

Abe Shinzō on Southeast Asia: Maritime Policy and the “Abe Doctrine”

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Abstract

Since his return to office in 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has been widely recognised as pursuing a more proactive foreign and security policy than previous prime ministers. This thesis examines the maritime policies of Prime Minister Abe applicable to the South East Asia region as an example of his changed approach to foreign and security policies. First, this thesis addresses the question as to what policies Abe has espoused, and if he has been consistent in his policy pronouncements throughout his term. This thesis uses discourse analysis on translated transcripts of Prime Minister Abe's public speeches and statements to identify and consider the constancy of the relevant policies promoted by Abe. Subsequently, the thesis compares these findings to the 'Abe Doctrine', a concept recently developed to understand Abe's policies, to test the current effectiveness of the Abe Doctrine concept. This thesis finds that current ideas for an 'Abe Doctrine' are largely accurate but require greater attention to how 'values-based diplomacy' is used by Prime Minister Abe in different policy contexts.

Keywords: Abe doctrine, Abe Shinzō, Maritime policy, Southeast Asia

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Abstract.....	1
Acknowledgements.....	2
Note on Japanese Language.....	5
List of Abbreviations	5
INTRODUCTION	6
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE	10
Southeast Asian Waters within International Relations.....	10
Prime Minister Abe Shinzō	12
METHODOLOGY	17
Data Collection.....	17
Method of Analysis	21
Constructing a Framework for the Abe Doctrine.....	22
Ethical considerations	25
PRIME MINISTER ABE AND MARITIME POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA	26
Geography	26
Named Policy Strategies	28
“Five Principles for Diplomacy”	28
“Three Principles on the Rule of Law at Sea”	30
“Proactive Contribution to Peace”	31
“Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”	33
Abe’s Other Policies	35
Rule of International Law.....	35
Maintaining Open Seas.....	36
Capacity Building Assistance.....	38
Maritime Education	39
Ocean Pollution	39
MARITIME POLICY, SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE ABE DOCTRINE.....	41

Great Power Status and Leadership	41
An Increased Security Role for Japan	43
Cooperation with ASEAN	44
Freedom of Navigation	44
Values-Based Diplomacy	45
Strengthening the Japan-US Alliance	46
CONCLUSIONS	48
Abe Shinzō’s Maritime Policy in Southeast Asia	48
Feasibility of the Abe Doctrine in a Regional Context	49
BIBLIOGRAPHY	51
Primary Literature	51
Secondary Literature	58

Note on Japanese Language

Japanese names are ordered in the traditional Japanese order (family name, personal name).

Long vowel sounds in Japanese words will be shown using macrons (e.g. ō, ū).

List of Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Secretariat
JSDF	Japanese Self-Defense Forces
ReCAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia
SCS	South China Sea
TPP	Trans-Pacific Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines Prime Minister Abe Shinzō's stance on Japanese maritime policy in Southeast Asian waters during his second term as Prime Minister of Japan. This includes Japan's active or proposed roles in Southeast Asian waters, as well as Abe's official stance on maritime issues in the region (e.g. the South China Sea disputes). For the purpose of this thesis, 'Southeast Asian waters' are defined as Southeast Asian nations' territorial waters and international waters in the Southeast Asian region. These policies are identified and analysed as presented in Prime Minister Abe's public statements and speeches. Considering existing literature that proposes the existence of an 'Abe Doctrine', the policies are examined to determine whether they align with what might reasonably be expected of such an 'Abe Doctrine'.

Within the existing literature on Japanese foreign relations and foreign and security policies, there is a significant body of work exploring the constantly evolving relations between Japan and its immediate neighbours, China, South Korea and North Korea. Similarly, there is much literature concerning relations between Japan and its sole official ally, the United States. In many of these sources, there is speculation that Japan is seeking further allies, military, economic or otherwise, and increased involvement in the Asia-Pacific region, largely with the aim to surround China. Furthermore, since his re-election in 2012, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō is widely seen as a major driving force behind this move. However, less literature addresses how Abe would seek to cooperate with these other countries, or what sort of roles Abe desires Japan to play in the wider Asia-Pacific region.

If Japan under Prime Minister Abe is indeed seeking allies and greater involvement in the larger Asia-Pacific region, it becomes important to examine a subsection thereof. Southeast Asia fits this criterion, as a large geographical area near to but not containing Japan, comprising many other nations, major shipping lanes and increasing Chinese activity. Southeast Asia therefore appears to be a prime location for modern Japanese policy to focus on and an ideal region for examining modern Japanese foreign and security policies.

Japan-Southeast Asia relations are not an untrodden area of study. However, most studies are predominantly focussed on the political and/or economic ties between either Japan and various Southeast Asian nations (e.g. Sing, 1995; Mendl, 2001), or between Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (e.g. Sudo, 2005). In this context, Japan's

security roles or interests have often been relegated to minor notes under the umbrella of diplomatic relations. This can largely be attributed to the influence of the Fukuda Doctrine. Declared in 1977, the Fukuda Doctrine stated that Japan would not play an active security role in Southeast Asia, instead focusing on diplomatic and economic ties. This declaration was immediately welcomed by Southeast Asian leaders and strengthened Japan-Southeast Asia relations. However, as Singh notes, Japan has actually pursued a more active role in Southeast Asian security affairs since the 1980s (Singh, 2010, pp.394-395). I would therefore argue that the existing literature has neglected Japan's security role in Southeast Asia, leaving a relatively unexplored subject that warrants further investigation. Japan does frequently engage in multi-lateral naval exercises in Southeast Asia, and in recent years has become increasingly involved in operations in international waters. As a result, this thesis will focus on Japanese maritime policy within Southeast Asian waters.

For the purpose of this thesis, the 'Southeast Asia region' is defined as the 10 member-states of ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) plus Timor-Leste. Accordingly, 'Southeast Asian waters' are defined as any waters belonging to or claimed by any of these countries. Given that several of the above-mentioned states claim sections of the South China Sea (SCS), it is reasonable to expect that these territorial claims will influence Japanese maritime policy in the region, or at least, how it presents maritime policy in a multilateral setting. For this reason, the SCS is included in this study.

This thesis also offers the opportunity to investigate, and in effect stress-test the "Abe Doctrine", an academic concept that has emerged in recent years. The Abe Doctrine has been the subject of various researchers' attentions (e.g. Akimoto, 2018; Fukuda, 2015; Hughes, 2015; Dobson, 2016), as they seek to explain and predict a distinct change in Japanese policy (including foreign policy) under Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. Although Abe himself has not officially declared a 'doctrine', Hughes states that:

Abe's 'diplomatic agenda' (*Abe gaiko*) has been so distinctive and so forcefully articulated in the past years that it might be labelled as a doctrine capable of rivalling, and even of displacing, the doctrine of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru that has famously determined Japan's entire post-war international trajectory (Hughes, 2015, p.2).

The thesis therefore further considers the issue of 'doctrines' and the positioning of Japan's maritime policy within such a framework.

I posit that within an Abe Doctrine as described by Hughes and others, Japan should exhibit a clear and consistent maritime policy; or at the least, Abe should exhibit intentions for such a policy. As such, I examine this maritime policy, specifically in the Southeast Asia region, and compare this reality to what would be expected in line with the proposed Abe Doctrine. Finding consistent promotion of such policies as per the Abe Doctrine would strengthen the proposal for the Doctrine. As a result, the Abe Doctrine may prove a more useful tool in understanding and predicting future Japanese policy.

Different ideas have been proposed by academics for a so-called ‘Abe Doctrine’ though, and there is no consensus yet as to precisely what the Doctrine entails. However, there are common themes and policies between them, and all versions focus on Japan more proactively contributing to peace on a regional or global scale. As such, constructing a working framework of the Abe Doctrine is a crucial process discussed later in this thesis.

Overall, the purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, it considers the question: *Has Prime Minister Abe Shinzō maintained a consistent approach to maritime policies affecting Southeast Asia?* If the policy statements are not consistent, this would raise the further question: *Is it possible to determine the reason for the differentiation?* Second, it addresses the question: *Do the proclaimed policies align with what would be expected within the broader framework of the ‘Abe Doctrine’?*

The first chapter, offering a review of the existing literature, is separated into two parts, the first looking at Southeast Asian waters, and Japanese policies towards the region; and the second examining the existing discussions around Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and his influence on Japanese ideals and policies. The second chapter explains the methods used in this thesis. The primary sources comprise of translated speech transcripts and press releases from Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. These sources are then analysed using discourse analysis. Chapter three discusses the findings regarding Japanese maritime policy applicable to Southeast Asian waters. The policies have been divided between policy strategies that have been officially declared as such, and those that have been identified from the materials through analysis, which are a matter of interpretation. In chapter four these findings are further compared to the framework of the Abe Doctrine; and I examine whether the maritime policies identified are in line with those that would be expected as per the doctrine. A final review of the findings allows conclusions to be drawn about Japanese maritime policy in

Southeast Asia waters, and whether these lend support to the concept of the Abe Doctrine, or question its viability as a theory going forwards.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This thesis examines Japan's stance and policies regarding Southeast Asian waters during the Prime Ministership of Abe Shinzō. This includes Japan's active or proposed roles in Southeast Asian waters, as well as Japan's official stances on issues in the region (e.g. the SCS disputes). For this purpose, I examine these issues regarding both Southeast Asian nations' territorial waters and international waters in the Southeast Asian region. A review of the existing literature can be broadly separated into two major themes: Southeast Asian waters and Japanese policy regarding them, and Abe Shinzō and the 'Abe Doctrine'.

Southeast Asian Waters within International Relations

First, regarding Southeast Asian waters within the field of International Relations, I have identified two major topics of discussion: territorial disputes and piracy. However, the literature on piracy is only a small niche, and is far outweighed by that on territorial disputes. In terms of territorial disputes, a variety of literatures outlines the origins of the disputes (e.g. Heydarian, 2018) and how they have developed more recently (e.g. Ravenhill, 2013; Storey and Lin, 2016). The major set of territorial disputes in Southeast Asia are in the SCS between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei.

The SCS contains thousands of small islands and reefs, most of which are known as the Spratly Islands and are spread across the SCS; and in the SCS's Northwest corner is another significant group called the Paracel Islands. The Paracel Islands are disputed between China (and subsequently Taiwan, which makes all the same claims as Beijing based upon the 'One China' policy) and Vietnam, as China took the islands from Vietnam in 1974. The greater dispute, however, concerns the Spratly Islands. As the islands are scattered across the entire SCS, they fall within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei; most of which overlap, leading to conflict over who controls which islands. However, some of these countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia have settled disputes over specific islands (e.g. Scott, 2012, pp.1020-1021; Yang and Li, 2016).

