The (Un)changing Hamas

A 'New' Hamas in a New World?

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Abstract

Terrorism seems to have changed character in the wake of globalization and the modern world. The unclear magnitude of these changes has given rise to a debate on whether terrorism today can be labeled as 'new'. This thesis examines how the terrorist organization Hamas should be defined in this debate on the character of contemporary terrorism. The study is carried out as a theory-testing case study, in order to try Peter R. Neumann's theory 'Old & New Terrorism' with previously unproved empirical data. Three operational frameworks based on this theory guides the analysis of empirical material related to Hamas's character. The main concepts of interest are its structure, aims, methods. The study concludes that the character of Hamas is equally 'old' and 'new'. The results show that the theory gives a better understanding of where to locate a terrorist group on the evolutionary spectrum of 'older' or 'newer', but lacks the ability to assess the importance of each individual characteristic.

Keywords: Hamas, Old Terrorism, New Terrorism, Palestine, Israel

Characters: 69 792

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Tables and Schemes

1   Introduction

Terrorism looks very different today compared to what it did just a few decades ago. In the context of late modernity and globalization, there have arguably been changes in the structure, goals, and methods of terrorist groups (Neumann, 2009: 17-28). The character of terrorism is said to have become more vaguely organized, religiously inspired, brutal, and lethal since the '90s (Neumann, 2009: 46-47).

There has been much debate on the alleged 'newness' of today's terrorism. Some argue that the changed character of these factors can be found in the past (Copeland, 2001; Tucker, 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004; Spencer, 2006), while others believe that they have been developed and combined in such a radical way that it is possible to talk of an unprecedented, 'new' type of terrorism (Laquer, 1999; Neumann, 2009). The debate on 'new terrorism' is relatively new, which means that there exists a gap of knowledge concerning the concept as a whole and how some of the most prominent terrorist groups relate to it.

The more academical relevance of the study is the theory-testing approach to the 'new vs. old terrorism' theories, where the results may lead to conclusions regarding the validity and reliability of the theory.

Hamas is an organization which has been classified as a terrorist group in large parts of the world, foremost in the West, and is continuously a prominent topic in the public discourse on terrorism. Several voices have, however, been raised for adopting a more nuanced approach to Hamas by accepting the notion that it is an important and complex political actor, and increasingly so since its victory in the Gaza elections in the year 2006 (Gunning, 2009; Tamimi, 2011; Brenner, 2017a).

This blurred line between Hamas political and terroristic identity is not sufficiently addressed in previous research, and the approach of 'old' and 'new' terrorism has not yet been applied explicitly to Hamas. Such an analysis of the group can contribute with valuable knowledge which can be used to address some of the divisions and uncertainties both in the debate regarding changing terrorism, and the view and characterization of Hamas.

Relating to a 'real-world' issue is also an essential factor to consider in order to assess the rationale of the chosen case (Halperin & Heath, 2017: 85). The choice of Hamas as the case of the present thesis is thus based on the fact that the group is one main actor in one of the most intractable and infected international conflicts in the world. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general, and Hamas's actions in particular, directly affect millions of people in the Palestinian territories and Israel, as well as worldwide. The frequent reports on the conflict in the news are proofs of this, and the conflict is said to be one of the most well-covered and debated issues in European and American media (Segev & Miesch, 2011: 1947). Not having sufficient knowledge about one of the main actors, Hamas, is a real problem if the ambition is to end violence and reach a sustainable peace.

1.1 Purpose

The main aim of this study is not to initiate a discussion on whether Hamas is a terrorist organization or not. The overall purpose is instead to address the debate mentioned above, by outlining Hamas character from an approach based on the theory of 'Old and New Terrorism'.

Most previous research studies Hamas as a part of the terrorism field. The analysis in this study adopts the outset of characterizing Hamas as a terrorist organization as well. It would otherwise be difficult to use the theories and frameworks created to analyze such groups. Nevertheless, the results of this essay can potentially contribute with knowledge that can be used in future discussions regarding the definition of Hamas as a terrorist organization.

With that being said, the primary intention of this study is to investigate what Hamas's terrorism is an example of in the context of late modernity and globalization, which arguably is the main explanation for the development of a new kind of terrorism (Neumann, 2009: 5). The purpose of this study is thus to test theories related to contemporary terrorism as applied to Hamas.

1.1.1 The Research Questions

The main research question which this essay revolves around is:

How should Hamas be defined in the debate of 'Old and New Terrorism'?

In order to reach an answer to this question, the following sub-questions will be used to guide the scope in the research process:

- *How is Hamas organized?*
- *What is its goal?*
- *What methods are used in order to achieve these goals?*
- *Is Hamas mainly an example of 'newer' or 'older' terrorism?*

1.2   Disposition

The study will start with a method chapter, presenting the research design and the empirical material used in the study.

The methodology is followed by a theory chapter, introducing the debate on definitions and the changing character of terrorism as well as the theoretical background used in this study. The last part of the chapter concerns the conceptualization and operationalization of the theory, summarized in three operational frameworks.

A brief historical exposé of Hamas's development introduces the analysis, and the operational frameworks are then used to carefully analyze empirical data related to Hamas's structure, aims, and methods

In the final chapter, the conclusions made of Hamas character are summarized and discussed in order to see how well these finding can help to answer the research question. The study ends with a discussion on how the knowledge produced in this study can contribute to a greater understanding in both the field of 'Old and New Terrorism' and Hamas.

2   Method

2.1   Research Design

2.1.1   Research Puzzle

One approach of keeping a rationale and consistency throughout the process of selecting method, case, and research design in political science, is to constantly refer back to the question "why *not* x *despite* y?" (Gustafsson & Hagström, 2017: 641). When applied to the chosen case and theory, such a question can be formulated as '*Why is Hamas (the case) possibly not an example of new terrorism (X) despite the context of late modernity and globalization (Y)?*'. This question has guided the approach to the topic and been helpful to keep in mind throughout the writing process of the study.

