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In the Aftermath of the Peace Agreement:  
A Case Study of Internal Displacement in Colombia

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## **Abstract**

Colombia has suffered from an internal armed conflict with different armed groups for more than five decades. This conflict has resulted in more than eight million victims of whom the majority have had to leave their home and become internally displaced persons (IDPs). Currently, Colombia is the country with the most IDPs in the world. On 24th of November 2016, a Peace Agreement was signed between the government and the largest guerrilla group, FARC, to disarm the guerrilla, and to attend the rights of the victims. Two years since the signing of the Agreement, one part of the Colombian society is still against it while others support the peace as it is in the agreement. The main aim of this thesis is to investigate the impact of the implementation in the Colombian displaced population as well as their insights in their inclusion in the processes of peacebuilding. Data has been gathered through interviews with the IDPs themselves as well as with key informants closely related to the topic. Theoretical concepts of peacebuilding and empowerment are used in the analysis of the results. Major impediments to the implementation and future of the Agreement according to many is the current government and their lack of political will. The progress of the implementation has been rather institutional instead of societal. This puts Colombia in a post-agreement phase where more progress is needed rapidly to prevent the frustration within the IDPs who find it hard to trust the government and its institutions, and the former members of FARC, who still have the risk to returning to rifles.

*Keywords: armed conflict, internally displaced people, peace agreement, peacebuilding theory, empowerment, Colombia*

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## List of Abbreviations

AUC – *Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*, The United Self-Defenders of Colombia

FARC – *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (ex guerrilla-group)

- currently *Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria de Colombia*, Alternative Revolutionary Force of Colombia (political party)

ELN – *Ejército de Liberación Nacional*, The National Liberation Army, guerrilla group

IDMC – International Displacement Monitoring Centre

IDP – internally displaced person/people

IOM – International Organization for Migration

JEP – *Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz*, Special Jurisdiction for Peace

NDP – National Development Plan

ONIC – *Organización Nacional de Indígenas de Colombia*, National Organization of the Colombian Indigenous People

PA – the Peace Agreement

PDET – *Plan de Desarrollo Con Enfoque Étnico-Territorial*, Development Program with Territorial-Based Approach

SDG – Sustainable Development Goals

Uribismo – the political movement of the former Colombian President from the political right, Alvaro Uribe, which is against the PA and mostly in line with the current President, Ivan Duque

WB – World Bank

## 1 Introduction

*“Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.”*

Article 13, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UN, 2018)

This preceding article stated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights unveils the most visible human rights violation of the victims of forced displacement, but by no means the only one. People in situations of displacement are in many cases facing violations of rights to protection by law against interferences with privacy, family, home (article 12), to property (article 17), to freedom of expression (article 19), to education (article 26) and to adequate standard of living (article 27) amongst other possible violations (UN, 2018). Reasons for displacement are various, including violent conflicts, persecutions, natural disasters and breaches in human rights. Examining the current situation on a global scale, the number of forcibly displaced people has almost doubled since 1997 to 2017 (IOM, 2018). The share of internally displaced people (in the following, IDP) has risen from 26 million in 2007 to 40 million in 2017. In lack of durable solutions or assisting returns for the majority of these people, they continue to rise in number. Colombia currently holds the largest amount of IDPs in the world (UNHCR, 2018).

This study is aimed at investigating the advances in the implementation of the Peace Agreement (PA), where each of the six articles places victims in the center. The aim is to investigate the concrete changes that the displaced population has experienced subjectively since the signing of the agreement. Research methods include interviewing of the IDPs as well as key informants closely related to the topic. Total of 14 interviews were conducted in the capital city of Colombia, Bogotá, as well as in the capital city of the department of Chocó, Quibdó<sup>1</sup>. These two locations were chosen for reference since both are inhabited by substantially large populations of IDPs but have different kind of historical trajectories as well as current situation when it comes to the armed conflict. Theoretical concepts consist of peacebuilding theory and empowerment, which are used in the analysis of the results.

Although none of the current sustainable development goals (SDGs) of UN (2016) is directly targeted to the issue of forced displacement, the most relevant considering the peacebuilding process in Colombia is the goal 16 of Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions,

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<sup>1</sup> Colombia is divided into 32 departments – map is provided in Chapter 2

which promotes peaceful and inclusive societies by reducing all forms of violence, promoting the rule of law to ensure equal access to justice for all and ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory and responsive decision-making at all levels, amongst other targets. Durable solutions for the displaced population need the contribution and cooperation of many different sectors, which is also the idea in the PA and the Comprehensive System it has created (explained in Chapter 2, see below).

In the Colombian case, reasons for displacement are several, including disguised development projects (e.g. construction projects that are rather for economic development than social) and natural disasters, but most of the IDPs in Colombia are displaced due to the violent conflict that has marked the last five decades in the country. In total, the amount of all victims<sup>2</sup> of the conflict stands at more than eight million, of which 88 per cent are victims of displacement (PMI, 2018; UNHCR, 2019). The number of all victims is likely to be even higher, because there are unregistered victims due to the fact that they are afraid to be registered (Mooney, 2002 in The Brookings Institution, 2007: p. 31). While displacement as a concept only came into existence in Colombia in 1985, it has existed throughout the conflict and even before. Different legislations directed to the IDPs have been implemented since then, the main one being Victims' Law 1448 of 2011. This law also served as a basis for the Article 5, Victims of the Conflict, in the Peace Agreement which was signed on 24th of November 2016, between the Colombian government and the largest guerrilla group of the country, FARC. The signing of the Agreement has brought Colombia a step closer to peace, although various armed groups still continue to exist. An important factor of the Agreement has been to recognize the victims in the center in all of its elements. Moreover, for a first time in the Colombian peacebuilding history, the victims of the conflict have been included in the process of the Peace Agreement (Alto Comisionado Para La Paz, 2016). This is significant, since the victims of the conflict have been ignored for decades (CNMH, 2013: p. 15).

### 1.1 Purpose and Specific Research Questions

The main focus of this study is in the last two years after the signing of the Peace Agreement (PA) between the Colombian government of President Juan Manuel Santos and the largest guerrilla group, FARC, on 24th of November 2016. This focus is taken through the viewpoint

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<sup>2</sup> *Victims* refers to all the people who have suffered due to the conflict in various ways, these including but not being limited to persecutions, death threats, torture, killings and sexual abuse. This definition applies whenever mentioning victims in this study.



of the displaced population and professionals working closely related to the topics of peacebuilding and victims of the conflict. These professionals will be referred to as key informants. This focus was chosen since there is a knowledge gap of research on the actual experiences of the IDPs on the impact of the implementation of the Agreement in their lives. The reasoning for taking the perspective of IDPs and key informants is supported by Chigas and Woodrow (2018, p.16) in their statement that both the context and people immersed in the situation are the main components in determining the perceptions of progress. According to them, the contributing factors to sustainable peace cannot be separated from people. The main focus in this thesis is in the Article 5 of the Agreement, Victims of the Conflict, which states the victims' rights to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition.

Research questions are the following: *1) What impact has the Peace Agreement brought forward in the lives of the displaced Colombians and how was the displaced population included in the process? 2) What are the current challenges for the successful implementation of the Agreement according to the IDPs and key informants?* Rather than forming a hypothesis to test, they aim to evaluate a phenomenon: in this case, evaluating whether the Agreement has brought changes in the life situations of the IDPs (Denscombe, 2010 in Bryman, 2012: p.9). The relevance and importance of the research questions bind to the fact that there is a knowledge gap in the subjective experiences of the IDPs regarding the implementation, and that the Agreement in question is a very current phenomenon in Colombia. While it is out of reach of this study to provide a representative analysis of the wide range of subjective experiences of the IDPs that exist in Colombia, it offers a glimpse into the realities of the ones that were interviewed.

The structure of this thesis consists of seven chapters: introduction and background in the beginning are rather detailed in presenting the aims of the thesis as well as the Colombian conflict itself. The literature review, theoretical concepts and methodologies present the important literature, the main concepts and the choice of methods. The analysis will present the main findings from the interviews through the concepts mentioned, backed up by sources from the literature review. Conclusion will bind all this information together and rather than presenting new data, it will sum up what was found in the analysis part, connect the results with the research questions and reflect on the future studies. In the appendices, list of the interviewees is available, as well as the interview guides and nodes, that were created in the coding phase.