China on the other hand, has established its so-called 'Nine-Dash Line', encompassing the majority of the SCS, far from China's EEZ. China (and subsequently Taiwan) has made this claim based upon supposedly discovering and thus owning the islands since ancient times.

These claims are, however, widely disputed, thereby making China and Taiwan the only countries in dispute with every other nation on the SCS (e.g. Yang and Li, 2016). China is also claiming the sea based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea's (UNCLOS) principle of a continental shelf, whereas the ASEAN nations claim the area based on the UNCLOS principle of 'Territorial Seas' (Simon, 2012, p.1001). In 2013, the Philippines submitted an arbitration request to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Seas to examine the legitimacy of China's Nine-Dash Line. In 2016, the Tribunal ruled in favour of the Philippines, and found the Nine-Dash Line to be unlawful. China and Taiwan have rejected this outcome (Sison, 2018).

Japan has long shown a key interest in Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1946-7, 1948-54) was the first post-war prime minister to publicly recognise the significance of Southeast Asia to Japan in both economic and political arenas (Llewelyn, 2014, pp.86-89). This is because Japan views Southeast Asia as strategically vital to Japanese security, in large part due to Japan's nature as a resource-poor maritime nation. Sea Lines of Communication are therefore vital to Japan - key among these is the SCS, through which large percentages of Japanese exports and imports travel, including the majority of Japanese oil imports (Grønning, 2018, pp.540-542; Boon, 2018, p.351; Midford, 2015, p.525). As a result, post-war Japan has placed a clear focus on promoting stability and Japanese influence in the region, largely through economic and other non-military means (e.g. Llewelyn, 2014; Singh, 2010). However, in the 21st century, as the Rise of China has increasingly been seen as a risk to Japan and/or the regional order, and as Japan has moved towards becoming a 'normal power', Japan has also been more open to building the military capacity of Southeast Asian nations (e.g. Grønning, 2018; Trinidad, 2018).

The concept of Japanese prime ministers declaring 'doctrines' is established within the existing literature. Although none of these doctrines were named as such by the respective Prime Ministers, they have each come to be widely recognised as 'doctrines' based on a specific set of policies actively espoused and pursued by each Prime Minister. The most well-known of these is the Yoshida Doctrine, which has defined Japan's post-war trajectory. The Yoshida Doctrine focusses on Japan's economic growth, while pursuing restrained defence policies and committing to the US-Japan Alliance to guarantee Japan's security (Dobson, 2017, p.205).

There is also a history of Japanese doctrines specifically denoting Japanese policy towards Southeast Asia. The first and most important of these was the Fukuda Doctrine, articulated by Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo in 1977. The Fukuda Doctrine declared the basis for Japanese relations with Southeast Asian nations going forward based on three concepts: Japan would act as an economic but not military power in Southeast Asia, Japan would act responsibly towards an interdependent world community, and Japan would commit to mutual understanding between itself and Southeast Asian nations (Kojima, 2006, pp.5-6; Sudo, 2015, p.11). The subsequent Takeshita Doctrine (declared by Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru in 1989) and Hashimoto Doctrine (declared by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō in 1997) reiterated Japan's commitment to the Fukuda Doctrine and placed further emphasis on Japan's continuing commitment to Southeast Asia, albeit in a non-military capacity (Sudo, 2015).

Given this history, the Abe Doctrine recently proposed by academics may plausibly affect Japanese policy towards Southeast Asia. This opens the question as to whether a supposed Abe Doctrine would have significant ramifications on Japanese policy towards Southeast Asia specifically; and is considered in this thesis.

Prime Minister Abe Shinzō

After a short-lived first term as prime minister which ended with Abe's resignation (2006-7), Abe was re-elected to office in December 2012. After winning the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)'s leadership election in 2018, he is now expected to govern until 2021, and become the longest serving Prime Minister in Japanese history. Since his return to power in December 2012, Abe has universally come to be seen as a significant figure in contemporary Japanese politics. The first and most obvious reason for this is his staying power: Abe has now been in office for 6 consecutive years and may become Japan's longest-serving Prime Minister. This stands in stark contrast to the previous 6 Prime Ministers (Abe's first term, Fukuda Yasuo, Asō Tarō, Hatoyama Yukio, Kan Naoto, Noda Yoshihiko), none of whom held the office for more than 15 months. In fact, there is a noticeable change in how Abe is viewed before and after his return to office. For example, writing in 2012, Jeff Kingston said "Abe will mostly be remembered as a hapless politician out of his depth" (p.123). Compare this to more recent sources, with Hugo Dobson stating that "Abe has emerged not only as the "comeback kid" of Japanese politics but also something of a success story" (2017, p.199-

200); with other researchers declaring Abe to be “Japan’s Most Consequential Prime Minister since Yoshida Shigeru” (Editorial Staff, 2015).

The other key aspect of Abe Shinzō is his role as a change-maker. Abe has become well-known for his revisionist tendencies, especially during his first term (2006-7) – Pugliese explains in detail the reasoning behind Abe’s ideological stances, many of which were inspired by his grandfather Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (in office 1957-1960). A key component of Abe’s ideology is the notion of Japanese primacy in Asia, and the threat China poses to such primacy (Pugliese, 2017, pp.155-157). This explains many of Abe’s foreign policy approaches, such as ‘value-based diplomacy’ to encourage other nations to side with democratic Japan over authoritarian China (Pugliese, 2017, pp.162-164). Abe’s beliefs seem to have been fuelled by the fact that during the five years between his two turns in office, China had come to increasingly exert its influence in territorial disputes (e.g. De Castro, 2016, pp.166-170; Yang and Li, 2016, pp.144-148). As a result, despite saying China’s rise offers “great opportunities for us all”, Abe has placed increased focus on providing a counterbalance to China since his re-election, compared to his first term (Lee, 2015, pp.10-18). However, according to Kitaoka, Abe is doing this in a circumspect manner, avoiding the overly provocative approach that defined his first term (Kitaoka, 2013, p.8). This seems to explain the newfound approach of “proactive pacifism”, which calls for increased Japanese presence on the world stage but still in a limited capacity. Similarly, Abe has taken the approach of reinterpreting Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution to allow collective self-defence of allies, rather than trying to amend it outright. Article 9 prohibits Japan from maintaining a military (although the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) are essentially a military force in all but name) and forbids Japan from ever going to war, except in self-defence upon being attacked. Abe’s change in tack comes after he was heavily criticised for trying to amend the constitution during his first term (Kingston, 2012, p.123).

Abe also has clear intentions in terms of shaping which nations Japan works with as partners. In an English language op-ed released days after his re-election in 2012, Abe called for the construction of “Asia’s democratic security diamond” among the four largest Indo-Pacific democracies of Japan, India, Australia and the United States, and an increased presence in the region of the “sea-faring democracies” of France and Great Britain; so as to prevent the SCS from becoming the “Beijing Sea”. With this publication, Abe showed a clear intention to completely reframe the security situation in East Asia as an “Indo-Pacific” one with greater

interaction between the large democracies around China (Maslow, 2015, p.751; Sakaki, 2015, p.30).

Admittedly, Abe has not been the only Prime Minister to advance Japan's military capabilities, raising debates in the literature as to what extent Abe can be credited with Japan's recent policy shifts. Many sources point out that Japanese foreign and security policy have changed gradually since the end of the Cold War (e.g. Gilson, 2006). More specifically, Midford states that it was in fact the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) which is responsible for much of Japan's recent shift towards playing a greater role in global and regional security. In government from 2009-2012, the DPJ's election victory in 2009 removed the LDP from government for the first time since 1955; part of which is credited to Hatoyama Yukio's unsuccessful attempt to make Japan more assertive within the Japan-US alliance. Midford assigns great credit to DPJ Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko, detailing the way in which Noda's administration advanced ideas of greater Japanese participation in international fora and organisations, and engaged in other security activities such as capacity-building of Southeast Asian nations (Midford, 2015, pp.535-543). Grønning similarly shows that capacity-building and other activities seen as China-balancing were undertaken before Abe's return to power (Grønning, 2014; Grønning, 2018). However, I would argue that major change has still occurred under the Abe administration. For example, the Abe administration's 2015 revision of the US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation made radical changes, in comparison to relatively minor tweaks in previous revisions; such as by greatly increasing both the scope and geographic range of support for American forces (Hughes, 2018a, pp.53-54). Another major development under the Abe administration was the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) in 2013, consisting of the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Foreign Minister and the Chief Cabinet Secretary. The NSC is also supported administratively by the National Security Secretariat (NSS), which in addition to providing information and support to the NSC, de facto operates as a new major channel for security negotiations with other nations. As a result, the NSC and NSS have been credited with giving the Prime Minister and his Cabinet real power to direct foreign and security policy in a newly synchronised manner that is likely to have a major impact on the Prime Minister's role in long-term strategic policy. The NSC can also definitely be claimed as one of Abe's achievements, as it was initially proposed during his first term (Sakaki, 2015, pp.12-15). I would therefore suggest that the reality lies somewhere between the two extremes:

although Japanese foreign and security policy had begun to change before Abe's return to power, Prime Minister Abe has still made a significant impact.

Several authors posit that Abe may be more harmful for Japan's foreign strategy than beneficial, but this demonstrates that they also see Abe as important to Japan's trajectory (e.g. Fukuda, 2015). As for those who accuse Abe's administration of a lack of innovation, they at the very least tend to concede that he is rapidly 'accelerating' initiatives put forward by past administrations (particularly that of Prime Minister Noda). This interpretation would mean that even if Abe is creating fewer new policies himself, he is at least still trying to shape existing policies to his own design, rather than merely letting them continue as originally planned (e.g. Sakaki, 2015, p.18; Liff, 2015). There therefore appears to be a general consensus that Abe is a changing force within Japanese politics, even if the extent to how much and in what way is debated.

