; The Brexit war cry has been bellowed from a flimsy stage set of Britishness. Leaving the EU won't miraculously transport us back to 1950s domesticity” Oliver Wainwright (2016)

“For the first time in 18 years, I don't feel welcome in Britain; I fell in love with this country on a university exchange and built my academic career here. Now I'm not sure I'll be able to stay, or even if I'd want to” Higher Education Network (2016)

“On Friday I'll get my country back. Britain will vote remain; This country is not the leave campaign's ingrown place of phobias, conspiracies and fear of foreigners. Our generosity will defeat their meanness of spirit” Polly Toynbee (2016)

“The Brexit crash will make all of you poorer - be warned; My 60 years of experience tells me the pound will plummet, along with your living standards. The only winners will be speculators” George Soros (2016)

“The English working class will be the first victims of a Brexit vote; Leave's libertarians will destroy the welfare state. The desire to give the ruling class two fingers is understandable, but we must resist this false patriotism” Billy Bragg (2016)

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“Why 'remain and reform' works for disabled people; I am not keen on a pan-European profit machine for the few - but the rights and services of disabled people have benefited hugely from EU membership” Penny Pepper (2016)

“Why Brexit makes a visceral appeal to the older generation's psyche; The grey vote is critical, and the prospect of independence takes us back to the good old days when we did things 'our way', unaided by Johnny Foreigner” Stewart Dakers (2016)

“Why should we vote to leave the EU? It's migration, stupid!; With two days to go before polls open, the two best-selling Brexit- supporting newspapers hammer home messages based on immigration” Roy Greenslade (2016)

“1,200 business leaders back remain in EU referendum vote; The group, which included leaders of 50 of the FTSE 100, outlined their support for Britain in the EU in a letter to The Times” Ben Quinn (2016)

“A vote to leave is a vote to needlessly destroy our legal system; 'Take back control'? This Brexit slogan has precious little truth to it, given the reality of how EU legislation affects British law” Elizabeth Prochaska (2016)

“British financial sector sure of EU remain vote despite late FTSE dip; Stock market sell-offs follow Brexit fillip, but strategist warns sterling may fall whatever result - owing to 'economic mess” Larry Elliott and Jill Treanor (2016)

“David Cameron makes final plea for Britain to vote to remain in the EU; Prime minister in emotional attempt to persuade voters to reject Brexiters' 'untruths' on eve of referendum” Heather Stewart, Rajeev Syal and Rowena Mason (2016)

“Don't vote remain for us Europeans - do it for yourselves; A Brexit vote in this referendum would make Britain smaller and more isolated, and would defy the very logic of those arguing to leave the union” Matteo Renzi (2016)

“Investors sure of Britain staying in EU despite FTSE dip; Stock market sell-offs follow Brexit fillip, but strategist warns sterling may fall whatever result - due to 'economic mess” Larry Elliott and Jill Treanor (2016)

“Italy's Matteo Renzi calls on Britons not to make 'wrong choice' over EU; Exclusive: Italian prime minister says a vote to leave in referendum on Thursday means giving up 'autonomy for isolation” Patrick Wintour (2016)

“Nigel Farage: I claim 100% credit for forcing government to poll; Ukip leader 'proud' Gove and Johnson used his party's slogans to back Brexit, as he deflects critics in last referendum push” Rowena Mason (2016)

“Of course Ukip plays the race card. But I'm still voting for Brexit; Baroness Warsi was so shocked by Nigel Farage's immigration poster that she switched sides. But there are plenty of decent people who want to leave Europe - and I'm with them” Dreda Say Mitchell (2016)

“Stay or go, this vote gives us the chance to reset immigration policy; The referendum has show us that a new framework is required, whether we're part of the EU or not” Jonathan Portes (2016)

“The strange death of scepticism in the leave campaign; As a European commissioner I've been struck by the myths promoted by Brexiters. If cooler heads prevail and we remain, Britain would realise it was among friends” Jonathan Hill (2016)

“The Sun dares to use the Queen again in Brexit front page; Paper quotes monarch despite being criticised by watchdog over misleading 'Queen backs Brexit' headline” Roy Greenslade (2016)

“Denial then panic: how the EU misjudged the British mood; Brexit would have far-reaching consequences for the whole European Union, yet for a long time leaders saw the UK referendum as a tedious sideshow” Natalie Nougayrède (2016)

“How can we heal a nation divided by the referendum?; The debate over the UK's future has revealed a country of strong feelings and distinct outlooks, with generations, classes and regions growing apart from each other” Deborah Mattinson (2016)

“Is the EU referendum legally binding?; Parliament is sovereign and, if Brexit wins, Cameron will not be legally obliged to invoke the Lisbon treaty to start an EU exit” Haroon Siddique (2016)

“Newspaper front pages reflect that this is a truly historic day; Editors, whether neutral, favouring leave or remain, speak with one voice in urging their readers to vote in the EU referendum” Roy Greenslade (2016)

“Nigel Farage declares 'remain will edge it' as polls close in historic vote; Latest survey suggests verdict edging towards remain after bitter contest, with record 46.5m voters” Anushka Asthana (2016)