Table 1 shows the construction of the research puzzle when applied to the case of Hamas and the theory of this study. It should here be noted that Neumann states that globalization, and late modernity, in this case the 'Y'-factor, is the main explanation for why terrorism today can be defined as 'new' (Neumann, 2009: 28)

Table 1. The Research Puzzle of Hamas and 'New Terrorism'

	Explanation (y)	*Outcome* (x)
Neumann theory	Globalization and Late Modernity	'New Terrorism'
Hamas (case)	Globalization and Late Modernity	➔ *To be discussed in this study*

The more general goal of this essay can be formulated as determining the 'X-factor' which represents the independent description of Hamas character when tested against the theory of 'Old & New Terrorism'. The study does not, however, primarily aim to test the validity of the 'Y'-factor, that is to say, examining other potential factors than globalization or late modernity explaining Hamas's character.

2.1.2 Theory-Testing Case Study

This study can briefly be characterized as a qualitative, theory-testing, single-case study. When conducting a single-case study, the assumption is that one particular case can help produce knowledge which is relevant when used in other contexts as well (Halperin & Heath, 2017: 214). The assumption in this study is that Hamas is an adequate case for the contribution to the academic debate on 'New and Old Terrorism'. The decision to only analyze one case with one theory is partly due to the limited space, time, and resources designated for this study. A single-case study is not necessarily a weakness since it can be a better tool than multiple-case studies for discovering complex and hidden aspects of the empirical material (George & Bennett, 2004: 10, 13).

Theory-testing case-study approach is often overlooked as a research method, despite the methods potential to refine and develop theories. It can help to outline the potential strengths and weaknesses of the theory in question, by analyzing it with a case of which character initially is not apparent when applied to the theory. (Lokke & Sorensen, 2014: 66). Hamas is a previously unexplored and unusual case when framed within the discussion of contemporary terrorism, meaning that studying it can critically test the existing theories in the field and thus problematize the existing theoretical boundaries (Halperin & Heath, 2017: 214). The uncertainty of Hamas role in this context is evident in the few cases where it is mentioned in previous research (Neumann, 2009: 47). **Table 2** is based on a table created by Lokke and Sorensen (2014: 69) and shows how theory-testing affects differentparts ofn the research design of this study.

Challenging a theory with a complicated case, rather than with a simple one, can also increase the likelihood of showing the validity and reliability of the theory in question. Validity concerns the suitability of the chosen measurements, and the reliability relates to how accurately indicators are measured. Low validity and reliability may lead to a study where methods and results cannot be reproduced or generalized (Halperin & Heath, 2017: 171, 173).

In the case of the 'Old and New Terrorism'-theory, validity relates to whether the indicators summarized in the theoretical framework, as presented further on in **Table 2,** are suitable in order to measure the central concept – terrorism. For instance, the validity of the framework would be low if the conceptualization of terrorism used would be too narrow, and exclude several terrorist organizations, or too broad, including actors not customarily defined as terroristic.

Thereliability ofn this stuy, is determined by the consistency in the results produced after analyzing terrorist groups with the framework. The author of the theory in questionarguese that all terrorist groups have been affected by 'New Terrorism' in one way or another (Neumann, 2009: 13). The reliability of that argument could be questioned if analyses of several terrorist groups with these theoretical measurements would, for example, produce results that are too difficult to reproduce or that differ depending on the chosen case.

Important to consider in this study is that academic theories are not typically intended to be perfectly applicable without exceptions in every case. However, a

critical discussion of the exceptions that may appear could increase insights into the limits and applicability of the theory in question.

Table 2. Theory-testing Research Design

Parts of research design affected:	Purpose	Action	Outcome
Research goal	State the point of departure	Specify the context, the theoretical debate on 'new' terrorism, for the case.	The general framework for the study, e.g. choice of case and analytic strategy.
Outline previous research/theory	Preparation for empirical phase/analysis of Hamas	Discuss and operationalize 'Old & New Terrorism'	The theoretical framework for the analysis
Analysis	Link Neumann's theory and data on Hamas	Relate empirical findings of Hamas to the theory, examine potential paradoxes/anomalies.	Findings in Hamas related to 'Old' or 'New' Terrorism.
Internal validity (in conclusion)	Support findings credibility.	Check alternative rivals not covered by 'Old & New Terrorism'-theory. Comparing minimum data requirements to actual data collected	Credibility of analysis
External validity (in conclusion)	Theory testing	Extend previous results to the current context	Evaluation of 'Old & New Terrorism'-theory; explanatory power or boundaries

Based on: Lokke and Sorensen, 2014: 69

2.2 Empirical Material

Two tracks of literature are used in order to analyze the case and find answers to the research questions of this study.

The first track is literature on 'New an Old Terrorism', mainly focusing on books and articles related to the academic debate of this issue.

The second track is empirical material relating to the structure, aims, and methods of Hamas. Academic literature in the field will be used here as well, but external material is also included in order to obtain as much comprehensive data as possible to process in the analytical framework. Examples of such material are news articles, statistical databases on terrorism, and official documents such as declarations or policies from Hamas themselves.

The broader research field related to the theory is outlined and further discussed in **Chapter 3.**

2.2.1 Demarcations

´The empirical material on Hamas in the analysis is mainly limited to the period from 1987 until today. The movement that would later become Hamas can be traced back many decades before that, but 1987 is used as the starting point in this study since it was the year when the organization was officially established. The early historical development is mentioned briefly, but the inclusion of events from earlier periods could cause much speculation since it is not possible to clearly state to what grade they independently have influenced the character of what later would be Hamas.

The focus will primarily be on the parts of Hamasthathrelates to terrorism.Hamas iss a well-established and comprehensive organization, controlling anything from health-care to relief for the poor. These aspects of the group are, however, mentioned when proving to be important for understanding the group's general character.

3 Theory

3.1 Previous Research

During the past thirty years, the presence of religiously motivated terrorist groups has gone from nearly non-existing to becoming the majority, simultaneously as mass-causality terrorism has increased at a steady pace (Neumann, 2009: 24, 26). Therefore, it is of great importance for governments and societies to understand the logic and the unfamiliar components of contemporary terrorism in order to counteract it.

This study will approach the complexity of terrorism by outlining an overview of previous research in the field, starting with a brief historical background of its development followed by a review of both academic and public definitions and discussions of the concept. The focus will then shift to the more specific discussion on how contemporary terrorism should be characterized, often referred to as the debate on 'new' and 'old' terrorism, aiming to identify terms and definitions that will subsequently be applied to the analytical framework of Hamas.

