When Sovereignty and Solidarity Collide

The European Migration-Security Nexus

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Abstract

The aftermath of the European Union's 'migration crisis' in 2014-2016 continues to challenge the European security discourse, marked by a dilemma of securing the internal Member States political, societal and economic sector, whilst providing human security for forced migrants in accordance with international obligations. This thesis therefore aims to elucidate the dynamic between state security and human security, within the particular discursive development of the European Council. By examining the European Council's Conclusions from March 2014 until December 2016, a qualitative content analysis has been conducted, in accordance with the critical lenses of the Copenhagen School's securitization theory, combined with a Human Security approach deriving from the Human Development Report 1994. Throughout these documents the conflicting interests and inherent dilemmas have become evident, demonstrating a complex and transformative discourse marked by an underlying state-centric dominance in which humanitarian ambitions are gradually undermined through the discursive practices of the European Council.

Key Words: Forced migration, European Union, EU, The European Council, Solidarity, Sovereignty, Human security, State security
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Table of contents

1   Introduction

The migration policies of the European Union have been extensively criticized due to fragmentation and inadequate efficiency throughout the so-called 'migration crisis' 2014-2016, a trend that most recently was confirmed in the European Council's meeting June 28th2018 (Europaportalen 2018; EUCO 2018ª). Accordingly, the lack of a unified voice has resulted in a humanitarian failure exposing the European incapacity to meet international standards for refugees, and consequently questioned the Union's fundamental legitimacy and credibility as an international actor and normative power (Amnesty International 2017; Sardelic 2017).

Starting in 2014, the UNHCR recorded a rapidly increasing migration influx, reporting 216,054 forced migrant arrivals. By 2015, the numbers had exceeded more than one million, whereof 3,771 forced migrants had died at sea in the attempt of reaching the European coast (UNHCR 2018). As a humanitarian crisis unfolded, Amnesty International documented the widespread human rights violations that forced migrants faced due to systemic shortcomings, urging the Union to take responsibility and humanitarian action (Amnesty International 2017). The unprecedented migration influx consequently left extensive political reverberations, consolidating a migration-security nexus, in an increasingly divided Europe. This confronted the EU with a dilemma of providing humanitarian security in terms of solidarity, whilst safeguarding the internal state security and sovereign integrity.

In light of this complex situation, the following thesis explores the development of two parallel migration-discourses within the EU, relating to state security versus human security. The ambition to critically analyze the EU migration policy is primarily motivated by the impeding need to establish a sustainable migration policy, regardless of the migrant's legal status. Furthermore, it is of academic value to explore the discursive practices that facilitate structural and substantive exploitation of migrants, and thus continues to pave the way for human insecurity. In retrospect, the need for an effective and unified European solution becomes crucial in preventing future humanitarian shortcomings, and thus eventually paramount for international peace. This thesis will therefore address the following research question: *How has the migration discourse developed within the European Council during 2014-2016, in relation to state and human security?* The research question will preferably be examined in two subqueries, initially answering: *What type of state-centric or humanitarian security sectors are actualized in the migration discourse?* And secondly: *What type of relationship do state security and human security have in terms of dominance or balance?* Hence, the aim is to unfold the dynamic between the two

parallel security discourses, in order to understand how these seemingly paradox discourses co-exist within one political frame.

2   Theory

In order to illustrate the discursive development, the theoretical framework will be based on an integration of the Copenhagen School's securitization theory and the concept of Human Security, as it facilitates the deconstruction of the EU migration-security nexus. In order to position the thesis within a wider field of research, the following section will initially provide the previous research on migration and its relation to the EU. Subsequently, a short review of the broadened security concept will be provided as a background for the theoretical framework and central conceptualizations of this study.

2.1   Previous research

International migration is not a new phenomenon and has thus been extensively covered in the literature. According to The World Migration Report 2018, the stock of international migrants was estimated to be 244 million in 2015, in which Europe hosted 31% (IOM 2018[a]:2-4,18). Building on these statistics, the 'Age of Migration' (Castles – Miller 2009) is indeed present. However, whereas solicited migration is coupled with multiple profits for the collective and individual, unsolicited migration is rather understood as a continuum of humanitarian crisis bringing multifaceted insecurities, rendering a 'Global Migration Crisis' (Ibrahim 2005:168-169; Kaldor 2007:183). Hence, begging the inevitable question: A crisis for whom?

Scholars of international relations have traditionally observed migration as a continuum of the tension between globalizing forces eroding the state sovereignty (Evans 1998). Subsequently ascribing this trend to the expansion of the international human rights regime, in which the national autonomy is undermined through supranational or intergovernmental policies (Sassen 1996). As such, migration has primarily been viewed through the state prism, as a de-territorializing mechanism diminishing territorial barriers and thus disarming the states capacity to seal their borders from unsolicited immigration. Hence, their antagonistic relationship is induced by the migrations intimate connection with insecurities of globalization and the inherent contradiction to state sovereignty in terms of territorial integrity and national citizenship (Guiraudon – Lahav 2000:163-164; Castles – Miller 2009: 211-214; Buzan 1991).

However, critical scholars have questioned these assumptions, reviewing migration policies as both reinforcing and challenging the territorialized nation state system. Thus, migration – a phenomenon of rootless transnationality– defies the states' right to control and obtain a permanent territory and population,

composing an impending threat to a nation's fundamental core and defining features. However, migration discourses also normalize and reproduce the state-centric and territorialized world order as the primary political authority, in which supranational and intergovernmental migration cooperation take place (Malkki 1992; Malkki 1995; Guiraudon – Lahav 2000:188-190).

In relation to this, Jef Huysmans argues that securitized migration policies have evolved alongside the European integration project, facilitating the control of the internal market and maintaining the European myth of cultural hegemony, in order to sustain political solidarity and loyalty (Huysmans 2000). Hence, the European immigration discourse is argued to operate as a political strategy, which excludes people based on their social category by referring to them as threatening (Huysmans 2000:771). As such, immigration – as a transnational community – is coupled with incivility redefining the cohesive nationhood and cultural status quo, which in the European context ultimately becomes an existential threat of fragmentation to the political and societal stability, thus endangering the European community. Hence, restrictive migration policies have been reviewed as a method for distancing underdevelopment and social relapse, attempting to preserve the position of the Westphalian international state system (ibid:758; Kalm 2008:16).

Building on these assumptions, Maggie Ibrahim argues that migration increasingly is being securitized in a racial discourse (Ibrahim 2005:164-170). Similarly, Peo Hansen argues that the formalized classification of migrants is based on ethnic labels sustaining the global inequalities, thus creating a migratory hierarchy in which racism is both confirmed and concealed (Hansen 2008:22-23). It is additionally argued that discursive objectifications deprive migrants of their access to social, economic and political rights, subsequently excluding them from the society and legitimizing further exploitation. Political systems are thus leaving a trace of neglected and dehumanized migrants exposed to multiple insecurities (Khosravi 2010:3, 27; Huysmans 2006:47; Huysmans 2000:767; Castles – Miller 2009:263-265). Moreover, the emphasis on restrictions and border controls has been subjected to criticism due to the negative narration of migrants, fostering racism and xenophobia. However, the hostility towards migration does not go by unchallenged; According to Huysmans, the experiences of the nineteenth- and twentieth century continue to shape the identity and political reality of the EU. As such, initiatives for common migration policies have been presented as an instrument to confront and campaign against racism, xenophobia and nationalism, in order to maintain the essence of the EU, i.e. a multicultural project across differences (Huysmans 2000:764-766).

2.2   Theoretical Background

The conceptual broadening of *security* has historically been marked by the geopolitical disruption associated with the end of the Cold War era and the accelerating globalization. As critical security studies challenged realist state-centric assumptions, comprehensive notions of security enfolded. Security has

thus become multifaceted concept, relating to material and immaterial as well as state and non-state actors and referent objects. Hence, what constitutes a threat is not static, but rather in a state of flux depending on the dominating perceptions and narratives of society. Accordingly, *new* threats and security referents are constantly unraveling and challenging the understandings of security and insecurity (Jarvis – Holland 2015; Buzan et. al. 1998). In relation, the European security-migration nexus can be understood as a result of the broadened security concept, in which migration has become a question of insecurity and security for both the state and the individual (Huysmans – Squire 2009).

However, the relationship between the sovereign state and the individual human is not unproblematic, as their interdependence holds inherent contesting and complementing elements. As such, the state and individual impose a myriad of potential (in)securities to each other's existence, premising either the collective or the individual security (Buzan 1991:37-55). It is within this paradox nature, that the contradictions between the traditional security approach and the critical human security approach arise. The former highly rests on realist assumptions, reaffirming the states' sovereign integrity and survival as the primary referent object enduring external and material military threats (Buzan et al 1998:1-3; Jarvis – Holland 2015:27-29, 99). The latter is a people-centered approach aiming to protect all human lives against a broad range of threats, in order to enhance human freedoms and empower human development, fulfillment and emancipation (UNDP 1994). The political challenges of forced migration are found at the juncture of these perspectives.