In the next chapter, the background of the Colombian conflict will be introduced in detail alongside with the specifics of the PA and its inclusion of victims. The current situation

in the country will also be briefly presented. While this chapter may seem long, I find it necessary to explain in detail the specific context of the country for the reader to better understand the environment where this thesis was developed. As previously mentioned, context is one of the main components in perceptions of progress (Chigas et al., 2018: p. 16).

## 2 Background

### 2.1 The Colombian Conflict

The roots of the armed conflict in Colombia date back to the 1960s when the guerrilla movement started. *Guerrillas* are groups of people that were excluded from the politics because of their left-wing and Marxist ideologies, and started to demand the rights of the common people by armed confrontations. Main motives for the foundation of guerrillas were the unequal land distribution system as well as political frustrations with the supposedly democratic government (CNMH, 2013: p. 17; 37). Unwanted political parties were eliminated, some very violently, while the two main parties, Conservatives and Liberals, have been the main driving forces in the Colombian politics. While guerrillas were demanding more equal land distribution and political inclusion amongst other things, the right-wing paramilitary groups were created of civilians to defend the land of the elites and landowners against the violent guerrillas. Colombian government's security forces have also been stated to have been in cooperation with the paramilitary groups, though this has never been declared by the state (ibid: p. 41, 44-45). Even though started as political groups fighting for social and political equity, the political resonance of the guerrillas has lost significance due to their violent methods and massacres as well as other means that violate the human rights of the civil community (IDMC, 2019). However, all the actors in the armed conflict have their equal share in violence towards the civil society, including paramilitaries, the government security forces and other armed groups. Different groups have had their different ways of spreading horror, the paramilitaries being especially fond of killing people in hostile ways, while guerrillas are more commonly kidnapping people and attacking properties (CNMH, 2013: p. 10).

Even until today, Colombia continues to be one of the countries with the most unequal distribution of land; less than one percent of the population owning 61 per cent of the rural lands (IDMC, 2006). This is also one part where the PA will aim for change, attacking one of the root causes of the conflict: Article one in the Agreement, Comprehensive Rural Reform,

includes land restitution for the ones who have lost their lands as well as land for the landless displaced people (Government & FARC-EP, 2016).

### 2.1.1. Conflict Analysis

The causes of the conflict can be divided into structural and proximate causes as well as triggers using the conflict analysis framework (Africa Peace Forum, 2004). In the Colombian case, using this framework, I consider the *structural causes* being lack of opportunities for political participation and false democracy, inequitable land distribution, poor governance and corruption, and lack of equal economic and social opportunities. False democracy refers to the acts of buying votes, and to the extreme cases of political extermination, as in the case of Union Patriótica (UP), a political party from the left which was exterminated as a whole (IDMC, 2006). *Proximate causes* according to this framework are the factors that are contributing to the armed conflict, these being human rights abuses – including selective killings, forced displacement, torture, forced disappearances, landmines, confinement, threats and persecutions – absence of State presence and discrimination against ethnic groups. As *triggers* that may contribute to the further escalation of the conflict, is the current insecure climate in which the PA is being implemented: this insecurity might result in frustration of the former FARC-guerrillas and their return to rifles.


Actors are crucial in conflict analysis, and they consist of the ones who are either engaged in the conflict or affected by it (Africa Peace Forum, 2004). In the Colombian case, actors are the national government, the former guerrilla group FARC, the different armed groups including guerrillas and paramilitaries, government security forces, civil society, social activists, leaders and human rights defenders, political parties, IDPs and other victims of the conflict. The whole Colombian society is affected by the conflict either directly or indirectly: the victims and combatants are examples of directly affected by the conflict, but other parts of society suffer through e.g. the impact of the presence of the armed groups in the resource-rich territories on the Colombian economy, and the funds that have been used in the compensations for victims instead of investing in the Colombian society as a whole (Flannery, 2017; IDMC, 2019). CNMH (2013; p. 18) offers an insight that while the society can be considered as a victim, it has also been contributing to the conflict by actions of silence and indifference.

This conflict analysis was presented in order to clarify the different actors and causes of the conflict.

### 2.1.2 Conflict in Bogotá and Quibdó

Colombian conflict has been a conflict of the rural regions. It has not materialized in the urban settings, with the exception of a few massacres, armed confrontations and selective killings along the years (CNMH, 2013: p. 34). The department where Quibdó is located, Chocó, has been largely affected by the armed conflict, and 60 per cent of its population are victims of the violent conflict (Amnesty, 2017). The divergence and regionality of the conflict have resulted in ignorance on some part of the population, who has not lived the conflict themselves. This has resulted in victims suffering in solitude (CNMH, 2013, p. 16). This ignorance persists despite the fact that most of the IDPs escape the conflict by settling in urban cities, living in the peripheries in informal settlements and inadequate living conditions (IDMC, 2019).

The starting point for the implementation of the PA has been therefore highly unequal in different regions of the country. In the images below are presented two maps of Colombia: the one on the left presents the historical density of the conflict in different regions of the country, green meaning low density and red very high. On the right, the map shows the dispersion of votes in the referendum for the PA, orange being the departments where *no* won and green for the *yes*. In the overall results, the ones who voted for no won slightly in the referendum. It can be seen that the most violent-drawn regions voted for *yes* to the PA between the government and FARC. The departments of Chocó (capital: Quibdó) and Cundinamarca (capital: Bogotá) are marked in the maps. Due to these unequal circumstances in different regions of the country, territorial priority is given to certain municipalities which are the most conflict-drawn and vulnerable. These municipalities are called PDET, which stands for Development programs with territorial-based approach. This is included in the Article 1 of the PA.



*Image 1. Salazar, G.S. 2016.*



*Image 2. Registraduría Nacional.*

*In both of the maps, Chocó is marked with rectangle and Cundinamarca with circle.*

*Image 1 represents the density of the conflict, Image 2 represents the dispersion of votes in the referendum.*

## 2.2 Other Peace Agreements

It is not the first time in Colombian history to pursue Peace Agreements between the armed groups and the government. In 1985, the government of the President Belisario Betancur held peace negotiations with FARC, which resulted in the introduction of the guerrilla into Colombian politics, when together with the Communist Party they formed the political party called *Únion Patriótica* (UP). However, UP experienced constant attacks and killings from paramilitary groups as well as the government security forces and was slowly exterminated for good. Up to 3000 of the party's members or affiliates were killed (IDMC, 2006).

Between 1990 and 1994 most of the minor guerrilla groups agreed to disarmament (Carvajal Martinez, 2016). In 2004, the peace negotiations with one block of the AUC came to a successful ending and led to the disarmament of the armed group (CNMH, 2018: p. 445-46). FARC resisted a new peace negotiation with the government until 2012 when the peace talks leading to the current Peace Agreement took place. After many years of peace negotiations,

Peace Agreement between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC-guerrillas was signed on 24th of November 2016. In 2019, the peace negotiations with the second biggest guerrilla group, ELN, came to an end with the government of Ivan Duque without an agreement. It seems unlikely that new negotiations will be held anytime soon.

### 2.2.1 Article 5 of the Peace Agreement: Victims of the Conflict

The Peace Agreement recognizes the victims of the conflict as the center in all parts of the agreement. The importance of the victims is highlighted in the formation of the agreement (through different forums as well as by participation in the peace talks in Havana, Cuba) as well as in their role given as active participants in the execution and monitoring of the different elements in the implementation (La Oficina del Alto Comisionado Para La Paz, 2016). Building on the Victims' Law 1448 of 2011, the Article 5 states the victims' rights to *truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition*. In addition to these, the Comprehensive System was created, which means the founding of different institutions that contribute in guaranteeing the rights of the victims (Government & FARC-EP, 2016). These institutions are presented below together with the explanation of what is meant by rights.

*Truth* stands for the clarification of truth, for which a Truth Commission was created. The aim of this Commission is to clarify the events of history as they happened, contributing to finding out what happened to the missing persons as well as the acknowledgment of responsibilities of the different actors, including the government. A Search Unit for Missing Persons was set up to contribute in finding the persons who have gone missing (La Oficina del Alto Comisionado Para La Paz, 2016).