3.1.1 The Characteristics of Terrorism

One can find the presence of terrorist groups throughout the last 2000 years, starting with the Jewish Sicariis in 70 CE, later followed by prominent groups like the Shia Muslim Order of Assassins in the 11th to the 13th century, Robespierre during the French revolution, and Al Qaeda in recent years (Persson, 2017: 103). However, the definitions of terrorism have changed over the years. The 'state-terror' in the French revolution has few similarities with the acts of small, non-state groups, which we usually think of as terrorism today (Neumann, 2009: 6).

Even though it is clear that terrorism is quite different today compared to what it was several centuries ago, conceptualizing and defining it is still a complicated matter due to its politically sensitive character, which has resulted in a seemingly everlasting and occasionally infected debate (Neumann, 2009: 6). Because over 200 definitions of terrorism are currently in use (Copeland, 2001: 2), it is necessary to here include a discussion regarding definitions. The primary aim of this study is not an in-depth analysis of the contesting definitions of terrorism, or to argue which definition that might be the most correct, but it is vital to introduce the main features of the debate in general and thus define the definition and concept of terrorism as used in this study.

After years of diplomatic efforts, there still has not been any agreement on a universal definition of terrorism in neither international law or academics (Neumann, 2009: 6). There is some consensus, however, in the international communities with regards to lists of terror groups, e.g., between the UN and the EU. Instead, the main divide can mainly be found between the 'Western World' and parts of the Muslim world (Persson, 2017: 104). Hamas is an eloquent example of this division, as it was put on US's and Europe's terror lists just before winning the elections in Gaza.

The classic area of conflict, which is exemplified in the case of Hamas, is that a group can be viewed upon as terrorists and freedom as fighters simultaneously depending on the sympathies of the observer. However, some argue that using such logic is futile since it does not give any space to an objective differentiation of terrorism from the legitimate use of violence (Copeland, 2001: 2-3). This discussion exemplifies the gap between the descriptive and normative definitions of terrorism. In other words, should the term solely be used to describe a particular type of violence, or to condemn the illegitimacy of terrorist acts and causes? (Neumann, 2009: 6).

Nevertheless, most definitions do include the use or threat of violence aimed at reaching political, religious, or ideological goals as a component to distinguish terrorism (Persson, 2017: 103). Several governments and international organizations also tend to classifyviolence thath intentionally targets civilians or non-combatants as terrorism (Neumann, 2009: 7). The Special Tribunal of Lebanon (STL), established by the UN Security Council in 2009, challenged the perception that a universal definition for at least 'international terrorism' does not exist. In 2011, they claimed that one definition has been present within customary law since 2005, based on how it has been used both in theory and practice in a number treaties, UN resolutions and legislative and judicial practice of States. STL outlined that the customary rule definition consistently included three key elements:

"(i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an act; (ii) the intent to spread fear among the population (which would generally entail the creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; (iii) when the act involves a transnational element." (Special Tribunal to Lebanon, 2011: 49)

This definition is arguably more nuanced than many of the official ones mentioned above which have been criticized for being too narrow to include terrorist attacks not targeting civilians but broad enough to cover violence which usually is not defined as terrorism, e.g., the Holocaust (Neumann, 2009: 7-8).

Bruce Hoffman, a prominent scholar of terrorism studies, distinguishes the acts committed by terrorists as compared to those committed by criminals, arguing that their motives are entirely different even though they frequently use the same methods. He also adds that terrorist groups do not primarily fight armed forces or try to hold territory compared to guerilla groups (Hoffmann, 2006: 36-37), an argument which however seems to be less valid in contemporary Islamist groups where the two elements seem to coincide (Persson, 2017: 104).

T.P. Thornton's definition of terrorism is another classic definition in the field, formulated in the following way: *"Terror is a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence*." Moreover, he outlines the specifics of terrorism as the presence of violence that is beyond the norm accepted by a given society and can, therefore, be labeled as 'extra-normal' and, most importantly, conducted as a symbolic act to send a message to a target audience (Thornton, 1964: 43-47).

Another critical characteristic of terrorism is the presence of an asymmetrical power and size relation between the terrorist groups and the main enemy/enemies, where the former is generally weaker and smaller. It is this 'underdog' mentality that is a core element in the social aspect of the movement (Neumann, 2009: 15). The asymmetry characterizing modern conflicts is a crucial background factor for contemporary terrorism since stronger groups tend to use conventional fighting and less terrorism (Persson, 2017: 105).

Since the structure of a terrorist group does not itself define the phenomena's uniqueness compared to other organizations, one can more easily discuss terrorism when viewed upon as a method. Neumann's definition in his book about old and new terrorism is based on the definition of terrorism by T.P. Thornton, and he formulates it as follows:

"*The deliberate creation of fear, usually through the use (or threat of use) of symbolic acts of violence, to influence the political behavior of a target group*" (Neumann, 2009: 8).

Neumann's definition lifts out the uniqueness of terrorist groups compared to other organizations, by defining the specific aims and methods, which together with the character of their structure makes them easier to distinguish as a study object. This is the definition of terrorism of the theory used in this essay.

3.1.2 The Debate on 'Old and New Terrorism'

The debate in this field of study concerning the changed character of terrorism is often initiated with a discussion on how the term 'new' should be defined. One argument used by critics of the 'new terrorism' concept is that 'newness' implies a historically unobserved phenomenon or a new historical interpretation, which is an understanding of the concept which is not applicable when describing the characteristics of terrorism today (Duyvesteyn, 2004: 439).

More recent scholars who advocate for using the 'new terrorism' concept do not necessarily disagree with the standpoint that the concept of 'new terrorism' cannot be defined as 'new' if it refers to the isolated elements of terrorism characteristics as unprecedented. However, it is instead the notion that the elements of terrorism have been combined in a previously unseen manner, leading to such a significant change in terrorism as a whole that it can be conceptualized as 'new' (Neumann, 2009: 12).

Early critics of the concept 'new terrorism' have claim that there is no proper empirical study which can prove the trend of a supposedly 'new' combination of elements in terrorism, arguing that some of the fundamental components supporting that notion have been statistically false, for example, the supposed increase in the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists (Duyvesteyn, 2004: 450).

