

Strategic Narratives in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute:

An analysis of Chinese and Japanese newspaper coverage in 2012

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Master's Program in Asian Studies
Spring semester, 2018

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Abstract

From Nye's famous *soft power*, a new international relations concept has recently emerged: *strategic narratives*, the narratives which different states use to promote their agendas in the international system. This thesis focuses on one particular aspect of Sino-Japanese relations: the understanding, characterization and possible implications of the *strategic narratives* projected by both countries via the English language version of online newspapers about the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands territorial dispute.

Three periods and three newspapers were selected. The periods were before, during and after the September 2012 crisis period, following the announcement and effective purchase by the Japanese Government of three privately owned islands. The newspapers were the *China Daily*, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* and the *Asahi Shimbun*. The corpus of 188 articles was subjected to content analysis. In order to contextualize the discussion, an historical background on the territorial dispute and on the media environment in both countries was provided.

The analysis brings to light a complex set of narratives, which are derived from the plurality of sources and views that characterize each one of the three newspapers. The concept of strategic narratives proved to be adequate to analyze the "war with words" played out in the articles reporting on the dispute.

Keywords

Strategic narratives; Soft power; China; Japan; Sino-Japanese relations; Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial dispute; Media analysis

Acknowledgements

This thesis is the conclusion of a two-year journey from South to North, West to East, East back to West and North back to South again. As such, I have met and received support from a considerable series of people, all of which are owed my thanks and appreciation:

Paul O'Shea, my International Relations and Japanese Studies teacher and supervisor, whom I thank for his mind-opening and informative classes (from where I learned about strategic narratives in the first place), useful advice and invaluable guidance.

My other professors at Lund University (such as Marina Svensson, Stefan Brehm, Nicholas Loubere, Nina Brand, Carina Enestarre, Astrid Norén-Nilsson, Monica Lindberg Falk, Sidsel Hansson, and other lecturers and staff during my time in LU), as well as the ones in Xiamen University (such as Xu Ke, Shen Huifen, and Fei Huang) and Professor Toru Shinoda from Waseda University, for their helpful advice; while I am still inexperienced and have much to learn, I feel that, in comparison to two years ago, my knowledge and understanding of educational issues, among others, is exponentially more developed now than it was then, and I owe it to the quality and depth of the teaching I received.

The wonderful country of Sweden in general, for granting me this amazing opportunity.

The overwhelming and incomparable country of China, where I have learned and experienced so much and spent a large part of my adult life.

The beautiful country of Japan, where my stay was shorter but not the least eye-opening and valuable for that.

My classmates and friends from all corners of the Earth who I happened to meet in Lund and Xiamen University; even if I do not see them any time soon, their friendship has already left my life richer than it was before.

My friends and mentors met through the Lund Debate Society and associated debating competitions; their teachings developed my critical thinking and my argument making skills beyond the realm of competitive debating; their spirited, enjoyable competition sharpened my wit; and their irreplaceable camaraderie will never be forgotten.

My friends and family in my country and my hometown; we were far apart, but not truly.

My friend José Araujo for his suggestions on business related strategic narratives literature, which helped to complement this thesis in a small but important way.

Professor Catarina Menezes for her important and helpful advice and recommendations on media analysis literature.

My friend Sadie Chandler for her writing tips.

And last, but not the least, my father, mother and brother, for their unwavering love and support.

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List of Abbreviations

A – Asahi
AS – Asahi Shimbun
CD – China Daily
CPC – Communist Party of China
DPJ – Democratic Party of Japan
LDP – Liberal Democratic Party
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
NHK – Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
Y – Yomiuri
YS – Yomiuri Shimbun

Introduction

Ever since Joseph Nye came up with the concept in the early nineties, *soft power* has been the target of much academic discussion (Nye 1990). Perhaps one of the reasons for the continuous attention it has received is the notion that it can work not only as a complement, but even as an alternative to hard power, reducing the need for military interventions (and the damage and casualties of thereof) (Gallarotti 2012, 34). *Strategic narratives* are a more recent concept which has been called the “soft power in the 21st century” (Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, 2014, 71). They address “how different states try to use narratives strategically to sway target audiences”, and “the formation, projection and diffusion, and reception of ideas in the international system” (2014, 71); they can be seen as an extension of Nye’s original concept. This thesis will focus on strategic narratives, analyzing them as “means and methods of persuasion and influence” (2014, 71), a way to deploy soft power instead of hard power, to carry out a war with words instead of a war with weapons. For this purpose, the thesis has put one particular aspect of Sino-Japanese relations under lens: the strategic narratives projected by Chinese and Japanese media about a territorial dispute between the two East Asian neighbors. More precisely, this thesis analyzes the strategic narratives projected via the English language version of Chinese and Japanese online newspapers and their articles covering one issue: the dispute in 2012 over the islands in the East China Sea, which are named Diaoyu in China, Senkaku in Japan.

One reason why strategic narratives were chosen as a central concept in the thesis is that its advantages are similar to the ones ascribed to soft power: they can be a complement or even an alternative to military action. Another reason is that while there is already a vast body of academic work on soft power, strategic narratives, a more recent concept, have received less attention; this thesis hopes to fill a gap in knowledge and generate interest in a topic that hopefully will receive more attention and research in the following years. Finally, because narratives deal with issues of identity and perception (both of the self and the other), they can provide insight on the mindset and attitudes of the countries that use them. In this case, those countries are China and Japan, who have a complex and unique relationship that will be another focus point of the thesis.

China and Japan are, respectively, the second and third largest economies in the world, and two of the most influential nations in their region; therefore, a thorough and accurate understanding of the two is not just of regional but also global importance. Of course, to claim that the two have already received much academic attention would be an understatement; however, any potential additional insight that such a research as this may provide might be of relevance and use.

China and Japan share over a thousand years of history as neighbors; it is expected that such a long history would end up producing a layered and multi-faceted connection. If, on the one hand, the two neighbors have shared positive experiences (such as trade or cultural influence), there have also been historical events, which have led to antagonism, resentment and suspicion. Some examples of that antagonism are the two Sino-Japanese wars, and modern territorial disputes.

The nature of territorial disputes constitutes another important element of this thesis. Two factors make territorial disputes especially noteworthy: they tend to be long-lasting, and more likely to lead to armed conflict when compared to other foreign policy issues (Riley 2014). Strategic narratives play a role in territorial disputes because “the elites’ ability to achieve consensus mobilization behind particular nationalist territorial objectives is highly dependent upon the narratives they select to justify them” (Zellman 2015, 493). Narratives on disputes such as the Diaoyu/Senkaku one can contribute to the entrenchment of the dispute in a material, functional and/or symbolic way (Hassner 2006).

As it will be shown, the concept of strategic narratives is particularly well suited to analyze how escalating tensions over issues such as territorial disputes are dealt with by the press, and how press coverage can contribute to the reaction to and the entrenchment of these disputes. Therefore, this research will address the press coverage of the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial dispute in 2012, when tensions escalated after the Japanese Government announced its plans to purchase the islands. Even though the concept of strategic narratives has been used in different contexts (Rhodes and Brown 2005; Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle 2013; de Leeuw 2018; Dumitrescu 2018; Murrel 2018), the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute has been analyzed from many angles (Fogel 2009; O’Shea 2012a,b; Dreyer 2016), and even an analysis of the press coverage of the

Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute has already been carried out by Hollihan (2014a), a gap in research remains on the characterization of the strategic narratives that were projected by the press about this important territorial dispute, in a year in which tensions were particularly high to the point that heated words were complimented with the deployment of military vessels in the East China Sea. In cases like these, when the risk of a military clash is higher than usual, understanding the non-violent, alternative way of protecting a state's interests becomes more relevant; the images that each state tries to project about itself and about the other country to an international audience (i.e., their narratives) become more strategic than ever. As Nye put it, "international affairs has become a matter of 'whose story wins'" (in Roselle, Miskimmon and O'Loughlin 2014, 71).

With this in mind, this research hopes to help cover that gap by making its main research problem the understanding, characterization and possible implications of the strategic narratives deployed by the Chinese and Japanese press to an international audience. Therefore, this research is summarized in the following question: what are the prominent themes within Chinese and Japanese media's depictions on the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, in 2012, and what are the implications of the existence of these themes (whether in terms of issues such as the countries' identities, the international system they operate in, their views of each other, or their policies)?

That main question branches off into secondary questions: how do the narratives fit within the conceptual frameworks of strategic narratives and/or soft power? How do opposing narratives clash with each other? How do different newspapers cover the same issue?

Since the written media (i.e.: newspapers) is one of the significant platforms through which strategic narratives are projected, three newspapers were selected: *China Daily*, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, and *Asahi Shimbun*. The collected corpus of information – 188 articles - was further analyzed through content analysis. The results show that the volume of information about the dispute in these newspapers increased significantly during the crisis period and that each newspaper – with its own identity, related to the social context – has developed narratives which include simultaneously common and distinct traits on how its own country and the other one is presented.

This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter explains the theoretical framework. The second chapter addresses the sociohistorical context the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute takes place in, and is divided into two subsections: 1) the modern history of Sino-Japanese relations (with a special focus on the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute); and 2) the media context of each country, with a specific focus on the nature of each newspaper chosen for this research. The third chapter presents the methodology. The fourth chapter discusses the empirical findings and recontextualizes them through the lens of the strategic narratives framework. The two first chapters, thus, address the theoretical framework and the historical background while the two last chapters deal, in different ways, with the empirical research. The final chapter will be a conclusion that reflects on the thesis in general.

1. Theoretical framework: Soft power, strategic narratives, and territorial disputes

Strategic narratives are the central concept to the thematic framework of this thesis, and as such they make up a significant part of this chapter. However, given that strategic narratives are a concept that has evolved out of the idea of soft power, this chapter begins with an introduction to the latter (and public diplomacy, a key tool of soft power). Afterwards, the nature of strategic narratives will be explained (including the different main components of thereof), as well as the nature of narratives in general. Lastly, the chapter will conclude with a section on the nature of territorial disputes, and how strategic narratives play a role in them.

1.1. Soft power

In 1990, one year after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, Joseph Nye (1990) wrote on the changes that occurred in the international relations paradigm, and how, unlike in the past, sheer military might was no longer the be-all and end-all of what constituted a nation's power. He introduced the distinction between *hard* and *soft power*. Defining power as having the ability to do or make others do something in the service of one's objectives, Nye argues that coercive power's importance (while still relevant) has been undermined in favor of the power of attraction, which he named *co-optive power* or, more famously, *soft power*. Nye mentions how ideas and the framework of the debate can shape the preferences of others, and that there is "intangible power" in resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions (Nye 1990, 166-167). The term *soft power* has become popular ever since Nye first wrote on it, and has influenced many different academics (including those who have studied strategic narratives).

Public diplomacy, described as the way governments attempt to influence public opinion in other countries (Riley 2014), is an important instrument of soft power (Melissen 2005). Both China and Japan have invested in public diplomacy to support their foreign policy (d'Hooghe 2005; Duong 2013). For example, Japan used public diplomacy

to distance itself from its militaristic past (Watanabe 2018), while China promoted a “peaceful rise” narrative against a “China threat” narrative (Scott 2015). Developments in the recent decades resulted in the blurring of the line between the two forms of diplomacy: traditional (aiming at states and international actors), and public (aiming at public opinion) (Melissen 2005). Traditional diplomacy has been challenged and made more complex by factors such as the new media environment (the development and spreading of radio, TV, and the internet), the growing importance of non-state actors, and the growing influence of transnational movements (Melissen 2005; Riley 2014). A nation’s reputation, image, and credibility began to be seen just as or more valuable than resources like raw materials or land (Riley 2014). It is in this context that the narratives China and Japan promote in their English language media become of interest. During the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, the reaction of the Chinese and Japanese governments was not merely the use of threats or the deployment of military vessels; instead, Chinese and Japanese narratives were strategically used to defend their respective nation’s reputation, to portray a positive image of the country, and to demonstrate that the country’s credibility was solid (Hollihan 2014b).

It could be debated whether the Japanese newspapers’ narratives were a part of Japan’s public diplomacy. Unlike the *China Daily* (controlled by the ruling party of China), the *Yomiuri Shimbun* and the *Asahi Shimbun* are private, non-state actors; from a more traditional point of view their actions would not have been considered part of a country’s public diplomacy. But after the Cold War, the traditional idea of public diplomacy as only being carried out by state actors began being discarded; non-state private individuals and groups are now paid more attention as relevant players in the public diplomacy game (Gilboa 2001). As shown in the empirical findings chapter, both *Asahi* and *Yomiuri* supported Japan’s claims to the islands over China’s (regardless of whatever ideological differences they might have). Moreover, the media environment section of the second chapter of this thesis illustrates two important points: one, that despite Japanese media being considered relatively free, nevertheless there is still some degree of government influence in reporting, thanks to government/media arrangements, connections, and the so-called “kisha clubs” (press clubs) that limit and control the information flow; two, by the newspapers’ own admission, their English language versions were certainly written

with the purpose of reaching out an international audience (*Yomiuri* even mentions how it intends to inform influential foreign groups such as businessmen and diplomats), as well as English reading Japanese citizens and expats in Japan (Anon 2016a; Anon 2016b).

With that in mind, it is fair to say that given the way they promoted Japanese strategic narratives to foreign audiences, *Asahi* and *Yomiuri's* English language articles became a part of the Japanese public diplomacy just as much as *China Daily's* English language articles were a part of China's public diplomacy.

1.2. Strategic narratives: a core concept

At this point, it would be useful to elaborate on what exactly constitutes a strategic narrative. First of all, what is a narrative? The word narrative can be synonymous with the word "story" (Oxford English Dictionary, in Franzosi 2011b, 2). Roselle, Miskimmon and O'Loughlin (2013, 5) refer to it as "frameworks that allow to connect apparently unconnected phenomena around some casual transformation. (...) A narrative therefore is distinguished by a particular structure through which sense is achieved. This structure is comprised of actors; events, plot, and time; and setting and space". Franzosi further explains the omnipresent nature of narratives in all of their variations: "Poem, letter, children's book, or newspaper article, for as long as they tell a story, they constitute narrative, regardless of text genre." (Franzosi 2011b, 3). A narrative goes beyond simple chronology, which merely lists events in date order. A narrative redescribes events in a way that reveals "hidden patterns and hitherto unexplored meanings" (Rhodes and Brown 2005, 1).

