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**Framing Emotions:
Accounting for Feelings in Human Geography**

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Acknowledgements

My decision to work within a marginal field - if one even considers it to be appropriately established to lend itself such categorisation - was, for this reason, amongst others, a venture and a gamble within the department of human geography, at Lund University. The risks were diverse, and the challenges persistent, yet my good fortune lay in the encouragements of my supervisor, Tomas Germundsson, who remained considerate towards my ambitions, and helped ensure a successful outcome. Reviewers along the way, particularly during seminars, were of extreme aid, as were the insightful comments by Henrik Gutzon Larsen. More deeply, however, I would like to acknowledge the unceasing guidance I received from Matilda Smedberg, whose reflections and critiques were of immeasurable value: thank you. Your diligent mind reassured me in my most anxious and insecure moments; your industrious thoughts added depth and breadth to my research and writing. This thesis is, in no small part, attributable to our continuous exchanges, which spanned over four glorious, indeed enjoyable, months.

Abstract

Researchers, from various academic departments, are increasingly undertaking studies of phenomena by way of practices considered to be within the sub-field of emotional geography. Emotional geographers, in an attempt to imbue research with the intensely subjective experiences of events and spaces, seek to uncover feelings by way of emotions, yet cautiously avoids the non-representational by working through language. In this thesis, I expand upon theorisations of emotions, and affect, to a lesser extent, and position the reader amongst the rich methodologies inherent to emotional geography. The linkages that connect emotional and affectual geographies are exposed, which provide this thesis with a clear reading of emotions. The thesis also conducts a dual emotional geography in-practice, to familiarise myself, and the reader, with the *felt* experience of conducting an emotional geography on a plot of land in Västra Skrävlinge, Malmö; more importantly, however, the dualistic practice also demonstrates the differences between the dominant and less-dominant forms of emotional geographical conduct.

This extensive examination, which spans across various intensive readings of scholarly literatures, an interview, and memory-based reflections, highlights the importance and room for increased emotive accounts of events and spaces by researchers in human geography; indeed advocating that emotional geography need not feel itself restricted by the challenges inherent to approaching emotions. Rather, emotional geographers should build upon the increasing acknowledgements that emotions are spatially pervasive. This, I argue, promises to add more, if not a deeper account of human experiences in relation to events, spaces, and each other.

Keywords: *emotional geography, emotions, feelings, affectual geography, memory*

Introduction

To engage in the processes of how ‘I’ experience myself along the intersected labels of black, male, able, privileged, and heterosexual (to name but a few of the most politicised and commonly mentioned by those identified, and identifying)¹, then address how part of my lived experience(s) are, to varying degrees of intensity, both relationally oppressive and iniquitous, and/or advantageous in regards to equally complex ‘others’, in various spaces, would constitute meaningful socio-political and philosophical research. As an (auto)ethnography, it could branch off of contemporary feminist literature found in human geography and other disciplines, and contribute to the annals of critical and cultural geography (Spivak, 1995; Butler, and Spivak, 2011; Rose, 1996; Butler, 2003). Furthermore, it would account for the constructed, though ‘real’ performativity of spatial (power) formations as relational, keeping it quite comfortably within the discipline of human geography, though maintaining some form of reliance upon feminist approaches to geographical conduct (Butler, 2003; Sharp, 2009; Koskela, 2000; Harrison, 2007; Davidson, et al. 2007, Davidson, 2017). Furthermore, in going deeper along this practice, doing so would also stress the importance of addressing structural-material flows as *lived*, rather than as a series of disembodied processes; thus, the reasons for engaging on the experiences of co-constituting subjects in, for example, the urban, through feminist literature in human geography, is relevant and important. Not to say that contemporary materialist geographers (economic geographers; regional geographers; ecological geographers) are not deeply involved in research on the accounts of how spaces are experienced by people, but rather that contemporary cultural geographies offer researchers (and readers) vivid, intense, if not heightened, dimensions of depth, on the currents and torrents of human experience. This does not mean that other methodological approaches are not capable, nor willing and/or trying, to expose and explain people’s lived experiences; but rather that research based on the theorisations from cultural geographies (feminist, non-representational, phenomenological) are most effective in exposing and explaining lived experiences, particularly of those who have been marginalised socio-historically (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1998; Butler, 2003; Butler, and Spivak, 2011).

The epistemological practices within feminist literatures have, in the better half of the 20th century, contributed to waves of re-thinking what constitutes science: who ‘creates’ it, and for whom it is constituted (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1998). The philosophical criticisms of scientific knowledge systems (which have largely been attacked for being too positivist) within

¹ It is my belief that there are certainly less mentioned labels; in fact, the features of one’s identity, preferably arrived at individually or collectively, without coercion, are endless

gender and cultural studies departments have, of course, not occurred in isolation for the sole benefit of those operating within them: arguably, the critiques of particular philosophies of science have always been transdisciplinary, and resulted in crossovers between disciplines (Sharp, 2009). Still, the criticisms arising out of the 20th century were, for the better part, on the realms of knowledge the ‘natural,’ or as Harding called it in 1998, *internalistic* sciences, had neglected, exploited, or appropriated (Harding, 1998). Coincidentally, we also see the emergence of more humanistic geographies, in human geography, in the last three decades of the 20th century, from spatial and systematic geographies. Thus begging the question of whether this shift occurred in isolation within feminist disciplines and spread, or occurred simultaneously within all social disciplines as an alternative to the former. Whether it is necessary to ponder the extent to which criticisms of particular philosophy’s of science, among feminist theorists, influenced the conceptual frames of humanistic geographers in the 1970s, and onwards, depends on one’s stance towards academic disciplines; namely, whether they have, ought to, and/or do, operate within strictly defined boundaries, or overlap, particularly in regards to epistemologies and methodologies. That question, lying out-of-bounds of my research aim, will not be taken up, but my position towards it should be apparent to the reader: epistemologies, from critiques to practices, have been, and should be, transdisciplinary.

Many of these interdisciplinary criticism’s arguably contributed to a flourishing of literatures that departed from prevailing epistemologies within physical geography; the emergence of radical (which it may very well still be for some) theorisations such as Actor Network Theory reflect this departure most obviously. Thus, in this historic progression of challenges, new compassions have been afforded to current practitioners of humanistic geographies. An outcome being that it is now theoretically possible to ask of the emotional experience(s) of *being*, which entails *being in* as the process(es) of *becoming in*, and *with*, certain spatial locales, and additionally *of* certain spatial locales, in relation to others later-lived, imagined (temporally multidirectional, as for example, spaces of fantasy or dread), or previously-lived. Questioning these theoretical themes necessitates psycho-material flows that enable the humanistic researcher to move towards the historical, if desired. In doing so, the researcher would not necessarily obfuscate the intersected realities experienced by individuals, nor bypass them, *per se*; it instead implies that said intersected experiences are potentially constitutive of the emotional, or vice versa or simultaneously: in fact, it can also be that emotional geographers are attempting to access people’s intersected realities through emotive abstractions, without ‘too-heavily’ politicising the intersected labels through which individuals come to experience themselves, or spaces. Though it may seem as if I am now stating the historical developments

within humanistic geography's schools of thought to stem from feminist critiques of the mid-20th century, eventually giving rise to a new sub-discipline, that is in fact not my aim: human geography, as a discipline, has itself oscillated within criticisms of what should constitute scientific practice (Peet, 1998). Rather, I have only attempted to show a potential influence, or disciplinary contribution, or co-evolution, since emotional geographies appear quite strongly in proximity to other feminist theories of science. However, an attempt to uncover the intersected experiences of reality does not necessarily imply emotions (emotional language): herein, to me, lies the epistemological distinction between contemporary feminist methodologies and emotional geographies.

While contemporary feminist scholarship debates, within the branches of epistemology, how best to approach the experiences of the 'Other,' with popular debate revolving around situated knowledge's and standpoint theory, emotional geographers, having their own debates amongst each other, and with affectual geographers, largely seem to concur within the sub-discipline that emotive displays are the sought-after points of research; there is however no consensus on how best to approach and untangle the emotional (Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1998; Davidson, et al., 2007; Anderson and Harrison, 2006; Anderson and Smith, 2001).

The importance of the emotional, more simply said, is that it can also be viewed as a way of approaching experience of 'self' and experiences of relation (Harding and Pribram, 2002). Arguably, this forms the basis for why the preponderance of scholarly writings in emotional geography are accounts of specific emotional states, be it fear or anxiety *of* (as *resultant from*), and/or producing *of* spaces (as 'broadly' specific: i.e. *being outside*; or defined spaces as 'narrowly' specific: a dark, solitary street)². This 'self' is, however, in the more feminist inclined emotional geographies, never in isolation but in relation to imbalanced relations (Sharp, 2009).

Writing within emotional geography does not, however, ever fully depart from the internally, and/or externally perceived and lived identities of its subjects; in fact, it faces the same dilemma of causality found within feminist theories: do emotions form the foundation for certain perceived identities, or are they results of power relations prior to formed identities; indeed, brought about *by* the power relations, which are, too, manifestations of space. Another marked distinction between feminist and emotional methodologies is the explicit desire for 'emotional' language (happy; angry; sad, to name a few); fundamentally, upon cursory analysis, I would

² The degree to which something is broad/narrow is subject to individual conception, however, spatial discussions of specific emotional states exist along a spectrum of difference, as 'outside' and 'a dark, quiet street' are, to me, markedly different accounts of geographical space, though this does not entail, through correlation, any difference in regards to heightened or diminished experience of social space

ascribe to such a practice, and would endorse the usage of more emotional language within the social sciences, as a way of approaching ‘feeling’, which is what emotional geographers are truly after. It is certainly true that historic, and to a larger degree, contemporary discourses within the social sciences have favoured language devoid of the emotional, as the linguistic demands for expressing logic and reason, mechanical in their operation, are given more clout; as is the pursuit of, to borrow Harding’s term once more, *internalisitic* truths (Harding, 1989; Rose, 1993). In light of this, several emotional geographers have argued that an account of emotions in-and-of themselves resists extreme-positivism (historically perceived of as a form of western masculinity, by some); however, given the cultural objectification of language, emotional geographies are embedded within issues of what-can-be-known and representation, throwing it into the overarching schemas of non-representation (Thrift, 2004; Harrison, 2007; Anderson and Smith, 2001; Davidson, et al., 2007; Bondi, 2005; Thien, 2005).

Before moving on to my deposition, I would briefly like to state where emotional geographies’ are occurring, and conclude my thoughts on its developmental history. The majority of contemporary emotional geographical research seems to have flourished in the last two decades, if we assume its entry into human geography as a sub-disciplinary practice to have occurred in the last decade of the 20th century: arguably, however, its roots can be traced back further into the century, dependent on whether one is of the opinion that it emerged from transdisciplinary co-evolution, diffusion, or occurred in isolation within Human Geography. A narrow channel feeds my view, since it appears that writing, to my knowledge, has been limited to Anglophone researchers in Europe and North America. That which has been written is a concentration of studies done by scholars in geography, and other social science departments, in the United Kingdom; Swedish geography departments have seen little-to-no uptake in emotional geography³. Though the concentration appears to be in the United Kingdom, I will mention emotional geographical research done by scholars in English, from various other countries.

Disposition

Before addressing my research question, I would firstly like to clarify the tone of this paper, for it is rather unique in its intention, and prepare the reader for its structure. This paper will be exploratory in nature, and is thus an attempt to build upon what I perceive of as limited theoretical definitions within emotional geography, as well as limited critical reflections. Due to

³ Holmberg (2019), who’s article was written for Uppsala’s Department of Sociology, is referenced and mentioned in this paper, and, though moving towards an emotional geography of sort, is arguably closer in form to an affectual geography

the density and phenomenological nature of the core concept, my research relies on the surveying of existing literature and an exploratory emotional geography in-practice. Throughout this paper, 'in-practice' will be used to refer to an emotional geography not carried out to conclusion; I will not explicitly infer anything of the spatial from the emotional. The reader should know that, in gradually familiarising myself with editorials, research papers, and other various literatures published within/for the discipline of emotional geography, my initial intention was to conduct a particular form of an emotional geography, with less emphasis on theoretical/critical and scholarly analyses. Unfortunately, as will be explained in later sections, this proved to be a difficult endeavour in regards to the spatial field I had chosen to study.

I, therefore, attempt at a highly critical and analytical reading of academic literatures, as well as towards my own in-practice. As regards structure, *Theory* will encompass deep analysis of concept and epistemology, and include my own intellectual grappling; *Methodology* will be dualistic, as it will include a light theorisation of existing methodologies, and, describe the methods to be used in my emotional geography in-practice; *Scholarly Overview* will attempt to, in more detail, untangle the various methodologies by emotional geographers, and could be considered results (1); the *Temporal Nature of Emotions* will be a recounting of my experiences, and Cyrille's experiences, and can be considered results (2); then, the *Analysis* will also be dualistic in more deeply analysing scholarly methodologies, and, the experience of my exploratory emotional geographies. In both the *Scholarly Overview* and *Analysis*, methodologies are prioritised since it is accepted from the outset that there is no conceptual consistency in regards to emotions. However, the lack of consistency does not mean scholars should immediately abandon theoretical digging, which I attempt in *Theory*.

The reason for having only conducted one interview is thus partially based on unforeseen difficulties in getting subjects to talk emotively, but more so because this exploration, in being limited in scope at this academic level, suffices in what is revealed in pairing one interview with critical readings of several emotional geographies and my own emotive experience. I should also state that my role in this paper will appear dualistic to the reader: I will write from the perspectives of researcher of emotional geographies, Cyrille's emotions, and of an emotive subject. Incorporating my emotive experiences should, I hope, contribute in making my theorisations more extensive.

Research Statement

My curiosity thus leads me towards theoretical exploration, which will constitute the majority of my writing, as I navigate the thematically varied texts by emotional geographers to grasp any methodological challenges and (in)consistencies; then ask: how should ‘we’ consider emotional geography within the dominating paradigms of human geography, and how is it best practiced? Who practices it best and to what end is it necessary? Thus, my research question is: **How, and to whose benefit, do emotional geographies extend the epistemological ranges within human geography?** This question strikes me as both important and apparent, as it is immediately obvious from the preponderance of writing within human geography that critical realism, as leading epistemic methodology, reproduces the practices of methods perceived to be on paths towards the ‘true’ nature of the world, whereby all other knowledge systems are merely precursory, or irrelevant: a viewing of the world from elevated planes of knowledge(s), supposedly leading to accurate, objective truths, based on rationalised measuring/measurements of physical space (Smith, et al., 2009; Haraway, 1988; Harding, 1998). Furthermore, how can we account for its burgeoning popularity: is it merely a re-focus on the social after a completed cyclical period within more materialist methods? And can this paper serve to contribute to its solidification as a practical, theoretically sound discipline? Or, will its continued growth encourage strong resistances from proponents of ‘masculinist’, ‘natural’ epistemologies, as the continuation of more immersive, poetic, linguistically flexible, and materially varied forms of ‘data’ collection and descriptivism threaten to undermine their established systems (Koskela, 2000; Rose, 1993)? The immediate answer as to whether emotional geography can exist as an epistemological science is not directly answerable, for it conforms and resists, and is itself manifestly aporetic in wanting validity within a highly materialist knowledge-production system; but also chooses to resist it by focusing on tainted qualia: this, however, is comparable to critical realism’s self-acknowledged challenge of approaching the ‘Real’, where emphasis is placed on the realm of the ‘Actual’ (Collier, 1994). I will, in the *Theory* section, elaborate on the systematic materialism I claim has been, and is, dominant in human geography.