Given that Abe is seen as a changing force within Japanese politics, this raises the question as to whether there is indeed an 'Abe Doctrine'. Hughes equates this with the Japanese term *Abe gaikō* (安倍外交), which translates literally as 'Abe diplomacy' (Hughes, 2015, p.2). In recent years, increasing numbers of scholars, both Western and Japanese, have begun to use the phrase Abe Doctrine (or *Abe gaikō* in Japan) (Dobson, 2017, p.203). However, the term 'Abe Doctrine' was not coined by the Abe administration, but within academia; and the term has not yet come to be commonly used in ordinary Japanese parlance, nor has Prime Minister Abe ever defined his national security strategy with such a term (Akimoto, 2018, p.3). In addition, the Abe Doctrine evidently remains an evolving concept, as there are differing lines of discourse in the existing literature as to precisely what the specifics of the Doctrine may be. Other discussions centre around how effective such a doctrine actually is in achieving Abe's goals (e.g. Fukuda, 2015). However, little if any of the literature on the Abe Doctrine questions the core concept itself, denoting an increasing acceptance of the existence of an Abe Doctrine (Akimoto, 2018, p.4; Dobson, 2017, p.203). Reference to an Abe Doctrine only emerges after Abe's re-election as Prime Minister, and not during his first term, which, as previously mentioned, was seen as relatively inconsequential, hence the focus of this thesis on Abe's time in office since re-election.

There is not yet, however, a consensus as to precisely what an Abe Doctrine entails. Christopher Hughes perhaps offers the most developed ideas in his work, but other authors have proposed other tenets that either expand on or differ from Hughes' work. As a result,

there appears to be no pre-set framework for investigating the Abe Doctrine. As part of my methodology, I therefore further discuss existing ideas on the Abe Doctrine, and attempt to construct a functioning framework for this thesis.

There is one final observation that I drew from the existing literature, which helped influence the design of this study. Amongst sources that write about the Abe administration, it is common for authors to reference speeches by Prime Minister Abe. However, they tend to focus on a select few speeches, such as Abe's keynote speech at the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue (Abe, 2014g). As such, there does not appear to be a thorough analysis of speeches during the Abe administration from either Abe or his senior ministers. This thesis takes a different approach by examining a more comprehensive selection of speeches.

METHODOLOGY

This chapter outlines the methods chosen to answer my research questions. Regarding data selection, I have chosen to use translated transcripts of speeches given by Prime Minister Abe Shinzō relevant to Southeast Asian waters. The selected materials are then analysed using discourse analysis. This is done by coding for emergent themes, and then drawing conclusions about Abe's policies from the results of the coding process.

Data Collection

The chosen primary materials for this thesis are translated transcripts of public speeches and statements given by Prime Minister Abe. I have selected translated statements and speech transcripts based on several factors.

Firstly, I examine speeches and statements rather than legislation. This is because, although legislation will show the current legal state of Japan's maritime policy towards Southeast Asia, this may not necessarily represent the intentions of Prime Minister Abe. As the literature shows, when progressing from ideals to actual legislation, bills can be greatly altered in response to public opposition or the LDP's coalition partner Komeitō (a Buddhist, pacifist party). As a result, the goals of the Prime Minister or the LDP may not necessarily come to fruition (e.g. Lande, 2018, pp.180-182; Liff, 2015, p.92). Therefore, I have instead chosen to review speeches delivered by, and statements released by Prime Minister Abe, which will have been specifically structured to reflect the intentions of Prime Minister Abe's administration.

Secondly, public speeches from senior government officials will have been written for a specific purpose. This is crucial, as it means the speeches are more likely to have been crafted to convey strategic messages, rather than the private opinion of the speaker. This is also why I do not examine interviews, Q&A sessions, etc., as an answer given on the spot may not be 'on message' due to a lack of facts or the intervention of the interviewer to cut an answer short; in contrast to pre-planned speeches, which should be properly prepared to avoid any such factual pitfalls. Given that the focus of this thesis is devised policy, I therefore posit that pre-drafted statements will more accurately reflect the intended government policy. This is particularly useful when assessing whether the content of these speeches fits within the

framework of the proposed Abe Doctrine. The official nature of speeches is therefore key to analysing government policy and the possible existence of the Doctrine.

Thirdly, the official transcripts for speeches are recorded and made freely available online. In the case of Abe, his speeches, as well as other statements such as press releases and press conferences are available through the website of the Prime Minister's Office (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2019). The public availability of documents clearly facilitates research and further means that if any other researcher wished to repeat my investigation and compare or critique my analysis, they can easily access the primary materials.

Finally, I have selected the transcripts for these speeches because they are officially published in English as well as in Japanese. Foremost, this facilitates analysis of the materials.

Although I have studied the Japanese language for several years and achieved a recognised business-level fluency in Japanese (Japanese Language Proficiency Test Level 2), I may still miss minor details, such as the choice of specific words instead of other alternatives, which I would be less likely to miss in English. In line with this idea, although direct translation from one language to another is not always possible, the fact that the documents have been officially translated and released by the appropriate government outlets means that they should be translated to convey Japanese policy as intended in the original Japanese version. This is opposed to an independent translation, that may still be technically correct, but lack some of the intended nuance, which should be maintained by an official translation. Naturally, policies may be presented slightly differently for an English-speaking audience than for a Japanese audience. However, the policies will remain the same, and the way they are presented specifically for a non-Japanese audience may provide further help in assessing how Abe seeks to portray policies geopolitically. As a result, I concluded that using official English translations of the speech transcripts was the most effective way for me to analyse the policy content of the speeches.

As stated above, Abe's first term in office is largely viewed as inconsequential, and references to the Abe Doctrine do not appear in the literature until his second term in office. As a result, speech transcripts from Abe's first term in office have been excluded from this investigation.

Given the establishment of the NSC and NSS, and the increased synchronicity that they now provide to Japanese foreign and security policy, I had previously explored the possibility of

also examining Defense and Foreign Ministers' speeches in line with those of Prime Minister Abe. As highlighted by the existing literature discussed earlier, the establishment of the two bodies in 2013 represents a significant advancement in policy-planning under the Abe administration. Due to the newfound unity created by the NSC, I considered that this might create a unified policy front between Abe's own speeches and those of his Defense and Foreign Ministers. However, at present, critics point to various issues with the NSC. For example, Sakaki notes that the Japanese Cabinet remains prone to reshuffling, and ministerial positions are often redistributed to satisfy factions within the LDP. This continual upheaval may cause the NSC's membership to fluctuate substantially, slowing down policy strategizing within the NSC (Sakaki, 2015, p.13). Maslow highlights other issues. For example, the NSC has been criticised for lacking methods to guarantee transparency or public accountability; issues which raise many questions, including about how effective the NSC actually is in achieving a unified policy front between Prime Minister Abe and the other members of the NSC (Maslow, 2015, p.755). As a result, although the NSC introduces a new dynamic to Japanese policy making, in light of issues such as those listed above, this thesis focusses specifically on Prime Minister Abe himself. Doing so guarantees that the material in question will reflect the Prime Minister's policy intentions.

The next step is the selection of transcripts that are relevant to the research area. My first research question focusses the scope of this thesis on waters within the Southeast Asia region: *Has Prime Minister Abe Shinzō maintained a consistent approach to maritime policies affecting Southeast Asia?* In the introduction to this thesis, Southeast Asia region was defined as the 10 member-states of ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) plus Timor-Leste; thereby defining 'Southeast Asian waters' as any waters belonging to or claimed by any of these countries. Given that several of the above-mentioned states claim sections of the SCS, and, as demonstrated in the review of existing literature, the SCS is important to Japanese strategic interests, the SCS is included in my definition of 'Southeast Asian waters'. As a result, speeches have been selected if they refer to waters within this region. This also includes references to international waters.

Speeches were then systematically selected from the database of Prime Ministerial speeches on the Cabinet Office website (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2019). At the time of data collection (early March 2019), the database contained Abe's speeches and statements

from his re-inauguration on 26th December 2012 until 30th January 2019. This represents a time period of over 6 years, which as mentioned previously in the literature review is an exceptionally long time under a single Japanese Prime Minister; and contains a total of 336 speeches or statements, as well as a handful of links to articles by Prime Minister Abe published in international newspapers prior to his visits to those countries (none of which were applicable to the subject area of this thesis). Out of this total of 336 speeches, I selected 57 which I deemed relevant. These 57 materials refer to waters in or including the Southeast Asia region as defined above. A complete list of the selected material is denoted as ‘Primary Literature’ in the bibliography of this thesis.

Several points should be clarified about the selected materials. First, it should be noted that in the vast majority of the selected material, maritime policy and/or the Southeast Asian region feature as only a segment of the speech. In some cases, this may be a sizable section, but in others only a comment or two. However, if they touched upon the area relevant to this thesis, I selected them as primary material, regardless of size; as even small comments can provide insight into Abe’s intentions for maritime policy in Southeast Asia and may demonstrate or disprove continuity in them. In fact, of the selected materials, only a few are specifically dedicated to Japanese maritime policy applicable to Southeast Asian waters – if only these sources had been selected it would not represent a significant enough sample size for analysis. Therefore, the amount of relevant material contained within the selected materials varies from piece to piece.

Secondly, it should be noted that although several of the selected materials are listed as press conferences, I only examine the Prime Minister’s opening statement in each such case. This reflects the decision to examine pre-prepared, rather than off-the-cuff remarks, as discussed above.

Finally, there were two topics of speeches that may be connected to maritime policy in Southeast Asian waters which I chose not to select. The first excluded subject is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP was a proposed economic partnership between 12 nations bordering the Pacific Ocean, which was not realised after the United States withdrew from the proposed agreement. Before then, Japan had been a keen advocate of the TPP, and as such, it was mentioned in many speeches by Prime Minister Abe. However, although the TPP involved several ASEAN nations, I deemed that the partnership was an economic, rather than maritime policy for Japan; both in terms of functionality and how it was portrayed by Abe

Shinzō in his speeches on the subject. As a result, I chose to exclude the TPP from the primary material. The second subject I chose to exclude was deployment of JSDF to the Philippines. I chose to exclude this subject because, in Abe's speeches, he only mentions JSDF troops engaging in rebuilding efforts and medical care in areas affected by natural disasters on land; and does not mention any activities occurring simultaneously in Philippines waters. As a result, I deemed the deployments as not maritime policy (and rather as diplomatic policy) and thus chose to not include them.

As previously mentioned, this leaves 57 speeches or statements by Prime Minister Abe Shinzō that appear relevant to understanding Abe's intended maritime policy in Southeast Asian waters.

Method of Analysis

Having gathered the appropriate research materials, this brings us to the matter of analysing the speech transcripts. First, the selected materials were exported into the analysis programme NVivo 12 Plus, with which the materials were coded for themes. A few themes were coded based on major points of the Abe Doctrine Framework, which I have constructed in the following section. However, in respect of Abe's maritime policies, policies and themes were coded for as they emerged from the materials.