2.2.1 The Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School's (CS) securitization theory has emerged as one of the promising critical approaches challenging the traditional security system. The theoretical framework emphasizes the importance of dominating norms and ideas as they categorize and shape social and political realities. Drawing from the power-knowledge nexus (in)security is thus a discursive construction of threats. They are produced and reaffirmed through speech acts in which certain issues are moved above and beyond politics. Securitization is thereby marked by its self-referencing practice consequently legitimizing extraordinary measures in order to protect the survival of the designated referent object (Buzan et. Al. 1998:21-26, 33). As such, securitization is an intersubjective process and ultimately an exercise of power regarding "for whom security becomes a consideration in relation to whom" (ibid:18, 29-31). Security is thereby defined in fixed terms of survival from an existential threat, while the theoretical focus is directed at the dynamic process of the threat construction altering between different levels of securitization and de-securitization (ibid:21-29). Consequently, securitization transpires within multiple vertical and horizontal dimensions, such as the military, political, economic, societal and environmental sector (ibid:7-8). This flexible securitization process and strategy, primary consist of two central actors: The securitizing actor (a privileged actor who formulates the security threat upon a

referent object, i.e. the object that is perceived as threatened with a legitimate claim to protection), and the audience (the collective that receives the securitization move)(ibid:36). However, the formulation of an existential threat does not per se constitute a complete securitization, but rather a securitizing move. Hence, the degree to which a securitization succeeds is determined by the audience legitimization and the actualization of specific counter measures. Security is thus always invoked by someone, against someone and for someone through highly subjective and discursive practices (ibid:23-36).

2.2.2 Theoretical Framework: An Integrated Perspective

The CS will form the basis of the theoretical framework alongside a human security perspective. However, for the purpose of this research question only the securitizing moves will be analyzed in accordance with Rita Floyd's understanding of securitization, in which the utterance itself - i.e. the securitizing move- holds the *illocutionary* force rather than the normative concept of the 'audience' (Floyd 2011:428-429). Hence, a securitizing move can be understood as the speech act *seeking* to legitimize extraordinary measures through the discursive creation of a threat and referent object (Buzan et. al. 1998:25).

The state security perspective will derive from the CS conceptualization of the political, economic and societal security sectors, as these are found to be particularly connected with issues of European migration relating to the internal and cultural security as well as the welfare system (Huysmans 2000). The political security sector relates to the concept of sovereignty such as internal legitimacy and external recognition. This includes expressed threats towards the fundamental principles or ideas of the state, the physical territorial integrity and institutional stability of the authority (Buzan et. al. 1998). Hence, the sector is discursively actualized when the securitizing actor formulates their securitizing moves around state-based concepts such as territorialized border systems and legislative structural norms or authorities that are deemed endangered through physical defiance.

The societal security sector relates to the collective identities within a community, such as cultural relations, traditions and narratives that sustain the group survival (ibid). Hence, the societal sector is discursively evoked when securitizing moves emphasize the collective identity or belonging as endangered by socio-cultural differences threatening to dissolve the unity of the in-group.

The economic security sector relates the economic reliability and capability in terms of financial relationships through markets or production, in which an effective welfare system is maintained and thus legitimizing the state authority (ibid). By discursively depicting issues of employment, production and financial relationships as unstable and/or compromising the welfare system due to a created threat, the economic sector is discursively actualized.

However, as the political, societal and economic sector operates from a state-based perspective, the CS security sectors will be integrated with a Human Security (HS) perspective in accordance with Scott Watson (2011), claiming that

humanitarianism acts as a distinct securitization strategy, that equally defines existential threats to a referent object in which extra ordinary counteractions are legitimized. A humanitarian sector is thus applicable to the criteria of a securitization process and will therefor compose a security sector of its own within this theoretical frame (Watson 2011; Buzan et. al. 1998). The humanitarian sector will be conceptualized in accordance with the understanding of human security articulated in the Human Development Report (HDR) 1994, as a question of "freedom from want and freedom from fear" (UNDP 1994:24). Hence, the humanitarian sector is actualized when the securitizing actor expresses a perseverance of human life and human dignity as the core referent object. Moreover, by emphasizing human vulnerabilities, including the "safety from chronic threats [such] as hunger, disease and repression" and the physical "protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life" (UNDP 1994:23) such as conflict, natural disasters, or human rights violations, the humanitarian sector is evoked.

One could argue that a threat upon any of these security sectors, in reality constitutes a threat to all due to their interdependence and overlapping features. As such, it should be noted that these sectors are 'ideal types' used as an analytical tool to categorize and simplify reality, in order to elucidate the migration-discourse development.

2.2.3 Migratory Definitions

The connotations of migratory concepts often exceed the denotation. Hence, there is a need of conceptualizing the central terms and principles. However, conceptualizing terms of migration is not unproblematic, as they are highly disputed and marked by different rationales and practices (Huysmans – Squire 2009:3). Adding to the complexity, migratory themes are frequently used interchangeably throughout the material, leading categorization to become ambiguous and at times contradictory. In order to avoid political bias or conceptional distortion the thesis will therefore use the term *forced migration* as it includes all forms of involuntary migratory movement due to threats of life and/or livelihood, inflicted by natural or human causes. It thereby includes movements such as, *irregular migration, refugee* and *displacement*, as a collective framework (IOM 2018[b]). In order to fully grasp forced migration, one is thus obliged to conceptualize these three key dimensions. It should be noted that as any category these are ideal types, which in reality are extensively fluid.

Migrant is an umbrella term that applies to those who move from one country to another, either temporarily or permanent. *Regular migration* refers to those who are entitled to stay in the host country, according to domestic law. In contrast, *irregular migration* applies to all forms of unauthorized and undocumented entry or stay that do not meet the established requirements of domestic immigration legislation (Koser 2007:17,55; Amnesty 2017:4).

In unison with the 1951 UN Refugee Convention art 1. a *refugee* is defined as a person whom in "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,

religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality […] and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country" (UN 1951:14). A refugee is thus protected under international law. In relation, *asylum seeker* refers to those whom crossed international borders in search for protection, but whose legal status are not confirmed (Castles-Miller 2009:189).

      Internal or *external displacement* refers to individuals or collectives who have been forced to flee their homes as a result of conflictual and/or violent situations or disasters. Internally displaced apply to those who have not crossed international state borders, while externally displaced concerns those who have crossed international state borders (IOM 2018[b]).

3 Methodology

In order to elucidate the European migration discourse, the thesis will be conducted as single case study through a qualitative content analysis, aiming to unravel the relationship between the dual migration discourses within the Union. As such, the analysis will be based on the European Council's (EUCO) Conclusions during the period 2014-2016 as they reflect the comprehensive EU migration discourse. The following chapter poses the methodological and empirical considerations that has guided the research, followed by an outlining of the content analysis and applied operationalization. Finally, the pre-given limitations and delimitations of this study will be discussed in order to enclose the research project.

3.1 Method and Material

Due to the research questions' descriptive character, the study is primarily concerned with a nuanced understanding of the relationship between the European Union's state security and human security discourse. The thesis will therefore conduct a qualitative single case study, to provide an in-depth analysis with a high level of internal validity, assuming a theory consuming and abductive approach, as general theory alongside observations will form the basis for a refined analysis (Halperin - Heath 2017).

The defining feature and primary strength of a single case study, builds on the analytical concentration on a defined object of interest, which enables conceptional precision and rich description of the empirical case of interest. As such, single case studies are not limited to isolated factors or simplified causality but have the ability to unfold underlying processes and complex relations in a given context, due to its comprehensive and holistic approach. Consequently, the strategy avoids conceptional stretching as it is interested of the particular (Denscombe 2003:30-32, 234; Halperin - Heath 2017:6, 14). Although, a single case study can be criticized for running the risk of being bias or unrepresentative - thus limiting the level of reliability and external validity - this thesis will not aim to make generalizing claims in terms of replication or universality, but rather analyze a particular social reality, in which migration constitutes a case of securitization (Halperin - Heath 2017:170-175, 214-216; Sundberg - Harbom 2011:97-99).

Furthermore, a single case study allows the use of combining multiple sources of data in order to encompass the complexity of the case. Thereby, prompting an increased level of external validity and reliability through triangulation and thus

prevent selective bias (Denscombe 2003:31-38, 132-133; Halperin —Heath 2017:160-161). Consequently, the thesis' empirical data will initially be based on primary sources originating from the EUCO Conclusions during the period 2014-2016, including the conclusions from March and June 2014; March, June, October and December 2015; and February, March, June, October and December 2016; As they specifically address the issue of migration. However, in order to present a nuanced and precise description of the posed research question, the thesis will be complemented with multiple and diverse sources of secondary character, figuring as background information for the empirical data. These include several academic writings and research presented by NGOs such as Amnesty International and data statistics from UNHCR, as they have been essential in recording the migration dynamic. As with any primary or secondary source an element of bias is expected, and it is therefore essential that sources are handled with internal and external criticism in order to avoid confirmative or selective bias (Halperin —Heath 2017:254-256).

3.2   Content Analysis

By analyzing the European migration discourse as a social practice that generates legitimacy for a given actor or world perception, the ambition is to unfold the state security and human security relationship. By using a qualitative content analysis, it is possible to categorize the actualized security sector and its relation to the state and human security perspective.