The concept of strategic narratives covers a wide range of issues, being, thus, used in different contexts. Its meaning is always connected to the idea of building and promoting an effective narrative capable of advancing someone's goals, whether that someone is a person, a group, a company, or even a nation. In an organization and management context, narratives are important for creating and maintaining corporate culture and legitimating power structures within an organization (Rhodes and Brown 2005, 11). In a marketing context, strategic narratives can help a company make its products successful in its respective market (Murrel 2018). And of course, there is the

international relations context, which is the context of this thesis (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle 2013). In their article on the subject, Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin (2014) explain the usefulness of strategic narratives in international relations, and the connection they have with soft power:

Strategic narrative is soft power in the 21st century. Strategic narrative sets off from a similar starting point that Nye faced in 1990 – understanding fundamental change in the international system and asking: What are the best methods to influence international affairs? Strategic narrative brings us back to core questions in International Relations (IR), back to asking what means and methods of persuasion and influence are likely to work under what conditions, and to a focus on those conditions of communication and interaction, which have changed so fundamentally since Nye’s seminal 1990 article. (2014, 71).

In the field of International Relations, a narrative is strategic whenever it is deployed by political actors to frame identities and a sequence of events (giving meaning to past, present and future) in order to achieve one or more political goals (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle 2013). In other words,

one needs to look at strategic narratives as a power exercise that helps construct and reproduce systematically a collective meaning about the present, past and future of world politics, with the purpose of influencing the conduct of internal and international actors (Dumitrescu 2018, 35).

Strategic narratives is a complex concept that encompasses a wide range of aspects, which will be addressed in the following subsections.¹

Narrative components

There are four components of *strategic narratives*.

Actors

“Actors are those who have agency and are depicted as important to the narrative” (Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2014, 75). At their core, narratives are defined by

¹ Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin will be followed closely since they are the authors who developed this concept in the field of international relations (2013, 2014).

action, which is carried out by actors; the relationship between actors in a narrative is tied by action (Franzosi 2011a, 7).

While the field of International Relations has traditionally focused mainly on state actors, the rise of the importance of non-state actors (such as Non-Governmental Organizations or transnational corporations) has changed this to a degree, even if the focus still remains on states. In the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute narratives, the two main actors are obviously China and Japan (as well as other involved states like the USA, or the international community in general), but individual, non-state actors like citizens protesting in favor of their state's sovereign rights are also given the spotlight.

Setting/environment/space

This component refers to the “stage”, to the place where the action is taking place. In an international relations context, it concerns the depiction of the international system and its workings (Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2014). In the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute narratives, the international system is the current Westphalian one, where state sovereignty is a right by law (Molina 2016, 416-419), and countries that do not respect it (i.e.: either China or Japan, depending on the narrative) should be shunned or even sanctioned by the other countries. It is also a system where the US dominance is apparent, whether it is seen as a help in defending territorial integrity (by Japan), or an unwanted and destabilizing outside interference (by China).

Conflict or action

To acknowledge “Who does what to who or what, and what reactions and interactions follow from that?” (Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2014, 75) is vital. Action may take the form of conflict, but action temporality is also important. As mentioned above, the time sequence in which events unfold matters. The past, present and future are a part of any narrative's structure. The narratives concerning Diaoyu/Senkaku speak of the historical background of the dispute and each countries' respective historical claims to the islands; of the impact the dispute is having in the

present (whether in the form of deteriorating relations, protests, and boycotts); and of warnings, consequences and predictions of the future.

Resolution or suggested resolution.

Narratives (particularly strategic ones) present actions capable of resolving the current problem, conflict and/or disruption to the status quo. In the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku narratives, suggestions and advice on how to deescalate tensions between China and Japan are frequently presented; each side is advised to stand back, embrace wisdom and moderation, not to jeopardize the important Sino-Japanese relations, and to concede to the other side.

Narratives Types/Levels

Related to the narrative components, there are three narrative types/levels (Roselle, Miskimmon and O'Loughlin 2014): a) the *system narratives* describe the dominant global order, how it works, and who the relevant actors are; b) the *identity narratives* designate the identities of the actors involved in international affairs, their history, goals and values; and c) the *issue narratives* explain why certain policies are necessary, as well as the needed logistics to carry out those policies, and how it will be successfully implemented or accomplished. The way this is present in the Diaoyu/Senaku narratives will be addressed in the empirical findings chapter; however, because the line that separates the different types of narratives is not set in stone (ex: both system and identity narratives involve the description of actors), the three sections will have overlapping elements.

1.3. Territorial disputes and entrenchment

Finally, now that both soft power and strategic narratives have been approached, one final concept should be expanded upon: territorial disputes. Other than their aforementioned tendency to last for a long time and higher chances of causing military clashes, there are other relevant factors which should be pointed out.

One is the *entrenchment* factor, the process through which these disputes become more unlikely to be resolved as time goes by. Hassner's analysis of the entrenchment process claims that there are three processes at work that lead to intractability of these disputes: 1) the material entrenchment (which consists of making it more difficult to divide or separate the territory); 2) the functional entrenchment (about making the boundaries and borders more precise); and 3) the symbolic entrenchment (makes it harder to settle the dispute with monetary compensation or other substitutes, because it is connected to ideology) (Hassner 2007, 114-118). This entrenchment is often followed by an increasing unwillingness to compromise, and escalation on hostile rhetoric and even military clashes (Riley 2014, 236).

Another factor in territorial disputes is their *socially constructed nature* (Riley 2014, 237). Because of this, media narratives can reproduce and enlarge the identities, values and discourses that construct these conflicts in the first place; strategic narratives can add fuel to the entrenchment of the disputes.

Paul O'Shea, on his analysis of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute (2012a,b), makes this clear through the use of the constructivist *sovereignty game* concept, one which does not necessarily require the use of force, because it "refocuses primary attention away from the escalation/de-escalation of conflict, and onto the use of sovereignty as a political resource by the states involved." (O'Shea 2012a, 2), so that

The logic of the sovereignty game is based upon the premise that the primary goal of a state is to gain or maintain sovereignty over the disputed territory. This is achieved through the direct exercise of sovereignty over the disputed territory and international recognition of this sovereignty, and by preventing the other state from doing the same. Just as under contemporary international law states must undertake legal protest to another state's exercise of sovereignty to protect their legal claim, thus preventing legal acquiescence, so too in the sovereignty game must a state make an effective political protest against another state's exercise of sovereignty to protect their own political claim – thus preventing political acquiescence and a change in the sovereignty status quo. (O'Shea 2012b, 3).

This sovereignty game is very much on display in the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. While "direct exercise of sovereignty over the disputed territory" is a part of the game that relies on hard power, "international recognition of this sovereignty" can be aided through the persuasive powers of a well-made strategic narrative projected to an international audience, through English language media such as *China Daily*, *Asahi* and *Yomiuri*.

Lastly, there is *issue-linkage*: sometimes a state allows one dispute to escalate and remain unresolved so that it may receive concessions on another dispute. China, for example, has used this tactic on Japan in the past (Riley 2014, 238).

Synthesis

The purpose of this chapter was to explain the different theoretical concepts that informed the empirical analysis of the newspaper articles. The opening soft power section included a subsection on public diplomacy, because the strategic narratives of a country are usually inserted in a larger context of its foreign policy, and, by extension, its public diplomacy; therefore, that concept had to be made clear. Next, came strategic narratives, the core theoretical concept of the thesis. While a concept wide enough that Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle (2013) wrote an entire book on the subject, only a summary of the elements deemed relevant for this thesis were presented: narrative components (actors, setting, action, resolution) and narrative types (system, identity, and issue narratives). Finally, because the focus of the thesis is on one territorial dispute, it was important to address theory related to territorial disputes, and the ways narratives affect disputes (by contributing to their entrenchment, their social construction, and the way the sovereignty game is played). With this theoretical framework out of the way, it is now time to provide social and historical context to the dispute.

2. Sociohistorical background: Sino-Japanese relations, the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, and the media environment

This chapter is split into two sections providing social and historical context for the Diaoyu/Senkaku strategic narratives. The first section deals with the historical background of modern Sino-Japanese relations and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, and it is also split into two parts: part one is a broader summary of modern Sino-Japanese history, part two concerns more recent Diaoyu/Senkaku history. The second section explains the unique media context of each of the two countries and provides information on the nature of the selected newspapers.

2.1. Modern Sino-Japanese history and the origins of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute

All states in international relations hold a narrative about their own past, present and future, and that of the system. No state's narrative exists in a vacuum: the ether of international affairs is filled with multiple narratives – competing and overlapping, epochal and issue specific (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 102).

The narratives of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute projected in 2012 did not in fact come from a vacuum, but were built upon previous historical narratives, and operated with a certain historical awareness and understanding in mind. Because of that, a full understanding of the strategic narratives analyzed in the empirical findings chapter cannot be had without at least some previous knowledge on Sino-Japanese history. The purpose of this chapter is to provide that historical context, as well as the Japanese and Chinese understanding of it. The scope of the history presented here goes from the alleged first acquisition of the islands (China claims that they have belonged to China since the 15th century, whereas Japan claims that they were *terra nullius* before being annexed by Japan in 1895), to the aftermath of the First Sino-Japanese War, to the lead-up to the Second Sino-Japanese war in the context of World War II, to the postwar/Cold War era, to finally the more recent years (with particular emphasis on the 2010-2012 period, which contributed to the escalation of the territorial dispute).

A turbulent century

Sino-Japanese relations go back at least to the 5th century (Fogel 2009; Jacques 2013; Dreyer 2016), but the forceful arrival of European and American powers during the 19th century had a dramatic, irreversible effect in the East Asian nations. China and Japan had distinct reactions to the threat presented by the West. While Japan would take steps to emulate Western colonial powers with such success that it would eventually install a colonial empire of its own, China would fall from grace and repeatedly fail to resist foreign intrusion in a series of traumatic events later called “the century of humiliation” (1839–1949). This sequence of indignities inflicted upon China still informs the way it interacts with the rest of the world until this very day, particularly when China views its sovereignty being threatened.

The Chinese view the First Opium War (1839-42) between China and the British Empire as the beginning of the century of humiliation, and the end of the Chinese civil war (with the Communist Party of China’s victory) as its end. China’s defeat in the Second Opium War (1856-1860) only made the matters worse for itself. In the process of these wars, China had to make several concessions to foreign powers, including losing Hong Kong and paying heavy indemnities (Encyclopædia Britannica 2018). China realized it had been drawn to a new international system in which Western powers had the upper hand, and while its rulers attempted some “self-strengthening” reforms, ultimately this was not enough to prevent the decay and fall of the Chinese imperial system (Qu 2016). For this reason, it stands in contrast with the Meiji restoration in Japan.

Japan did not have its Opium Wars, but it did have a similar “awakening” of sorts: the arrival of the Black Ships led by the American Commodore Perry in 1853. Perry’s imposing ships, implicit threats, and demands (the opening up of Japan to foreign trade) ended three centuries of Japanese isolation, led to a revolution that centralized the national power with the emperor in the capital, and began the Meiji Restoration (1868 – 1912), which modernized Japan in all areas: the political, economic, technological, and social (Fujimoto 2003). Japan’s development into a modern nation state allowed it to triumph over its former “mentor” when they once again met in the battlefield in the First

Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) (Goto-Jones 2009, 42-51), a war over the control of Korea. The outcome was the total victory of Japan; in the aftermath, Japan was granted control of Korea, Taiwan, and, ultimately, the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands (2009, 63-66).

China claims that the islands have long been part of its territory, citing evidence such as a Ming dynasty book published in 1403, which shows that China had already discovered and named Diaoyu by the 14th century (CD107). Japan disagrees with this position, claiming that until the 19th century (when it acquired Okinawa) the islands were *terra nullius*, going so far as saying there is no dispute at all. Regardless of which country is in the right, it is an accepted fact that the Treaty of Shimonoseki (signed after the First Sino-Japanese War) reinforced the Japanese hold on the islands at the time (Naarajärvi 2017, 165).

After losing the first Sino-Japanese war, China's humiliation continued in various forms, such as its defeat in the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), where China was defeated by a coalition of foreign powers, which included Japan, and the long period of chaos following the revolution of 1911-1912 (which overthrew the Chinese monarchy and founded the Republic of China) (Mitter 2016, 28-29).

With a weakened and divided Chinese Republic and a rising Japan, the stage was set for the Second Sino-Japanese War (a part of World War II), which started in 1937 and ended in 1945. Japanese aggression and war crimes throughout this war remain in the memory of the countries affected; cruel events of the war (such as the infamous Japanese "Rape of Nanjing"), and Japan's perceived failure to properly apologize for its role in them, are something that still undermines Japanese relations not only with China but also other former victims of Japanese occupation, such as Korea. The outcome of the war is well-known: the Japanese imperial plans came to an end with its defeat and occupation by the American forces, whereas China regained most of its territory and resumed its civil war (Goto-Jones 2009, 76-86). In 1949, a triumphant Communist Party of China proclaimed the foundation of the People's Republic of China, as the Guomindang nationalists retreated to Taiwan. This was seen as the end of the Century of Humiliation.

The temporary US occupation of Japan in the postwar period was followed by a close alliance between the two, in which (partially due to WWII related restrictions against

having a strong military of its own) Japan had to rely on US troops for security (Goto-Jones 2009, 89-100). While the US does not officially take sides on whose claim to the islands is correct, they have pledged to support Japan in case of any armed attack on the territory (Manyin 2016).

From the Chinese viewpoint, it was during the occupation of Japan that the origin of the current state of the dispute came to be, namely due to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. This treaty declared that the islands South of 29 degrees of North latitude would be under the control of the US military. This was done without consulting either China or Taiwan, who did not accept the US's control of the islands. As the US's occupation ended in 1972, the islands were returned to Japan, in a move still deemed invalid by China and Taiwan. A 1970 report highlighting the potentially enormous natural resources in the area of the islands only complicated matters (Naarajärvi 2017, 165). The dispute remained shelved for the following decades, but would resurface in the early 21st century, particularly in 2012, when the Japanese Government announced the purchase of the islands from their private owner.