Later literature has however emphasized the importance to avoid a 'black or white' view of the debate by solely highlighting the exceptions from the rule, and instead have a principal understanding of it as a degree of 'newer' or 'older', and not as a question of either 'new' or 'old' terrorism (Neumann, 2009: 13). The latter approach is the one adopted when conducting this study, in order to examine whether it is possible to characterize Hamas simply as a 'newer' or as an 'older' terrorist organization. Discussing Hamas explicitly in the context of 'newness' has not been done in any previous research that I am aware of.

Two contesting approaches to 'New and Old Terrorism', one by Duyvesteyn (2004: 449-50) and another by Neumann (2009, 12-13), are summarized and organized into conceptual categories in **Table 3,** in order to clearly outline the main arguments from the different sides in the debate. The first category is labeled as 'Newness' and refers to different definitions of 'new' as a universal term. The second category is labeled as 'New Terrorism' and includes both different opinions on the concept itself and different explanations for changes related to terrorism.

One observation made of the figure is the importance of sorting out the definitions used by authors in order to understand their following reasoning. The potential 'Newness' found in the analysis of Hamas will follow Neumann's reasoning. However, both the approaches below appear to have individual weaknesses. Duyvesteyn does not include any specific criteria for 'Newness', making the interpretation of it subjective and futile in reaching any conclusion. On the other hand, Neumann's definition of 'newness' is possibly too inclusive. Since it does not include any defined line between old and new, everything that appears to have the slightest trace of change falls under his definition of 'newer'. The question is if defining something as 'newer' is sufficient in order to draw any conclusions. This uncertainty will be raised in the discussion regarding the final results of this study further on.

Table 3: The 'New' Terrorism Debate: Two Different Approaches

	Duyvesteyn	*Neumann*
'Newness'	A historically unobserved phenomenon or a new historical interpretation.	A significant change due to an unprecedented combination of elements.
'New Terrorism'	The world has changed, not the terrorists. No empirical/historical proof of unprecedented combination of elements in terrorism.	'New Terrorism' is an effect of globalization/late modernity. All terrorism is more or less 'new', no clear division.

3.2 'Old & New Terrorism' – A Theoretical Approach

Peter R. Neumann's book "Old & New Terrorism" is so far one of the more ambitious attempts to formulate a distinct theory about the changes in terrorism over the past decades. One of Neumann's main argument is that late modernity and globalization has profoundly changed the structure, aims, and methods of terrorism today (Neumann, 2009: 28). This section shortly outlines the presumedsignificantr changes in these areas. The theory lays the foundation for creating the framework and operationalization used to analyze Hamas in the present study.

3.2.1 Structure

The first area which has changed, according to Neumann, is the structure by which the terrorist groups organize themselves. He argues that traditional terrorist groups had structures more similar to regular armies, defined by hierarchy, a chain of command and a territorial center of gravity.

In contrast, the structure of new terrorism can be described more like a network where the formalized structure is more diffuse and based on personal relationships, and is more transnational rather than revolving around one given geographic point of reference (Neumann, 2009: 17-21).

3.2.2 Aims

The aims of a terrorist group mirror the social and political movements in the context in which it operates. The argument is therefore that the prominent ideologies, and thus the goals, have changed over the decades, which is reflected in the aims of the prominent terrorist groups today. The general shift is said to be from Marxism/nationalism to religiously inspired ideologies (Neumann, 2009: 21-25).

3.2.3 Methods

The third shift in terrorism that has occurred relates to the methods used. The main argument is that terrorists before tended to focus on targets where they could legitimize their actions, while 'new' terrorism is more brutal and lethal by conducting mass-casualty attacks against civilians and an increasing interest in the use of weapons of mass destruction (Neumann, 2009: 25-28)

3.3 Analytical Frameworks, Conceptualization, and Operationalization

3.3.1 Neumann's Analytical Framework

In order to describe the character of Hamas, the analytical framework with "ideal types of old & new terrorism" by Peter R. Neumann (2009: 29) is used to set the foundation for the operationalization and conceptualization of this study. See **Table 4** for concepts used henceforth.

Table 4. Old and new terrorism: 'Ideal types'

	Old terrorism	New Terrorism
Structure	Hierarchical; geared towards one center of gravity	Networked; transnational reach and orientation
Aims	Nationalist and/or Marxist	Religiously inspired
Methods	'Legitimate targets': rules of engagement	Mass-casualty attacks against civilians; excessive violence

Source: Neumann, 2009: 29

The framework pinpoints three main categories that together cover the essential factors of a terrorist group and can thus be used to describe its general character. The goal is to sort out what the structure, aims, and methods of Hamas are, and finally test these against the framework in **Table 4** and its related concepts.

3.3.2 Conceptualization and Operationalization

When studied in its original form without context, the framework in section 3.3.1 could rightly be accused of being overly simplistic. The framework is, howeverna reduced summary of a far more extensive theory. An analysis of Hamas based on this framework can thus only be done coherently if the definitions and variables of the theory as a whole are clearly outlined. The study will not be coherent if the theoretical variables are adapted inconsistently to the empirical material as discovered. The framework in **Table 4** is, for that reason, strictly adhered to in the analysis of Hamas.

As previously mentioned, a thorough conceptualization and operationalization in the research design decrease the risk of ending up with low validity and reliability in the study (Halperin & Heath, 2017: 171, 173). A conceptualization is performed in order to set the boundaries for what factors that can be included in a more general term (Halperin & Heath, 2017: 130).

The three main terms used in the analysis of the terrorism of Hamas are structure, aim, and method. The general definitions of these terms related to the theory are briefly explained above but are not sufficient to examine the case by themselves. Operationalization of these terms is, therefore, necessary to define the variables that can be used to systematically identify and grade the occurrence of definitions in the empirical material (Halperin & Heath, 2017: 130). See the comparisons between these variables of 'Old and New Terrorism' in **Tables 5-7**.

3.4 Operational Frameworks

The concepts, variables and operational definitions used in the operational frameworks are summaries of the main arguments put forth in the theory of 'Old & New Terrorism' as presented above (Neumann, 2009: 17-28).

The operational definitions are the guiding questions in the analysis, and the concept with the most considerable amount of positive matches, after compared to the case, will determine whether Hamas has the character of a 'newer' or 'older' terrorist organization.