*Justice* stands for recognizing the responsibilities as well as serving the penalties. A Special Jurisdiction for Peace was created to serve this purpose, called JEP. It is the judicial component of the Comprehensive System, that seeks to fight against impunity in order to implement the victims' right to justice. Different sanctions will be given out by JEP, depending whether the crimes committed are subject to being amnestied or not (ibid.).

*Reparation* refers to the strengthening of the reparation programs of the government, including repairing the damages caused in the conflict by the responsible actors themselves, e.g. by participating in development projects in vulnerable communities. Integral reparation also includes psychological help for the victims as well as *indemnities*, that are monetary compensations for the victims of the conflict (ibid.).

*Non-repetition* is more than anything the sum of all of the previous elements as well as the other Articles of the Peace Agreement, including the land reform, restitution of lands to their previous owners and displaced people, assisting of returns for the displaced people when possible, reforming of the political system towards a more inclusive one and the disarmament of the FARC-guerrillas and their reintegration into the civilian life (ibid.).

### 2.2.2 End of Displacement: Framework for Durable Solutions to IDPs

The Article 5 in the PA considering the victims of the conflict entails safe and assisted returns for the IDPs who wish to go back to their home regions. This is the most visible means to end displacement, but nevertheless in many cases not possible.

Displacement is a condition that does not end abruptly, but rather continues for an indefinite amount of time, even decades. Even though freedom of movement is listed as a fundamental human right, national authorities may limit this in case regions are uninhabitable or unsafe. Whether a person has transitioned from being an IDP to an ordinary citizen depends on objective and subjective aspects (The Brookings Institution, 2007: p. 11). One person might receive the kind of support that makes them consider themselves as repaired, whereas other can feel displaced their whole lives. Therefore, there is no clear formula to decide when the displacement has ended: in some cases, it might not be realistic to ever be able to return home. Principle of voluntariness is essential in the protection of rights of the IDPs: whether they wish to resettle or return home, they should be able to make a decision without coercion. The national authorities have the responsibility to guarantee a safe return for the IDPs in the regions where it is possible (ibid: p. 12-13, 27).

A durable solution to displacement has been achieved when 1) there is no discrimination and equal access to national protection, income generation, public services, political rights, freedom of movement and property restitution; 2) reintegration in economic, political and socio-cultural matters as well as family unification and 3) no more needs or vulnerabilities that relate to displacement (ibid: p. 19). This topic is discussed further in Chapter six.

### 2.3 The Current Situation in Colombia

Current human rights violations occur in forms of new displacements despite the Peace Agreement, especially in the regions where FARC used to operate before and left a power

vacuum behind them. ELN and other armed groups have come to take charge of these regions in many cases (Amnesty, 2017). The alarming human rights situation applies especially to the killings of human rights defenders, social leaders and activists. According to Amnesty (2018), more than 200 social activists and leaders have been killed after the signing of the PA. As of 2019, this number is likely to be a lot higher.

Low voting percentage (electoral as well as referendum) reflects little faith in the Colombian democratic institutions; in the last presidential elections 53 per cent voted whereas the voting percentage in the referendum for Peace Agreement was only 37 per cent (IFES, 2019). Factors like corruption, buying of votes and poor governance can be main reasons for these low percentages. In the World Values Survey from 2012 about Colombia, 25 per cent of the respondents stated they do not have faith in the Colombian government at all whereas further 35 per cent said they have very little (Inglehart, R. & al., 2014).

Venezuela's current political situation creates tension in the Colombian society. The common opinion towards Venezuelans seems to be more hostile by each passing day, partly because of misconceptions on the amounts of crimes committed by them. Another topic of concern among Colombians is that Venezuelans are receiving help while many Colombians in need are left without it. These issues were emphasized by the local people in conversations that I had with them and by reading the local news.

#### 2.4 Contemporary Development Aspects

National Development Plan (NDP) and contemporary development aspects in the country are not putting the peace efforts and the PA in the center of the interests of the government. Apart from that, civil society and the victims were included in the formation of NDP, but themselves are disappointed in the minor inclusion they had in it (IOM, 2018). In the previous government's NDP the Peace and Victims were the main focus, whereas the current plan puts more emphasis on economic matters and production. There are still 20 per cent of people in the Colombian rural periphery living in extreme poverty, while the same number for cities is 4 per cent (PND, 2018). Although in the previous four-year-long NDP poverty was diminished in numbers, it did not manage to close the gap between rural and urban territories. Among the displaced population, the percentage of poverty is extremely high: in 2017, 69 per cent of the IDPs were living in conditions of poverty and further 31 per cent in extreme poverty (ibid). It can be acknowledged that in the majority of cases poverty is an outcome of the armed conflict, since the IDPs are often deprived from access to education and employment and left with no



possessions they might have held before displacement. The conflict is still on-going in many rural regions, such as Chocó, despite the Peace Agreement.

Quality education continues to be a target in the current NDP, since in education too there are differences between the rural and urban contexts. Education is stated as a key for combating the poverty as well as for reaching social inclusion. Currently 44 out of 100 children who start the elementary school, finish the basic education. However, education is underfunded in the budget of the NDP (PND, 2018). When it comes to higher education, it continues to be a privilege of the ones who can afford it, since universities are expensive comparing to the wage level in the country.

Colombia faces many challenges, but many of them can be linked to the Peace Agreement. The successful implementation of all of its elements would bring major progress, since it is very comprehensive all in all, including the plans for rural reforms, disarmament and the victims' comprehensive reparation.

### **3 Literature Review**

The literature review for this research consists of a research put together by Amnesty International (2017) on the process of Peace Agreement in the department of Chocó, where 60 per cent of the population are considered victims of the conflict. This research recognizes that despite the inadequate implementation on the part of the Colombian government in fulfilling the elements in the Peace Agreement by September 2017, there is a lot of hope in the future for the peacebuilding process. Now, one and a half years later after the Amnesty research, this study aims to find out whether this process has been going forward and whether the victims have gotten something more out of the Agreement than hope.

This research by Amnesty emphasizes that Colombia is tied to various different international conventions and laws on providing protection, full reparation and other rights to victims, apart from their own constitution and the current PA. The situation in the department of Chocó is even described as humanitarian crisis, since there are structural obstacles for the inhabitants to decent living conditions and fundamental rights. Having such a high percentage classified as victims makes Chocó one of the most affected regions of the armed conflict. There is ongoing revictimization and persistence of violence present. In this research, it is stated that the victims interviewed expressed their support to the implementation despite the difficulties. However, there is lack of confidence on victims' part in the institutional responses of the

government. Their concern on disarming FARC was the possibility of other groups entering the region. State was supposed to prevent this by adding up their presence in this historically abandoned department, but since this never happened, ELN and other groups entered, and conflict never left Chocó. According to this research, the systematic state refusal continues, especially in acknowledging the existence of paramilitary groups and the reality of the extent of the conflict in the region, which is far greater than the official reports.

Another current literature where reference is drawn is on the topic of peacebuilding itself (Chigas and Woodrow, 2018). In an analysis of various case studies and cumulative impacts of peacebuilding, six domains are distinguished as measures of making progress in a post-agreement phase (further explained in Chapter 4, see below). The experiences of the interviewees will be analyzed and linked to these domains. In the same study, it is reminded that progress is often delayed and slow in manifesting itself, and in some areas may even reverse itself (*ibid*: p. 16). At the same time, progress in one area often brings progress to larger extent as well, either due to ripple effects or since there are various domains interconnected (*ibid*: p. 21-22). Authors also remind that key conflict drivers must be acknowledged and committed to address by the leaders, but this is seldom the case (*ibid*: p. 20). In some cases, leaders and elites might be even unwilling to gain peace or to acknowledge the conflict drivers, since they might be profiting from the conflict economically or in other ways (*ibid*: p. 48). This results in incomplete peace agreements in their implementation. If new government expresses their political will and engagement in pursuing change, the population will most likely show some patience, and the peace processes can continue in adding up, even if the nature of the peacebuilding would be incomplete (*ibid*: p. 23).

