Putting people back into the economy

Urban restructuring and emerging alternatives in time of crisis

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Acknowledgements

Abstract

In many cities around the world, the financial crisis 2007 served as an opportunity both for grassroot movements and governments to rethink existing models of urban development. Some authors have pointed out that the crisis served to elevate discourses for progressive post-neoliberal urban transformations. Other, more sceptical accounts have pointed at the shift towards participative, networked governance and the introduction of green and socially "innovative" planning as just another phase in the ongoing neoliberal restructuring of cities. In Barcelona, a broad-based coalition of actors, including the local government and activists, has developed a city-wide strategy for socio-economic local development based on plural economy and participative modes of governance. The social and solidarity economy has been put in the centre for this development. This study aims to critically explore how the politics on the social and solidarity economy could contribute to social justice in local development. By exploring spatial patterns and discursive mechanisms in politics and practice of the social and solidarity economy this study forms a contextually sensitive analysis to understand how the social and solidarity economy responds to needs of disadvantaged groups in the city. The results of the study show that the social and solidarity economy in Barcelona is contributing to a more just local development by redistributing influence over local development from individual, private and financial actors to collective social needs. By repositioning the meaning of social innovation and social entrepreneurship, from a primarily individual undertaking to a collective form of civil society action, it strengthens already existing forms of economies that traditionally have not been seen as a part of the market.

1. Introduction

Discourses play a central role in the ongoing attempts of imagining and remaking cities. As alternative discourses on urban development emerge and hegemonic discourses are reassembled, power relations also shift as new groups of actors are put in the centre of the discourse. In many cities around the world, the financial crisis 2007 served as an opportunity both for grassroot movements and governments to rethink existing models of urban development. In more or less progressive ways, the crisis served to incentivise the search for ways to reinvent the economy and to find new forms of governance in cities (Oosterlynck & Gonzalez, 2013). Some authors have pointed out that the crisis served to elevate discourses for progressive post-neoliberal urban transformations (e.g. Soureli & Youn, 2009). This discourse, primarily raised by grassroot movements, saw the crisis as an opportunity to challenge the excesses of the prevalent urban growth model and to introduce participative forms of democratic governance. Other, more sceptical accounts have pointed at the shift towards participative, networked governance and the introduction of green and socially "innovative" planning as just another phase in the ongoing neoliberal restructuring of cities (e.g. Peck et al, 2010; Wanner, 2015).

Today, over a decade after the eruption of the financial crisis, we see a variety of urban responses in regard to "sustainable" planning and participative governance unfold across the world. In Barcelona, social movements have been particularly successful in translating their calls into political demands through the formation of the citizen platform- and political party, Barcelona in Common (Barcelona en Comú). The current municipal government, led by Barcelona in Common, have since 2015 advanced a politics on plural economy and participative modes of governance, what has been described as a new "socio-economic" model for Barcelona. In this model, social economies based on values of cooperation and solidarity rather than financial profit - have been put in the centre with the aim of producing new development rationalities. While this politics indeed demonstrate a potential to effectively question the hegemony of capitalist economies, it also demonstrates new forms of governance arrangements. By challenging traditional state-centred forms of policy-making and service provision, the sector is not only emerging as a complement to the private or public economy as a provider of services, employment and innovation, but also as a sector for state-civil society partnership in economic and social planning. As this model aims to empower previously disadvantaged

groups in the future development of the city, it also demonstrates tendencies of liberal forms of governance which effectively redefine and reposition the state-civil society relationship. Thus, there seems to be a need to consider whether a strengthening of the social and solidarity economy can effectively serve to empower previously disadvantaged groups and produce new, post-neoliberal urban governance rationalities or whether it risks reinforcing ongoing neoliberal urban restructuring.

1.1 Aim and scope of the research

In Barcelona, a broad-based coalition of actors, including the local government and activists, has developed a city-wide strategy for socio-economic local development. To support the proposed development, social and solidarity economies (SSE) have been put at the centre. The SSE is described as a tool for "reducing social and territorial [i.e. spatial] inequalities, while promoting an economy at the service of people and social justice" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 4). On city-wide level, Barcelona has followed an approach where the local government actively supports and strengthens the sector through capacity building and networking strategies. On district and neighbourhood scale, specific plans have also been developed for the most disadvantaged areas of the city. This approach aligns with the current trend of socially innovative strategies of governance which involves the public in solving social problems through innovation based on collaboration and cooperation (Oosterlynck & González, 2013). Through the politic's explicit focus on social justice, this approach offers opportunities but also challenges to advance a more socially just local development. While the impetus on SSE has the potential to empower previously disadvantaged groups by its organising principle of solidarity and self-management, the politics through which it is advanced also demonstrates new forms of governance arrangements which may redefine and reposition the state-civil society relationship.

Critical scholars have interpreted the recent growth of interest in social innovation as a way of legitimizing a neoliberal roll-back of the well-fare state in favour of market principles and networked governance strategies (e.g. Fougère et al. 2017). This critique forms the basis of my study, which aims to critically explore some of the mechanisms that drive the development of the SSE and the institutional transformations involved in

the new-found political interest in social innovation in Barcelona. By exploring the motivations behind the development of the sectoral politics, I try to form a historically, politically and institutionally sensitive analysis to understand its implication for socially just local development. My study is focused on the politics associated with the strategic incorporation of the actors in social and solidarity economy (SSE) in the governance of local development in Barcelona. The study offers a critical investigation using a combination of spatial analysis and discourse analysis to uncover some of the politics associated with the development of the sector and its implication for urban social justice.

My research question is:

How could the politics of the social and solidarity economy contribute to social justice in local development?

In addition to the overall research question my study is also guided by three working questions which are all explored in relation to the central theme of social justice. I explore these questions in the context of Barcelona and in relation to the political strategies outlined in The Impetus Plan for the Social and Solidarity Economy in Barcelona (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016).

Where and how do initiatives in the social and solidarity economy respond to social needs?

What are the motivations and interests guiding local practices and politics of the social and solidarity economy?

How does the politics of the social and solidarity economy influence local development?

1.2 Approach of the thesis

According to a critical realist methodology, my study is designed using a combination of extensive and intensive research (Sayer, 2000). The extensive part of the study aims to explore how the sector of social and solidarity economy (SSE) responds to needs of disadvantaged groups in the city. The assumption underlying this part of the study is that

there are patterns which direct the local development of the SSE sector and that these can be identified and described on the basis of studying extensive data related to its spatial distribution and socio-spatial relations. As the local policies of SSE in Barcelona (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016) have been developed in partnership between the municipal government and actors in the local SSE fabric, the socio-economic base can be assumed to have a significant impact on the strategies and results of the policies. The extensive study is approached by quantitatively performing a cross-analysis between the distribution of the SSE with two measures which help me locate disadvantaged groups in the city: income distribution and gentrifying areas. This extensive, quantitative analysis adds a spatial understanding, and forms the background, to more deeply explore the spatial and socio-economic realities that the politics of the SSE is a response to.

Secondly, and forming the intensive and qualitative part of the study, I use discourse analysis to detect some structures and mechanisms that influence motivations and interests guiding the SSE. While being aware that discourses can only provide a partial explanation, this part of the study however helps me parse out how the SSE influence and form practices which could advance a more socially just local development in Barcelona. For the discourse analysis I use the overarching political document The Impetus Plan for the Social and Solidarity Economy in Barcelona (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016) which has been developed and implemented by the municipally and the SSE sector. I also use associated documents for local economic development, neighbourhood development plans, City Council meeting recordings as well as interviews with key actors to complement and understand the policy document. The discourses I am able to capture through this material covers the political formulations expressed by a broad-based coalition of actors that have been part of formulating this material in Barcelona. Because the SSE covers a broad spectrum of actors, the discourses should however not be understood as general for all actors in the SSE, neither in Barcelona nor in the international context.

My analysis is guided by the theoretical framework of political economy and social justice. The two theoretical strands of literature serve different purposes to my analysis. The framework of social justice runs as a central theme throughout my thesis and helps me evaluate the politics and practises which are advanced through the SSE. The framework of political economy serves as a background and guides my analysis of which

mechanisms and structures might be at work. The framework of political economy contends that in a context of neoliberal urbanism, socially innovative forms of governance is as much a result of, as a response to global economic restructuring. In other words, an expansion of the SSE sector may serve as much to reinforce and legitimize a neoliberal political rationality as to challenge it. Thus, to evaluate the kind of social and institutional arrangements that are enabled through the politics of the SSE in Barcelona I use the theoretical framework of social justice. With its focus on both distributive and procedural justice, it enables me to critically examine which groups and interests this may actually serve.

1.3 Outline of the thesis

My thesis is structured to describe the theories and methods I have used in my study before turning the attention to my results and conclusions. Chapter two provides an overview of political and economic changes which have brought the SSE to the urban agenda. Chapter three introduces concepts and theoretical readings of social justice which forms a central theme in my thesis. Chapter four is a methodology chapter and documents the framework for the research, methods used in the study and limitations associated with the research. Chapter five describes the results and analysis of the empirical findings. Chapter six concludes my thesis with a summary of the research findings, final conclusions and suggestions for future research.

2. Urban restructuring and crisis governance in the sustainable city

In this section I lay out the theoretical framework of political economy and previous research which supports my study. I use theories on urban governance strategies and social innovation as my theoretical foundation and as part of my analytical framework to empirically examine what the politics of the social and solidarity economy (SSE) in Barcelona means for social justice in local development. To situate the literature, I first outline the current development of the SSE and its introduction into public policies in Barcelona. I then turn to some of the broader economic and political changes which have influenced the renewed interest in the local scale. After that, I outline how urban entrepreneurialism has become linked with sustainability. Next, I turn to some of the literature on social innovation and the renewed interest of it after the financial crisis. Finally, I briefly conclude and reflect on how all of this impacts the SSE.

2.1 The social and solidarity economy

During the last decades, the state has been widely challenged in its capacity to respond to current societal challenges and new ways to manage the mechanisms for formulating and designing public policies and services have been advanced (e.g. Aguilar, 2014; Woods et al, 2016). The idea of innovation has also become increasingly important in European countries since the financial crisis which made visible the effects of the neoliberal development model (Zurbriggen & González, 2014). It is in this context that the interest in the SSE has been growing among social movements as well as in local governments and supranational institutions such as the EU and OECD. The SSE sector is increasingly formalised and framed as a collection of grassroot "entrepreneurial" solutions to democratic deficiencies, neighbourhood inequalities and unsustainable global production chains. In response to the growing visibility of the sector, policies from international and local institutions has been formulated to support the development of the SSE sector. In Barcelona, the political support for the SSE sector grew after the financial crisis in 2008. In 2015, a commission to support the growth of SSE was formed in the municipality of Barcelona following the entry of Barcelona in Common - a political platform formed out

of anti-systemic social movements (Municipality of Barcelona 2018a). In a city-wide strategy for socio-economic development, named the *Impetus Plan for Social and Solidarity Economy in Barcelona* (from here onwards referred to as the Impetus Plan), the growth of the SSE sector has been put in the centre for local development. One of the most important tools used by the local government to strengthen the sector has been the development of specific neighbourhood plans aimed to tackle the growing income gap between the city's 10 districts to encourage local socio-economic revitalisation (Metropolis, 2019). Recently the SSE has also been supported as a means to mitigate the impacts of gentrification following from large scale urban projects and tourism-led development in parts of the city (Municipality of Barcelona, 2018b).

During the last decade, the SSE has been used to refer to a wide range of economic activities that aim to prioritize social profitability instead of purely financial profits (Utting, 2015). It includes a variety of formal and informal entities such as cooperatives, social enterprises, community organisations, self-help groups, fair trade organisations, exchange networks and grassroot solidarity networks (Fonteneau et al., 2010; Neamtan, 2002; Utting, 2015). Put in productive terms, it partially corresponds to what Seyfang and Smith (2007: 585) have called "grassroot innovation" that is, "a network of activists and organizations generating novel bottom-up solutions for sustainable development and sustainable consumption; solutions that respond to the local situation and the interests and values of the communities involved". Partially many initiatives in the SSE also correspond to the concept of social innovation. In this latter sense the literature emphasise the significance of social innovation, understood as those socially led initiatives that try to meet the satisfaction of social needs that are not adequately addressed by macro-level welfare policies or the private market or in terms of addressing big societal challenges such as climate change and social exclusion (Oosterlynck et al., 2013; Cahill 2010).

Many actors in the SSE argue that their practices also entail the transformation of power relations (González et al, 2010: 55). More specifically, SSE as a form of social innovation is expected to compensate pre-existing power inequalities in favour of the weakest social groups, the most deprived urban neighbourhoods and social organisations (Cruz et al, 2017). In line with a vast strand of the literature emphasising the spatial dimension of poverty and social exclusion (e.g. Musterd et al., 2007), the Impetus Plan describes the SSE as "a fundamental component for fighting against socio-economic inequalities in the

city, which are numerous and particularly concentrated in certain neighbourhoods and districts" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 54). The main argument appears to be that "locally based initiatives, often much more so than official state-led programmes, can galvanise a range of publics in activities that have city-wide (if not greater) impacts on the dynamics of urban cohesion and social development" (Moulaert et al., 2010: 5).

2.2 Economic and institutional restructuring in a neoliberal era

Over the last three decades, a range of new and often innovative institutional and economic arrangements have emerged at a variety of geographical scales. Authors in political economy have described this current era of political and economic co-ordination as a strategic erosion of the hegemony of the national scale that dominated up until the 1970s. In this shift, much related to the process of globalisation, Purcell (2008) describe how both the global economy and the nation-state have been significantly rescaled. Among others (e.g. Swyngedouw 1992; Harvey, 2005; Robertson, 1995), Purcell (2008) argues that to a much greater degree than before, non-national scales are being promoted as alternative to the national scale in what can be seen as a neoliberal economic and political strategy. In what Swyngedouw (1997) has theoretically termed as "glocalisation", these alternative scales are both supra-national and sub-national (local and regional) and affect both economic and state-controlled activities.

Firstly, commentators have stressed the growing importance of regional and local economies above nation-states as functional nodes in the world's economic geography (e.g. Storper, 1997; Scott, 1996). The growing importance of the local and regional scale is associated with the shift to "flexible specialisation" in industrial production. In flexible specialisation, very large firms give way to a proliferation of smaller ones by which intrafirm cooperation becomes increasingly important to economic production. The need for intrafirm cooperation gives rise to geographical clustering of specific industries which allows (often urbanised) regions to function as nodes in the global economy (Scott, 1996). Regional specialisation has therefore become an increasingly important concept in urban and regional planning to attract specific kinds of industries. Due to declining profit seen in industrial economies, mostly because of higher wages earned through successful labour organising, knowledge and innovation have (rather than low paid labour) become

important strategies in the regional competition of industrial capital investments (Purcell, 2008). This trend of economic regionalisation is important because it has made regions and urban areas more independent from national economies and can thus, in part explain the growing importance of new strategies for urban governance and innovation.

Secondly, the nation-state as dominant scale of decision-making has also undergone a process of glocalisation. While important state functions and powers have been shifted to supranational scales through international coordination and agreements, sub-national governance relations have become increasingly important for urban development. This process has involved the transfer of functions, obligations, and expectations to local governments at various scales, from regional to municipal (Purcell, 2008). Purcell (2008) argues that, although this has been a geographically and institutionally uneven process, one general outcome has been the weakening of state-coordinated wealth redistribution which previously protected vulnerable regions from competition. The weakening of the national state has instead favoured the stimulation of entrepreneurialism by encouraging regional and local authorities to compete among themselves (see eg. Swyngedouw, 1996).