  A qualitative content analysis is an analytical method consisting of coding and categorizing through interpretation of content units. Through analyzing the frequency and/or correlation of a given word, idea expression or argumentation – i.e. the recording units – it is possible to discover prominent patterns that are being expressed in a given context unit. Due to the thesis qualitative approach, the analytical coding – i.e. the unitizing of the data and the categorization – has been conducted through an open coding also known as grounded theory, as the theoretical categories has been refined in line with the discovered patterns in the text material (Denscombe 2003:109-114, 271). Hence, the level of reliability rests on coding explicit expressions, whilst the validity derives from practicing interpretive reflection with contextual consideration to the empirical materials' intrinsic and implicit trends (Bergström – Boréus 2012:50-55, 82-83). Accordingly, the ambition is to define dominating features and values within the EUCO discourse and describe how these ideas has changed through time.

  However, interpretive research challenges the objectivity due to the researcher's unavoidable involvement. Ideally the content analysis should therefore include intercoder reliability – i.e. the extent to which two independent persons code the recording units equally, thus prompting reliability – however, due to the thesis limited resources, the content analysis will be carried out though a first face coding. The thesis reliability will therefore rely on carefully

categorizations with an absolute intersubjectivity of the reasoning behind the categoric organization (Denscombe 2003:270-274).

3.3 Operationalization

The thesis will operationalize the dual securitization of migration through the use of analytical coding of the EUCO's Conclusions. It is thereby possible to explore the extension and context in which forced migration has been addressed as a state security or human security objective. As such, the analysis initially identifies the referent object and further examines and categorizes the expressions of the EUCO's Conclusions relating to (i) the state security according to the conceptualization of the CS's political, economic and societal security sectors respectively. The expressions of (ii) human security will be categorized in accordance with the conceptualization of the humanitarian sector deriving from the UNDP HDR 1994. In doing so it is possible to identify for whom security becomes a consideration in relation to a specific type of security sector.

3.4 Case Study, Limitations and Delimitations

The thesis investigates the migration discourse development and balance between state and humanitarian arguments. Accordingly, EUCO will be the focal point of the security discourse surrounding the migration influx in 2014-2016. As such, EUCO constitutes a typical case of securitization of migration. Additionally, the case is of intrinsic interests as the Union, and thus the EUCO, represents an ambitious normative power within international peace and development (Van Schaik - Schunz 2012:169). The European discourse and practice is therefore likely to influence future legislation and policy, within and potentially also outside the EU. However, analyzing the EU as a unit, is not unproblematic as it poses multiple conceptual challenges concerning what and whom that constitutes and represents the EU and thus the EUCO. Nonetheless, the EU represents a central actor on the international arena and should thus be recognized accordingly. While the Union has been praised for its regional integration, the recent migration crisis has shown an inefficient apparatus, trapped in a security complex of migration, due to heterogenic ambitions and capabilities (Van Schaik-Shunz 2012). It is therefore impossible to analyze the individual member states without relating to the Union, as their security concerns and perceptions are strongly interlinked (Buzan et. al. 1998:12). As the EUCO represents the highest level of political cooperation (consisting of the representatives of the 28 Member States, The President and the President of the Commission) defining the political direction and agenda through the summit meetings adopted 'Conclusions', they exert substantial influence over the European policymaking. Moreover, the Council set

the agenda for the common foreign and security policies of the Union and is therefore an essential actor in the migration- security nexus (EUCO 2018[b]). Thus, in order to provide a representative reflection of the prevailing attitudes on migration the EUCO will be the subject of analysis in the following thesis.

The thesis is concerned with a specific instance of migration and its relation to the discourse on the European level. This implies numerous important limits and delimitations. Firstly, the timeframe for the empirical data will be limited to the period of 2014-2016, as the migration crisis culminated during this period of time. Secondly, the thesis will not aspire to investigate the migration per se, but rather the general discourse surrounding it. Hence, it will not include the experience of migrants nor analyze the European operations and their effects on human security. Thirdly, the thesis approaches the collective expressed discourse regarding the need for regulating movement across EU external borders. As such, it disregards from policies within separate nation states concerning assimilation or integration. It is thus limited to the EUCO's migration discourse regarding the Union's external borders, concerning the entry and stay of a migrant. Consequently, the focal point will be limited to the securitizing move generated by the EUCO. Fourthly, the study aims at illuminating the forced migration, such as irregular migrants, displaced persons and/or refugees, and thereby excludes voluntary movement of people across the European borders. Lastly its empirical focus is to describe the way in which migration is discussed in high politics within the EU, hence, discourse is understood in broad terms as the expressed speech act of the EUCO.

4 Analyzing the European Migration-Security Nexus

This chapter analyzes the EUCO's migration discourse during 2014-2016, starting with a historical background of the developed migration policy within the EU. Following, the Conclusions of the EUCO will be examined and analyzed chronologically, focusing on the expressed migratory discourse. Prior to the analysis of the empirical material, a brief summary of critical events alongside migratory statistics from UNHCR will be provided in order to reach a nuanced understanding of the specific context in which the discourse take place. Finally, a summarizing discussion will be presented in which the overall discursive development will be considered and problematized.

4.1 Historic Background: European Migration Policy

The inherent tension between migration and European security is intimately linked to the acceleration of the European integration, starting with the Treaty of Rome (1957) articulating the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the internal market (Huysmans 2006:1; Castles-Miller 2009:196-197; Hansen 2008:35).

During the 1950s and 1960s foreign immigration was primary associated with flexible workforce as 'economic immigrants', fostering economic growth and counterbalancing the demographic deficiency of Europe. Accordingly, the legal status of immigrants was neither politically sensitive nor significant to domestic interests (Huysmans 2000:754). However, during the late 1960s and 1970s, immigration successively became a subject of political concern, due to increasing immigrant populations. Moreover, the consequences of permissive immigration alongside integrative shortcoming of the EU Member States began to unfold, leading the tolerant immigration policies to be replaced with a restrictive regulation arguing to protect the domestic socioeconomic security of the EU (Hansen 2008:13-18; Huysmans 2006 65; Huysmans 2000:753-754). One of the significant changes was the Council Regulation 1612/68 (1968), which granted the Europeans special rights of movement within the internal market, and thus differentiated the rights of European citizens and third country nationals. The prerogatives of EU citizens were further established in the Paris Summit (1973) initiating a European migration legislation (Huysmans 2000:754-755).

During the 1980s, a progressive Europeanization of migration policies evoked. Most evidently, the Schengen Agreement (1985) and the Single European Act

(1986) created a defining momentum, reshaping the single market as an area without internal frontiers, whilst creating a continuum between strong borders and internal safety, thus coupling migration with transnational organized crime and instability. Hence, migration regulations increasingly transferred to the constitutional structure of the EU, laying the foundation of the so called 'Fortress Europe' (Huysmans 2000:755-759; Castles-Miller 2009:196-198).

Subsequently, the Treaty on European Union (1992) introduced the Third Pillar, in which migration and asylum were subjected as a as a common policy area requiring a united security agenda, in which the migration-security nexus was consolidated in an externalizing discourse (Hansen 2008:21, 76-77; Castles-Miller 2009:131). A few years later, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) moved migration from the Third to the First Pillar as a matter of 'freedom, security and justice' rendering the migration area to become of supranational character. However, the treaty also became a political turning point, through the incorporation of a humanitarian discourse countering discrimination and racism (art. 13) and opting to establish minimum standards for asylum policies (art. 63) (Hansen 2008:105-106). This was further implemented in the Tampere Program (1999), in relation to the commence of the Common European Asylum System, which sought to homogenize the Member States asylum system and establish minimum standards, emphasizing the Refugee Convention and the principle of non-refoulment as a humanitarian obligation. Consequently, European migration policies have gradually advanced from being of exclusively national and bilateral to a semi-supranational jurisdiction, with an increased focus on regulation. Most evidently the Hauge Program (2004) and Dublin Regulation (2013) alongside the establishment of surveillance and borders systems such as Frontex and Eurodac reflects the control-oriented policies attempting to attain international humanitarian standards and needs, without compromising the internal security or legitimacy of the Union (Huysmans 2000:756). However, one longstanding problem within migration legislation, is the differentiated implementation and enforcement within Member States, exposing an unclarity and inefficiency within the Union objectives. Nonetheless, migration policies have continuously figured as a cornerstone in the EU, marked by an increased quest for control explicitly as well as implicitly (Castles – Miller 2009:196-197, 205; Hansen 2008:21).

4.2   The Reemerging Security Issue of 2014

In the year of 2014, UNHCR reported 216,054 forced migrants crossing the European border and additionally 3,538 deaths and missing people in the Mediterranean Sea (UNHCR 2018). However, the political landscape was yet dominated by the Russian Annexation of Crimea, the Ebola outbreaks in West Africa, and the Eurozone's continued recession, as some of the top European priorities (Lindsay 2014). Consequently, migration was only discussed in two out of six Conclusions, thus limiting the material of 2014. However, the EU took

several measures in order to hinder the migration influx, including the launch of The Frontex Joint Operation Triton, which replaced the humanitarian 'search and rescue' operation Mare Nostrum. Although Triton was heavily criticized due to its lack of humanitarian assistance, it continued to be reinforced in the following years, as a central effort in the migration policy of the EU (Amnesty International 2017:10-11; EUCO 2018[c]). Moreover, the 2013 Task Force Mediterranean continued to operate with death prevention, through cooperation with countries of origin and transit, openings of new legal entries for migrants, and countering criminal networks of illegal migration (EC 2013:2).