2010 – 2012: The escalation of tensions

Hostility over the dispute only started to become considerably serious in 2010, when a Chinese trawler collided with a Japanese coast guard patrol in the disputed area and the trawler's captain was detained by Japanese authorities for 17 days (Kolmaš 2017). On the Chinese side, the detainment resulted in massive protests. On the Japanese side, Tokyo governor Ishihara compared China to "gangsters", and the overall narrative of the Japanese government and media was the denouncement of China's behavior as unlawful and aggressiveness; this denouncement was harsher than it had been in the past. In response, China retaliated with criticism, sanctions, and citizen organized protests (Kolmaš 2017).

The next diplomatic row would be worse. In 2012, nationalist Tokyo governor Ishihara announced that the Tokyo metropolitan government was going to buy three of the islands, in order to protect them. The Japanese government was now stuck between a rock and a hard place: blocking the purchase outright would make it look weak in the

eyes of domestic audiences; but allowing Ishihara to conduct the purchase (and possibly build infra-structure on the islands) would attract China's fury. In the meantime, both Chinese and Japanese nationalists carried out a number of increasingly provocative symbolic actions to defend their countries' sovereignty (Hollihan 2014b).

Faced with growing pressure and two hard choices, the Japanese government opted for a compromise, which was announced on the 10th of September: they themselves would purchase the islands, thus managing China's objections more diplomatically than Ishihara might have, and preventing any infra-structure from being built in the islands. China was not impressed by the compromise; it only became angrier, and just like in 2010, Japan was the target of sanctions, boycotts (reducing the trade between the two countries) and protests (some of which were violent and resulted in the destruction of Japanese property). The Chinese government dispatched Maritime Surveillance Agency (MSA) ships into the waters surrounding the disputed area, bringing them precariously closer to US and Japanese operational zones at a time of deteriorating diplomatic relations (Hollihan 2014; Hafeez 2015). September 2012 marked "the biggest anti-Japanese protests since China and Japan normalized diplomatic relations in 1972" (Anon 2012a). It is from this dramatic time period (August, September and October 2012) that the newspaper articles chosen for this thesis were collected.

2.2. Japan and China: Media environment

While any narrative will always have some universal and omnipresent elements (such as actors, setting, etc.), they nevertheless will be influenced by their respective media environment (Strate 2014, 10). Because of that, it is important for the narrative analysis to have a sense of the specific environments in which these narratives were produced. This section will analyze the media environment on two levels: first, the national level of each country's media in general; secondly, the level of each particular newspaper addressed in this thesis, as well as the reasoning for their selection.

The media in China

The media environment in China has undergone through significant changes throughout the decades, changes whose nature is not just related to the advances in media technology and infra-structure (although those have been relevant as well), but also due to the changing political paradigms and attitudes in modern Chinese history. The articles analyzed in this thesis were written from August to October of 2012, which was only one month before Hu Jintao ceded the country's leadership to Xi Jinping; while there were already shifts underway in the Hu Jintao's years, these would be accentuated during Xi Jinping's leadership up to the present day (Cook 2016).

Political context

From the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 until the Deng Xiaoping era and its reforms started in 1978, Chinese media operated under strict Marxism-Leninism influenced principles in which it was seen as the "eyes, ears, tongue, and throat of the party", and it was almost fully subsidized by the state (Brady 2017, 129; Guan, Xia and Cheng 2017, 234). Alongside the liberalization of the economy in the late 1970's came the commercialization and decentralization of Chinese media, which was still under the control (and censorship) of the party, but was no longer a simple extension of the party's propaganda; Chinese newspapers, magazines, television and radio stations were now part of a market competing for an audience. The degree to which Chinese media has had autonomy has fluctuated ever since then, reaching a high point of autonomy between the 1990's and the early 2000's, then entering a period of decline after that. As far as newspapers are concerned, this (relative) autonomy is mostly concentrated on regional/local newspapers, which make up the most of Chinese newspapers (Guan, Xia and Cheng 2017; Brady 2017, 131-138). Therefore, a major newspaper like *China Daily* would not be expected to stray from the party line (Li and Wong 2018, 37; Zhang 2008, 310).

China Daily

China Daily is a national level newspaper which is under the control of the *People's Daily*, the Communist Party of China's official newspaper. It is also seen as China's number one English language newspaper, and is written with a foreign language-speaking audience in mind. Regarding readership, its website's claims the following: "Our readers are from all over the world. Domestic readers mainly include foreigners and high-end nationals, for example, diplomats and governmental policy makers. Overseas subscribers are mostly government officials, members of parliaments, staff members of international organizations and multinationals, professors, researchers and students in universities and institutes."

So, taking these two factors into account, it can be said that, while *China Daily* might not be the most representative of Chinese newspapers in general, its potential role as the "party's mouthpiece" for the outside world makes it adequate for a study on the use of strategic narratives to aid the enacting of foreign policy (Chen 2012, 309). Just like many other news outlets in China, it was affected by the commercialization that started in the late 1970's; no longer able to rely only on state subsidies, it had to adopt a more commercial approach, even if it is still subject to state control (2012, 309).

The media in Japan

Given the different political context, it is no surprise that Japan's media environment is significantly different than China's. In 2012, according to the Freedom House watchdog organization, on a scale from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free), Japanese media freedom was ranked at 22 points (free), as opposed to China's 85 points (not free) (Anon 2012b; Anon 2012c). However, there are still some nuances that should be addressed in regard to the Japanese media (and political) environment.

Political context

While Japan is a multi-party democracy, for most of the post-WWII period Japanese politics have almost uninterruptedly been dominated by a single party, the right-leaning

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Ever since 1955, there were only two times when the LDP was out of power; the second of them was between 2009 and 2012, and it was precisely in the last few months of the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) incumbency that the articles analyzed on this thesis were written (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010; Kushida and Lipsky 2013). In fact, the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations during the Diaoyu/Senkaku crisis in 2012 has been cited as a factor in the DPJ's electoral defeat (Kushida and Lipsky 2013).

The dominance of the LDP in the government is seen as having had an impact on the media, particularly on public broadcasting. Japan's national public broadcasting organization, the NHK, is generally well-trusted by the Japanese as a source of reliable information, but the fact that its budget and the selection of its president is dependent on the government has led to some tensions. Broadcast laws state that broadcast programs shall be "politically impartial"; this has the result of dissuading the NHK from taking political stances, effectively leaving political debates to the sphere of privately owned media, such as the "big five" main Japanese newspapers (Gatzen 2001). Before addressing those "big five", there is one last important aspect of the Japanese media environment that should be mentioned: the "*Kisha Clubs*".

Kisha Clubs

The 2012 Freedom House report stated that, while Japan was classified as having a free press and a positive score, nevertheless "concerns regarding the lack of diversity and independence in reporting are rooted in Japan's *kisha kurabu*, or press clubs" (Anon 2012b). These press clubs are attached to different governments, businesses and institutions (Seward 2005, 20). This press club system is convenient for journalists in the way it allows them easier access to information from official sources. However, it has also been criticized: even though freedom of the press is a right according to the Japanese constitution, critics of the Kisha club system have accused it of allowing authorities and other elites to effectively regulate the flow of information for their own purposes (Nester 1989; Seward 2005; Kuga 2016). In other words, this system undermines the media's expected role as a "watchdog" (Seward 2005; Kuga 2016).

The “big five”

There are five main newspapers in Japan: the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, the *Asahi Shimbun*, the *Mainichi Shimbun*, the *Sankei Shimbun*, and the *Nikkei Shimbun*. The first two were the ones chosen as the sources of the articles to be analyzed in this thesis; they are, respectively, the most read and second most read newspapers in Japan (McCurry 2017). *Yomiuri* is seen as more conservative, in favor of a more hawkish foreign policy, and pro-LDP. *Asahi*, on the other hand, is seen as more progressive, dovish, and favored by intellectuals (Sakai 2003, 164).

Currently, the English version of *Yomiuri* is called *Japan News*, whereas the English version of *Asahi* is called *Asia & Japan Watch*. Regarding readership, *Yomiuri*'s corporate profile had the following to say (Anon 2016a):

The Japan News, published by The *Yomiuri Shimbun*, boasts the largest circulation of any English-language daily in Japan. Its mission is to promote accurate, well-balanced, quality information in English, based on The *Yomiuri Shimbun*'s editorial policy. (...) *The Japan News* is widely subscribed to by many Japanese and non-Japanese residents, including readers from the business community and diplomatic corps in this country.

Asahi's corporate report had the following (Anon 2016b):

In this time of accelerating globalization, it keenly feels the need to gear up to become a world recognized brand that can compete in a global environment. Based on this belief, the *Asahi* currently offers news reporting in English and Chinese. To further expand its global readership, the *Asahi*'s English website *Asia and Japan Watch* (AJW: <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/>) moved to a free platform in April. (...) The *Asahi Shimbun* is making an aggressive push through social media to promote English and Chinese news services as a way to expand and cultivate its global readership.

3. Methodology

To fulfil the purpose of characterizing the strategic narratives projected by Chinese and Japanese newspapers about the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial dispute in 2012, the total of 188 newspaper articles were subjected to content analysis of the qualitative kind. But the eventual selection of the method of analysis and data collection, the choice of quantity, newspapers and time period of the analyzed articles, these were not at all obvious decisions at the initial stage of the research. Every scientific research process (Maykut and Morehouse 1995; Bryman 2012) implies the existence of ontological assumptions (on the nature of reality), epistemological options (on the nature of knowledge) and methodological procedures (depending on the aim of the research). Social research usually points to the following “phases”: literature review, concepts and theories, definition of the research problem and questions, data collection, data analysis, and writing up (Bryman 2012); however, they cannot be considered as quite independent of one another. They can partially overlap. Every scientific report is a product that arises from a process, one full of uncertainties, doubts and discovery; this chapter addresses the way that process was conducted. It explains the choice of and reasoning behind the methods of data analysis and data collection, as well as the ethical considerations taken in this research.

3.1. Data analysis

Initially, the exact number of articles and words that would be collected and analyzed was not yet known, but that such data would be subjected to some form of qualitative analysis was always certain. After searching through the literature for qualitative methods that would be suitable for written media analysis, ultimately the method of content analysis was chosen. Described as “a technique which aims at describing, with optimum objectivity, precision, and generality, what is said on a given subject in a given place at a given time”, it has frequently been used for analyzing media content (Macnamara 2005, 1-2); therefore, it appeared appropriate for this research on media narratives. While for Bryman (2012) content analysis is synonymous of *quantitative* content analysis, authors such as Bardin (1979) and Quivy and Campenhoudt (1992) do

not support taking the qualitative out of content analysis. They acknowledge the existence of both quantitative and qualitative content analysis. According to Bardin (1979, 115), “The quantitative and qualitative approaches do not have the same field of action. The first one obtains descriptive data through a statistical method. (...) The second corresponds to a more intuitive procedure, but also more malleable and adaptable to unanticipated indexes or the evolution of hypotheses.” She adds: “In quantitative analysis what serves as information is the *frequency* with which certain characteristics of the content arise. In the qualitative analysis is the *presence* or *absence* of a given content characteristic”. (Bardin 1979, 21). Yet, to her and other authors there is no rigid border between them. The current research assumes both quantitative and qualitative aspects of content analysis, although the emphasis is still mostly on the qualitative.

The collected information – 188 articles, 10923 lines and 106335 words - appears under the form of words, sentences, and, sometimes, images. The quantitative content analysis aspects allow counting and displaying the data through visual devices such as tables and figures; this is useful, but perhaps not enough for a deeper understanding, which could include hidden meanings and their relation to a larger context. Hence, qualitative content analysis complements what is missing by including the codification of data and the construction of categories (themes and subthemes) from deductive and inductive origin.

After finding the articles online (their list can be found in Appendix 1), a copy in Word was made. For the first reading, an Excel grid was built, and excerpts and different aspects of the articles were assigned to 14 separate entries (Appendix 2). The same excerpt could be placed in different entries. From there, a large grid of the 188 articles with 1490 lines and 15 columns was made. The articles and this grid were re-read many times. From there, another grid was built with themes and subthemes. The themes were mostly created in a deductive fashion (i.e.: based on the theoretical framework), while some of the subthemes were created inductively (i.e.: derived from the data itself) (Table 4, Content Analysis Grid, Appendix 5). Based on all of the former, portions of text were written up; they eventually formed the data discussion section, which attempts to bridge theory and empiria.

3.2. Data collection

With a data analysis method already in mind, the time came to decide on how to best build a corpus of newspapers articles for analysis. Only English language articles were considered, for two main reasons. The first was that, given the international relations context of the strategic narratives concept, the plan was to analyze narratives projected especially for a foreign audience. Secondly, while the researcher is fluent in Chinese, he is not fluent enough in Japanese to read Japanese language newspapers; for comparison purposes, both news sources had to be in English. The research was also based on articles published online. This was for practical reasons, and also because such articles are meant to reach a wider public.

Another method of data collecting was considered: the interviewing of some Chinese or Japanese on the topic. This was discarded, but nevertheless, several informal conversations were held with some masters' professors - either at Lund, Xiamen and Tokyo - as well as with some Chinese and Japanese masters' students in order to get suggestions about the selected newspapers.