I have coded and analysed the content of the gathered materials using discourse analysis. I have chosen discourse analysis for several reasons. First, I am examining how Abe frames his maritime policies, making discourse analysis an obvious choice. This makes sense when viewed from the perspective that "our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, rather, play an active role in creating and changing them" (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002, p.1). As such, the discourse in Abe's speeches can be analysed to understand how Abe frames the world as it exists, and how he seeks to make changes to it. Second, discourse analysis is applicable to my chosen methods, and works especially well for emergent coding, as discourse analysis is a deductive method oriented on solving specific problems (Siegel, 2018): in the case of this thesis, the research questions presented. Finally, as the sources being analysed regard intended policy, discourse analysis allows us to examine how Abe uses discourse in an attempt to influence other discourses, or to make "certain activities possible, desirable or inevitable" (Bryman, 2012, p.537).

Constructing a Framework for the Abe Doctrine

The final research question of this thesis asks: *Do the proclaimed policies align with what would be expected within the broader framework of the 'Abe Doctrine'?* To conduct this analysis, I first had to construct a framework of the 'Abe Doctrine', against which to analyse my findings. In this case, the framework is composed to reflect the Abe Doctrine as proposed by academics. Using this framework allows me to examine whether this proposed Abe Doctrine has been consistently pursued by Prime Minister Abe in his speeches regarding Southeast Asia.

As mentioned, the term Abe Doctrine was coined in academia, not by the Abe administration itself, and Prime Minister Abe has never used the term himself to refer to his diplomatic or security strategies (Akimoto, 2018, p.3). As the Abe Doctrine is still a developing concept, however, there is currently no single accepted framework that defines what the Abe Doctrine is or is not. I have therefore constructed a framework for use in the context of this thesis based on the current academic discussions on the concept. I should make it clear that it was not my aim to construct a framework of how the Abe Doctrine relates to all of Japan's foreign policy; but specifically, to the Southeast Asian region.

The data collection process, however, did reveal an interesting anomaly. As stated by Akimoto above, I did not find any uses of the term 'Abe Doctrine' within any of Abe's speeches whilst reading through them for data selection. However, in the English transcript for a Dinner Speech Abe gave on 23rd May 2013 regarding the "Future of Asia", The subheading "The "Abe Doctrine"" was added for a section where Abe talks about five principles to define Japanese diplomacy (Abe, 2013f). It should be made clear that the term 'Abe Doctrine' does not appear within the speech itself, nor was it added as a subheading in the original Japanese transcript. However, this does signify that someone within the Prime Minister's office has at some point deemed there to be some relevant connection between the 'Abe Doctrine' and these five principles. These principles should therefore be considered when constructing a framework for the Abe Doctrine. The five principles expressed in this section are as follows: first, allowing the universal values of freedom of thought, expression and speech to flower in Asia; second, ensuring the seas are governed by laws and rules, not might; third, Japan will pursue free, open interconnected economies; fourth, increasing intercultural ties; and finally, inviting 30,000 young people from across Asia to Japan in a

program called JENESYS 2.0 (Abe, 2013f). Interestingly, Fukuda (2015) does use this speech as a basis for an Abe Doctrine. This will be discussed later.

The ‘Abe Doctrine’ is a term still predominantly used in the academic sphere though; meaning that review of the academic discussion around the concept is key to the construction of an Abe Doctrine framework.

At present, perhaps the most comprehensive study on the concept of the Abe Doctrine has been carried out by Christopher Hughes in his 2015 book *Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’: New Dynamism or New Dead End?* In this book, Hughes identifies three key tenets of the Abe Doctrine. The first tenet is the restoration of Japan’s status as a ‘great power’. This includes Japan’s appeals to “values-oriented diplomacy”, which is a strategy to elevate Japan’s position in Asia compared to China. Second is Japan engaging in a more proactive security role – what Abe has labelled as Japan making a “proactive contribution to peace”. Finally, historical revisionism to remove Japan’s historical constraints. Hugo Dobson suggests Abenomics (Abe’s economic plans) should constitute a fourth tenet, as continued economic strength will be necessary to ensure the three tenets identified by Hughes (Dobson, 2017, pp.203-205, p.217; Hughes, 2015).

Hughes is not the only scholar to propose a structure for an Abe Doctrine. One of the earliest uses of the term ‘Abe Doctrine’ is by Bhuhindar Singh. Singh proposes a different Abe Doctrine, based upon Abe’s keynote speech at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue (Abe, 2014g), and composed of three policies for diplomacy under Abe’s administration:

First, Japan is committed and will strongly uphold international law that related to the freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight. Second, Japan will continue to not only maintain but strengthen the US-Japan security relationship. Third, Japan will strengthen its relations with the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) both as an institution and with the member states. Together, these could be understood as the Abe Doctrine (Singh, 2014).

Singh’s proposition for an Abe Doctrine does not contradict Hughes broad themes but rather provides a narrower concept for an Abe Doctrine that has a far greater focus on Southeast Asia and maritime policy, but is largely only a suggestion, and lacks the comprehensive discussion provided by Hughes.

Fukuda offers yet another alternative, this time based upon Abe’s “Future of Asia” speech (Abe, 2013f), as previously referenced, giving added weight to the proposition that the five

points presented in the speech be considered for inclusion in a framework for the Abe Doctrine. As outlined previously, this provides another version of a Southeast Asia-focused Abe Doctrine, and consists of the following five policies: 1) protection of universal values such as freedom of thought, expression, and speech; 2) ensuring the rule of law at sea; 3) pursuit of free, open, interconnected economies; 4) strengthening of intercultural ties; and 5) promotion of youth exchange (Fukuda, 2015, p.24).

As a comparison between the three different Abe Doctrines, the most well-developed model is the one developed by Hughes, although this version of the Doctrine is designed as a Doctrine guiding all Japanese foreign policy, not just that aimed at Southeast Asia. The other two models are less developed, but more focused on Southeast Asia, and are each based on elements of Prime Minister Abe's speeches. I therefore decided to combine the three models into a hybrid, using Hughes' grand-strategy version as a base, but tailoring it to a regional level as per the other models. If the concept of an Abe Doctrine is to serve as a new grand theory for explaining Japanese foreign policy under Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, it must logically be able to be applied to specific regions and specific areas within Japanese foreign policy – in the case of this thesis, maritime policy in Southeast Asia.

Given this focus, I have chosen to exclude some of the above proposed points. Firstly, although Abenomics has been Abe's flagship economic policy, and as Dobson rightly points out that a strong economy is necessary for implementing other policies, none of Abenomics' 'Three Arrows' relates to maritime policy. As such, I have chosen to exclude Abenomics, based upon its nature as an economic, rather than maritime policy. Similarly, Abe is often associated with historical revisionism, but this tends to come in domestic cultural forms such as revision of history textbooks. The only historical revisionism relevant to maritime policy would be revision of Japan's pacifist constitution. However, given that Abe has shelved that plan for now, I have also chosen to exclude historical revisionism from this framework.

As such, the framework for the Abe Doctrine will consist of the following list of points, which should be observed within Abe's public speeches if the Abe Doctrine can indeed be applied to specific policies and regional contexts. First, we should expect to see Abe emphasise Japan's status as a regional and global power. Second, we should observe Abe pushing for a greater security role in the region – his "proactive contribution to peace". This should contain two key subsections: strengthening cooperation with ASEAN nations and

securing freedom of navigation and overflight. Third, Abe should be seen espousing values-based diplomacy, focusing on values such as democracy and rule of law. Finally, Abe should be seen to promote strengthening of the Japan-US alliance within the region.

Ethical considerations

Given the chosen methods of data collection and analysis, one noticeable aspect of this study is the lack of direct human interaction. One clear advantage of this document-oriented approach is that this study avoids many of the ethical concerns that other researchers may encounter. For example, Bryman discusses general ethical principles regarding participant research (2012, pp.135-143). However, this thesis does not endanger or affect anyone in any such way.

Nevertheless, ethical issues can arise when using official documents, primarily in the forms of credibility (biases, etc.) and representativeness (Bryman, 2012, p.550). Similarly, there are issues of authenticity and credibility when using documents found online (Bryman, 2012, p.554). Authenticity is not an issue in this study, as the speeches are available from an official government source. Regarding credibility, potential biases within the documents are not a problem for this thesis, as Abe's biases will be of interest in analysing what policies he proposes and why. Finally, Bryman notes that representativeness is difficult to assess with official documents, due to their unique nature; but that in qualitative, non-statistical research, such as this thesis, this is not necessarily a problem anyway (Bryman, 2012, p.550).

Therefore, I conclude that by remaining aware of biases present in the documents, I can avoid the ethical concerns raised by Bryman regarding the analysis of documents.

PRIME MINISTER ABE AND MARITIME POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The first question to be addressed is: *Has Prime Minister Abe Shinzō maintained a consistent approach to maritime policies affecting Southeast Asia?* And if the policy statements are not consistent, the further research question: *Is it possible to determine the reason for the differentiation?*

Geography

Before analysing maritime policy, it is important to first examine the geographical context of Abe's maritime policies. In this first research question, I specifically chose to phrase the question as "policies affecting Southeast Asia" as opposed to "policies regarding Southeast Asia", as I knew that Prime Minister Abe would express views on maritime policies that were applicable to Southeast Asian waters, but did not specifically refer to Southeast Asia. This proved to be the case during data collection, as Abe often referred to waters in the larger region, international or global waters, or gave views on maritime policies with no mention of a particular geographical region.

This raises some interesting questions though: What regions or scope does Abe refer to when proposing maritime policies? And what can this tell us about the intentions of Abe's maritime policies? For this purpose, one of the themes I coded for was geographic regions of waters that Abe referred to in these speeches. The first region was Southeast Asia specifically, given that it is the area of primary interest to this thesis. The next three regions are larger specified areas that Southeast Asia may be included within: Maritime Asia, the Pacific, and the Indo-Pacific or meeting of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Otherwise, Abe made references to 'the seas' in general, with no reference to any specific geographic area. As such, these were not coded based on location.

Examining how and when Abe uses each geographical term may inform us of how Abe views maritime policy in Southeast Asia geopolitically speaking.