In this study through the cumulative cases it was acknowledged that there is no single pattern that fits all the contexts. However, it was acknowledged that each of the six domains must be addressed at some point and there must be progress in each of the domains: if one of the domains is left out or lagging behind, the peace is only impartial (*ibid*: p. 25, 54). Another recognition included that while peace agreements are essential in the peacebuilding processes, they are by no means sufficient to reach sustainable peace, neither are they alone able to transform existing political systems (*ibid*: p. 44, 46). Colombia is currently in the implementation phase, which is even more crucial than the actual peace negotiations. Another point of notice is in the key drivers of violence, noticing that rather than poverty or unemployment, the driver is the experiences of injustice (*ibid*: p. 50).

One more piece of research on this area is a booklet published by Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica (CNMH, 2013) which is a recollection of the brief history of the conflict

itself as well as its dimensions on the civil society, taking into account the spoken memories of the victims themselves as well as adding future recommendations to the solving of the conflict. This material is important in providing impartial information of the conflict as well as providing insights to the current data on various dimensions of the conflict. It also gives voice to the victims, and even though these are from a time before the PA, they are valuable in providing information from the time when peace process had already started (the peace process leading to the current PA started in 2012). This report recognizes the regional and local weakness of the State, especially in the most peripheral regions of the country where the conflict has persisted the most. Victims state that they have been abandoned by the State midst the conflict. The recommendations of this report include the recognition of responsibility of the State.

In the next section I will present the theoretical concepts that will be used in the analysis of the results.

## **4 Theoretical Concepts**

### 4.1 Empowerment

Empowerment is an important concept in this research, since the placing of the victims in the center of the Peace Agreement is about giving them agency and tools to build their lives in their situations of displacement and to be able to lead a dignified life. The relationship of empowerment and the experiences of the displaced population will be further explored in the analysis of the research.

Empowerment as a concept means various different things and sets of values. World Bank (2002) lists various factors, and the ones feasible for this research are the following: life of dignity in accordance with one's values, capable of fighting for one's rights, independence, own decision making, being free as well as *"the expansion of assets and capabilities of /.../ people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives."* (ibid: p. 11). Apart from these, four key elements are recognized as a crucial part of building institutional reform and for the successful implementation of empowering factors: 1) access to information, 2) inclusion and participation, 3) accountability and 4) local organizational capacity. All together these factors consist of somewhat same empowering dimensions as mentioned by Kabeer (2003): access to agency, resources and achievements. Kabeer emphasizes that empowerment implies change, since in order to

experience empowerment one needs to be disempowered to start with. Agency refers to one's ability to make strategic life choices, resources to medium through which this agency is exercised and achievements to the extent people are able to realize their potential. As stated by World Bank (2002), information is power and plays a crucial role in access to services and rights as well as to make informed decisions or hold institutions and government accountable. Inclusion and participation focus on who is included and how are they participating. Accountability recognizes the political, administrative and public means to transparency. Local organizational capacity means the ability of people to organize themselves in order to solve common problems and reach common interests. These are the supporting empowering factors by the local and national institutions in the empowerment framework, that are in continuous exchange with the assets and capabilities of the IDPs in form of norms and behaviors, rules and processes. The most relevant expected development outcomes include improved governance and access to justice, more inclusive basic services, strengthened civil society and increased assets and freedom of choice (ibid: p. 28).

Apart from the empowering factors, WB lists the major influencing conditions: the nature of public action, patterns of exclusion and conflict, decentralization, the strength of local-level institutions and civil society and the extent of political freedom (ibid: p. 29). As mentioned in their framework, discrimination in Latin American countries is often still directed to the African and Indigenous descendants which remain poor. This is no exception in Colombia. Political freedom is limited, since corruption exists and expressing political opinions may end up in extermination. The current conditions in the country pose a challenge to enabling empowerment, but also great potential.

As stated in the declaration of the world summit for social development, "*empowerment requires the full participation of people in the formation, implementation and evaluation of decisions determining the functioning and well-being of our societies*" (UN, 1995). This is also stated in the PA, including that the IDPs are present in the formation, implementation and monitoring of the elements in the agreement.

#### 4.2 Peacebuilding Theory

Drawing from the literature review of Chigas et al. (2018), six main domains of peacebuilding in a post-agreement phase will be used in analyzing and linking the experiences of the interviewees of the possible progress in the implementation. These domains are the following: 1) physical security and sense of security, 2) acknowledgement of key conflict drivers and

commitment to address them, 3) a durable political arrangement for handling power, 4) resilient relationship between government and society, 5) economic fairness and opportunity and 6) social cohesion (ibid: p. 14). These or similar key domains are supported by various other authors (Reychler, 2004; Schwarz, 2005 in Lambourne and Herro, 2008) whereas some add the importance of cultural context, opinions and attitudes of the local population as well as inclusion and empowerment (Lederach; Stover et Weinstein, 2004 in ibid). Therefore, peacebuilding in a post-agreement society, as well as the empowerment approach, are necessarily context-specific (WB, 2002).

What are the factors that might hinder progress in post-agreement societies? Bell and Pospisil (2017) introduce the concept of *formalized political unsettlement*, which is a situation where country might be implementing new features in many sectors but is still stuck with the old patterns of political culture, inequity, corruption and social exclusion. These undermine the impact of the implementation and might also result in reverses on some sectors.

In the following, the methodologies used in this study will be presented.

## **5 Methodology**

### **5.1 Semi-structured interviews and sampling**

This thesis has been performed as a qualitative case study, since it focuses on providing detailed and intensive analysis of a particular case (Bryman, 2012: p. 66). Semi-structured interviewing was chosen as the most relevant interviewing form for this research, since it allows for open answers and in-depth discussions. This type of interviewing also allows the changing of question order as well as including new ones (Bryman, 2012: p. 470). All together 14 interviews were performed with six IDPs and eight key informants (see Appendix 1). Interviews were conducted in Spanish, recorded and transcribed. The transcriptions were then coded into English. The length of the interviews varied between 30 minutes and one and half hour. Two main interview guides were in use: one for the IDPs and another one for the key informants. Since the key informants were entities working for different organizations, there was some variation in the questions directed towards to them, depending on their area of expertise. The interview guide for IDPs includes questions about their displacement, and even though these do not provide direct answers to the research questions, it was important to ask these questions for more profound understanding not only about their life situations, but about the different kind of diversity behind the Colombian displacements. Other questions that are

not directly concerning the research questions were formulated to discern possible hidden characteristics or new viewpoints and takes on different matters.

Interviews were conducted in the capital city of Bogotá and the capital city of Quibdó in the department of Chocó. These two locations were decided in order to capture possible regional differences in the implementation. As mentioned in previous sections, these regions have different historical trajectories as well as current situations concerning the conflict, so there is a possibility that the implementation has proceeded differently in the two. Representation of the IDPs consisted of ethnic minorities (indigenous, afro-Colombians) as well as social leaders and human rights defenders and one who participated as a representative of the victims in the peace talks between the government and the FARC in Havana, Cuba in 2016. Key informants were from international (UNHCR, IOM) as well as national organizations (Redprodepaz).

Sampling methods consisted of purposive as well as snowball sampling. Purposive samples are strategically chosen participants (Bryman, 2012: p. 418), which in this study are the organizations that were contacted and considered as adequate for the research. Snowball sampling means acquiring relevant contacts through others (ibid: p. 202-03), which were the contacts of the IDPs that were given by these organizations or other IDPs and that matched with the profile for this research; meaning that the IDPs had been displaced for various years (minimum four years) to be able to compare the time before the signing of the PA as well as the two previous years since the implementation, and that they were politically active. This guaranteed that the IDPs were aware of the contents of the PA as well as used to discuss about it with ease. Snowball sampling was helpful, since it was harder than thought to find IDPs to interview: many organizations working with the victims were not allowed to give interviews without a special permission, nor connect IDPs for interviews. These two sampling methods do not provide a general representation of the topic, but since that is not in the interest of this thesis, they were considered the most suitable methods.