Six newspapers were originally considered (three Japanese and three Chinese). At this stage, an experimental "test run" search was conducted with the newspapers considered for selection, in order to gauge the number and size of the articles in 2012. The search was done using "China", "Japan", "Diaoyu" and "Senkaku" as keywords. It was a full text search, meaning it included both the headlines and the whole text of the articles. For the Chinese newspapers, both *China Daily* and the (eventually discarded) *Global Times* allowed for a customized search and finding the articles directly through each newspaper's own website (even though for *China Daily*, a few of the articles required paid subscription to get full access, which was purchased). The process was more difficult with the Japanese newspapers, which did not allow to find articles from 2012 directly on the website. Therefore, two of Asia Portal's (<http://www.asiaportal.info/>) information resources were used instead: Asahi Shinbun Kikuzo II Visual's database (for the Asahi articles), and the Yomidas Rekishikan database (for Yomiuri). In just three newspapers, over 2000 articles were found. Considering the time frame, after several attempts to narrow down the corpus, four newspapers were taken into account and, finally, three online newspapers were selected. Their names, along with the features that made them

of interest, are as follows: *Asahi Shimbun*, an important left-wing Japanese paper, the second most read in Japan; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, an important conservative newspaper, the most read in Japan; and *China Daily*, effectively CPC owned, and the most read online English language Chinese newspaper. Two potential problems arose then. One was that there being only one Chinese newspaper and two Japanese newspapers risked making the analysis unbalanced; however, *China Daily* made up for the lack of another Chinese newspaper with its comparatively high number of articles (about 2/3 of the total number of articles of the three newspapers). The second problem was that after searching through Yomidas Rekishikan's database, it seemed that the articles available in there were only the digitalized versions of Yomiuri's printed newspapers. To verify if this was true, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* English language website's database was accessed and searched for articles (from 2018, which are still available); those were compared with the ones on the Yomidas Rekishikan's database. It became clear that some of the digitalized print articles were also published online, but there were still online-only articles not available on Yomidas Rekishikan. After weighting options, the conclusion was that it was better to include the Yomiuri's point of view (even if with less articles) than not to include it at all. Furthermore, it is likely that the selection of the digitalized articles included the most representative ones, since the selection was done by *Yomiuri* itself.

To select the time frame was another challenge. As Bryman (2012, 293) states, "Sometimes, the decision about dates is more or less dictated by the occurrence of a phenomenon." After considering several possible periods, 2012 was chosen, the year the Japanese Prime-Minister, Yoshihiko Noda, decided to buy three of the five islands and consequently tensions escalated. After several test run searches, three periods were chosen: a) Period 1: the first two weeks of August, before the announcement of the purchase; b) Period 2: the first two weeks of September, the crisis period; and c) Period 3: the first week of October, after the escalation². The result was a corpus with a total of 188 articles, 126 of the *China Daily*, 21 of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, and 41 of the *Asahi Shimbun*.

² For Period 1, in fact, only the first week had been selected (like Period 3), but after realizing the small number of articles, one more week was extended in order to have a more reasonable number of news.

For comparison purposes (Chapter 4), a full text search was made on the total number of articles about China (in the two Japanese newspapers) and about Japan (in the *China Daily*), during the three periods (710 articles). So, out 710 articles about China and Japan in general, only 188 explicitly mentioned the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute.

3.3. Ethical considerations and limitations

All social research handbooks (such as Bryman 2012) mention the importance of ethical procedures, which include obtaining the informant's consent and signature with a guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality, and explaining and answering any doubts about the purpose and methodology of the study. In this case, however, there were no surveys or interviews, just the analysis of previously published articles. So, other usual procedures were applied, such as rigorous citations or quotes from books, scientific papers, and the three selected newspapers. Furthermore, the point of this analysis of narratives is not to decide which side of the dispute is right, or to make value judgments; therefore, a pledge was made to beware personal bias and remain as objective as possible. This links to the notion of reflexivity (Bryman, 2012), and also to the research limitations, which should be acknowledged. One of them is the selected articles' corpus. With these 188 articles it is not possible to generalize, but it is expected to gain a deeper understanding of strategic narratives and of the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, an understanding that should be complemented with other studies in the field. A longer period and a higher volume of analyzed newspapers would possibly have been fruitful, although a line has always to be drawn somewhere. It was also not possible, due to time constraints, to essay other procedures such as providing a narrower analysis (close to discourse analysis) of some particular articles, or making a content analysis of the published images, or, even less, analyzing media other than the press (for example, social media, TV news or radio broadcasts).³

³ Other interesting researches could be, for example, comparing the English language version of the newspapers to its native language version, or comparing the printed version with the online version of the same newspaper.

4. Empirical findings: discussion and analysis

This chapter includes an overview of the collected data together with its interpretation. This interpretation was informed by an awareness of the purpose of the study (research problem and questions) and the theoretical framework (outlined in Chapter 1). Therefore, it makes use of major concepts such as soft power and strategic narratives in the context of the Japanese and Chinese press coverage of the Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial dispute in 2012, the year tensions escalated after the Japanese Government's announcement of the purchase of three of the five islands. The chosen newspapers, as explained, were the *China Daily*, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* and the *Asahi Shimbun*. The selected periods were Period 1 (Pre-crisis): August 1 to 14; Period 2 (Crisis): September 1 to 14; and Period 3 (Post-crisis): October 1 to 7.

4.1. Press coverage: Diaoyu/Senkaku became strategic

As previously mentioned, the corpus under analysis is composed of 188 articles, with around 400 pages, 10923 lines and 106335 words about the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute through the *China Daily*, the *Yomiuri Shimbun* and the *Asahi Shimbun*, distributed by three periods. However, these 188 articles are part of the total of 710 articles about Japan (in the *China Daily*) and China (in the *Yomiuri* and the *Asahi*) for that period of time (Table 1).

Newspaper	Period 1			Period 2			Period 3			Total		
	D/S	Jn/Ch	%*	D/S	Jn/Ch	%*	D/S	Jn/Ch	%*	D/S	Jn/Ch	%*
<i>China Daily</i>	9	217	4,1	107	276	38,8	10	46	21,7	126	539	23,4
<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>	2	24	8,3	10	20	50,0	9	18	50,0	21	62	33,9
<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	2	39	5,1	20	41	48,8	19	29	65,5	41	109	37,6
Total	13	280	4,6	137	337	40,7	38	93	40,9	188	710	26,5

Table 1 – Articles about the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute and about the other country (Japan/China) by newspaper and period (frequency and percentage)

*Percentage of articles about Diaoyu/Senkaku (D/S) relative to the total number of articles about the other country (Japan/China)

Table 1 shows us that 2/3 of the articles about the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute belong to the *China Daily* (126 articles). Within the one third left about this dispute (62 articles from the Japanese newspapers) the *Asahi Shimbun* presents the double of articles (41

articles; 22%) in comparison to the *Yomiuri Shimbun* (21 articles; 11%)⁴. So, one first finding is that, in general, the Chinese press seems to have paid a lot of more attention to the dispute than the Japanese one. This trend also applies to the first two periods, but not to the third one. In fact, the *China Daily* has about the double of articles than the two Japanese newspapers together in Period 1 (9 versus 2+2), and in the second one the numbers are overwhelming (107 versus 10+20). However, in the post-crisis period, the number of the *China Daily* articles is only about the same than the *Yomiuri Shimbun* and half of the *Asahi Shimbun* (10 versus 9 versus 19).

This seems to suggest that a) the Chinese press was paying a little more attention to the dispute before the crisis arose, and this attention was strongly reinforced during the crisis period (increasing from 9 to 107 articles); and b) the Japanese press showed a late response to the dispute. However, when changing the angle of analysis, another perspective can be seen. This is the case when the number and percentage of articles about the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute is compared to the total number of articles about the other country (about Japan in the CD, and about China in the YS and the AS), as is displayed in Table 1: in average, 26,5% of the 710 articles about Japan/China focus on the Diaoyu/Senkaku tension, with the *China Daily* being below the average (23,4%) and the *Yomiuri* (33,9%) and the *Asahi* (37,6%) above it. So, the highest number of articles about Diaoyu/Senkaku (*China Daily*) should be balanced with the highest percentage (*Asahi* and *Yomiuri*, respectively). Volume should be balanced with proportion. Also, it is noteworthy that, in general, the percentage of articles about D/S is short in Period 1 (5%), increasing then dramatically to 41% in Periods 2 and 3, with the CD reaching 39%, the YS 50%, and the AS 65%.

In sum: in August, the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute was paid comparatively less attention by both countries' newspapers, but this state of affairs drastically changed during Periods 2 and 3. The narratives about Diaoyu/Senkaku became more self-consciously strategic:

⁴ As previously explained, the *Yomiuri* articles only correspond to the digital version of printed articles. This means that the original number of (online) articles could be higher, but there was no access to them.

China also has started making a concerted effort to win international support for its claim to the islands. Japan needs to step up its own efforts to make sure that its position on the issue is understood (...) (A17).

4.2. Newspapers content: a brief view

This section consists of a brief characterization of each newspaper's traits, some of which differ, some which are shared by all. Common traits include the fact that they are all targeted to an international audience, written in English and available online.

A careful reading of the 188 articles provides us with a good knowledge of the events and chronology, as well as distinct viewpoints. There are several types of articles: some more descriptive, others more analytical; some longer, others shorter; some with authorship, others not; some with interviews, others with declarations; some with photos, others not; etc. Nevertheless, general differences among the narratives displayed by the three newspapers can be traced.

China Daily: quantity, history and assertiveness

When analyzing *China Daily*, China's biggest English language newspaper, the sheer quantity of its articles should once more be mentioned, as well as the fact it increased during the crisis period, and then went down again. This might be partially due to the fact that the *China Daily* is a state-run newspaper in an authoritarian one-party state, and from its very creation (1980) was seen as a tool of public diplomacy (Zhang 2008, 308).

Most of its articles have no authorship or photos (Table 2, Appendix 3), and are issued by the national news agency, Xinhua. Many articles are short, descriptive and repetitive. In some cases, only the title is changed between articles (CD20 and CD21; CD66 and CD67). In others there is only a slight change (CD42 and CD44; CD 121 and CD122) or they become the basis of a forthcoming longer article (CD112 and CD115). Naturally, there are also longer articles, with authorship and/or photos.

Among the different kinds of articles, some features can be highlighted. Many adopt a firm, almost aggressive tone towards the measures announced by the Japanese, either by warning or admonishing, describing possible and strong Chinese counter-measures:⁵

The country [Japan] should be informed of the serious consequences of its behavior. (CD32)

China may dispatch cruise ships to claim sovereignty and put direct pressure on Japan. (CD39)

China will never sacrifice its sovereignty to maintain the peaceful development. (CD81)

China will not tolerate Japan's arrogance, an arrogance that could be disastrous to all of East Asia. (CD93)

Tensions surrounding the Diaoyu Islands are being stirred up single-handedly by Japan in an attempt to rewrite Japan's inglorious history of illegally stealing Chinese territory. (CD111)

Overt or covert threats can be traced in some of these strong sentences. Acts of punishment, including military action, are presented as a possibility on the table. Soft power and hard power are not treated as mutually exclusive, but used in conjunction with each other.

Another kind of articles are those that include *historical claims*. These have become an important part of the Chinese media strategy. Some of them go back centuries ago, and are quite exhaustive:

It is known to all that the Diaoyu Islands and the affiliated islands have been China's sacred territory since ancient times, which is supported by historical facts and jurisprudential evidence. (CD63)

Thus it can be seen that China, by the early 1400s at the latest, had discovered Diaoyu Islands and placed them under its jurisdiction as affiliated to Taiwan. (CD107)

Also regarding historical claims, several articles remember the “fascist” past of Japan and the Chinese humiliation under the Japanese army; some of the articles also emphasize that Japan never regretted this past, and that this contrasts with the attitude of other countries:

Former German Chancellor Willy Brandt knelt down at the monument to Warsaw Ghetto victims to show Germany's sincere apology for its crimes committed during the Second World War, and a united Germany officially renounced in 1990 all claims to the

⁵ The excerpts below act as examples; they are not exhaustive.

territory east of the Oder-Neisse line. By comparison, Japan, another invader in the WWII, not only refuses to apologize for its war crimes, but also goes to so far as to "nationalize" territories that belong to another country. (CD63)

However, what Japan is presently doing is an outright denial of the outcome of the victory of the world anti-Fascist war, which constitutes a grave challenge to the post-war international order. (CD82)

At the same time, while never conferring too much importance to the Japanese Government's argument that the purchase of the islands was a way of preventing unwanted acts from private hands, the CD stresses the Japanese "rightist" forces that are driving this issue. Several articles mention it. Two titles are enough elucidative: *Reining in Japanese rightists* (CD11) and *Japanese govt must stop conniving at rightist provocations* (CD124).

Most CD articles are about China's position or moves related to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. They do not grant much space to the Japanese position (CD10, CD24, CD42, CD58). Rather, CD prefers to evoke other countries' position or the good relationship between China and other countries (even mentioning acts of solidarity done by overseas Chinese citizens). So, *other states* (besides Japan) and *particular individuals or groups* become an important *social actor* targeted in the CD narratives to make their point. As Table 3 (Appendix 4) shows, 26 different countries are mentioned, the most represented being the US (mentioned in 37 CD articles), followed by Taiwan (21) and South Korea (14).

Yomiuri Shimbun: focus on internal affairs

Yomiuri, Japan's main conservative newspaper, has the majority of its articles focusing on domestic issues related to the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. *Yomiuri's* narratives portray the different political forces as its actors; they include the (then) Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, the Liberal Democratic Party led by Shinzo Abe (the once and future Prime-Minister), and Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, the nationalist who threatened to buy the islands and build infra-structure on them. Several articles concentrate on the domestic political tensions, which are often related to particular aspects at stake in the dispute.

The main opposition Liberal Democratic Party is considering issuing a censure motion against Defense Minister Satoshi Morimoto (Y1)

Noda launched his third reshuffled Cabinet on Monday. The purpose of the reshuffle, he said, was "to further deepen cooperation between the government and the ruling parties and to strengthen the Cabinet's functions." (Y16)

This week's Cabinet reshuffle is a prime chance for the government to rectify previous economic policy blunders. (Y19)

Some articles, however, put the emphasis not only on the territorial dispute with China (Y3, Y5, Y17, Y18, Y20) but also the one with South Korea (Y2) and Russia (Y11). An explicit reminder of the importance of soft power can be found in Y18 under the title *Govt should counter China's propaganda on Senkakus*:

China's propaganda campaign over the Senkaku Islands has run rampant, conveying false and improper messages to the world. The Japanese government should counter China's campaign by demonstrating the legitimacy of Japan's territorial claim on the islands to the international community. (Y18)

Asahi Shimbun: moderation and multiple viewpoints

Left-leaning *Asahi* seems to display a more balanced stance, having more different types of articles and perspectives. It contains a) the account of actions and reactions by both Japan (A3, A6, A10, A11, A12, A13, A18, A21, A26, A29, A31, A34, A41) and China (A2, A4, A5, A9, A14, A16, A17, A19, A22, A27, A33, A37, A38, A39); b) opposite opinions on the dispute, including divergent historical claims (A8, A16, A17, A20, A22, A25, A40); c) examples of moderation and good will acts towards the Chinese (A17, A23, A25, A32, A35, A40); d) considerations on the economic consequences of the dispute (A15, A19, A27, A30, A33, A38, A39), and e) views about the relationship with the two other countries with whom Japan has territorial disputes, i.e., South Korea (A1, A12, A13, A18, A20, A21, A24, A31, A36, A40) and Russia (A1, A11, A24). Nevertheless, it consistently maintains support for Japan's territorial claims.