Thirdly, and accompanying these new scalar arrangements has also been the outsourcing of previously state functions to non-state institutions, both in national and local governments. Guided by neoliberal strategies to move governance out of the routinised channels of the formal state, governments have increasingly privatised and semi-privatised its functions by contracting out to volunteer organisations, community associations, non-profit associations and non-profit corporations, foundations and private firms and public-private partnerships to carry out the functions of formal governments (Purcell, 2008; Evans & Shields, 2000; Krumholz, 1999). The result has been a move from *government* to *governance,* in which new flexible, open and more unstable governing arrangement between ad hoc and special purpose entities and state are proliferating. As Swyngedouw (2005: 1993) point out, "the urban scale has been a pivotal terrain where these new arrangements have materialised in the context of the emergence of innovative social movements on the one hand and transformations in the arrangements of conducing governance on the other". This is particularly apparent in how horizontal and networked arrangements for urban policy-making and planning have begun to challenge traditional state-centred forms of policy making. With reference to their more participatory character, such arrangements draw heavily on a greater involvement of

individuals or actors from both the private economy and civil society (Moulaert et al., 2005). While these innovative governance arrangements, which are often actively supported and advanced through demands of grassroot movements, offer the promise of greater democracy and empowerment of civil society, they also exhibit a number of contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, and what will be explored more in detail later in relation to entrepreneurial urban strategies, the democratic character of such settings risk being eroded by the encroaching imposition of market forces that set the "rules of the game". On the other hand, and what is most apparent in urban development processes where networked governance arrangements serve for micro-decisions, democratic decisions are often assumed to be ensured through deliberative principles. The challenges involved in ensuring democratic legitimacy by deliberative principles will be discussed later in relation to social justice.

Geographical scholarship on the "politics of scale" argues that scale is best seen, not as a neutral container that exists outside of politics, but as a *strategy*, and as a way to pursue a political agenda. Scale are in geographical work of political economy regarded as socially constructed. Each scale and the relationship among scales are contested and continually reproduced through struggles and conflicts between different interests to "fix" relationships at specific scales. Thus, if the production of, and "fixing" of scales is the result of struggle and conflict, geographical scholarship contends that the content and extent of each scale must be the result of particular groups achieving a configuration that best suits their agenda (Purcell, 2008). To judge the outcome of a particular scalar arrangement Brown and Purcell (2005: 608) therefore argues that "the social and ecological outcomes of a given scalar arrangement are not to be divined in the scales themselves, but in the political agendas of the actors and organisations that produced and are empowered by the arrangements".

2.3 Entrepreneurial strategies in the search for the sustainable city

While the neoliberal agenda has been successfully advanced virtually everywhere on the planet, writers in urban political economy note that it has advanced furthest in cities (Harvey, 2005). One of the clearest expressions of this can be seen in the intensified competition between urban areas for capital investments. Economic growth is largely

seen as the dominant imperative for urban policy and planning and as a result urban land is also primarily seen as property. Maximising its exchange value is thereby a dominant concern, particularly evident in many redevelopment strategies. In reference to these developments, Purcell (2008) argues that the neoliberal logic has become the dominant way to imagine the urban future. While governments have expanded the assistance that they provide to capital interests, commitments to citizens are increasingly out-contracted to private or civil society actors. In that context, democratic decision-making is often seen as messy, slow and inefficient; a luxury that cities competing for investments cannot afford.

However, as Gibbs and Kreuger (2007) note, not all urban strategies have followed the path to engage in a desperate search for mobile capital, jobs, investments and grants. As already noted, neoliberal urbanism develops unevenly and not all cities are "entrepreneurial" – at least not in a narrow economic sense. Many so-called entrepreneurial cities are also engaged in various environmental and social improvements designed to make urban space more habitable for all residents rather than competing for the benefit of a few (Gibbs & Kreuger, 2007). Entrepreneurial cities such as New York, London, San Francisco, Berlin and Barcelona are increasingly involved in attempts to reduce or restrict, rather than intensify, their global impact (e.g. lowering carbon emissions). There is also a greater attention to the nature of the "social" and "environmental" in contemporary politics of urban development, particularly in the return to concepts such as local economies and increasing interest in environmental sustainability (Cox & Jonas, 1993; While et al. 2004).

In terms of rethinking the trajectory of urban governance after (or against) entrepreneurialism, Gibbs and Kreuger (2007), argue that one important idea is that of the sustainable city. The idea of the sustainable city draws upon various strategies of planning and urban management which minimize the global ecological footprint of urbanisation. This includes that instead of consuming resources and contributing to environmental degradation, cities ought to be managed in a way that enhances their role in sustainable development. As an urban redefinition of sustainable development posed in the Brundtland Commission report (WCED, 1987), cities should "contribute to development on a global scale that meets the daily needs of people without compromising the ecological, social and economic needs of future generations" (Gibbs & Kreuger, 2007:

128). In urban planning, sustainability has emerged as an important agenda with increasing interest in redensification, urban compactness, smart growth, green and circular economy, green infrastructure and healthy- and sustainable communities. This has also included a renewed interest in devising socially inclusive decision-making, and governance structures. However, even if some cities advance an agenda upon the principle of the sustainable city, Gibbs and Kreuger (2007) note that they often coexist with neoliberal urban forms that are socially regressive and with which they may be in conflict.

As Gibbs and Kreuger (2007) note, in many respects, the boundaries between the sustainable city and the entrepreneurial city have thus become – or for that matter might always have been - blurred. In other words, new urban strategies and governance relations show clear articulations of interrelating sustainability with urban competition. In that sense, there seems to be a need to consider entrepreneurial strategies not simply from a narrow economic perspective. Rather, there is a need to also consider how the variety of social, environmental and economic interests in the entrepreneurial city are expressed in particular strategies, projects, and policies relating to sustainability, to reveal the changing nature of governance associated with these.

2.4 Social innovation and crisis management

As a reincarnation of the broad but nonetheless prominent concept of "innovation" in European academic and political debates (Osborne & Gaebler, 1994; Hood, 1991; Borins, 2014), literature now stresses green entrepreneurship and social innovation as a way of developing new means of producing, managing and delivering public services in urban settings. In the same vein, social organisations and citizens are expected to explore and put into practice innovative ways of satisfying social needs and meeting environmental challenges (Cruz et al., 2017). In this latter sense, the literature emphasises the significance of social innovation, understood as those socially led initiatives that try to meet social needs that are not adequately addressed by macro-level welfare policies or the private market (Oosterlynck et al., 2015; Cahill 2010).

During the last two decades, the emphasis on innovation as a form of crisis management as well as a source of new economic and social practices has significantly increased (Oosterlynck & González, 2013). In Europe we can see this in policy-developments within the EU and in local governments which are emphasising the need for innovation to come up with new solutions for the sustainable transition of cities, new green-economic practices and social innovation. In relation to this, the social and solidarity economy is also increasingly promoted as a grassroots-based platform for social innovation both by local governments and supranational institutions such as EU and UNDP. With reference to the changing economic and governing structures that have been rolled out during the last three decades, the emphasis on social innovation can be understood in relation to the acute "fiscal squeeze" (Purcell, 2008: 18) experienced locally. With the general retrenchment of the welfare-state experienced since the 1990s, local governments are faced with the choice of raising local taxes for welfare spending and thereby risk a decrease of local competitiveness or adopt entrepreneurial strategies that attract new investment that can increase tax increments (Harvey, 1989). In short, welfare retrenchment and devolution have been an important incentive for local policy to be more competitive and entrepreneurial and so, social and green entrepreneurship is in that sense both a form of crisis management and a strategy to grow creative and competitive innovations.

Although the renewed interest in social and green innovation are interrelated with these larger structures which support competitive forms of urban governance, the strategies promoted through the social and solidarity economy has largely been advanced from the grassroots level. Borowiak (2013) argues that the current momentum of the SSE is sustained by a combination of backlash against the alienating and disruptive effects of neoliberalism, the rise of ethical consumer consciousness among the middle class in rich countries, the appeal of pragmatic alternatives that eschew ideological battles between state and market, and the efforts of young people to creatively adapt their lifestyles to the realities of ecological change and the limits of growth (Borowiak, 2013).

The SSE is frequently presented as a collection of practices and values which offers an alternative development model, capable of integrating marginal populations and bridging divisions within communities. A theme that pervades the SSE literature is that in tough times, relations of economic solidarity are thought to provide ways for people to get by

(Moulaert & Ailenei, 2005). In that sense, solidarity-based economies have also been argued to be an important strategy against unemployment, as people organise themselves collectively in order to create employment (Leubolt, 2007). Apart from the more enthusiastic approaches, some authors however stress the contradictory nature of solidarity- and particularly social economies (Laville, 2008; Leubolt, 2007). Laville (2008) argues that the very sectorial conceptualisation allows for a functional and pacified version of the relation between the state, market and non-profit organisations. In such a setting, Laville (2008) argues that responsibilities can be outsourced from the state to non-profit civil society organisation to answer for market failures and/or the withdrawal of the welfare state. Together with the tendencies to outsource and privatise welfare responsibilities previously held by the state, voluntary or non-profit work such as that performed by some initiatives in the SSE, have therefore sometimes been treated as a cheaper alternative to service provision by the state (Eizaguirre et al., 2017).

2.5 Conclusion

Given the changing governance landscape where entrepreneurial and innovative actors are increasingly gaining influence over spatial development strategies in cities, the SSE can rightfully be seen as an economic sector influencing urban development processes. Particularly in Barcelona, where the sector accounts for 8% of the municipal GDP (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016), SSE is increasingly seen as an important part of neighbourhood and economic development strategies. The theoretical framework of urban political economy has highlighted that power asymmetries are inherent in the recent turn to participation, innovation and entrepreneurship in processes of neoliberal urban restructuring. This has prompted me to consider that also seemingly progressive social movements such as the SSE might simultaneously benefit from, and at the same time be effectively constrained by the imposition of market forces that set the "rule of the game".

3. Social justice and the city

My focus on the role of solidarity economies in local development strategies is placed under the broader framework of urban social justice. The framework of social justice actively tries to address questions of equal economic and political rights for disadvantaged groups. It is most suitable for my research since it seeks to judge the distribution of benefits and burdens, as well as empowerment and disempowerment in social and institutional arrangements (including power in governance and decision-making) (Gregory et al, 2009). In my study, I particularly make use of geographical readings of social justice which highlight the role of space and territory in, and for, equitable redistribution and recognition of disadvantaged groups (Lefebvre, 1969/1996; Harvey, 1973; Fraser, 1990). As a conceptual framework, social justice highlights how some groups benefit from specific socio-environmental or institutional arrangements while other groups are disadvantaged by it. In addition to explaining why these conditions arise and how they are produced, the concept of social justice also encourage us to question how *just* these arrangements are.

The concept of social justice unavoidably poses the question of what "justice" means and for whom. The conceptual framework of social justice has developed from two contrasting understandings of justice. The most extensive literature on justice is to be found in liberal political theory that seeks to determine the essential characteristics of "fair". John Rawls' (1971/1993) *A theory of justice,* which has been particularly prominent within this strand of literature, imagines an original position, prior to the creation of society to describe what justice means. Rawls (1993) argues that, the just social order is that which, if we did not know in advance whether we would be rich or poor in the resultant society, we would agree to. From this, he derives a number of yardsticks to assess social justice, of which the most famous is his "difference principle", which holds that inequality can only be justified if it benefits the least advantaged.

Contrasting the essentialist characterisation of social justice, Marxist analysis rather understands social justice as an ideological construct. In *Social justice and the city* (1973) David Harvey develops a dialectical view of social justice as "contingent upon the social process operating in society as a whole" (Harvey, 1973: 15). According to this understanding, questions of spatial distribution are judged not according to the prevailing

standard of efficiency but, rather, according to measures of distributive justice – who gets what, why and where? Social justice thus applies to the distribution of benefits and burdens, as well as the social and institutional arrangements arising from production and distribution. With its focus on both distributive and procedural justice, this drives a perspective of "a just distribution, justly arrived at" (Harvey, 1973: 98). Challenging, but also building on, the Marxist emphasis on class and economic relationships, a post-structuralist reading of social justice includes the recognition of social differentiation such as gender and race. For example, Iris Marion Young (1990) constructs a pluralist understanding of oppression and advocates for a politics that "instantiate[s] social relations of difference without exclusion" (Young, 1990: 227). In my research, I understand social justice from a dialectical perspective in that it does not hold an essential character but is rather defined through and contingent upon social processes and relations.

Drawing on readings of social justice by Henri Lefebvre, my starting point for understanding social justice is "the claim to inhabit well, to have reasonable access to the things one needs to live a dignified life" (Purcell, 2008: 94) and the central role of users, inhabitants, of urban space to determine its future. This perspective is also driven by the understanding of urban space as shaped by the daily routines of its inhabitants, by their active inhabiting of the city and the right for appropriation of place and space. Governance is from this perspective not only the official processes of decision-making but also encompasses the direct claim, appropriation and partaking of space and spatial change.

More specifically, my effort in investigating the politics of actors in the SSE is guided by Susan Fainstein's theoretical reading of social justice. In her reading, she formulates three dimensions of social justice: equity, democracy and diversity. Explicit in Fainstein's urban theory of justice is the claim that a just city is "a city in which public investment and regulation would produce equitable outcomes rather than support those already well off." (Fainstein, 2010: 3). The emphasis on "equitable outcomes" reflects the basic premise on which the just city approach builds. By recognizing that there is an inherent tension between democracy, diversity and equity, the just city approach emphasises that equitable outcomes must always be a guiding principle. Thus, the three concepts can more correctly be understood to represent three dimensions of equity. In the next sections, I will use the conceptual framework developed by Fainstein (2010) while drawing on

writings by, among others, Mark Purcell, Iris Young, Nancy Fraser, Henri Lefebvre and Chantal Mouffe to operationalise respective concepts in relation to the context of my study.

3.1 Social exclusion and democracy

The first concept revolves around the notion that "in an unequal society democracy and justice are frequently at odds" (Fainstein, 2010: 30). The definition of what kind of democracy is strived for in decision-making processes is important as it ultimately decides how justice is expressed, and how far it can go. Democratic participation is at once related to what Lefebvre has called *inhabiting* – "to take part in a social life, a community, village or city" (Lefebvre, 1969/1996: 76) – and at once with the possibility to partake in larger decisions that reshape the city. For example, activities pursued by actors in the SSE are in that sense a way of inhabiting the city as well as a way of governing processes that reshape the city.

Different understandings of democracy directly relate to the ability to form just outcomes. The dominant form, liberal democracy, is joined by a host of alternative approaches such as participatory, deliberative, direct, pluralist, and radical democracy (Purcell, 2008). I will not go through the meaning of all of these forms but rather discuss the dominant form, prevalent in urban planning, in contrast to alternative conceptions that are argued to better align with claims of social justice. As already mentioned, deliberative (or communicative) democratic practices have been increasingly prevalent in planning and liberal democratic policy development since the early 1990s. Based on the assumption that the process of decision-making has a strong influence over the outcome of the process, deliberative approaches emphasise the process of decision-making, rather than the outcome of decisions, as central for its legitimacy (see e.g. Habermas, 1989). Fainstein (2010) however argues that deliberative processes are always influenced by unequal power relations of participants, whether by income, identity or personal attributes. The deliberate ideal is to seek to neutralise and minimize these power-inequalities through the facilitation of communication. Its ultimate goal is to arrive to a comprehensive "we" and make decisions that serve the "common good" (Mansbridge, 1992).