The material of 2014 reflects a critical inflection point within the EU migration policy. Starting with the Conclusion of **March 20-21st 2014** migration is briefly mentioned in reference to the 'EU-Africa relations', as a concern regarding irregular migration, the fight against smuggling and trafficking of human beings, emphasizing a shared responsibility between the EU and Africa (EUCO 2014[a]). Hence, migration is primarily discussed in relation to criminal activities imposing an insecurity for the political sector of the EU. This association is in itself a securitizing move, as it equalizes migration with crimes against the institutional authority of the EU.

Similar trends are prominent in the Conclusion of **June 26-27th 2014**, as forced migration is addressed under two headlines: 'Freedom, Security and Justice' and 'Strategic Agenda for the Union in Times of Change' (EUCO 2014[b]). The issue thereby advances from being a political anecdote, to encompassing the European security agenda in line with the defining features of a securitization move.

> "One of the key objectives of the Union is to build an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, and with full respect for fundamental rights. To this end, coherent policy measures need to be taken with respect to asylum, immigration, borders, and police and judicial cooperation […]" (EUCO 2014[b]:1).

Consequently, migration is presented as a contradiction to the fundamental freedom security and justice of the EU, hence equating the EU with normative values and power. As such, forced migration represents a fundamental threat to the Unions political structure and stability, in which the EU acts as the sole referent object. The securitization move is further reinforced in the following paragraph, as it insinuates migration as a challenge of instability requiring effective border control, thus referring to the physical base of sovereignty (Huysmans 2000:764):

> "Faced with challenges such as instability in many parts of the world […] the Union needs an efficient and well-managed migration, asylum and border policy […] A comprehensive approach is required, optimising the benefits of legal migration and offering protection to those in need while tackling irregular migration resolutely and managing the EU's external borders efficiently." (EUCO 2014[b]:2).

The paragraph also illustrates the migratory hierarchy, that characterizes the EUCO discourse: By using the term legal it predisposes the existence of illegality – the former being of humanitarian obligation while the latter constitutes a direct threat. Consequently, 'irregular migration' – as a type of forced migration – is being contrasted to the 'legal migration' indicating indifference between illegal and irregular migration. Moreover, the quest of legality grants legitimacy to the wanted migrant, while implicitly delegitimizing the existence of the unwanted as their unauthorized boarder-crossings defies state sovereignty. Hence, the classification of the 'legal' or 'irregular' migrant not only determines whom are entitled to protection, but more importantly, acts as a securitizing move constructing the unwanted migrants as a threat to the political sector. The mere utterance of legality is thus a securitizing move, reaffirming the EU's political security in terms of territorial integrity.

The state-centric security view continues to dominate with a persistent focus on European solidarity and responsibility in order to "guarantee a genuine area of security for European citizens" (EUCO 2014[b]:5). To that end, the EUCO urges the need to intensify cooperation with countries of origin and transit; strengthen the external borders; addressing the root causes of irregular migration; prevent unsafe journeys and human casualties; forcefully prevent and combat crime such as irregular migration, smuggling, terrorism and human trafficking; and lastly establish a collective and effective return policy and readmissions obligations (EUCO 2014[b]:3- 5, 19). As such, forced migration is being coincided with serious criminal offences, constituting both political and humanitarian insecurities. These consistent elements – individually and collectively– constitute securitizing moves in their own right, as they reinforce the sense of forced migration as an existential threat towards the EU system and its citizens. Although their territorial focus initially renders a state-centric view, the EUCO also express the need to prevent human loss, thus actualizing the humanitarian sector. This reflects the essence of the dilemma between state and human security, in terms of providing humanitarian assistance without risking the internal security of the EU, ultimately raising the question of whom to prioritize. However, the prominent emphasis on state cooperation, border control, combatting crime, and return policies reaffirms the political security as the dominating referent object enduring the existential threat. The accentuated securitizing move thereby legitimizes counteractions as expressed in the following:

> "The Schengen area […] require efficient management of the EU's common external borders to ensure strong protection. *The Union must mobilise all the tools at its disposal* [my emphasis] to support the Member States in their task To this end […] Frontex, as an instrument of European solidarity in the area of border management should reinforce its operational assistance […] making full use of the new European Border Surveillance System" (EC 2014[b]:4).

The formulation to "mobilize all the tools at its disposal" is an explicit call upon undefined and extraordinary measures in order to "ensure strong protection" (ibid) of the Union. Hence, an explicit securitization move is created. Moreover, the paragraphs allude to the fundamental pillars of the EU structure through the

internal freedom of movement, articulated by the Schengen area. This arguably adds to the securitization moves gravity, as the migration is presented as a threat to the political stability of the Union. Additionally, the reinforcement of Frontex and surveillance systems builds on assumptions of defined and controlled borders, hence reaffirming the political security as primary referent object.

Additionally, the Conclusion repeatedly couple migration with social and political insecurity, describing forced migration as an uncontrolled 'flow' resulting from instability and poverty.

> Another challenge in the years ahead will be managing migration flows, which are on the rise due to instability and poverty in large parts of the world and demographic trends – a matter which requires solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility (EUCO 2014[b]:19).

The rhetoric arguably objectifies – and as such dehumanizes – forced migration whilst creating a sense of social malaise and collapse, consequently coupling forced migration with political and economic insecurity. This becomes specifically prevalent in the Conclusion's final remarks as the EUCO defines critical challenges confronting the EU societies, including forced migration (EUCO 2014[b]:14). Moreover, forced migration is depicted as an external pressure, actualizing the societal sector:

> "People expect Europe to defend their interests and keep threats at bay, but also to respect their identities and sense of belonging. The Union must be stronger outside, more caring inside" (EUCO 2014[b]: 17).

> "Citizens expect their governments to provide justice, protection and fairness with full respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law. This also requires joint European action, based on our fundamental values. Given their cross border dimensions, phenomena like terrorism and organised crime call for stronger EU cooperation" (EUCO 2014[b]:19).

The use of dichotomies such as defend and protect, outside and inside adds to the societal division, alongside the emphasize on the internal *European* values, the collective identity and legal system as something valuable and in need of protection. Accordingly, the need to "keep threats at bay" (ibid) directly refers to migration management as vital in order to secure the legitimacy of the EU and the European identity. As such, uncontrolled border crossings are presented as an existential threat endangering the European political and societal sector.

In summary, the Conclusions of 2014 address migration as a political, societal and economic instability endangering the EU and its Member States citizens, in terms of irregularities associated with socioeconomic eruption and political defiance. Moreover, it is presented as a common responsibility, in order to secure the European area of freedom, security and justice, consequently premising a state-centric world view.

4.3   The Ambivalent Dilemma of 2015

The year of 2015 represents a critical point in the asylum and migration governance throughout Europe. An unprecedented immigration took place rendering the so called 'migration crisis' in a divided, inconsistent and porous Europe. As the world witnessed over one million arrivals and 3.771 deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, migration policies became the top priority of the EU (UNHCR 2018; Lindsay 2015). Following numerous deadly shipwrecks, the EU adopted a comprehensive European Migration Agenda in May, confronting the incentives of irregular migration while emphasizing humanitarian assistance and strong borders (EC 2015[a]; Sardelic 2017; Amnesty International 2017:10). In addition, the EU launched the military operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia in June, targeting the business assets of irregular migration and criminal networks (Amnesty International 2017: 11; EUCO 2018[c]). However, the policies abruptly changed in September, as the photograph of the three-year-old toddler Alan Kurdi drew global attention to the plight of refugees as a defining momentum. As a consequence, the German 'wilkommen kultur' and 'wir schaffen das' opened the doors for humanitarian cooperation and the Western Balkan Route of semi-regular migration (Sardelic 2017). However, compassion quickly swung to concern November 13th when Paris was attacked by terrorism, followed by several other terrorist attempts in European cities 2016 (Lindsay 2015). Consequently, this lead to more restrictive migration attitudes focusing on managing migration though increased control of the external borders alongside intensified cooperation with third countries such as the Valetta Summit on migration. Additionally, The EU and Turkey adopted a joint action plan to halt the irregular influx through collaborative return policies (EC 2015[b]; EUCO: 2018[c]).

The reached Conclusion of **March 19-20th 2015** indicates a subtle de-securitization in comparison with the previous Conclusions of 2014, as migration is swiftly addressed in one paragraph under the headline 'External relations' similarly to the Conclusion of March 2014. However, the rhetoric of EUCO is continuingly marked by criminalization and delegitimization of the forced migration, subjecting them as 'migratory flows' and 'illegal migration' in need of management and prevention with a focus on securing external borders (EUCO 2015[a]:6).

Similar trends are observed in the Conclusions of **June 25-26th 2015,** under the separate headline 'Migration'. The EUCO express the need for solidarity and responsibility to prevent human tragedy through intensified cooperation and management in order to "contain the growing flows of illegal migration" (EUCO 2015[b]:1). As previously discussed, this rhetoric depicts the forced migrant as an unnatural force, hence a securitizing move is constructed through the objectification of the migrant as uncontrollable and endangering entity. Additionally, the urge to control migration is presented as a humanitarian argument, however, the primary objectives is arguably to secure the European

geopolitical stability. Consequently, the humanitarian sector is actualized in order to legitimize the political sector as a referent object.