Structure

Table 5. Operationalization framework: Structure of Old vs. New Terrorism

Concept	Variables	Operational definitions
Structure of 'Old Terrorism'	*Organization*	A clear chain of command Formal military ranks Only the cell-leader has contact with the broader org. Only the leadership which can give the cells autonomy
	Center of gravity	Country, part of a country or transnational territory The base for recruitment Where most operations are carried out Whose authorities and government is the target? First post-war generation in the west or Latin America (Marxism) or minorities in established European states (nationalism)
	International linkage	Support from the diaspora Collaboration with other ideologically similar groups State-sponsored training Go abroad to prepare attacks. Strike targets abroad only if associated with their adversary The international linkage is a mean to strengthen/sustain center of gravity, not shifting it.
Structure of 'New Terrorism'	*Organization*	A formal hierarchy is absent The hierarchy is based on personal relationships. The personal contact networks are more significant than formal ranks. Absence of central leader/commander Individuals with numerous links to other network members Many hubs and middle managers The elimination of one hub has little effect on the whole network Lack of firm rules on initiating/authorizing operations The role of the leadership is symbolic: aimed at giving inspiration, justification, guidance
	Center of gravity	Absence of a single, permanent geographical point of reference Virtual over physical based identification among the members Shifts depend on changing ideological emphases or likeliness of victory Operations are frequently carried out in places that are not linked to the recruits/base of leadership
	International linkage	Beyond the control of a single state Worldwide recruitment Transnational reach and orientation

Based on: Neumann, 2009: 17-21

Aims

Table 6. Operationalization framework: Aims of Old vs. New Terrorism

Concept	Variables	Operational definitions
Aims of 'Old Terrorism'	*Ideology*	Marxist Nationalist Combination Marxist/nationalist Related to the radical political/social movements prominent in the '60s-'80s
	Goals	Self-determination is central Anti-imperialism Anti-neo-colonialism
Aims of 'New Terrorism'	*Ideology*	Religious Nationalist Combination nationalist/religious Related to the radical political/social movements prominent in the '80s and onwards
	Goal	National liberation Strong religious imperative

Based on: Neumann, 2009: 21-25

Methods

Table 7. Operationalization framework: Methods of Old vs. New Terrorism

Concept	Variables	Operational definitions
Methods of 'Old Terrorism'	*Mass-casualty attacks*	The aspiration to avoid the killing of civilians Dead civilians are mistakes or exceptions Mass-casualty attacks are rare
	Targets	Efforts to legitimize Members/symbols associated with enemy security apparatus or government Warnings before attacks to avoid unintended casualties
	Intentions	Drama or public attention "A lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead" Minimal brutality Proportional violence Disinterest in CBRN Follow the rules of engagement
Methods of 'New Terrorism'	*Mass-casualty attacks*	Attacks against civilians are routine/intentional Endorsed/encouraged by the whole org. Mass-casualty attacks are frequent
	Targets	Legitimacy based on ethnicity, religious affiliation, policies carried out by targets government
	Intentions	Maximum violence to gain attention Mass-casualty attacks and brutality as a symbolic value Maximum brutality by violent and grotesque killing methods Interest in the use of CBRN

Based on: Neumann, 2009: 25-28

4   Analyzing Hamas

In this chapter, empirical material related to Hamas is analyzed with the help of the operational frameworks as defined in Chapter 3. The purpose is to examine how well Neumann's theory applies to this particular case. The chapter begins with a short background of Hamas, followed by the analysis of its structure, aims and methods.

4.1   Background

Hamas was formally established in 1987 as a paramilitary branch of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, which in turn had been derived as a branch from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood founded in 1928 (Gunning, 2009: 26). The primary purpose for transforming the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza into a resistance movement in 1987, was indeed to create an organized counterforce to Israel. One important reason for doing so was the vacuum created in the '70s when military powers like Egypt, which the Palestinians had counted on as the key to their liberation, shifted focus and instead prioritized their national interests and initiated diplomatic relations with the Israeli government (Tamimi, 2011: 11).

However, the first decade of Hamas existence turned out to be quite challenging, and the first way of organizing the group was not adapted to the broad support it came to get from those who were appealed by Hamas opposition of Fatah's commitment to a peace process, and not primarily to the Muslim Brotherhoods ideology. The heterogenization of Hamas supporters, together with extensive imprisonment and deportation of senior and Islamist leaders, forced a reconstruction of the organization. The political, social and military wings of Hamas were formally separated in 1992, and a leadership structure was set up in the Diaspora. Hamas's militant fraction called the Qassam Brigades was created at that time (Gunning, 2009: 40). As of October 2017, Hamas reportedly controlled an armed force consisting of 25.000 militants, making it the most militarily powerful Palestinian faction (Al-Mughrabi & Fahmy, 2017).

As previously mentioned, there is today disagreement on whether Hamas should be treated as an illegitimate terrorist organization, or as a critical actor to involve in the process of reaching a solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

4.2 The Structure of Hamas

4.2.1 Organization

Looking at the first variable – organization – there have been some reformations of Hamas's internal structure during its more than thirty years of existence. Hamas has in general, with a few exceptions, maintained a hierarchical, military structure, strongly tied to the specific geographical Palestinian area it aims to 'liberate'. It is nonetheless important to keep in mind that Hamasis aalarged and sophisticated organization, with more or less independent fractions withinthe broaderr group. Their responsibilities are divided into either the social, military, or political areas.

The hierarchy of Hamas is altogether organized with a clear chain of command. The lowest level in the hierarchy is made up of small cells called *Usra,* consisting of a cell leader and cell members (Gunning, 2009: 98). One step up in the hierarchy are the regional *shura* (consultative) councils. They consist of representatives who are elected on a two-year mandate by prominent Hamas members within one of the seven regions in Gaza or five in the West Bank (Gunning, 2009: 98-99; Mishal & Sela, 2000: 158).

The rank of the members who are called 'established' and eligible to vote isnot entirelyy clear, but are seemingly the cell leaders, and those who have pledged loyalty to Hamas and proved their commitment to participate (Gunning, 2009: 98). The regional *shura* councils elect the representatives for the national *shura* council, the legislative power with the final authority over policies, strategies and political aims for the organization at 'state' level (Gunning, 2009: 99-100). Lastly, there is the Executive Council which members are both elected by, and under the authority of the National *Shura* Council. Its role is to implement the strategies which are decided by the Nation *Shura* Council (Gunning, 2009: 99-100).