Mouffe (1993, 2002, 2005) also argues that the expectation that all groups will have equal possibility to influence ignores relational aspects of spatial and social differentiation. Rather than contributing to equal possibilities to influence, deliberative decision-making tends to privilege those already in privileged positions. She proposes that rather than seeking the intersubjective understanding and agreement that the deliberative approach strives for, we should *not* attempt to overcome political disagreement and conflict. In her vision, the power-relations and exclusion that capitalism produces, should not be excluded from politics. It should, rather, "enter the terrain of contestation" and be at the centre of democratic politics and struggle (Mouffe, 2000: 33-34). As an extension of these arguments Purcell (2008), proposes a democratic attitude that rejects the argument that the aim of democratic decision-making is to achieve consensus and/or the common good. He argues that the demand that all groups should put the common good ahead of their own interests and ignore pre-existing inequalities, unavoidably skews the outcome of decisions in favour of more powerful groups. In extension, this also imposes an unequal burden on less advantaged groups. He argues that it, for example, is a much greater demand to ask a poor neighbourhood to eschew its particular interest than it is to ask the same of a rich neighbourhood. A democratic process which aims for just outcomes would according to these arguments necessarily demand agonistic struggles and conflicts where the common good is rejected in favour of decisions that seek to empower less advantaged groups.

3.2 Diversity and redistribution

The concept of diversity stresses how group-based differentiation built on multiple foundations such as ethnicity, gender, religion and culture, directly influences all social processes. Recognition of social differentiation is important for the analysis of social justice in urban development, as it highlights that economic inequality is not the only base for unequal development of space, and should neither be the only measure of justice. Without neglecting economic inequality, writers such as Iris Marion Young (e.g. 1990), Nancy Fraser (e.g. 1995) and Seyla Benhabib (1992) have argued that the concept of social justice has to recognise how inequality is expressed also through group-based differentiation. By combining the goals of material equity and recognition of social

difference, the vocabulary of inclusion and exclusion is particularly useful to advance a broader understanding of equity. In *Justice and the politics of difference*, Young (1990) argues that social justice requires not the melting away of difference, but rather institutions that promote the reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression. This stance supports the widely agreed notion that recognition of culture is unequally distributed in society and that the level of recognition in many ways mirrors the unequal distribution of other resources (Purcell, 2008).

A common liberal argument for achieving greater equality is to widen democratic inclusion. The theoretical and political move towards deliberative forms of democracy reflects the perception that broader inclusion will provide more equal participation and outcomes for groups previously not recognised in decision-making processes. Unfortunately, as Fainstein (2010: 49) argues, "the view that widening democratic inclusion will break the vicious circle supporting inequality seems overly sanguine, as there is no necessary link between greater inclusiveness and commitment to a more just society". Further, Purcell (2008) argues that as long as people are not equally valued, their argument will not carry equal weight in deliberation. Dominant classes, gender, ethnicities and sexualities begin with greater authority "before they even open their mouths" (Purcell, 2008: 72). From this stance, recognition as a result of broadened participation will only be able to achieve greater equity as long as it carry with it substantive material redistribution in favour of the less advantaged.

3.3 Equity in urban space

With the aim of developing new economic relations, equity is argued to be one of the defining characteristics of the SSE. For most actors in the social and solidarity economy, this implies a more just distribution of resources, burdens and benefits. Equity, as Fainstein employ the term, aligns closely to this logic as she refers to "a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy that does not favour those who are already better off at the beginning" (Fainstein, 2010: 36).

For the most part, urban policies under a pro-growth regime favour the well-off over the disadvantaged. In neoliberal development regimes, urban space is imagined to be owned

property and its role is to contribute to economic productivity (Purcell, 2008; Harvey, 2005). A pro-equity regime, Fainstein argues, would require that the distributional outcomes of programs instead be measured in terms of (a) who benefits from them, and (b) to what extent? A pro-equity regime would favour the less well-off more than the advantaged, which means it would be redistributive, not simply economically but also, politically, socially and spatially. In a more radical approach of equity, Purcell (2008) argues that urban space would also demand the direct diminishing of the power of capital, and neoliberal governance, in favour of a socially centred notion of the urban.

This argument again goes back to Lefebvre's (1996) conceptualisation of the city as first and foremost "inhabited". Equity would in Lefebvre's understanding of the right to the city mean equal opportunities to participate in and shape daily life of the city. Under social relations of capitalism space is conceived in a rational and technical way, as a commodity which can be bought and sold or activated through effectivization or appropriation, to increase its value on the market. Resistance to capitalist urbanism is therefore necessary, according to Lefebvre, not only because it imposes social relations which treat space as a commodity rather than as where life takes place, but also because the very spatial form that the ideology takes reduces our ability to think, act and form more equal and fully human alternatives.

3.4 Conclusion

In my analysis of the politics and practice of the SSE, I engage with the different dimensions of equity, sometimes explicitly and at other times more implicitly. In my spatial analysis, the dimension of equity in terms of economic and group-based recognition is most present. In the discourse analysis, I go deeper into how all of these dimensions are expressed in the formulation of the policies and in practices of the SSE. To guide my analysis of the findings, I have considered the three dimensions of equity in relation to the two questions formulated by Fainstein as a) who benefits from them and b) to what extent? and in relation to conception of what space *is for*. Exploring the formulation of what space is and what it is imagined to be for, can help uncover how different interests are privileged over others.

4. Methodology

My study is concerned with understanding some of the motivations and mechanisms behind the local politics on the social and solidarity economy (SSE) and the kind of social and institutional arrangements it gives rise to when used as a tool in local development. As interest for the social and solidarity economy appears to have increased in relation to the financial crisis, both among citizens and governments, there seems to be a need to consider why this has happened, as much as what this might lead to. To enable my analysis to go under the surface on the politics and practices of the SSE, I therefore consider critical realism as a suitable methodological framework. With the assumption that action and structure are mutually constituted (Fairclough et al., 2002) the framework of critical realism allows me to explore how the SSE could contribute to a socially just development both in terms of how, for example social, economic or political mechanisms and structures constrains it, as well as how it might enable, the advancement of such politics.

In my study, I use discourses expressed in policy documents and by actors, as a key to understanding the mechanisms which impact the adoption of specific strategies. Discourse is in general defined as an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to a certain phenomenon (Gasper & Apthorpe, 1996). Discourses are ways to mirror and make sense of phenomena in the world, but they also derive from current non-discursive material aspects of the world. In my study, I primarily engage with the non-discursive dimension through extensive research where I explore the patterns of spatial distribution and socio-spatial relations of the SSE sector. This enables me to gain insight to some of the social and territorial realities which motivates and forms the politics of the SSE. From the perspective of social justice, I am particularly interested in the way the sector responds to socio-spatial inequities. I do this by quantitatively performing a cross-analysis between the distribution of the SSE with two measures which help me locate disadvantaged groups in the city; income distribution and gentrifying areas.

As Fairclough et al. (2002) argue, discourse analysis is particularly useful to provide a more complete understanding of how action and structures are mutually constituted in the "real world". Investigating discourses can therefore provide research with a better understanding of the social context and "precondition" of the phenomenon. However,

Fairclough et al. (2002) also argue that insofar as discourses are studied in isolated from their context, they are bound to lead to incomplete accounts of causational relationships and risk leading to reductionism (Fairclough et al., 2002: 2). According to this reasoning, my study therefore builds on what I call the non-discursive, that is, the extra-discursive domain, and the discursive domain. In the following section I will give a brief sketch of central features within critical realism which serves as a basis to formulate my method of discourse analysis.

4.1 Critical realism

Critical realism combines a realist ontology with an interpretative epistemology (Bhaskar, 2010) which means that although it claims that a real world exists (including a real social world), our knowledge of it is socially constructed and fallible. For critical realists, ontology must be distinguished from epistemology which means we must avoid the "epistemological fallacy" of confusing the nature of reality with our knowledge of reality. Critical realism is a philosophy attributed to the British philosopher Roy Bhaskar, who conceives reality as being stratified in three domains: the real, the actual and the empirical. The real domain is made up of structures of objects, both physical and social, with capacities for behaviour. These behaviours (which holds casual powers), called mechanisms, may or may not trigger events in the domain of the actual. The actual does not however in any straightforward way reflect the real. According to Fairclough et. al (2002) it is contingent on the complex interaction of different structures and casual powers and the extent to which and ways in which the particular casual powers are activated. In the third layer, the empirical domain, which is also the domain where concrete research takes place, these events may or may not be observed.

Critical realism holds the assumption that action and structure are mutually constituted, however, it also upholds that social structures exists independently of current human activity. This means that although structures exist only through human activity, it is not reducible to such activity. This resonates intuitively with urban political economy, which addresses not only socio-economic urban structures, but also the direct influence of ideas, ideologies and action derived from human agency. Structures enable and constrain action.

At the same time, human action reproduces or transforms structure, although this is not always the intention of the activity.

According to Bhaskar, the objects and structures of the real give rise to causal powers and mechanisms, which cause the events that we may observe (Bhaskar 1998). However, mechanisms are usually not observable. For example, while we may observe displacement as a result of higher rents, the underlying urban and market mechanism is unobservable. Following from these assumptions, critical realism does not intend to uncover general laws, but to understand and theoretically hypothesise or explain the underlying mechanism of events and phenomenon. Critical realism is thus useful as a methodological approach to distinguish and identify "what things must go together, and what could happen, given the nature of the objects" (Sayer, 2000: 11).

4.2 A critical realist approach to discourse analysis

As indicated, critical realism claims that mediating entities are necessary to understand the relationship between structures and events. These mediating entities are "social practices" which is the articulation of more or less stable elements of the social which also includes discourses. Social practices are networked together in distinct ways. Therefore, in the context of this study, I understand the organisational form of the social and solidarity economy as a network of social practices. Discourse analysis is in general taken to be the analysis of texts in its broad sense. Texts include written texts, spoken interaction, multimedia texts but also semiotic elements of those such as images and body language. Discourse analysis, and specifically Foucauldian discourse analysis which has become the predominant form, is focused on identifying recurrent and relatively stable forms of discourses in texts to explain social phenomenon. In contrast, a critical realistic discourse analysis is not merely concerned with language and orders of discourse, "it is equally concerned with texts as (elements of) processes, and with the relation and tension between the two" (Fairclough, 2005: 923).

I take texts to be the linguistic/semiotic element of social events and, more specifically, expressions of action such as the formulation and implementation of strategies in specific places by particular social groups. Rather than limiting the definition of discourse to language, I apply a broader definition which Blommaert (2005: 3) has defined as "all meaningful semiotic human activity seen in connection with social, cultural and historical patterns and developments of use". This takes in all kinds of meaningful semiotic "flagging" performed by means of objects, attributes, or activities and focuses the analysis on the actions related to who and how different actors assert particular discourses. As I have indicated, adopting critical realism to discourse analysis implies that I adopt a "stratified" view of ontology along with the claim that the relationship between structures and events is mediated by social practices. As Fairclough (1995) explains, this means that linguistic and semiotic systems can generate texts which differ without limit, but the actual range of variation is socially delimited and structured trough the ways in which discourse interact with other social structures and systems. In the case of the politics of social and solidarity economy, this means that the discourse is effectively constrained by, among other things, the historical, political and institutional context in which it acts. Applying a critical realistic discourse analysis of concrete events and texts then centres on the relationship between them as situated events and texts in pre-structured networks of social practices and orders of discourse (Fairclough, 1995). People and their capability for agency are seen as socially produced and subject to change while also possessing real casual powers which, in their tension with casual power of social structures and practises, is the focus of analysis.

4.3 Data collection and analysis

In the extensive study I explore patterns of how actors in the SSE are geographically located in the city to understand how they respond to needs of different groups. In the intensive study I analyse the policy documents in search for overarching discourses guiding the local development and how they relate to social justice. To better understand the interests underlying and governing the implementation of the policy of the Impetus Plan, I further use interviews with seven key actors active in the development of the SSE in Barcelona. Thus, I carry out both intensive and extensive research to understand the

political development of the SSE in Barcelona. In critical realism, the combination of intensive and extensive research is particularly helpful as intensive research generally serve to detect mechanisms and extensive research in general serves to situate them within contexts (Sayer, 2000). In this, I use a mixed method approach which combines quantitative and qualitative data collection.

In order to answer which communities are being served and which groups that primarily are involved in the practices of SSE, I first map the spatial distribution of actors in relation to income level in the city. I then map the spatial distribution of SSE in relation to gentrification. This is conducted by first examining where gentrification is taking place on a citywide level. The data that is used to measure gentrification have been distributed by and validated by researchers at the Barcelona Lab for Urban Environmental Justice and Sustainability, an institute based in and well familiar with the present and historical development of Barcelona. Secondly, I gather georeferenced data on actors in the SSE and analyse hotspots of SSE initiatives to discover statistically significant clusters of initiatives in the city. By mapping the spatial pattern of actors in the SSE in relation to gentrification the aim is to detect how the initiatives responds to residential shifts and displacement on a city-wide scale. Another aim is to detect possible correlations between SSE initiatives in places where I can expect to find neighbourhood struggles and where alliances between different groups might be more prevalent. To incorporate measures of socio-economic changes that have contributed to residential shifts in the city, the data collection is focused on the period of 1991-2016. To account for older and recent stages of gentrification the data is analysed in two stages: 1991-2001 and 2001-2016. The first time period covers the period of Barcelona's most intense redevelopment that ran from the granting of Barcelona as the host for the Olympic Games 1992. This period includes the redevelopment of large areas of formerly industrial, working-class neighbourhoods of the city. The later time period involves the last redevelopment of the maritime and industrial parts of the city and also includes the period of the financial crisis. See appendix for closer details on the analysis I have performed for the quantitative study.

In the intensive study, I engage with the discursive dimension by analysing the main document guiding the politics of strategic local development, the *Impetus Plan for Social and Solidarity Economy in Barcelona* (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016). This document draws up a vision for a city-wide strategy to develop the SSE sector and includes a

diagnosis of the current state and a number of desirable actions for the future. It is therefore particularly useful to explore discourses used to empower actors of the SSE in strategies for redistribution and in governance of local development. To better apprehend the specific ways this plan is implemented, I analyse the *Economic Development Plan* (Municipality of Barcelona & Barcelona Activa, 2017) of the Sants-Montjuic district and the *Neighbourhood Plan of La Marina* (Municipality of Barcelona, 2017) which is a neighbourhood located in the district of Sants-Montjuic. Based on participative principles of "co-production" and decentralisation, these plans demonstrate an example of the development plans implemented by the current municipal government. Sixteen neighbourhood plans and four district plans have been rolled out based on the principles and vision formulated in the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016), with a specific focus on development in the most disadvantaged districts and neighbourhoods

I have undertaken eight interviews with key actors in the SSE in Barcelona to gain deeper understanding of the findings in the spatial analysis and the discourse analysis. An outline of the questions that have been asked can be found in Appendix B. Four of the interviews are with key actors in the municipal entities working with the Impetus Plan, the Economic Development Plans and the Neighbourhood Plans. These includes: Xavier Rubio Cano, technical coordinator in the municipal Commission for Social Economy, Social Development and Consumption which been the coordinating entity for the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016). Elisenda Vegue Gisbert, head of Barcelona Department of Socioeconomic Innovation (initially Other Economies Department) within Barcelona Activa – the city entity for employment and economic development. David González Satué and Meritxell Ribalta, technical coordinators in the department for local development (Desarrollo Proximidad) and responsible for the implementation of the Economic Development Plan in Sants-Montjuic. Both the Department for Socioeconomic Innovation and the department for local development was created within Barcelona Activa as a response to the reorientation in strategic local development initiated by the local government led by Barcelona in Common. I also have also undertaken four interviews with key actors from civil society networks working with local development of the SSE in Barcelona and, specifically in Sants-Montjuic. These includes Guernica Facundo Vericat, founder of LabCoop, which in partnership with the municipality work as a consultancy agency for cooperatives and social enterprises. Xavier Latorre Tapis member of the steering group in CooperaSec, the network for solidarity economies in one

of the neighbourhoods of Sants-Montjuic. Mercè Esteban member of the technical team for territorial development in Coòpolis, an independent cooperative working with city-wide development of community economies and cooperatives in partnership with Barcelona Activa and the Commission for Social and Solidarity Economies. And finally, Joan Costa, active in the commission and secretariat of Can Battló, a social centre located in Sants-Montjuic and one of the largest community-run spaces for neighbourhood development in Barcelona.