Out of the 57 sources, 15 specifically referred to Southeast Asian waters, as defined earlier in this thesis. In terms of specific waters in Southeast Asia, 11 referred to the SCS and 1 mentioned the Straits of Malacca. Otherwise, mentions were made to the waters of specific Southeast Asian nations (mainly Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines) or to Southeast Asian waters in general.

In several of the selected materials, Abe made references to Asian seas not in Southeast Asia, primarily those close to Japan such as the East China Sea or Sea of Japan. However, Abe rarely referred to these seas as a unified area, using the term ‘Maritime Asia’ in only 4 of the sources (Abe, 2013a; Abe, 2014e; Abe, 2015f; Abe, 2018e). The reason for avoiding this term is unclear, but perhaps due to the vagueness of precisely what area it might cover, as ‘Maritime Asia’ could include Southeast Asia and/or the Indian Ocean or neither.

The next category is the Pacific Ocean. Despite Japan often being characterised by Westerners as a Pacific nation, Abe only refers to the Pacific Ocean in 8 of the selected materials. This does not include references to both the Pacific and Indian Oceans, which I have classified as ‘Indo-Pacific’ (see next paragraph). Of these 8 sources, 2 are from speeches at Pacific Island Leaders Meeting summits, a Japanese initiative to encourage diplomacy and interaction between Japan and 16 other Pacific Ocean nations. As a result, Abe only mentions the Pacific Ocean (without the Indian Ocean) in 6 speeches not targeted solely towards Pacific island nations.

The Indo-Pacific, loosely-defined, was referred to in 22 of the 57 selected materials. I specify loosely-defined, as Abe did not specifically use the term “Indo-Pacific” in any of the selected materials until 2017 (Abe, 2017a), but in many cases made it clear that he referred to a continuous region spanning between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, such as referring to “the Confluence of the Two Seas” (Abe, 2013g; Abe, 2014g). This is interesting, as it shows that Abe has referred to the Pacific in connection to the Indian Ocean far more frequently than he has referred to the Pacific Ocean by itself; despite the fact that Japan has no territory in the Indian Ocean, and at present, very little naval presence there. Referring to connection between the two is therefore clearly done for a particular reason. There are three likely reasons to explain this: first, Japan is seeking to expand its own activities into a wider area not restricted to its immediate vicinity, and second, Abe can use this logic of ‘connected to seas’ to draw more nations from a wider area, such as India and Australia, into areas that Japan has interests in such as the East and South China Seas. Finally, Abe may have started using the term directly from 2017 to position himself geopolitically among other nations framing their foreign policies as within an ‘Indo-Pacific’ context, such as the United States.

Interestingly, this means that of all the regional terms, Abe refers to a wider Indo-Pacific region more than he does specifically to Southeast Asia, or even to just the Pacific (and not the Indian) Ocean. Similarly, although ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘Maritime Asia’ could have similar

meanings, Abe chooses to talk about the defined area of the ‘Indo-Pacific’, rather than a vague term such as ‘Maritime Asia’.

The problem with vague terms (such as ‘Maritime Asia’) is that anyone else can define them in a way you do not intend or wish, hindering the ability of one nation to operate in an area another nation is keen to keep them out of. As such, Abe displays a clear preference for specific terms, enabling him to better control the narrative of Japanese maritime policy. By referring to a larger region, Abe highlights the importance of Southeast Asian waters to a wider international region or community, rather than just those adjacent to it. This seems logical given that, Southeast Asia is a crucial channel for Japanese maritime trade.

Additionally, by referring to a larger region, in future Abe may be able to justify the involvement of Japan or its allies within Southeast Asian waters as members of a larger “Indo-Pacific” region; making them appear less like interfering outsiders to the region than they might do otherwise. This certainly seems to be the case: since 2017, Prime Minister Abe has stated a new maritime policy he calls the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”. This is discussed in greater detail below.

Named Policy Strategies

When policies are presented, it can be in the form of constructed, named policy strategies, or simply as individual policies. During the coding process I identified 4 policy strategies that had been deliberately constructed and framed as such.

“Five Principles for Diplomacy”

The first of these policy strategies is Abe’s “Five Principles for Diplomacy”, which first appears in the speech *The Bounty of the Open Sea: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy* which Abe was due to deliver in Jakarta on 18th January 2013 but was unable to, due to the development of the Algerian hostage crisis (Abe, 2013a). Despite not officially delivering this speech, Abe explicitly referred to this list of principles in a further three speeches, all later that year (Abe, 2013b; Abe, 2013f; Abe, 2013j). While this set of principles is focussed on a new strategy for Japanese diplomacy, it does place a clear emphasis on the significance of maritime policy within this new strategy.

The first is protecting freedom of thought, expression, and speech in this region where

two oceans meet. These are universal values that humanity has gained and they must be allowed to flower to the fullest.

The second is ensuring that the seas, which are the most vital commons to us all, are governed by laws and rules, not by might.

In connection with these two goals, I wholeheartedly welcome the American rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region (Abe, 2013a).

The second principle is the one that clearly applies to maritime policy, focusing on the respect for international laws and rules, and taking a stand against the use of force or coercion in violation of these rules. An interesting thing to note though is the phrasing used to describe the seas: “most vital commons to us all”. This phrase seems to define the seas by universal value, which could be done for two purposes. Firstly, it demonstrates the importance of the seas to all nations, so that Japan may gain support for this policy. However, it can be also be said that this phrasing demonstrates the importance of the seas to Japan, thereby clarifying why Japan may seek a more active role in the region so as to ensure that this principle is indeed met.

The final line of the quotation, however, is particularly interesting. Although protecting freedom of thought, expression, and speech is a common diplomatic agenda for democratic nations, it is generally not one that impacts on national maritime policy or strategy. However, in this line, Abe uses this goal as reasoning to support America’s involvement in the region, which includes America’s position as a major maritime power in the Asia-Pacific region. Given the American stance on the SCS dispute, support for continued American involvement in the region will de facto influence and be influenced by Japanese maritime strategy in the region. Abe has therefore declared that values are inherently linked to Japanese maritime policy.

The final three principles are geared towards general Japanese diplomacy. The third principle is the pursuit of free, open, interconnected economies; with Abe stating flows of trade and investment, people, and goods will create networks that bring Asia closer together.

The final two principles regard culture. In the fourth principle, Abe calls for an increase in intercultural ties between Asian nations; and in the fifth, he calls for promoting exchange between the younger generations of Asia “who will carry our nations into the future” (Abe, 2013a). However, before delivering these final two principles, Abe also makes an interesting statement about culture and how it connects to the Asian seas:

Maritime Asia has since ancient times been a place where civilizations blend with one another. Indonesia is a prime example of Maritime Asia's calm, open nature, which

brings about not conflict among different religions and culture, but coexistence. This is something that continues to impress a great many Japanese to this day (Abe, 2013a).

Although this observation was delivered between the third and fourth of Abe's Five Principles, it leads into the final two principles regarding culture, but also calls back to the second principle about respect for maritime rule of law. By calling a nation that "brings about not conflict... but coexistence" a "prime example" of "Maritime Asia... since ancient times", Abe may be making another point against the use of force or coercion in solving disputes. In doing so, Prime Minister Abe once again ties values to the Japanese stance on maritime issues in the region.

Interestingly though, overt references to the Five Principles for Diplomacy only appear in 2013, during Abe's first year after returning to power, but do not appear again after this. It is probable that as a new Prime Minister, Abe felt the need to declare his diplomatic principles immediately, to show that his appointment would have a significant impact on Japanese diplomacy. After this, the policies simply appear as individual policies, rather than in the Five Principles combination, as demonstrated in the following section regarding individual policies.

"Three Principles on the Rule of Law at Sea"

The next of Abe's policy strategies to emerge was his "Three Principles on the Rule of Law at Sea", which he first declared during his keynote speech at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue (Abe, 2014g). Abe lays out these Three Principles as follows:

The first principle is that states shall make and clarify their claims based on international law. The second is that states shall not use force or coercion in trying to drive their claims. The third principle is that states shall seek to settle disputes by peaceful means. So, to reiterate this, it means making claims that are faithful in light of international law, not resorting to force or coercion, and resolving all disputes through peaceful means (Abe, 2014g).

This makes for perhaps the clearest and most explicit maritime policy stance of the Abe administration's tenure. However, of all the materials analysed for this thesis, Abe only refers to his Three Principles as such in a further two speeches (Abe, 2015b; Abe, 2016c). For a maritime policy strategy aimed specifically at international disputes, this incredibly low

frequency rate suggests that this policy strategy either failed to enter international parlance or was designed only as a short-term strategy.

This is not to say that these ideas do not appear before or after these speeches. In fact, all the Principles (claims based on international law, force or coercion as illegitimate, and peaceful settlement of international disputes) each appear more times individually than they do as part of Abe's "Three Principles". It is possible that presenting these ideals as the "Three Principles on the Rule of Law at Sea" was a move to push them further into the international spotlight. However, as the term failed to gain common currency, it was ultimately dropped so that the ideals could continue to be pursued without having to refer to a since-abandoned concept.

As a result, the consistency of the policies that make up the Three Principles must be examined in further detail later.

"Proactive Contribution to Peace"

Aside from Abe's "Five Principles for Diplomacy" and "Three Principles on the Rule of Law at Sea", Abe has also promoted further policy strategies, but with less clarification as to what they explicitly mean. The first of these is Abe's call for Japan to make a "Proactive Contribution to Peace". This is perhaps the best-known of Abe's strategies, and already has a place in the existing literature: Alexandra Sakaki refers to "proactive pacifism" as Prime Minister Abe's "New Leitmotif" (Sakaki, 2015, pp.16-21).

Of the 57 materials gathered, in 25 of them, Abe made references to Japan making a "Proactive Contribution to Peace". This means that, of the four named policy strategies identified, "Proactive Contribution to Peace" is by far the most mentioned. Furthermore, it is the only phrase or strategy that has continued throughout the majority of Prime Minister Abe's tenure since his re-election: first appearing in September 2013 (Abe, 2013k) and most recently used in January 2019 (Abe, 2019b). It is therefore safe to say that "Proactive Contribution to Peace" is indeed the major foreign/security policy being proposed for Japan under Prime Minister Abe.

