

In between letter and practice

A case study investigating the impacts of informal institutions on the
outcomes of the Parity Law in Senegal



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Abstract

Male dominance remains commonplace in institutional settings, including the political arena. In order to challenge the status quo, gender quotas have been applied in various parts of the world to increase the descriptive – or numerical - representation of women in decision-making bodies. In Senegal, a Parity Law was implemented in 2010, allowing women to enter parliament at a tremendous rate. Through a mixed-method, this case study investigates the extent of the gap between the law and the practice in the Senegalese National Assembly. Empirical data was collected during fieldwork in the Senegalese capital, Dakar. Political actors and members of the civil society have been interviewed, and data on sessions held in the hemicycle compiled. The study suggests the implication of informal institutions that influence the intended outcomes of the law, namely: absolute parity, equal participation in the political life, and equal access to mandates and functions between men and women. The findings disclose discrepancies between the aspiration of symmetrical gender relations that the law intends to enhance and the actual dynamics unfolding in parliament. Gender roles, strategical mechanisms, and distributional struggles have been identified as prevalent factors affecting the Parity Law's expected outcomes.

Key words: Parity Law, informal institutions, formal institutions, gender dynamics, parliament, Senegal

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List of Abbreviations

AJS	Association of Women Lawyers
CECI	Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation
COSEF	Senegalese Council of Women
FI	Feminist Institutionalism
MP	Member of Parliament
NI	New Institutionalism
ONP	Parity National Observatory
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals

1 Introduction

The need for women representation in the private, or personal, sphere has been at the core of the second feminist wave arguing that the “personal is political”¹ (Runyan and Peterson, 2014: 103). The slogan resumes how political structures and outcomes impact women’s personal experiences steering the urge to challenge male dominance in the political field. In 1995, the fourth United Nations Conference of Women in Beijing has not only raised awareness on the need for more women's representation in political instances, but it also incited many countries to adopt measures to facilitate women's access to decision-making bodies. Accordingly, it was suggested that a critical mass, or a proportion of 30% of women, should occupy strategic positions in political institutions in order positively affect policies and act as an influential body (Dahlerup, 1988). It led to the implementation of gender equality strategies or measures introduced by institutions in order to improve women’s social, economic and cultural experiences across the world. Amongst them, positive actions methods² focus on strategies to increase women’s position considering their different starting line with men and material conditions in society. It is a compensation for the prejudices women face due to their gender, the aim being to achieve equality of outcome. Subsequently, fast-tracking its way to gender equality has been a method widely used to counter male dominance in politics. Today, half of the countries in the world have adopted gender quotas in their parliament (International IDEA, 2009).

1.1 The quest for parity

Legislative quotas have mainly been prevalent in Africa (Krook, Lovenduski and Squires, 2009). Senegal is no exception of these countries where the numerical representation of women in the parliament has dramatically increased due to the introduction of a legal candidate quota. Introduced in 2010, the Parity Law was first applied in 2012, where the number of women Members of Parliament (MP) increased from 22.7% to 42.7 % (World Bank, 2019a). This revolutionary step was only possible through alliances made within civil society, particularly between women's organizations and associations. Indeed, the Senegalese Council of Women

¹ Slogan of feminist student and women movement in the 1960s

² Positive action methods are measures taken to counter discriminations

(COSEF) initiated the fight for parity through its diverse campaign, its awareness-raising on gender equality issues across the country, and its capacity building of young female leaders (Toraasen, 2016). Additionally, influenced by the will to conform to the emerging international norm and acquire international legitimacy, the sharp political will of the former president Abdoulaye Wade allowed the introduction of the law. Today, women represent 41,8% of the seats in the Senegalese parliament, ranking the country at the 11th position at the global level and 4th position within Africa (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019).

1.2 Research question and purpose of the study

1.2.1 Research question and aim

According to Bjarnegård and Kenny “formal rules should be understood in connection to the informal practices that they affect and are affected by” (2016: 372). In the case of Senegal, the introduction of the Parity Law translates a will to promote gender equality in decision-making positions. Yet, along with the law, some practices may prevail and have impacts on the formal rule. The purposes of the study are to unravel informal institutions and see how do they interact with the expected effects of the Parity Law. It will provide an insight into how informal institutions impact women experiences in the Senegalese Parliament despite the introduction of gender quotas. Additionally, this study seeks to offer a more profound understanding of gender dynamics in the Senegalese hemicycle by analyzing, who decides, who speaks, and what is the nature of the relationship between parliamentarians.

Consequently, the research question guiding this study is:

- To what extent does the Parity Law affect gender dynamics in the Senegalese parliament?

Furthermore, underlying questions will be answered through the research:

- What are the informal institutions unfolding in Senegalese Parliament?
- How do these informal institutions interplay with the Parity Law’s intended outcomes?

Hypothetically, the argument is that gendered informal institutions govern relations in parliament, rather undermining than enhancing the effects of the Parity Law that seek to establish more symmetrical gender relations.

1.2.2 Significance

The target 5.5 of the Sustainable Developments Goals (SDGs) places gender equality and women's political representation as a necessary channel for a more sustainable future (UN Women, 2017). Politic is about powers, power is gendered and thus, so is politic. As Kenny (2014) argues, the consideration of gendered dimensions deserves more credits and attention in political science academia, hence the will to contribute to the scholarly debate. Indeed, although these dynamics are often "hidden" and unquestioned, they remain crucial for political processes and outcomes and therefore, should not be neglected. Furthermore, the study of privileged groups tends to be overlooked in the development field, yet, investigating influential institutions can offer a broader understanding on the impacts of representation on development issues (Scheyvens, Scheyvens and Murray, 2014: 189). It is especially the case as this thesis refers to the National Assembly, where the laws are voted and have consequences on the broader population. Finally, this research aspires to provide more insight in the restricted body of literature on the specific case of Senegal regarding the existing informal institutions impacting official statements. On a broader scale, this research aim at contributing to the literature on the implementation of legislative quotas on parliamentary bodies.

1.2.3 Delimitation

The Parity Law is applicable on all elective and semi-elective political bodies in Senegal, including the National Assembly. A decree for the modalities of application of the law³ further established parity in the Bureau and Committees of the National Assembly. However, due to late harmonization of the Parity Law with both the Bureau and the Committees, this research will exclude these organs in the analysis. Indeed, to optimize the measurement of analysis, this research will focus solely on parity that has been effective since 2012 regarding the seats in the National Assembly. In other words, this thesis will focus on the deputies who constitute the political parties and therefore participating in the ordinary and plenary sessions held in the

³ See Appendix 2 for a translation of the application decree of the Parity Law

hemicycle. Finally, in view of the data collected, the conclusions of this research are applicable to the XIIth legislature (2012-2017).

1.3 Disposition of the thesis

Chapter 1 has presented the context of the study, along with the problem it raises and its boundaries of analysis. Chapter 2 sets the groundwork for the contribution of this thesis providing the scholarly body of research in which this study lies. The thesis pursues with Chapter 3, which outlines the theoretical framework that will serve as a basis for the data analysis. Chapter 4 establishes the methodological approaches employed in the research, including the limits it entails and ethical considerations. Guided by the research question, Chapter 5 presents the analysis of the data collected. Subsequently, Chapter 6 briefly discusses the findings and provides a broader insight into the data collected. Chapter 7 consists of concluding remarks that summarize the results obtained and suggest further research.

2 Literature review

2.1 Facilitation and impediment to gender quotas efficiency

Gender quotas⁴ have enabled to broadly extend the descriptive representation of women in political instances throughout the world. Their impacts are diverse and have been the subject of many studies either theoretical, critical, contextual, comparative or descriptive (see Bacchi, 2006; Ballington and Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, Lovenduski and Squire, 2009; Meier and Lombardo, 2013; Bjarnegård, 2013; Toraasen, 2016). The diversity of quotas' type, additionally to the many contexts in which they evolve does not allow for any general conclusions on their efficiency, however, some trends can be identified.