Some examples:

Two Chinese patrol boats reached waters off the disputed Senkaku Islands on Sept. 11, a significant escalation in the standoff just a day after Beijing threatened to retaliate over a move by Japan's government to nationalize three of the islands. (A14)

In 1895, Japan found that no other country had laid claim to the Senkaku Islands and incorporated them into its territory. (A17)

Japanese exporters to China are braced for repercussions that could range from mob violence to a consumer boycott, and even outright sanctions, amid an escalated standoff over the disputed Senkaku Islands. (A15)

4.3. System narratives

“System narratives are about the nature of the structure of international affairs. (...) The agency of actors is inherent to this process” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle 2013, 7).

In *China Daily*, international law is usually presented as a reason why China is entitled to the control of the islands, while the Japanese control of the islands is presented as the product of illegal aggression (CD49), and Japan’s current behavior is linked to its past as a dangerous imperialist nation: “*the dispute (...) reminds the Chinese people of the past aggression brought against it by the Japanese military state*” (CD29); through these lens, Japanese actions on Diaoyu are portrayed as a challenge to the postwar order and to the other permanent members of the UN Security Council (CD29). China’s actions to reclaim the control of the islands are depicted as compatible with its “peaceful rise” narrative, since China tries solving the issue through the proper, official means, whereas Japan is only acting through unilateral action. CD highlights China’s integration and relevant place in the global order by mentioning its seat in the UN Security Council (CD29), once again emphasizing that it wishes to handle the dispute through the proper channels of the dominant international system. CD also accuses the Japanese purchase of the islands of being a public diplomacy “farce” (CD84). Another recurrent argument in the CD articles is that Japan does not accept going to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), contrasting its acceptance of such mediation in its dispute with South Korea (CD118). More: China accuses Japan of not even acknowledging the existence of a dispute: “*To settle a dispute, one must first acknowledge that the dispute exists.*” (CD11)

In fact, the Japanese press mirrors this position through declarations of its Prime-Minister: “*We are not considering using the ICJ,*” Noda said at a press conference, emphasizing there is no doubt the “*Senkaku Islands are an integral part of Japanese territory both internationally and historically.*” (CD118) On the Japanese side, there are also allusions to the law and the international system, but even considering the smaller number of Japanese articles, those allusions are still disproportionately less than the ones in the Chinese newspaper. The Japanese newspapers’ main argument is this:

It was only since the 1970s that the Chinese government began claiming territorial sovereignty over the islands, after the existence of an oil deposit was confirmed beneath

the nearby seafloor. Before then, Beijing had never objected to Japan's possession of the Senkaku Islands. This fact clearly supports Japan's claims. (Y18)

The idea that Japan is entitled to the control of the islands is taken mostly for granted whenever the dispute is mentioned, which might be a side effect of the Japanese government's position that there is no dispute to begin with. There is usually no phrase that is a counterpart to the Chinese repeated variations of "the Diaoyu islands belong to China", except in a few articles where the Japanese right to Senkaku is explicitly articulated (Y18, A17, A8) such as "*The Japanese government's view is that procedures were in line with the appropriate means under international law for acquiring territorial rights*" (A8). In these articles, the two Japanese newspapers mention Japan's own historical claims to the islands, as well as the need to convince other countries of Japanese legitimacy in spite of Chinese efforts:

China also has started making a concerted effort to win international support for its claim to the islands. Japan needs to step up its own efforts to make sure that its position on the issue is understood by explaining the grounds on which it bases its claim. (A17)

Showing concerns over Chinese propaganda efforts in Europe and the USA (which included buying ads in major Western newspapers), *Yomiuri* supported the Japanese government's investment in public diplomacy and counterpropaganda (Y18). *Asahi* suggests that the reason why Chinese surveillance ships entered Japanese territorial waters during that time period was precisely to keep the dispute "*in the international spotlight*" (A37); if this assumption is correct, then it showcases how even military maneuvers (a traditional element of hard power) can be incorporated into public diplomacy (and, by extension, soft power).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, system narratives also are about which actors are relevant to the system. In the Japanese and Chinese newspapers' narratives, the role of the USA as the *hegemon* (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle, 2013) is implicit (and sometimes explicit). The Japanese newspapers depict US military presence as a way of keeping China in check (Y21, A20). China claims that the main reason Japan has the control of the islands is thanks to "backroom deals" with the US (CD82, CD107), and the reason why it is not afraid of military confrontation with China is also US assistance (CD29, CD54, CD63). China goes so far as implying that the US's will overrides international law under the current system, claiming: "*The Japanese government dares to defy the Potsdam*

Proclamation by claiming the Diaoyu Islands because it has been counting on American military support in the event of a military confrontation with China", adding that Japan "lives at the mercy of American military superiority" (CD29). CD urges Japan to stop relying on US hegemony for its foreign policy and instead become closer to its regional neighbors (CD29), which Japan has alienated "due to its aggressive history during World War II and irresponsibility over its history" (CD105). China itself is also portrayed as a *rising power*, one that can alter the balance of the regional system:

Japan is worried that China's continued rise and the change in the regional power balance will end its illegal possession of the Diaoyu Islands and is thus eager to get an upper hand in the dispute. (CD27).

Finally, one recurring theme throughout the articles is sovereignty, and its importance. Both countries vigorously play the *sovereignty game* (O'Shea, 2012a,b); the countries justify their actions in the present and in the future (even the eventual deployment of military forces into battle) within the framework of the modern Westphalian system where nations are entitled to the respect and protection of its rightful territory and borders. This implicit acceptance of the system once again marks the evolution of China's foreign policy rhetoric since the Maoist era; that previously revolutionary and hostile rhetoric in the past (which openly planned to disrupt dominant powers like the US and the Soviet Union) now presents itself as peaceful and international law-abiding (Zhang 2008), and thus deserving support from the other world powers.

4.4. Identity Narratives

Identity narratives are about the identity of the actors of international affairs that are in a constant process of constant negotiation and contestation. (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle 2013, 7).

The nation-state is the actor *par excellence* of the Westphalian international order. While the globalization process highlighted the growing importance of other actors (ex: transnational corporations, NGOs), nevertheless this section still mainly addresses the characterization of the two main state actors of these narratives: China and Japan.

China

There are many points regarding the characterization of China's identity which have already been mentioned. One is its status as a nation who underwent a *"rapid rise as an economic and military power"* (A24), and as such will not allow another *"century of humiliation"* (CD69). China's status as a *rising power* is acknowledged by both countries' narratives: CD mentions China's *"continued rise and the change in the regional power balance"*, whereas *Asahi* goes as far as interviewing Wang Jisi, a Chinese professor who argued that *"since China has already ascended to first-class power status in the world, "it deserves more respect""* (A40). Keeping up the peaceful rise narrative and rejecting the China threat theory, the Chinese press presents its country as a *"responsible rising power"* (CD53), acting harshly only for the understandable and reasonable cause of safeguarding its own sovereignty. CD quotes third parties to support this point, such as Iran, whose official says *"[Iran] speaks highly of China's independent and peaceful foreign policy and the positive role China has played in international and regional issues"* (CD46).

The Japanese newspapers, on the other hand, are far more ambivalent in their portrayal of China, and at points outright negative. Not only do Japanese newspapers defend Japanese historical claims on the islands and reject China's arguments, but they go so far as implying that China might not wholeheartedly believe its own claims and might actually be acting disingenuously for self-serving purposes (A8, Y18). They portray China as aggressive, and increasingly so as of recent times: *"China (...) has a history of aggressively protecting what it considers its territory."* (A6). *Asahi* claims that China's anger is counterproductive and not entirely justified because it is not appreciating the Japanese government's reasoning for its decision, even though such reasoning has been repeatedly explained:

Many Chinese seem to believe the Japanese government took advantage of Ishihara's action to strengthen its control over the islands. But Japan's decision was aimed at preventing unnecessary diplomatic friction over the islands, which would have flared if they had come under Ishihara's management. After all, he has a history of exhibiting provocative behavior with regard to China. The purchase was the only possible way for the central government to prevent the metropolitan government from gaining control of the islands. Japan has repeatedly explained this to China. (A17).

Interestingly, both *Asahi's* most negative and positive article on China consist of an interview with a foreign expert. The most negative interview is with Aaron Friedberg, an

American scholar, who shows wariness towards the combination of *“China’s growing wealth and power, and the unchanging character of its political regime, the fact that it’s still ruled by a one-party, authoritarian dictatorship”* (A20) and warns Japan not to concede on territorial disputes or otherwise *“Beijing will just keep pushing”* (A20). On the other hand, the most positive interview is with Wang Jisi, the Chinese expert who views China as a *“first-class power status in the world”*, who claims that *“the leadership in China is very prudent and very sober-minded”* and who believes that *“China’s interactions with its neighbors were neutral and defensive”* (A40). It should be said, however, that such a positive portrayal of China in *Asahi* is more the exception than the rule.

As for non-state actors, Chinese citizens are portrayed as being openly against Japanese actions, which led to some of them engaging in activism and boycotting Japanese products (CD65). While this was applauded as a sign of patriotism by the Chinese press, the Japanese newspapers criticized the Chinese government for allowing the *“the radicalization of the opinions (...) due to anti-Japanese sentiment”* (Y5) and the decision to *“fan Chinese public sentiment against Japan amid a fresh wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations”* (A17). As some of the anti-Japanese protests turned violent, *Asahi* categorized the violent offenders as *“barbaric”* (A11), and *Yomiuri* criticized China for not doing enough to dissuade its citizens from being violent (Y5).

Japan

The previous sections have already made a substantial characterization of CD’s portrayal of Japan, where it is consistently portrayed as dishonest on its words and deeds, often resorting to what CD calls *“tricks”* (CD41), a *“farce”* (CD30), *“crafty plots”* (CD54), *“historical lies”* (CD 107) and *“provocations”* (CD30). To further emphasize this point, when CD mentions Japan’s plan to purchase the islands, it usually uses words such as *“nationalize”* or *“purchase”* with quotation marks in a way to delegitimize such actions (CD21, CD 25, CD27). There are also allusions to Japan’s fascist past (and Japan’s failing to fully deal with that past, which is connected to its present negative attitude), which are either explicitly or implicitly made. The idea that Japan can present a *“challenge to the post-war international order”* (CD74) adds elements of a *rogue state* (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle 2013) to the Chinese narrative’s characterization of Japan.

It is also worth pointing out that with both Chinese and Japanese newspapers there is more differentiation between the individual actors within Japan's politics as compared to China; this is likely a product of the differences between a one-party state and a multi-party democracy. CD writes that the unreasonable actions of the Japanese government are in part a product of Japanese domestic politics and the incumbent party's electoral struggles (CD15, CD20). In fact, a common theme between the three newspapers is a generally unfavorable portrayal of then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda and the DPJ, his party, although for opposite reasons: the Chinese side thinks Noda did not stand up to the Japanese nationalist right and instead made things worse by purchasing the islands, whereas the Japanese side saw Noda's government as unstable and not assertive enough in handling China. Despite Noda's claim that the island purchase was meant to prevent Ishihara, the nationalist Tokyo governor, from escalating the situation, China rejected that argument saying that *"there is no essential difference between the Japanese government's plan and Ishihara's claim, (...) that's why the Chinese will always oppose such moves"* (CD45). On the other hand, *Yomiuri* compared Ishihara's proposal favorably to Noda's lack of initiative:

Tokyo Gov. Shintaro Ishihara's proactive steps to jump-start the purchase negotiations with the owner apparently prompted the central government, which had been dragging its feet on the issue, to make such a move (Y8)

Even *Asahi* remarks on the DPJ's loss of confidence among the Japanese public (A34). On the topic of Ishihara, Japanese right-wingers as a whole are singled out by CD as one of the main causes for the escalation of tensions and Japan's erratic policies, as seen above.

Other state actors

Japan and China are the main actors of both narratives, but outside actors are also mentioned and involved (Table 3, Appendix 4). The United States is treated as the most important third party: Japanese newspapers portray the US as a fundamental ally in keeping China in check, whereas CD depicts the US as an unbalancing force that is encouraging bad behavior on the part of Japan and contributing to regional instability. CD links the US's role in the Diaoyu dispute to a larger context of an adversarial containment strategy of China (CD105).

Taiwan is mentioned in 21 articles by *China Daily*, either as a previous administrator of the islands and Chinese territory (CD7, CD49, CD54), or for its current position against the purchase of the islands (CD64, CD71, CD72). Other main state actors include South Korea, Russia and the Philippines, which have their own territorial disputes with either China or Japan, and provide a counterpoint to the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute.

4.5. Issue Narratives

“Issue narratives are strategic in the sense of seeking to shape the terrain on which policy discussions take place” (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle 2013, 7).

This section is related to the narratives surrounding the characterization of the issues, their context, and the policies that may solve those issues. It consists of three parts: the historical narratives of issues, suggested policies, and the specific issue of economic consequences.