My writing will focus on practiced methodologies from scholarly articles and books, without addressing contributions at an extended length, and will also include my own attempt at an emotional geography of a spatial locale (which, in this paper, will be interchangeable with emotional space, since both are intertwined, if not the same). An emotional geography, by example, will put the more popular methodological conceptions into practice, and scrutinise the degree to which such practices can have validity within human geography, as it currently exists at the dominant scale; this comparison of sorts will occur in the *Analysis* section. Having

acknowledged that emotional geographers typically, though not always, attach the exploration of specific emotional states to/of particular geographies, I have chosen to fixate my exploratory case study to a plot of land in Västra Skrävlinge, Malmö, which I consider to be imbued with social, political, and emotional phenomenon, as I believe all geographies are (Anderson, 2016: in: Clifford, et al., *Key Methods in Geography*). My theoretical adoption and affirmation that various spatial strands are geographically and emotively monistic will be explicated further in my *Theory* section. I have not from the onset decided to focus my emotional geography in-practice on fear, anxiety, or happiness, but, unlike the work of several emotional geographers, will work from the spatial towards the emotional: from the opposite side of the same field; a practice not entirely unique to me. This spatial field, though host to a set of characters, will only focus on the experiences of one of its participants, for reasons to be elaborated on in the *Methodology* section. I should state that the emotionally-laden spatial field, like most if not all geographies, is one of intense political flows due to the (pre)determined configurations that determine how particular bodies experience spaces: demarcation of it as such occurred prior to my undertaking an emotional geography in-practice; indeed, as shall be elaborated on in the *Scholarly Overview* section, the work of some emotional geographers begins with an explanation of the politically-laden spatial field.

As stated above, my subject of emotional research will be but one participant who is directly involved with a farming initiative on a plot of land in Västra Skrävlinge. Though there are many participants, in this case, as wide as I choose to cast the net, this paper is not attempting to represent *all* emotional states, nor all the emotionalities of participants in relation to the land in Västra Skrävlinge. Doing so would seem to avoid the (largely material) dilemma of what is a considerable representative sample; if I were not relying on theoretical reasoning as the main approach to epistemological critique I would make this paper easily susceptible to such rebuttals. Still, the issue of representation is pervasive within emotional geography, and is part of the identity crisis faced by its practitioners due to its positioning between the non-representational and more politically-grounded feminist theories. However, as I have stated, my interview will constitute the background, and the foreground of this paper will be from theoretical explorations of scholastic conceptions in emotional geography, as well as an analysis of my experience of doing an emotional geography, though to a lesser extent. The case study will only serve to partially inform me of the experience (at least my own) of conducting emotional geography, for the methodological component is arguably the largest obstacle to overcome in the discipline within current frameworks of the social sciences.

Why, then, if I can draw observations and conclusions from theoretical reasoning's and methodological analyses of scholarly publications, should I attempt it myself? Especially since I will not be politicising emotionalities as rising out of relational inequities. Firstly, It would seem that to be dismissive of an epistemology without engaging with the more-common methodological approaches would seem inherently materially-elitist, and distant (another attribute of masculinist knowledge production); in a sense, I would be evoking the prejudices emotional geographers claim the social sciences currently espouse. Furthermore, in claiming to fundamentally agree with the purpose of emotive geographies, principally from a theoretical outset, it seems that theoretical reasoning may not in-of-itself go 'far' enough. A minor practice also gives me insight into knowledge's I may not have realised from theoretical reasoning: given that the discipline is dealing with, or attempting to approach feelings, it is safe to assume there may be other 'knowledges' hidden away from theoretical reasoning – known only through movement-based experience. In fact, the experience of approaching emotions is necessary to 'feel'.

Whether or not this could be the case is unknowable given the uncertainty in predicting feelings stemming from thorough, deep and immersive literary readings, and from interviewing another human through an emerging framework. In claiming myself to be at proponent, if not, at a minimum, an intrigued individual, of the increase of emotional geographies within human geography, it follows that any critique I intend on directing at the discipline ought to be accompanied by an actual attempt.

Emotions in Geography

If we assume early 20th century feminist theoretical critiques, and the developments in humanistic geography of the 1970s onwards, to be the sources of increasing accounts of lived experiences in contemporary geographical research, we can, after accounting for the logics of the epistemologies, conclude that emotional geography succeeds, without superseding, the aforementioned theories. The nascent, though proliferating epistemology revolves around accounts of one's lived experience by-way of emotions, which are expected (but not limited) to be expressed through verbal symbols (language) to the researcher, who should/could (a topic of debate) then politicise the emergence, persistence, and/or discontinuity of those particular emotional states; as well as stress the inter-subjective experience of similar and/or differing emotional states (Smith, et al., 2009; Jones, 2007, "*An Emotional Ecology of Memory, Self and Landscape.*"; Thien, 2005; Bondi, 2005; Anderson and Smith, 2001; Pile, 2009; Parr, et al., 2007: In: *Emotional Geographies*).

Since feminist geographies stress the historical record as contributory to the lived experience(s) of individuals, thus informing perceived identity, while also co-constituting perceived history, it differs from emotional geography, as the latter does not take history to be the entry point for (of) individual identity; rather, emotional geographies occur *in medias res*, which is not ahistorical since it can still move in a historic direction (Rydström, 2015; Bondi, 2005; Anderson and Smith, 2001). This, too, of *life in movement*, raises challenges to the methodological desire to approach emotions. Emotional geography does, nevertheless, permit space for the interpretation of history and lived experiences as co-constituting, but stresses the emotional as the experiential point of analysis.

We can, here, too, assume that it is commonly accepted within the social sciences that experience is the metaphysical flow between history (known and/or imagined), future (as desired or feared), and perceived identity (the labels through which one is forced or chooses to live), continuously. Could we stand to argue that emotional geography, rather than proclaiming itself its own sub-discipline, should simply act as supplement to feminist geography? Perhaps; however, I would contend that direct, and explicit accounts of emotions, by way of language or otherwise, can form part of the processes of understanding lived experience, and this does not have to necessarily be done after, or before, more feminist approaches to knowledge production: it does not need to be consumed into feminist theories of knowledge.

The philosophical and political implications in emotional geography are in-and-of themselves colossal inquiries into particular systems and structures (cultures of emotion): the conditionings of language, the most striking. Similarly, too, current feminist epistemologies are faced with immense philosophical challenges to their conduct, so that subsuming emotional geographical methodology would inflate the philosophical task to an impractical density. Maintaining a degree of exclusivity, in this regard, has the benefit of ensuring sharper criticism and definitions within the respective disciplines.

Stadsbruk

Brief mention of Stadsbruk, as well as a picture, will feature in this paragraph, to familiarise the reader with the spatial locale I chose for this exploratory study. Stadsbruk, which was conceived of by the municipality of Malmö in collaboration with a host of other entities, was founded in 2011 (Anneli and Friblick, 2016). In short, the organisation functions primarily as an incubator for entrepreneurs-cum-farmers who would like to learn and begin the processes of urban farming (Anneli and Friblick, 2016). The intention, it would seem, is to provide residents of the city with access to locally-grown, organic produce during seasons of harvest, and

entrepreneurial farmers a starting point for future agricultural ventures. What was not stated in the official Stadsbruk publication or website, but that I later came to know, is that, though the municipality funds efforts such as soil rejuvenation, farmers are expected to pay exorbitant rents for the use of municipal land, and are only expected to be there for a set period of time⁴. Stadsbruk is located in an area known for being disproportionately disadvantaged/marginalised economically, compared to the rest of the city, and is arguably situated in its periphery. It is, however, accessible via public transport and bicycle.

Picture 1.1 *Stadsbruk*



Taken by Mumbi Mkandawire

⁴ During a day of volunteering at Stadsbruk in November 2018, I spoke to several farmers who outlined this information; our discussions were informal and occurred before I had any idea about my thesis topic. However, I had at this point read Stadsbruk's official publication and website, for a course paper. Later, Cyrille, coincidentally, mentioned this as a source of tension between the farmers and the municipality during our interview, which he held to be due to the farmers' fanciful delusions.

Theory

Progressions

The intellectual progressions in humanistic geography can be perceived, in the broadest sense, as attempts to be more inclusive of the conditions of *being* human, and arguably forms part of a shift towards the *social* in the social sciences. Readings of Hartshorne (1939), Livingstone (1992), Christaller (1966), and Harvey (2006) illustrate the matrixes previously employed for geographical research; namely, the quantification and measurement of (borrowed from Harvey) *absolute* space. Distances, speeds, logics, and formations constituted answers to the questions of human experience in most decades of the 20th century. Later, the more humanistic geographers of the same period (20th century), whom I will mention later in this section, in contrast to the aforementioned, elucidated the disciplines internal strife in being caught between two seemingly oxymoronic terms: social and science; clearly, the practitioners of more materialistic geography had a rather fixed notion of science: that it exists objectively for all those with the right tools to know. In contestation to this, within the overarching field of humanistic geography, emphasis was placed on the perceptions of space(s) as tied to the conditions of self and the ‘other’, implying co-constitutive relationships. In this vein, humanistic geographers acknowledged that spaces are rarely, if ever, devoid of human perceptibility and experience, resulting in works focused on the relations between humans, spaces and places (Tuan, 1974; Buttimer, 1976; Massey, 1991; Relph, 1976)⁵. However, the assumed universality of human perceptibility, of course, implied universal modes of perception/experience, and thus much writing within these schools reduced perceptibility into a common universal, devoid of relationality and subjectivity. The self was, to an extent, extended to include all humans, without an accurate account of the relational (intersected) experiences of humans, as well as among humans *of* a particular space.

In pushing the bounds of humanistic geography, phenomenologists pursued the perceived states of/amongst various subjects of/amongst other subjects, without human limitations; thus, non-human bodies were, and are, indeed, perceivable as subjects due to their influence on, and influencing upon, human bodies (Tuan, 1974; Buttimer, 1976; Massey, 1991). However, the politicisation of such phenomenon, and the resistance to the abyss of post-structuralism/modernism, was realised in burgeoning feminist theory, which sought to explore and document the specific conditionalities of particularly situated bodies as materially *lived*

⁵ Known-unknowns (that which one is aware of not knowing), and unknown-knowns (that which one is *experientially* aware of but not conscious of), are both emotive spaces. Unknown-unknown (arguably falls within known-unknowns).

constructions (Anderson and Smith, 2001; Bondi, 2005; Conradson and McKay, 2007; Pain, 2009). In understanding that various phenomenologies exist, feminist critiques politicised our conceived, lived, (inter)subjective differences, in order to uncover structural inequalities, and the entailed processes (speeds and logics) of oppression and/or resistance. Social constructivisms were exposed but not abandoned for a degree of the 'Real' is the lived construct of people.

This, too me, is relevant and ever needed; yet, whereas feminist theory rely on an identified subject, as to avoid the pitfalls of post-structuralism, which scholars within said disciplines have often identified and categorised at distances, scholarly literature on the nature of structurally intersected inequalities often lacks the emotional. Thus, something can be said of proximity, which I will return to momentarily. Secondly, in acknowledging the constituted 'other' there is often a reproduction, and maintenance of, what are typically, opposing dualities: black/white, man/woman, male/female, private/public, rich/poor, and nature/culture, primitive/civilised, among others. Though these dualities are constructed, they are also lived, freely or by coercion, and should thus be addressed. However, in acknowledging the existence of life's continuity along a multiplicity of scales of being (arguably, as a constant, never-ending becoming: a coming into, which is constantly maintained, or moved away from), and the entailed dilemma(s) of such representation, many people may feel excluded from research conducted on the dominant major and dominant minor hegemonies. I should state that this does not mean it should not occur, but rather that in its occurrence is its reproduction. How, then, to depart, or step out, from it?

Still, I ask: how do we maintain an awareness of the socially constructed with its resulting structural and relational inequalities, while acknowledging that experience is deeper, (inter)subjective, and along lesser explored continuums, while also increasing our proximity to the variegated lived experiences of all of life's subjects? In employing the sub-discipline of emotional geography, which is inextricably bound to qualities within feminist theory, and (to a degree) non-representational theory (though it is claimed its functions are *out of* the non-representational, not *in* them), we can potentially maintain an awareness of the constructed (non)binaries pertinent within social life, without identifying them as the sole constituting pillars of our research. We thus choose to work along, and within, a spectrum of life in attempting to engage, emotionally, with the qualities and conditions that may form individual subjects (Anderson and Smith, 2001; Bondi, 2005; Davidson, et al., 2007; Conradson and McKay, 2007; Pain, 2009). However, how/when is one aware that they are approaching or dealing with (non)binaries if the intersected labels are deliberately avoided: to what extent are labels drawn/avoided? It seems that emotional geographies cannot step out of the binds of social

constructivism, and this is fine: that is not its intention; what is, however, of importance, is the increased proximity to accounts of experience.

Accounting for Emotions

I posit that relationality is the metaphysical and physical distance between subjects, social or geographical, space is entailed, and I adhere to the formulation of space as biophysically ‘real’ and socially pervasive, as singular. We are all thus bound to a variety of spaces that are informing of relationality, which has the potential to simultaneously inform us of our emotional states. Space, which conceptually sits higher than *Place* (in being broader), but includes it, is the added dimension of bio-physicality, whereas I would argue that *Place* deprioritises this dimension and focuses on the social. Furthermore, positionality, which stems from relationality, occurs within space, and requires us to acknowledge how subjects find themselves constituted within/of certain relational spaces (Bondi, 2005; Pain, 2009; Conradson and McKay, 2007). In trying to uncover various spatial positionality’s, we gain and maintain proximity, in approaching subjects as individual constellations of emotional past(s) and present(s) (Jones, 2007, “*An Emotional Ecology of Memory, Self and Landscape.*”). However, as I will explore in my own methodological practice of emotional geography, qualities of approach are not universally identical, meaning proximity is not continuously attained. Certain variations of proximity may elicit various responses. Though there is a need for emotional geography in the social sciences, as to resist the increasing systemisation and quantification of the field, and all the other encroaching aspects of the natural sciences into the social, there are several notable shortcomings, which I will scrutinise (Anderson and Smith, 2001; Bondi, 2005; Smith, 2009, *Introduction*).

Several humanistic geographers argue for more emotional geography on account of spaces, by default, being imbued with emotions; particularly human emotions, though much more can be said of the emotional experiences of other biological life, I will not (Thrift, 2004; De Paal, 2019). It is argued further that policy implementation could stand to benefit from the inclusion of emotional accounts (Capineri, et al., 2019; Sharp, 2009; Anderson and Smith, 2001; Bondi, 2005; Pain, 2014; Conradson and McKay, 2007). Since varied emotional experiences may inform relationality, and relationality may inform positionality, internally and externally, we can utilise the theoretical approach to attain more proximity, while also preserving socio-political relevancy (Anderson and Smith, 2001; Bondi, 2005; Conradson and McKay, 2007)⁶. If it is done in such a (seemingly linear) way, then it would seem to have immense validity as a social science within

⁶ I here say desired since it is not always explicitly clear whether certain emotional geographies are political.

human geography, something several emotional geographers desire from it; still, does this decrease the extent to which it may uncover ‘truths’, falling victim to the pressures of rational materialism, in binding emotive states to material processes? Possibly: it would seem that the desire for political reference is prevalent, as will be mentioned in the section *Scholarly Overview*. Nonetheless, it is one I must leave with the reader, as I believe there is ample space within human geography for both approaches to emotional geography. Still, it would seem that in asking subjects how ‘feelings’ produce or are produced by certain spaces is a heightened proximity to that of feminist accounts of space.