Forced migration is further addressed in relation to humanitarian needs in terms of relocation and resettlement for those "persons in clear need of international protection" (EUCO 2015[b]:2) emphasizing the human security of the migrant in terms of their political rights and physical survival. However, the phrase also indicates the existence of those who do not qualify for protection, referring to the migratory hierarchy. In relation reception facilities, i.e. hotspots, is stressed in order to ensure identification and thereby "determine those who need international protection and those who do not" (EUCO 2015[b]:2). Human security is thus constantly secondary to the EUs political security.

Additionally, forced migration continues to be associated with criminal activities.

> "Effective return, readmission and reintegration policies […] are an essential part of combating illegal migration and will help discourage people from risking their lives. *All tools shall be mobilised* [my emphasis] to promote readmission of irregular migrants [with focus on] border control, asylum, counter-smuggling and reintegration" (EUCO 2015[b]:3).

Thus, by criminalizing forced migration, a security move is constructed justifying all necessary means. Moreover, the emphasis on combating crime, border control and returns reaffirms the political sector as primary. However, the securitizing move also alludes to the humanitarian sector in terms of preventing deaths.

Finally, the Conclusion ends with a particular focus on the EU-Africa relation in relation to the Valetta Summit. The partnership is described as essential in order to 'stem the flows' in terms of 'fighting smuggling' and 'targeting' the root causes of migration associated to economic and social challenges (EUCO 2015b:4-5). Migration is thereby securitized through a militarized language, as an external and in particular African threat connected to socioeconomic insecurity rendering a political threat. As such, the exclusionary migration discourse confirms global inequalities in the North-South relation, premising the Western security above the non-Western (Huysmans 2000:758).

The Conclusion of **October 15[th]2015** generally follows the previous discursive patterns, regarding the need to 'tackle' migration through "solidarity and responsibility" (EUCO 2015[c]:1) with a focus on strengthened external borders and effective returns and readmissions alongside strong cooperation with third countries in order to 'stem the flows' and dismantle criminal networks and illegal migration (EUCO 2015[c]:1-4). Additionally, the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and Valletta Summit is presented as essential in migratory management, arguably indicating a reaffirmed securitizing move of migration, since both initiatives intend to fend off forced migration (EUCO 2015[c]:1-2).

However, the October Conclusion also presents a discursive breaking point of humanitarianism, calling on comprehensive strategies to be "consistent with the right to seek asylum, fundamental rights and international obligations" (EUCO 2015[c]:4). The Member States are further encouraged to contribute with humanitarian efforts:

> "…explore possibilities for developing safe and sustainable reception capacities in the affected regions and providing lasting prospects and adequate procedures for refugees and their families, including through access to education and jobs, until return to their country of origin is possible" (EUCO 2015^c:2).

Contrary to the previous discourse, this paragraph reflects a discursive shift towards the forced migrant as the referent object in need of sustainable protection, due to their exposure to political and economic insecurities. As such, the forced migrant is portrayed as the exploited victim in need of physical and economic safety, referring to the humanitarian sector.

However, by the Conclusion of **December 17-18th 2015** the political landscape has changed significantly, in which forced migration is addressed as an urgent threat towards the integrity of the Schengen area and European Union. The following citation encapsulates the comprehensive securitization move of the Conclusion:

> "For the integrity of Schengen to be safeguarded it is indispensable to regain control over the external borders […] notably by ensuring systematic security checks with relevant databases, and prevent document fraud; […] ensure systematic and complete identification, registration and fingerprinting, and take measures to tackle refusal of registration and stem irregular secondary flows; […] take concrete measures to ensure the actual return and readmission of people not authorised to stay and provide support to Member States as regards return operations; […] enhance measures for fighting smuggling and trafficking of human beings" (EUCO 2015^d:1).

The paragraph illustrates multiple embedded securitizing moves that resonate with the state-centric premise of the EU. Unauthorized border crossings are interpreted as defiance to state sovereignty and consequently, legitimizing defensive measures. Additionally, the wording "integrity", "safeguard", "indispensable" and urge to "regain control" reinforces the securitizing move by depicting migration as an uncontrolled threat to the European body actualizing the political sector. Moreover, the call upon ensuring systematic (and if necessary coercive) identification, registration and fingerprinting and prevention of document fraud, not only reflect a distrust towards the migrants' legitimacy, but figures as a state-centric exercise of power. The state-based assumption also becomes prevalent when addressing "returns and admission of people not [authorized] to stay" (ibid.) reinforcing the migratory hierarchy as a part of the state system. Finally, the December Conclusion solidifies the criminal dimension of migration through a militaristic rhetoric as in the following:

> "The recent terrorist attacks demonstrate in particular the urgency of enhancing relevant information sharing, notably as regards: […] increasing Member States' contributions to Europol databases, as well as providing for the access of Europol and Frontex to relevant databases." (EUCO 2015^d:3).

By coupling Frontex to the European Police Office as a counterterrorism strategy, migration is portrayed as a relevant participant in terror networks. While not denying the transnational character of the twenty-first century terrorism, the

migration discourse nonetheless acts as a securitizing move depicting forced migration as indivisible to military and subsequently political harm, ultimately creating an existential threat to the political security sector of the EU and its citizens.

In summary, the Conclusions of 2015 reflects an ambivalent dilemma with sharp contrasts, in which forced migration becomes a tug of war between state sovereignty and humanitarian solidarity. However, the Conclusions predominantly assume a state-centric position regarding the EU political security.

4.4   The Vigilance of 2016

The year of 2016 was marked by a decreased number of forced migrants entering the EU, counting 362,753 persons (UNHCR 2018). However, the number of casualties had risen to 5,096 victims. The start of 2016 was marked by the New Year's Eve mass sexual assaults in Cologne. As many perpetrators were of non-European descendants the crimes became strongly linked to issues of migrants and refugees, leading to the disruption of the German 'wilkommen kultur' (Connolly: 2016). Consequently, the EU intensified their control-oriented approach. Initially, the Triton Operation and EUNAVFOR MED Sophia was strengthened and extended. The implementation of EU-Turkey Joint Operation was further elaborated in the EU-Turkey Statement in March, thus putting an end to the Western Balkan Rute (Sardelic 2017; EUCO 2018[c]). Moreover, the Council permitted the continuation of temporary internal border controls within the Schengen area in May. Lastly, the Schengen Borders Code was reinforced in December, obliging the Member States to perform systematic checks at the external borders (EUCO 2018[c]).

The EUCO Conclusion of **February 19th 2016** is characterized by a defensive language, narrating the migration influx as an urgent crisis:

> "In response to the migration crisis facing the EU, the objective must be to rapidly stem the flows, protect our external borders, reduce illegal migration and safeguard the integrity of the Schengen area […] The European Council welcomes NATO's decision to assist in the conduct of reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal crossings […] and calls on all members of NATO to support this measure actively" (EUCO 2016[a]:3).

The paragraph illustrates a continued comprehensive securitizing move, which is primarily directed at the political security sector, in which the EU represents the referent object. The protective rhetoric explicitly depicts the migration as an actual 'crisis', i.e. an urgent threat, from which the EU and its integrity must be protected and safeguarded. Consequently, the inherent urgency adds to the securitizing move. The threat construction is further reinforced with utterance of the military alliance NATO, as it redefines the 'migration crisis' as a military

security threat. Additionally, monitoring and surveillance measures are traditionally used when detecting military security threats, and their actualization thereby confirms a securitizing move. The quotation above also affirms the continued criminalization and dehumanization of the migrants as 'flows'. Moreover, the Conclusion of February emphasizes the EU-Turkey Action Plan in order to stem migration and "restore the normal functioning of the Schengen area" (EUCO 2016ª:4). Consequently, the EUCO express a state of disorder which legitimizes extraordinary measures in accordance with a securitizing move. However, a human security discourse relating to the forced migrant political safety is also present:

> "The humanitarian situation of migrants along the Western Balkans route calls for urgent action using all available EU and national means to alleviate it. To this end, the European Council considers it necessary to now put in place the capacity for the EU to provide humanitarian assistance internally, in cooperation with organisations such as the UNHCR" (EUCO 2016ª:5).

> "…progress must be made towards reforming the EU's existing framework so as to ensure a humane and efficient asylum policy" (EUCO 2016ª:5).

By acknowledging the insecurities of migrants and calling for humanitarian assistance the EUCO legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures, and thus create a securitizing move defining the forced migrant as referent object within the humanitarian sector. Hence, the Conclusion of February reflects an intertwined humanitarian and state security discourse, which in combination acts as a securitizing move defining the forced migrant as both a potential threat *and* a life that is threatened.

   In contrast, the following Conclusion of **March 18th 2016** primarily addresses the need to tackle forced migration and to regain control of the external borders (EUCO 2016ᵇ:1-2). Additionally, the discourse is continuingly defensive:

> "The European Council is extremely vigilant as regards possible new routes for irregular migrants and calls for taking any measures that may become necessary in that respect. In this context, the fight against smugglers everywhere and by all appropriate means remains key" (EUCO 2016ᵇ:3).