Additionally, my understanding of the politics of SSE in Barcelona is also based on general overviews of related document such as City Council meeting recordings, Economic Development Plans and Neighbourhood Plans of other neighbourhoods and districts and web-based published material from the Municipality of Barcelona. As I have lived in Barcelona while researching for this thesis, I have also had the possibility to participate in presentations and open meetings with actors from the SSE and the municipality, as well as form my understanding from informal conversations with actors in the social and solidarity economy.

There are a number of reasons for the choice of Barcelona as a study context and many of these have already been detailed in earlier sections. Three particular aspects which makes Barcelona an interesting choice for this study are, firstly, that Barcelona have large social inequities which was further exuberated by the financial crisis. Secondly, Barcelona have a long history of cooperative movement which during the last years have been translated into policies to introduce new urban development strategies. Thirdly, the local governments of Barcelona have since the 1990s actively experimented with different city models where neoliberal and sustainability discourse have been closely interrelated. I have also chosen to focus more specifically on the development in Sants-Montjuic. This is a methodological choice which helps the understanding of how the discourse of SSE is translated into development strategies on the local level. Sants-Montjuic was chosen as an extreme case in the context of the SSE of Barcelona (Sayer, 2000). It is the district where the politics of developing the SSE can be expected to have reached furthest, as Sants-Montjuic historically and today has been a centre of cooperative and social movements in Barcelona. Although local development strategies vary between the context of each neighbourhood, I can expect to find some of the clearest articulations of the prevalent discourse and the most developed form of SSE based local

development strategies here. Contrastingly, if I do not find clear articulations of it here, I will be unable to find it elsewhere.

4.4 Limitations of the study

I have used the maps to illustrate a set of spatial relationships between socio-economic income and patterns of gentrification in Barcelona to assess which communities that participates in and have access to the services provided by the SSE. It is nevertheless important to acknowledge some of the methodological challenges that this type of analysis faces and what this kind of analysis does not tell us. First, mapping SSE initiatives in a physical location might be misleading by implying that official location is strongly correlated with the entities impact on a community. Many of the initiatives are locally orientated by serving its immediate neighbourhood while others operate at city-wide, regional or national level (e.g. XES, 2019). These differences impact the spatial representation of them and might eschew the results. The maps I have generated fail to capture this information and raises questions about the limitations of spatial representations of quantitative data and the need for complementary qualitative studies of these practices. Secondly, as the data I use is gathered by entities that follow a particular definition of requirements that need to be fulfilled for an initiative to be considered part of the SSE, this might shrews the result to only detect specific kind of SSE practices. The maps make it possible to assess, on a general level, which communities are being served and which groups that primarily are involved in these practices. However, they cannot answer the extent to which these practises manage to extend to also serve marginalised communities through networks or activities in other than their official location. To provide some more answer to this, control the conclusions I draw from the maps and support a deeper understanding of the observed pattern, I use the political documents and interviews with actors in the SSE of Barcelona.

The qualitative data also display some limitations to the study. First, the choice of focusing more specifically on practices of the SSE in the district of Sants-Montjuic is a methodological choice which enables me to locate the more pronounced impact of the SSE sector and the related politics in the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016). As a district with a strong history of cooperativism and social mobilisation this might

however eschew my analysis to only pick up those more progressive strands of the SSE that are not necessarily as pronounced in other parts of the city. Secondly, a higher number of interviews, particularly with cooperative and social enterprises in the sector, would have enabled for a more differentiated understanding of the practices of the SSE. However, as the SSE covers a large spectrum of actors engaged in different sectors of the economy, my intention was not to form a representative sample covering all parts of the sector. Rather the intention was to guide my analysis of the political documents. The interviews were particularly important as all documents that I have revised, except from the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016), were only available in Spanish or in Catalan. Although I hold a good understanding of Spanish and I am able to understand great part of the Catalan texts, I have needed to take help from google translate in some cases. Interviews have therefore been a great source to also capture nuances in the language of the documents which I otherwise might have missed.

5. Landscape of social and solidarity economy in Barcelona: Politics and Practice

In this section, I present my quantitative and qualitative analysis of the politics of social and solidarity economy in Barcelona. First, I provide the background to the political context in which the politics of the SSE have emerged in Barcelona. Secondly, I present part of my spatial results to explain what appears to be the geographical determinant of the practices of SSE sector. Third, I explain the motivations and practices that appear to form the basis of the activist practices in SSE and how these respond to social needs. Fourth, I turn to some of the potential barriers to enable the SSE to be a viable respond to vulnerable groups. Fifth, I begin to present my results of the discourse analysis by laying out two main discourses present in the sector and how these relate to politics and practice of the sector. Finally, I lay out my results on how the politics is implemented in the district of Sants-Montjuic.

5.1 Introducing citizen claim into the political agenda

Spain has had a long cooperative history even before the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s. The initially agrarian formation of agricultural cooperatives, which developed in the beginning of the twentieth century, later spread to the cities of Catalonia, and especially in Barcelona, anarchist groups would form cooperatives in so-called *ateneus* or community centres (Ealham, 2005). In Barcelona, cooperatives grew predominately in the working-class neighbourhoods of Sants, Poble Sec and Barceloneta (Fernàndez & Miró, 2016). While a more radical working-class politics developed in these neighbourhoods, anarchist unions and organisations grew in strength all over Barcelona up until the civil war when they became a main target for the Franco-led nationalists. With the end of the dictatorship in 1975 the cooperative model could, to a larger extent, be recuperated and again grow in strength (Ealham, 2005). With this history in mind, it is no surprise that Barcelona has become a centre for cooperativism and social economies. Although the SSE is a collection of a plurality of juridical and economic forms, the cooperative tradition has been an important building block to strengthen and form a common identity of the SSE in Barcelona. The impact of this history is particularly

present in some neighbourhoods, such as Sants, which have a long history of cooperativism and working-class struggles (Fernàndez & Miró, 2016). In the district of Sants-Montjuic we can find 500 initiatives which make up 11 % of the SSE sector in Barcelona (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 9).

With respect to the wider historical dynamics of cooperativism in Catalonia, actors in the SSE fabric in Barcelona largely attribute the diversification and growth of initiatives in the SSE sector to the social impact of the financial crisis 2007 and to new forms of socio-political interventions in response to the social needs in the city (e.g. Rubio Cano, X. 2019, personal interview, 8 January; Facundo Vericat, G. 2019 personal interview, 15 April; Porro, 2018). Among other things, the political interventions have included changes in public procurements contracts to purchases of only socially responsible and collaborative goods and services, subsidies for construction of non-profit cooperative housing, development of socio-economic actions plans for the most vulnerable groups and areas of the city to support the development of a plural economy, including pilot projects for basic income and a large number of interventions to support the growth and visibility of collaborative entrepreneurship and social innovation (Rubio Cano X. 2019, personal interview 8 January & 28 Mars; Vegue Gisbert, E. 2019, personal interview 24 April). These political interventions, directed towards a fairer local economic development and strengthening of collaborative economies, appear in much to be a response to the demands mounted by social movements after the financial crisis.

The great impact of the financial crisis in 2007 in terms of housing, rising debts and increase of poverty in the city sparked the growth of the M15 movement and the Platform for People Affected by Mortgages (PAH). Mobilised through public and neighbourhood assemblies, these movements formed support networks and political demands in response to the widespread precarious living conditions experienced after the crisis (Eizaguirre et al. 2017). The movements' demands for "the right to the city" was as much a claim for redistribution of resources as a claim of social and political participation in the governance of the city. Their demands, which directly attack the capitalist model of Barcelona, brought a broad support for change of direction in public policy to prioritize the "common good" over private interests. However, it was first through the consolidation of these demands in the political citizen platform Barcelona in Common – co-produced through principles of participatory democracy – that they won political influence to direct

the change in public policy (Eizaguirre et al., 2017). However, it is important to note that the strong political fragmentation in the city, with Barcelona in Common having only 11 out of 41 seats, and the friction with private actors resulting from the aim to promote a new "economic model" which gives a prominent role of the social economy, has forced the local government to negotiate and limit some of their original proposals (Eizaguirre et al. 2017).

Through its success in the local election 2015, Barcelona in Common, shows the transformation of a locally-based movement in defence of social rights and of participatory democracy into a governing coalition. While the structure of a citizen platform allows grass-root organisations to dialogue with the city council, Mr X. Rubio Cano from the Commission of Social and Solidarity Economy explains that the implementation of, for example, the Municipal Action Plan and District Action Plans has allowed for participation in the establishment of priorities at city and district level. The election of Barcelona in Common coincided with the 2015 regional election, well known for its predominant focus on the question of Catalonia's independence, but which also brought support for several left-wing parties with coinciding agendas of pushing forwards pro-cooperative policies. This has made it possible to form alliances between the local and regional government to provide support for collaborative economies not just in Barcelona but in all of Catalonia (Rubio Cano, X. 2019, personal interview 28 Mars). With this shift, a range of governmental support programmes and policies have been implemented to develop the SSE sector. This has significantly strengthened the presence of the SSE sector in the city and also made it possible for actors in the SSE sector to partake as stakeholders in (some) decision-making for local development (Rubio Cano, X. 2019 personal interview 8 January & 28 Mars; González Satué, D. 2019, personal interview 24 April; Ribalta, M. 2019, personal interview 24 April).

One of the first measures taken in 2015 by the Barcelona in Common-led city council was the implementation of a Commission for Social Economy, Social Development and Consumption. (Porro, 2018: 195). Also, in January 2016, the Barcelona Department of Socioeconomic Innovation was created within Barcelona Activa - the municipality's entity for employment and economic development, to promote the development of collective entrepreneurship and social economies.

These political interventions, which interfere in the economic and social planning of the city, are underpinned by the explicit aim to formulate a new socio-economic model for the city (Barcelona City Council, 2016). With the intention to respond to social needs in the city, it is highlighted that the socio-economic model "must be promoted by the following values: cooperation, quality of life, sustainability and equity. Cooperation must become the guiding principle of our society, assuming that no form of life is possible without any bonds with others and understanding it also as an everyday practice" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 70). The SSE sector is seen as key to grow "social innovation" and "collective entrepreneurship". This aligns the politics, at least discursively, with the broader turn to social innovation and social entrepreneurship. To guide this development which includes the development of new regulatory frameworks, sectoral policies and local initiatives to strengthen the SSE sector, the municipality initiated the creation of the Impetus Plan for the Social and Solidarity Economy in Barcelona (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016).

The aim of the document is to "offer a transformative socio-economic vision of the urban reality" and includes an action programme which "aims to contribute towards reducing social and territorial inequalities, while promoting an economy at the service of people and social justice" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 4). The document comprises a diagnosis, the development process and a set of actions desired to be carried out in the city over the years 2016-2019. More than setting out the guidelines for changes in legislative frameworks and sectoral policies, this document has also been translated into specific district and neighbourhood plans, among others in the district of Sants-Montjuic (Porro, 2018). These plans and its public directorates, which previously did not exist, aim to guide socio-economic interventions in some of the poorest districts and neighbourhoods.

5.2 Determinants of geographical distribution

A diagnosis, performed by the Commission of Social and Solidarity Economy (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016), estimates that, in 2016, there existed nearly five thousand SSE initiatives in Barcelona. Among these, 2400 are third social sector organisations, 1197 worker-owned enterprises, 861 cooperatives and 260 community-

economy initiatives (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 6). The initiatives exist in all sectors of the economy, ranging from energy to culture, finance, education, housing and food sector. In a personal interview, Mr X. Rubio Cano (2019, 28 Mars) from the Commissioner's Office for Cooperative, Social and Solidarity Economy, says that although these alternative economies "are today in an inferior position, […] and it will take many years before they form a hegemony in the economic model" they are already "showing new paths".

The language he uses to describe the sector is indicative of the emerging political discourse of the SSE in Barcelona. It reflects the largely positive view of the SSE as a people's movement which is challenging the hegemony of the economic system by experimenting with new ways to reinsert the social and common good into the economic equation. The discourse which accompanies the development of the sector has been given great importance due to its potential to "contribute towards reducing social and territorial inequalities" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 4). This framing has, however, left it somehow uncritical to the contexts in which it has evolved and so leaves little answer to what the common good actually means and for whom. An important claim of critical discourse analysis is that discourse is not produced without context and cannot be understood without taking the current and historical context into consideration (Fairclough, 2002; Wodak & Ludwig, 1999). In other words, as any other discourse, the discourse of the SSE in Barcelona is connected to the past and the current social context and must so be understood also through its spatial context.

Figure 1: Geographical reach of the SSE sector in real number and percentage per district. Source: Municipality of Barcelona (2016).

According to the previously mentioned diagnosis, the SSE is unevenly distributed over the city, with a predominance in the central districts of Eixample and, to a lesser but still high extent, Sant Martí and Gràcia. Apart from the high-income districts of Sarrià-Sant Gervasi and Les Corts, these districts host the larger part of the city's middle- and high-income population. This is also mirrored in the results of my extensive study of the distribution of SSE initiatives in Barcelona. Similar to what Cruz et al. (2017) suggests, my study also show that the concentration of SSE (or, in their words, "grassroot strand of social innovation") is primarily concentrated in higher- and middle-income areas in the more central parts of the city. Contrastingly, a smaller portion of SSE initiatives are present in the norther part of the city, which predominately host a below city-median income population (Figure 2).

*Figure 2*: Number of SSE initiatives in relation to income (and gentrification). Income variable is only available on neighbourhood-level for 2016.

Figure 3: District and neighbourhoods of Barcelona.

The predominance of SSE initiatives among middle-income groups could be explained by what Cruz et al (2017: 24) observe: "social finances, community consumer groups, energy cooperatives, etc. seem to be more adapted to middle-income progressive social groups with a relatively high level of political sophistication and with sufficient resources to afford the extra costs of such practices". When considering the costs, both in time and monetary terms it may not come as a surprise that practices such as social finance, community consumer groups or energy cooperatives, which are common within the SSE sector, do not emerge in the most deprived communities. They might rather emerge in communities with more resources for collective action such as knowledge, income and time. Looking at the current distribution of SSE suggests that this is part of the explanation.