While the outcomes of gender quotas differ across environments, their effectivity generally depends on the enforcement degree and their formulation (Waylen, 2013). Krook (2007) stresses on the latter argument stating that the wording of the quota can significantly impact its outcomes by enhancing or reducing ambiguity in its application. Indeed, the requirements, the sanctions and its legitimacy all depend on the specific wording employed to establish the quota. For instance, the word "Parity" does not imply a minimum share of seats rather an equal proportion (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005). Furthermore, Krook et al. (2009) provide contextual insight regarding the outcomes of quota systems arguing that their impacts depend on domestic views on equality, beliefs on political identities, and contrasting ideas on political representation.

However, many are the obstacles to the regulation of women's entry to political bodies. These barriers commonly reside in various arguments, beliefs and practices. The abundance of actors against the quota for instance, represents a potential barrier for the quota's efficiency, particularly when the latter is the elite of political parties (Krook, 2007). Active measures can indeed be employed to reduce the quota expected effects which could go from intimidation of female participant or the violation of the quota itself. For many actors, the reluctance to an imposed increased descriptive representation of women is due to the infringement of the principle of meritocracy. This stems from the vision that women do not deserve their place at

⁴ Gender quotas include reserved seats, party quota, legislative quota and soft quota (Krook Lovenduski and Squires, 2019)

the same extent of men if they do not “fight for it” (Dahlerup, 2007: 84). It supposedly hinders free competition among participants and questions the quality of representatives (Profeta, 2017). Furthermore, Shvedova (2005) identifies three main factors impeding women’s participation in parliament. First, ideological and psychological impediment includes factors such as the lack of confidence of women, gender roles, and the association of politics with corruption and harmful practices. Then, the author emphasizes on the lack of socio-economic capital as a major barrier to women’s entry to the parliament. This deficiency may deprive women of education and tied them to domestic tasks. Finally, political obstacles include the prevalent power that males exert in political bodies. This crucial point for the study of institutions when considering gender dynamics will be discussed in the next section.

2.2 The gendered nature of institutions

One critic that has emerged from New Institutionalist (NI) school of thoughts is the minimization, or even absence of recognition, of the gendered nature of institutions. Mackay, Kenny and Chappell (2010) emphasize on the encounter between NI and gender studies from which Feminist Institutionalism emerges. This NI approach shed light on the challenges with gender-blind studies of institutions.

2.2.1 A dichotomous approach

The gendered nature of institutions could be expressed in two ways according to feminist scholars. First, the nominal characteristic of institutions refers to the numerical domination of men in power positions compared to women, or in other terms, the descriptive male dominance (Shvedova, 2005; Waylen, 2013). However, gains of women in positions of power alone do not suppress gender stereotypes and asymmetrical domination considering that power relations are inherent to political institutions. Indeed, the second aspect is the substantial value it holds involving a ubiquitous gender bias. It illustrates how social norms enhance expected behaviors and attitudes of male and female, where the latter commonly occupy a subordinated place, or the ‘weak’ role (Chappell and Waylen, 2013; Waylen, 2013). This pattern of institution reinforces the argument of Runyan and Peterson (2014) on the dichotomy of roles between men and women in politics within the crisis of representation. There, the clash of opposite expected behaviors defines the supposed role of males and females in political institutions. For instance,

women are assumed to be apolitical, emotional, followers and passive while men are supposed to be political, rational, leaders, and active, to cite a few (Runyan and Peterson, 2014: 102).

2.2.2 A male domain

Additional aspects enhance and strengthen the beliefs on the gendered dimension of institutions. Bjarnegård and Kenny (2016) investigate the informal mechanisms behind candidate selection in a comparative case study of Scotland and Thailand. The authors discovered in both cases that informal institutions played a significant role in party recruitment where gendered interactions occur in a way which favors men and labels women as “outsiders” (ibid: 387). Similarly, Dahlerup and Leyenaar (2013: 157) and Bjarnegård (2013: 22) respectively refer to the “old boy network” and homosocial capital⁵ as enhancing and strengthening male dominance in politics by the prevalent selection of male subjects by male actors in male-dominated fields. Bjarnegård (2013: 116-151) illustrates these dynamics with the case of Thailand, where a gendered pattern of candidate selection in political parties was said to be influenced by informal networks where men dominated. To the extent that institutions are gendered, increased numerical representation of women does not necessarily lead to greater gender equality (Waylen, 2013).

⁵ Bjarnegård (2013: 21) calls homosocial capital the combination of homosociality and bonding social capital.

3 Theoretical framework

3.1 Definition: the dual form of institutions

Institutions have been the subject of many studies in the field of political science arguing that the latter are “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North, 1991: 97). Their dual nature has been acknowledged with the emergence of NI and sustained by its historical approach which highlights the existence of informal institutions along with the formal ones (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010). However, the distinction between them represents a greater challenge of differentiation. According to Helmke and Levitsky, formal institutions are “rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official” (2004: 727). Due to the complex task of identification, informal institutions often fall into a residual category for everything that formal institutions are not, hence the misleading association of informality with the status quo. This lies in the fact that informal institutions are deeply rooted by cultural pattern and shared expected behaviors. There are “socially shared rules” (ibid) that, in contrast to formal institutions, are generally unwritten and do not imply official sanctions.

3.2 Informal and formal interplay: a fourfold typology

NI scholars have recognized the substantial role of informal institutions and how they interact and affect social and political life (Mackay, 2008; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004 ; Kenny, 2014). Consequently, thoughts on how formal and informal institutions interact have emerged. In their interaction with formal institutions, informal institutions have often been categorized as either functional or dysfunctional⁶. However, Lauth (2000) for instance, distinguishes three forms of interaction between informal rules and enforced regulations. The substantive, as being both effective and equivalent, the conflicting which refers to the incompatibility of each institution, and the complementary where informal rules as formal institutions support and reinforce each other. The author does not go further in the distinction between these three types of interplay, yet similarly, Axelrod highlights the completing role of institutions. According to the author

⁶ Functional as a provider of solutions to coordination and interaction issues and dysfunctional as a problem enhancer

“in most cases, the law can only work as a supplement (and not a replacement) for informal enforcement of the norm” (1986: 1106). Furthermore, Waylen (2013) argues that informal institutions could either subvert or uphold formal institutions, or, in other words, undermine or maintain them.

Helmke and Levistky (2004) offer a more comprehensive framework of analysis of institutional interplay capturing the complexity of situations by using a bi-dimensional typology. The degree in which informal rules converge or diverge with formal institutions is the first element to consider. Explicitly, when the outcomes of formal and informal institutions are highly different, both institutions **diverge**. On the contrary, if the outcomes of following informal rules are significantly similar than the formal one, informal and formal institutions **converge**. The effectiveness of the formal institution under study is the second dimension relevant to the interpretation of institutional interplay. It detects whether what is written on paper “constrain or enable political actors’ choices” or if the expected cost of violation of the formal rule is low, respectively, if formal institutions are **effective** or **ineffective** (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 728). When both dimensions of the interplay between institutions are considered, four potential scenarios unfold as illustrated in the table below.