“Preparing for Brexit? Voters stash the cash and hoard the holidays; Britons wary of a leave EU vote tell the Guardian they are stockpiling euros, deferring house buys and sorting savings” Sarah Marsh (2016)

“The digested referendum campaign: Immigration! Economy! Immigration!; Brave little Boris has had plenty to say - much of it delusional - in the contest David Cameron never wanted” John Crace (2016)

8.2 The Daily Express and The Sunday Express Print Articles

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“Tory voter humiliates PM over immigration” David Pilditch (2016)

“EU will collapse if UK leaves, says Farage” David Maddox (2016)

“The EU debate is not complex - it’s really very simple” Leo McKinstry (2016)

“”Migrant seized every 6 minutes” Giles Sheldrick (2016)

““Gutless’ Tory defects from Brexit camp” Daily Express (2016)

“Prospect of leaving gives huge boost to exports” Mark Reynolds (2016)

“JCB boss proves that Brexit would not hurt business” Stephen Pollard (2016)

“Trust Northerners to vote for Britain” Frederick Forsyth (2016)

“Migrant crisis will cost £20bn - Experts reveal shock price the EU has to pay” Alison Little (2016)

“Anger as Remain campaigners handed honours” Alison Little (2016)

“Brexit secret weapon Eddie in odd TV rant” Alison Little (2016)

“Eurozone heads towards its next monetary crisis” Ross Clark (2016)

“Pro-EU MP’s now plan for Brexit” Macer Hall (2016)

“Panic grips Downing St - Brexit surge forces desperate rethink, ‘Toxic Cameron told to take a back seat, Labour drafted in to win over the North, Secret contingency plans for leaving EU” Caroline Wheeler (2016)

“The British people have not fallen for the fantasy” Penny Mordaunt (2016)

“Cameron - Leaving would be a leap in the dark for our children’s future. IDS - We are being held over a barrel by Turkey which wants EU entry” Caroline Wheeler (2016)

“Leaders fear real EU debate” Nick Ferrari (2016)

“Cameron’s tactics are backfiring on Remain” Sunday Express Opinion (2016)

“Fury at PM’s EU pension threat - Now ‘vindictive’ Cameron tries Brexit blackmail” Macer Hall (2016)

“‘Secret talks’ bid to let 1.5m Turks come to Britain visa-free” Macer Hall (2016)

“With just one leap we could finally be free of the EU” Leo McKinstry (2016)

“The birth of a superstate” Frederick Forsyth (2016)

“Proof we can’t stop migrants - Five million new EU citizens have been given right to enter Britain” Macer Hall (2016)

“‘Hidden’ cost of luxury jollies” Alison Little (2016)

“EU is like ‘a badly run hotel’” John Chapman (2016)

“We no longer decide who has the right to live here” Daily Express Opinion (2016)

“Women don’t need Brussels” Suzanne Evans (2016)

“Pound low in EU bets” David Shand (2016)

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“Pupils lose chosen schools to migrants” Sarah O’Grady (2016)

“Blow to Cameron over EU exit plan” Macer Hall (2016)

“Scare tactics from Project Fear are ever more absurd” Stephen Pollard (2016)

“Leavers want to go forward not back to the past” Ann Widdecombe (2016)

“The Left-Wing Case For Brexit - EU does nothing for working people, says the general secretary of Labour Leave” Brendan Chilton (2016)

“Outrage at plot to raise our taxes - Osborne ‘is finished’ over his plan for EU punishment budget” Macer Hall (2016)

“PM told to reveal all on Turkey EU bid” Macer Hall (2016)

“Farage pushes the boat out for Britain” Giles Sheldrick (2016)

“Record numbers in work as UK job market stays strong” David Maddox (2016)

“Osborne has lost all credibility with his budget threat” Leo McKinstry (2016)

“Support Britain’s fishing industry by voting leave” Daily Express Opinion (2016)

“Hear from the people who make Britain great - Why we’re voting to LEAVE” Daily Express Opinion (2016)

“Dramatic swing as Brexit surges into a six-point poll lead” Alison Little (2016)

“Cynical Osborne is destroying his political future” Chris Roycroft-Davis (2016)

“I will not be voting for Cameron again” Frederick Forsyth (2016)

“Migrant Chaos Cannot Continue - The fearless Daily Express columnist examines the dangers of open borders” Leo McKinstry (2016)

“IMF: Brexit will boost Britain” David Maddox (2016)

“Putin: Referendum is blackmailing Europe” Sophie Goddard (2016)

“Britain Will Thrive Outside The EU” Peter Hargreaves (2016)

“Signs that the Cameron era is nearing its end” Macer Hall (2016)

“Why Theresa May has been kept in the shadows” Macer Hall (2016)

“PM’s battleplan to keep keys of No.10” Caroline Wheeler (2016)

“Four days to save Europe from itself” Caroline Wheeler (2016)

“Let’s have a ‘vote of confidence’ in our fantastic country, says Gove” Caroline Wheeler (2016)

“Farage: Believe in Britain” Caroline Wheeler (2016)