Challenges in Emotional Geography

Emotional geographers posit the presence of unknowable unknowns, partially placing it within the rubrics of non-representational theory, but distinguishes itself from affectual geography in splitting affect (the unknowable unknown) from thought (that which is conditioned, objectified, and potentially less ‘true’). Emotional geography is the prioritisation, and scrutiny, of that which is objectified and tainted by language (or other) and, thereby, expressible. Accounts of emotional geographies, particularly methodological approaches to it, vary, and will be explicated in later sections, but it will benefit the reader for me to define how I conceive, and distinguish, between emotion and feeling. In this paper, it may seem as if I use the words ‘emotions’ and ‘feelings’ interchangeably, and that is because they are simultaneously capable of being the same phenomena, but also not, depending on the extent of ‘capture.’ Emotions, to me, are the close-to, or ‘lesser,’ or in fact identical, representations of feelings through symbols of language, both spoken or written: it occurs to me that these points of proximity can vary among those who are *experiencing*; and that ‘feelings’ are the highly individualised phenomenological experience of events and things (Rose, et al., 2010).

One might state that an emotive term perfectly captures the ‘feeling’ of a particular space, or entity, with or without an awareness of the potential falsity inherent to emotive descriptors; still, these are claims one has to sit with and ponder internally since the task is based on experiential phenomenon. To talk of an emotional experience is to categorise it through the conditions permitted by a particular language; the ‘feeling’ has been, in an instant, for better or worse, partially or fully, potentially made graspable. Another distinction I find important is that the perceiving subject manifests emotions, as representative symbols, internally and externally, whereas ‘feelings’ are only ever *potentially* manifested externally, and certainly manifested internally. To question the possibilities for ‘feelings’ to have manifestation outside of the perceiving subject would, to me, move this paper in the direction of affectivity, once more

(Vannini, 2015; Thrift, 2004; Massumi, 2002). When I speak of *potential* external manifestation, it is solely based on the inclusion of the aforementioned possibilities brought on by emotive descriptors. The certainty of internal ‘feelings’ is based on an individual awareness that I feel, and accounts, though from a rather small sample of presently living or previously encountered humans, and read literature, that others feel, too.

When emotional geographers talk of emotions as being pervasive, one can assume this talk to mean that ‘feelings’ are universally pervasive, and that may indeed be the intention by several researchers; however, my point has been to state how I find the two terms in relation to each other, and caution the reader that interchangeable usage is rampant; also, that there is not always a strong indication of whether ‘feelings’ are intended to address the affective, or emotional. Thus, to me and several other geographers, emotional geography is partially within non-representational theory because the content it chooses to analyse stems from a non-representable source. This presents several dilemmas, which I will elaborate on in chronological order: (1) the objectification of emotions (2) the need for expression (3) issues of representation (4) no account of the ‘spaces-in-between’ and (5), scale (Pile, 2009; Harding and Pribram, 2002; Harrison, 2007).

The objectification of emotions merely assumes that the networks of language are wholly representative of commonly agreed abstractions, meanings, and behaviours; in this sense, ascribing words to a feeling by way of emotive terms, (or words to emotions if one disagrees with my conceptual framing of emotions as stemming from feelings), both universalises and objectifies individual phenomena, by way of descriptors, which departs from any lived interior and/or socially co-lived world (Wittgenstein, 1953; Smith, 2007, “*On ‘Being’ Moved by Nature: Geography, Emotion and Environmental Ethic.*”). However, since it seems as though we need language to know other’s feelings, which may not be the same as coming-to-know feelings (internally as individuals), we encounter the problem of non-rigidity that all words are bound to (Liz Bondi, 2014, “*On Freud’s Geographies.*”). Coming-to-know feelings is the external expression (verbal or otherwise) of phenomena (or the non-representable), whereby *knowing* is within, extended to or limited by, the capacities of the one feeling; coming-to-know feelings is the process of attempting to externalise feelings, potentially resulting in conditioned language-use, or another mode. Here, too, I will state that *knowing* has taken on two degrees of intensity: the latter *knowing* is the felt, which, though of a higher intensity, is not necessarily ‘truer’. The former is a leap towards the latter (the coming-to-know intensity) and potentially less intense. For example: I can *feel* anger (the phenomena which leads me to say ‘anger’), and thus know it’s intensity, but if I communicate “I feel anger” towards someone not in that moment feeling it, the word merely is

to them an assumed representation of what I perceive: it serves as a common bridge that does not necessarily link our shores. My representation communicates to them how they would represent *felt* anger. Nor does my felt-ness necessarily become theirs, and if it does, is it from the verbalisation of a conditioned word? Rather, what may be felt could be something different (or not), which is not to say anything/nothing is felt at all.

Since words do not purely exist as objective matter but rather as abstractions, it is hard, if not impossible, to deduce how the word captures feelings similarly or differently within various people. Furthermore, it seems that though feelings are seemingly ungraspable, their externalised product (emotions), can induce more of the ungraspable once the initial ungraspable has been externalised: the point of association between two communicating subjects can occur through coincidentally felt 'feelings' as a direct or indirect result of emotive descriptors, which themselves were brought about by preceding 'feelings.' I should state that the term ungraspable suits proponents of non-representational theory quite well in positing unknowable phenomena, but that my position is less solid: non-representational, as a term, is apt in communicating *difficulty* of direct comparison, but not apt in claiming that something cannot be *landed upon* (a degree of representation). Thus, in using ungraspable, I am not stating that 'feelings' are hard to land upon internally or externally, but that the degrees to which it has been landed upon are difficult to determine. As I have stated before, this sense of difficulty may vary and indeed even be unique to a few: attempts to know the extent of this would constitute profound research itself. It is therefore my preference to use the term hard-to-grasp since it sheds the tones of certainty in comparison to 'ungraspable.'

The deconstruction of language, which has so profoundly contributed to the assumed shortcomings of emotional geography, is difficult to reconcile. This is presumably resisted within affectual geography since it strives to monitor movements/events (moving, as well as laughing, smiling, dancing, and playing); however, it does not acknowledge the potential for the cultural construction of movements, as well (Rose, et al., 2010; Thrift, 2004; Massumi, 2002; Vannini, 2015). 'Dancing' can appear as a contextually manifested, non-cognitive moment, yet one may 'dance' due to previous, and/or presently imagined conditions of self, and be under the tides of cultural influence, which, potentially, flow from the pre-cognitive into thought into movement. In determining certain movements as 'dance' is one not already operating within a conditioned gaze? It would also seem as though dancing, laughing, smiling, etc., are pre-cognitive in that they are usually not thought, but reactants; yet, the extent to which my mind is told a 'joke', or something humorous, still requires computation, where the cultural, or conditioned, has potentially already entered. Another example: when I hear sounds, 'rhythmic' or not, it may seem

as though affect has presented itself in my movement; however, again, the sounds must be processed, synaptically, since my cognition must understand *what* it is that is occurring; this form of cognition is what would then warrant a performance. The space between this processing, and the ensuing performance, is where culture, experience, and identity, *may* co-emerge; however, it may also co-emerge in the processing stage, before the conscious subject is aware of their own performance, as a contribution to the *way* in which the processing happens. Thus, the non-representable (hard-to-grasp) remains as such: states of non-representation, as quarks are in string theory, feelings, too, before the processes of conditioning, are metaphorical strings (Rose, et al., 2010; Greene, 2003). Simply said, the performativity theorised by affectual geographers of the co-emergence of culture and identity (culture *as* identity – the subjective, and identities *of* culture – the collective) as being outcomes of affectual vibrations does not give an account of the potential nature of affectual registers, specifically their temporality and subjection to cultural influence (Rose, et al., 2010)? How is future affect registered given one's particular co-emergence? How does the experience or outcome of an affectual flow indeed produce additional affectual flows, within or among subjects, and how do affectual flows intensify and detensify through time?

Still, there remains a need (and desire) to express what we feel, and it is commonly done through language, though we may from time-to-time utter expressions like: 'It's hard to describe' or 'I can't describe the feeling.' If feelings usually result in a form of expression, then there has been a 'contamination', whether in the form of spoken word (language) or movement (dancing), I would posit (Bondi, 2005). If we choose not to split affect from emotion, we can say that the representations of such qualia, though muddled by sociocultural variations and experiences, could still mean that the representations we observe are extremely proximate to the unrepresentable, for there is a range, or continuum, along which qualia (d)evolves into abstraction. In this sense, what we would observe would be something approaching the unrepresentable, proximate in identity, rather than a whole representation. If we choose to split affect from emotion, then we could argue that affect can only be known by looking for it without dependence on emotion: one would have to get to the non-cognitive immediately, rather than through the cognitive (Pile, 2009; Thrift, 2004).

To some affectual geographers, movements represent this isolated realm of affect, leading affectual geographers to argue that emotional geographers are observing false representations. However, can we not argue that these varying performativity's of the body are somewhat, if not entirely culturally produced as well? These differences between affectual and emotional geographers are cause for current thriving debates. Fortunately, a degree of

permissibility is allowed in emotional geography in acknowledging that individual qualia, though contaminated by culture and language, and so forth, is still revelatory of something; this would address issues (1) through (3). Several affectual geographers certainly reveal something that is of importance, too, in accounting for the material-spatial creation of affect through/by material entities (Rose, et al., 2010; Thrift, 2004).

In my interpretation of the 'spaces-in-between,' the flow of affect, which I perceive and use as the potentials and capacities for realisation, in-and-of itself, or by another subject, occurs in-between, and through subjects. This capacity for realisation does not posit the logics common to Actor Network Theory, which goes beyond potential and capacity by stating that outcomes are the result of *communicated* relations: 'communicated' being co-agreed intent towards the maintenance and continuation of experienced phenomena, or current order, by cognizant and non-cognizant entities. In this sense, my understanding of affect does distinguish between the cognizant and non-cognizant, in that both are dormant with affect, yet only the former can grasp affects flow. Though understandings of affect vary in complexity, it is commonly thought to reside within subjects capable of expression, while the 'spaces-in-between' is understood as the gap between affect and emotion (Pile, 2009; Thrift, 2004; Bondi, 2005). I would agree that affect is certainly an unknown form that precedes thought (emotion) and abstraction, since it is our arrival point after deconstructing emotion. Thus, I abide by the definition of 'spaces-in-between' denoting the void between these two states. Though I am of the opinion that it is also in-flow between all subjects (regardless of consciousness) as an unknown capacity for potential; in fact, it is the intersubjective flow of affect, I would argue, that produces inner affect within subjects (Massumi, 2002; Pile, 2009). I should here distinguish that this flow, to me, applies in equal measure between cognizant and non-cognizant subjects, and that inter-affective flow exists prior to the conscious subjects; the conscious subject is, however, exclusively capable of recognising it's unknowable existence by way of 'feeling'. It merely has to be since if there is no affect, there can be no abstraction (emotion); unfortunately, as I have argued above, I, too, am unable to offer more exploration of how (a) emotion comes into being from affect, other than by the logics of abstraction, and of the entailing speeds, distances, and processes of this, and (b) if affect, too, can come into being from emotions; (c) if affect, as inter-affect, is the sole constituent of inner affect, or if affect is more than cross-permeating, in that it is a medium existing solely within the internal, as well as differently externally, then as some mixture of both, simultaneously, and if this varies, by degrees, between subjects; and (d), the extent of this *realisation* of affect in conscious subjects, in that it is always *wholly* realised (for more, see *Non-Representational Methodologies* for contemporary accounts of Atmospheric Affect; Pile, 2009; Vannini, 2015).

As I have stated, this affectual flow of potential is not limited to humans, and occurs between various subjects, such as a table. A table can be seen to contain, and have in/out flow of affect simply because affect is also invocation of capacity; thus, a relational capacity, be it between a cognitive subject and non-cognitive subject, or several non-cognitive subjects, still means all retain affectual capacities. In the case of the table and the human, the affectual flow between them presents conditions for realisation, which I consider, partly, to be the expression of emotions (within the conscious). It may be here that adherents to Actor Network Theory may propound that this flow may lead to co-constituted ‘events’ in the external ‘real’ world. Furthermore, much can be said of the emotional geographies of animals, and whether they would fall into the same categorical definitions of human emotional experience (Holmberg, 2019; De Paal, 2019; Anderson and Harrison, 2006). This, and the preceding paragraph, would address concern (4), which has no immediate revelation.

As for scale, the dilemma is rather obvious: how do we account for the emotional state(s) of communities, populations, en masse, and to what extent can emotional geography depart from the scale of the individual. Is this possible? (Pile, 2009; Thien, 2005). Given the necessity for in-depth interviews to ‘observe’ (and/or experience) the emotional states of an individual subject (who, of course, is not isolated), emotional geography is persisted to operate solely at this scale; arguably, the most informative scale is at the individual, and a remaining question will be to what scale can the expressed emotions of an individual, or several individuals inform (contribute to) larger narratives, which involve more than those accounted for: to speak of the emotive landscape of a state, how can all its subjects be accounted for? This presents interesting challenges for methodology in particular (Kenway and Youdell, 2011). Again, this is a problematic of representative samples, and has saliency within positivistic accounts of data, too. If emotional geographers seek validity in regards to methodological processes in the social sciences, this issue remains at-large. The problem of scale is also that of temporality: at which temporal scale should the emotional geographer take note? I later attempt to offer immediate resolution to this dilemma by stating that amplitude/intensity is all that should matter; but is it all that *should* matter? This has addressed issue (5). These are pressing issues, but it would still seem as though the theoretical framework abounds in value in contributing to our understanding of spaces.

I have argued that affectual flows between various subjects informs the burgeoning of emotion within conscious subjects; however, I have not given an explanation for why and how affect informs emotion. Scholars seem divided on the matter of whether affect is isolated from emotion, and if not, how affect becomes emotion (Pile, 2009). The idea of movement from the pre-cognitive to the cognitive (affect to emotion), however, informed my understanding of

affectual spaces as existing outside of, and between, cognizant subjects, and between cognizant subjects and non-cognizant subjects; I should stress that affectual flows between cognizant and non-cognizant subjects is not necessarily dependent on the cognizant through, and to, the non-cognizant; non-cognizant subjects, I would argue, may have affectual flows between them, too. Alike some non-representational theorists, I will stress that this affectual flow cannot be observed, but we know affect exists in non-cognizant subjects because they exist, partially, as abstractions (as a table is part qualia and part abstraction of qualia; we know there is qualia since it's the remnant of deconstruction; thus we see, in absence of the conditioned, or named, the 'space' for qualia). Thus, affect, is not necessarily bound to emotion, though it does seem to precede it: emotion can be considered but one outcome of affectual flows. Affect is potentially realised/informing (in cognizant subjects) and entirely latent in non-cognizant subjects; arguably, we *feel* affectual flows, but I cannot state the degree to which what is *felt* is of an affectual flow, or multiple. However, we cannot state the degree to which affect informs emotion in cognizant subjects; nor can it be said whether the affect in non-cognizant subjects is entirely different from the affect in cognizant subjects, or part of the same constituting medium.