Table 1 – A typology of informal institutions

Outcomes	Effective formal institutions	Ineffective formal institutions
Convergent	Complementary	Substitutive
Divergent	Accommodating	Competing

Source: Helmke and Levitsky (2004)

When the outcomes of informal institutions converge with effective formal institutions, the former is **complementary** (ibid). In this case, informal institutions work alongside formal institutions often enhancing the efficiency of formal rules. Complementing informal mechanisms may then create or reinforce the will to comply with the formal institution. In this scenario, informal rules can have a crucial role in the effectivity of formal institutions. Secondly, when there is a convergence between the outcome of informal institutions and ineffective formal institutions, the **substitutive** role of informal institutions arises (ibid: 729-730). The latter is produced in order to produce outcomes compatible with the formal rule – a

formal institution that was defective and needed the presence of informal mechanisms to contend with its lack of efficiency. Thirdly, informal institutions' outcomes diverging with efficient and enforced written rules result in an **accommodating** situation of informal rules (ibid: 729). Here, the effect of formal rules may be altered due to the informal mechanism implemented. Indeed, the actors who carry out these informal rules usually are unsatisfied with the outcomes of the formal institution itself. Informal mechanisms are therefore created to reshape the effects of the routinely enforced rules. Finally, with the combination of significantly different outcomes of informal institutions with the ones produced by ineffective formal institutions, **competing** informal institutions emerge. In this scenario following informal rules would violate the formal ones. For this reason, institutions are competing for incompatible outcomes (ibid).

3.3 The parity law

Given the definition of formal institutions, one can argue that the Senegalese Parity Law, being a written and enforced legislation, is a formal institution. Indeed, political actor's choice is constrained by a mandatory gender alternation (woman-man or man-woman) when elaborating the lists of candidates for political parties. If violated, the Parity Law provides a sanction: non-compliant party lists are rejected and judged ineligible. This constraint allows the efficiency of the alternation of lists and hence presupposes a competent formal institution that eliminates the probability of inefficiency from the outset.

The gender dynamics that are expected to unfold due to the introduction of the law are implicitly stated in the law and its explanatory memorandum⁷. In its discourse the required lists alternation of both genders will ensure (1) the absolute parity of men and women candidates in all fully or partially elected institutions; (2) the guarantee for women of an equal participation of political life and finally (3) the equal access for women and men to mandates and functions (LOI n° 2010-11 du 28 mai 2010 instituant la parité absolue Homme-Femme, 2010). These intended outcomes served as indicators for assessing gender dynamics.

⁷ See Appendix 1 for the translation of the Parity Law


4 Methodology

4.1 A Case study

Conducting a field study was crucial for the validity of the research. Indeed, as Waylen and Chappel (2013) argue, informal institutions are difficult to detect especially when they are the status quo. Therefore, the authors highlight the need for an appropriate research method which would privilege “actors, their actions, and views about themselves” (ibid: 609). In-depth and contextual analysis through a single case study is, therefore necessary to unravel the hidden dynamics of institutions in the Senegalese National Assembly and to tackle issues related to access of information and confidentiality. Moreover, according to Kenny (2014: 681) the adoption of a Feminist Institutional (FI) approach is crucial not only to understand the impact of informal mechanisms comprehensively but also to assess the gap between official statements and actual behaviors. Given the research aim introduced in Chapter 1 and the gendered nature of institutions discussed in Chapter 3, the use of such an approach seems necessary for this case study.

4.2 Overall methodology

Table 2. Overall methodology



As illustrated in Table 2, this research has adopted a mixed methodology, namely a qualitative and a quantitative method, where the latter complemented the findings of the former. Qualitative data has allowed the research to get an insight into the subjective views of attitudes, meanings and experiences of women within the political sphere. On the contrary, quantitative data have provided numerical evidences of trends in participation and linguistic competences in the parliaments whereby a corroboration with qualitative findings may occur. Combining both research method will enhance confidence in the findings by offering greater validity and accuracy (2016: 392).

Primary data – interviews, audio recording, informal discussions, quantitative content analysis and field notes - are the result of a field study conducted in Senegal’s capital, Dakar, from the 26th of January until the 19th of March 2019. These sources of information are the basis for the contextually of the case. Secondary data consist of academic articles and legal texts which will serve to support, reject and complement the findings as well as providing sources of official acts.

4.3 Data collection and analysis

4.3.1 Interviews

The field work in Senegal allowed me to conduct semi-structured interviews but also informal interviews and discussions helpful for the viability of the study. Using a pre-determined set of questions according to the informant’s position⁸, 14 semi-structured interviews have been conducted and recorded when consent was provided. Once transcribed, the interviews have been translated from French to English supported by DeepL and subjected to meticulous manual verification. Concerned with data reduction, I used digital coding with the Nvivo software, which allowed the retrieval of relevant and recurrent themes.

4.3.2 Sampling

It was a great challenge to meet available individuals for interviews, especially considering the presidential elections that took taking place on the 24th of February 2019, namely, in the middle of my presence on the field. Indeed, gaining access to the political elite was not an easy task, and is a political process in itself (Bryman, 2012: 151). Luckily, my contact person and a friend

⁸ See Appendix 3

working in Dakar have been of considerable help. Indeed, the latter provided me with a list of presences of women who attended the projection of a movie on the Parity Law at a United Nation (UN) event. My contact person gave me numbers from her personal phone book which included women who experienced being a parliamentarian under the Parity Law and women working in the civil society. It helped to increase my network which was essential for conducting this research. Therefore, the sampling is qualified as purposive for its reference to the aim of the research (Bryman, 2012: 418) but also a snow-ball sampling - a method which requires acquaintances and contacts from informants - has been employed (Bryman, 2012: 418).

The sample⁹ is composed of 3 distinct groups providing me with different types of data: general informants, intermediate informants and key informants. General informants¹⁰ are people with whom I had informal and contextual discussion helpful for the research (Contact person, Panelist, National Assembly librarian). Intermediate informants¹¹ are women activists or women working in political instances who gave me insights on the context in which women politician evolves (one High counselor, one woman working in the Ministry of education and research, one woman working in the Ministry of interior, programme officer in gender equality, Center for gender peace and development). Finally, key informants¹² are the counsellor of the Minister of Women, Gender and Family along with six women parliamentarians between the 10th and the 12th legislature supplying direct information on gender dynamics and behaviors in the Parliament. Additionally, to the key informants' lists, the directors of the two fundamental organizations that are tied to the Parity Law, one at the origin of the law (COSEF), the other being a consequence of the law, namely the Parity National Organization (ONP). The last key informant is the former president and current member of the Association of Women Lawyer (AJS) who supported the legal writing of the Parity Law, therefore, offering relevant data on the Parity Law and surrounding mechanisms.

4.3.3 Quantitative content analysis

Despite the lack of online sources provided by the government (e.g. audio recording of plenary sessions; transcribed debate), being in Dakar allowed me to retrieve documents out of the National Assembly Archives room. Thanks to the librarian, I could get a hold on 12 transcribed

⁹ See Appendix 4

¹⁰ Informant 1, 2, 3

¹¹ Informants 4, 5, 6, 16, 18

¹² Informants 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17

plenary sessions that took place between 2012 and 2015, in digital format¹³. These documents have been randomly given to me as I wanted the findings to be as neutral as possible in order to have consistent conclusions.

The quantitative content analysis has been solely employed to assess indicator (2), namely equal participation in political life. To assess these dynamics, three trends have been considered¹⁴. First, the number of intervention according to the gender has been calculated, allowing to evaluate the trend on how many men and women intervene in political debates. Second, an estimation of the speaking time in plenary sessions has been found thanks to the number of words each parliamentarian pronounced depending on their gender. It was analyzed through a “copy-paste” method from a Portable Document Format (PDF) to Word, where the latter provides word counts. Therefore, debates have been meticulously reviewed in order to exclude the page numbers, the annotations, the speakers’ name, the moderator and rapporteur intervention, in the word count. Therefore, it includes only the interactions of parliamentarians debating. Finally, since the Wolof¹⁵ parts of the debate are not transcribed but indicated (as a “Switching to Wolof” annotation), this limitation was used to assess if the tendency to speak only Wolof during an intervention is more prevalent amongst women MPs or men MPs. Based on the calculation of the number of intervention by gender, the rate of interventions of men and women in Wolof has been calculated separately. The introduction of the data collected on Excel allowed the transposition of information into graphs and figures.