“Brussels fatcats not laughing any more” Marco Giannangeli (2016)

“There’s so much at stake for us here” David Cameron (2016)

“Today’s Britain is strong, dynamic and influential. Let’s keep it that way VOTE LEAVE” Sunday Express Comment (2016)

“EU decision is so tough” Nick Ferrari (2016)

“A word from the Editor” Martin Townsend (2016)

“City set for reaction to vote to leave - Markets expect referendum night roller-coaster ride” Geoff Ho (2016)

“EU ‘Very Bad’ For Pensions - Yet another good reason to break free from Brussels” David Maddox (2016)

“EU stockpiles £13m of art (bought by you)” Macer Hall (2016)

“Let’s grab this chance to take back control of our country” Macer Hall (2016)

“We cannot waste our last chance to leave the EU” Sir Ian Botham (2016)

“Only one way to stop the meddling Brussels elite” Daily Express Comment (2016)

“By the way” Peter Hill (2016)

“On Thursday vote for independence - We cannot afford to risk staying in a political organisation that is ready to admit Turkey and planning deeper integration” Nigel Farage (2016)

“FTSE surges ahead of poll” David Shand (2016)

“New EU tax raid on Britain - Soaring cost of staying in is revealed as PM heckled on TV” Alison Little (2016)

“We’ll thrive out of EU say bosses” Alison Little (2016)

“Time for our country to believe in itself says Boris” Alison Little (2016)

“A historic week in our island story starts now” Daily Express Comment (2016)

“Referendum must not be decided on one terrible crime” Leo McKinstry (2016)

“Separating fact from fiction - The man behind our five and a half year crusade to leave the EU reveals what Remain campaigners have got wrong” Patrick O’Flynn (2016)

“Banks face long night on EU D-Day” Daily Express (2016)

“Queen issues EU challenge - Give me 3 good reasons to stay, she asks guests” Richard Palmer (2016)

“4m migrants flock to Britain” Giles Sheldrick (2016)

“Shocking £29bn migrants bill” Macer Hall (2016)

“PM ‘purdah’ row over his panic plea to older voters” Alison Little (2016)

“We did not vote to let in four million more people” Daily Express Comment (2016)

“Cameron knew his migration pledged was unachievable” Ross Clark (2016)

“The real EU issue is always sovereignty” Ann Widdecombe (2016)

“Why I’m voting to leave - Vote Leave for a brighter future” Boris Johnson (2016)

“Property’s on the up despite Breit hype” Harvey Jones (2016)

“An EU referendum gold rush” Daily Express (2016)

“Your Country Needs You - Vote Leave Today” Daily Express Comment (2016)

“Shameful EU bullies” David Maddox (2016)

“Cameron accused of misleading voters over Turkey bid to join EU” Macer Hall (2016)

“It’s time to be brave and stand up to these tin-pot figures” Macer Hall and Alison Little (2016)

“We can be a proud, independent, democratic country” Macer Hall (2016)

“Five reasons to walk away” Macer Hall (2016)

“EU rules a bitter pill for sugar chiefs” Macer Hall (2016)

“Outrage over border shambles as migrant who walked through the chunnel is freed” Giles Sheldrick (2016)

“Vote Leave to make Britain even greater” Daily Express Comment (2016)

“Flying finish from Boris in exit rally” Macer Hall (2016)

“Brexit key in the hands of silver surfers” Macer Hall (2016)

“Make tomorrow independence day pleads Boris in TV debate” Macer Hall (2016)

“High power bills? ‘Blame Brussels’” Alison Little (2016)

8.3 The Guardian / Observer / Daily Express / Sunday Express Online Articles

Open Access Link to data harvested online articles -

<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1zk2OQt9--sfLXvTto06Fcct0iBT3GTjGbEwuSp-K434/edit#gid=739051887>

Appendix A

Content analysis coding sheet of twenty framing measures (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000)

Attribution of Responsibility Frame

1. Does the story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate the problem?
2. Does the story suggest that some level of government is responsible for the issue / problem?
3. Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem / issue?
4. Does the story suggest that an individual (or group of people in society) is responsible for the issue / problem?
5. Does the story suggest that the problem requires urgent action?

Human Interest Frame

1. Does the story provide a human example or “human face” on the issue?
2. Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy, caring, sympathy, or compassion?
3. Does the story emphasize how individuals and groups are affected by the issue / problem?
4. Does the story go into the private or personal lives of the actors?
5. Does the story contain visual information that might generate feelings of outrage, empathy, caring, sympathy, or compassion?

Conflict Frame

1. Does the story reflect disagreement between parties / individuals / groups / countries?
2. Does one party / individual / group / country reproach another?
3. Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue?
4. Does the story refer to winners and losers?

Morality Frame

1. Does the story contain any moral message?
2. Does the story make reference to morality, God, and other religious tenets?
3. Does the story offer specific social prescriptions about how to behave?

Economic Consequences Frame

1. Is there a mention of (financial) losses or gains now or in the future?
2. Is there a mention of the costs / degree of expense involved?
3. Is there a reference to (economic) consequences of pursuing or not pursuing a course of action?