In addressing the theoretical difficulties within emotional geography it should appear to the reader that the theory remains operable within the humanistic geographies; more so, even, than affectual geography, due to apt and valid politicisation that may emerge. Even more, in working within abstractions, the fact that something *can* be said makes it socially operational. The pursuit of the political from the emotional is conceptually rooted in understandings of emotionality as positionality thus entailing various degrees of relation: as we know, these are the conditions, which informed the politically acute theories of feminist scholarships (Anderson and Harrison, 2006). As Pain suggests, it is not "to focus in on emotions, risking their depoliticization or trivialization, but to demonstrate that they, and their spatiality's, are fundamental to the layout of society." Though this can be done and is, I should state, largely employed this way, accounting for the political is not my intention.

Spatiality, Power and Emotion

The spatial significance of social realities, which were accorded increasing relevance during human geographies phenomenological turn, and subsequently, more relevance during feminist theorisations and approaches, continues in importance within emotional geography (Koskela, 2000; Pile, 2009). Emotional geographies do account of spaces as biophysically locatable geographies, yet stress the metaphysical, more-than-physical experience of, and/or formation of space(s), without necessarily postulating causal emergence of the latter: in this

sense, the spatial is not necessarily the biophysical then the social; rather, I would argue, causality is replaced by an indeterminate co-emergence theorisation that is likely to vary by subject.

Similarly to how radical geographers, such as Neil Smith or Doreen Massey, highlight the socio-political infusion of social life and biophysical space, emotional geographers attempt at approaching this infusion without trying to demarcate one from the other (Smith, 1996; Massey, 1991).

My conception of space, as overdone and contentious as it is, is needed. If, as I have argued in previous sections, emotional geographies are *all* geographies, I am implying the immediate infusion of the biophysical with the social. There is no temporal beginning to an emotional geography from a biophysical space but, rather, co-emergence of/within the conscious subject (Davidson, 2003). This, however, is limited in so much as there needs to be conscious subjects: human cognition, however one chooses to define it and its emergence, is the only requisite for the premise that emotional geographies are *all* geographies. Geographies prior to cognition existed, to me, as entities imbued with affect; thus, my statement, and that of other geographers, that all geographies are emotional geographies, is dependent on the conditionality of consciousness. However, now, in this moment of writing, biophysical geographies of, say, a million years ago, other planets, or unvisited cities, are *arrived at as* 'feeling', in the mind: once I have fixed my consciousness, or arrived at it subconsciously, on a distant, historic, and/or future geography, that geography, to my mind, is inextricably of feeling(s). So, I would hold that in my use of the word geography, feelings are continually present so long as conscious subjects exist.

In more critical and feminist theorisations of space, power is conceived of as the (main, if not sole) producer of spatial identity: the degrees to which one may experience themselves is always in relation to others; and this relationality is of power interplays (Davidson, 2003; Koskela, 2000). Said otherwise: power relations are a set of carried-out, lived, and assumed performances, which in turn shape perceptions and experiences of identities. Are feelings thus an outcome, or lesser 'primary', of the concept of power as regards spatial identity? Not necessarily, as I have argued that feelings, too, are constitutive of spatial identities without having to be the sole resultants of power formations. Furthermore, I would argue that affect precedes one's self-identity, but is not outside of (hidden away), or isolated from power interplays; in fact, affect and power, are in constant interaction, equally capable of exerting a (shifting) force upon the other.

Power formations may have influences upon affectual flows that then produce (through expression) certain lived emotional geographies (emotions); for example, the increasing privatisation (social movement, and performative event) of a housing market may influence affectual flows between a subject and a building, observable as, or leading to, emotions of

despair, desperation, hope, or longing. Though to me, power is not affect since it is cultural, which affect precedes. Quite similarly, affect may exert influence upon lived power relations by *bringing about* emotional states, which could then result in movements of resistance (Pain, 2014; some affectual geographers would argue that affect may even be capable of influencing power formations directly).

The challenge with this dualistic conception of power and affect is that the former is observable in relational formations, whilst the latter, owing to its non-representational nature, is only ever a hard-to-grasp capacity, with which we choose to operate once it has seized being exactly that⁷. However, the *felt* of power, to me, represents an affectual flow: so it would seem that power could have direct influence over affect. The interplay between power and affect, however, is not necessarily a form of affect, but may suit the reader to be conceived of as an affectual-power flow, with power (largely in the abstracted) formations extending ‘down’ towards affectual flows, and affectual flows ‘up’ to power formations, be it as affectual movement or conditioned response. In this sense, power formations and affect have the capacity to influence each other. One may call question to the extent to which affectual flows can influence power formations given my presumption that affect is only ever indirectly expressible through conditioning: the outcome of any such critique would, however, expose ones stance towards affect: either it is directly observable, or not.

In my distinguishing emotions from affect, I here carry the logic further in arguing that emotions emerge as a cultural product, and have thus already felt the presence of power in/on affectual flows. Additionally, it is problematic and difficult for me to say that emotions precede identity because I, among others, claim that emotions are observable by-way of spoken language, which requires a degree of conscious development and conditioning. I would agree with the postulation that identities are in part informed by lived/imagined power relations between subjects, and add that emotions are outcomes of these identities since they are the culturally tainted qualia that emerge, in part, from power formations.

Conceptions of space within emotional geography are similarly based on the theorisations dominant in feminist geography (Rose, 1993); it is firstly not a Newtonian container of fixed localities but rather the lived dynamism of subjective realities within and of these localities (Koskela, 2000). The biophysical, though an important descriptive term that denotes preconscious materiality, is present, but not as a strict (fixed), un-influenceable void. It serves to have the term so as to operationalise its existence independent of the social but, as I have previously argued,

⁷ What is *felt*, could be the interplay between power and affect at various intensities, and/or entirely affect, and/or entirely power

within current human consciousness, is impossible to conceive of as untouched by the psychosocial: that which is untouched *is* but also *is not*. Space can also be conceived of as a tool whereby ‘self’ can come to be known, since ‘self’ emanates from (non)relational position among variously close/distant subjects (Harrison, 2007; Koskela, 2000). In my operationalisation of space, the reader will not need to wonder too far: space will be perceived of as a psychosocial process (of the various *becomings* of/within space), and as a locatable domain filled with affectual (hard-to-grasp) occurrences; the extent to which space is both is a temporally-based fluctuation, but it’s my affirmation that is not capable of lacking the latter.

Methodology

Foreword - Whereas typical (economic and regional) human geography papers, operating within the epistemological structures of critical realism, format methodology sections to lay down the structures of how they will observe phenomena, my methodology section is both a theory of methodology and methods: an outlaying and reflection on the physical and theoretical processes of emotional geographies conducted (by scholars), and the emotional geography I will conduct in two-parts (by me). For this reason, this section will shift in tense: between present and future.

Form

In conducting an emotional geography, I acknowledge that the researcher, and those being researched, could be under changing (similar or differing) forces that are constitutive of their emotional perceptions; and that the manner and mode of my questions, if not my presence alone, may influence emotional responses (Anderson and Harrison, 2007). Coming in as an ‘outsider,’ too, may have unforeseen effects on my desire to grasp emotional states (Davidson and Milligan, 2004); however, an informal, in-person interview should relinquish any reluctance felt by the interviewee; and though I will refer to my interviewee as subject from time-to-time in my writing, I, too, am a subject in the inter-subjective process of seeking (while possibly constituting, to an unknown end) emotional states; my seeking of questions, and their seeking of answers, and our co-seeking of emotions⁸ (Davidson, 2003; Anderson and Harrison, 2007). Our inter-subjective, emotionally expressed (by him) interaction, also stemming from affectual flows, is mutual, yet my research is geared towards an external understanding of emotional geography, and include my emotions of a previous point in time as I found myself to be a participant of an event on the land in Västra Skrävlinge (Davidson, et al., 2007; Smith, 2007, “*On ‘Being’ Moved by Nature: Geography, Emotion and Environmental Ethic.*”; Pile, 2009). Though the emotional geography I plan on conducting should be holistic, and account for the materially objective, which experiences multi-(scalar)permeation with (as from and to) the subjective, it is in part its own domain, and no account of the material would result in a form of poetic descriptivism that could be attacked for not attempting to attach itself to the biophysical. Though I may not propound such an argument, since ‘realisms’ could be considered to be floating ‘above’ the biophysical indefinitely, it is still worthwhile to talk of ‘realisms’ as something-landed-upon in regards to the biophysical (Anderson, and Harrison, 2007).

⁸ Save for in the *Theory* section, I will use the term emotions instead of feelings since I now am operating within the conditioned. The use, and demarcation of feelings and emotions was necessary in *Theory*, but not in upcoming sections.

Though space is both material and social, I stress the emotional, as this is regarded to be co-constitutive of space(s) in emotional geography, when talking about Stadsbruk (Davidson, 2003); I will hereafter use Stadsbruk and the *land-in-Västra Skrävlinge* interchangeably, and will elaborate on this further below.

Because emotions are, in addition to being *outcomes* of phenomenology's, tied to (and of) particular material processes, and material bodies, they are currently considered among less positivistic research methods; It is understandably difficult to try to quantify emotional states, and this is not the approach of emotional geographies at-large. Yet in an attempt to make them more empirically valid, emotions are typically paired to several quantitative realities. This is the safety measure some emotional geographers allow themselves, as they then argue that one is more capable of politicising emotional states with such an account. Furthermore, it is also common practice to stress that the represented emotions are in-fact outcomes from, if not somehow linked to, good or nefarious political, and/or economic strategies (Bondi, 2005; Anderson and Smith, 2001). In asking my interviewee of his emotional experience of, and on, Stadsbruk, I will not seek to then relate his emotionalities to that of other social-material formations (political beliefs, material occupation, income, etcetera), though they may, of course, come to be stated. Nor will I attempt to grasp whether these states (emotions) have been manufactured or engineered; nor the degree to which they have been influenced! I am sure that to some I will be undertaking a theoretical study of emotional geography in half-measure, or inappropriately, even. I will not do this because this paper relies on one interview.

Though there is diversity of opinion, the majority of emotional geographers would still, however, consider it relevant to go beyond the question of where/which emotional experiences are embedded in/of particular locales (and by who), and explore the extent to which it can be said that socio-political relations emerge. Though there is a radical minority writing emotional auto-ethnographies of spaces without obvious politicisation (see: Jones, 2007, "*An Emotional Ecology of Memory, Self and Landscape.*")! Given this consensus, if I were to be undertaking a 'fuller' study of the emotionalities of Stadsbruk, I would forego my foregrounding the majority of this paper as an analysis of the theoretical (an analysis of the more celebrated, popular, and common discourses and practices, as well as the lesser), and attempt to imitate popular methodologies...perhaps. Even though there are inconsistencies in terminology (the ontological nature of emotions and subsequent epistemologies) among prominent emotional geographers, there are still observable consistencies in research practices.

Still, I am of the opinion that even if this were to be a 'fuller' geographical exploration (in the sense that it is acknowledging that there is a consensus, or unstated rigidity born out of

common practice) of the emotionality of Stadsbruk, it would not necessarily have to come-to-know the relationality of position by-way of multiple emotional discourses; it could be considered ‘full’ if the politicisation of a single emotionality occurred. Whether the more radical emotional geographies risk devaluing the work of other geographers will be taken up in later sections; to demonstrate the myriads of practice, I will in the section titled *Scholarly Overviews* address the practices of lesser, and more popular (by publications, etcetera) scholars in emotional geography.

Performances

Part One

Given my informed (or conditioned) belief that comfort is universally important when talking about emotions, my initial intention was to contact a farmer with whom I volunteered in November 2018 (Davidson, 2003; Pini et al). In the emails that I sent to them, I decided that it was important to stress the nature of our interaction: that I would be asking questions that revolve around feelings, and would like for an expression, from them, of emotional language. Stressing this also fulfilled the ethical requirement of disclosing my intention, and narrowing the gap between myself as the researcher, and them as the researched. However, after two emails sent without a response, and finally upon receiving an email and being told that, to use my own words, emotional talk of Stadsbruk would be difficult due to a felt exploitative relationship between the farmers and the municipality, I will conduct my interview with Cyrille Gaubert, Stadbruk’s municipally-assigned project leader. Given that I lack prior in-person and electronic intercourse with Cyrille, I will use the general format of email in corresponding with him; that is, I will explicitly state that I am doing an *exploration* of emotional geography, and would like for there to be emotional language.

I will ask Cyrille how he feels at different spatial scales; thus the emotional qualities Cyrille may reveal are temporally bound, and thus cannot be identified as static and consistent; in viewing his emotional accounts as a snapshot of a phenomenon constantly in-flux, I will have to ask him to state which emotions are the most intense, persistent, and informing⁹. Emotions as undulating, I will inquire on the peaks and troughs of his emotional accounts of Stadsbruk; It may serve the reader to conceive of emotional fluctuations, and even an emotional state, as a wave function, with the various peaks and troughs, amplitudes and wave distances as metaphors for

⁹ I will ask how he feels in-relation to Stadsbruk’s land in three states: passively engaging with the land, at-work on the land and, when not on the land. I acknowledge that passivity and activity are both socio-political, -economic processes since they both entail the adherence and (re)production of political and economic status

intensity, duration, and frequency. Of course, whether these metaphorical wave functions correspond to a whole range of emotions, singular emotions, or both, is not important; the metaphor, rather simply, attempts to highlight the movement of (an) emotional state(s)¹⁰.

I imagine that I will need to ask him about his practices on and in-relation to Stadsbruk as part of expected conversational exchange; a degree of performativity will occur, on my part, which I will scrutinise and problematize in the section titled *Analysis*. Although Cyrille will be asked to express his emotional state(s) in regards to Stadsbruk's land (the biophysical land on which he works, as well as the concept *for* which he works), his material-occupational role(s) will form part of how he is identified. Thus, emotionalities, if any, may or may not be preceded by his material role(s) and the biophysical activities conducted by him; it will not serve to think of these two modes of *being* through Cartesian logics. In the section titled *The Temporal Nature of Emotions*, however, I will introduce Cyrille by his material role, give a brief account of his practices, and then give an account of his emotional state(s); this, however, does not imply causality from material role to emotional state.

In asking Cyrille how he feels about Stadsbruk, I will direct my questions to the land, though this does not mean the emotional responses are without influence from the concept (as it exists phenomenologically, similarly or differently, potentially, within him). I am of opinion that Stadsbruk is both biophysical land, as *land-in-Västra Skrävlinge* locatable through idealised GPS coordinates, and as a concept entailing economic, political, and cultural philosophies, which transcend the material land (Butler, 2003)¹¹. Since Stadsbruk exists both as biophysical land, and as a concept, or condition, and I am of opinion that I cannot demarcate the beginning of the concept and the end of the biophysical, my methods will employ questions that will be both linguistically ambiguous, and explicit: questions about the land will be biophysically-directed, but will nonetheless automatically entail an asking of the concept and other abstractions, while questions such as feelings about Stadsbruk will be more ambiguous. The reason for explicit questions about the land is to showcase the existence of a locatable, material space, which to me, is not done when broadly asking about Stadsbruk. Asking about the land also serves a methodological practicality, but does not refute the concept of space as culturally performative, emotionally embedded, and phenomenologically embodied (Davidson, 2003; Rose, 1993; Anderson, and Smith, 2001). Thus, though part of my approach strives to uncover the emotional

¹⁰ I here conceived of this metaphor prior to having read Pain's *Seismologies of emotion: fear and activism during domestic violence*, and state this to highlight that one is inherently able to conceive of the fluidity of emotion from self-introspection; and that Pain's use of seismological language, similarly, denotes properties of waves

¹¹ The land is *in* various named scales

state(s) Cyrille may feel in regards to, as well as on, the land, I cannot know the extent to which the emotionalities of Cyrille are informed by the conceptual, or biophysical. It may be easier to state that the two are inseparable, and that to ponder the limits of either ones presence or influence is unnecessary since they constitute the same whole. These are the question I will have with me during the interview, and attempt to ask: (1) how do you feel when you're on the land, at work? How do you feel just being on the land, without working (explicit)? (2) how do you feel when you think about the land when you're not on it? Please feel free to state whether certain emotional states arise in particular settings (ambiguous). (3) How do you feel about the idea of Stadsbruk (ambiguous)? And (4), are there any dominant emotions that predominate when you think about Stadsbruk (ambiguous)? In the parentheses of each question are the terms ambiguous and explicit, and should I clarify why I have included them though it may well appear quite obvious to the reader. The questions marked explicit merely denote the clear referential point of the question, as being *slightly* more rooted in the biophysical. The questions marked with ambiguous denote the questions as being of a stronger conceptual nature.