Historical background: a meaningful past

Part of what can “shape the terrain on which policy discussions take place” is the historical context. Roselle, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin (2014, 75) talk about “the importance of temporality – as narratives are quite often structured to address past, present, and future”. While the three periods of time are all present in the narratives one way or another, there are three elements of the past which are mentioned repeatedly in China and Japan’s Diaoyu/Senkaku narratives, and their significance impacts those narratives in a relevant way. Those three elements of the past are 1) China’s “Century of Humiliation” (which is mainly mentioned on the Chinese narratives); 2) the “40th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties between Japan and China” (which is mentioned by the newspapers of both countries); and 3) Japan’s “fascist past” (mostly referenced by Chinese press). Those elements are further expanded upon and analyzed below:

1) The nature of the instability and foreign interference in China during the century of humiliation left a feeling of wounded pride and resentment in the Chinese collective

identity, as well as the notion that such indignities must never be inflicted upon China ever again, and that China's modern strength is a tool for this purpose.

Japan took control of the islands when China was distracted by domestic and foreign troubles in the late 19th century. But China is no longer the weak country it was then. (CD93).

Long gone are the days when the Chinese nation was subject to bullying and humiliation from others. The Chinese government will not sit idly by watching its territorial sovereignty being infringed upon. (CD94).

The link between what China sees as the unlawful control of Chinese territory by the Japanese and the way China was mercilessly pushed around by foreign powers in the previous two centuries is made explicit in quotes such as these. However, this link can also be understood as implied throughout the whole narrative in the way China guarantees the protection of its sovereignty.

2) The fact that 2012, the year in which the tensions over Diaoyu/Senkaku flared up, is also the 40th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties between Japan and China becomes an irony of fate that is repeatedly mentioned throughout the two narratives:

It should be remembered that this year marks the 40th anniversary of restoring diplomatic relations between Japan and China. The two countries should not allow a flare-up in a territorial dispute to spoil the celebration of that occasion. (A11)

It is sad to see this dispute ahead of the 40th anniversary of the normalization of China-Japan relations, which ought to be celebrated and used to create closer ties. (CD98)

CD criticizes Japanese politicians for jeopardizing Sino-Japanese relations on such a date (CD 107), whereas *Asahi* (which in 2012 ran a series of articles on the 40 years of normalized relations) asks not to let the current disagreement between China and Japan ruin the celebration (A11, A32).

3) Chinese narratives frequently allude to a shared past with the countries which opposed the fascist Axis Powers (such as Japan) in WWII in an attempt to elicit sympathy and support. As mentioned before in this chapter, China said that the victors of WWII have a "legal and moral obligation to enforce the verdict of the WWII" (CD29), which is to say, not to let Japan hold territory such as Diaoyu/Senkaku (which should have been returned to China's control as a result of WWII). During a visit of the Papua New Guinea Prime-Minister, the Chinese Vice-Premier reminded him that "both China and Papua New

Guinea were victims to the Japanese fascist invasion back in the Second World War” and that Japanese behavior in regard to Diaoyu “is an outright denial of the outcomes of victory in the war against fascism and constitutes a grave challenge to the post-war international order”. (CD74) By alluding to a certain historical background, China thus shapes the terrain of the issue to its favor, painting Japan in a bad light and China in a positive one, creating a dichotomy from which it benefits.

Even though the Japanese press occasionally mentions China’s past aggressiveness, this is a comparatively weaker message. The negative images about the other country do not have the same force in the Chinese and Japanese narratives; the Chinese narrative is clearly more assertive.

Suggested measures and solutions

China Daily makes several mentions on how to deescalate the tensions and solve the conflict. Its advice on what Japan ought to do can be summed with the following quote:

We urge the Japanese side to make concrete efforts to correct its mistakes, immediately stop activities that undermine China's sovereignty, and come back to the understanding and consensus reached between the two sides, and return to the track of settling the dispute through negotiations. (CD95).

The appeal for Japan to admit the existence of the dispute and to sit at the negotiation table is a recurring theme on the Chinese narrative. At the same time, China makes it clear that one thing it will not make concessions on is its territorial sovereignty:

Premier Wen Jiabao said Monday the Diaoyu Islands are an inalienable part of China's territory and China will "absolutely make no concession" on issues concerning its sovereignty and territorial integrity. (CD47).

Through CD’s narrative, we can see the description and support of measures that effectively promote the *entrenchment* (Hassner 2007) of the territorial dispute on the three different entrenchment levels:

From announcing base points and baselines of territorial waters of the Diaoyu Islands to the patrolling, China has taken just and legitimate actions to safeguard its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, which has won widespread applause from the Chinese public. (CD63)

1) Material entrenchment: *“China's civil patrol ships Tuesday reached the waters around the islands to start patrolling and showing China's sovereignty over these islands.”* (CD63);

2) Functional entrenchment: *“announcing base points and baselines of territorial waters”* (CD63);

3) Symbolic entrenchment: essentially all of the historical references to the Century of Humiliation, Chinese and allied resistance against Japanese fascism, and the importance of sovereignty. All of these help to confer an ideational quality to the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute that goes beyond a materialistic view on the practical need for land and resources.

As for the Japanese narratives, we find the calls for China to keep a cool head, to be understanding, and to reach a compromise, stressing Japan's purpose to *“maintain the island chain peacefully and stably.”* (Y6). We can read declarations such as: *“We should further strengthen our strategic partnership with China.”* (Y6); *“the government did not want to provoke China”* (Y8); *“We do not want anything that would affect the general bilateral relations between Japan and China.”* (Y12); *“Japan's decision was aimed at preventing unnecessary diplomatic friction (...) Japan has repeatedly explained this to China.”* (A17); or *“we have to overcome these immediate obstacles and focus on other priorities that are in our best long-term interests.”* (A40)

The Japanese side also had its levels of entrenchment:

1) Material entrenchment:

Meanwhile, the nation needs to strengthen the Japan Coast Guard's policing system and its authority to beef up surveillance of the Senkaku Islands. A bill to revise the Japan Coast Guard Law, which was approved during the current Diet session, is part of such efforts. Previously, when foreigners landed illegally on the Senkakus, police officers had to come all the way from neighboring islets. But under the revised law, JCG officers will be allowed to arrest such intruders. (Y8)

Interestingly, an article discusses that even more material entrenchment (i.e.: the building of infra-structure on the islands, such as the repairing of a lighthouse) could have been enacted, but the Japanese government opted against it because it did not want to draw China's anger any more than it already had (Y12).

2) Functional entrenchment: *“On Sunday, a team of surveyors dispatched by Tokyo surveyed the islands and conducted research from boats in the sea surrounding the islands.”* (Y6)

3) Symbolic entrenchment: all of the references to the importance of protecting Japan’s sovereignty, and the presentation of Japan’s historical claims to Senkaku. The symbolic entrenchment of the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute on the minds of Japanese citizens is meaningfully captured in an article about the formation of a Japanese political party. Not just Senkaku, but also the Takeshima islands (disputed with Korea) are symbolically entrenched via that new Japanese political party’s logo, which is a map of Japan that purposefully includes both sets of disputed islands in it (A18).

Economic consequences for the "cockpit of the global economy"

The three newspapers thoroughly deal with this economic issue, either by directly drawing attention to it or by depicting acts hurting the Japanese economy (namely boycotts to Japanese products).

Acknowledging that *the Asia-Pacific region is the "cockpit of the global economy"* (CD89), both countries show awareness of the possible damage from a trade war, one that would have effects beyond their own countries. There is a relation of interdependence which works both as an argument for contention and as an instrument to make a point. Some articles promote a deeper look into their economic relations in the past decades and in the present (CD5, CD91, CD103, A30) while others report actions such as the drop of Japanese car sales in China (CD34, CD126), the cancellation of touristic tours by Chinese in Japan (A27), or the destruction of Japanese stores in China (A33).

Not surprisingly, we find crossed arguments. For example, the Japanese stress that *“China's economy has itself suffered an increasingly evident slowdown.”* (A15) and that Japan *“has the technology China needs and helps create jobs there.”* (A15), while the Chinese allude to the economic and demographic stagnation of Japan. It is the case of the Chinese scholar Zhu Jianrong (professor in a Japanese university in Tokyo and Japanese TV commentator) who *“realized that Japan's hardening position against China reflected a public loss of confidence due to crippling economic challenges at home”* (A32) and who

declared that *"I now have a sense of mission to encourage Japanese to have more confidence in their country's place in the world"*, adding that *"That way, I think people generally will not cave in to exclusive nationalism"* (A32). As stated in the Introduction, these two countries are the biggest economies in East Asia and an important part of the globalized world. In the characterization of the economic issue, their narratives show awareness for what is at stake.

Conclusion

We asked if any of the great powers could create a narrative about that future order that they could all buy into. Could a compelling narrative make World War III unnecessary? (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle 2013, xi)

Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle open their book on strategic narratives with this question. They admit that the question may be naïve, but still conclude that “political leaders have no choice but to try and create a consensus around their narrative” (2013, xii). This thesis never aspired to single-handedly answer their monumental opening question, but it did intend to analyze narratives which not just political leaders, but also newspapers tried using to create consensus around one thorny aspect of Sino-Japanese relations: the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute. Throughout the thesis, different components and types of strategic narratives were highlighted: components such as *actors*, *environment*, *action* or *resolution*, and types such as *system*, *identity*, and *issue narratives*. These narrative elements, complemented with other concepts such as soft power and different aspects of territorial disputes, all presented in the theoretical chapter, served as the framework for the analysis of the Chinese and Japanese narratives. The historical background and media environment in which the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute coverage took place was also provided, this under the assumption that one cannot fully grasp the formation, allusions and subtexts of a narrative without understanding the conditions from which they emerged.

Different narratives could only be understood having in mind the previously presented details of China and Japan's shared turbulent past: China's century of humiliation, the acquisition of the islands at the end of the 19th century by Japan (which, depending who you ask, was either entirely lawful or an act of imperialistic aggression), the US's hegemonic role through which it returned the islands to Japan (an act China characterized as “backroom deals”) and pledged to defend that territory in case of a Chinese attack, and the progressive deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations in 2012 due to the purchase of three of the islands by the Japanese Government (an act presented by the Japanese government as a way of preventing tensions from escalating, but nevertheless drew angry political and economic retaliation from China). All of these historical details made their appearance in the narratives.

The media environment section revealed some ironies in the comparison between the narratives of the two countries: China is an authoritarian one-party communist state which nevertheless allowed for some (limited) media autonomy and commerciality in some cases; Japan is a multi-party democracy which despite a mostly free press nevertheless has some degree of government influence over private media outlets, in part thanks to the press club system. An individual analysis of each of the three selected newspapers was also provided. Indeed, awareness of these factors allowed for a deeper understanding of the strategic narratives in display.

The 188 articles revealed diverse narrative trends, which were often intertwined. A main narrative stood out for each country. For China, it was the recurrent and detailed historical claims which “prove” that the Chinese possession of the islands goes back as far as the 14th century, despite Japanese “tricks”; for Japan, it was its “irrefutable” ownership of the islands, and that dishonest, aggressive China only started to reclaim the islands in the seventies after it was made aware of important natural resources in the area.

Other relevant narratives were found on two particular points: a) the countries’ (self) identities; b) the unique characteristics of each newspaper.

a) In *China Daily*, we find a China who depicts itself as a rising power and a military/economic powerhouse, but also as a peace-loving nation who respects the international order; at the same time, it looks at Japan as an important economic partner, but one with an economic slowdown, a difficulty to distance itself from its militarism, and one who took an unacceptable, unlawful political measure against China’s sovereignty. In the Japanese newspapers, we find Japan sees itself as an economic power and a peaceful nation, with a moderate government which (very legally) purchased the islands with the intention of preventing a Japanese nationalist hard-liner from making the situation worse. China’s unexpected and unwise backlash was portrayed as being part of China’s aggressive, threatening identity.

b) *China Daily*, a state-run paper, is characterized by the enormous volume of information, with an emphasis in historical claims and an assertiveness in its language. The *Yomiuri* and *Asahi* are both Japanese private newspapers, the first more hawkishly conservative, the second more dovish and left-leaning. As such, it is not surprising that

Yomiuri focused more on the internal affairs and depicted China rather negatively, while the *Asahi* tended to make more nuanced descriptions of the troubling political and economic internal affairs, and of both the Japanese and Chinese positions and policies regarding the dispute; at the same time, it depicted friendly gestures towards China (such as displaying Chinese movies in Yokohama), published interviews, and provided the opinion of people from different backgrounds (including a Chinese and an American scholar). Both Japanese newspapers wrote a higher percentage of articles than *China Daily* about the territorial dispute within the total number of articles about the other country. In a way, volume was compensated with proportion.

In the end, while each country's narratives had their distinctive context, tone, connotations, and emphasis, their similarities were easy to see. Despite their discernible differences, each newspaper promoted a self-centered picture of their respective country as a peaceful and legally acting nation, which contrasted with the other being defined by its militarism, aggressiveness, and illegal actions. Which country's narrative rings the truest? That may depend on the reader and is beyond the scope of the thesis. Currently, no actual war has yet broken out over those islands; only time will tell how Sino-Japanese relations will further evolve in the future.

As it can be seen, the empirical findings created some information that may be worthy of further analysis, recontextualization, and inquiry; it would be of interest to see what such further research might produce (as suggested in the methodological chapter). After all, in the recent years, there have been more and more academics who took an interest in strategic narratives as a noteworthy aspect of international relations. However, in comparison to other terms like Nye's soft power, it is still an underresearched topic. Hopefully, this thesis will eventually be seen as a step in the right direction of expanding awareness and knowledge on the subject. Even more hopefully, such research will have in mind Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle's opening question, and shed light on how to unlock one of the strategic narrative's greatest potentials: that of being a non-violent alternative to violent hard power.

Appendices

Appendix 1 – List of newspaper articles (title and code)

CHINA DAILY

Article 1 / CD1 - Defense paper plays up naval issue

Article 2 / CD2 - Japan's defense paper reflects Cold War mentality

Article 3 / CD3 - What's wrong with children loving their country and city?