4.3.4 Academic articles and legal texts

Although the empirical database consisted of the groundwork for the analysis, academic articles have been of a significant need. Retrieved through LUBsearch and Google Scholars, these were necessary to establish the background and contextual environment where the Parity Law arose. Moreover, these sources have not only been beneficial as providing a window of interpretation of the findings but also they have supported and complemented them. Lastly, considering the political and legal nature of this study, pieces of legislation were also consulted.

¹³ See Appendix 5

¹⁴ See Appendix 6

¹⁵ Although Wolof is the most spoken language in Senegal, French is the official language according the Senegalese Constitution (2001)

4.4 Ethical considerations

Consent to publication and recognition of name has been given from all the interviewees. However, on second thoughts, the informant's name was anonymized, numbered and only their professions and secondary information have been revealed. This will allow avoiding the potential harm of participant considering that some confessions against the odds of mainstreaming political opinion have been provided. It is even more the case when it comes to political actors where positions can be affected and lynching undertaken.

Moreover, the stereotypes attributed to the privileged should not lead to the reduction of their being to this dimension alone, it is a duty to overcome these beliefs when studying the powerful (Scheyvens and al. 2014: 204). This research does not seek to clarify the privileges held by some of the respondents, instead it aims at detecting what might hinder or reinforce the exercise of their power.

4.5 Limitations

The first limiting factor concerns the criticism of sources with regard to interviews conducted during fieldwork. Given that some interviews were conducted with current and former government officials, there is a risk that some information may not have been released or may have been distorted because of the respondents' positions (Scheyvens and McLennan, 2014: 9). Analogically, regarding parliamentarians, loyalty to a special political ideology could bias the findings. Furthermore, as the sample of the semi-structured interviews is solely composed of women, their voices may be over-studied at the expense of male subjects leaving the complete portrayal of MPs experiences disregarded. Previous researches on legislative institutions tend to underrepresent women's experiences producing a bias towards males' empiricism (Childs and Krook, 2009). However, this research requires particular attention to women's experiences given the FI approach this thesis adopts as well as the gender-specific nature of institutions. Finally, analyzed in a specific cultural and sociopolitical environment, the findings that this research has provided do not allow for external validity. Indeed, as the delimitation section disclosed, this research's universe of cases is restrained to a specific country, political instance, targeted group, and time frame. This constrains the findings to be non-generalizable (Bryman, 2012: 47).

5 Analysis

5.1 Absolute Parity

One of the main reasons behind the introduction of the Parity Law is the will to allow women to be part of the decision-making by increasing their number in political instances. It did not fail, due to the law, women massively entered the parliament. However, one can wonder why - despite the law claiming an equal share of seats between men and women deputies, numerical¹⁶ Parity does not occur. The reasons behind this observation have been identified as the voting system from which strategies are employed, and that reflects distributional struggle in decision-making power.

5.1.1 The voting system

Behind the asymmetrical share of women and men MPs lies the voting system. It is composed of two internal procedures, where one of them is a constraint for numerical Parity as Informant 15 states:

“We have a proportional voting system and a majority voting system. So, for the proportional voting system, there is no problem because the list is already even. [...]. Now, in the departments, the number of seats varies according to the size of the population, and that is how we have even and odd number seats. So necessarily, if there is an odd number, there will be an imbalance in favor of one sex or another”.

The alternation of the list is the directive of the Parity Law, however the fact that some list requires odd numbers of candidates can derive the law from its parity aim as highlighted in the quote above. The Parity Law refers to this issue stating that “When the number of members is odd, parity applies to the next lowest even number” (LOI n° 2010-11 du 28 mai 2010 instituant la parité absolue Homme-Femme, 2010). As indicated in the quote, the formal institution itself hinders its expected outcomes in terms of implementation as Informant 7 argues:

¹⁶ Parity implies a 50-50 share of seats between women and men MPs (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005)

“That is the hidden flaw behind this law. That is why, in the notion of parity itself, this gap is not illegal, but it is conceptually a gap that does not reflect the notion of parity”.

Indeed, this “conceptual gap” mentioned by Informant 7 allows for a range of interpretation of what parity is. The subjectivity of its definition can, therefore, differ from the 50-50 share to a more ideological vision of the concept as exemplified by Informant 12:

“We may not even reach 50% but when at a certain critical threshold, we must be able to express the voice of those we represent. And for me that's parity. We can have 50-50, if we [women] go to sleep in these instances it's not necessary. I prefer to have a significant man who represents women well.”

This latter quote appears to undermine the assumptions of Dahlerup (1988) on the assumed correlation between numbers and outcomes that critical mass theory presupposes. Instead, Informant 12 advocates the desire for quality over quantity through a critical actor.

In the light of these findings, one could argue that the odd-numbered pattern of some lists combined with the ambiguity of interpretation arising from the formulation of the law could itself impede the effective implementation of the intended absolute parity. This goes in line with Krook (2007) who also refers to this issue of the wording of gender quotas as able to increase the ambiguity of interpretation.

5.1.2 The rule of the game

According to some interviewees, the failure to reach numerical parity is not a question of formulation, nor a flaw in the law, instead, the lack of political will of actors towards the composition of the lists is the real challenge. Some called it a game, other strategies or tactics, but many informants witnessed the way repeated mechanisms unfold regarding the gendered alternation of candidates resulting from the voting system. Informant 12 argues that:

“There are tricks inside, and that a fine connoisseur can bypass the law without violating it [...] the trick is that every time you have an odd number, you interpose the female candidate between the other two candidates who were male. You can't say you broke the law.”

The probability of women being simultaneously first and last in the list as the chance to hold a single-seat position appears to be significantly low as Informant 14 asserts:

“If there is one seat, it will be for a man unless the party is led by a woman, which is very rare”.

The positive discrimination enhanced by the introduction of the Parity Law is thus hindered by negative discrimination¹⁷ when candidates' lists are elaborated. This distortion of the “parity game”¹⁸ that has been instituted by male subjects profoundly resonates with the theoretical considerations of this research. Candidate lists entering parliament are alternated otherwise they do not pass for elections making the rule effective. However, strategies are implemented to maintain male dominance through legal forms. Indeed, as Helmke and Levitsky highlight accommodating institutions “contradict the spirit, but not the letter of formal rules” (2004: 729). These informal mechanisms are created by actors who do not fully agree with the expected outcomes drew by the formal institutions resulting in alternative methods to work around the law. Political party elites can indeed have this active tendency to deliberately bypass the law to hinder the effects of quotas (Krook 2007; Bjarnegård 2013). This informal mechanism appears to impede the equal descriptive representation of women in the National Assembly in relation to their male counterparts.

5.1.3 The decisive power

As above-mentioned, some candidate list, being odd, results in an unequal representation between men and women. In the light of the interviews, there is a general sentiment that the alternation of the list is not neutral, rather, it translates an unbalanced gender dynamic in decisive power. The reiteration of this practice has been repeatedly mentioned by informants noting that “if there is one seat to fill, it will be for a man” (Informant 7) or “Wherever there have been odd numbers, women have been negatively affected” (Informant 9) adding that:

“Because most of the time it is the men who lead”.

¹⁷ Positive discrimination as giving advantages to marginalized groups while negative discrimination as depriving privileges based on certain attributes of an individual

¹⁸ Informant 8 referred to the parity game as the tendency to play with number and reduce women representation

This latter quote shed light on the prevalent practice of men's decision-making when it comes to establishing the list, placing them in positions of power (Waylen, 2013). Women seem to occupy more passive roles contrary to men who appear to be more active in the control of party-list, generally being the leaders. This is confirmed by Informant 9 who asserts that:

“Since 2012, women have been at the top of the list by about 11%”

Explicitly, Informant 17 highlights that:

“Gender has been an element that has penalized us in political institutions, especially when it comes to choosing candidates for positions of responsibility in political parties.”