My approach will rely on techniques espoused by emotional geographers, as well as other practitioners of qualitative methodologies, and attempt to create an informal, mutually comfortable environment for our interaction. The questions will be on my phone, and will be referred to as we progress through the questions, but no voice-recording will be done, nor will there be any need for formal note-taking; the note-taking I foresee will merely be written accounts of the emotive terms he uses.

Since my relationship with Cyrille has no historical basis, it seems beneficial to my desire for emotional-talk for us to meet during formal work hours. How this may impact my desire for the emotional is unknown. Rather, his sense of comfort should be heightened in my coming into his domain.

Part Two

My emotive experience is going to be the retelling of my experience volunteering of volunteering at Stadsbruk in November 2018, on a particular day, which will have important conditions accounted for. The primary reason my emotive account will stem from memory, rather than from an explorative walk through Stadsbruk during the writing of my thesis is to minimize the influence new information (since beginning this thesis) could have on my emotional account. That is not say a retelling/recounting of prior emotions is reflects an absence of contamination from recently acquired information, however; yet it is my affirmation that what I 'felt' on that day, which has also been chosen since it was my first time on Stadsbruk after learning about the incubator, may contain less contaminants.

Furthermore, given that emotional geographies can take on the format of auto-ethnography from memory, attempting my own will elucidate conceptual and practical challenges for me to scrutinize in the *Analysis* section: given my desire to explore the methodological implications of emotional geography, utilizing my capacity for emotionality as a referential point for the broader analysis of the sub-discipline should add depth. Thus, on a given day but only of that day, I will retell my emotive accounts of my first time at Stadsbruk, and provide the reader with an in-depth account of important conditions I perceive as potentially having influence upon my historic emotive perception.

Reservations and Approach

I think I know, from my own experience, that weather, time-of-day, time-of-last-meal, and level of activity can have influences on my emotional states, and that when asked of a particular space, my emotional responses may differ if the aforementioned attributes (affects!) are inducing discomfort (and many other unknown externalities/internalities). I think this, and believe to know this, as a result of my cultural environments (scientific studies on emotions; casual talk of weather-induced sadness, etcetera). What is troubling, however, is that I am unaware of the extent said affects (if any!) are exerting on me; are they even inducing discomfort/comfort? Which dominates at any given point? Does a certain affect always predominate others, or is there equitable influence; or, are they part of the same medium, a singular interacting affectual whole? Furthermore, was it induced upon my *realization* of it? A flow establishing itself once I have chosen to look for it. I also assume that an apparently persistent feeling (*translated* as sadness, hopelessness, anxiety, etcetera.) is broken by other *realized* affectual flows, but what if it is not 'broken' but rather subdued yet still persistent? A subfield within emotional geography goes further in arguing that the realization of specific affectual flows as such, are to be analyzed psychoanalytically; for this reason, psychoanalysis, with its Freudian roots, contributes its practices of counsellor-to-patient formations during interviews conducted in emotional geography (Kingsbury and Pile, 2014, Introduction: in: *Psychoanalytic Geographies*; Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Thien, 2005).

The systemic, somewhat structural, talk-based approach to emotional geography has already been scrutinized in previous sections, however it is still my intention to engage in an emotional geography this way. This will mean the 'seeking' and hopeful use of emotional language: happy, discontent, content, forlorn, optimistic, pessimistic, angry, excited, exhausted, hopeful, hopeless, etcetera. Though as I have said above, and in previous sections, the affectual influence is largely, to me, an assumed conclusion. Furthermore, writers such as Hoschchild,

addressed emotion in novel ways that, though not considered to be the preceding sources for contemporary emotional geographies, arguably addressed issues still pervasive in the sub-discipline, which form the basis for my largest concern.

Hoschchild's *The Managed Heart* (1979) can be considered to be among the first insights into the commonalities between Freudian psychological formations of self as related to external events and how they inform an internal self, *and* how emotions are culturally rooted in conditioned practices. Hoschchild's concept of emotional labour, as a process whereby labourers are conditioned if not pressured, by an employer, to express certain emotional states, and repress others, is to be considered a form of labour. Herein lies my dominant concern over feigned emotions given that Cyrille and I will be communicating as strangers (given that there are cultural implications to emotional expressions; namely, that strangers take on a public distance to family/friends)¹². My concerns, compounded by a consensus within the social sciences on the duality of private and public life (the former where emotions are expected to emerge and stay, and the latter where emotions are repressed) may bring irresolvable difficulties. Given my desire to approach Cyrille in the realm of the public, it's safe to assume that emotional expressions may be difficult, even though I have attempted to reduce such hesitancy via language in my email to him.

As regards the second part of my emotional geography in-practice, my most immediate concern is the degree to which 'awareness' may have altered my perceptions of my own emotive accounts, and the degree to which I prioritise the historical. However, since I plan on conducting a dualistic exploration of emotions through Cyrille, and myself, my reliance on memory is more appropriate for this paper as it is an attempt towards an exploration of various methodologies.

¹² To the extent that we have never physically met before but have shared email correspondence

Scholarly Overview

The extent to which epistemological, conceptual, and methodological practices vary in works characterised as being within emotional geography is impressively large, contradictory, and at times indigestible. Though most works I will present in this section seem to have strong similarities in their conceptual framings of emotions, and methodological conducts in the field, it would be rather narrow to avoid, and not present, literature that takes a rather dramatic departure from the most common approaches found in emotional geography. Said otherwise, the dominant texts align with my conception of emotions as distinctly different from affect (feeling), and avoid conceptual murkiness in not using the two words interchangeably. There are texts, however, which conceptually seem to focus on the emotional, but use terms such as ‘affective’ though their descriptive explanations seem to indicate emotions (of my sort). This, of course, presents a level of confusion, especially when it *may* be in the interest of the field to have clearly defined terms. Thus, for the sake of simplification, papers that seem to talk of the emotional, yet use affect/affective throughout, will be considered to be emotional geographies. However, the bulk of literature reviewed in this section aptly compliments the dominant conceptions and methodologies at-large. Works that I consider to be firm examples of these dominant conceptualisations and practices, will be exemplified through articles by Matthee (2004), Capineri (2018), Fahnøe (2018), Holt, et al. (2013), Rose (2004), Zembylas (2011), Sultana (2010), and others.

There will also be mention of contemporary emotional geographical works that appear to be more in-line with theorisations found within affectual geography; though some of these authors would seemingly consider their research papers to be a part of the emotional turn in geography, I will argue that their use of particular language in describing terms and conceptual arguments, as well as their methodological practices, actually places them more firmly within what I consider to be affectual geography. If anything, to be fair, these works sit somewhere in-between affectual and emotional geography; however, I also acknowledge that in choosing to determine what is within/outside of emotional geography I am indirectly advocating for a particular set of practices: I will return to this point in the *Conclusion* section of this paper. Such works will include the likes of Jones (2007), Graybill (2019), and Wood (2013). Papers that I consider to be unmistakably within affectual geography due to the practices and concepts upheld, will also be mentioned, such as Holmberg (2019), Rose, et al., (2010), and Tolia-Kelly (2007). Doing this will help demonstrate the methodological differences between affectual geographies, and emotional geographies; though I have already stated that some scholars view

'affect' and 'emotion' as interchangeable, my review will attempt to focus on scholars who, I believe, view the two as distinctly different stages of phenomenological flow(s). Dealing with authors who have a not-as-yet defined, or murky view or synonymous view of affect and emotions would simply add to the already hazy world of the concepts. This, however, is to be expected given the inconclusive tensions between affect and emotions among scholars.

As I have argued in previous sections, the emotional geographers I seek to overview attempt at practices which seem to prevent their work from falling into the non-representational: there is an apparently clear desire of steering towards the political. Though a case can be made as to whether this is even possible, I will address this in the *Conclusion*. The exploration of psychoanalytic geographies (some of which has been done by popular scholars such as Liz Bondi, Kingsbury, and Pile) also intends on carrying strong political motivations, but will not be referenced due to the limits of this paper. Though I consider it a branch, or sub-sub-disciplinary field that can have significant contributions to emotional geography, and is itself imparted with concepts and methods from emotional geography.

Emotional Geographies

The bulk of scholarly texts reviewed for this paper began with conceptually dense publications by, I would argue, the leading if not contemporary advocates of emotional geographies, which were mentioned in the *Introduction* of this paper. Academics such as Bondi, Anderson, Smith, Harrison, and Pile, offered critical contributions in the form of critiques of the dominant epistemological practices in human geography, and the space for radically (if not now, then certainly in the early 1990s) 'humanistic' approaches for researchers in the social sciences. In light of this, I hope it has become clear to the reader that the field of emotional geography, and its off-shoots, have gained increasing propensity and validity within human geography; this, I hold, is observable in published content: emotional geography searches in online databases from the 1990s and early 2000s are largely scholarly theorisations and methodological framings, whereas publications from the last decade consist of research articles into particular phenomenon! The development from mostly theoretical publications towards material research publications, and the emergence of scholarly journals (see: *Emotions, Space and Society*, which has been ongoing since 2008) speak to the increasing interests and desires for intellectual engagements with the discipline. It is therefore befitting that I now summarise several works by contemporary practitioners to quell any uncertainties the reader may have in regards to how emotional geographies are actually implemented.

In my first categorisation of texts, I focus on what appears to be the dominant approaches to emotional geographies, which will be broken into accounts of space, the politicisation of emotions, and methods (Fahnøe, 2018; Rose, 2004; Capineri, 2018; Pini, et al., 2010; Matthee, 2004; Zembylas, 2011; Sultana, 2011; Kenway and Youdell, 2011; Holt, et al., 2013; Ey, et al., 2016; Koskela, 2000; Parr, et al., 2007).

The partitioning of a particular spatial field, from broader space, is the initial effort; this, of course, complementing theoretical concurrences of emotionalities as being pervasive, yet of localities. Fahnøe's (2018) spatial field is urban Copenhagen; Rose's (2004) are several living rooms in suburban, middle-class areas; Zembylas' (2011) is of a particular school; Blazek and Windgram-Geddes' (2013) of children's emotional lives; Sultana's (2011) is of resource management within several Bangladeshi villages; and, Pini, et al., (2010) focus on a nickel mine in south-west Australia, among others. The (concept of) spatiality that pervades these texts is not a fixed, material conception; rather, spatiality is a zone, which is demarcated through the revealing of how entities are (dis)united: space is interactive and fluid. Choosing to observe these unifications arguably forms the basis for inquiry into the emotional, which should consequently reveal something of the spatial. In talk of emotions, Capineri, et al., (2018) contend that emotions are "a means to understanding practices and interpretations of the surrounding environment" (273). Similarly, Ey, et al. (2016) holds that emotions are "vital to our interactions with a host of spaces and places" (155), implying that these hosts of spaces and places are equally informed by the *type* of emotional interactions we have, *becoming*, in part, through emotions. This is emphasised when the authors say, "they also in turn *produce* encounters and exchanges" (155). The underlying commonality within the stated authors in this section is the *becoming* of space, rather than the emergence of emotions within a fixed spatial field.

Another dominant commonality within the respective research papers of the aforementioned authors is the desire to politicise the spatial, which is, of course, to emotional geographers, an outcome of emotional relations. Zembylas' (2011) focus on the ethnic/racial experiences of education systems within a school in the Republic of Cyprus, with particular focus on the small nations ethnic/racial tensions among its dominant and minority populations, sought to highlight the political nature of spatially-informing emotions, by focusing on the emotionalities of exclusion. The author does so, first, in situating the themes of 'race' and 'ethnicity' within the frames of social constructivism, then argues that doing so ultimately leads towards "uneven material consequences" (152). Having identified the political nature of said social and political terms, the objective of the researcher then becomes an attempt to "take a more careful look into the relationship between race/ethnicity and emotion" (152).

In similar fashion, Pini, et al., (2010), who's paper offers the reader a clear example of the synonymous use of affect and emotion, to my discontent, determined that the residents of Ravensthorpe were worthy of emotional inquiry after the closing of BHP Billiton mine. To them, the mines closure itself "calle[d] for more politically aware emotional geographies that attend to the differentials of power in the processes and practices of affect" (560). The underlying theme in the two excerpts from the respective scholars, as well as others who I have not mentioned (see authors listed above), is of power, conceived of in terms of material and meta-physical imbalance, and which, of course, is highly political. To this end, such a conception of power bares strong resemblance to feminist theorisations of experience.

Matthee (2004), too, documents the power fluctuations experienced by women of colour farm workers in South Africa's western cape, in the practices of meal preparation. Food preparation, she argues is situated within concepts of embodied knowledge's, and power imbalances (in having to cook, but being positioned in front of the stove, but also in having the ability too cook). Matthee's research highlights the paradoxical experiences of power among women of colour farm workers along the concepts of agency and confinement, but chooses to access these lived realities through narrative discourse, rather than direct emotive terms. Nonetheless, her intention was to explore the emotional geography of a particular setting, and though excerpts are narratives devoid of explicit emotional language (as I have advocated), the reader still gets a sense for the emotional from them (nostalgia, belonging, memory, loss, and oppression).

In turning towards methods, there is arguably concurrence in the prioritisation of qualitative methods: even in some of the papers that make use of affect/affective. Some, as I will demonstrate, embark in the direction of the avant-garde, while others remain within the tried-and-tested methods of qualitative data collection: ethnographies, in-depth interviews, and participatory observations; though most interviews seem informal, the inclusion of direct quotes implies that there has been transcription of (recorded) interviews. Several, though far from all, stated how important it was to have pre-existing, interpersonal relationships with the people they were going to research (Pini, et al., 2010). Capineri, et al., (2018) formulated interesting data sets based on the 'affective responses' of citizens within two urban settings; I read 'affective responses' as their equivalent of 'emotions' since the majority of writing in the paper makes explicit usage of language in the direction of emotions rather than affect. Their data, from composition to representation, in comparison to the other scholarly literatures reviewed, made use of contemporary data systems (Capineri, et al., 2018). Data was recorded through VGI (volunteered geographical information), which, to them, represented an approach aptly suited to

the study of emotions: “the widespread availability and use of smartphones, and the rapid spread of Web 2.0 have enabled researchers to collect self-reported affective responses from large groups of people” (275); the data was then coded into GIS, and represented through an application (EmoMaps). The authors make compelling arguments in favour of said technologies, as ‘face-to-face’ data collection, especially in regards to emotions, can become time intensive and demanding. In representing their data, Capineri, et al., focused on displaying explicit emotive terms onto their GIS-based map.