Article 4 / CD4 - Japan ignores history lesson

Article 5 / CD5 - Cash-rich Chinese firms urged to take acquisition trail to Japan

Article 6 / CD6 - Japanese cabinet leader urges ministers to avoid Yasukuni Shrine

Article 7 / CD7 - The way to foil Japan's plans

Article 8 / CD8 - Japan harms ties 'for own interests'

Article 9 / CD9 - Activists to protest plan to buy islands

Article 10 / CD10 - Japan writes letter to China as calls to ease tensions grow

Article 11 / CD11 - Reining in Japanese rightists

Article 12 / CD12 - Islands dispute triggers battling ads in US

Article 13 / CD13 - Tokyo govt starts illegal survey near Diaoyu Islands

Article 14 / CD14 - Japan's islands survey 'illegal and invalid'

Article 15 / CD15 - Tokyo up to another trick

Article 16 / CD16 - Deceit pivots US foreign policy

Article 17 / CD17 - China lodges representation over Tokyo island survey

Article 18 / CD18 - PLA diplomacy to ease tensions

Article 19 / CD19 - US position on Diaoyu Islands very dangerous

Article 20 / CD20 - China cautions Japan over islands dispute

Article 21 / CD21 - China cautions Japan over bid to 'nationalize' Diaoyu Islands

Article 22 / CD22 - PLA hopes to ease tensions in Asia-Pacific

Article 23 / CD23 - Matching words with deeds

Article 24 / CD24 - Handle Diaoyu issue with care

Article 25 / CD25 - Actress skips Japanese film premiere

Article 26 / CD26 - Clinton flies in amid tension

Article 27 / CD27 - Japan should end the farce

Article 28 / CD28 - Japan govt to buy Diaoyu Islands: media

Article 29 / CD29 - Japan stands to lose if Diaoyu row escalates

Article 30 / CD30 - Islands-buying farce breaks commitment

Article 31 / CD31 - Beijing to take 'necessary measures' to defend territory

Article 32 / CD32 - Japan fans farce on islets

Article 33 / CD33 - Japanese actress invited to visit China's Diaoyu Islands

Article 34 / CD34 - Diplomatic row hurts Japanese car sales in China

Article 35 / CD35 - Better legacy from Clinton

Article 36 / CD36 - 'Shared duty' of all Chinese to guard territory

Article 37 / CD37 - Tokyo signals defense shift to disputed islands

Article 38 / CD38 - Hu: Diaoyu Islands purchase illegal, invalid

Article 39 / CD39 - Tokyo 'must realize this is serious'

Article 40 / CD40 - Getting tougher on Japan

Article 41 / CD41 - Japan should jettison short-sighted tricks

Article 42 / CD42 - Japan determines to buy China's Diaoyu Islands

Article 43 / CD43 - Hu's APEC attendance helps boost integrity, innovation, development, prosperity: FM

Article 44 / CD44 - Japan determines to buy Diaoyu Islands

Article 45 / CD45 - Experts warn Japan against making a wrong move

Article 46 / CD46 - Sino-Iran ties won't change amid intl changes

Article 47 / CD47 - Absolutely no concession' on Diaoyu Islands: Wen

Article 48 / CD48 - Wen vows no concession

Article 49 / CD49 - China's statement over Diaoyu Islands

Article 50 / CD50 - Japan's decision on islands illegal: top legislator

Article 51 / CD51 - China resolutely safeguards sovereignty: FM

Article 52 / CD52 - Japan's further provocation

Article 53 / CD53 - Asia-Pacific integration

Article 54 / CD54 - Diaoyu will remain China's

Article 55 / CD55 - Foreign minister summons Japan's envoy

Article 56 / CD56 - Foreign Ministry statement

Article 57 / CD57 - Mistrust hindering Sino-Japanese ties

Article 58 / CD58 - Japan to disburse reserve funds to buy Diaoyu Islands

Article 59 / CD59 - Full text of Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Article 60 / CD60 - Japanese govt signs purchase contract on Diaoyu Islands

Article 61 / CD61 - Japan appoints new ambassador to China

Article 62 / CD62 - Japan PM orders Self-Defense Forces fully prepared

Article 63 / CD63 - China's determination to safeguard sovereignty unshakable

Article 64 / CD64 - Taiwan strongly protests against Japan

Article 65 / CD65 - Chinese riled by Japan's 'purchase' of islands

Article 66 / CD66 - China's military vows to defend Diaoyu

Article 67 / CD67 - China's military ready to defend Diaoyu

Article 68 / CD68 - China voices protest to Japan over Diaoyu Islands

Article 69 / CD69 - China's top legislature condemns Japan island purchase

Article 70 / CD70 - CPPCC condemns Japan's purchases of Diaoyu Islands

Article 71 / CD71 - Taiwan blasts Japan over Diaoyu Islands

Article 72 / CD72 - PLA pledges support

Article 73 / CD73 - New Japan ambassador to China appointed

Article 74 / CD74 - Vice Premier reiterates Diaoyu Islands in meeting

Article 75 / CD75 - Chinese people support govt on Diaoyu Islands

Article 76 / CD76 - Tokyo lacking sincerity, experts say

Article 77 / CD77 - Islands stolen by Japan

Article 78 / CD78 - Timeline of islands dispute

Article 79 / CD79 - Cross-Straits people indignant at Japan

Article 80 / CD80 - US urges peace in dispute over Diaoyu Islands

Article 81 / CD81 - Expert view on Diaoyu Islands

Article 82 / CD82 - US seems unusually ignorant about Diaoyu Islands history

Article 83 / CD83 - Japan's island 'purchase' challenges post-WWII order

Article 84 / CD84 - Tokyo must come back 'from the brink'

Article 85 / CD85 - Youths indignant over 'purchase' of Diaoyu Islands

Article 86 / CD86 - What Panetta's visit means

Article 87 / CD87 - What major Japanese media said

Article 88 / CD88 - Japan official criticizes Diaoyu 'nationalization'

Article 89 / CD89 - US hopes 'cooler heads' prevail

Article 90 / CD90 - Official criticizes Diaoyu 'nationalization'

Article 91 / CD91 - 'Island purchase' to have negative impact on trade

Article 92 / CD92 - Japan's 'island purchase' to affect trade ties

Article 93 / CD93 - Misjudgment causes misbehavior

Article 94 / CD94 - Japan's move violates common ground for ties

Article 95 / CD95 - China urges settling Diaoyu dispute through negotiations

Article 96 / CD96 - No compromise on Diaoyu Islands sovereignty: Ma

Article 97 / CD97 - Philippine renaming of S China Sea fond dream

Article 98 / CD98 - 'Purchase' of Diaoyu Islands could cost Japan

Article 99 / CD99 - Trade war will have no winners

Article 100 / CD100 - China to conduct routine Diaoyu Islands patrols

Article 101 / CD101 - Sea renaming is politically short-sighted

Article 102 / CD102 - Diaoyu Islands baseline announcement significant: diplomat

Article 103 / CD103 - Islands 'purchase will hurt economic ties'

Article 104 / CD104 - Overseas Chinese protest 'purchase' of Diaoyu Islands

Article 105 / CD105 - US defense chief prepares for Asia trip

Article 106 / CD106 - Chinese federations voice islands indignation

Article 107 / CD107 - Diaoyu Islands cannot be bought

Article 108 / CD108 - Japan to take measures in response to China ships

Article 109 / CD109 - Locke pushes for dialogue

Article 110 / CD110 - Australia enhances military ties with Japan

Article 111 / CD111 - Japan is trying to cover up Diaoyu's theft: official

Article 112 / CD112 - 'Purchase' of Diaoyu Island reflects weakened Japan

Article 113 / CD113 - Resolution reiterated to safeguard sovereignty

Article 114 / CD114 - Safety of Japanese citizens in China protected: FM

Article 115 / CD115 - Diaoyu Islands 'Purchase' reflects weakened Japan: experts

Article 116 / CD116 - Tricks cannot change China's sovereignty over Islands

Article 117 / CD117 - China refutes Japanese politician's remarks

Article 118 / CD118 - Japan not to solve islets row via intl court

Article 119 / CD119 - Noda reshuffles cabinet again

Article 120 / CD120 - Man captured for attacking Japanese car owner

Article 121 / CD121 - Chinese surveillance ships will continue Diaoyu Islands patrols: FM

Article 122 / CD122 - Chinese surveillance ships to continue Diaoyu Islands patrols

Article 123 / CD123 - Ambassador: Diaoyu Islands are Chinese

Article 124 / CD124 - Japanese govt must stop conniving at rightist provocations

Article 125 / CD125 - Japan's new China envoy revealed

Article 126 / CD126 - Toyota's China sales fall by half

YOMIURI SHIMBUN

Article 127 / Y1 - LDP mulls censure of Morimoto / Defense minister's comments on
Takeshima prompt calls for reprimand

Article 128 / Y2 - Taking island row to court / Govt eyes intl trial to show ownership of
Takeshima isles

Article 129 / Y3 - Japan-China exchange events put off, canceled

Article 130 / Y4 - Noda sends letter to Chinese president

Article 131 / Y5 - China shouldn't treat suspects in car attack like heroes

Article 132 / Y6 - Govt 'in last stage of talks to buy Senkakus'

Article 133 / Y7 - Govt to buy 3 Senkaku isles for 2 billion yen

Article 134 / Y8 - Govt should work out specifics for stable control of Senkakus

Article 135 / Y9 - Govt to sign Senkaku contract / Islands' purchase scheduled to be
finalized as early as Tuesday

Article 136 / Y10 - Japan must swiftly overcome its internal deadlock on TPP

Article 137 / Y11 - Japan needs solid strategy for territorial talks with Russia

Article 138 / Y12 - Govt drew up multiple plans for Senkaku use

Article 139 / Y13 - Mixed reactions to Ospreys / Protesters block Futenma gate, others
resigned but demand safety

Article 140 / Y14 - Noda adds new faces to Cabinet / Reshuffled lineup aimed at
strengthening DPJ ahead of next election

Article 141 / Y15 - Continuity of key policies top priority

Article 142 / Y16 - Can Noda's new Cabinet be entrusted to revive Japan?

Article 143 / Y17 - Chinese customs seizes Japanese newspapers

Article 144 / Y18 - Govt should counter China's propaganda on Senkakus

Article 145 / Y19 - All-out efforts needed to avert economic downturn

Article 146 / Y20 - Toyota's China sales fall by half / Tensions between Japan and China
weigh on

Article 147 / Y21 - 2 U.S. carriers deployed to W. Pacific

ASAHI SHIMBUN

Article 148 / A1 - Lee's visit to Takeshima came like bolt out of the blue for Japan

Article 149 / A2 - Hong Kong group departs for Senkaku Islands on a fishing boat

Article 150 / A3 - Governor of Tokyo: Develop Senkakus, and I'll halt purchase

Article 151 / A4 - Chinese authorities question four over Japan flag incident

Article 152 / A5 - Japanese flag incident not premeditated, Chinese authorities say

Article 153 / A6 - INSIGHT: Main battle over Senkaku isles waged between Ishihara, Noda

Article 154 / A7 - Traces of Japanese activity remain on Senkaku Islands

Article 155 / A8 - China only began openly claiming Senkakus in 1970s

Article 156 / A9 - Flag-snatching suspects not indicted, given 5 days detention

Article 157 / A10 - UPDATE: Noda government to buy Senkaku Islands for 2 billion yen

Article 158 / A11 - Government's Senkakus purchase aims to end dispute flare-up

Article 159 / A12 - Abe's remarks on history lack consideration

Article 160 / A13 - Japan tries to break ice with neighbors on fringes of APEC

Article 161 / A14 - Senkakus standoff escalates as Chinese patrol boats approach

Article 162 / A15 - Exporters braced to lose as China strikes back in Senkakustandoff

Article 163 / A16 - China ups the ante in its row with Japan over Senkaku Islands

Article 164 / A17 - China's hard-line response on Senkaku issue counterproductive

Article 165 / A18 - New political party shows its colors with logo carrying disputed islands

Article 166 / A19 - China visit cancellations mark a new cost in Senkaku's dispute

Article 167 / A20 - Interview/ Aaron Friedberg: More balancing needed than engagement with China

Article 168 / A21 - LDP candidates showing no real leadership qualities

Article 169 / A22 - China brings up Japan's past militarism in Senkaku dispute

Article 170 / A23 - Doraemon pre-birthday exhibition brings smiles in Beijing

Article 171 / A24 - Japan-Russia talks are useful, but Tokyo must demand firm concessions

Article 172 / A25 - Hu's Japanese friend calls on him to remember their peace vow

Article 173 / A26 - Interest in Japan Coast Guard career suddenly surges

Article 174 / A27 - Chinese cancel Japan tours as media cast doubt on safety

Article 175 / A28 - 40 Years/ Rocky Partnership: Chinese idol Chen says Japan, China need 'idol ambassadors'

Article 176 / A29 - Vox Populi: Protecting Japan at Okinawa's expense

Article 177 / A30 - Analysis: China slowdown overshadows Japan economy

Article 178 / A31 - Genba, Morimoto stay in Cabinet; prolonged spat with China expected

Article 179 / A32 - 40 Years/ Rocky Partnership: Chinese TV commentators struggle to bridge troubled waters

Article 180 / A33 - Izumiya store in China laments cost of anti-Japan protests

Article 181 / A34 - *Asahi* Poll: 39% prefer Abe as prime minister, 34% choose Noda

Article 182 / A35 - Chinese movies screened again in Yokohama's Chinatown

Article 183 / A36 - Japan deleted from list of countries on Chinese video-sharing sites

Article 184 / A37 - Chinese surveillance ships enter Japanese territorial waters again

Article 185 / A38 - Panasonic's protest-damaged Qingdao factory soon to resume operations

Article 186 / A39 - Mazda sales in China fall 35% in September

Article 187 / A40 - INTERVIEW/ Wang Jisi: China deserves more respect as a first-class power

Article 188 / A41 - Cabinet decides on Kitera as new China ambassador

Appendix 2 - Excel working grid

Entries

Number of article

Newspaper

Title

Themes

Subscription

Period

Date

Link

Type

Photo

Photo description

Author

Sources

Comments

Appendix 3 – Articles with authorship and photo

Newspaper	Author	%	Photo	%	Articles
<i>China Daily</i>	52	41,2	26	20,6	126
<i>Yomiuri Shimbun</i>	0	0	0	0	21
<i>Asahi Shimbun</i>	19	46,3	35	85,4	41
Total	71	37,8	61	32,4	188