The main focus for Abe's "Proactive Contribution to Peace" is for Japan to take on a greater global security role, as he declares that he "will make Japan a force for peace and stability". More specifically, he states "I will enable Japan, as a Proactive Contributor to Peace, to be

even more actively engaged in UN collective security measures, including peacekeeping operations” (Abe, 2013k). However, Abe does not intend UN missions to be the sole means by which Japan can be a proactive contributor; he also intends for greater security support for, and interoperability with the United States. This is clear from his assertions that the Japan-US alliance is vital to the strategy:

Japan must not be the weak "link" within the "chain" of international cooperation. Japan must contribute to the peace and stability of the world more actively. I believe that "proactive contribution to peace" should be the banner Japan should raise in the 21st century. It goes without saying that the Japan-U.S. alliance should be the center of the "chain"... We will build a more robust Japan-U.S. alliance under the banner of our "proactive contribution to peace (Abe, 2013o).

Abe has intermittently reiterated this importance of Japan being a proactive contributor in allegiance with the United States, as well as with other allies of the US (Abe, 2014b), such as the UK (Abe, 2014d) or NATO (Abe, 2014e).

Perhaps the most interesting thing about “Proactive Contribution to Peace” though, is its flexibility. Although it demonstrates a clear strategy for Japan to play a greater global security role, by not laying out a clear-cut list of tenets when introducing the term (as was the case with the two previous strategies discussed), Abe has created a strategic term without the trappings of a specific policy that might become out-dated. As a result, Abe has been able to use the phrase to great utility, attaching the phrase to a wide variety of potential Japanese security activities, such as protecting freedoms of navigation and overflight (e.g. Abe, 2014e), disaster response (Abe, 2013p), cyberspace issues (Abe, 2013p); or making all-encompassing pledges to “safeguard and cultivate international goods, ranging from space and cyberspace, to the skies and the seas” (Abe, 2014c). In many cases, Abe simply states that Japan will be a proactive contributor to global peace and security, without making pledges of specific actions. In fact, over time, Abe has increasingly chosen this latter strategy. This suggests Abe may be increasingly wary of naming specific policies; perhaps in fear of either having Japan’s “Proactive Contribution to Peace” become reduced to a small, specific list of policies, or accidentally declaring a policy that could provoke condemnation and thus endanger the phrase’s viability.

While this demonstrates that “Proactive Contribution to Peace” is an overall security strategy, rather than a specifically maritime one, it demonstrates clear intentions for an increased

Japanese naval role in “global” contexts – i.e. for Japanese naval forces to be more involved in non-Japanese waters.

Finally, it should be noted that although Abe seeks Japan to play a larger security role, he has still been wary enough to assure critics that Japan remains committed to Pacifism. In 14 of the selected sources, Abe made this clear by either referring to Japan’s peaceful post-war history, or through phrases such as “I have absolutely no intention to climb the escalation ladder” (Abe, 2013c). In this, Abe shows he is wary of those that criticised him as a militaristic revisionist during his first term as Prime Minister.

As such, although “Proactive Contribution to Peace” may sound somewhat like a mere slogan, its flexibility has given it a longevity, which in turn has helped Abe continually press for Japan to play a greater global security role. At the same time, he has done this without pinning Japan into a position where it is either forced to complete or abandon specific policies within this strategy.

“Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”

Finally, the most recent of Abe’s named maritime policy strategies is the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”, which first appeared in the opening statement to a press conference in January 2017 (Abe, 2017a). The phrase appears in a further four of the selected materials since then (Abe, 2018a; Abe, 2018e; Abe, 2018f; Abe, 2019b).

Similar to his “Proactive Contribution to Peace”, Abe provides broad brush strokes as to what this strategy entails but gives few specifics as to precisely what Japan can or cannot do as part of this strategy. The first part of this strategy is that “to make unwavering the peace and prosperity of this region... Japan is determined to shoulder a major role and responsibilities as member of the region” (Abe, 2017a). This provides another clear signal that Japan intends to play an active role within this Indo-Pacific region, fitting in with the aforementioned pledge to make a “Proactive Contribution to Peace”.

The second key point of this strategy is cooperation with a vast range of nations across the Indo-Pacific region. When first mentioning the strategy, Abe talks about making the strategy “[o]n the solid basis of the Japan-U.S. alliance” (Abe, 2017a). However, since then he has expressly named other countries that he wishes Japan to cooperate with as part of this

strategy; in particular, Australia and India. When discussing partnerships with these countries, Abe emphasised the “fundamental values and strategic interests” that these countries share (Abe, 2017a), listing these values in early 2018 as “freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (Abe, 2018a). However, at no point does Abe define what either “fundamental values” or “strategic interests” mean, or what makes the values ‘fundamental’.

In terms of how this strategy is used, an interesting distinction appears. In the first appearance of the strategy, Abe also lists countries that Japan should work with “[b]ased on this overall direction”: China, South Korea and Russia (Abe, 2017a). The phrasing suggests that Abe likewise seeks cooperation with these countries but has made a distinction that they do not fall specifically under the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”. In the case of Russia and China, the point of “fundamental values” may explain why these countries are excluded due to their deficiencies of “freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”. However, these are all values that most scholars would agree are applicable to South Korea, raising the question of why South Korea is excluded from the Strategy. Given that Abe supposedly selects countries for cooperation within the strategy based upon “fundamental values and strategic interests”, and South Korea share the fundamental values, this suggests that South Korea has therefore been excluded from the Strategy due to “strategic interests” instead. The reason for this is not specified but may possibly be due to either South Korea’s relatively weaker military power, or historically poor relations between the two nations. Nevertheless, this exclusion would be consistent with Abe excluding South Korea from his “Asia’s democratic security diamond” proposal in 2012.

In the most recent reference to the strategy however, Abe lists each of these nations, as well as the United States as countries that Japan must cooperate with “[i]n order to make Northeast Asia a peaceful, prosperous and truly stable region... Japan will create a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, working together with all the countries that share this vision”, with no mention of values connecting any of these countries (2019b). This demonstrates a clear inconsistency in the Strategy, with a move away from a clear focus on “fundamental values” as a defining feature. This would suggest that although in earlier versions, Abe refers to “fundamental values and strategic interests”, the two are not integrally linked. Instead, the two are separate, with ‘strategic interests’ seemingly taking priority over ‘fundamental values’; meaning that as Japan’s ‘strategic interests’ shift over time, they may override ‘fundamental values’ when necessary. This could explain the observed recent shift away from ‘fundamental values’.

Abe's Other Policies

Unlike the four named policy strategies, above, many of Abe's other policies are not given such catchy monikers. Additionally, specific policies included within overarching strategies that Abe has abandoned, such as the Three Principles on the Rule of Law at Sea, continued even after the original terminology was discontinued.

Rule of International Law

The first and foremost of Abe's general policies is an emphasis on respect for, and protection of the rule of law, appearing in 47 of the 57 selected materials. This demonstrates that rule of law is a major principle for Abe Shinzō.

Abe refers to rule of law in a variety of ways. Often, he refers to it as a universal value shared by Japan and other nations, alongside democracy, freedom and human rights (e.g. Abe, 2013j; Abe, 2014c). In many other cases though, Abe emphasises that rule of law is the way in which the seas should be governed. In 25 of these cases, Abe further declares that peaceful resolution of disputes should be done by rule of law, and not by nations acting unilaterally through force or coercion (e.g. Abe, 2015e; Abe, 2016d). The sheer number of times that these ideas appear in Abe's speeches demonstrates that respect for the rule of law, and rejection of forceful resolution of international disputes are major maritime policies for the Abe administration.

It should be noted though, that Abe rarely refers to any specific laws by name. In a few cases, Abe refers to the "international law of the sea", but this is largely used in a historical context, so as to demonstrate why the principle needs to be maintained (e.g. Abe, 2014g; Abe, 2015f). As a result, Abe refers to specific international maritime laws in only three of the selected materials. In two of them, Abe refers to UNCLOS (Abe, 2013l; Abe, 2014j). However, in the second of these, Abe is simply using UNCLOS continental shelf rules to justify Japan expanding its EEZ and the benefits to Japan; rather than the international importance of UNCLOS (Abe, 2014j).

In Abe's Shangri-La Dialogue Keynote Speech, he also talks about maritime laws within the Southeast Asian region. Abe asks:

Would you not agree that now is the time to make a firm pledge to return to the spirit

and the provisions of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea that all concerned countries in the Sea agreed to, and not to undertake unilateral actions associated with a permanent physical change? (Abe, 2014g).

He follows this up by urging China and ASEAN to establish an effective Code of Conduct for the SCS (Abe, 2014g). However, this longform speech is the only one in which he specifically mentions laws in Southeast Asia.

Given how often Abe refers to laws, it appears he is more dedicated to upholding the concept of rule of law as a way of deterring other nations from acting unilaterally with force, rather than any specific laws.

Maintaining Open Seas

The second recurring policy is Abe's insistence on maintaining the openness of the seas. Of course, this was mentioned earlier as point two of Abe's "Five Principles for Diplomacy". However, the Five Principles concept was only used during the first year of Abe's second term; whereas a more general policy for maintaining open seas has continued in Abe's speeches until the present.

In most cases, Abe talks about maintaining open seas in the broadest possible terms; not referring to any specific actors, cases or geographical regions. Instead he tends to talk about maintaining open seas as a general principle based upon the notion of the seas as a space for all. He does this by either referring to the seas as international commons or as connections between nations; using the two terms nearly equally, with the former appearing in 14 materials and the latter in 12. However, the two are used in slightly different ways.

When Abe talks about the seas as connections, he often does so as an emotional appeal, showing the links between Japan and other nations. For example, Abe has urged for closer ties with ASEAN by stating that:

From ancient times a great many people have freely traversed the sea lanes stretching north to south, from the South China Sea to the East China Sea. I consider it to be a historical inevitability that Japan and ASEAN would become true partners and an inseparable community surrounded by a single sea (e.g. Abe, 2013p).

In this way, Abe calls for closer maritime cooperation with ASEAN, as nations with a

supposed history and mutual interest in a “single sea”. Both of these are objectives for Abe’s administration.

On the other hand, when Abe refers to the seas as global commons, he describes them as something that needs protecting, and that Japan can be that protector. This is perhaps best demonstrated in Abe’s 2015 speech to commemorate Marine Day:

From ancient times, freedom on the high seas and the free flow of trade have been the cornerstones of the development and prosperity of humankind... Everyone has a common interest in maintaining the sea as a “public good” governed by the rule of law, which is indispensable for the peace and prosperity of the international community. “The seas are for all humankind to use.” Even today, these words of Grotius, the “father of international law,” from 400 years ago still ring true. We must hand these magnificent seas down to the next generation... Japan must demonstrate leadership in securing free and peaceful seas, transitioning from “a country protected by the sea” to “a country that protects the sea.” (Abe, 2015f).