## 5.2 Data analysis and coding

Data was analyzed through the concepts of empowerment and peacebuilding domains that were mentioned previously. During the fieldwork, the analytical process started hand in hand with the data collection phase. Firstly, the interviews conducted with the IDPs and key informants were transcribed in Spanish, and then reduced into different codes in English. Coding means reducing and organizing the data to more manageable pieces that are then easier to analyze and

link to the research questions and theoretical concepts (Bryman, 2012: p.13). These codes were created by using qualitative data analysis software, NVivo. NVivo is a tool where data is managed and reduced to codes, called *nodes* in the software. This software was helpful in creating nodes without the loss of content. Nodes were divided between IDP interviewees and key informants and can be found as Appendix 4.

### 5.3 Ethical considerations

Since the topic of the research is delicate and must be handled with special care, ethical code of conduct as laid out by Lund University was strictly followed. IDP interviewees were politically active and used to talk about the topic. Therefore, talking even about the delicate issues was fairly common for them. Each of the interviewees participated voluntarily, and the motive of the interview was always clarified in the beginning. According to Bryman (2012: p. 221), difficult topics should be left at the later stage of the interview. However, for the interviewees it came most naturally to talk first about their displacement and then on their experiences of the implementation of the Peace Agreement. Therefore, the question order was often changed from the original interview guide if the interviewees seemed comfortable with it. In addition to this, the interview places were private, and anonymity was guaranteed at the beginning of each interview. No names have been revealed either in the transcriptions nor in the actual thesis, and even though organizations are mentioned in the interviewee list, it was made sure that these cannot reveal the identity of the interviewees.

One consideration was also to explain in a clear manner that the material is for a bachelor's thesis and since there is no organization involved, the tools to work with the topic in the future are limited. Of course, there is a possibility to raise awareness and participate in different forums, but without an organization there is not a lot of possibility to contribute in concrete changes for the IDPs. This had to be done in order not to raise too high hopes in the IDPs.

### 5.4 Limitations of the study

Limitations of this study consist of the fact that the topic of the research is sensitive and might have resulted as discomfort in answering certain questions that were asked. This discomfort was tried to be eliminated by interviewing IDPs who are used to talking about this topic and who are familiar with the process of PA and its elements. In many cases rapport was established

by having met and discussed about the topic in general before the actual interview; in Colombia, as in other Latin American cultures, it is important to get to know each other a little bit to gain trust. In the case of key informants, rapport was established in the moment of the interview. Additionally, the places for interview were private and it was of course repeated that the interviews are anonymous: names are not mentioned in the thesis work nor other precise information that might risk revealing the identity of the interviewee.

Since this study is a qualitative case-study, the limitations are also in the methodologies: a deeper understanding of the interviewees has been acquired, but in terms of generalizability across geographical region and population might be hard to implement. However, Colombia is a pioneering country in victims-based peacebuilding with their Comprehensive System, so the experiences of this sample can shed a light to other regions that are in post-agreement or post-conflict phase.

Limitations of the sampling draw to the fact that the sample was mainly male interviewees, even though the majority of IDPs are women and children. Empirically it seems that the positions of key informants are male-dominated. Women's organizations were contacted, but without a response. Size of the sample is quite small, and I could not reach as many IDPs to interview as I had originally thought. However, the IDP universe is very diverse and since it consists of millions of people, there is no way I could get a representative result by interviewing for this thesis. Even though locating IDPs to be interviewed was harder than previously imagined, their answers were in line with those of the key informants. Therefore, I have decided to settle for this number of interviewees. It offers a glimpse to the current situation in the country from the viewpoint of both IDPs and people closely related to the topic.

My own background as non-Colombian female researcher might have affected in the interviewees' answers. However, I feel that this resulted more than anything in rather extensive accounts given in the answers, knowing that I do not share the same knowledge on the conflict and its history as the interviewed Colombians. Therefore, some deviations from the topic did occur in the interviews, but this was only enriching my knowledge on the topic. Additionally, being a foreign researcher might have added expectations on the IDPs' part to this study being able to contribute in some concrete changes in their situation. These expectations had to be cleared in order not to give false ideas on the actual impact that this study might have.

Spanish is not my native language, which can also be a limiting factor to the study. However, I trust my linguistic capabilities as well as the years before acquired knowledge on Colombian culture and country. The primary motive for me was to be able to conduct a study without the use of a translator to be able to remove the limitation of the linguistic barrier.



Interviews were recorded and carefully listened various times in the transcription process. Therefore, while it is acknowledged that linguistic biases are possible, this is not considered as an impediment to the results of this study.

## 6 Analysis

In the analysis I will present the main findings observed in the interviews analyzing them through the six domains of the peacebuilding theory as well as the concept of empowerment. Findings will be also linked to the literature mentioned in the literature review and other references to support the claims. Quotes will be used to highlight the personal opinions of the interviewees. Analysis is concluded with current challenges in the implementation, and reflection on the topic of end of displacement.

### 6.1 Physical security and sense of security

*“When I go out of the door in the morning, I know I may not return back home in the evening. I have told this to my children.”*

Interviewee 2, IDP

Human rights defenders and social activists are in an extremely vulnerable situation considering their safety and protection. The IDPs interviewed who were in such occupations were all aware of the risks it means to work in this specific area. According to them, the security situation of the country has not changed in the previous years but rather remained the same. There exists a national unit for protection, but this is highly inefficient when it comes to protecting leaders who have received death threats. *“If it was for the government, for the State, I would be dead already.”* (Interviewee 8, IDP). However, they continue risking their lives each day to guarantee the full re-establishment of rights to their communities.

Apart from the threat that individual human rights defenders face, there is still armed presence in many regions, which means that these communities are deprived from the sense of security. Government has not been able to guarantee safety in these regions and in majority of cases neither safe returns for the IDPs who want to return to their home regions. In many cases these IDPs decide to return alone, facing many risks to safety. As a few of the interviewees stated, many of the returnees go back to their home territories even when the violence has not

ceased. They reasoned that since the IDPs live in lousy conditions in the cities where they have displaced, they rather go and live in lousy conditions, but at home.

*“When the victims of the conflict who were displaced claim their territory, they are put in the grave. /... / So, they quiet down, because nobody wants to die.”* (Interviewee 9, key informant). In many parts of Colombia it is not safe to freely express political opinions nor participate in the politics. The current situation on physical security and sense of security among IDPs is disempowering, since there is a deprivation of capability to fight for one’s rights. Even though many are prepared to risk their lives in demanding their rights and manifesting the injustices they face, the threat of violence restricts the participation of another great many. As interviewee 1 stated, when an indigenous leader is forcefully disappeared or assassinated, it affects the community in a disproportionate amount and breaks the whole cycle of governance. Those acts may damage the social tissue of these communities for a long time.

Physical security and sense of security have not increased in the last two years of time, but rather stayed the same, as confirmed by various IDPs and key informants. This is in line with the Amnesty Report from 2017, proving that in 2019 the same human rights violations are experienced as before, the ones mentioned by interviewees being new forced displacements, confinement and selective killings. When it comes to the empowerment of the IDPs, this situation is rather disempowering, since it limits the choice of the people and their ability to challenge the existing power relations (Kabeer, 2003), mainly because of fear and threat to life.

## 6.2 Acknowledgement of key conflict drivers and commitment to address them

*“We have the faith in God that one day, not too distant in the future, the government will have to sit down with ELN /.../ and other illegal groups, so that none of the Colombian citizens will be killed or disappeared in this country.”*

Interviewee 7, IDP

This concept includes the leaders’ acknowledgment of the issue as well as the public willingness to deal with problems (Chigas et al., p. 36). This is a contested matter, since it must be acknowledged that the new government has not brought much faith in people to pursue the changes listed in the PA. Additionally in the referendum, people voting no to the agreement won slightly, meaning there is still a big part of population who are not supporting the PA. As interviewee 14 stated, even though the part of the society that wants change in the political arena to end the conflict is growing, there are still many who do not want the changes to happen.

The PA states that the Colombian society as a whole is needed in the successful implementation of the Agreement: there is no further explanation what this means exactly, but it is clear that the society as a whole is not rooting for the changes mentioned in the PA. Interviewee 14 mentioned that Colombia is divided in two, the ones who root for change and the ones who do not. Another division by another interviewee was made between rural and urban Colombia. There are different realities that people live in the different regions of the country, historically and currently.