Overall, the cells receive their autonomy from the leadership. The independent autonomy of the Qassam Brigades did, however, increase during the early years, resulting in tensions with both the leadership of Hamas and among the cells (Gunning 2009: 41). Apart from the Qassam Brigades occasional disagreements with the Hamas leadership, receiving authorization from the national *shura* in every decision is in general widely respected both by leaders and ordinary members throughout the whole organization (Gunning, 2009: 101).

Scheme 1 schematically presents the formal organizational structure and hierarchy of Hamas. The scheme clarifies the hierarchy, representatively, chain of command, and formal ranks of Hamas's structure.

Scheme 1. Hamas' Hierarchy & Organizational Structure

Hamas Organizational Structure¶

4.2.2 Center of Gravity

The center of gravity for Hamas is clearly defined. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, which Hamas originates from, gradually shifted their emphasis from pan-Islamism to Palestinian nationalism (Gunning, 2009: 38). The main focus when creating Hamas thus came to be the "liberation" of the territory considered to be Palestinian, including all of Israel and not only the occupied areas (Tamimi, 2011: 147-148).

Hamas' center of gravity is also its main base for recruitment. Hamas' pool of supporters can roughly be divided into three groups; the passive supporters, the active members, and finally the supporters abroad. Passive supporters are those who would vote for Hamas but are not members or armed. The active members are mainly those affiliated to the political or military wings. Lastly, the supporter group abroad could include anyone from diaspora members to foreign activists supporting the Palestinian cause. They are not officially members but are relevant sources of legitimacy and funding for Hamas (Counter Terrorism Ethics). Overall, most of Hamas' supporters and members are Palestinian refugees, or their descendants, who were displaced during the Arab-Israeli War in 1948 (Tamimi, 2011: 156). Hamas

actively seeks support from all of these categories, but the ones who could be referred to as 'terrorists', are the active members in the second group. The recruits to this group are mainly Palestinians living in the Palestinian territories, Israel, or the surrounding area (Counter Terrorism Ethics). One of Hamas's main arena for recruitment, mobilization and general interaction with the public, are mosques situated in Gaza (Gunning, 2009, 122-123). Most Qassam members, that will say those belonging to the military wing, are also politically affiliated with Hamas (Brenner, 2017a: 63).

Hamas' center of gravity is also where most of its operations are carried out. Half of Hamas' terrorist-related operations, 216 out of 432 to be precise, have taken place in Israel (GTD). It is here that Hamas's main adversary (Hamas 2), the Israeli government andauthorities ares located. The rest of the operations have been carried out mainly in the West Bank or in the Gaza Strip, and on a few occasions, in Egypt and Lebanon (GTD). The only incident outside the region linked to Hamas in the statistics (GTD), was a firebombing of a Jewish school in Montreal in 2004, conducted by a Canadian-Lebanese teen who motivated the attack as a retaliation for the Israeli army's assassination of the leader of Hamas militant group (CBC News, 2004). However, nothing proved that the perpetrator was formally affiliated with Hamas, or any other group for that matter (Levitt, 2006: 224). The area where most operations have been carried out has consistently been limited to the territories the group aims to 'liberate'.

4.2.3 International Linkage

Despite having the Palestinian territories and Israel as its center of gravity, an international linkage has continuously been an essential part of Hamas' character. One of these links is the ideological connection to the global movement of 'national liberation' or political Islam. However, the ideologically similar groups that Hamas has associated with have varied frequently over the years. In the original covenant from 1988, it was stated that Hamas was a part of the universal organization of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (Hamas 1: art. 2). The formal ties to its parent organization, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, did, however, go from being central during the first two decades, to being entirely denied in 2016 by Hamas' spokesman (Khoury, 2016). In an attempt to position itself as a more reliable and serious actor, the group formally stated in 2017 that it did not have any organization ties to other Islamic organizations, (Brenner, 2017b). Nonetheless, it is still stated on Hamas' English website that it works with everyone who shares the same goals, including all other national and Islamic factions and bodies (Hamas 2).

Other international links have been more instrumental. Hamas has periodically received training, financial support, and other resources from states like Qatar, Jordan, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Most of these countries have, however, distanced themselves from Hamas in different ways over the past couple of years (Keinon, 2016; Abu Toameh, 2013). The frequent change of affiliation with other groups and states proves that Hamas continuously assesses them after how well they can be used to strengthen the goals it has for its specific region.

The diaspora has played a vital role throughout all of Hamas' history. Muslim Brotherhood representatives from the Palestinian diaspora in Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf countries, Europe, and the US were a main driving force behind the creation of Hamas, offering both financial and logistic support (Tamimi, 2011: 14, 45). The diasporas importance is also evident in Hamas' organizational structure, with The Executive Council being dominated by members living in exile, mainly in Lebanon and Syria (Gunning 2009: 99).

4.3 The Aims of Hamas

4.3.1 Main Ideology

The ideology of Hamas' has all in all had kept the same basic foundation since its establishment, except for some modification of its aims attempted to better fit the changes in society and the groups' changed position.The centraln ideological starting-point for the Islamic Resistance Movement, the official name for Hamas, is in the first defining article of its original covenant explained as being Islam, providing guidance and inspiration for all of Hamas' ideas, thinking and understanding of the world (Hamas 1: art. 1). The nationalist aspect is not mentioned until article twelve in the chapter concerning Hamas' strategies and methods. Nationalism is described as a part of the religious system that is justified by the duty of every Muslim to resist and kill any 'enemy' who tries to step on 'Muslim land'. (Hamas 1: art. 12-13). Verses from the Quran follow nearly all articles in the covenant, supposedly to legitimize them. The religious imperative exemplifies the fundamental ideological difference between Hamas and its rival Fatah, where the former sees the Palestinian peoples' claim to the land as divine while the latter seeks to establish a Palestinian state based on secular nationalist ideas (Brenner, 2017a: 174).

When presenting its ideology today, it is instead the national liberation aspect of Hamas' character that is emphasized. On its website, it is not until far down in the text where it is mentioned that the movement is based on an Islamic school of thought, thus now describing it as 'moderate Islam' (Hamas 2). Important to consider is that this description is taken from Hamas' English website, supposedly aimed at gaining legitimacy from a wider group of people potentially more appealed by the message of national liberation rather than the creation of an Islamic state. The attempts to play down the religious aspirations of the movement have, however, been ongoing since the '90s. The more radical original covenant from 1988 has hardly ever been quoted or referred to by Hamas' leaders (Tamimi, 2011: 47).