By pledging Japan as a country to protect the public common that is the sea, Abe hopes to gain support for an expansion of Japanese maritime activity and calls for other countries to likewise maintain the existing maritime order. Although Abe has appealed for open seas in various ways, it becomes clear that he deliberately chooses his phrasing for a specific purpose in each case.

To a lesser extent, Abe has also demonstrated interest in maintaining open seas and rule of law by pointing to Japan’s continued contribution to anti-piracy measures around the world. These focus largely on anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

Abe has also addressed Japan’s contribution to anti-piracy within Southeast Asia, citing Japan as the nation that created the idea of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Based in Singapore, ReCAAP is the first regional government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia, between 14 Asian nations and 6 non-Asian partner nations (Abe, 2015f).

In both global and regional scopes then, Abe presents Japan as a leader in anti-piracy operations, as part of his policy of maintaining open seas. It should be noted, however, that Abe rarely refers to anti-piracy measures directly; suggesting that his main focus is instead on

maintenance of peaceful open waters between nations. This is not entirely surprising given Abe's concerns about Chinese activities in the SCS.

Overall, maintenance of open seas is vital to Prime Minister Abe, especially in the Southeast Asian region. It also becomes apparent that this policy is inextricably linked to Abe's insistence on respect for the prevailing international rule of law.

Capacity Building Assistance

One policy that is specific to Southeast Asia is Japanese support for maritime capacity-building of Southeast Asian states. However, this is a policy that rarely appears in Abe's speeches, and is rarely explained in detail.

In one 2014 speech, Abe makes the point that it is necessary for Southeast Asian states to increase their military capacities given the incredible rise in defence expenditure carried out by China. Abe claims that China's defence budget had increased at a rate of over 10% per year since the end of the Cold War, forcing Southeast Asian nations to increase their defence spending by 80% in the previous decade. Overall, in this speech, Abe is making a call to NATO nations "for stringent export control of arms and dual-use technologies" for fear of destabilising the region (Abe, 2014e). This suggests that Abe is not necessarily in favour of capacity-building in Southeast Asia for the sake of capacity-building per se, but primarily as a counterbalance to China, to prevent a radical change to the existing order in the region.

Japanese assistance for the capacity-building of Southeast Asian nations is already well-documented; for example, Japan has gifted hardware to Vietnam and the Philippines as part of Japan's Overseas Development Aid to those countries (e.g. Grønning, 2018, p.538; Hughes, 2018b). However, the way that Abe presents the capacity-building of Southeast Asian nations makes the policy sound like a necessary obligation Japan has to carry out within larger strategic interests, specifically, gaining favour with ASEAN nations, reducing China's relative power gains in the region, and maintaining the stability of the regional status quo (which is aided by the first two objectives).

Maritime Education

Another policy that is mentioned infrequently but applies specifically to Southeast Asia is education of coastguard and naval officers from other Asian nations. In 2014, Abe stated that officers from five ASEAN nations' coast guards "have learned from Japan about how coast guard operations should be conducted"; naming the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia in particular as nations that benefitted from this program (Abe, 2014g).

In his message for Marine Day 2016, Prime Minister Abe mentioned that Asian coast guard officers had once again been learning maritime safety and security policy from their Japanese counterparts, as part of a new program to "strengthen our bonds of friendship that protect the sea in order to enhance world peace and security" (Abe, 2016b).

Most recently, Abe announced the success of a master's program in maritime safety and security policy. Abe was keen to point out that this program is unique to Japan, and its graduates had come from countries all over Asia, such as Malaysia, and the Philippines. Abe gave this rationale for the program:

Every year a class learning such an everlasting truth and taking it as a guiding principle for their lives will head out from Japan to the seas... Cultivating those who will protect and defend a free and open Indo-Pacific is, precisely, Japan's noble mission (Abe, 2018e).

Abe points out that Japan is a nation that teaches others the ways of maritime security. The fact that these announcements come very rarely shows that this is not one of Abe's most forefront maritime policies; however, it is nevertheless important. Through education programs, Japan can encourage other Asian nations, especially those in Southeast Asia, to adopt Japanese principles; and allow Abe to position Japan as a leader to Southeast Asian nations, potentially justifying an increased Japanese role in the region.

Ocean Pollution

The final major maritime policy that Abe has championed is the need for awareness about ocean pollution, and steps to promote conservation. By promoting ocean conservation, Abe can further Japan as a protector of the oceans, albeit in a non-security context. Although this policy has not appeared in speeches nearly as often as Abe's concerns for issues such as rule of law or maintaining open seas, it is interesting to note that more than half of the sources calling for "saving the blue" (Abe, 2018b) have come since 2018. This suggests that as knowledge about oceans plastics and other forms of marine pollution have become common

knowledge, this issue has become more important to the Abe administration. As such, it is possible that this issue may be raised more frequently in future speeches by Prime Minister Abe.

MARITIME POLICY, SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE ABE DOCTRINE

Now that we understand Prime Minister Abe's intentions in terms of maritime policy applicable to the Southeast Asian region, we can move on to address the second research question: *Do the proclaimed policies align with what would be expected within the broader framework of the 'Abe Doctrine'?*

To recap, the framework of the Abe Doctrine within the Southeast Asia region to be used by this thesis consists of the following points. First, we should expect to see Abe emphasise Japan's status as a regional and global power. Second, we should observe Abe pushing for a greater security role in the region – his “proactive contribution to peace”. This should contain two key subsections: strengthening cooperation with ASEAN nations and securing freedom of navigation and overflight. Third, Abe should be seen espousing values-based diplomacy, focusing on values such as freedom and rule of law. Finally, Abe should demonstrate a desire to strengthen the Japan-US alliance.

Great Power Status and Leadership

The first key tenet of the Abe Doctrine frame is the notion of restoring or reaffirming Japan's status as a major global power. This belief is most adamantly stated by Prime Minister Abe in his speech *Japan is Back*, delivered on 22nd February 2013 in Washington. In this speech, Abe opens with the emphatic statement:

Last year, Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, Michael Green and others published a paper about Japan. They asked, if Japan would end up becoming a Tier-two nation. Secretary Armitage, here is my answer to you. Japan is not, and will never be, a Tier-two country. That is the core message I am here to make. And I should repeat it by saying, I am back, and so shall Japan be (Abe, 2013c).

Abe appears to suggest that until recently, Japan's global standing had faded, and only with Abe's return to power will Japan once regain its great power status: “I am back, and so shall Japan be” (Abe, 2013c).

Nor is this Abe's only reference to the idea of Japan being a fading light on the world stage in recent years. A few months later at a dinner speech, Abe states:

At the same time, I thought, if we were to raise Japanese to be pessimistic about the future and withdraw further and further into themselves, that would be an abandonment of our responsibility to the world. I felt that is absolutely unacceptable for a nation's leader... Japan must once more become a vibrant member of an Asia that is young and

full of vitality. This was one reason why I thought that we must restore our former selves (Abe, 2013f).

With these two statements, it is evident that Abe feels the need to address the notion of a fading Japan for both a foreign and domestic audience. In the first quote, he directly challenges American scholars who suggested Japan had lost its great power status, and in the second, he speaks of the need to reaffirm the Japanese people that they should not settle for less than great power status. Overall, early in Abe's second term, he made it abundantly clear that this was an important message from his administration: "It is not twilight, but a new dawn that is breaking over Japan" (Abe, 2014a).

So how does this play into Abe's maritime policies and relations with Southeast Asia? Firstly, Abe uses this belief in Japan as a great power to justify greater Japanese maritime activity, based on the 'responsibility' that Japan bears due to its status, which he articulated on various occasions (e.g. Abe, 2013e; Abe, 2014d; Abe, 2015h). Abe asserts that this 'responsibility' gives Japan the right to contribute to maritime matters in the Southeast Asian region. Given Japan's interests in maintaining freedom of navigation in the region, Japan is therefore using its 'responsibility' to position itself as a just protector of that freedom; against what are perceived as Chinese efforts to create a "Beijing Sea".

In this manner, proposals to increase Japanese maritime activity serve as statements of intent that Japan is and will continue to be a great power player in the Southeast Asian region. The two ideas therefore reinforce each other: as a 'responsible' great power, Japan will preserve freedom of navigation, etc. within the Southeast Asian waters, and doing so will demonstrate Japan's great power role there; simultaneously achieving two goals that defy China.

Abe has also positioned Japan as an advanced nation in terms of maritime science and knowledge. Perhaps the best example of this is Abe's maritime education policies discussed earlier. These policies position Japan as a teacher to other Asian states, giving Japan the dual benefit of promoting international maritime norms that benefit Japan as well as positioning Japan as a leader in the region that others would do well to emulate.

In regard to Southeast Asia, Abe clearly positions Japan as a regional leader. This is done by emphasising the power and history of democracy in Japan, making it a major hub of democracy in the region; as well as Japan's size and power, in terms of the economy and

military capacity, e.g. “Japan is Asia's largest maritime democracy and a liberal capitalist state second only to the United States” (Abe, 2013a). These themes appear in several of Abe’s speeches (e.g. Abe, 2016e; Abe, 2017b). Notably, the only nation that Abe willingly accepts is ahead of Japan is the United States; although Abe also sometimes refers to Japan leading alongside the US (e.g. Abe 2015g), putting Japan on a par with the US as a great power.

When it comes to China, Abe is willing to acknowledge the importance of China to the region, for example, by saying “China has long been an important friend for Japan. We both have a major responsibility to regional peace and prosperity and to the world economy” (Abe, 2016d). However, Abe never makes any direct comparison between the two nations’ strength as he does with the United States. In this way, it appears Abe is willing to recognise the significance of China but is cautious not to praise China as a regional leader that rivals Japan or the US.

In summary, Abe began his second term in office by firmly challenging the idea of Japan as a fading power. However, with the progression of time, he has stated this idea less often, instead emphasising Japanese responsibility and leadership within the region. Both methods are forms of Abe expressing his belief that Japan is a great power, as was expected by the Abe Doctrine framework. Furthermore, it appears Abe intends for Japan’s great power status and increased maritime activity to reinforce each other: as a great power, Japan can engage in more proactive maritime policy, which will in turn demonstrate Japan’s capacity and strength, reaffirming the idea that Japan is a great power. Abe therefore holds up the expected notion that Japan is indeed a great power, both directly through statements on Japan’s status, and indirectly through his intentions for Japanese maritime policy.