In the Colombian conflict, the key conflict drivers are recognized in the PA: the unequal land distribution, illegal crops, lack of opportunity in political participation and the growing number of the armed groups. As mentioned by Chigas et al. (2018: p. 50), key drivers of violence are the experiences of injustice rather than monetary reasons. Commitment to address these issues is strong from the civil society's part who is politically active, but repeatedly mentioned in many interviews was the expression *lack of political will and government that is not interested in the implementation*. What was mentioned as reasons for this lack of political will was that maintaining the conflict is beneficial for some, that the government is implicated in the conflict and that their interests are the megaprojects in geostrategic territories – in other words, economic reasons. This statement is confirmed by Chigas et al. (2018: p. 48) in their mentioning that often the leaders are not willing to commit in the acknowledgement of the drivers of the conflict for these same reasons. “Uribismo<sup>3</sup> *is not interested in fulfilling the Agreement neither telling the truth.*” (Interviewee 14, Key Informant).

Recent developments in the political arena of Colombia have caused uncertainty in the people who fight for the implementation of the agreement: the seats that were reserved for the victims of the conflict in the Chamber of the Congress were canceled, the power of Special Jurisdiction for Peace was limited and cuts have been made to the budget for implementing the elements for Peace. The question is if the state is unwilling or unable to provide the rights of their citizens? In the research by Amnesty (2017), some interviewees mentioned that the reality of the situation is surpassing the resources of the state. Interviewee 4 (key informant) stated that there are not enough resources to pay indemnities<sup>4</sup> for all of the victims. Interviewee 11 (key informant) expressed that there are concrete examples that if willing, State can end the conflict; there are proofs from this kind of development in some regions of the country. It remains open for discussion whether the reason for unfulfilling with the implementation can

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<sup>3</sup> Uribismo is a right-wing political alignment of the supporters of the former President, Alvaro Uribe, who was one of the main protestors of the Peace Agreement.

<sup>4</sup> indemnity is a monetary compensation for the victims of the conflict in which everybody is entitled to

be lack of resources, but according to many of the interviewees it is at least a problem of lack of political will.

Formalized political unsettlement is a concept that was previously mentioned and fits the Colombian case: this concept refers to the persistence of old patterns, including social and political exclusion, corruption, inequity and such. It seems that the country has not been able to move forward in these themes. Social exclusion is acknowledged since it is highly visible in the statistics of poverty. This problem has been answered by implementing the “differential focus” in the elements of the PA, meaning that there is a priority in attending afro-Colombians, indigenous and women firstly. Indigenous IDPs interviewed said they have yet to see the differential treatment.

While the current government is not considered as being committed to address the key conflict drivers nor to fully implement the agreement, this positioning makes it also harder for the civil society to commit themselves, since it undermines the possibilities of participation of the civil society in this area. In other words, lack of political will and lack of commitment to address the key conflict drivers from the government’s part, reduces the opportunities of empowerment of the civil society. Lack of acknowledging the key conflict drivers means also denying the victims’ right to *truth*.

### 6.3 A durable political arrangement for handling power

*“It’s more difficult to make peace than war.”*

Commander of the FARC, La Negociación, Documentary Film

*“I feel that this Agreement never left the academy.”*

Interviewee 10, IDP

Successful settlements and agreements on new rules pertain to this concept alongside with acknowledging that negotiation is better than violence. However, it is highlighted that peace agreements alone are not sufficient guarantees on sustainable peace (Chigas et al., 2018: p. 44). This was confirmed by two interviewees, stating that the agreement as such does not contribute in peacebuilding. Majority did think that the PA includes all the necessary items to guaranteeing durable peace, in case implemented correctly. Two of the IDPs are critical towards the whole peacebuilding process. *“In Colombia, nobody believes in another possible world anymore.”* (Interviewee 10, IDP).

Many of the interviewees agree that on paper, the agreement as such has all the required elements for sustainable peace. However, the problem in the last two years of implementation seems to be that the elements have not materialized in reality. It is understandable that building peace takes its time, but a decent amount of progress should be made each passing year. Alongside the official agreement, alternative agreements have been made in the department of Chocó, and according to Interviewee 11, these agreements made between the civil society and the armed groups, have been working better than the actual agreement.

Two years ago, there were high hopes for the Peace Agreement and the building of sustainable peace in the country. Lot of promises were made, but too many continue to be without an effort of change. In Colombia, the power is very much centered in Bogotá and as expressed by Interviewee 1, the situation in the rural regions is very different and needs more decentralized decision-making. Other IDPs interviewed expressed this same concern of too centralized power in the capital city. Decentralization of power is also mentioned as one of the major influencing conditions for empowerment by the WB Framework (2002). In comparison to the report by Amnesty (2017), two years after the implementation the environment of insecurity has brought down the expectations of the IDPs. One IDP stated that there will not be peace. Another key informant informed that there is only bad news. Only one of the interviewees, IDP, mentioned that there is hope.

The transformation of the political system is still in progress, but at least FARC-political party has entered politics as promised in the PA. Victims are still waiting for their promised seats in the congress. Many are disappointed in this delay, and Interviewee 7 expressed that the whole idea of political participation in form of seats in the congress was originally an idea of the victims, but then stolen by FARC. Inclusion and participation are part of the concept of empowerment of the WB (2002), and in the sense of political participation, the opportunities for the victims are limited. As more than eight million they make up to 16 per cent of the country's population but are not adequately represented in decision-making. Guarantees for political participation for the victims were mentioned by various interviewees as an important factor for the future implementation, and Chigas et al. (2018: p. 44) point out that the idea of changing power structures in a peace agreement is to guarantee a more inclusive access to political power. In the empowerment framework by WB, it can be seen as the medium to hold accountable the institutions that affect the lives of the IDPs and victims in general, and therefore is a crucial building block for empowerment.

#### 6.4 Resilient relationship between government and society

*“We did not sign the Peace Agreement so that they [the government] can then shatter it, modify it, change the rules of the game.”*

Senator of the FARC-party, *Challenges for a Peace in Crisis-Forum*

*“This government is more interested in violence than in overcoming it. /.../ They are rather restricting democracy than extending it.”*

Interviewee 14, Key Informant

The main point of the PA and all of its elements is that victims are in the center of each of them. Mainly all of the key informants agreed that victims were very well included in the formation of the PA, but that they hardly remain in the center of the agreements anymore. However, the majority of IDPs were considering that they were not sufficiently included in the formation, even though there were various forums organized to hear everyone’s opinion.

Many interviewees agreed that IDPs and victims in general are very organized and know and claim their rights. Others disagreed, saying that while many are organized, the majority of the victims remain invisible to the society, and do not participate in political activities nor in social organizations. It was also mentioned by some that many of the victims are not familiar with the contents of the Agreement and that despite the efforts, it never reached the furthestmost rural areas.

Access to information, which is one of the four building blocks of empowerment by World Bank (2002), is still an ongoing process: the access to truth is one of the rights of the IDPs, but so far, the truth in all its dimensions has not been granted. One of the interviewees mentioned that he would like to have an access to the information of subsidies he has received from the part of the State: without this access he finds it hard to believe in the honesty of the system: *“If everything is as it should be, why can’t they show me the information concerning my very own data?”* (Interviewee 12, talking about the indemnity and Unit for Victims). Another point considering access to information is the impact it has on enabling participation and inclusion: if the IDPs do not know how to participate, they cannot choose whether they want to or not. In the formation of the Agreement, various forums and events were organized to hear the victims of the conflict: however, a couple of interviewees stated that they did not have the opportunity to express their opinions. If these politically active IDPs had no idea how to participate, how about the victims that are not so politically active? Two IDPs considered

that it was not the voice of the real victims, but rather of victims' organizations and the elite of the victims. It is unlikely that all of the victims expressing their opinions were elite of the victims, since in the forums there were thousands of victims participating, but it does reflect that not all of even the politically active knew how to participate in the process.