While economic and social capital thereby seems to be beneficiary to participate in and access the services of the SSE, the lack of SSE initiatives in high-income neighbourhoods together with a relatively high presence in neighbourhoods such as Gracía, San Martí,

Ciutat Vella and Sants however adds another explanation to the geographically uneven distribution of SSE initiatives. Mr X. Rubio Cano provide an explanation to this pattern:

> This area [Sarrià-Sant Gervasi] have little initiatives because, although there is a [economic] capacity, there is no collective social network yet […]. It [the SSE] grows more where there is a social capital, not only economic capital but also a capital of community relationships, this is very important. (Rubio Cano, X. 2019, personal interview 28 Mars)

In the same sentence he also emphasises that there are places in the city where the practices of the SSE sector are more present and where they do "have a stronger impact" on the economic model for development. Similarly, to the findings of previous studies on the geographical distribution of the SSE sector in Catalonia (Cruz et al., 2017), Mr X. Rubio Cano (2019, personal interview 28 Mars) refers to the historical presence of cooperativism and social mobilisation as a central explanation to why practices of SSE are more present in some neighbourhoods than others. As Figure 2 shows, there is a high presence of SSE initiatives in neighbourhoods such as Sants, Bordeta, Poble Sec, Gràcia, Porta and Poblenou which are commonly mentioned as neighbourhood with long history of social mobilisation or cooperativism (e.g. Fernàndez & Miró, 2016; Suriñach Padilla, 2017). With exception from Poble Sec and Bordeta, these traditionally working-class neighbourhoods today host a predominant middle-class population. This suggests that the SSE do predominate among groups with a relatively good access to economic capital but that the initiatives they form go beyond traditional lines of class. Simply looking at the income level might therefore be insufficient to explain how the sector respond to needs of more disadvantaged groups. Understanding the social and spatial base of the SSE sector is important, not only to judge the impact of the sector, but also to understand where the knowledge it builds on comes from. However, if we are to understand the mechanisms that drive the mobilisation of actors in the SSE, and the way in which the practices developed within the sector empower or disempower actors from different social groups, we need to take one step further and look at the interests underlying the current development of the SSE sector.

5.3 Citizen practice and motivation

The neighbourhood of Bordeta and Poble Sec, two neighbourhoods located in the district of Sants-Montjuic, provide interesting examples to explore the interests which drives the formation of SSE. Can Battló, which is a former industrial complex located in the neighbourhood of Bordeta, is one example where particularly the political formation of the M15 movement seems to have played an important role to form alliances between residents on the basis of what is conceived as "common needs" (Costa, J. 2019, personal interview, 17 April). This concerns problems such as unemployment, lack of community space or housing, which indeed do not only concern the middle class. Mr J. Costa, a long-term activist in Can Battló explains in a personal interview (2019, 17 April) that the industrial complex which is self-managed through cooperative practices now function as a platform to provide space for collaboration between people in the neighbourhood to find collective solutions to such needs. He explains that the alliances that have been formed around the project are directly linked to the post-crisis 15M and Indignados movement:

> Three weeks before entering in Can Battló, the 15 of May took place which was followed by the occupation of Puerta del Sol in Madrid, Plaça Catalunya in Barcelona and neighbourhood block occupations in many places of the country. This was the birth of the Indignados movement. […] the people who formed part of this movement were people who were very discontent with the politicians, that's why they were called the Indignados […]. All of these things formed a strong alliance for the fight [in Can Battló] to succeed, […] and a bit at a time we are now constructing this space. (Costa, J. 2019, personal interview 17 April)

These movements, which together with other global mobilisations marked 2011 as the start of one of the greatest cycles of mobilisation after the Cold War, brought together people from a broad spectrum of social and class backgrounds (Antentas, 2015). The mobilisation in Barcelona was particularly marked by the large participation of highly educated but poor young people (Eizaguirre et al., 2017). This group placed the issue of job and life precariousness, not just as a result of the financial crisis, but as a logical consequence of the neoliberal economic model which Barcelona (as most other cities) has followed, at the heart of the movement (Eizaguirre et al., 2017). In general terms this

group embodied what has come to be termed the "precariat" (Standing, 2013) which signifies the rising insecurity associated with precarious work and employment of the middle-classes and the upper part of the working-class during the last decades.

With the establishment of Can Battló, working groups such as Coopolis were also formed as a response to the needs that were detected in the neighbourhood. Ms M. Esteban, who was part of establishing Coopolis, explains that as diverse people from the neighbourhood came together in the formation of the platform of Can Battló, the idea of a "public working group among neighbours" (Esteban, M. 2019, personal interview 16 April) was born as a response to the insufficient support provided by the government after the financial crisis. With an initial focus to provide support for self-managing practices such as cooperative and associative formations in the neighbourhood of Bordeta and the district of Sants-Montjuic, a collaborative agreement with the municipal government has now allowed Coopolis to expand their support also to other neighbourhoods. Through educational and technical support, Coopolis is now working together with neighbourhood associations and local SSE networks in all districts of the city to support the formation of groups which can respond to the more pressing needs of the neighbourhoods.

The alliances that were formed after the crisis between people who in general can be seen as the "losers" of this economic model are not specific to Can Battló and the neighbourhood of Bordeta. Mr X. Latorre Tapis (2019, personal interview 11 April) activist and member of the steering committee in CooperaSec, also emphasises the strong impact of the post-crisis social movements on the current formation of the SSE sector in Poble Sec. Although the financial crisis is not the only factor which has formed a broad participation in these kinds of initiatives, he highlights how the post-crisis-movements have helped to form solidarity networks between neighbours

> CooperaSec emerged out of the 15M and Indignados movement when the people's assembly in Plaça Catalunya decided to decentralise and establish neighbourhood assemblies. In the assembly of Poble Sec it was decided to create some specific commissions to be involved in the solidarity economy, with the idea of generating alternatives based on self-management and mutual help, to collectively face everything that the deep crisis had brought. (Latorre Tapis, X. 2019, personal interview 11 April)

Figure 4: Relation between high (hotspot) and low (coldspot) spatial clustering of SSE initiatives and gentrification - expressed in *recent gentrification* (2001-2016), *old gentrification* (1991-2001) and *continued gentrification* (1991-2016).

The mobilisation of the 15M and Indignados movement, thus seems to have played a fundamental role to leverage the organising capacity of the SSE to find solutions to common but not identical needs of people in neighbourhoods. This shows that although the initiatives appear to concentrate in middle-income neighbourhoods, income is not the only determinant for which groups participate in, or benefit from, these initiatives.

If exploring the location of SSE initiatives in more detail, we can see that they also hold a strong correlation to areas that recently have, or still are, undergoing gentrification. These places reflect areas where lower income groups in general are facing increasing difficulty to remain in the area because of rising rents, increased cost of living or cultural shifts. As can be seen in Figure 4, the majority of SSE "hotspots" fall directly within, or in between gentrifying areas, and non-gentrifying areas which suggests that these areas hold a significant importance to form strategies of the SSE.

Exploring the socio-economic and demographic shifts in the statistical data I have gathered for the neighbourhood of Raval, show a parallel process of disinvestment in some areas and gentrification in other areas. In the non-gentrifying parts of the neighbourhood this has includes a significant increase in vulnerable immigrant population between the years of 2001 and 2016, accompanied by falling property values and related variables that signify that these parts of the neighbourhood have underwent disinvestment and still host a largely lower-income population. In other parts of the neighbourhood, parallel but opposite socio-demographic shifts have led to gentrification and displacement of previous low-income population. As can be seen in Figure 4, it is in the border between these areas, characterised by on the one side disinvestment and, and on the other side gentrification, that the majority of the SSE initiatives are concentrated. Keeping in mind the high number of evictions that has been carried out after the financial crisis[1], it is not a far guess to assume that part of these changing socio-economic dynamics which can be observed in Raval (and other neighbourhoods) are due to the crisis. During the financial crisis, the neighbourhoods that were hardest hit were also those hosting a large immigrant population, who had "benefitted" from the real estate bubble and been

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[1] since 2013 more than 14 841 evictions have been carried out only in Barcelona (Open Democracy, 2019)

able to buy houses in areas with lower prices (Nel.lo, 2010). As unemployment went sky-high and people lost their jobs, many were no longer able to sustain the payment for debts.

As mentioned earlier, the support networks that were formed in the aftermath of the financial crisis to support people in vulnerable situations, and particularly those facing eviction, later formed a base for much of the practises within the networks of SSE. This offers one explanation to why SSE are particularly concentrated in areas undergoing gentrification. Poble Sec, which is one of the neighbourhoods with the highest number of tourist establishments in Barcelona (Romero et al., 2018), is another site which is undergoing rapid gentrification and where SSE initiatives are more concentrated. Mr X. Latorre Tapis explain that also after the worst part of the financial crisis, an important part of the work in CooperaSec have been the formation of support networks for people facing eviction or increasing rents due to the effect of gentrification. This work is not only aimed at handling the immediate effect of gentrification but also include more long-term strategies which are advanced in alliance between CooperaSec and other SSE networks and organisations on local and national level (Latorre Tapis, X. 2019, personal interview 11 April).

Concludingly, even if it is clear from the geographical distribution of the SSE sector that the most disadvantaged groups, such as those from long-term working class neighbourhoods in the north part of the city, do not form a predominate part of the SSE sector, it is important to note that they are not absent. As many of the initiatives in the SSE are firmly rooted in its territorial context, they also appear to form alliances between groups within the territory, as well as between territories, experiencing similar needs. Many of the initiatives that has emerged within Sants-Montjuic, and particularly in the Bordeta and Poble Sec neighbourhoods can be seen as an example of this. It is however clear that economic capital is not insignificant and may even constrain the ability of certain groups to benefit from, and initiatives to form, more easily in some neighbourhoods than others. This I will explore in the next section.

5.4 Potential barriers to participation

Ms G. Facundo Vericat is the founder of Labcoop, an entity which provides consultancy services for SSE initiatives, and she has during the last years collaborated with the municipality to strengthen the SSE in Barcelona. In respect of providing equal possibilities to participate in the SSE, Ms G. Facundo Vericat (2019, personal interview 15 April) explains that the greatest challenge for vulnerable groups to participate in the SSE is time and money. Even as the governmental support has provided more opportunities for vulnerable groups to participate in and start up cooperative or entrepreneurial entities, these kinds of initiatives often takes longer than "regular" entrepreneurial enterprises in the SSE to become economically sustainable. She mentions cooperatives started by migrant women in domestic services, people with unregulated legal status who sell on the street, people with disabilities who want to manage kiosks and cooperatives for people who collect and sell metal waste as some examples and explains that:

> during the time you need to establish yourself you need to leave other work. […] actually, it is impossible without public support, or no it is not impossible, but it is very hard. (Facundo Vericat, G. 2019, personal interview, 15 April)

The challenges that Ms G. Facundo Vericat sees with SSE initiatives specifically aimed at strengthening the most vulnerable groups in the city was brought up by all the actors I have interviewed for this study. In a personal interview, Ms E. Vegue Gisbert (2019, 24 April) head of the Department for Social Innovation at Barcelona Activa admits that these groups do pose a bigger challenge than other groups but also emphasises that this has also been one of the areas where the municipal support for the SSE has had its greatest impact. She explains that the established priorities of the plan have enabled Barcelona Activa to work specifically with groups in unregulated sectors of the economy. She emphasises that Barcelona Activa have an important role to play in facilitating a process out of precariousness and explains

> Rather than just leaving money or material support, we ask: 'what do you want to do?' and then we give support to make them realise it. But we don't do it for them, they have to do it, we just enable it. (Vegue Gisbert, E. 2019, personal interview, 24 April)

Her line of argument follows a similar logic as that which is mirrored in the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016). By replacing the words of self-management with collective entrepreneurship and economic democracy with social innovation she specifically argues that the SSE do provide new possibilities for the government to work with groups in particularly disadvantaged situations.

The high concentration of initiatives in the neighbourhoods belonging to the district Eixample, which can be observed in Figure 2, also demonstrates some potential challenges in regard to the distributive effect of the SSE in Barcelona. The correlates to the estimations made by the municipality in their study of the city-wide distribution of SSE initiatives (Figure 1). This concentration, in the middle- and high-income neighbourhoods of Eixample is according to Mr X. Rubio Cano (2019, personal interview, 28 Mars), in part explained by its locational advantage. With its central location and by far most populated area in the city, Eixample is a strategically good place to locate the administrative and legal office for many initiatives, although their services are not necessarily distributed only here. However, Mr X. Rubio Cano also offers another explanation, which is more central to understand the challenges the SSE sector, as a market-based actor, faces in terms of distributing services to low-income groups:

> The social and solidarity economy offers services that are expensive. They are expensive for people because the social and solidarity economy attempts to pay the just price, the price is not the most important. […] The social and solidarity economy want to play with dignified salaries, the goods and services will cost money. So what happens? the people who lives in the poorer neighbourhoods are not able to access the services of the social and solidarity economy, at least not as easily… they [the SSE initiatives] gather in the district of Eixample where people with median- and higher income resides […] quantitatively it does make sense, it also makes sense economically, also in terms of exposure and advertising. (Rubio Cano, X. 2019, personal interview, 28 Mars)

This explanation highlights the entrepreneurial side of the SSE. It brings light to the tension between market-based provision of social services and economic sustainability, which is inherent to any private enterprise that aims to respond to social needs. Even when it is not for the purpose of profit, but simply to be economically sustainable, goods and services are necessarily becoming more expensive when the price is put according to

the real price of labour and resources. To meet the need to be economically sustainable many initiatives thus seem to adapt to a market-based logic of locating services to areas with higher purchasing power. As such, a trade-off is done between economic sustainability and empowerment (of some), and accessibility for low-income groups. Apart from displaying some of the entrepreneurial logics which the sector appears to adopt, this explanation highlights that market forces sets the "rule of the game" for SSE entities as much as for any other economic entities. It brings to the forefront some of the limitations that any socio-economic project, which focuses one-sidedly on market actors to ensure a just distribution, will run into as long as it is not combined with other kind of market legislation or state support.

In the same way that green consumerism turned environmentally friendly products into an ethical lifestyle choice of the middle-class (e.g. Crane, 2010) a similar development is not unthinkable for initiatives in the SSE. On the basis of my study it is hard to say if the correlation between SSE initiatives and gentrification could also indicate a positive relationship between some kinds of SSE initiatives and gentrification. Previous studies in the field of green gentrification (e.g. Maantay & Maroko, 2018) have identified how some community practices which aims to make neighbourhoods greener have led to unintended effects of gentrification. It is not unthinkable that such a relation could exists also between some practices of the SSE and gentrification, particularly those engaged in practices for sustainable and alternative life styles such as consumer cooperatives, alternative education and urban gardening. However, such arguments would be pure speculations and further studies would be needed to establish such a relationship. In addition, Mr X. Latorre Tapis (2019, personal interview, 11 April) activist in the SSE in Poble Sec points out that market speculation, as a result of the tourism industry and the largely privatised housing market, is a more pressing challenge to ensure the viability of SSE initiatives. To effectively limit the negative impact of gentrification and subsequent displacement of low-income groups he says that SSE initiatives have to be accompanied by changes in public policy:

> Even if we fight and we win some things, our initiatives are not viable in the face of the speculative logic of Barcelona. The reality is that this is a great tension [between the SSE and public housing policy] that constrains our efforts. It is possible with some kind of public policy that slow down or limit the investment

structures […] but we need a more proactive public policy to invest in housing. (Latorre Tapis, X. 2019 personal interview 11 April)

5.5 Redefining social innovation

With the aim of promoting the "SSE as an integrated proposal for a change of urban socio-economic model" the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016) draws on two main discourses that will be discussed in the following section. The two discourses – which I will refer to as the *counter-discourse* and the *entrepreneurial discourse*, are present in the political documents of the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016), the Economic Development Plan for Sants-Montjuic (Municipality of Barcelona & Barcelona Activa, 2017), the Neighbourhood Plan of La Marina (Municipality of Barcelona, 2017) as well as in other related material which I have analysed. They are also present in the language of the actors I have interviewed and can to some extent be said to be mirrored in the distributional patterns which I analysed in previous parts of the analysis. The two discourses together form what Fairclough (1995) and other analyst of discourse call a "hegemony" in the discursive and social strategies of actors in the SSE in Barcelona. Hegemony is here understood as a dominating mode of action which is based upon alliances (of different groups, interests and organisational contexts) and that is generated through consent rather than coercion. By analytically separating the two discourses, my accounts in the coming sections of the analysis centres on how the combination of them have come to generate consent, under the specific circumstances of the financial crisis in Barcelona, and the specific circumstances of global social and political-economic changes. To better understand how the politics of the SSE may empower or disempower certain actors, I try to locate some of the mechanisms which are activated through the discursive practices.