An Increased Security Role for Japan

The second key tenet of my Abe Doctrine framework is that Abe should be expected to push for Japan to play a greater security role in the world. As shown in the previous chapter, this has clearly happened. The most obvious example of this is Abe’s pledge to make a “Proactive Contribution to Peace”. Although this phrase has demonstrated a great deal of flexibility for Abe when proposing Japanese policy, he has always used the phrase in one way or another to call for Japan to play a larger role than it currently does. This clearly applies to Japanese

maritime policy, as Abe has sought to portray Japan as a nation with both the responsibility and capability to be “a country that protects the seas” (Abe, 2013h).

Cooperation with ASEAN

Across the selected materials, Prime Minister Abe has promoted cooperation with ASEAN states, often based upon the notion of historical ties, shared values and the importance of the seas to each party. Cooperation has been proposed in the form of various policies, such as supporting capacity-building of ASEAN states and providing maritime security training to Asian coastguards. In each of these policies, Japan has clearly positioned itself as the senior partner.

Regarding specific countries, Abe has referenced working with Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. While it is not surprising that these states were mentioned, given the data selection criteria of this thesis, it should be noted that nations such as Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar were not mentioned, despite being ASEAN members with lengthy coastlines. This suggests that although Abe wishes to increase ties with ASEAN as a whole, when it comes to maritime concerns, he has specifically focussed on the nations that are involved in the SCS disputes. As such, this supports the literature that suggests Japan-ASEAN relations are often constructed vis-à-vis China.

Freedom of Navigation

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Prime Minister Abe has consistently called for the maintenance of open seas. In many of these cases, he has specifically used the term ‘freedom of navigation’ (and accompanying ‘freedom of overflight’). Furthermore, Abe has made it clear that he believes freedom of navigation is a principle Japan has a responsibility to uphold (e.g. Abe, 2014e; Abe, 2014f). As such, it is clear that Abe has consistently pledged Japanese support for freedom of navigation, and that Abe would like part of his “Proactive Contribution to Peace” to involve Japan playing a greater role in protecting this freedom.

Values-Based Diplomacy

A recurrent theme in the materials analysed for this thesis is Abe's focus on the idea of universal values, and how they apply to both cooperation between nations and international issues. Specifically, there are four values that Abe focuses on: "the fundamental values of freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law" (Abe, 2013b).

During the coding process, however, I noticed a major distinction between the values. Freedom, democracy and human rights are often interlinked, whereas the rule of law appears independent of the others. As a result, the first three values are mentioned in 24, 27 and 20 of the selected materials respectively, while rule of law is mentioned in 47. This demonstrates that although Abe frequently invokes each of the four values, he places a far greater emphasis on rule of law than the other three. Why does this happen?

One explanation is that there is a substantial differential in where the speeches are given, and which countries Abe is talking about relations with. For example, Abe is willing to invoke rule of law when discussing Russo-Japanese relations (e.g. Abe, 2017f), but not the other values. This may be because Abe knows these values are less likely to appeal to Russia, and thus focusses only on rule of law.

It is also interesting to note that although Abe has invoked rule of law as a key value continuously since his re-election, the other three values were used extensively at the start of Abe's second term but have been used much less frequently in the last year or two, especially in comparison to rule of law. This also coincides with a period in which Abe has called for closer relations and cooperation with Russia and China.

Earlier in this thesis, it was discussed that Abe focussed on "fundamental values and strategic interests" shared with other nations in the region. While neither term has been provided with an actual definition by Abe, it could be said that 'strategic interests' refers to Abe's or Japan's goals, and that 'fundamental values' are cultural norms deployed to persuade other nations that they share a common cause with Japan. I propose that since rule of law can be classified as both a universal value and a strategic interest for Japan, it has received greater priority than the values of freedom, democracy and human rights. Additionally, it appears that as Abe has called for greater cooperation with countries who do not share these three values, Abe has perhaps been more willing to overlook these values so as to focus on Japan's strategic interests, including the rule of law.

Strengthening the Japan-US Alliance

The final aspect of the Abe Doctrine framework to be assessed is the Japan-US Alliance. Out of the selected materials, Abe refers to the alliance or Japan-US cooperation in 29 of them. This is more often than many of Abe's unilateral policies, demonstrating the continued significance of the Japan-US alliance to Abe. Throughout his time in office, Abe has continued to label the alliance as Japan's "cornerstone" (e.g. Abe, 2014g; Abe, 2019b); clearly demonstrating that the alliance remains a vital priority for Abe. Furthermore, Abe has continuously demonstrated a clear desire for furthering this alliance, stating: "Above all, we must further reinforce the Japan-US alliance" (Abe, 2013a). Perhaps the clearest example is the statement: "I intend to further strengthen the bonds between Japan and the United States in order to tackle the issues that the world faces as an "Alliance of Hope."" (Abe, 2016f).

So how does Abe want Japan and the US to work together within the alliance? In the first speech, Abe says: "From now on the Japan-US alliance must effect a network, broad enough to ensure safety and prosperity encompassing the two seas" (Abe, 2013a). In other speeches, Abe says that Japan and the US will "jointly provide the region and the world with more rule of law, more democracy, more security and less poverty" (Abe, 2013c), and "cooperate so that the Asia-Pacific region becomes a region governed not by intimidation or coercion but rather by the rule of law" (Abe, 2013d).

It should be noted though, that in such statements, Abe commits Japan to the alliance, but not to any specific activities. In fact, there are very few materials in which Abe outlines specific actions that the alliance is undertaking, and those that he does require Japan to do very little over and above its current commitments. Examples of activities include joint exercises, revising the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation (Abe, 2014k) and providing funding for improving US bases on Guam (Abe, 2015b). Otherwise, cooperation is only said to be happening "across a broad range of fields" (Abe, 2013d), with no mention of specific maritime cooperation between joint exercises; although in some cases this may be due to reasons of operational secrecy.

Overall, the Japan-US alliance remains vital to Abe, as evidenced by the frequency he mentions it. Abe has also displayed a clear desire to strengthen the bonds between the two

nations. This fits with what was expected by the Abe Doctrine framework. However, Abe appears wary of committing Japan to specific actions within the alliance. Abe never suggests why this is, but possible reasons may include concerns about entrapment in American conflicts, or the pacifist constitution and norms present in Japan.

CONCLUSIONS

Having analysed Prime Minister Abe's speeches, a variety of intended maritime policies have been discerned. When comparing these policies to our working framework of the Abe Doctrine concept, we find that these policies largely comply with what would be expected as per the framework. However, they do not fit perfectly, therefore raising questions as to how the concept of an Abe Doctrine as an analytical device can be further developed in future.

Abe Shinzō's Maritime Policy in Southeast Asia

For the first section of this thesis, I addressed the research question: *Has Prime Minister Abe Shinzō maintained a consistent approach to maritime policies affecting Southeast Asia?*

Of Abe's named policy strategies, his "Proactive Contribution to Peace" motif has been evoked continuously since his re-election in a variety of ways. Additionally, Abe's new policy of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy" is appearing in increasing frequency and may require further study.

On the other hand, Abe's "Five Principles for Diplomacy" and "Three Principles on the Rule of Law at Sea" were short-lived strategies at the start of Abe's second term. However, each of these sets of principles appears to have been designed only to introduce Abe's new governance style on the international stage, with policies within the two strategies being used in other ways long after the guises of "Principles" were dropped from Abe's speeches. This demonstrates that Abe is not necessarily tied to buzzword policies and is willing to pursue policies in different ways at different times.

In terms of general policy, I identified policies that I divided into five major categories: Rule of International Law, Maintaining Open Seas, Capacity-Building Assistance, Maritime Security Training and Ocean Pollution. Of these five, Ocean Pollution Awareness is by far the newest, and as such, has probably not been in use long enough yet to assess its consistency. Maritime Security Training and Capacity-Building Assistance are two policies that Abe has endorsed and used to demonstrate Japanese leadership in Southeast Asia but does not tend to call upon as often in his speeches and statements.

Of the five categories, there is a clear focus on Rule of International Law and Maintaining Open Seas in terms of policies applicable to Southeast Asian waters. In a number of cases,

Abe has specifically mentioned Southeast Asia and the SCS as areas of concern regarding these policies.

Overall, this thesis found that Prime Minister Abe has tended to be very consistent in his pursuit of maritime policies applicable to Southeast Asian waters; placing a clear emphasis on Rule of International Law and Maintaining Open Sea, with other policies often being used to reinforce these two. Additionally, Abe has proven to be fairly adept at relabelling and reusing policies in a variety of ways. This calls for further research as to how Abe presents his policies to specific countries for what reasons, and what causes him to change the way he delivers them (if at all) over time.

Feasibility of the Abe Doctrine in a Regional Context

Following on from this, I addressed the research question: *Do the proclaimed policies align with what would be expected within the broader framework of the 'Abe Doctrine'?* I then formulated a framework of the Abe Doctrine to be applied to maritime policy within Southeast Asia.

Overall, this thesis finds that Abe Shinzō's statements regarding maritime policy in Southeast Asia do generally reflect those expected by the framework. In respect of the first two and final tenets of the framework, namely expectations that Abe would emphasise Japan's status as a regional and global power, push for Japan to play a greater security role in the region, and aim to further strengthen the Japan-US alliance, it was found that Abe did consistently express these policy intentions.

An interesting phenomenon was observed however, regarding the third tenet of the framework; that Abe should be expected to champion values-based diplomacy, focusing on values such as freedom and rule of law. Although this thesis found that Abe frequently called for values-based diplomacy, interesting distinctions appeared as to which values were being used and when. A clear divide was observed between the more liberal values of freedom, democracy and human rights, and the more strategic value of rule of law; with the latter being invoked significantly more than the other three. This thesis therefore concludes that although values-based diplomacy is a key tenet of any theoretical Abe Doctrine, greater analysis and

further research are required as to which values Abe invokes on which occasions, and for what purposes he employs them.

In summary, this thesis successfully demonstrated that the Abe Doctrine concept can be applied to specific policy and regional contexts. This lends greater strength to the Abe Doctrine as a model going forward which may be used to understand or anticipate Prime Minister Abe's foreign policies in future. However, this thesis also showed that the Abe Doctrine still needs further development before it can be used as an accurate model or theory. Particularly, it requires further research in the area of how Abe strategically utilises different values within his 'values-based diplomacy'.

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