In sharp contrast, and reflecting the most common approaches, Sultana (2011) focused on ethnographies, and included direct quotes to capture embodied subjectivities; however, there was no explicit use of emotive terms (anger, happiness, joy, etcetera), and emotions were gauged through expressions and statements of suffering. Fahnøe, too, focuses on humanising the homeless in urban Copenhagen, and includes direct quotes to enhance the reader’s experience of particular subjectivities. These two respective forms of data collection are highly qualitative, and, given the presence of direct quotes, were subject to discourse analysis and transcription. Holt, et al. (2013), in focusing on the contextual *becoming* of subjects relied on interviews and participant observatory methods.

I have now given an account of how some researchers operating within emotional geography conceptualise space, politicise emotions, and formulate methods. Before taking a brief look at affectual geographies, I would like to return to the papers I mentioned as sitting rather awkwardly between the two disciplines. Jones’ chapter in *Emotional Geographies* (2007) offers the reader insight into how emotional geographies can come to be done along the channels of memory and landscape. The article, from the outset, states that the ultimate intention is to engage with the emotive experiences of landscapes, and the author seems to approach qualities/aspects of his memory through poetic recollection. The chapter is no scholarly research article; instead, it’s an attempt towards an account of how emotions and memories may offer insights (as in producing, and/or exposing knowledge[s]) of particular landscapes: the chapter, in that sense, provides a conceptual starting point for future emotional geographers to begin untangling the theoretical relations of memories, emotions, language, and landscape. I have included it in this section for that exact reason, and because it inspired my own emotive retelling. To talk of the theoretical relations between emotions, memories, and language, but more specifically of emotions and memories, to me, implies the potential for affectual research because the relation between memories and emotion are of an affectual nature. Sharing one’s recollection of a particular landscape (or landscapes) from memory is a form expressionism, if not reductivism, and abstractivism, for memories are bound within conditioned ways of *being*, and the hard-to-

grasp affectual flows: the retelling of memories is both an interaction with (previously experienced) affective registers and conditioned modes of experience.

Graybill (2019), in looking at the emotional and affective experiences of residents in an extractive, hydrocarbon economy that is becoming more authoritarian, succinctly (and rather lucidly) differentiates affect and emotion as being two distinct theoretical approaches, and states that the research looked at both. This literature is, in that sense, between affect and emotion not because the author fails to make any clear ontological distinctions, but because she chooses to observe the two: the emotional experiences of residents through explicit emotive terms, and the affectual flows (of power) relations between an authoritarian state and its subjects, and a nations subjects in relation to the energy extraction sector. The author executes this complex task in looking for emotive terms in interviews, and accounting for affective display from bodily gestures and fluctuations in tone and rhythm of speech.

Lastly, Wood (2013), after introducing ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ as terminologically separate, yet close, established that her literature would focus on the emotional geographies of *being* citizens. The paper has recurring mention of affect/affective, and is arguably influenced by affectual theorisations, such as ‘the everyday’, bodies, and small moments of significance: “A focus on the informal and everyday social interchanges which inform every aspect of our lives, and the emotions which are imbued in such interactions, presents an opportunity to consider how different forms of political deliberation, including ‘bodily and affective’ are manifested within public participation processes” (page 52). It would seem that emotions are, to Wood, indeed manifested from noticeable (perhaps unnoticeable to me; hard-to-grasp!) affectual flows of, as stated, but not limited to, political processes of discussion and participation. Wood’s use of the word ‘imbued’ implies an aspect of simultaneous occupancy, where emotions and affect are contained within the same moment. I would contend that there is a progression from the latter to the former, as argued in aforementioned sections. However, I would argue that Wood’s methodology, given my opinion of affect and emotion, intended on looking for emotions in a manner that would seem more appropriate for to those looking for affect.

Wood does state quite clearly that the processes of observing affect and emotion are fraught with immense difficulty: “one of the challenges of research into emotional landscapes is the difficulty in ‘capturing’ the affective and the emotive within both formal practices (such as interviews) and informal processes. This is in part because abstract and ‘emotional’ concepts such as belonging are difficult to ‘see’, and problematic to articulate” (page 53). It comes as no surprise that Wood attempted to capture both affect and emotion since the author may have been of the opinion that they inhabit the same moment. The author’s two methods (café-style and

photovoice) are perfectly suited for attempts towards the affectual, but in not asking about emotions directly, the author, in stating that she wanted to capture both, is forced to insert her own emotive perceptions (see: page 55). This emboldens my argument that Wood's research skews, rather dramatically, towards an affectual geography, since the insertion of emotive perceptions (which are the author's) is theoretically undergirded within the impressionistic characteristics of affectual geography. The author's literature sits between an emotional geography in still choosing to have emotive terms present, but falls quite strongly within an affectual geography in being the author's impressions of affectual exchanges. This is highlighted further in Wood's inclusion of dramatized voice exchanges, which she states as being "inevitably [...] shaped by [her] own reflexive position and interpretation of events and emotions and, as such [...] is necessarily partial, provisional and situated."

Affectual Geographies

Affectual geographers, rather, prepare and present impressionistic readings of particular spaces from either their own accounts (Anderson and Ash, 2015: in: *Non-representational Methodologies*), or participants. More often, this process is about allowing the reader to observe/see the political within the impression¹³. Moreover, in my limited readings of affectual geographies, most scholars present the political upfront and centre, leaving little room for varied political interpretations. This brief section will present a text that does just that, in presenting the political up-and-centre; a text that does not, where the political ought to be read-into; and, a text that is situated somewhere in-between.

Tolia-Kelly's (2007) work offers readers an explicit account of affectual geography's political potential, in looking at the often marginalised, if not entirely neglected, experiences of minority community's to/with the concept of 'British' landscapes. This work clearly politicises the experiences of politically vulnerable communities, beginning the interpretation of a concept ('British' landscapes) by asking participants to project their impression of/with these landscapes on canvases in the form of paintings. Attempting to 'see' the affective registers of particular groups within a country, in relation to a concept that has excluded multiple histories, in prioritising one narrative, is profoundly political (and important) in increasing the representation of other cultural narratives.

¹³ In my use of impressionism/impressionistic, I intend on conveying the attempt at capturing a feeling or experience, of a particular moment in space-time.

Through Rose, et al., (2010), it is clear that affect, and its constituting/entailing outcomes, is the sole phenomenon being investigated in relation to 'big things'. The authors choose to observe 'big things' or, in their case, shopping malls, through the performance(s) of the lived experiences *of* malls: in this sense, the malls, and the humans who frequent them, are co-assembled. Verbal descriptions of feelings, photo-diaries, walk-alongs, body watching, and prompting questions, are all meant to gauge affectual registers, which in turn, are meant to inform the authors of any intentionally assembled affectual patterns by urban planners/designers. For the most part, the political emerges in the impressionistic readings given by the authors, of their encounters with people in the malls: memory, freedom, escape, and position, being themes ascribed to the experiences of mutual *becoming* with/in the malls (either independently or by the will of planners).

Holmberg's (2018) text, which was published in the journal *Emotion, Space, and Society*, is included even though the author was writing from within Uppsala's sociology department. Nonetheless, it is included since Holmberg's 'look' into human/dog rhythms argues that spatio-temporal formations inform, and are informed by, human/dog intimacies, which co-produce spatially located bodies, and a corollary of condition identities, and feelings; still, the affective collective is Holmberg's focal point. The author's referencing of affectual writers such as Vannini, and Berlant, who are mentioned in passages addressing the co-emergence of human/dog spatiality's, and mutually-dependent/independent *becomings*, makes clear the authors familiarity with affectual geographical writing. Again, though focusing on the *becomings* of humans and dogs, the political may be less apparent as with the aforementioned papers. However, it could be argued that Holmberg's paper addresses the anthropocentric exclusionary *becomings* that often neglect how other animals constitute an important part of spatial-temporal emergences.

I hope to have, in a very brief manner, demonstrated aspects of affectual geographical conduct, with examples from readings that are arguably all political in nature, yet at different visibilities.

The Temporal Nature of Emotion

Recalling Emotions – on the 25th of March 2019

Foreword¹⁴ - this could be considered the second part of the data/results section, as it will attempt to recount the (two-part) experience of conducting emotional geographies, with the first part of the data/results being the scholarly review section; this section will be highly narrative in style (Jones, 2007, “*An Emotional Ecology of Memory, Self and Landscape.*”).

I have previously described how Stadsbruk simultaneously entails the concept, with its socio-political/economic fibres, meanings, and impacts, and that it is actual biophysical land in material space. I have further spoken to this space as a phenomenon that is informing of ‘I’ and informed by ‘I’; as well as being formed by collective, relationally-dependent ‘I’s (Butler, 2003). Thus, the experience of Stadsbruk is partially an experience of ‘I’ that can be known through self-reflection, and/or communicated externally to an audience, and the experience of ‘I’ of Stadsbruk. I must acknowledge that the ‘I’ that is informed and informing of Stadsbruk is not wholly ‘I’; in fact, the degree to which it is does not necessarily matter; of importance is the acknowledgement that it is contributory to aspects, or degrees of ‘I’ as all that is, and can/can’t be, and is not, is too. It is in this section that I will communicate my experience of Stadsbruk; the reader should keep in mind the framework I have described above. Also, it is my use of emotional language that can be understood as an attempt at expressing the degree of ‘I’ I find oneself wrapped in in a particular moment of time.

I presently find myself situated at a desk, in the living room of an apartment I share with my co-habiting partner in Malmö, Sweden. The date is Monday, 25th March 2019, twenty-six minutes past noon. The writing in this section will all occur on this date, throughout the day, as it will be on this date that I will be recalling my emotionalities in, and of, Stadsbruk at previous moments in time: save for grammatical edits, this section will not be edited, specifically the emotionalities described, as to prevent potential future misrepresentations, or uncertainties, that may stem from a ‘wrongly’ recalled experience (contaminated). I could try to specify down to smaller quantities of time in my recalling of my emotional states from my memory, but that would exhaust my capacities to document the fluctuation of my historic emotions along such a narrow scale of time. As I have previously said, I will only account for the most intense

¹⁴ Foreword was written after the 25th of March 2019, but the immediate contents afterwards was written on the 25th of March 2019

emotional states I *think* I experienced at a historic moment of time, in this current moment of time. I have stated the date and location of this current writing, and the upcoming writing in this section because to talk, type, or think of something is for that process to happen within a point of time; and so, I must acknowledge the point in time at which I recall my experience and emotional states of Stadsbruk, as my memory of the emotional states I think had, may change tomorrow.

A thick layer of seemingly immobile clouds currently covers the sky; greyness dominates. Earlier this morning, I arose from bed several minutes past our 8:30 alarm after a night of uneasy sleep; I awoke feeling overheated during the middle of the night, and eventually, after murky thoughts on the necessity of it, launched myself towards the bathroom to urinate. After blinding myself with the sharp fluorescent light from the bathroom, I stumbled into the exaggerated darkness of our bedroom, and resumed my position in bed. Here, once prostrate, my mind, rather than following unguided thoughts through various surrealisms, began entertaining reasoned ideas; at this point, I knew it would be a long night.

Before giving an account of what I think my emotional states regarding Stadsbruk were previous in time, I have in the above paragraph tried to offer the reader potential conditionalities through which my recollection may be influenced. Had I sufficed to document the emotionalities of that day into a written log, along with several perceived conditionality's of the day, I may have been able to forego the above description. Several emotional geographers stress the importance of accounting for the environment in which interviews occur when talking of the emotional, as the present is constantly under barrage (Pain, 2014). I hereby choose to apply this equally by accounting for the environment I find myself situated in when giving an account of my own historic emotionalities; similarly, I will offer an account of the environment I perceived when interviewing Cyrille.

My, and Stadsbruk's, *becoming-in-tandem*, occurred in two stages: firstly, and in order of unfolding, my awareness of the conceptual (Stadsbruk X) from online research, then secondly, through my physical presence on the material land (Stadsbruk Y; Stadsbruk Y is knowledge from both concept and experience of its materiality). If I conceived of the idea of it and even saw pictures of the land, how much changed in my being on the land? One could argue that much may not have changed, but it serves the purpose of this paper to categorise the two, as it is the emotional states I felt while on the land for the first time, that I want to express; expressing the historical emotional states of when I first read an article, or webpage description about Stadsbruk is, however, doable. In fact, I can briefly mention the emotional states I believe I experienced when reading about Stadsbruk: hopeful yet doubtful, and intrigued and repulsed, from what I recall now. This, partially, I assume, because of my understanding of its conceptual structure of

incubating farmers-cum-entrepreneurs, and my alternative preference for subsidised, or income-protected transitions towards ecological, local, urban farming (Anneli and Friblick, 2016).

The first day I was on the *land-in-Västra Skrävlinge* the sky was clouded by insulting, oppressive greyness. I found out about their need for volunteers through REKO-Ring, a members-only group on Facebook that is composed of local, organic farmers, and non-farming individuals. The purpose of the platform is for local farmers to be able to market their produce, and for the non-farming members to express interest. At that point, the land I was travelling to, and would volunteer my physical labour on, was more than 'land'; the emergence of the conceptual undercurrent had already been exposed to me, if not at a higher intensity than other 'lands' I may learn of, due to my invested interest. From what I remember now, several things struck me.

I seem to recall being struck by an endless rise of grey, dull, monolithic residential buildings, which complimented the sky, and encircled the plot. I was aware of the neighbourhood it was in at the time (Rosengård, which too, is imbued with its own conceptual phenomena). From where the bus had dropped me off it was a two-minute walk to a small, rustic fence, which swayed on one of its two hinges: the barrier between what is not, and what is Stadsbruk Y, was before me; I had constructed a metaphysical point-of-entry, then, as I have now, of the moment I would conceive of myself as *more* constituted with/in Stadsbruk when I passed through that barrier. I would now not say that a torrent of emotions were felt during my entrance onto Stadsbruk; rather, I had dominant emotions throughout my day of talking, listening, digging, laughing, drinking, playing, spraying, and leaving. The emotions, on that day, now described on the 25th of March 2019, as now several hours have passed, around four or five, from the beginning of this temporal account of my first time on the land, during which I have remained in the living room of the apartment that is now drenched in late-afternoon sunlight, and except for occasional refills of water and a toilet break, I recall as being of: **joy, acceptance, anticipation, and distraction**. I was consumed by the tasks at hand, the people around me, and the sheer novelty, if not absurdity, of being on a 'farm' while twelve-story residential towers loomed all-around; while the constant roaring, sound-of-air-being-pressurised from nonstop vehicle traffic continued as time progressed from day into night.

The Temporal Nature of Emotions - After the 25th of March 2019 and Onwards

A contemporary affectual geography would have me describe the various 'atmospheres' in order to gain a sense of the affectual flows between participants on the 'land', as done by Anderson and Ash in a waiting room in a hospital in England (Vannini, 2015). Such an approach

would have required to me listen in on the tones of voices during exchanges between volunteer-to-volunteer, farmer-to-farmer, more importantly, human-to-human; and, the shifting glances during communal breaks and lunches; or, the piercing cries of seagulls above, and/or more. Arguably, it seems the practice of affectual atmospheres is unending in range of observable possibility: why not the affectual interaction of the residential buildings in Rosengård (and one's socio-political knowledge of the landscapes modern contestations), the hues of light, the noise from the aforementioned cars, and the noise from the shovel gliding into the moist, clay earth, which caused, more often than not, little stones and rocks to be pushed aside, causing a distinctive scraping sound (Rose, et al., 2010). In intending on departing from the strict structures of methodology, it is the writer/researcher who determines what is to be named an affectual atmosphere (Vannini, 2015).