The prevalent male decision-making is also stressed through whom male subjects choose within their party. The afore-mentioned filling role that some women occupy in candidate lists seems to aim for strategic outcomes. Indeed, hidden mechanisms behind decision-making unfold in some political parties. Choices can be directed more towards malleable women who will follow the guidelines determined by the leader and not question their actions. This practice has been greatly acknowledged and denounced by interviewees arguing that:

“At the time of choices, as it is men who choose the place of women, they choose the women on their sides, of their choice, the women who obey them the most” (Informant 16)

“They [men MPs] sometimes succeed in dissuading them [women MPs] from making decisions. They can turn women's heads sometimes” (Informant 7)

“What we suspect is as if they [men MPs] are afraid of educated women. They don't take them, they take others” (Informant 8)

In addition to the fact that it is generally the man who makes the lists, the choice of women candidate can hide the will to perpetuate the status quo. This goes in line with the findings of Krook (2007) who stresses the practice of some male party leaders who choose women who do not intend to curb their decisive power.


5.2 Equal Participation

The Parity Law has clearly formulated the will to produce equal participation between women MPs and men MPs. Human capital and discrepancies in engagement in political life have been identified as the main factors impacting on participation amongst deputies.

5.2.1 Human Capital in the Hemicycle

Despite the recognition of the influx of women intellectuals in the hemicycle as a result of the introduction of the Parity Law by Informant 8, the significant entry of non-educated women in the parliament appears to be of a major constraint for most of the interviewees. Indeed, it seems like for many informants it was inconceivable, even scandalous, that some women MPs do not have a political education neither are able to write, read and speak French, categorizing them as “illiterates”¹⁹. Quantitative findings affirm that when intervening, women tend to speak Wolof 58% of the time against 33% for men MPs as Figure 1 displays. This confirms the tendency for women to use Wolof but also affirms that men use this language to a lesser extent.

Figure 1- Interventions in Wolof by gender



Moreover, when asked if the Parity Law, is according to them, a barrier to meritocracy, several informants answered in the affirmative. For instance, Informant 17 claims that:

¹⁹ Informant 4, 8, 10 and 11 use this term to describe the women involved

“The quota is a brake on meritocracy. The idea of imposing gender quotas to accelerate the achievement of parity in politics is a bad thing for women politicians, as second-class women candidates could take the place of more qualified people”

The interviews reveal the highly mechanical alternation of the list when selecting women candidates, where some are here solely to comply with the law directives. When discussing her personal experience in her political party process of recruitment, Informant 8 states that:

“For our party, it was not a problem, because we had activists and we did not go out and get illiterates, as some of them were able to do, to stuff lists and have compliant lists”.

In contrast, for some interviewees, being illiterate does not mean being incompetent or counterproductive to the parliament’s aim. On the contrary, it could highlight the challenges of a broader range of the Senegalese population by steering more diversity of representation. Informant 9 notes that:

“There has been a lot of criticism that we have sent women who do not have a political education, but all strata must be represented, whether they come from the other side of the world or not, they have specific demands for women, and that is the usefulness of parity”

Informant 11 exemplifies this statement by stating that:

“When you take the field of agriculture for example, where you have peasant women who now have their plots, they get involved, they grow their crops, they produce. These women, they are more able to bring out the experience, the difficulties they have [...] we had a woman like that, she spoke in her local language, but before coming, when she knew we were going to talk about this theme, she prepared”

Moreover, Informant 8 and 16 highlight that the lack of educated women in the parliament is due to their reluctance to association with politics. Informant 8 implies that:

“In general, intellectual women, women who have a certain level [...] they turn away a little from politics.”

One can, therefore, argue that equal participation to the political life is enhanced thanks to women’s recruitment in their diversity, whether regarding education (illiterate, educated) and the people they represent and defend (rural areas, urban areas) allowing a more intersectional political configuration of the Senegalese parliament. However, mechanical alternation could unfold, placing illiterate women to fill the lists. Additionally, following Shvedova’s findings (2005) on women’s obstacle to participation in parliamentary bodies, intellectual women tend to be reluctant to participate in political activities. This can reduce the supply of human capital and thus hinder women qualitative participation in parliament. This leads to the next section who will further investigate the dynamics behind the participation of deputies.

5.2.2 Engagement in political life

The audacity to assert oneself has proven to be a major challenge for women's exercise of power in parliament according to the data collected. It appears that some women would not even dare to take responsibilities on the same level as men. Subsequently, women’s behaviors in the Senegalese hemicycle could reinforce gender stereotypes by excluding themselves from participative activities. When discussing the attitudes of women MPs in parliamentary debate, Informant 7 explains that:

“Observation has allowed us to observe that sometimes women, even present in decision-making bodies, do not take a position or even speak out. They are present but do not speak, surely for the factors of social, cultural and religious weight. Some women leave the floor to a man whom they consider to be a brother ”

Accordingly, the findings of the quantitative analysis confirm this latter argument. Not only men are three times more likely to intervene during plenary sessions (Figure 1) but also their speeches seem to be rather longer than that of their female colleagues (Figure 2).

Figure 2 – Intervention in plenary sessions





Figure 3 – Average duration of speech by speakers (word count)



Furthermore, the interviews allowed to detect a consensus on a common pattern within political parties. The prevalent watchword of this latter acts as a barrier to women’s participation in the parliament. Informant 8 for instance, admits that:

“It is very rare for you to see women, for example, stand out from their groups to vote for certain laws because there is pressure [...] We'll always tell you that we have a watchword to follow.”

Informant 10 further stresses that:

“The parties must vote for this or that text when you yourself do not want this text but you are obliged to do so. We don't have all the freedom.”

Additionally, some parliamentary duties do not consider the double burden carried by women, namely family and work obligations. Once again, parallel strategic mechanisms can unfold influencing the participation of women MPs and extensively, the intended outcomes of the law (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Informant 11 sheds light on this practice that appears to be intentional, asserting that:

“Most of the parties also managed to make sure that the meetings were so late that for a woman it was not a good idea to come home every night that late when you were married and you had children to support. So that's how it always worked.”

Paradoxically, despite their substantial participation in the plenary session in comparison to women MPs, male deputies' absenteeism during working-sessions has been pointed out, raising in contrast, the generally strong commitment of women. Informant 9 cheerfully notes that:

“We women had fun counting the men in the room, we were 65 women and almost all of us were there. There was a lot of male absenteeism during the XIIth legislature.”

Informant 11 further emphasizes:

“In plenary, women were represented by a majority, we could note two three absences but no more, unlike the men who were much more numerous than us and who, if we counted them, were in a minority or equal. I really believe that they have honored this legislature and the people by being very present in all the working sessions.”

Many impediments to women MPs' participation in parliament have been identified, one being women's behavior itself. By generally being in the background, and conforming to the parties' instruction, some women appear to hold secondary roles, or as Runyan and Peterson's findings highlight, “passive” roles (2014: 101). Moreover, the findings have highlighted the gap in

participation in plenaries, whether in terms of intervention or duration of the latter, accentuating the prevalence of male engagement in the hemicycle. Political party dynamics can also be a barrier to women's participation by imposing guidelines that hinder free will and thus constraints votes. Finally, despite the recognition of women's strong commitment, the deliberate schedule of late meeting reproduces the features of accommodating informal institutions seeking to reduce participation of women subjects. (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004).

5.3 Equal access to mandates and functions

The analysis of the interviews revealed that not only internal mechanisms are necessary to consider when assessing gender dynamics within the hemicycle. External informal factors impact the law outcomes to a great extent. These exogenous elements have been determined as the economic capital, the social weights and the early emergence of a new norm.

5.3.1 Economic capital

Economic capital appears as an essential resource for women's empowerment and emancipation in the political sphere (Shvedova, 2005). Informant 16 argues that:

“Women's economic independence plays an extremely important role in their leadership. Holding a base is not easy.”