Local organizational capacity, another block of empowerment previously mentioned by WB, comes as a challenge in building the relationship between government and the society. In some regions where armed groups have been or still are operating, development projects and basic services are offered and maintained by them. As one of the interviewees mentioned, "*The armed groups haven't been all bad. Because of them, government has had to build roads and other infrastructure as well as communication networks to the regions where there previously were none, in order to battle the armed groups.*" (Interviewee 5, key informant). Interviewee also mentioned that the armed groups have done this consciously, knowing that by persecuting them the government needs to develop these areas otherwise undeveloped. Interviewee 13 mentioned as well that to some communities the only projects that arrive are the ones from the armed groups, since the State has never been present.

According to Interviewee 3, it is a challenge that IDPs come to trust the institutions build for them, since they have seen their rights harmed time and time again. This lack of trust is mentioned also by Amnesty (2017). The more times goes by without concrete changes, the more difficult it might get to gain the trust of the displaced population. Interviewee 13 thinks that the peacebuilding is not done by politicians. This is verified by interviewee 11, who claims that while the PA is not implementing, the agreements that the civil society themselves have done with different armed groups are working and respected.

A few IDPs and key informants mentioned that the government does not have the interest in telling the truth, because they are implicated in the conflict. These kinds of opinions hardly help in building resilient relationship between the government and civil society. Space for participation as means of empowerment is limited also in this sector. All in all, it was somewhat surprising that while IDPs have grudge against the government, all of the interviewees were quite compassionate when it came to FARC. "*FARC is interested in having the victims in the center of the Agreement*" (Interviewee 2, IDP).

Topic of resilient relationship between the government and the society is particularly difficult with the current government, and the President Ivan Duque who comes from the Democratic Centre-party that is known for its political positioning against the PA. Each passing month new obstacles seem to arrive hindering the implementation process. Patterns of exclusion persist in the society and make this peacebuilding domain particularly hard to reach.

Apart from this, the government has been involved in the same atrocities as the armed groups, participating in the kidnapping and killings amongst other breaches (CNMH, 2013: p. 32, 43) and as long as there is no commitment to tell the truth, this cannot be repaired. According to Interviewee 1 (Key Informant), the indigenous communities continue experiencing these breaches from the part of the government as well as the armed groups.

## 6.5 Economic fairness and opportunity – Peace as a Social Justice

*“The agreement was signed with FARC, but there is more poverty each day.”*

Interviewee 10, IDP

*“Even if there is nobody fighting, if I don’t have a job and I go to bed hungry, can you talk to me about peace?”*

Interviewee 2, IDP

A common theme with the interviewees is the relationship of social justice with peace: many agreed that peace is not just the elimination of guns, but providing social justice with possibilities to education, employment and decent living conditions. Many have been deprived of these as a result of the armed conflict, which can be seen in the high numbers of poverty amongst the IDPs: 69 per cent of the IDPs live in conditions of poverty, whereas further 31 per cent in extreme poverty (PND, 2018). Only 29 per cent of the displaced population enjoy decent living conditions, even though it is in the victims’ rights. Also, only 12 per cent have received the indemnity to which supposedly all of the IDPs are entitled to (ibid.). None of the IDPs interviewed had received the indemnity, but two had received minor subsidies for alimentation from the government. One had been offered the indemnity but rejected it since it was not respectful of her rights – the money is administered by the State – and she did not want to be considered as repaired victim for accepting the indemnity. *“The rifles do not prioritize the victims, /.../ in the moment of the attack everybody suffers, the rich, the poor, /.../ everybody. In the same way, the Colombian government has to guarantee us the right to indemnity for everybody under equal conditions.”* (Interviewee 7, IDP). The support offered by the State has been minor, which results from the interviews with both IDPs and key informants, as well as in the previously mentioned data from PND. The most important support that would be important to have according to IDPs are decent living conditions, access to education and land restitution. And these are already mentioned as their rights.



Chocó has been a neglected territory in Colombia for a long time, and according to interviewee 7, the population feels that the government has a historical debt to pay to the communities of Chocó for the abandonment as well as backwardness in development. Access to very basic services both in Chocó and Bogotá are limited for the IDPs. An empowering factor of access to opportunities is not the same for everybody and this breach has not narrowed in the previous two years of time. IDPs are not in the same line with the rest of the population when it comes to opportunities and economic fairness, since in many cases they have lost all the property they might have held before displacement, as well as faced disruptions in other areas of life, including employment or education. Poverty and economic deprivation can be considered as a threat to peace and must be therefore properly assigned in a post-agreement society (Chigas et al., 2018: p. 50). If the victims feel that they are deprived from economic opportunities, this results as an obstruction to sustainable peace (ibid: p. 50-51). Narrowing of the gap in equal opportunities is yet to be seen.

## 6.6 Social Cohesion and Social Exclusion

*“As indigenous people and displaced persons, we face rejection by the rest of the society.”*  
*“/.../ to protect our language, culture, to continue alive in our culture, that is our dream.”*

Interviewee 8, IDP

Even the displaced indigenous people who live in the department with high numbers of IDPs, face rejection and discrimination from the rest of the community. As stated by interviewee 7, indigenous people are highly vulnerable to abuses also due to the fact that they do not necessarily speak Spanish. Interviewee 10 stated that he feels this rejection mostly from behalf of the institutions, *“the way they look at you changes when you tell you are a victim”*. He thinks it is because the people who work with issues for the victims are not victims themselves, and therefore cannot understand, as well as with the fact that victims are often living in poverty and discriminated for that matter as well. According to interviewee 11, there is a lack of solidarity between the victims and the rest of the society. These attitudes from the civil society’s part might affect in the self-worth of the victims, reducing their agency (Kabeer, 2003).

Problems in social cohesion could be linked to lack of common identity in the Colombian society, as well as trust between the government, society and FARC (Chigas et al., 2018). While a few of the interviewees from Chocó mentioned that there exists peaceful

cohabitation between former *guerrilleros*<sup>5</sup> and civil society, the Colombian society is divided in two in the sense of those who root for change and those who do not – the result of the referendum (Interviewee 14, key informant). As mentioned by couple interviewees, there is a revictimization of the victims in the sense of accusing them of being collaborators of the armed groups. As mentioned before, it was stated in the PA that in the implementation the whole of Colombian society is needed. Currently, this is not the case, since not everybody approves of the Agreement. Instead of progress in social cohesion, the victims are rather experiencing social exclusion, through both the society and institutions.

As mentioned previously, the IDPs interviewed seemed surprisingly compassionate towards FARC and less so towards the government. Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the most conflict-driven regions of the country were the most willing to accept the PA in the referendum, whereas the least conflict-driven regions were reluctant to do so. There seems to be a gap of communication between the civilians and IDPs to understand the two different realities: it seems irrational that the ones who have lived the conflict are willing to forgive and move on, whereas the ones who did not suffer themselves in the conflict, are not ready to let go. This can be accredited to misunderstanding, ignorance and powerful political campaigns against the PA, but it could be possible to mend these by communicating the two societies with each other to contribute together in the peacebuilding process. Chigas et al. (2018: p. 51) mention the social cohesion and difficulties in the implementation referring to the affected group (IDPs) and the armed group, but as mentioned, I rather find the problem to be between the part of Colombian civil society that does not support the PA and the rest of the community.

## 6.7 Regional Differences

*“There might be regional differences in how well this plan was executed here and how badly there, but there are parts of the Agreement that have not been implemented at all anywhere.”*

Interviewee 14, Key Informant

*“Here [in Chocó] in the referendum [for Peace Agreement] we voted yes. Because here we know what war is, we know what conflict is.”*

Interviewee 10, IDP

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<sup>5</sup> person belonging to a guerilla

Regarding the regional differences in the lives of the IDPs themselves, the implementation of the PA has not brought changes in the life situations neither for the ones living in Bogotá nor Quibdó, Chocó. However, the current conditions in these two cities are very different from each other: in Quibdó people still live in the armed conflict, whereas in Bogotá there are no threats of that. Interviewees from Quibdó did think that the implementation has been more successful in Bogotá. This might be due to the centralization of power that finds itself in Bogotá, and since the Comprehensive System was designed and founded in Bogotá.

In the region of Chocó there are various PDET<sup>6</sup>-municipalities which have a territorial priority in the peacebuilding elements. However, both IDPs and key informants agree that the implementation has not reached even the PDET-zones. *“To implement a Peace Process in this scenario [Chocó]... I think that not even the government has sat down to do the analysis, how.”* (Interviewee 11, key informant). All in all, the conclusion is that while there are some regional differences on specific programs and their implementation, the progress in implementation concerning the IDPs does not have regional differences – IDPs are fairly bad off in both of the cities examined.