As such, the Council explicitly reinforces the securitization of migration as an impending threat, demanding the Member States constant attention due to its supposedly unpredictable nature. Similar vigilance is found in the Conclusions of **June 28th 2016.** As the Council commend the progress of the Schengen Borders Code and the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, further action is initiated in order to reduce the migratory 'flows', save lives, fight smuggling and prevent 'illegal migration' and their root causes (EUCO 2016ᶜ:1-3). Moreover, the Council recognizes the need to balance the security objectives of both the migrant and the EU, when reinforcing the external borders (EC 2016c:3). Hence, the EUCO operates with in a dual, and somewhat paradox, migration discourses of state

sovereignty and humanitarianism in a combined securitization strategy. Here migrants are criminalized due to their illegality, whilst portraited as victims of smuggling and hazardous journeys.

The Conclusion of **October 20th-21st 2016** initially emphasize the political security sector in terms of protecting the external borders as a matter of "getting 'back to Schengen' by adjusting the temporary internal border controls to reflect the current needs" (EUCO 2016^d:1). Hence, the temporary measures constitute the extraordinary measures which are deemed legitimate through the continued securitization of migration. Moreover, migration is frequently addressed in terms of "tackling migratory flows" and "preventing illegal migration" and "stem the flows of irregular migration, in particular from Africa" (EUCO 2016^d:2). The rhetoric of irregularity and illegality is thus used interchangeably to delegitimize the forced migrants' existence, which is further depicted as an external African problem threatening the political sector of the EU. Moreover, the Council remains vigilant about the different migration routes and expresses the need to "closely monitor flows […] so as to be able to rapidly react to developments" (EUCO 2016^d:3). The cautiousness reflects a continued distrust towards the situation in which the forced migrant continues to be an underlying threat to the political sector of the EU.

Finally, the EUCO address humanitarian elements in terms of responsibility "to tackle the root causes of migration […] including by supporting displaced persons […] thus helping to prevent illegal migration" and further intensify the efforts to relocate migrants, with priority to unaccompanied children (EUCO 2016^d:2-4). As previously, the humanitarian arguments are strongly interlinked with the political sector. However, the imagery of forced migrants as a threatening force is being differentiated with victimization. This composes a strategic securitizing move in which the EU agenda persists, i.e. to hold illegal migrants at bay. Hence, the securitization move actualizes the political sector through the humanitarian sector.

The Conclusion of **December 15th 2016**, initially reiterates continued commitment to the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and the monitoring of the Eastern Mediterranean-West Balkan route alongside the EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sofia, as some of the central incitements to counter 'illegal migration' and its' root causes (EUCO 2016^e:1). Additionally, the council addresses the need to "remain vigilant to other routes including the Western Mediterranean, so as to be able to rapidly react to developments" as such migration is still considered to be a lurking threat to European political sector (EUCO 2016^e:2). However, the vigilance is accompanied with a humanitarian silver lining, as the Council raises the principles of responsibility and solidarity to assist migrants stranded in Libya in order to prevent dangerous journeys underlining the importance of relocation and resettlement. Forced migration is thus considered to be a continued shared responsibility of the EU, in order to provide political and humanitarian security internally as well as externally.

In sum the Conclusions of 2016 reflects the two ends of the spectrum connected through an overall vigilance, with an increasingly militaristic and defensive language intertwined with humanitarian arguments of responsibility.

5 Discussion

The unprecedented migration situation of 2014-2016 inevitably confronted the EU with a complex situation exposing the core dilemma of the European project in terms of sovereignty versus solidarity. However, the discursive evolution has not taken place in a political void, but rather alongside critical events that has become intertwined with forced migration. Whether they in fact are interlinked, is beyond this thesis to review, one can only conclude that the migration discourse is strongly characterized by transformative dynamics.

Starting in 2014, forced migration becomes subjected to implicit and explicit securitizing moves relating to political defiance in terms of unauthorized border crossing and criminal activity. Moreover, they are portrayed as societal pressures and economic instability, in which the situation is depicted as external aggression towards the institutional and territorial base of the EU. Accordingly, the discourse actualizes the three state security sectors of the state. Moreover, forced migration is explicitly contrasted to the self-perceived values of the Union, and thereby deemed as an illegitimate movement. Consequently, the EU is equated with normative values granting them - as the referent object - an extended legitimacy and power to claim survival. As such, the EU constitutes the nodal point, in which all other objects are interpreted and understood setting the tone for the following discursive trends.

Through the use of objectifying and delegitimizing language, the securitizing moves within the political sector are further reinforced in 2015 with the backdrop of forced migration as an illegitimate movement compromising the European territorial integrity. Moreover, the political, societal and economic sector are increasingly intertwined in securitizing moves relating Africa and the root causes of forced migration, such as economic and social instabilities endangering the *European* values and systems. Forced migration is thus projected as an external African problem disconnected from the EU and its migration system. However, the Conclusions of 2015 also represent the most differentiated discursivity reflecting the complexity of the situation within a fragmented Europe. Initially there is an increasingly criminalizing and objectifying language of forced migration coupled with the eruption of the institutional base and thus political sector. However, the October Conclusion of 2015 introduce an elaborated humanitarian security sector, in a discourse claiming responsibility and solidarity in preventing human tragedy seeking to establish safe and sustainable solutions for both the migrants' human security and the Union's state security. Consequently, the humanitarian sector is gradually incorporated in the migration discourse of 2015 and further in 2016. However, as the humanitarian arguments becomes embedded with political objectives an interdiscursivity is created, in which the normative power and status of the EU is reestablished. Hence, the EU

are legitimized, which thereby facilitates the continued externalizing policies. As such, the migration discourse greatly lacks balanced understanding of human security and its intrinsic value.

The intertwined discourse of the humanitarian and political sectors continues to operate in 2016, however, marked by an increased polarization and a consistent vigilance to migratory developments. Hence, the threat creation is continuingly strengthened through an increasingly militaristic and defensive language actualizing the political sector. The emphasis on military and defensive solutions consequently overshadows the humanitarian references, rendering the discourse to gradually undermine humanitarian objectives.

Consequently, the dominating security perspective throughout 2014-2016 is marked by state centrism that predominantly relates to the political security sector of the Member States system, characterized by a defensive language in terms of securing the sovereign integrity from forced migration, with a focus on border control, returns and effective surveillance. In relation, the migrants legal status becomes a central element in which the migratory hierarchy and sovereign state system is sustained and reaffirmed through discursive practices. This ultimately contributes to undermining the human security of forced migrants and begging the problematic question of human legality.

6   Conclusion

The following contains a conclusion on *How the migration discourse has developed within the European Council during 2014-2016, in relation to the state and human security* with the purpose to elucidate the dynamic between the interacting security perspectives. While there are subjective limitations within a qualitative content analysis, this study has nonetheless illustrated how the European migration discourse has been characterized by growing conflicting interests, creating a discursivity of dominantly political and humanitarian arguments, which strategically depend on each other in accordance with the state-centric objectives of European Union. Accordingly, the European migration discourse has endured particular, although critical, changes. Starting in 2014, the EUCO initially introduced a discourse based on the economic, societal and political sector. Following, the economic and societal arguments successively faded during 2015 and 2016, whilst the political and humanitarian sector expanded and gradually merged in a dilemma of internal safety and humanitarian obligation. However, the political security sector is ultimately the dominating perspective within this state-based system, thus rendering the human security as secondary. Moreover, the discourse is constantly marked by dehumanizing rhetoric, ultimately contributing to the undermining of human security ambitions. Consequently, the relationship between state security and human security is strongly asymmetrical due to the political security sector's dominance.

By analyzing the EUCO's Conclusions, this study has aimed to contribute to the awareness of how discursive and structural practices within high politics formulate and affect the scope of sustainable solutions for international politics and human prosperity. Further research would advantageously investigate whether there is a discrepancy between the Conclusions and EU's political outcome and how this has affected the life of forced migrants.

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2   Appendix

The following data has been interpreted from the European Councils Conclusions stretching from March 2014 until December 2016, regarding the so called 'migration crisis' as a security issue. In order to conduct a qualitative content analysis, the conclusions have been reviewed leading to a selection of representative citations of the discursive trends within the EU. In mapping out the data the political, societal and economic sectors from the Copenhagen Schools securitization theory and a humanitarian sector has been applied in order to categorize how migration is being securitized in relation to the state and the human security.

The chosen citations will be presented in chronological order under the given title and with a reference number. For example, a given citation from 2014 March will be referred to as 14.M.X. referring to the year, month and number of the citation. Below the citation follows the deemed referent object (R.O.) and the actualized sector.

Conclusions - 20/21 March 2014

EU-Africa relations

14.M.1.

"The European Council expresses the EU' willingness to further cooperate with its African partners in promoting trade and development, democracy and good governance, the rule of law and human rights. It also underlines the importance to address migration and mobility, including irregular migration and the fight against smuggling of migrants and trafficking of human beings, in a spirit of shared responsibility between countries of transit, origin and destination" p.15

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

Conclusions - 26/27 June 2014

FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE

14.J.1.