This economic base seems even more needed when they are willing to be mass mobilizers and aspire to be implied in the political scene actively. Informant 11 illustrates this point revealing that:

“We are used here, in Senegal to practice a food policy or when you are obliged to provide for the needs of the masses who follow you. So, you have to go to baptism, give money, if they are sick, pay for the prescription, if there is a death, help with the funeral, so there is all this social stuff around that is very heavy that weights on the politicians.”

The association of economic means and efficiency of leadership may impede women's entry to parliamentarian bodies considering that women are less likely to have economic opportunities in contrast to men (World Bank, 2019b).

5.3.2 Gender roles: a social burden

Economic instability seems to be interconnected to adjacent issues. Indeed, according to Informant 11:

“When you are really poor you are less likely to have an education”.

Women's lack of education has been identified as an additional obstacle to women's entry into parliament. Nevertheless, the latter often seems to be related to the social construction that takes place around gender roles. They appear to be ubiquitous already at an early stage and may entail specific consequences on women and men experiences. As exemplified by Informant 9:

“We [women and men] do not start from the same starting line; men have more advantages. In our families when girls and boys go to school, when they come back, the little girl does the household chores when the boy can read, take lessons or go play. So, it's not the same for girls as it is for boys.”

The latter quote expresses the privilege boys hold in families in comparison to girls when both go to school. Indeed, boys have more time to devote to their studies while girls, even when they go to school, are by some means prepared for future roles in the household. However, other trends precede, as the fact that girls are less likely to get a proper education. Informant 11 states that:

“Girls cannot access it [school] for reasons that everyone knows, either there is not enough infrastructure, or families are very poor and choose to always put the boy, and these are realities that still exist.”

These dynamics continue in the household at a later stage where peculiar attitudes resulting from one's respective gender are expected to unfold. Being a wife would not allow you to do the same things as being a husband and *vice versa*. Informant 7 notes that the husband legally exerts a significant decision power on his wife and children as he is defined as the “head of household”

by the Article 152 of the Family Code which remains in force today. This article states that “The husband is the head of the family, he exercises this power in the common interest of the household and of the children” (Code de la Famille Sénégalais, 1972: 28). Informant 5 asserts that:

“The husband is a social weight too. The man does not take care of the household, it is the culture. A woman who has not had the chance to have an education will not be able to challenge these social burdens because there are gender stereotypes”.

Further reiterating on this latter point, Informant 13 gives a more precise explanation of these roles by arguing that:

“We have relationships between women and men that make men still have a fairly significant weight in families, men still have this prevalent power over women. It's not everyone, but it's the majority. We think that women have a duty, if they get married for example, it is up to them to take care of a certain number of problems. So, the roles are clear, well defined. The roles [...] are really well culturally framed. [...] but what is paradoxical is that when you see the gender relations between men and women, you will realize that even intellectuals [...] in couples and in society, they still perpetuate these messages, they still perpetuate these roles.”

Similarly, to the reproduction of gender stereotypes in the hemicycle by women, this latter quote highlights the replication of these roles in a broader societal setting. Moreover, resonating with the internal dynamics of decision-making between men and women in the parliament, Informant 8 highlights that:

“Customs see better a woman who stays at home, who follows the orders of her husband, father or brother than a woman who talks, who makes decisions so we are not favored on the cultural side”

There are more profound and indirect causes that hinder the intended outcomes of the Parity Law. Conversely to boys, gender roles enhance the lack of girl's education impeding women's ability to challenge these stereotypes. By expecting and reproducing specific attitudes when being a girl, a sister, a wife, a mother, a woman, gender roles appear to be culturally inherent and steering particular beliefs on political identities (Krook et al., 2009). In contrast, the position

held by a boy, a brother, a husband, the head of the household, a man favors powerful status from which dominant attitudes arise. This social construction customarily assigns women to tasks related to their roles and thus confining them to the household. These informal factors obstruct women's entry into decision-making positions such as that of MPs, and extensively a party leader or an educated representative. Therefore, equal access to electoral and semi-electoral functions is widely influenced by the presence of these informal phenomena

5.3.3 An array of opportunities

There is a general sentiment amongst informants that the introduction of the Parity Law acts as an incentive for women to access parliamentary positions and is a source of motivation for one's empowerment. First, the array of "the possible" for women increases according to the interviews as demonstrated by Informant 15:

"The law gives them [women] opportunities. A well-educated woman knows that maybe with very little effort, and if she asserts herself, she can get on the lists and go to the National Assembly."

Moreover, it incentivizes women to focus on their education:

"They [women] will be more likely to take care of their instructions, their school, careers, by saying to themselves, 'ah, if I have my diplomas, I can claim this or that responsibility, I can be in politics, I can get in, occupy important places, I can.'" (Informant 8)

This results in a greater symmetry of gender dynamics:

"The strong presence of women in decision-making bodies will contribute to a change in mentality, their perception will change in the eyes of the populations, with the sharing of power with men." (Informant 18)

"The place of the woman is different because first of all, there are more women, more handkerchiefs, more scarves, and the tempo even at the aesthetic level, it's beautiful to see and then they are there, it changes. There is an evolving mentality

and there is a shock [...] we realize that it is not only men who can decide. It's important for the mind.” (Informant 9)

This change in mentality is a stepping-stone for the legitimacy of the law considering that women self-confidence is expected to increase and that the society sees women as more capable of decision-making and assertion.

When informal institution change is determined as growing along with societal values, this change is expected to be incremental and by extension, gradual (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 732). Informant 14 argues that:

“Parity is a way to achieve equality, it's a staircase, an elevator”

A power and resources redistribution between men and women may unfold not only regarding increased equality of chances to be eligible to parliamentary functions but also a chance to steer the quality of representatives within the hemicycle by women's greater interest in their education. By “facilitating the pursuit of individual goals within the formal institutional framework” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 728), the incentive created by the law illustrate the creation of complementary informal institutions aimed at reinforcing the Parity Law outcomes. Specifically, this targets equal access to mandates and function and consequently having impacts on the two remaining intended outcomes of the law.

6 Discussion

The findings have identified three types of institutions affecting the intended gender dynamics of the Parity Law. Both accommodating and complementary informal institutions have affected the outcomes of the law either as an obstacle or as a facilitator (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). To a smaller extent, formal institutions have been found to affect gender dynamics in the hemicycle. These institutions unfold at the societal level, in parliament and at the party level, all displaying influences on gender dynamics in parliament.

At the society level, the accommodating institutions deriving from cultural attributes mainly consist of socially shared expectations of roles based on gender. These profoundly impact equality before the law by privileging boys and men regarding the distribution of resources such as human and economic capital as well as decision-making power at the expense of girls and women. Moreover, the ideology of politics as a repulsive field restrain the input of quality of representatives by keeping intellectual women away from the field. Alternatively, one external formal institutions have been identified as hindering gender dynamics and especially equal access to mandates and functions. The formal disposition placing the man as the one taking decisions in the interest of the household can impact women considering the ubiquitous gender roles in the society and their unbalanced effects. However, the Parity Law itself enhances the creation of complementary informal institutions that are encouraging women to access parliamentary positions by taking care of their education, raising hope of prosperity among the female population and challenging the ideology of politics as a male domain. Being incremental, this evolution in attitudes is expected to unfold slowly.

The analysis of men and women's behaviors in the Senegalese hemicycle reports unbalanced participation among stakeholders in plenary sessions. Men MPs tend to intervene more and women are expected to replicate behaviors set by societal construction. Consequently, these accommodating institutions generate asymmetrical gender dynamics bypassing the spirit of the law. Nevertheless, the representation of a broader range of women accentuates the participation of female groups who once were marginalized and who can now raise issue inherent to their struggles. This complementary institution reflects the improved diversity of participation in the parliament due to the law introduction.