Combining Palestinian nationalism and Islamism has at times proved to be a difficult task for Hamas. The group has been challenged by its members and other Islamist groups who have been disappointed when Hamas's political leadership has chosen traditional parliamentary means over Islamist ones, e.g., *Jihad* (holy war). These disagreements came to be particularly evident in the 2006 elections (Brenner, 2017a: 68). Even if it is not prominent in the political practice, the role of religion and violence capital has remained to be a fundamentally important part in the identity of Hamas, and in the society it acts in (Gunning, 2009: 56).

4.3.2 Goals

The consistent ideological aim for Hamas has been the creation of an Islamist Palestinian state based on the principles of Sharia law, in the entirety of what was previously Mandate Palestine (Hamas 1; Hamas 2). The ultimate goal for Hamas in order to achieve this is ending the occupation of what it refers to as 'Historical Palestine' (Hamas 2). The goals of the Qassam Brigades, Hamas' resistance wing, follow a more paramilitary, underground logic rather than being in line with the political and social goals of the broader political organization (Gunning, 2009: 17).

The group views its struggle as a continuation of the resistance against British and Zionist 'occupation' that started over a century ago (Tamimi, 2011: 265). Hamas believes that national independence only can be achieved through armed force since the asymmetry of power with Israel rules out any possibility of dialogue (Tamimi, 2011: 266).

Hamas policies underwent a profound transformation, at least formally, in 2017. The new charter played down the antisemitism, indiscriminate use of violence and destruction of Israel (Brenner, 2017b), which was central in the original covenant (Hamas 1). The rhetoric of Hamas' leadership is arguably said to be the same as the 'old' national liberation groups in other parts of the world (Tamimi, 2011: 147).

Despite the shifts of priorities and goals over time, the lasting aims of Hamas are overall still marked by ideas of national liberation combined with a strong religious imperative depending on in which context they are used.

4.4 The Methods of Hamas

4.4.1 Casualties

Analyzing the third variable of Hamas, the general character and magnitude of its violence is a difficult task due to the group's transformed agenda and affiliations over time. One main difference between 'old' and 'new' terrorism is said to be the number of mass-casualty attacks; a method arguably used more frequently by groups belonging to the latter category. Hamas direct or indirect involvement in different attacks is not always possible to determine, meaning that the exact numbers of casualties that Hamas is responsible for are difficult to estimate. It comes back to the question of defining the limits of Hamas's authority; should the group be held responsible for all attacks by those who say that they identify with the group, or only the operations formally authorized by the leadership?

Nevertheless, Hamas is statistically linked, in one way or another, to the deaths of thousands of Israeli and Palestinian civilians and security personnel in the period 1993-2019 (Counter Extremism Project). One terrorist database connects Hamas to 432 separate incidents, which go the same definition of terrorism used in this study, over the years 1987-2017 (GTD). In 1994, Hamas began using suicide bombings against Israeli citizens as a tactic (Haberman, 1994). Hamas killed hundreds of people with such attacks throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (MFA 1; MFA 2), and one report found that the group alone was responsible for 40 % of the suicide attacks that collectively killed thousands of people during the Second Intifada 2000-2005 (Benmelech & Berrebbi, 2007: 227). Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs lists a total 200 suicide or bombing attacks carried out on the ground in Israel 1993-2016 (MFA 1; MFA 2), all aimed at maximizing the number of casualties, regardless of the actual number of people who were killed in the end.

Hamas has since 2007 officially abandoned suicide bombings as a tactic and instead resorted to the more symbolic firing of rockets, although allowing other fractions to take charge of the more brutal attacks which, however, have not proved to be as fatal (Gunning, 2009: 195-96). Nevertheless, either if it is by taking direct responsibility, or giving support and encouragement to the attackers, the statistics clearly show that intentional mass-casualty attacks were routine for Hamas for many years.

4.4.2 The Legitimacy of Targets

Hamas's official website in English states that "for Hamas, all types of legitimate resistance are practiced to end the oppression and injustices imposed by Israel, and it is Hamas's right then to resist with all means, including armed resistance, guaranteed by divine and international laws" (Hamas 2). This broad basis for legitimacy, in theory, does not say much about who Hamas targets in reality. The legitimacy of Hamas's targets is in practice partly based on ethnic and religious affiliation, as well as association with the enemy government, even if it attempts to legitimize them inmore customaryy ways.

After the outbreak of the Intifada in the year 2000, Hamas went from carefully justifying suicide operations as a response to Israel's unwillingness to change its positions, for example building new settlements and prolong border closures, into openly viewing it as a general, legitimate mean to gain political influence. (Gunning, 2009: 47, 50).

Since suicide is forbidden within Islam, such attacks are instead defined as 'martyrdom' and are religiously permitted when the purpose is to fight an enemy or end oppression (Tamimi, 2011: 178-79). Even if the 'martyrs' of Hamas appear to be indiscriminate in their attacks, they do put much effort in describing the military character, and thus legitimacy, of their targets. Supporters of Hamas's methods argue that the legitimacy of suicide bombings, or 'martyrdom', is limited explicitly to Palestinian attacks against Israeli targets.

Some of the reasons given are that all of Israel and its population, except the children, counts as a military outpost, and that the Palestinians' military disadvantage towards Israel gives them no other choice (Tamimi, 2011: 184). Hamas's idea of martyrdom does, in theory, emphasize the importanceto exclusivelyy strike against legitimate targets, but its definition of military objectsdoess, in fact, include all civilians who happen to be Israeli Jews.

4.4.3 Intentions

Hamas's intention for carrying out attacks has varied over time. In the beginning, the political violence against Israel was mainly aimed at undermining the Oslo peace process and challenging Fatah. Another important aspect is that violence has generally been used, or refrained from, as a mean to please the public opinion (Gunning, 2009: 46, 50). The maximum use of violence is thus not always what Hamas strives for in order to gain attention. While religion is used as justification and inspiration for attacks, it instead seems to be political and strategic thinking that determines the final decision to carry out operations (Mishal & Sela, 2000: 49-82). Hamas's overall intentions appear to be fully in line with a

nationalistic agenda, disguised in religion as a way to mobilize members and other support (Gunning, 2009: 202).