A more empirical emotional geography, as in the cases of Pini, et al., (2010), Pain (2014), and Ey, et al. (2016), to name but a few, would approach individuals affected by a recent calamity, or approach individuals in specific settings, to discuss the emergence of particular emotional spatiality's. In my attempted account of the emotional experiences of the *land-in-Västra Skrävlinge* I have relied on my own historic emotionality, and an interview with Cyrille, which will be mentioned in the section below, to gain an account of Stadbruk's emotional spatial field. Relying on two accounts, one of which is my own, may appear problematic in comparison to, say, Ey, et al.'s account of the emotionalities of the extractive sector, since it could be argued that my own emotionality is not equally, or likely to be equal, to the emotionalities of those directly involved in the socio-physical processes of those spaces. Here, I would resist assertions from those who may raise an argument that pure 'directness' is important if obtainable; however, my own account, though I would agree that it lacks aspects of pure 'directness' in comparison to Cyrille's account, it is not a substitution for pure 'directness', but an addition to it. The problem of 'directness' is only ever a problem in emotional geography if purer emotionalities are substituted for less pure emotionalities: the addition of a less pure (direct) emotionality would not appear obtrusive or distracting. It may indeed add dimensions of perspective for interpreting the more direct (pure) emotionality. I should state, too, that the idea of 'directness' or emotional purity, stems from the aforementioned argument (in the *Theory* section) that emotionalities may inform us of positionality, and thus relationality in, and of, spaces: purer emotionalities would imply purer positionalities, and purer relationalities among individuals of particular spaces, given their more frequent interactions (co-constitutions). In this sense, 'purity' of emotion is observable by-way of frequency.

The focus of this section has been on the temporal nature of emotions, the purity of emotionalities, and a given account on the various ways emotionalities can be viewed as *emerging* in certain spatial locales. It also attempted to highlight the importance of taking account of emotionalities as snapshots, through an expression of my own emotional history of the *Land-in-Västra Skrävlinge*, especially since we do not experience the same emotional dimensions of seemingly fixed spaces, equally, throughout time. Approaching these complexities as a researcher, as well as communicating them outwardly for a research, is demanding: It's thus not too presumptuous to assume that this was the primary reason none of the farmers responded to my emails, in my initial desire to work within a denser set of pure emotionalities. The following section will be an account of a 'purer' emotionality of the *Land-in-Västra Skrävlinge*; the reader should know that the upcoming section is indeed the second part of my results.

Emotionalities of Cyrille Gaubert

A Set Encounter

And so it was, the date of our interview had arrived: we were to meet in his workplace, and I was to ask him of his emotionalities of Stadsbruk. I cycled over, going through various areas of Malmö: starting in Värnhem, and cycling south towards Herrgården, through Västra Sorgenfri, Norra Rosengård, and Södra Sorgenfri; the nature of my presence in areas I had never been in in my one-and-a-half years of living in, first, Lund, and now, Malmö, accentuated my sense of discomfort with my ascribed role as researcher¹⁵. My ‘outsider-ness’ felt pronounced. Once there, I wandered into a refitted shipping container, and asked for Cyrille among the faces I assumed were not his¹⁶; he was to be with me momentarily and I was escorted into a small, four-walled room with a door fixed into the wall, which was more see-through glass than solid plaster. This, I assumed, would be where our interview would take place for the majority of time.

For having no control of the environment, the room in which I was waiting would, to me, be ideal. It was isolated from the majority of the other spaces (work areas) in the refitted shipping container, had a closable door, and could not have been larger than seven square metres; the intimacy, perpetual silence and privacy would be contributory to my aims. After about a minute of waiting, Cyrille entered the room, greeted me and extended the usual hospilities of water and coffee: I accepted both. I immediately fumbled out my own expressions of gratitude for his time, and for engaging with me in something I had not done before; he wanted to know exactly what it was, and stated that he had been asking several people what the nature of emotional geography is; I offered him my understanding, and explicitly stated then, for the first time in-person, that it was emotional language I was after.

Before giving an account of Cyrille’s emotional expressions of Stadsbruk, I will talk about the arrangements of the room, since this, too, if my *Analysis* section is to be as thorough as I have stated emotional geographies should be, or if it is to attempt to account for notable conditionalities, should be mentioned. We sat at a table no wider than a metre in length, so there was indeed high intimacy; we sat on plastic stools, and were able to break eye-contact by either looking out of a window that faced a major roadway (of which the glass, I presume, was at a minimum double insulated), or the glass wall that looked into a narrow hallway. Behind me was a cork notice board displaying newspaper articles from local publishers about Stadsbruk. No other person was present in the room, and the little white table was empty save for my phone, notebook

¹⁵ Save for Norra Rosengård because my co-habiting partner lived there previously

¹⁶ Stadsbruk’s platform included a picture of Cyrille under his title of project leader

and pen, a coffee thermos, two cups, a water beaker, and two glasses. Interestingly, the room was fitted with sensory lighting, meaning that every three minutes or so, we would both have to wave our arms frantically in the air. This act, seemingly insignificant, relieved the sense of pressure on my part due to the sheer animated nature of it; I can only assume it did on his part, too.

The interview, which lasted for over an hour, is hard to call an interview, and will be mentioned in the *Analysis*. We remained uninterrupted except for when a colleague entered the room to talk to Cyrille in French, and then to me in English; we introduced each other casually and he asked what it was I was doing; the conversation ended with a shared acknowledgement of the possibilities of learning Swedish without formal classes. Thus atmosphere, to my perception, was convivial and informal, replicating interactions we are more likely to have with friends and family. His interest in my private life, too, may have been an indication for some emotional reciprocity; this too, will be addressed in *Analysis*.

An Unfolding of Emotions

Cyrille felt it important to state the date he became emotionally involved with Stadsbruk; just as I have stated the date of my becoming of/in Stadsbruk, it is possible to conceive of 'emotional involvement' as a form of *becoming*, his moment of *becoming*¹⁷. His work with Stadsbruk began two-and-a-half years ago, as he came into the sub-firm of Botildenborg as a project manager. To him, this marked the beginning of his emotional coming-to; he himself stated that his role, or rather, material involvement (interpreted in the externally-manifested sense of the words meaning) was the first 'moment' he felt any sense of emotionality to/of Stadsbruk.

Throughout his description of the role he first had, and the ensuing responsibilities that came with it, Cyrille gave no mention of any emotional language. I observed this without feeling the need to ask him to use strict emotional language, since the desire was for him to arrive there himself; it was matter-of-fact descriptivism devoid of any language that moved in the direction of approaching feelings; here, however, affectual geographers would claim that such desires limit what it is I could see, and that there are in fact *movements* moving towards feelings. The affectual geographer would perhaps attempt to observe affect in his level of excitement, manner of speech, bodily movements, or even give a description of the emotional density of the atmosphere; the psychoanalytical-emotional geographer would perhaps probe into his past life for any details on potential subconscious drives. I, on the other hand, was awaiting the explicit emotional language I

¹⁷ Though he did not express it through the conceptual frame of emotional emergence, like I have, by way of explicit usage of the term *becoming*, it is arguably the same phenomena

had asked him to use to describe his sense of Stadsbruk, and was curious if there would be such an outpouring from my leading questions.

After perhaps fifteen minutes without the explicit use of emotional language, I asked the first question out of the four I had prepared (Question One: how do you *feel* when you're on the land, at work?). Cyrille paused, took several seconds to think, and asked me to give him an example of what I meant. Already here, in my first question, after indicating in emails, and in the first minutes of our having met each other, that I was seeking emotional responses, he was unable to use any emotive language without my assistance. He then asked me to give an example, which to me was highly problematic for several reasons, namely the problem of contamination/influence; I will elaborate on this further in the *Analysis* section. It may have spoken to my naiveté in expecting a person I had not previously met in-person to take that statement (Question One) to be an opportunity for emotional outlet, but it cannot be argued that I did not attempt to introduce the theme of emotions to Cyrille gradually. Once asked, however, I blurted out several emotional words! In hindsight, the words I blurted out were: angry, happy, and sad, as far as I recall. Cyrille consumed my responses, and stated, in response to Question One that he felt **proud** and **satisfied** when on the land, during harvesting season.

However, once these answers flowed, he soon took command of expressing others. **Stress** and **frustration** were felt when on the land, too, due to his largely physical role of supervising other farmers, and running managerial errands, rather than farming the land himself. He expressed an appreciation for the strong community involvement he was a part of, but felt secluded from the actual farming processes, which he strongly felt a desire to engage in. Feeling his outlet exhausted as regards Question One, I asked him Question Two (how do you feel when you think about the land when you're not on it? Please feel free to state whether certain emotional states arise in particular settings). Cyrille immediately stated that it is dependent on context, and asked me for an example of a particular setting; once again, the dilemma of contamination presented itself as I stated which settings I wanted him to consider when thinking of his feelings of Stadsbruk, when in them. I stated a few commercial food stores in Malmö, then got my response: **Anger**. Cyrille remarked on his felt anger when in larger food stores, such as ICA, since it reminded him of the systemic nature of conventional food production, and that his work, though important, is not “disrupting” (his word) the dominant food paradigm. Still, he then proceeded to state recognition fuelled his sense of **happiness**, and that never felt **sadness**.

At this point, it became quite apparent to me that the two remaining questions I had (Question Three and Question Four: see *Methodology* section) would be redundant, and that it may have been too much to ask from a one-off encounter. Cyrille had given emotional accounts

of the *Land-in-Västra Skrävlinge*, even though the two questions I asked only explicitly referred to the 'land,' and the remaining two questions specifically asked of Stadsbruk. It was a sense of caution that motivated me to perhaps decrease (potentially felt) pressures Cyrille may have felt in a barrage of question centred on emotions: indeed, there is no guideline towards how aggressively, persistently, or repetitively questions of feelings ought to be asked.

Sensing some form of conclusion as regards emotional inquiry, I continued asking questions that were of a distinctly quantitative nature, and noticed a dramatic shift in enthusiasm and energy in our discussion: it almost felt as if there was *more* to be said. The questions that were of an economic, political, and logistical nature were, most probably, two-thirds of our entire conversation. Gradually, we began to rise from our stools and walked towards the back of the converted shipping container, where Cyrille wanted to show me Stadsbruk's latest venture into microgreens. Once we were inside the humidified chamber - a space filled with rows of shelves that were stacked with trays full of edible green-growth - Cyrille continued along topics of economy, politics, and environment, until we parted.

Cumulatively, *The Temporal Nature of Emotions*, and *Emotionalities of Cyrille Gaubert*, ought to have presented the reader with two accounts of the emotionalities of Stadsbruk; the two sections, respectively, should have also addressed important theoretical themes of purity/density within emotional geography, and the ensuing dilemmas of engaging in emotional geographies. The two-pronged approach to emotionalities in Stadsbruk, as I have stated earlier, could have been a singular account of Cyrille's emotionalities of Stadsbruk, but my proximity to the *land-in-Västra Skrävlinge* allowed for a minor exploration of my own emotions: this stands to benefit the paper because it offers interested practitioners a glimpse into an alternative mode of conduct (Jones, 2007, "*An Emotional Ecology of Memory, Self and Landscape.*").

Analysis

Foreword - I will provide a concluding analysis of two categories: firstly, an analysis of some of the practices stated in the *Scholarly Overview* section of this paper; and, secondly, an analysis of the two-part experience of conducting an emotional geography. These two categories will naturally interweave. The analysis will not focus on comparing Cyrille, and my, emotionalities either, as our respective positionalities, though different, and important, is not been the objective of this paper.

Literatures

Since analyses' have been an on-going theme throughout this paper, I will forego any formal introduction, and commence with the some of the content that I stated would be scrutinised in previous sections. As Ben Anderson (2016) has stated in *Key Methods in Geography*, there is no single method to conducting emotional geographies; similarly Fahnøe (2018) states: "There is no consensus on how to study emotions" (18); but what I have tried to highlight is that there are dominant methods and practices occurring. Furthermore, *Emotional Geographies* (2007) re-states the theoretical challenges in regards to approaching and representing emotions in a collection of accounts by various researchers: ultimately, the complexities of representation are compounded in emotional geography when the ranges are undefined. Yet, the dominance I so claim to be present is found in: the explicit identification of emotion-infused spatial fields, argued as constituted by way of emotive exchanges; qualitative methodologies; and, the seeking and/or use of emotive terms: it may seem obvious that the presence of emotive terms is dominant, but I state this because there are emotional geographies aimed at imparting 'emotional responses' without relying on emotive terms (Davidson, et al., 2007; Davidson, 2017; Fahnøe, 2018; Ey, et al., 2017; Capineri, et al., 2018; Matthee, 2004; Rose, 2004; and, Zembylas, 2011, among others). Due to this, no scholar read makes any rapid departure from Anderson and Smith's (2001) conception of the spatiality of emotions, and for good reason (how can anything be said to occur outside of, or not *of*, space, itself). Nor do most make any departure from the idea that emotions are inherently human; there does seem to be rather hasty universalism as regards the spatiality of emotions, of which more will be said below.

Thus, practices reflect dominance insofar as the spatial is consistently seen to contain emotive registers. However, and rather problematically, what follows is immediate discord regarding the ontologies of emotion (and its representation), and is arguably cause for confusion when the interchangeable use of affect and emotion occurs in literatures. This discord, however, exists within all current domains of knowledge production as regards the objective; still, this does not erase emotional geography's problems. Perhaps this discord, or lack of conceptual unity, will

stay, and rightly so, given the phenomenological nature of emotions. At a minimum, scholars, most of whom do, should clarify their conceptions of affect and emotion, and retain conceptual consistency: if one states emotions to be the outcome of affective flows, they should not use emotions and affect interchangeably since that implies singularity; still, if they do, they should argue that emotions as outcomes of affective flows, does not impede on singularity. Thus, to me, there was space for more conceptual digging in most papers reviewed. Fortunately, in the literatures reviewed, most seemed to abide by a definition of emotion that translated into a stated methodology that did not seem to contradict their definition, save for an article by Wood (2013).

Wood's (2013) simultaneous use of emotion and affect, though titled an emotional geography, provides a somewhat problematic look into how the theoretically separate phenomenon can be investigated simultaneously; it is also an example of failed conceptual consistency, if not a failed attempt a merging of (what Wood argues in the beginning) two distinct theories. The impressionistic qualities of affectual geography can contribute towards research in an emotional geography, so long as it is stated to occupy a separate point of inquiry, which should also minimise any confusion readers may have in regards to whether authors are conceiving of affect and emotion as interchangeable, or separate.

Of the other literatures read, there was consistent use of qualitative methods, which were largely informal interviews. As a result, most, if not all texts read, had direct quotes. In placing direct quotes into their literary papers, scholars often departed from the stated (emotive terms), towards the political, in determining that specific words contained the effects/causes of power imbalances. This also happened with words that were not distinctly emotive adjectives, as in the case of Sultana (2011) who focused on verbs such as 'suffer. In this sense, scholars performed a discourse analysis of sorts, where particular stated terms were analysed politically, after having been determined to contain the emotive. 'Power' is thus thematically popular in emotional geography, as reflected in the literatures reviewed. This reveals concurrence towards arguments made by Bondi (2005), Anderson and Smith (2001), Smith, et al. (2009), etcetera, in choosing to politicise various emotionalities, since the politicisation of emotionalities occurs when they (emotionalities) are argued to be the result of power interplays.