Finally, accommodating institutions unfolding at the party-level, present more strategical and intentional mechanisms. The calculated gendered alternation of candidates, the placement of men as head of the list and women as “spacers”, the deliberate election of compliant women to steer loyalty to the party’s guidelines, but also the intentional organization of late meetings affect the intended symmetry of gender dynamics. These informal selection practices, which reflect a distributive struggle in the exercise of decision-making and participation, are once again, the translation of informal institutions at the society level that affects the endogenous gender dynamics in political parties. Additionally, the formulation of the law implies a contradiction between egalitarian aims and odd possibilities of candidate lists of political parties.

7 Conclusion

The purpose of this research was to unravel the informal institutions that are affecting gender dynamics in the Senegalese parliament based on the theory assessing their interplay with formal rules. As presented in the literature review, the prevalent ideology associating politics with masculine traits can result in practices that attempt to maintain the status quo and hinder the intended effects of gender quotas. In the light of the findings, it appears that despite the introduction of the law, gender dynamics in the parliament are mainly guided by informal institutions undermining absolute parity, equal participation and equal access to mandates and functions. It seems clear that there are asymmetrical power relations between women and men MPs in the Senegalese hemicycle. These internal relations seem to be a transposition of societal beliefs where gender roles affect the distribution of human and economic capital and thus gender dynamics in parliament. Indeed, the Senegalese patriarchal society reinforces the expectation of women's behaviors as tied to roles that are mainly passive and apolitical. However, this result must be put into perspective with informal institutions which reinforce the entry of educated and committed women into the political sphere and open doors for a larger range of representatives. Moreover, although the 50-50 parity aim is not attained, by implementing this Parity Law, Senegal has shown its sharp will to further position women in decision-making bodies.

7.1 Directions for future research

Besides its specific focus on the formal and informal institutions interplay, this thesis has shed light on the profiles that entered the parliament due to the introduction of the Parity Law. Research could benefit from further studies on how these deputies impact the broader population. Precisely, research could focus on the impact of the entry of illiterate women as deputies on symbolic and substantive representation in Senegal. Alternatively, as an incremental change is expected to occur regarding gender dynamics, future research could investigate their evolution through a comparative study between the forthcoming legislatures.

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Legal texts

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9 Appendices

Appendix 1 – Translation of the Parity Law

Law No. 2010-11, LAW establishing absolute parity between men and women*

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The United Nations Convention of 18 December 1979 and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human Rights of 11 July 2003 on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, all ratified by Senegal, establishes the responsibility of governments in the implementation of measures to ensure equal participation of women in political life.

Despite obvious legislative progress, marked in particular by the Constitution of 22 January 2001, article 7, paragraph 5, of which stipulates that "the law shall promote equal access of women and men to mandates and functions"; women remain in the minority among elected representatives and their participation in political decision-making is far from corresponding to their effective contribution to society and political life. It therefore appeared necessary to take concrete measures to quickly correct this under-representation by ensuring the absolute equality of male and female candidates in all fully or partially elected institutions.

That is the thrust of this bill.

The National Assembly adopted, at its session of Friday, May 14, 2010;

The Senate adopted, at its session of Wednesday, May 19, 2010;

The President of the Republic promulgates the following law:

Article 1. - Absolute gender parity is established in Senegal in all fully or partially elected institutions.

Art. 2 - The lists of candidates are alternately composed of persons of both sexes.

When the number of members is odd, parity applies to the next lowest even number.

The lists of applications must comply with the above provisions or else they will be inadmissible.

Art. 3 - The conditions for the application of this law shall be defined and specified by decrees.

Art. 4 - This law and its implementing decrees shall be inserted in the Electoral Code.

This Act repeals any provisions to the contrary.

This law shall be enforced as the law of the State.

Done at Dakar, 28 May 2010.

Abdoulaye WADE.

By the President of the Republic:

The Prime Minister,

Souleymane Ndéné NDIAYE.

*Published originally in French. Translated by DeepL.

Appendix 2 – Translation of the application decree of the Parity Law*

DECREE No. 2011-819 of 16 June 2011

DECREE No. 2011-819 of 16 June 2011 for the implementation of the Act establishing the absolute parity between men and women.

PRESENTATION REPORT

Act No. 2010-11 of 28 May 2010 establishing absolute parity between men and women applicable to all fully or partially elected institutions requires that the lists of candidates be composed alternately of persons of both sexes, under penalty of inadmissibility.

This law allows equal access to decision-making bodies and will constitute an important lever to correct the imbalance between men and women in these bodies.

This draft decree defines the modalities for implementing this parity at the level of the various institutions.

This is the thrust of this draft decree.

The President of the Republic of Moldova,

Considering the Constitution, in particular Articles 43 and 67 thereof

Considering the law n° 2010- 11 of 28 May 2010 instituting absolute parity between men and women;

Considering Decree No. 2011-634 of 17 May 2011 on the distribution of State services and the control of public institutions, national companies and companies with public participation between the Presidency of the Republic, the Prime Minister's Office and ministries;

On the report of the Minister of State, Minister of Culture, Gender and the Environment;

Decree:

Article 1. In accordance with Act No. 2010-11 of 28 May 2010 establishing absolute parity

Male - Female in all totally or partially elective institutions, the lists of candidates for election in these institutions are, in turn, composed of persons of both sexes, under penalty of inadmissibility.

Art. 2 - The totally or partially elective institutions concerned are:

- Regional, Municipal and Rural Councils and their Bureaus and Commissions;
- the Senate, its Bureau and its Committees;
- the National Assembly, its Bureau and its Committees,
- the Bureau of the Congress of Parliament;
- the Bureau of the Economic and Social Council and its Commissions.

For any vacant senator, deputy, or councillor position, the replacement must be of the same gender. On the lists of candidates, the gender of each candidate must be indicated after his or her name.

Art. 3 - The law instituting parity shall apply to any legally constituted political party, any coalition of political parties and to all lists of independent candidates.

All the lists submitted by each party, party coalition or independent candidate are declined in proportion to the number of potentially eligible men and women.

When the number of candidates on the lists is odd, parity applies to the next lowest even number.

For each election, the political parties, the coalitions of political parties and independent candidate lists are required to invest an equal number of men and women, all lists combined.

Art. 4 - This decree repeals any provisions to the contrary.

Art. 5 - The Minister of State, Minister of the Interior, the Minister of State, Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Justice, the Minister of State, Minister of Culture, Gender and the Environment, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of State, Minister of Culture, Gender and the Environment, the Minister of Culture, Gender and the Environment, the Minister of Decentralization and local authorities and the

Minister in charge of Relations with the Institutions are responsible, each as far as he is concerned, for the implementation of this decree, which will be published in the Official Journal.

Done in Dakar, on 16 June 2011

Abdoulaye WADE.

By the President of the Republic:

The Prime Minister,

Souleymane Ndéné NDIAYE.

*Published originally in French. Translated by DeepL.

Appendix 3 - Interview guide (non-exhaustive list of questions)

Recurrent process:

- Who am I, what am I studying, why am I interested in interviewing them, publication statement, clarify that the interview can be interrupted at any time, approval or refusal of audio recording of the interview, ask if the informant has any question
- Who is the informant, what is the informant's position
- "Do you have anything to add?" as the last question

Some questions asked to political actors (17 questions in total):

- What do you think the law on parity brought to women in the National Assembly?
- What are the criteria for choosing candidates for parliament?
- What could you tell me about your decision-making power in parliament?
- Do you think that the parity law has posed a lot of obstacles for some political parties during the recruitment process?
- In your opinion, outside the political-legal framework, what are the positive factors impacting on gender relations in political institutions?
- In your opinion, outside the political-legal framework, what are the negative factors affecting gender relations in political institutions?