"One of the key objectives of the Union is to build an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, and with full respect for fundamental rights. To this end, coherent policy measures need to be taken with respect to asylum, immigration, borders, and police and judicial cooperation, in accordance with the Treaties and their relevant Protocols" p. 1

R.O.: EU

14.J.2

" Faced with challenges such as instability in many parts of the world as well as global and European demographic trends, the Union needs an efficient and well-managed migration, asylum and borders policy, […] A comprehensive approach is required, optimising the benefits of legal migration and offering protection to those in need while tackling irregular migration resolutely and managing the EU's external borders efficiently." p.2

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

14.J.3

"To remain an attractive destination for talents and skills, Europe must develop strategies to maximise the opportunities of legal migration through coherent and efficient rules, and informed by a dialogue with the business community and social partners. The Union should also support Member States' efforts to pursue active integration policies which foster social cohesion and economic dynamism." p.2

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political, Societal, Economic

14.J.4

"Addressing the root causes of irregular migration flows is an essential part of EU migration policy. This, together with the prevention and tackling of irregular migration, will help avoid the loss of lives of migrants undertaking hazardous journeys. A sustainable solution can only be found by intensifying cooperation with countries of origin and transit, including through assistance to strengthen their migration and border management capacity. " p.3

R.O.: EU, migrant

Sector: Political, Humanitarian

14.J.5

"addressing smuggling and trafficking in human beings more forcefully, with a focus on priority countries and routes" p.3

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

14.J.6

"establishing an effective common return policy and enforcing readmission obligations in agreements with third countries " p. 3

R.O.: EU

14.J.7

"The Schengen area, allowing people to travel without internal border controls, and the increasing numbers of people travelling to the EU require efficient management of the EU's common external borders to ensure strong protection. The Union must mobilise all the tools at its disposal to support the Member States in their task" p. 4

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

14.J.8

"Frontex, as an instrument of European solidarity in the area of border management, should reinforce its operational assistance, in particular to support Member States facing strong pressure at the external borders, and increase its reactivity towards rapid evolutions in migration flows, making full use of the new European Border Surveillance System EUROSUR" p.4

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

14.J.9

"in the context of the long-term development of Frontex, the possibility of setting up a European system of border guards to enhance the control and surveillance capabilities at our external borders should be studied. " p. 4

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

14.J.10

"It is essential to guarantee a genuine area of security for European citizens through operational police cooperation and by preventing and combating serious and organised crime, including human trafficking and smuggling, as well as corruption " p. 5

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

STRATEGIC AGENDA FOR THE UNION IN TIMES OF CHANGE

14.J.11

"[…] Though the recovery in Europe is gaining pace, unemployment is still our highest concern – especially for young people – and inequalities are on the rise. Meanwhile the global economy is changing fast. In the digital age, the race for innovation, skills and markets forces all our countries to anticipate and adapt in order to thrive. Scarce natural resources, the cost of energy and impact of climate change are major challenges; Europe's current energy

dependency is a vulnerability. Across the world, radicalisation and extremism are reasons for concern. Geopolitical stability at our very borders cannot be taken for granted. Demographic trends are challenging, with ageing populations putting additional pressure on our welfare systems and irregular migration flows requiring common answers and concerted action" p.14

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political, social, economic

14.J.12

"People expect Europe to defend their interests and keep threats at bay, but also to respect their identities and sense of belonging. The Union must be stronger outside, more caring inside. " p. 17

R.O.: EU

Sector: Societal

14.J.13

"Citizens expect their governments to provide justice, protection and fairness with full respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law. This also requires joint European action, based on our fundamental values. Given their cross border dimensions, phenomena like terrorism and organised crime call for stronger EU cooperation. " p. 19
R.O.: EU

Sector: Societal

14.J.14

"Another challenge in the years ahead will be managing migration flows, which are on the rise due to instability and poverty in large parts of the world and demographic trends – a matter which requires solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility." p. 19

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political, economic, societal

14.J.15

"better manage migration in all its aspects: by addressing shortages of specific skills and attracting talent; by dealing more robustly with irregular migration, also through better cooperation with third countries, including on readmission; by protecting those in need through a strong asylum policy; with a strengthened, modern management of the Union's external borders. " p. 19

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

14.J.16

"prevent and combat crime and terrorism: by cracking down on organised crime, such as human trafficking, smuggling and cybercrime; by tackling corruption; by fighting terrorism and countering radicalisation – while guaranteeing fundamental rights and values, […] p. 19

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

Conclusions – 19 and 20 March 2015

EXTERNAL RELATIONS

15.M.1

"The European Council deplores the continuing loss of migrants' lives at sea, greatly increased by organised people smugglers and human traffickers. Implementation of the actions, agreed by the Council in October 2014 to better manage migratory flows, should now be stepped up, including by strengthening Triton, the Frontex Operation in the Central Mediterranean. " p. 6

R.O.: EU, Migrant

Sector: Political, Humanitarian

15.M.2

"The need to manage migration properly concerns the EU as a whole. Hence the European Council welcomes the Commission's initiative to submit in May a European Agenda for Migration built around the objectives of an effective asylum policy, well-managed regular migration, the fight against and the prevention of illegal migration and securing the external borders."

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

Conclusions – 25 and 26 June 2015

MIGRATION

15.J.1

"Europe needs a balanced and geographically comprehensive approach to migration, based on solidarity and responsibility. Following the decisions taken by the European Council last April, concrete measures have been taken to prevent further loss of life at sea, to find new ways of confronting smugglers and to intensify cooperation with countries of origin and transit, while respecting the right to seek asylum." p.1

R.O.: EU, Migrant

Sector: Political, Humanitarian

15.J.2

"Wider efforts, including the reinforcement of the management of the Union's external borders, are required to better contain the growing flows of illegal migration. Today, the European Council focused on three key dimensions which must be advanced in parallel: relocation/resettlement, return/readmission/reintegration and cooperation with countries of origin and transit" p. 1

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

15.J.3

"[…] the European Council agreed on the following interlinked measures to help 60.000 people: a) the temporary and exceptional relocation over two years from the frontline Member States Italy and Greece to other Member States of 40.000 persons in clear need of international protection, in which all Member States[1] will participate" p. 2

R.O.: Migrant

Sector: Humanitarian

15.J.4

"the setting up of reception and first reception facilities in the frontline Member States, with the active support of Member States' experts and of EASO, Frontex and Europol to ensure the swift identification, registration and fingerprinting of migrants ("hotspots"). This will allow to determine those who need international protection and those who do not." p. 2

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

15.J.5

"the agreement that all Member States will participate including through multilateral and national schemes in the resettling of 20.000 displaced persons in clear need of international protection, reflecting the specific situations of Member States." p. 2

R.O.: Migrant

Sector: Humanitarian

15.J.6

"Effective return, readmission and reintegration policies for those not qualifying for protection are an essential part of combating illegal migration and will help discourage people from risking their lives. All tools shall be mobilised to promote readmission of irregular migrants to countries of origin and transit. […] In particular: […] building on the "more-for-more" principle, EU assistance and policies will be used to create incentives for implementing existing readmission agreements and concluding new ones. Commitments set out in trade agreements regarding the temporary presence of persons for the provision of services should be used as an incentive to conclude readmission agreements; development policy tools should

reinforce local capacity- building, including for border control, asylum, counter-smuggling and reintegration" p. 3

R.O.: EU, Migrant

Sector: Political, Humanitarian

15.J.7

"[…] development policy tools should reinforce local capacity- building, including for border control, asylum, counter-smuggling and reintegration" p.3

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

15.J.8

"Member States will fully implement the Return Directive, making full use of all measures it provides to ensure the swift return of irregular migrants[…]" p.3

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

15.J.9

"The Commission has announced its intention to propose to amend the Frontex Regulation to strengthen the role of Frontex, notably so that it can initiate return missions" p. 4

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

15.J.10

" It is crucial to reinforce our overall cooperation with countries of origin and transit, both on stemming the flows of irregular migrants and on tackling the root causes of migration so as to reduce the incentives for illegal migration and to combat the smuggling networks." p. 4

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

15.J.11

"A true partnership between European and African countries, working together to tackle illegal migration in an integrated way, is essential. The Valletta Summit will seek in particular to achieve, together with the African partners: a) assistance to partner countries in their fight against smugglers; b) a strengthened cooperation on an effective return policy; c) better targeting of development cooperation and enhancing investments in Africa to address the root causes of migration, as well as providing economic and social opportunities." p. 5

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

<p style="text-align:center">Conclusions – 15 October 2015</p>

MIGRATION

15.O.1

"Tackling the migration and refugee crisis is a common obligation which requires a comprehensive strategy and a determined effort over time in a spirit of solidarity and responsibility." p. 1

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

Cooperating with third countries to stem the flows

15.O.2

"welcomes the joint Action Plan with Turkey as part of a comprehensive cooperation agenda based on shared responsibility, mutual commitments and delivery." p. 1

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

15.O.3

"ensure effective and operational follow up to the High-level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean/Western Balkans Route, with particular emphasis on the management of migratory flows and the fight against criminal networks" p. 2

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

15.O.4

"achieve concrete operational measures at the forthcoming Valletta Summit with African Heads of State or Government, focusing, in a fair and balanced manner, on effective return and readmission, dismantling of criminal networks and prevention of illegal migration, accompanied by real efforts to tackle root causes and to support the African socio-economic development together with a commitment concerning continued possibilities for legal migration" p. 2

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political, Societal, Economic

15.O.5

"explore possibilities for developing safe and sustainable reception capacities in the affected regions and providing lasting prospects and adequate procedures for refugees and their families, including through access to education and jobs, until return to their country of origin is possible" p. 2