The first discourse, which I call the *counter-discourse*, draws directly on the critique by M15, PAH and other left-wing social movements laid out in section 5.3. This frames the SSE sector as a civil society response to the collective problems that governments and the private sector are failing to solve in the context of crisis. The crisis, explicitly referred to as a "structural" crisis, is conceived as the combined environmental, political and financial crisis brought by the destructive tendencies in, and hegemony of the capitalist

system. This discourse also frames the initiatives according to a more general critique of the competitive logic through which Barcelona, as most other cities, has been constructed and transformed. In relation to these critiques, it is argued in the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016) that initiatives the SSE sector proposes a disruptive understanding of what the economy is for and how it can be managed through a collective and emancipatory approach which prioritise "satisfying needs" and "quality of life" above profitability and economic growth.

The second discourse, the *entrepreneurial discourse*, which draws on the more general turn towards social innovation in the political-economic management, frames the SSE as a collection of entrepreneurial and socially innovative solutions responding to social needs and democratic deficiencies in the political and economic system (e.g. Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 17). However, rather than linking social innovation to welfare-state scepticism and a correspondingly larger confidence in private initiatives to deal with social problems, which to some extent has driven the newfound interest in social innovation globally (Oosterlynck et al., 2015), the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: e.g. 7) rather present social innovation as new collaborative organisational, technological, financial and governance tools which can bring about deeper shifts in norms and consciousness. The SSE is presented as a way to "deconstruct the way in which we face the world on a daily basis, while constructing alternatives" which can be "a very appropriate tool for an economic intervention" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 70). This discourse highlights that the SSE and the associated politics in Barcelona is not to be seen as a shift away from traditional sectors of the economy but rather as a complement of an already existing reality of the market "that until now were dismissed or simply made invisible" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 68). In relation to this it is emphasised that "raising the visibility of this fabric must be facilitated as a factor for dynamic economic growth" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 9).

The entrepreneurial discourse which is present in the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016) and which also run through the Economic Development Plan (Municipality of Barcelona & Barcelona Activa, 2017) and Neighbourhood Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2017) emphasis the SSE as an economic, entrepreneurial and innovative sector which can contribute to the creation of stable jobs, with adequate remuneration, and working conditions that allows "life sustainability" to be put at the

centre. In this sense, we can see that the economic language of entrepreneurship and innovation which the plan draws on helps to lend influence and legitimacy to the SSE by ways of professionalisation. Although the politics of the SSE is not only a response to the unemployment and social needs felt after the financial crisis, the entrepreneurial discourse in Barcelona appears to have been activated as a post-crisis response to the loss of legitimacy in traditional political and economic responses. By professionalising and thus, depoliticising the sector on the one hand, and emphasising its role as an economic actor on the other, collaborative partnerships between the government and civil society can easier be established and thus include citizens as "co-producers" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 59) of the systemic challenges.

In relation to the counter-discourse, the entrepreneurial discourse also locates the strength of the initiatives of SSE in its self-organising capacity. In both discourses, self-management is emphasised as an essential character to the sector itself and as of strategic importance for its role in local development. Particular importance is given to the value of "self-management" in what can be termed as *territorial self-management*, *sectorial self-management* and *collective self-management*. What I call territorial self-management refers to the overall aim that is expressed in the Impetus Plan, of expanding community and self-organisation processes "that responds to specific identified needs" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 55) and contributes to local socio-economic development, on neighbourhood- as well as city-wide level. With sectorial self-management I refer to a number of explicit strategies which aim to keep the sector's "independence of the public authorities". This is expressed through, for example, the formation of "partnerships" rather than subsidiary relations to strengthen the "economic sustainability of the initiatives" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 10). Finally, by collective self-management I refer to the general objective of making "Barcelona Activa[2] a mentoring

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[2] Barcelona Activa – the city's entity for employment and economic development, has traditionally worked with support for unemployed people, businesses and entrepreneurship. Since 2015 it has underwent an internal reorganisation in order to support the growth of the SSE sector. Since then, it has played an important part in developing and implementing the politics of the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016) by mentoring and financial support to develop "capabilities" and "ecosystem" for "collective entrepreneurship" (Vengue Gisbert, E. 2019, personal interview 24 April).

and training resource for SSE initiatives" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 21) to grow self-managing and collaborative capabilities of individuals.

This discursive framing of the SSE is not specific to the context of Barcelona but can be observed to have been used globally, with increasing frequency in the aftermath of the financial crisis, among city governments and transnational development organs (Oosterlynck & González, 2013). Globally, and in general terms, this discursive turn can be understood to form part of a formulation of a new role of civil society, which has emerged through the reorientation of the welfare state towards privatization and outsourcing of social services (Swyngedouw, 2005). In Barcelona this was particularly exuberated by the public bailouts and austerity politics that the Spanish state embarked upon after the crisis (Antentas, 2015). In the Impetus Plan it is stated that it is important that the citizen sees and participate in alternative economies "to allow the debate on economic models to be opened up to the public sphere" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 36). The language in this statement position the citizen as both the producer and the participant in the construction of new models for local development, on the one hand as a political voice and on the other as a "co-producer" of the "social market". Together with an emphasis on growing "active", "critical", and "collective" values among citizens and to "encourage synergies between neighbourhood communities and social entrepreneurship" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 49), this point to the growing importance of the market, not only as an economic but as political sphere where political citizenship is defined. In this sense, the entrepreneurial discourse of the SSE seems to serve as much to grow the "social market" as to redefine the meaning of "the public", and consequently, political citizenship.

5.6 The role of SSE in new strategies for local development

As have been outlined in earlier sections, the social and solidarity economy in Barcelona does not seem to emerge in all parts of the city or among all social groups. This tendency has been observed also by the actors that participated in the development of the Impetus Plan and formed the strategies that are being implemented through the plan. By reference to the general aim to "contribute towards reducing social and territorial inequalities" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 4) the plan forms a territorial strategy which conclude

that priority will be given to develop projects in the poorest area of the city. To strengthen the city-wide impact of the sector, the Impetus Plan also formulates a strategy for capacity building which states that "measures for giving impetus to the generation of new initiatives and the transformation of traditional commercial companies into SSE enterprises or similar are aimed, firstly, at future and present entrepreneurs, secondly at unemployed and vulnerable people and thirdly at social collectives and activists" (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016: 17). In line with this, the plan proposes to grow the impact of the SSE in vulnerable areas and among socio-economic groups as a tool to generate "decent" and "quality" forms of employment and as a tool to strengthen local initiatives and residents to determine the future of the neighbourhoods.

These two strategies: capacity building and territorial interventions, are advanced with the help of the city's employment entity, Barcelona Activa, and through local Economic Development Plans and Neighbourhood Plans aimed specifically at some of the more vulnerable areas in the city. It is important to note that these plans are not aimed only at strengthening the SSE sector but covers a larger set of interventions. However, the plans are greatly influenced and guided by the principles and values which are expressed in the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016). The district of Sants-Montjuic is one of the areas of the city where a specific district- and neighbourhood plan have been developed for this purpose. The main goal of the local Economic Development Plan is set to counteract some of the local dynamics of job unemployment, precarious working conditions, gentrification and social exclusion (Municipality of Barcelona & Barcelona Activa, 2017). The plan explains that many of the neighbourhoods in Sants-Montjuic suffer from high unemployment, loss of purchasing power, falling incomes and forced closing of local businesses. Simultaneously, the district is growing increasingly attractive due to its relative proximity to the city-centre, both as an up-and-coming tourist "hot spot" and as a result of the development of conference- and business centres in the more central parts of the district (Municipality of Barcelona & Barcelona Activa, 2017).

In both the Economic Development Plan (Municipality of Barcelona & Barcelona Activa, 2017), which covers the whole district of Sants-Montjuic and the Neighbourhood Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2017) which is developed specifically for the Marina neighbourhood, "proximity" serves as an important keyword to guide interventions in the area. In what can be understood as a step towards decentralisation, the advisory council,

consisting of public official that helps with the design and application of all the neighbourhood plans, explains that: "The neighborhood plans represent, therefore, this logic of change of scale, which puts the value of the neighborhood as a subject and not only as an object of the municipal intervention." (Consell Assessor del Pla de Barris de Barcelona, 2017: 13). In the Economic Development Plan of Sants-Montjuic (Municipality of Barcelona & Barcelona Activa, 2017), this logic can be seen in the great emphasize on returning, or transforming, vacant properties into neighbourhood-run services and community projects. It can also, and more primarily, be seen in the very premises that the plan is built. Rather than identifying places which can potentially bring economic growth to the neighbourhood, it departs from a diagnosis of the social needs and economic realities that exists in the neighbourhood and builds the economic strategies based on these.

In a personal interview, Ms M. Ribalta and Mr D. González, the coordinators responsible for the development of the Economic Development Plan in Sants-Montjuc (Municipality of Barcelona & Barcelona Activa, 2017), however say that they do not see the increased focus on the SSE as a reorientation of the economy (2019, personal interview 24 April). Rather, they argue that it simply expands the notion of what traditionally have been perceived as economy and what the economy should be for. Ms M. Ribalta explains that in reality the role of Barcelona Activa has not changed:

> the thematic areas which influence the economy are the same as always, businesses, companies, labour market, tourism. What has changed is however that we put more importance on the SSE and have started to see it not as an alternative form of economy but as an economic form which already exists. Yes, there is a capitalist economy but there is also a social and solidarity economy which can help support many of the local needs and in the end benefit the communities that Barcelona Activa tries to support. (Ribalta, M. 2019, personal interview 24 April)

She continues to explain that the greatest difference that Barcelona in Common and the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016) have brought is rather related to new forms governance between citizens, private actors and local agencies:

> I think, that it is specifically the focus on proximity that have made a difference during these four years of the government. And its most innovative effect has been

the creation of spaces for governance. These spaces of governance, which more specifically are meeting spaces between businesses, entities, neighbours to work together, or as it is called "co-create". This form allows to implement measures in a more autonomous form, which before was more hierarchically directed. (Ribalta, M. 2019, personal interview 24 April)

The new form of governance that Ms M. Ribalta describes is further elaborated in the Economic Development Plan of Sants-Montjuic: "neither the vision nor the policies have been designed solely from the City Council nor will they be promoted exclusively from this. They are a result of the experiences, diagnosis and expertise within the social and community fabric of Sants-Montjuic, as well as their demands. Thus when we talk about public leadership we cannot understand it as isolated, it must facilitate and complement itself with the necessary community leadership and be in a permanent and fruitful dialogue with the economic agents of the territory, without thereby leaving a proactive role and manager of a large part of the policies." (Municipality of Barcelona & Barcelona Activa, 2017: 40). The mode of governance that is advanced through the Economic Development Plan do not mirror the prevalent governance model in Barcelona. It does however demonstrate an example of the form of participative governance that is called for by Barcelona in Common (Blanco et al. 2019) and through the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016).

The form of governance that is advanced in Barcelona share much similarity to what Swyngedouw (2005) has defined as a general shift to socially innovative forms of governance, based on a greater inclusion of key actors from civil society. Swyngedouw brings to attention that these kinds of governance arrangement often have emerged "in the context of the emergence of innovative social movements on the one hand and transformations in the arrangements of conducting governance on the other" (Swyngedouw, 2005: 1993). In conceptualising these kind of arrangements as "governance-beyond-the-state" he refers to this turn as a favouring of market principles which to a larger extent include civil society and private actors in decision and delivery of services.

In Barcelona, the recent inclusion of actors from the SSE in stakeholder dialogues where, for example, decision on allocation of resources or strategies for local development are taken, demonstrate the growing importance of civil society in such dialogues. In this

context, the disruptive effect of the crisis appears to have functioned as a key mechanism to open up for innovative modes of governance with emphasis on greater inclusion of civil society, particularly in social and economic development. It is worth noting that similar claims for participation and the actual implementation of a governance model in which citizens participated in urban and social planning was implemented after the first democratic election in 1979 and remained (with great variation in the degree of influence during different periods) in place until 2011 when a conservative party entered government for the first time since Franco (Eizaguirre et al., 2017). This so called "Barcelona-model" relied largely on the creation of mechanisms for intervention by different local actors in decision-making processes but with strong leadership of the public sector in a consensus building environment (Capel, 2007). Through this model the city council promoted local welfare with the involvement of civil society in the provision of services, such as active advocacy groups and third sector organisations. To a great extent, this is argued to have helped the municipality to implement an ambitious social programme despite limited financial resources (Blackeley 2005; Wollmann & Iglesias 2011).

The present call to enlarge the role of citizens in governmental management can thereby be understood as a return, rather than a new turn, to participatory mode of governance. Critical accounts of this shift in governance, which is not specific to Barcelona, have however pointed to the ways these arrangements put many of the principles of representative democracy out of play by the fact that they do not (yet) have codified rules and regulation that shape participation and mechanisms to distribute power. In that way they risk contributing to an informal and non-transparent form of decision-making (e.g. Hajer, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2005). In the case of Barcelona, we can see how a number of events in the historical and current social context have worked as mechanisms to produce todays calls for a shift in governance. Some of these are directly related to the erosion of the participative character in the "Barcelona-model" which were brought by the introduction of competitive strategies to reinvent the economy.

With the designation of the city for the Olympic Games in 1992, the participative characteristics of the "Barcelona model" was greatly eroded and the model is today more well-known for its focus on tourism, culture and innovation (Degen & Cabeza, 2012). This initiated a massive restructuring of the economy of the city towards "clean culture"

and "innovation industries". Since then, Barcelona has seen a massive redevelopment of the beachfront, industrial lands and central parts of the city. This has turned largely low-income neighbourhoods into central destinations for tourists, international events, high-tech and cultural industries. All accompanied with selective participative processes underpinned by the widely used argument of the need of post-industrial cities to reinvent themselves to adapt to the global economy (Degen & Cabeza, 2012). The erosion of legitimacy in the "Barcelona model" is perhaps clearest in view of the increasing social polarization, the growth of a peripheral population which has seen its quality of life deteriorate during this same period and the massive speculation accompanying the restructuring of the city.