Some questions asked to the COSEF director (14 questions in total):

- What were their arguments in favor of the parity law?
- What were their arguments against the parity law?
- Why talk about parity rather than quota?
- What do you think the parity law has brought to women in terms of power in political institutions such as the parliament?

Some questions asked to the ONP director (7 questions):

- In monitoring the application of parity, what can you tell me about the obstacles to the application of the law?
- What can you tell me about the profiles of women observed at the National Assembly?
- There are 41.8% women in parliament today in Senegal, but parity would like there to be 50%, how can this be explained?

Some questions asked to the current member and former president of the AJS (14 questions):

- Does customary law still carry weight today in Senegal?
- What measures are taken in the event of a violation of the Parity Act?
- Why talk about parity rather than quota?
- What do you think the parity law has brought to women in terms of power in political institutions such as parliament?

Appendix 4 - Sample

Networking procedure

Snow-ball sampling

- Informant 8 gave me the contact of Informant 18
- Informant 1 gave me the contacts of Informant 7, 8, 12, 13 and 15
- Informant 11 gave me the contacts of Informant 9 and 10 (Before I even met her)
- Informant 4 gave me the contact of Informant 15 (as Informant 1 did)

Internet search

- Found Informant 1, 5 & 14

List of attendances of the projection of a movie on Parity in the OHCHR*

- Informant 4, 9 (as given by Informant 11), and 16

Other

- The contacts of Informant 6, 11 and 17 were asked spontaneously to people I haven't interviewed
- Discussions with Informant 2 and 3 unfold in a contextual situation

* 34 contacts were on the lists, 8 contacts were unreadable thus not contacted, 3 agreed on meeting. The rest either did not respond or refused an interview.

Detailed Sample

Description	
Color	Status
Green	General Informant
Blue	Intermediate Informant
Grey	Key Informant
	Events

Date	N°	Status	Location	Gender	Discussion	Support
30.01.19	1	Contact person, Gender sociologist	Her office	Woman	Informative	Notes
31.01.19	1	Contact person, Gender sociologist	Diverse	Woman	Informal	None
31.01.19	-	Panel Discussion	Saint-Louis	-	Panel discussion	Notes
31.01.19	1	Contact person, Gender sociologist	French Institute of Saint-Louis	Woman	Contextual	None
31.01.19	2	Moderator for the "Night of Ideas" Panel discussion	French Institute of Saint-Louis	Male	Contextual	None
06.02.19	3	Librarian at the National Assembly	National Assembly archive area and by mail	Male	Informative	Notes
08.02.19	1	Contact person, Gender sociologist	Her office	Woman	Informative	Notes
13.02.19	4	Ministry of Superior Education and Research employee	By phone and voice messages	Woman	Formal	Audio, written transcription
14.02.19	5	Ministry of Interior, formation services employee	Her office	Woman	Formal	Notes
15.02.19	6	Administrator Pan-African Center for Gender Peace and Development	Her office	Woman	Informative	Notes
15.02.19	7	Counselor of the Minister of Women, Family and Gender	Her office	Woman	Formal	Written interview
19.02.19	8	Parliamentarian under X and XI legislature	Her place	Woman	Formal	Audio, written transcription
19.02.19	9	Parliamentarian under the X and XII legislature	Her place	Woman	Formal	Audio, written transcription
16.02.19	3	Librarian at the National Assembly	National Assembly archive area and by mail	Male	Informative	Oral
28.02.19	10	Parliamentarian under the XI and XII legislature, former mayor	Her place	Woman	Formal	Audio, written transcription
01.03.19	1	Contact person, Gender sociologist	Her office	Woman	Informative	Notes
02.03.19	11	Parliamentarian under the XII legislature	Her place	Woman	Formal	Audio, written transcription
04.03.19	12	AJS former president and current member	Her office	Woman	Formal	Audio, written transcription
06.03.19	-	Conference	OHCR	-	Conference	Notes
07.03.19	13	COSEF President	Her office	Woman	Formal	Audio, written transcription
08.03.19	-	Panel Discussion	Heindrich Boll Foundation	Woman	Panel discussion	Notes
11.03.19	14	Parlementarian under the XI legislature	Her Office	Woman	Formal	Written Interview
18.09.19	15	ONP President	Her Office	Woman	Formal	Audio, written transcription
18.03.19	16	High Counsellor at the HCCT (instance under the parity law)	Café de Rome	Woman	Formal	Audio, written transcription
18.03.19	1	Contact person, Gender sociologist	Her office	Woman	Informal	None
31.03.19	17	Parlementarian under the XII legislature	By email	Woman	Formal	Email
09.04.19	18	CECI Regional Programme Officer: Gender Equality	By email	Woman	Formal	Email

Appendix 5 - Session held in Parliament

	Date	Legislature	Opening of the session	Ministry involved/Purpose
Session 1	17.12.12	XII	10h45	Ministry of Justice
Session 2	17.12.12	XII	16h41	Ministry of Land Use Planning and Local Government
Session 3	04.06.13	XII	10h53	Ministry of the Armed Forces
Session 4	04.06.13	XII	12h30	Ministry of the Interior
Session 5	04.06.13	XII	16h52	Ministry of Hydraulics and Sanitation
Session 6	04.06.13	XII	18h58	Ministry of Trade, Industry and the Informal Sector
Session 7	04.06.13	XII	19h22	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Session 8	28.10.13	XII	10h45	Policy Statement
Session 9	15.01.14	XII	16h50	Ministry of Economic Affairs, Entrepreneurship and the Informal Sector
Session 10	03.06.14	XII	16h45	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad
Session 11	12.03.15	XII	16h15	Topical issue
Session 12	27.03.15	XII	11H20	Ministry of Justice

Appendix 6 - Detailed calculation of the quantitative content analysis*

	Male MPs Interventions	Female MPs Interventions	Male MPs amount of words	Female MPs amount of words	Male MPs Interventions in Wolof	Female MPs Interventions in Wolof
Session 1	50	15	10216	2148	13	11
Session 2	14	5	3699	51	7	4
Session 3	9	4	3243	1496	0	1
Session 4	8	2	2817	653	2	2
Session 5	8	1	669	3	5	1
Session 6	8	3	771	1099	3	1
Session 7	7	2	1311	7	2	2
Session 8	53	22	12402	3846	29	10
Session 9	44	21	12582	2785	13	16
Session 10	6	3	1335	703	1	0
Session 11	11	4	1798	583	0	0
Session 12	4	0	512	0	0	0
Total	222	82	51355	13374	75	48

- Calculation of Interventions by gender: manual (through reading)
- Calculation of amount of words by gender: copy-past method (PDF to Word)
- Calculation of Intervention in Wolof by gender: manual (through reading)
- Percentage of interventions in Wolof in comparison to French by Male MPs: Male MPs Intervention in Wolof * 100 / Male MPs Interventions **or** $75 \times 100 / 222 = 33$
 → Percentage of interventions in French in comparison to Wolof by Male MPs: Percentage of Interventions of Male MPs - Percentage of interventions in Wolof of Male MPs **or** $100 - 33 = 67$
- Percentage of interventions in Wolof in comparison to French by Female MPs: Female MPs Intervention in Wolof * 100 / Females MPs Interventions **or** $48 \times 100 / 82 = 58$
 → Percentage of interventions in French in comparison to Wolof by Female MPs: Percentage of Interventions of Female MPs - Percentage of interventions in Wolof OF Female MPs **or** $100 - 48 = 52$
- Average length of speech of Male MPs: Male MPs amount of words/Male MPs Interventions **or** $51355 / 222 = 231$
- Average length of speech of Female MPs: Female MPs amount of words/Female MPs Interventions **or** $13374 / 82 = 163$

* All calculations involve speeches of men and women MPs excluding interventions by the moderator and the rapporteur of the debates, page numbers and titles. The figures, graphs and tables have been generated by Excel.