R.O.: Migrant

Sector: Humanitarian

15.O.6

"ask Member States to further contribute to the efforts made to support UNHCR, World Food Programme and other agencies […]" p. 2

R.O.: Migrant

Sector: Humanitarian

Strengthening the protection of the EU's external borders (building on the Schengen acquis)

15.O.7

"work towards the gradual establishment of an integrated management system for external borders" p. 2

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

15.O.8

"devise technical solutions to reinforce the control of the EU's external borders to meet both migration and security objectives, without hampering the fluidity of movement"p. 3

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

Responding to the influx of refugees in Europe and ensuring returns

15.O.9

" in accordance with the decisions taken so far, press ahead with the establishment of further hotspots within the agreed timeframe to ensure the identification, registration, fingerprinting and reception of applicants for international protection and other migrants and at the same time ensure relocation and returns" p. 3

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

15.O.10

"The orientations set out above represent a further important step towards our comprehensive strategy, consistent with the right to seek asylum, fundamental rights and international obligations." p. 4

R.O.: Migration, EU

Sector: Humanitarian, Political

Conclusions – 17 and 18 December 2015

MIGRATION

15.D.1

"Over the past months, the European Council has developed a strategy aimed at stemming the unprecedented migratory flows Europe is facing. However, implementation is insufficient and has to be speeded up. For the integrity of Schengen to be safeguarded it is indispensable to regain control over the external borders […] notably by ensuring systematic security checks with relevant databases, and prevent document fraud" p. 1

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

15.D.2

"ensure systematic and complete identification, registration and fingerprinting, and take measures to tackle refusal of registration and stem irregular secondary flows" p. 1

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

15.D.3

"take concrete measures to ensure the actual return and readmission of people not authorised to stay and provide support to Member States as regards return operations; enhance measures for fighting smuggling and trafficking of human beings" p. 1

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

15.D.4

"continue to closely monitor flows along migration routes so as to be able to rapidly react to developments" p. 2

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

15.D.5

"The recent terrorist attacks demonstrate in particular the urgency of enhancing relevant information sharing, notably as regards: […] increasing Member States' contributions to Europol databases, as well as providing for the access of Europol and Frontex to relevant databases." p. 3

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

Conclusions - 18-19 February 2016

MIGRATION

16.F.1

"In response to the migration crisis facing the EU, the objective must be to rapidly stem the flows, protect our external borders, reduce illegal migration and safeguard the integrity of the Schengen area." p. 3

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.F.2

"The European Council welcomes NATO's decision to assist in the conduct of reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance of illegal crossings in the Aegean sea and calls on all members of NATO to support this measure actively. The EU, in particular FRONTEX, should closely cooperate with NATO." p. 3

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.F.3

"The full and speedy implementation of the EU-Turkey Action Plan remains a priority, in order to stem migration flows and to tackle traffickers and smugglers networks.

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.F.4

"regarding relations with relevant third countries, the comprehensive and tailor-made packages of incentives that are currently being developed for specific countries to ensure effective returns and readmission require the full support of the EU and the Member States." p. 3

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.F.5

"the continued and sustained irregular migrant flows along the Western Balkans route remain a grave concern that requires further concerted action and an end to the wave-through approach and to uncoordinated measures along the route, taking into account humanitarian consequences for Member States affected. It is also important to remain vigilant about potential developments regarding other routes so as to be able to take rapid and concerted action" p. 4

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political, Humanitarian

16.F.6

"It is important to restore, in a concerted manner, the normal functioning of the Schengen area, […] We need to get back to a situation where all Members of the Schengen area apply fully the Schengen Borders Code and refuse entry at external borders to third-country nationals who do not satisfy the entry conditions or who have not made an asylum application despite having had the opportunity to do so" p. 4

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.F.7

"to stem secondary flows of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers and to provide the significant reception facilities needed to accommodate migrants under humane conditions while their situation is being clarified. Asylum seekers do not have the right to choose the Member State in which they seek asylum" p. 4

R.O.: EU, Migrant

Sector: Political, Humanitarian

16.F.8

"the humanitarian situation of migrants along the Western Balkans route calls for urgent action using all available EU and national means to alleviate it. To this end, the European Council considers it necessary to now put in place the capacity for the EU to provide humanitarian assistance internally, in cooperation with organisations such as the UNHCR, to support countries facing large numbers of refugees and migrants" p. 5

R.O.: Migrant

Sector: Humanitarian

16.F.9

"At the same time, progress must be made towards reforming the EU's existing framework so as to ensure a humane and efficient asylum policy." p. 5

R.O.: Migrant

Sector: Humanitarian

Conclusions – 17 and 18 March 2016

MIGRATION

16.M.1

"The European Council confirms its comprehensive strategy to tackle the migration crisis. […] Priority will continue to be given to regaining control of our external borders. " p. 1

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.M.2

"Member States are invited to make immediate additional contributions under the Civil Protection Mechanism as well as to provide bilateral humanitarian assistance" p.2

R.O.: Migrant

Sector: Humanitarian

16.M.2

"[…]an asylum application from a migrant crossing from Turkey into Greece can be declared inadmissible, based on the concept of "first country of asylum" or "safe third country", in accordance with European and international law" p. 2

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.M.4

"The European Council is extremely vigilant as regards possible new routes for irregular migrants and calls for taking any measures that may become necessary in that respect. In this context, the fight against smugglers everywhere and by all appropriate means remains key. " p. 3

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

Conclusions – 28 June 2016

MIGRATION

16.J.1

"Further to the decision to fully apply the Schengen Borders Code and the implementation of the EU-Turkey statement of 18 March 2016, crossings from Turkey to the Greek islands have sharply decreased and have now almost come to a halt. It is important to continue working actively to further stabilise the situation and to ensure a sustainable solution." p.1
R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.J.2
"The flows must be reduced, thus saving lives and breaking the business model of smugglers. The relevant security procedures must be fully applied to ensure full control over external

borders. Delivering rapid results in preventing illegal migration and returning irregular migrants requires an effective Partnership Framework of cooperation with individual countries of origin or transit. " p. 1

R.O.: EU, Migrant

Sector: Political, Humanitarian

16.J.3

"The EU and its Member States will continue to address the root causes of illegal migration, in close cooperation and in a spirit of mutual ownership with the countries of origin. " p.3

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.J.4

"Recalling the need to reinforce the control of the EU's external borders to meet both migration and security objectives […]" p. 3

R.O.: EU, Migrant

Sector: Political, Humanitarian

Conclusions – 20 and 21 October 2016

MIGRATION

Protecting the external borders

16.O.1

 "strengthening control of our external borders and getting 'back to Schengen' by adjusting the temporary internal border controls to reflect the current needs. " p. 1

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.O.2

"The European Council calls for a swift adoption of the revised Schengen Borders Code enforcing systematic controls on all travellers crossing EU external borders" p.1

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

Tackling migratory flows

16.O.3

"More efforts are needed to stem the flows of irregular migrants, in particular from Africa, and to improve return rates." p. 2

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.O.4

"[…]cooperation with individual countries of origin or transit, with an initial focus on Africa. Its objective is to pursue specific and measurable results in terms of preventing illegal migration and returning irregular migrants, as well as to create and apply the necessary leverage, by using all relevant EU policies, instruments and tools, including development and trade […]" p. 2

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.O.5

"recalls the need to tackle the root causes of migration in the region, including by supporting displaced persons in the region, thus helping to prevent illegal migration […]" p. 2

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.O.6

"tackle challenges linked to irregular migration and improve practical cooperation on returns, readmission and reintegration." p. 3

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.O.7

"The EU will continue cooperation with other countries and closely monitor flows along other migration routes, including the Western Mediterranean, so as to be able to rapidly react to developments." p. 3

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.O.8

"Member States to further intensify their efforts to accelerate relocation, in particular for unaccompanied minors, and existing resettlement schemes" p. 4

R.O.: EU, Migrant

Sector: Political, Humanitarian

MIGRATION

External dimension

16.D.1

"The European Council recalls its October conclusions concerning the Eastern Mediterranean route. It reiterates its commitment to the EU-Turkey statement and underlines the importance of a full and non-discriminatory implementation of all aspects. […] The European Council calls upon all Member States to ensure speedy implementation of the Joint Action Plan" p.1

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.D.2

"[…] addressing illegal migration and its root causes […]" p.1

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.D.3

"[…] keep progress on stemming the flows and improving return rates under close review." p. 1

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.D.4

"The European Council underlines the need to enhance support for the Libyan coastguard, including through EUNAVFOR MED operation Sophia, so as to increase its capacity to prevent the loss of life at sea and break the business model of smugglers. In parallel, initiatives need to be taken to offer assisted voluntary return opportunities to migrants stranded in Libya and curtail dangerous journeys " p.2

R.O.: EU, Migrant

Sector: Political, Humanitarian

16.D.5

"It also reiterates the need to remain vigilant on other routes, including in the Western Mediterranean, so as to be able to rapidly react to developments." p. 2

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.D.6

"The effective application of the principles of responsibility and solidarity remains a shared objective." p. 2

R.O.: EU

Sector: Political

16.D.7

"Member States should further intensify their efforts to accelerate relocation, in particular for unaccompanied minors, and existing resettlement schemes." p. 2

R.O.: EU, Migrant

Sector: Political, Humanitarian