Although the model that is advanced by Barcelona in Common, which is mirrored in the Economic Development Plans, is not advanced nearly on the scale that the "Barcelona-model" was, it serves as a historical reminder of the fragile character of participative models if not advanced in concert with long-term strategies and larger shifts in economic policy. Clearly, these are no small shifts that have to happen, and it is exactly in relation to this that Mr X. Rubio Cano (2019, personal interview 28 Mars) argue that it is necessary to leverage the impact of the SSE, as a start. With reference to current competition in the global market and "power struggle" between cities and local political parties he puts it very simply:

> It is exactly this that the social and solidarity economy is working against, to favour cooperation over competition. If there are only individual gains, we will both loose on it but if we both win it is better because we benefit from it collectively. (Rubio Cano, X. 2019, personal interview 28 Mars)

As I have explained in this section, stakeholder dialogues appear to be central to the cooperative model that is envisioned by actors in the SSE. The very idea of using stakeholder participation as a tool for democratic decision-making assumes a relationship where actors hold equal position of power. However, the fact that unequal power relations between different groups in the city might pose a challenge to ensure equal participation in stakeholder dialogues is not mentioned in the political documents nor by any of the actors I have interviewed. This is not to say that there exist no mechanisms to ensure a more equal participation but rather that other values are more central. In the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016) a greater emphasis is rather put at developing

collective norms and values favouring collaboration and the satisfying of local social needs among all stakeholders. The very lack of mention of democratic mechanisms to ensure democratically just processes is indicative of this kind of innovative mode of governance but does not necessarily lead to unjust outcomes. By directing the basic premise of the plans towards social rather than financial impact, with a priority to enhance the capabilities of the most vulnerable groups, the discourse rather advances an understanding of democracy which is measured by its outcome more than process.

6. Conclusions

My aim of the study was to understand how the politics of social and solidarity economy (SSE) could contribute to social justice in local development. I have undertaken my study in the context of Barcelona where I explored the politics both on a city-wide scale and on the sub-local scale in the district of Sants-Montjuic. Exploring this question on two different scales has helped to bring clarity to the way local activist practices interrelate with, shape and are being shaped by political, economic and historical structures of the city. Barcelona presents an interesting case to undertake this kind of study. First, because it is a place where the politics of SSE have been advanced further than in most other places. Secondly, because it demonstrates a symptomatic example of governance innovation and entrepreneurial strategies, which have been advanced on a global scale after the financial crisis, with and through demands raised by social movements. To understand how the politics of the SSE may contribute to a more socially just development of cities, I have explored the motivations and interest that are driving the development of the sector. I have also explored how the politics respond to the needs of, and redistribute power to, disadvantaged groups in the city. I have undertaken this through a combination of spatial analysis, interviews and discourse analysis of political documents.

6.1 Summary of research finding

Through the spatial analysis of initiatives in the sector of social and solidarity economy I identified some patterns in the current development of the sector which, partly, helped answer how the sector responds to the needs of disadvantaged groups in the city. The results show that the SSE sector primarily develops in middle income neighbourhoods, particularly those with long history of social mobilisation and those with central locations favourable to raise the visibility of the entity. The low presence of SSE initiatives in low-income neighbourhoods is explained by the lack of time and money among groups residing in these areas. Important exceptions to this can be observed in the neighbourhoods of Raval and Poble Sec, which host a majority lower-income population. The low presence of SSE in high income neighbourhoods highlight that time and money

are not the only factors enabling or constraining the development of the SSE. Apart from the high economic independence which renders a lower engagement in high-income neighbourhoods, the lack of a strong social fabric and history of social mobilisation can explain its low presence. Taken together, these patterns suggest that it is generally easier for higher income groups to access the services and participate in the SSE sector while the participation by more vulnerable groups is constrained. Many of the actors that I have interviewed have highlighted that public support have been important to enable the participation of more vulnerable groups in programs which aims to strengthen their position in, for example, the labour market.

The spatial analysis also shows a high presence of SSE initiatives in areas which have underwent more recent gentrification. This may indicate that SSE initiatives are formed in those areas as a response to changing neighbourhood dynamics, either by inmoving groups or by already residing groups. Considering that the SSE in general aims to respond to social needs in the local environment, the most probable is that these initiatives demonstrates the presence of alliances between already residing groups, at risk of displacement, and inmoving middle-income groups. My study also indicates that the motivation and interests which form the practices of the SSE in Barcelona to a large extent is mirrored in the anti-systemic social movements. After the financial crisis these movements raised the issue of growing job- and life precariousness of working and middle class groups. As a result, the base of the SSE movement in Barcelona appears to be formed out of what have been called the "precariat" (Standing, 2013; see section 5.3).

My results indicate that while self-managing practices of the SSE may have formed an important emergency response on an individual level for both middle-and low-income groups in the direct aftermath of the crisis, they now appear to be predominant among middle-income groups. One possible explanation is that when the population as a whole moved out of the most extreme part of the crisis, people with higher incomes have, to a larger extent, had the economic ability to participate in practices which do not just respond to immediate needs but serves a more long-term political purpose. This is not to say that they do not also respond to immediately needs felt by more vulnerable groups. Rather it demonstrates that on a long-term basis, it is increasingly hard for low income groups to sustain self-organising practices without public support. Alliance-building, between groups with greater economic capacity and those with less, have for that reason

been an important strategy to form both long- and short-term responses within the sector. Some of the neighbourhoods in Sants-Montjuic such as Poble Sec and Bordeta demonstrates examples of alliances that have been formed on the basis of common problems, such as unemployment or precarious living- and working conditions.

Although the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016) formulates a politics of the SSE directed towards redressing economic inequality, it is therefore not the only interest driving the politics. Rather, the practices and politics of SSE respond to social needs derived from multiple forms of social problematics. In the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016), this translates into a politics that tries to strengthen what is called the "social economy". In effect, this renders a more formal role of social and solidarity economies (such as the third sector economy, social enterprises, community economies, care economies, commons economies and solidarity networks) in plans for economic development. Thus, actors in the "social economy" have been able to participate in the formation and implementation of the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016), the Economic Development Plans and Neighbourhood Plans as stakeholders alongside municipal and private market actors, in what can be seen as a networked mode of governance.

Proximity is a concept that in large capture the discourse through which these kinds of arrangements are advanced in the local development. Keywords such as "co-production", "participation", and "collaboration" are interchangeably used to describe this approach which aims to be more sensitive to local needs of the population rather than the needs of financial capital. In short, what is envisioned by actors in the SSE and the municipality is a horizontal partnership between state, private market and social market in developing guidelines and strategies for local development. Although the very idea of stakeholder participation assumes a relationship where actors hold equal position of power to ensure democratic decision and outcome, this is mentioned neither in the political documents nor by any of the interviewees. Rather, the discourses that I have identified in the political documents and among actors focus more on developing collective norms and values among all stakeholders, which favours collaboration and the satisfying of local social needs. The very lack of mention of democratic mechanisms to ensure democratically just processes is indicative of this kind of innovative mode of governance but does not necessarily lead to unjust outcomes. By directing the basic premise of the plans towards

social rather than economic impact, with a priority to enhance the capabilities of the most vulnerable groups, the discourse advances an understanding of democracy which is measured by its outcome rather than process.

By identifying discourses in the political documents the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016) the Economic Development Plan of Sants-Montjuic (Municipality of Barcelona & Barcelona Activa, 2017) and the Neighbourhood Plan of La Marina (Municipality of Barcelona, 2017), among key actors and in other written texts, I have been able to parse out two main discourses. These demonstrate some of the interests and motivations driving the politics of the SSE and the ways in which this enable also disadvantaged groups to partake and shape the city. The first discourse highlights the SSE as first and foremost a social movement. The second discourse emphasises that the SSE is a tool to grow collective entrepreneurship and social innovation. Together they form a strong discourse alliance that helps to move what, in the Impetus Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016), have been formulated as city-wide politics to activate the SSE as a tool in local development.

In both of these discourses, collective self-managing practices among disadvantaged groups are highlighted as being central to the movement. Both political documents and actors refer to these practices as, one the one hand, a response to unsustainable economic situations that have left vulnerable individuals with no other choice. On the other hand, and on a collective level, they are referred to as experiments, or actually existing alternatives, to the very political and economic structures which have contributed to precarious living situation for many. In the politics that has been developed in the aftermath of the crisis, these self-managing practices has on an individual level been translated into the language of social entrepreneurship. On a collective level the practices have been translated into a language of social innovation. Although the actual practices that the politics of the SSE aims to build does not appear to have changed, the very use of the language of social innovation indicates a form of professionalisation of the sector. In a context of the growing interest in social innovation among governments, it can be seen as a strategic way to lend legitimacy and influence in local development to the politics advanced by the sector.

This discursive turn has favoured the SSE as a strategy to manage social and economic tensions in Barcelona, both by civil society and government. Seen from a broad

perspective, the politics can be understood as a strategy to transfer power and influence from the private economy to civil society and the "social economy". In this sense, the discourse cannot be seen to favour a neoliberal governance rationality which would imply a transfer of state responsibility to civil society actors. The language of the political discourse explicitly refers to the state as a facilitator and enabler of this transition but also as a part of it, where the values of social responsibility and solidarity have to be incorporated also in the municipal organisation. In this sense, the political discourse opens up opportunities for collective and solidarity movements to influence the future evolution of both state and market. However, the discourse in the political documents also points to the growing importance of the market, not only as an economic but as political sphere where political citizenship is defined. As a politics focused on enabling civil society responses to the unequal distribution of resources, the responsibility to ensure equal possibilities to participate in society is to a larger extent defined as shared between social and private market and the state. In this sense, the entrepreneurial discourse of the SSE seems to serve as much to grow the "social market" as to redefine the meaning of "the public", and consequently, political citizenship.

6.2 Final conclusions

The results of my study contribute to the expanding literature on SSE and its relation to social innovation and social entrepreneurship. By critically examining its relation to political, social and economic structures, I add a contextual understanding to both the potential and challenges which the SSE brings to a socially just local development. In relation to previous literature on the SSE, the results of my study divert from claims that says that locally based initiatives such as the SSE, more so than official state-led programs, can reach a broad public in activities that impact the dynamics of urban dynamics and social development (e.g. Moulaert et al., 2010: 5). In contrast, my study indicate that these dynamics seem to hold true under time of crisis but to sustain a broad range of actors in the long term, which include also disadvantaged groups, they often need to act in concert with official state-led program. Therefore, I would like to call for further research to explore the question of how the SSE is, and could be, advanced in concert with broader legislative measures by local, regional and national government.

My findings show that the practices of SSE could, and are, contributing to a more socially just urban development by counteracting the neoliberal growth discourse and expanding the space of other-than-capitalist forms of economies that put local and social needs, rather than financial profit, in the centre of urban development. The politics, that is advanced through and with the actors in the SSE is concerned with making production (of space, goods and services) more participatory and collective so it responds to the needs of producers and the public at large rather than just individuals and private firms. In this sense, the politics aligns closely with Lefebvre's (1996) and Purcell's (2008) concept of space, which tries to move away from a commoditized notion of space and into a more socially centred notion of space. By repositioning the meaning of social innovation and social entrepreneurship, from a primarily individual undertaking to a collective form of civil society action, the policies strengthen already existing forms of economy that traditionally have not been seen as a part of the market. In the case of Barcelona, the financial crisis worked as a key event to activate and enable this discourse. While the discourse on the "social market" works as a mechanism to open up possibilities for civil society to influence state and market structures, it also appears to be the very need to re-establish legitimacy in the state and market that made the shift in discourse possible. The politics of the SSE is in that way an expression of the local governmental search for new ways of re-inventing the economy and re-inserting legitimacy into the state, advanced with and through the interests of social movement and civil society demands.

However, my study also demonstrates a number of challenges and risks, related to the SSE sectors ability to redistribute these benefits to more vulnerable groups in society. As the results of my study shows, the largely middle-class composition of the SSE does not so much reflect a lack of initiatives aimed at supporting more vulnerable groups. It does however reflect a greater ability of groups with more social and economic capital to access, benefit from and, therefore, direct the policies of SSE. This highlights the importance of public support to enable participation of more vulnerable groups in the SSE. It also highlights that capacity building, directed at vulnerable groups, has to remain central to ensure the democratic character of the politics. With the current local government, led by Barcelona in Common, such support has been available and appear, to a large extent, to have benefitted more vulnerable groups by the explicit guidance of the policies towards these groups. In this regard, the democratic character of the Impetus

Plan (Municipality of Barcelona, 2016) is not vested in a deliberative approach that seeks equal participation of all groups but rather in the formation of strategies that actively seek to empower less advantaged groups. In large, the policy has been advanced in accordance with democratic norms which recognises both the group-based differentiation in, and structural character of social exclusion.

Finally, my study shows that the discourse of the SSE does not so much advance a new relationship between the state, market and civil society as is sometimes argued by critical account on socially innovative modes of governance. Rather it blurs the boundaries between the different spheres by establishing the social agenda as a common agenda where each sector has its own role to play. My study also points to the growing importance of the market, not only as an economic but as political sphere where political citizenship is defined. As the politics of the SSE explicitly focus on enabling civil society responses to the unequal distribution of resources, the responsibility to ensure equal possibilities to participate in society is to a larger extent defined as a shared between (social and private) market and (local) state.

In conclusion, the results of my study show that the development of the SSE in Barcelona is contributing to a more just local development by actively contributing to redistribute influence over local development from individual, private and financial actors to collective social needs. In this sense, it embodies a revived recognition of the need to formulate the economy in accordance to social values. By developing a politics that calls for a more controlled growth, changing value systems and cooperative practices, the actors in SSE advances an agenda which radically reformulates the aim of economic development. This is not to say that the politics are without challenges, nor that practices of SSE does not run the risk of being co-opted by more powerful actors. By treating the SSE sector as a formal sector of the economy, I see a risk of social services being outsourced to voluntary civil society practices. Drawing on the result of my study, I therefore see that the transformative potential that the SSE sector holds to advance a more just city runs the risk of being greatly reduced if not accompanied with state-enforced regulation of private market activity and redistributive measures.

List of interviews

Xavier Rubio Cano, 8 January and 28 Mars 2019, Technical Project Manager: Commissioner's Office for Cooperative, Social and Solidarity Economy, Municipality of Barcelona.

Elisenda Vegue Gisbert, 24 April 2019, Executive Director: Department for Socioeconomic Innovation (initially Other Economies Department), Barcelona Activa.

David González Satué, 24 April 2019, Technical Coordinator: Sants-Montjuic Economic Development Plan, Operative Department of Local Development, Barcelona Activa.

Meritxell Ribalta, 24 April, Technical Coordinator: Sants-Montjuic Economic Development Plan in the Marina neighbourhood, Operative Department of Local Development, Barcelona Activa.

Guernica Facundo Vericat, 15 April 2019, Director: LabCoop.

Xavier Latorre Tapis, 11 April, 2019, Activist member of Steering Group: CooperaSec, Poble Sec.

Mercè Esteban, 16 April 2019, Technical Project Coordinator: Territorial Development, Coopolis.

Joan Costa, 17 April 2019, Activist member of Commission and Secretariat: Can Battló.

List of databases

Age, profession, education, vulnerability data:

> The official National Institute for Statistics (INE) Provided by the INE itself, the Municipality of Barcelona and IDESCAT. Data was publicly available or was requested/purchased by email. https://www.ine.es/

Income and Average Household Distributional Income data:

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Appendix A

1. Gentrification data

All statistical data have been collected by the Research Institute Barcelona Laboratory for Urban Environmental Justice and Sustainability led by Isabelle Anguelovski. The work of processing the data have been done between me, Lucia Argüelles and Margarita Triguero-Mas. I have performed the final analysis and mapping of the data. The variables included in the analysis is taking into account theoretical developments in the gentrification literature such as socio-economic, cultural and demand-side theories that contends that gentrification is not simply a process produced by rising property prices followed by the replacement of low-income residents by middle and high-income residents, but rather the combined shift of economic, cultural and social fabric in areas (Ley, 1994; Zukin, 1987; Lees, Slater & Wyly, 2010; Smith, 1987). The data I have chosen to include therefore consists of five demographic measures; socio-economic status, education (bachelor's degree or higher), age (population over the age of 65) and ancestry (population whose nationality is respectively from the global north and from the global south). For the years 1991-2001 the data also includes census level data on percent of population active in professional field of public administration and research which was not available for the later years. Further, it includes two economic measures: home sales value and rent prices. All of the data is extracted from published sources produced by municipal agencies or requested by researchers at BCNUEJ from which I got access to the dataset.