There have been some suspicions pointed at Hamas for trying to acquire chemical weapons. There are not, however, many cases of it being used, and large scale attacks are said to be unlikely. Hamas does probably evaluate the risks against themselves as too high, considering the destructiveness, retaliation, and bad publicity the use of weapons of mass destruction could cause (Dolnik & Bhattacharjee, 2002: 119-121). Even if the likelihood of such attacks is low at the moment, Hamas interest in chemical weapons and threats of using it shows that the group does not entirely reject the idea of using it as a method in the future.

All acts of terror are of course 'brutal', but Hamas does not actively seem to focus on maximizing its terrorism by violent and grotesque killings.

4.5   The Character of Hamas

Based on Neumann's framework presented in **Table 4,** the variables of Hamas found in the analysis are summarized and presented similarly in **Table 8.** The percentage of 'old' vs. 'new' terrorism is calculated by counting the number of operational definitions in **Tables 5-7** that are true for Hamas. For example, if 5/10 operational definitions found in Hamas correlates with the structure of 'old' terrorism, the result will be that Hamas's structure is 50% 'old'.

Table 8: 'Old' & 'New' Terrorism Framework including Hamas

	Old terrorism	New Terrorism	Hamas
Structure	Hierarchical; geared towards one center of gravity	Networked; transnational reach and orientation	Representative hierarchy; Palestine as the center of gravity **Old**: ≈ 100% **New**: ≈ 0%
Aims	Nationalist and/or Marxist	Religiously inspired	Islamist (Religiously Inspired) Palestinian Statehood (Nationalist) **Old**: ≈ 70% **New**: ≈ 100%
Methods	'Legitimate targets': rules of engagement	Mass-casualty attacks against civilians; excessive violence	Mass-Casualty attacks against 'legitimate' targets. **Old**: ≈65% **New**: ≈75%

Based on: Neumann, 2009

5　Conclusion

The analysis of Hamas with the theory of 'Old & New Terrorism' outlines that the case has factors relating to the character of being both an 'old' and a 'new' terrorist organization. As evident from the analysis summarized in **Table 8**, the conclusion is that Hamas can be classified as 'Old Terrorism' in terms of its structure, with variables relating to 'new' terrorism being nearly absent. Moving on to the aims, Hamas qualifies for belonging to the category of 'new' terrorism. Hamas's combination of a religious and nationalist ideology, rooted in the political and social movements that have been prominent since the '80s, correlates heavily with the change described by Neuman. Regardingg methods, it characterizes slightly morelikes 'New Terrorism'. Mass-casualty attacks against civilians have been common and intentional, but Hamas does try to legitimize the targets after the rules of engagemen.

All in alll, Hamas's character approximately consists of 57% 'Old Terrorism', and 43% 'New Terrorism'. It could, therefore, be described as a nearly perfect hybrid of an 'Old' and 'New' terrorist organization. Neumann argues that it is the 'new' combination of elements in terrorism today that makes it 'new', and that no terrorist group has been able to avoid at least a few of these elements. When having a first look at the cocktail of 'new' and 'old' elements that relate to Hamas in this analysis, the initial conclusion is that Neumann's observation appears to be correct Terrorist groups today can seemingly be described as either 'older' or 'newer', rather than 'old' or 'new'. Defining Hamas in this manner is a bit tricky, as anticipated when choosing it as the case for this study. Some parts of Hamas appear to be ultimately 'old', while others are prime examples of 'new' terrorism.

What do those findings reveal? Neumann explains that one purpose of his categorization is to change the mindset in counter-terrorism so that it is better suited for the threat it is facing. The analysis of Hamas raises a few points related to this purpose. The main concern regards the counter-terrorism' adaptation to the terrorist groups, which is emphasized in theory. The structure, aims, or methods are theoretical divisions ofa terrorist group, and are not sufficient to fully understand how the groups function in practice. As mentioned in the analysis, Hamas is connected to a movement that has evolved over nearly a century. It is part of a complex network consisting of politics, charity, religion, terrorism, and much more. No political or social movements, terroristic or not, are created and live on in a vacuum. It is thus difficult to reduce Hamas, and other terrorist groups, into three variables, defined as either 'newer' or 'older'. Even if Hamas elements would have been characterized as 'new' in nine out of ten cases, it might be the sole 'old' element that is the core of the whole organization. In Neumann's theory, for example, the methods of terrorist groups get equally as much attention as their aims. In reality, however, do the members of Hamas see their interest in using chemical weapons

as equally crucial for the group's character as their goal to 'liberate' Palestine? Most likely not.

A suggestion for improvement would thus be to develop the theory by adding a dimension of assessment. By doing so, the theory could be used to distinguish the whole essence of the groups it aims to describe. This could lead to a more progressive approach to terrorist groups, clarifying the reasons for their existence. By going to the bottom with the causes behind a groups decision to use terrorism, could make it easier to counteract. If the main conclusion is that they reach for their weapons due to some extremist and intolerant ideology, there might not be anything else to do than to strike back with full force. However, if the conclusion is that violence is a reaction to poverty, oppression, or lack of freedom, the solution might instead be to address those roots to the conflict.

This study's limits did not allow a more extended discussion regarding counter-terrorism. However, the results can be useful in a potential study with the purpose to problematize how authorities view and fight terrorism today. As mentioned previously, several scholars have criticized the uniform and simplified approach to Hamas, as well as terrorist groups in general. The operationalization frameworks outlined in this study aimed at giving a more nuanced picture of Hamas, but are equally useful for increasing the understanding of what counter-terrorism efforts should focus on in order to be effective. It would not, for example, be constructive to reduce the combat of Hamas's terrorism to solely being a fight against 'Islamism'. It is indeed a vital part of its history and organization, but this study shows that a significant amount of its supporters are more appealed by Hamas social politics and cynical approach to the peace process with Israel, rather than the religious ideologies.

This study was limited to one theory and one case. Nevertheless, I believe that both of these where adequate choices for addressing the research problem and the purpose. There will, hopefully, be further research which will develop the 'Old & New Terrorism'-theory, or similar ones, by rigorously testing them with more complex studies as done in this study. Combining many studies of that sort could give a solid foundation of empirical data which can increase the understanding of contemporary terrorism. Just as the critics of 'new terrorism' argue, a concept is not scientifically valid until proven by such studies.

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