Table 2 – Articles with authorship and photo/image by newspaper

Appendix 4 - Countries by newspaper and article

Country	China Daily	F	Yomiuri	F	Asahi	F	Total
Australia	CD24, CD53, CD54, CD110	4	Y10	1	A20, A40	2	7
Bangladesh	CD18, CD22	2					2
Brunei	CD43, CD53	2					2
Canada	CD43	1	Y10	1			2
Fiji	CD50	1					1
France	CD5, CD11, CD125	3					3
Germany	CD11, CD16, CD63, CD98, CD123, CD124	6					6
Greece	CD104	1					1
India	CD18, CD22	2	Y10	1	A20, A40	2	5
Indonesia	CD53	1					1
Iran	CD16, CD46, CD48, CD50	4			A20, A40	2	6
Malaysia	CD18, CD22, CD109	3	Y21	1			4
Mexico			Y10, Y11	2			2
Myanmar	CD18, CD22, CD50	3					3
New Zealand			Y10	1			1
North Korea			Y16	1	A40	1	2
Papua N. Guinea	CD72, CD74, CD76	3			A22	1	4
Philippines	CD23, CD86, CD97, CD101, CD109	5			A27	1	6
Poland	CD113, CD123	2					2
Russia	CD7, CD16, CD24, CD31, CD38, CD39, CD41, CD43, CD53, CD62, CD80, CD89	12	Y1, Y10, Y11, Y16	4	A1, A11, A24	3	19
Singapore	CD5, CD18, CD86	3					3
South Korea	CD5, CD6, CD10, CD16, CD24, CD29, CD37, CD39, CD57, CD61, CD73, CD110, CD118, CD119	14	Y1, Y2, Y10, Y11, Y15, Y16	6	A1, A12, A13, A18, A20, A21, A24, A31, A36, A40	10	30
Sri Lanka	CD18, CD22, CD50	3					3
Taiwan	CD7, CD9, CD36, CD49, CD54, CD56, CD59, CD64, CD71, CD72, CD76, CD77, CD79, CD82, CD83, CD84, CD88, CD90, CD96, CD107, CD123	21	Y1, Y12, Y21	3	A7, A8, A14, A19, A29, A35, A40	7	31
USA	CD2, CD4, CD5, CD7, CD11, CD12, CD16, CD18, CD19, CD22, CD23, CD24, CD25, CD27, CD29, CD35, CD49, CD54, CD56, CD59, CD61, CD69, CD72, CD73, CD76, CD77, CD80, CD82, CD86, CD89, CD93, CD105, CD109, CD110, CD115, CD116, CD117, CD125	37	Y10, Y13, Y16, Y18, Y21	5	A1, A8, A15, A20, A40	5	47
Vietnam	CD18, CD22, CD23, CD26, CD43, CD53, CD109,	7			A20, A40	2	9
Total		140		26		36	202

Table 3 – Other mentioned countries by newspaper and article

(F = Frequency)

Appendix 5 - Content analysis grid

Themes	Subthemes	Description	Excerpts/Examples
Time Sequence	Past	Historical claims	<p><i>It is known to all that the Diaoyu Islands and the affiliated islands have been China's sacred territory since ancient times, which is supported by historical facts and jurisprudential evidence. (CD63)</i></p> <p><i>Long gone are the days when the Chinese nation was subject to bullying and humiliation from others. (CD63)</i></p> <p><i>It was only since the 1970s that the Chinese government began claiming territorial sovereignty over the islands, after the existence of an oil deposit was confirmed beneath the nearby seafloor. Before then, Beijing had never objected to Japan's possession of the Senkaku Islands. This fact clearly supports Japan's claims. (Y11)</i></p>
	Present	Description of current acts	<p><i>Mainland actress Li Bingbing did not show up at the Tokyo premiere ceremony for Resident Evil: Retribution 3D on Monday. The ceremony was attended by leading actress Milla Jovovich. Hong Kong tabloid The Sun quoted Li's manager Ji Xiang as saying that Li did not attend the Tokyo event because she had some work to do in Beijing, but also because she was concerned with the Diaoyu Islands issue between China and Japan recently. "We're taking the same position as our government. Bingbing will attend the film's premiere ceremonies in other countries, but not in Japan," he was quoted as saying. (CD25)</i></p> <p><i>Customs authorities in Beijing confiscated Japanese newspapers delivered from Tokyo on Friday after refusing them entry to China, it was learned Wednesday. (Y17)</i></p> <p><i>This summer, Japanese police arrested Hong Kong-based activists who landed on the disputed islands. The incident triggered a fresh wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations across China. Another incident that further hurt bilateral relations saw Japanese Ambassador to China Uichiro Niwa's official car forced to stop, and then its Japanese flag ripped off. This was an unpardonable act of barbarity. (A11)</i></p> <p><i>The owner gladly agreed that the hall could become the venue of the film festival [in Yokoama]. The event runs until Oct. 10, with a choice of eight films from China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. They include "Farewell My Concubine" and "Under the Hawthorn Tree." This celebration of Chinese culture comes at a time of continuing tension between the Japanese and Chinese governments over the Senkaku Islands territorial dispute. (A35)</i></p> <p><i>Major video-sharing websites in China, which host a huge range of overseas content, are turning a cold shoulder to TV shows and movies created in Japan. The websites, including Youku, Tudou and PPS, recently removed the "Japan" category from their list of countries, making it harder for users to find Japanese content. (A36)</i></p>
	Future	Anticipated or desired consequences	<p><i>The country [Japan] should be informed of the serious consequences of its behavior. (CD32)</i></p> <p><i>With the rise of China and other emerging economies, the trend of development is inexorable. Japan should make a correct assessment of the situation and adopt a right attitude toward China's peaceful rise. (CD2)</i></p> <p><i>If Japanese and Chinese leaders hold a summit meeting on the sideline of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit talks this weekend, they should discuss the future bilateral relationship from a broad point of view. (Y8)</i></p> <p><i>Ishihara's actions over the disputed territory left no choice for the central government but to nationalize the islands. It is now vital to ensure that work begins to repair strained diplomatic relations between Japan and China. (A11)</i></p> <p><i>The Noda administration decided not to build a shelter for fishing boats or a lighthouse on the islands to avoid making any change to their current state. These decisions were made out of consideration to China. Beijing should reflect on these Japanese efforts to prevent a diplomatic row over the islands from spinning out of control. (A17)</i></p>
Power	Hard	Military actions	<p><i>Demonstrating China's undisputable sovereignty over the islands, two ships of the China Marine Surveillance (CMS) reached the waters around the islets Tuesday morning. (CD62)</i></p> <p><i>On Friday, two Chinese surveillance fleets, comprising six ships, arrived in waters around the Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islets. (CD114)</i></p> <p><i>For the second day in a row, Chinese marine surveillance ships entered Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands on Oct. 3, a strategy apparently designed to keep the dispute over sovereignty in the international spotlight. (...) The Japan Coast Guard is maintaining a strong presence in the area. It dispatched 50 or so patrol boats to nearby waters in mid-September. (A37)</i></p>

Soft	Meetings with ambassadors and other officials	Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi on Monday urgently summoned Japanese Ambassador to China Uichiro Niwa for a meeting to lodge solemn representations and strong protest against the Japanese government's illegal "buying" of the Diaoyu Islands. (CD51)	
	Media diplomacy	At a time when Japan and China are embroiled in diplomatic tensions over the Senkaku Islands, a Japanese man wants his good friend, Chinese President Hu Jintao, to remember a pledge they made together in 1984. "Let's recall that day when we vowed never to fight a war again," said Kiichiro Onodera, who served as mayor of Yuza town, Yamagata Prefecture, for four consecutive terms until 2009 and is called "peng you" (friend) by Hu. (A25) It is essential for the nation to conduct public relations activities tenaciously and with a clear strategic vision. It is also important to swiftly respond to China's actions at diplomatic events. (Y18)	
	TV/cinema (people)	Zhu and his fellow [TV] commentators espouse a single message: for more open, self-reflective thinking from the media and citizens of both countries to prevent further instances of extreme nationalism as seen in recent demonstrations that raged in cities across China. (A32) Mainland actress Li Bingbing did not show up at the Tokyo premiere ceremony for Resident Evil: Retribution 3D on Monday. (CD25) While Chinese society is condemning and protesting a recent trip by Tokyo officials to illegally survey the waters near China's Diaoyu Islands, many Chinese netizens are "sincerely" inviting a Japanese actress to set foot on the islands. (CD33) "Movies let us appreciate countries and cultures directly, and we can enjoy them regardless of politics," Kajiwara said. "Especially at a time like this, I want people to watch Chinese films in the Chinatown and develop a better understanding of each other's culture." (A35)	
System narratives	Main social actors (China and Japan)	Contextualization or structure of the international order As a permanent member of UN Security Council, China should discuss the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands at the Security Council in order to peacefully resolve the issue with Japan. (CD 29) The Japanese government's view is that procedures were in line with the appropriate means under international law for acquiring territorial rights (A8)	
Identity narratives	State social actors	China	China's rapid rise as an economic and military power (...). (A24) Since China has already ascended to first-class power status in the world, "it deserves more respect" (A40) As a responsible rising power, China has promised to maintain economic stability and strong economic growth by stimulating domestic demand and rebalancing its domestic economy to help the global economy recover. (CD53) Well, I think China is obviously a rising power in the sense that it's growing rapidly economically and increasing its military power. And those factors, in and of themselves would not be a great concern. The real source of the concern is the combination of China's growing wealth and power, and the unchanging character of its political regime, the fact that it's still ruled by a one-party, authoritarian dictatorship. (A20)
		Japan	Both China and Papua New Guinea were victims to the Japanese fascist invasion back in the Second World War (CD74) (...) Japan has never seriously reflected on its militarist past or made a serious apology. "Such a remorseless attitude has made it difficult for Japan to earn the trust of its neighbors and the forgiveness of people around the world." (CD123) By placing the islands under state control, the [Japanese] government is apparently carrying out its plan to "maintain the island chain peacefully and stably." (Y7)
		Other countries and their official representatives	Both China and Papua New Guinea were victims to the Japanese fascist invasion back in the Second World War (CD74) Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr said Friday morning that Australia will take a neutral stance over China-Japan territorial disputes of Diaoyu Islands, while pledging to enhance military tie with Japan. (CD110) Lee's visit to the Takeshima islands in the Sea of Japan has sparked protests from around the nation. Some people criticized the government for failing to stop Lee from visiting the

			<p>islands. Known as Dokdo in South Korea, the islands are at the center of a territorial dispute between the two countries. (Y1)</p> <p>Before holding further territorial talks with Russia, Japan must firstly strengthen the base of its negotiation stance. (Y11)</p> <p>As far as Japan is concerned, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak crossed the line, and in doing so threw relations with Japan into a tailspin. (A1)</p>
	Non-state social actors	Citizens, groups, scholars, TV people, VIPs	<p>Angered by Japan's so-called "purchase" of some of the Diaoyu Islands, a Chinese territory, people in China of various walks of life have expressed support for the Chinese government in introducing countermeasures. (CD75)</p> <p>Chinese expats in Greece staged on Thursday a demonstration in front of the Japanese embassy in Athens, protesting the "purchase" of the Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese government. (CD104)</p> <p>As Beijing maintains its hard-line stance, a feeling of tension is rising among Japanese people living in China. Some have reported being refused rides by taxi drivers. (A19)</p> <p>In mid-September, Ye Qianrong, a professor of Chinese studies at Tokai University in Tokyo, appeared as a commentator on a Hong Kong news program aired by Phoenix TV, a major Chinese broadcasting station. To the Chinese audience, he repeated the same message of "anti-nationalism," which he discusses whenever he has the chance in Japan. (A32)</p> <p>Recent coverage includes a smoke bomb thrown into the Chinese Consulate-General in Fukuoka and a plastic bottle containing black ink hurled at the Consulate-General in Osaka. Circulating over the Internet are photos of demonstrators carrying a banner that reads "Sink Chinese ships." (A27)</p>
Issue narratives	History	Recurrent historical themes	<p>Long gone are the days when the Chinese nation was subject to bullying and humiliation from others. (CD63)</p> <p>It should be remembered that this year marks the 40th anniversary of restoring diplomatic relations between Japan and China. The two countries should not allow a flare-up in a territorial dispute to spoil the celebration of that occasion. (A11)</p> <p>It is sad to see this dispute ahead of the 40th anniversary of the normalization of China-Japan relations, which ought to be celebrated and used to create closer ties. (CD98)</p>
	Economy	Economic consequences	<p>"If Chinese consumers, in a reasonable manner, express their positions and views against Japan's violation of China's territorial sovereignty, I think it is within their rights to do so and it is understandable," Vice-Minister of Commerce Jiang Zengwei said at a news conference on Thursday. (CD103)</p> <p>Customs authorities in Beijing confiscated Japanese newspapers delivered from Tokyo on Friday after refusing them entry to China, it was learned Wednesday. (Y17)</p> <p>Violent anti-Japan protesters who stormed an Izumiya Co. department store in Suzhou, Jiangsu province, rang up 100 million yen (\$1.3 million) in damage, the company said. (A33)</p> <p>The national economy has taken another turn for the worse. The government and the Bank of Japan must step up their vigilance and make all-out efforts to revive economic growth. (Y19)</p>
	Education	Patriotism in school content	<p>Japan has made many mistakes in its handling of relations with China. It has refused to face up to history and has approved history textbooks that whitewash its heinous war crimes. Such serious mistakes are detrimental not only to bilateral relations but also to Japan's credibility and image on the world stage. The Japanese people have become anxious over their country's strained ties with China, and have urged the government to seriously reflect on its view of history. (CD124)</p> <p>Effects of patriotic education</p> <p>However, an opinion survey conducted by a Chinese portal site on the Internet showed that 80 percent of respondents supported the attack on the Japanese ambassador's car. It is alarming for Japan that many people praised the attack, calling the suspects "heroes."</p> <p>There is a slogan in China that a patriotic act should not be considered a crime. However, it is certainly a problem that the destruction of Japanese cars and restaurants by anti-Japan demonstrators is virtually permitted in that nation. We must point out that the strong effects on young people of the patriotic education by Chinese authorities are behind the radicalization of the opinions they express on the Internet due to anti-Japanese sentiment. (Y5)</p>

Table 4 - Content analysis grid

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