While home sales value, rent value, household income, education level and profession are common variable used in studies of gentrification, the variables of older population and disadvantaged population reflect unique aspects of Barcelona in terms of context and available data. As Anguelovski et al. (2018) argue, the high home ownership rate in Barcelona (almost 90%) leads to very low residential mobility because people tend to stay in their homes for most of their lives. This limits vulnerabilities for displacement to those who are renting and those who can no longer afford neighbourhood amenities but cannot easily get elsewhere to get basic services. Elderly are more likely to be renters in Barcelona and thus comprise one key indicator population of displacement (Anguelovski et al., 2018). This group are among the more likely to be inclined to move because of rising costs and changing demographics in their neighbourhoods.

Measures of changes in racial or ethnic disposition are also common in gentrification studies. However, as data on race and ethnicity is not available in Barcelona, I have used a comparison of immigrant population from the global north with those from the global south. As argued by Anguelovski et al. (2018: 469), "if race and ethnicity data are used in the context of gentrification studies to measure the extent to which those considered "other" within a city are displaced by real estate trends, a comparison of new arrivals from the Global North with those from the Global South is of interest for analogous reasons". With Spain, and Barcelona in particular, having a relatively recent history of diversified and intensified immigration from the global south (the majority of global south immigrant communities came to Barcelona in the 1990s and early 2000s from Latin America, North Africa and Asia), this variable is quite indicative of ethnic and racial diversity in the city (Anguelovski et al., 2018).

During my period of study, Barcelona's administrative structure changed in 2008 from 10 districts, 73 neighbourhoods and 248 small research zones into 10 districts, 73 neighbourhoods and 233 Basic statistical areas after 2008. The division of census tracts change every year and the period also includes a shift from *seccion estadistica*, representing considerably smaller census divisions to *seccion censal*, representing increasingly smaller census tract division for every year starting of 2001. For the data used in this study only five of the variables is available on census tract level; percent of bachelor's degree or higher, percent of population over 65 years old, percent of population active in professional field of public administration and research, percent of immigrant population whose nationality is from the global north and percent of population whose nationality is from the global south. To compare the data on census tract level, a census tract convertor, developed and provided by the Municipality of Barcelona, have been used to reapportion data collected in smaller units to the year with largest units of census tracts. By reapportioning from smaller to larger units, I avoid introducing errors in the data while accepting a smaller loss of data for some of the years.

For the remaining three variables; socio-economic level, housing prices and rent the data is only available in larger geographical levels and due to the shifting administrative structure in Barcelona they also shift over the years. Some of them are not available at all why proxies have been used. For none of these variables the same measure is available

for all years why I developed an index to make comparisons. By evaluating supplement document provided by the municipal of Barcelona on data collection and measurements used for the different variables available for housing, rent and socio-economic level respectively, I concluded that they, in lack of consistent data, could be considered comparable. To measure housing prices, I have used Land Housing Average value for year 1991, Average Sales Price for the year 2001 and Total Sales Price for year 2016. To measure rent I have used second hand rent prices for year 1992 (as a proxy for 1991 for which year rent prices is not available) and 2001and total rent price which also includes new construction for year 2016. To measure socio-economic level, I have used ICEF for year 1991 and household distributional income (HDI) for year 2000 (as proxy for 2001 for which year rent prices is not available) and 2016.

Although a reapportioning of the data collected in larger geographical units would have allowed to better account for smaller geographical differences, there is no feasible way of doing this without introducing errors in the dataset. Due to the method of data collection used by the municipal, I instead developed a method to reassign data from larger to smaller geographical units. Hence, to reassign data from the different larger geographical units in which it was collected in to census tract boundaries, I built a code for reassignment using ArcGIS to decide how the census tract boundaries intersect with the larger geographical units. To make sure that census tracts were assigned the value from the larger geographical units of which it had the largest overlap, I assigned a rule where only overlaps of above 50% was accepted. For those tracts that displayed less than 50% overlap with one single polygon (for the whole dataset that only accounted for a total of three census tracts of which all were exceptional cases where the census tracts had a larger boundary area than the larger geographical unit) I manually assigned them to the polygon of which it had the highest percentage of overlap. As a final step in preparing the data for analysis I used the data management program R to reassign the values for attributes from the larger geographical units to census tract level using the code for reassignment. Following this process, I have avoided to introduce errors in the data-set but it however also means that local differences are not taken into account for these three variables.

2. Data on actors in the social and solidarity economy

The collection of data on SSE actors in Barcelona is based on collection of secondary data and manual mapping of location-based data from two different source: the activist-based SSE platform Pam a Pam and the open access mapping project named "Map of social innovation in Catalunya" (Leyseca, 2019). Together with the Municipally of Barcelona and the regionwide network for SSE in Catalunya, Network of Solidarity Economies in Catalunya (XES), these are the two larger entities/networks which have mapped the SSE in Barcelona. Pam a Pam (2019) and the "social innovation map" do both provide web-based maps with the location of SSE actors categories by sector. These maps have been used as the source for data collection and together account for 521 mapped initiatives. The Municipally of Barcelona and XES provide open access information on all actors connected to them, however not georeferenced. Because of the limited time frame of this research project, the data from these two entities have not been included in the dataset.

Collection of data on SSE actors are connected to a number of challenges and limitations associated to the informal character of the sector. First, although the sector is comparatively well developed in Barcelona there exists no formal index covering all initiatives. Since the sector cover initiatives that are not primarily involved in economic activities most of them are not registered as a business. Depending on their purpose, and the regulations tied to different sectors, they might not even be registered in any official record. However, through the relatively comprehensive database that XES holds with 4718 initiatives active in Barcelona 2016 (XES, 2019) the sample of 521 initiatives I have mapped correlates to roughly 10% of these. Secondly, the mapping of SSE initiatives is often dependent on voluntary based, collaborative mapping efforts and limited to the definition used by the entity that collects the data. Consequently, the types of SSE actors I will explore in this study is tied to the definition used for data collection by the main sources I use for the study and might not necessarily reflect the definition used on other places or entities. However, as these are the largest entities/networks active within the SSE sector in Barcelona, they arguable reflect the main trends and definitions used by the SSE sector in the city.

3. Methods of analysis

3.1 Analysis of gentrification and stages of neighbourhood change

Following the most common approaches, I applied a threshold strategy for which I first identified census tracts as being eligible to gentrify at the beginning of 1991 and 2001 respectively and then assessed and compared changes among these tracts. As part of the data is gathered on larger geographical scale than census level, extreme values are more neutralised compared to data gathered on smaller scale. For this reason, I chose to apply a cruder measure developed by Ding et al (2016) and used by Gibbons and Barton (2016) where values below that of the city median is used to predict gentrification. Except from the greater flexibility their methodology offers, it also allows for comparison of gentrified places with those that had the risk of, but so far, have not been gentrified. In contrast to the strategy used by Ding et al (2016) and Gibbons and Barton (2016), that only considered tracts to be *gentrifiable* if they had a combined household disposable income below the citywide mean in the beginning of the measured time period, I took into consideration all seven (eight for 1991-2001) variables used in my analysis. By developing an index, I assigned one point to each variable that fell below the city-wide median of that measure and considered all tracts that had a total of five or more variables as gentrifiable. After identifying gentrifible tracts I calculated the proportions of all the measures, except for socio-economic level, rent and housing selling price for which I calculated an index to allow for comparison between the measures. The index divides the level of rent, housing prices and socio-economic level respectively in four categories; *lowlow* within which tracts that fall under 25% of the city-wide median is assigned, *lowhigh* within which tracts that fall above the 25% of the city-wide median but below the city-wide median is assigned, *highlow* within which tracts that fall above the city-wide median but below 25% above the city-wide median is assigned, and *highhigh* within which tracts that fall above 25% of the city-wide median is assigned.

Next, I calculated percentage/real change between 1991 and 2001, 2001 and 2016 and 1991 to 2016 for each tract that was considered gentrifiable. From the mean change in each measure, I calculated a gentrification score by first comparing the rate of change within each census tract to the city-wide change over the same time period. If the rate of change between the years was greater than that of the city-wide change, I considered this as one indicator of gentrification. For counts of older population and residents from the global south, representing a change in socially vulnerable residents, I reversed the coding

such that a lower change in the percentage of these populations was considered an indicator of gentrification.

In an index I then summed up the indicators of gentrification for each neighbourhood. Although there is little agreement among gentrification researchers on when neighbourhood change should be considered gentrification, most researchers tends to agree that gentrification are occurring only if several indicators of gentrification are moving the direction of gentrification. Thus, I considered neighbourhood in which four or more indicators of gentrification were present to have strong signs of gentrification for the year 1991-2016 and 2001 and 2016 and five indicators or more for the years 1991-2001 for which I have used eight variables. In a similar way as in previous research (Ding et al., 2016; Gibbons & Barton, 2016) I divided the group of neighbourhoods where gentrification was not happening into two groups. *Non-gentrifiable* neighbourhoods featured a median income in the beginning of the measured time period that fell above the city median, thus serving as a measure of already advantaged places in the city. *Gentrifiable* neighbourhoods which had a below city-wide median income in in the beginning of the measured time period but did not to meet the criteria of gentrifying. The classification scheme thereby counted neighbourhoods as being 1) non-gentrifying 2) non-gentrifiable, or 3) gentrifying.

Given Brown-Sacracino's (2017) recent call for more attention of the stage of gentrification, I chose to also incorporate stage measures of gentrification in the analysis. By including census data from 1991 this allowed to better capture the different characteristics of gentrification and highlight both longer processes of gentrification and more recent gentrification. This also helps to capture advanced stages of gentrification which by default is often overlooked in quantitative studies of gentrification where only the city-wide mean of the first year studied is used as a measure to preselect gentrifiable tracts (Brown-Sacracino, 2017). To do this, I used the strategy described by Ding et al. (2016) and later Gibbons and Barton (2016) were tracts that were gentrifiable in 1991 and experienced gentrification between 1991-2001 but were no longer gentrifiable or gentrifying in 2001 were classified as *old gentrification*. Tracts that experienced gentrification between 2001-2016 but not between 1991-2001 were classified as *recent gentrification*. Tracts that experienced gentrification both during 1991-2001 and 2001-2016 or over the whole period of 1991-2016 were classified as *continued gentrification*.

Tracts that were gentrifiable in 1991 or 2001 but did not experience gentrification were classified as *non-gentrifying*. Thus, the classification scheme counted neighbourhoods as being in the stage of 1) old gentrification 2) recent gentrification 3) continued gentrification, or 4) non-gentrifying. These categories reflect all the measurable changes associated with gentrification in these tracts from 1991 to 2016.

3.2 Analysis of spatial composition of SSE

To analyse the spatial composition of SSE initiatives in the city, a hotspot and coldspot analysis is performed to delineate the spatial clustering of initiatives. The analysis is based on Gits-Ord Gi* statistics, using fixed distance band in ArcGIS software. To prepare the dataset in which each point initially represented one initiative, I aggregated the data points that fell within a 100 m radius and counted the features so that each feature instead had an attribute with a value in a range. By running the spatial autocorrelation tool available in ArcGIS the resultant P-value identified the initiatives as having significant clustering. Using the hotspot analysis tool, clustering values for each feature in the data set was then calculated by looking at each feature within the context of its neighbouring features. The resulting positive and larger Z scores indicate more intense clustering of high values (hot spot) and negative and the smaller the z-score signifies more intense clustering of low values (cold spots). A z-score near zero indicate no apparent clustering.

The results of the hot spot Morans I applied to the number of SSE initiatives demonstrated statistically significant clustering of the SSE initiatives (p value <0.00). The clustering of SSE initiatives is particularly pronounced in the districts of Gràcia, Eixample and Ciutat Vella while also having some clustering in southern part of the district Sarrià-Sant Gervasi and the neighbourhoods, Lacluna del Poblenou, Sants and Poble Sec. Coldspots, representing the area with less than average occurrence of SSE initiatives, are particularly pronounced in the northern part of the city, in the districts of Nou Barris and Sant Andreu.

Appendix B

Overview of interview questions

1. Questions for civil society actors in SSE entities

Introductory questions
- Could you please elaborate on your position/engagement and your background?
- Could you please give a brief background to when and how the initiative started?
- What is the main focus of the entity/network?
- Can you give some specific examples of activities and projects you have developed?

How does initiatives in the SSE respond to social needs?
- Are there any specific groups that are more attracted to participate in the activities and projects you run?
- What groups do you primarily work with? Is this a conscious choice? Has this changed since you first started?
- What different interests, groups and geographies do you consider in the projects you work with?
- What would you say is your greatest successes and challenges in the initiative?
- What is the most important contribution of the SSE in the city today?

How does the politics of SSE influence local development?
- Could you describe how you perceive this neighbourhood? Both the neighbourhood itself and as part of Sants-Montjuic and the city of Barcelona?
- What future do you want to contribute to for the neighbourhood?
- What broad challenges do you see in bringing about this development?
- What role do you see that the social and solidarity economy can play in forming this development?
- What specific challenges do you see in the neighbourhood/city to develop the social and solidarity economy?

Relationship with the Municipality of Barcelona and the Impetus Plan

- Do you have any cooperation with the Municipality of Barcelona? What kind of services and projects are you receiving and developing together?
- How do you perceive the strategies employed in the Impetus Plan and the involvement of the Municipality of Barcelona in developing the social and solidarity economy?
- Were you involved in the drafting of the Impetus Plan?
- Have you been involved in the process of developing the Economic Development Plan for Sants-Montjuic?
- What possibilities do you see in cooperating with the municipality and what challenges?
- Which groups do you think will benefit most by the Impetus Plan and related strategies? Why? How?

2. Questions for municipal actors

Introductory questions

- Could you please elaborate on your position and your experience with social and solidarity economy?
- What role has your department had in developing and implementing the Impetus Plan and the Economic Development Plans?
- Could you describe some of the most important strategies and project that you are developing to implement the Impetus Plan?

How does initiatives in the SSE respond to social needs?

- What measures or tools have you used to include communities of less advantaged groups in the areas that you are working in?
- How well do you consider different interests, groups and neighbourhoods have been represented in the process of developing the plans?
- Are you satisfied with the process? In retro perspective, is there anything that you believe you could have done differently?

- Which are the primary groups that use the services that you provide or that participates in the projects that you facilitate?
- Do everyone have equal access the services/projects that you provide? Do you see any barriers for some groups to access them?

How does the politics of SSE influence local development?
- Could you briefly describe what impact the Impetus Plan have had on the development of the social and solidarity economy sector?
- What do you think is the most important contribution of the social and solidarity economy in terms of the services they provide in the city?
- How do you define entrepreneurship and innovation in the social and solidarity economy?
- In what way has the Impetus Plan influenced economic development planning?
- Do you see any challenges with implementing the Impetus Plan in planning of local economic development?
- Has the Impetus Plan changed or influenced the role of the citizens in urban development?
- What role do you think the social and solidarity economy have in the future development of Barcelona?