As mentioned above, there was no clear abandonment of founding proponents' belief that all spaces, human (or otherwise), are experienced emotively; feeling was, and is, taken to be a constituting part of space. To ask of those who do not 'feel' or experience emotionally would perhaps take the field beyond its intended scope, but one can see room for investigation: 'unfelt geographies', or something of the sort, if current neuroscience, or individual accounts, offer research anything in that direction.

Of the less dominant approaches, several of which are observable in *Emotional Geographies* (2007) and *Emotion, Place, and Culture* (2009), authors engage with the themes of *being*, emotion, and embodied identity more artistically and poetically, with memory figuring as an important feature throughout several texts. It seems as though memory, and the temporality of emotion, feature as uncontrollable variables that factor into our emotive descriptions at any point in time. An analysis of this begs the question of how explicit the political can/should be, especially if one does not want to make a striking departure from the political, which some state to be at the crux of emotional geographies. This, unfortunately, will vary subjectively, but in my account of texts that were auto-ethnographic in structure, and laced with the poetic, the political still shone rather brightly in the fore. Any maybe this will always occur given that the readings are published in academic journals, and are a part of academic institutions: the reader's perspective will, as a result, already be calibrated to 'look-out' for the political; just as one 'begins' to notice more of that which they are looking for, though it has always featured in their environment. This, I would argue, lends the poetic favour.

As I have stated in my *Disposition*, the structure and aim of this was predicated on what I felt to be a strong lack of theoretical digging in regards to emotions, the non-representational, 'feeling', and research methods; before continuing with an analysis of my practice of an emotional geography, I return to it now in saying that since works by Pile (2009), Smith, et al., (2009), Davidson, et al, (2007) and Thrift (2004), most scholars have contributed little towards theoretical depths, that I am legitimately limited in my analysis of present literature.

An Emotional Geography in Practice

In my practice of an emotional geography with a person I seldom knew, my deepest concerns were realised: talking of emotions, in spaces commonly conceived of as public, is demanding. The demands are mutually placed on the researcher and the participants, with the researcher having to exercise empathy and caution in probing for emotive terms, which, may be laden with 'negative' emotions, or bring about negative memories. Creating an appropriate environment for such an exchange is thus crucial. For the participants, even when told in advance of the nature of the academic research, the actual performance of emotive talk (in the 'public') may lead to unforeseen realisations of its difficulty. This, I believe, was realised for Cyrille, who was given several weeks notice of the nature of our *interview* (which is exactly what I called it, and may be a fault on my part: had I called it a 'talk' may have imparted a sense of the casual, therefore resulting in more emotional disclosure), yet could not use explicit emotive language when prompted; furthermore, he asked for examples of emotive terms, which arguably could

have influenced how he thought he felt. Cyrille's questions as to my own private life and emotionalities of living in Europe, among others centred on emotion, clearly represents a troublesome question of ethics: should the researcher be open, if not prepared, to share a degree of their own emotionalities when asked? It was something I had not foreseen, and after he asked his questions, I answered with heavy reluctance. Still, I would argue that the qualities of the room aided us, respectively, in disclosing our emotive accounts. I was fortunate that the interview *happened* to occur in an isolated room, but should have exercised caution in requesting an isolated room in my email.

Though I would consider myself empathetic to his emotive experiences (which could be argued to be due to my interest in his emotive experiences), one still ponders whether there is risk for feigned emotions in formal research literatures. Since I, too, began with the identification of a spatial field that I held to be *of* various emotionalities, and, had I be doing a 'fuller' emotional geography, would have certainly politicised them along their various points of relation, it begs the question of whether empathy becomes a means to an (academic/political) end. This does not necessarily have to be problematic, depending on ones outlook in regards to human intimacy; I, however, would contend that empathy should be unconditional, rather than serve as an objective. Still, I would add that utilising empathy as a tool still reflects it (perhaps to a lesser extent; of this I am still undecided).

The reality of choosing to work with/through human emotions, indeed qualities that reflect the most intimate aspects of our *being(s)*, is admirable, especially when aforementioned complexities are accounted for. Going beyond the complexities of shared emotional experiences between subjects and researchers could stand to benefit from prolonged research with a community; hence the reoccurring reference by respective scholars to their established track records with particular communities; some of whom had been working with particular communities for several years, before undertaking emotional geographies! (see: Pini, et al., 2010; Holt, et al., 2013; Tolia-Kelly, 2007; Wood, 2013). Thus, if not months (Zembylas, 2011), then years (Sultana, 2011), whilst Capineri, et al., (2018) benefitted from the anonymity that is inherent to VGI (volunteered geographical information). Though I would argue that their approach is deeply within the positivistic in choosing to use an electronic medium, where participants are limited to entering text-based responses, to the benefit of the authors as data points. And though it may seem self-evident that exposure is of essence, Rose (2004) also demonstrates that previous interactions are not a fixed condition in having 'snowballed' a participant on the emotionalities of family photographs, and the various ways of *seeing*, in a public park. I would argue, still, that richer accounts are bound to stem from deeper (mutual)

senses of familiarity (be from shared identities or level of exposure), especially if one is restricted on time and need in of producing something by a certain deadline.

In abiding with feminist theorisations of identities being simultaneous co-assemblages of (perceptions of) spaces (in partiality) and subjects, my next concern is Cyrille's stated identity. Cyrille, sensing the direction of the theoretical framework, was interested in stating his identity, and how this informs his own conception of himself. Without engaging with this, the question is one of apparent importance: should emotional geographers ask their subjects to reflect on their self-perceived identities? I ask this because had I intended on doing a larger emotional geography of scale, I would have certainly (as is necessary) identified subjects along their material roles, but not at the depth Cyrille willingly (with political intentions) addressed himself to me. Should there be subtle prompts that encourage this as to make the emotional 'data' richer? I hold that as long as participants are aware of the intention of the interview, with subtle statements as to the nature of emotional geographies, what follows should provide adequate data for an emotional geography, without the need for strong emphasis on identity.

I would like the analysis of my own emotive experience to be brief: firstly, my retelling occurred twenty days after my interview with Cyrille, which may have arguably contributed untellable amounts of 'contaminants', which I, in my *Methodology*, expressly wanted to minimise. Thus my decision to retell my emotive experience of Stadsbruk on the 25th of March, whilst the interview occurred on the 4th of March, in essence exacerbated that which I tried to prevent: I may have well retold my emotive experience of Stadsbruk after an exploratory walk, on any particular day, rather than of my first day of activity. However, in defence of my memory-based retelling of Stadsbruk on the 25th of March - which, unless I had participated in another such activity of volunteered labour after my interview with Cyrille - contained heightened proximity to the *reason for* Stadsbruk. Memories from a day on which I was a volunteer, among others, rather than a solitary, wandering researcher, may have led to feelings based on the affectual registers of those among me. Either way, as that is difficult to know, I posit that emotive retellings of spatial locales imbued with variously passing 'feelings' (other people) may hold revelatory supremacy, as increased affectual flows may produce particular emotionalities.

In concluding the *Analysis* section, I would like to return to my point of conceptual consistency. It will appear to any reader of multiple emotional geographies that there is limited consistency among scholarly interpretations of emotions. Thankfully, in their respective papers, consistency abounds internally, and so the richness of emotional geographical conduct aptly

reflects the richness of emotions. It is, to me, an undertaking that should not too strongly focus on trying to replicate the uniformity of other disciplines (more materialist approaches) in human geography, especially in regards to methodologies. This is because the varied methodologies in emotional geography still offer lived accounts of varied spatialities. In addressing various spatialities differently, the universalism ascribed to emotions does not extend beyond the contention that emotions are *of* space, which itself may be problematic. The benefit of open methodological interpretations is that that which is hard to represent is accorded various channels of representation, and thus contributory to research on a phenomenon that is pervasively diverse.

Conclusion

The tone I employed at the beginning of this paper may have given the reader the impression that I perceive the survival of emotional geographies to be dependent on their ability to politicise; then the reader may have noticed a progression in my writing, namely that emotional geographies are ‘safe’ from the influences and critiques of more-materialist geographies so long as the political can be read at a minimal intensity: this, I then argued, would be inherent to any emotional geography given the necessity of the spatial, which by default, includes the political (due to predetermined configurations, permissions and restrictions). I then attempted to demonstrate the various political intensities that are prevalent in emotional geographies, with strong focus on the methodologies of those I categorised as being dominant. I would like to return to my point regarding the direction and evolution of emotional geographies in this section, as well as offer my opinion on how such progressions relate to other non-representational theories. Then, before closing, return in brief to the phenomenological nature of emotions, and my theorisations on emotions, which featured so strongly in this paper, and conclude that those theorisations should be considered points of departure rather than an attempt towards a universally employed, conceptual frame.

The beauty of political interpretation (reading-in the political) is that there is no fixed scale and the minimum is easily achieved. Researchers who want their work to be classified as emotional geographies need only operate within the spatial, where the only requirement, to me, is lucidity of the spatial to make political interpretation feasible; once more begging the question of whether ‘operating’ or ‘inquiry’ can be non-spatial. I have previously said that emotionalities should be observed to identify positionalities that should then inform researchers of power imbalances, and by all means, this can be the case: but it ought not need be. The aforementioned approach, like feminist theorisations (in their co-construction of ‘self’ among ‘Others’), relies on a plurality of *beings*, but it is my firm belief that auto-ethnographic accounts of spatialities, though in a minority (Smith, et al., 2009; Jones, 2007, “*An Emotional Ecology of Memory, Self and Landscape.*”; Smith, 2007, “*On ‘Being’ Moved by Nature: Geography, Emotion and Environmental Ethic.*”), demonstrate how a lack of pluralities can still lead to a political interpretation of the emotional. Since *beings* are co-constituted, is not the focus on a singular *being* always an avenue into the political? Yet, in demonstrating how the preponderance of emotional geographers conduct their respective research, it is apparent that there is currently a preference for political interpretations that are based on the emotionally varied accounts of a multitude of subjects. And though most contend that there is no appropriate way to conduct

emotional geographies, readers should not conflate the consensus of their methodologies as promoting one.

I had stated earlier that my initial intention was to conduct a ‘full’ emotional geography, rather than an emotional geography in-practice, and quite clearly stated how it would have been done. Now, after reflecting on the various methodologies, dominant and less-dominant, as well as seeing potential space for the future incorporation of affectual theories into emotional geography, I would admit that I cannot state beforehand how I would, in-future, practice an emotional geography. This would depend on various contextualities that are too numerous to state, but among them: duration of research, engagement with a community (if desired), and symbols (as regards representation). Also, my use of ‘full’/’fuller’ has only been to acknowledge this paper as being a dominantly theoretical critique, and minimally practiced, emotional geography.

The future of emotional geography appears to be as open as it currently exists, though there are bound to be constellations of conformity emerging from the masses of literature. So far, however, these literatures remain open to the varied approaches and interpretations that are bound to come after them, which is likely to guarantee the future of emotional geography, as internal discord is more detrimental than external disagreement. The need for rigidity as regards methods is thus unfounded.

On the ability of emotional geographies to become more attuned to the emotionalities of subjects in research, while respecting the established (or being established) grounds of affectual theories and more-than-representational theories, I will need to, again, mention the unstable grounds upon which emotions are situated. In my *Theory* section, I have tried to highlight the phenomenological qualities of emotions, and the ensuing difficulties of understanding and representation, which led to sharp critiques of the subjectivity of emotions (though they are often spoken about objectively), and critiques of the temporality of emotions in my emotional geography in-practice, which was elucidated in the section *The Temporal Nature of Emotions*. It seems as though emotional geographies can expand in approaches to investigating emotionalities in asking subjects to represent their experiences (the conditioned, though individual) alternatively. One could ask subjects to draw, verbally express (outside of common language, or inside of common language, but recorded, so that more is *transmitted*), or act (bodily) their perceived emotionalities. This would expand emotional geographies without infringing upon affectual geographies since the latter, for the most part, would have researchers observe bodily movements, drawings, and non-conditioned verbal expressions, *without* asking their subjects to do so. In asking of the emotional, but for alternate ways of expression, we preserve a desire to observe ‘feelings’ rather than variously situated affectual flows (which to me, I would have you

recall, precede emotions, though emotions are not their sole resultants). The desire to operate with (potentially, and if so, to an unknown extent) tainted qualia, in alternative ways, could offer richer accounts beyond the need for the verbal-to-textual.

Furthermore, as regards the nature of emotions, it will benefit me to roughly restate Smith's opinion (in *Emotion, Place and Culture*) of Livingstone (1994), that there is indeed no pre-existing meta-frame for human geography that we should be attempting to move towards, or rebuild; in essence, the fact that positivistic accounts of material space have predominated, for the benefit of systems, markets, and western societies, has merely been the result of an intellectual direction. Similarly, the concerns and anxieties expressed by human geographers in the 20th century have returned to the fore as concerns and anxieties of 21st century geographers. Yet, if we acknowledge that the overshooting of the 'human', or aspects of *being*, resulted in a sort of positivistic overcompensation stemming from anxieties, it should, by default, become apparent that those overcompensations need rectification. More so now, given the advancements in phenomenological thinking and writing as well as approaches to understanding and representation.

Though positivism(s), and its epistemological intentions, has continually faced criticism from artists, activists, and academics throughout academic history, the consequences of positivism having so strongly established itself within the social sciences only cements notions of our interactions as being nothing more than material. And now, in the face of material catastrophe, I ask you, dear reader, to ask yourself this: can human geography continue as an academic discipline in which research is predominantly based on the mappings of material phenomena, when catastrophes abound? Should not emotive (and more-than-material) accounts, indeed accounts of that hard-to-grasp *felt-ness*, feature into accounts of human concern, in-and-of themselves and/or contribute towards policy, in hopes that it may counter what is surely well known and (materially) documented at this point! Broadly, if one were to take any spatial catastrophe, whether it be the spreading violence of white nationalism, ecosystem/biodiversity collapse, the brutalities of neoliberalism, or the emotive experiences of bureaucracy and/or everyday life, and look at existing literature within the archives of human geography, one would observe an uneven account of said phenomenon by way of positivistic descriptors, and a lack of the emotive. Even in texts where interviews have been transcribed meticulously; where one might contend that interviews are a form of 'giving an account' as a qualitative method and thus resisting positivism! Whilst somewhat true, it is also not entirely the case that interviews and meticulous transcriptions are in fact resisting positivistic mentalities, since the sole prioritisation of verbal-to-text data creation/computation/representation reinforces the notion that objective data

is observable by way of a sensory medium: that spoken words are objectively true, and the senses are paths of access.

In light of this, it would thus seem that the experiential, at depths approaching the hard-to-grasp (states in/through which most, if not all of us live!) is thus heavily understudied in human geography. Fortunately, and simultaneously, intellectual investigations of individual phenomena as regards material, and non-material experience, have deepened, the results of which are increasingly entering academic departments. The emerging literatures and research approaches are encouraging up-and-coming geographers, from geography departments around the world, and social scientists within other disciplines, to take the plunge into research methodologies ripe with potential for richer accounts of experience.

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