#### 6.8 Concrete Changes – *Rights to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition*

Concrete changes in the lives of the IDPs themselves are rather disappointing: according to them – apart from one interviewee who mentioned initiatives and projects, and another about strengthening of the social tissue – there are none. Reflecting on the previous analysis made, the security situation has not improved; there is no commitment on behalf of the government to address the key conflict drivers nor political will to fully guarantee the implementation of the agreement and political participation of the victims; durable political handling of power has not changed, but the power continues to be centered in Bogotá; resilient relationship between the government and society seems out of reach for multiple reasons, e.g. lack of trust from society’s part, lack of funding and guarantees from government’s part; economic opportunities have not improved towards being more equal, but instead IDPs continue with limited access to even the most basic services, up to 29 per cent of them living in extreme poverty and social cohesion is closer to social exclusion due to rejection and prejudices from the rest of the society, including institutions.

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<sup>6</sup> PDET are development programs with territorial-based approach, meaning that the territories affected the most by the conflict get a priority in receiving the development programs

Key informants are a little bit more optimistic, interviewee 12 stating that there are many advancements made in the last two years, main one being the creation of the Comprehensive System and its different institutions and units. At the same time, there has been a considerable de-escalation of the conflict, as well as significant decrease in the amount of new displacements. While these can be considered as advancements, they nevertheless do not materialize in the subjective perceptions of the IDPs themselves but are rather collectively perceivable changes in the level of the whole country. The victims' rights to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition are seriously lagging behind, even two years after the start of implementation of the PA and eight years since the creation of Victims' Law 1448 of 2011.

### 6.9 Current challenges

*“We have a president who does not listen to the civil society.”*

Interviewee 2, IDP

Most interviewees were concerned with the current government that is cutting budget from the agreement, willing to modify it, and even denying the existence of armed conflict in Colombia. The most severe current developments have been the cutting of legislative power of the JEP. Many of the interviewees stated that one of the biggest challenges for the implementation is the current government. Other challenges were the guaranteeing of political participation of the victims and the implementation of the Agreement as such. It was also mentioned that the reincorporation of FARC into civilian life as well as their sticking to disarmament are main challenges for the future of implementation.

As mentioned in the literature by Chigas et al. (2018), all of the six domains of peacebuilding need to be addressed in order to have progress towards sustainable peace. At the moment, none of these have been achieved in their entirety. The four key elements for building institutional reform and guaranteeing successful implementation of the empowering factors, are the before-mentioned 1) access to information, 2) inclusion and participation, 3) accountability and 4) local organizational capacity (WB, 2002). While inclusion and participation were somewhat guaranteed in the process of formation of the Agreement (even though there was no unanimous opinion about the inclusion, it was acknowledged by the majority that it was due to the victims that ethnic chapter was included in the PA), most of the interviewees agreed that the victims are not in the center of the Agreements anymore. One of the key informants regarded that rather that the PA is working for the benefit of the victims, it

is the victims who are justifying the existence of the PA and giving it its functionality. Even though it is the first time in Colombian history to include victims in the PA in such an extensive manner, there must be efforts to keep them included and participating. While victims have their municipal boards for victims, they are still waiting for their seats in the Chamber of Congress, guaranteeing them more visibility in the decision-making. Local organizational capacity exists partly, since there are many organizations for victims, but at the same time there is no complete freedom to express political opinions without the risk to one's safety. Key informant 5 criticized that social protests are criminalized in Colombia. These lacking empowering factors are of concern for the future of the implementation.

#### 6.10 When does displacement end?

Important topic of discussion is whether displacement ends at some point or can the IDPs be considered as victims for their whole life? Most of the interviewees had been displaced for various years or even decades already, and especially when the probability of ever being able to return home is very limited, are they never going to be recognized as regular citizens? This question also raises when it comes to internal reparation: is there such a thing? Many interviewees agreed that for all their losses, they can never be fully repaired. At the same time, victims were included in an extensive manner in the formation of the PA, and themselves have included reparation as one of the rights of the victims.

Interviewee 12, key informant, considers that a victim is repaired when they have their rights satisfied: e.g. if you are a victim that has a right to indemnity and psychological help, you are repaired when you have these rights fulfilled. Interviewee 9, key informant, considered that a victim is repaired when their conditions in their home territory have been settled and they are provided a safe return. Interviewee 3, Key Informant, considers that the IDPs who have been displaced for more than 10 years consider themselves more as regular citizens than victims. IDPs interviewed themselves do keep considering themselves as victims, even after decades. Interviewee 2, IDP, even mentioned turning down on the offer to indemnity, since she rejects the idea that indemnity equals reparation, and she feels disrespected by the system that would then monitor her on the money usage.

According to many, return to the home territories does not seem likely anytime soon. The Framework for Durable Solutions for IDPs by the Brookings Institution (2017), as mentioned in Chapter 2, categorizes end of displacement when these factors are fulfilled: 1) there is no discrimination and equal access to national protection, income generation, public

services, political rights, freedom of movement and property restitution; 2) reintegration in economic, political and socio-cultural matters as well as family unification and 3) no more needs or vulnerabilities that relate to displacement. For the majority of Colombian IDPs, these rights are not fulfilled. The reparation of IDPs interviewed seems quite a long process still, even though none of them are recently displaced.

## 7 Conclusion

This thesis analyzes the impact of the implementation of the Peace Agreement on the Colombian displaced population. Focus is placed in the last two years of time since the signing of the Agreement on 24<sup>th</sup> of November 2016, and the subjective perceptions of the displaced Colombians as well as the insights of the key informants related to the topic. Theoretical concepts of empowerment and peacebuilding theory have guided the analysis part of the thesis. The objective of this study is not to generalize, but to shed light on the current situation in Colombia through the interviews with internally displaced people and key informants.

Pertaining to the main research question about the concrete changes in the lives of the displaced population, it can be acknowledged that the changes have been institutional rather than societal. This means that the main progress has been the foundation of the Comprehensive System (Special Jurisdiction for Peace, Search Unit for Missing Persons and the Truth Commission) which in itself is progress, but the System has not started to fulfill their functions yet. Another progress is the de-escalation of the conflict meaning that the number of victims and forced displacement have diminished in numbers, but nevertheless still continue to happen. Disarmament of the former FARC-members and their inclusion in the politics as their own party is also a progress of the Peace Agreement, even though there are some who have already returned to rifles and others who have the risk of doing so. Therefore, the progress of the Peace Agreement has been unnoticed by many of the displaced persons, since it has not brought changes in their own life situations. Large majority of the displaced population have not received any indemnity<sup>7</sup>, as none of the interviewees either. Even though many displaced Colombians are politically active, another great many are not organized in any organizations and are preoccupied with survival rather than participation in the elements of the agreement. Basic services are very limited in both Bogotá and Quibdó, and while decent living conditions are the main wish for the IDPs, it continues to be just a wish. Return to home territory was not

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<sup>7</sup> indemnity is a monetary compensation for the victims of the conflict

possible for any of the interviewees, and without the guarantees of State for safe return, it is even further from realizing. Victims' rights to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition (mentioned in Chapter 2.2.1) are yet to be materialized: truth has not been granted, justice in form of serving penalties has not been put to practice, reparation in form of indemnity as well as other means has not reached but a small margin of the victims and non-repetition cannot be reality in regions where the conflict has never even left. None of the IDPs interviewed considered they have received support from the government apart from the minor subsidies for alimentation. Some were praising the support received from NGOs, whereas others had not received any help from NGOs either. As mentioned, a rather perfect peace agreement on paper does not guarantee anything solely. Even though it is a great accomplishment in itself to have reached a Peace Agreement with FARC, there exists great risks if the speed of the progress does not increase in the following years: the frustration from the part of former FARC-members that might return to rifles as a result of this, as well as the extension of the ELN and the dissidents of the FARC occupying evermore regions. As the Senator of the FARC-party mentioned, they did not sign the agreement so that it can then be modified, and the rules of the game changed. As mentioned in Chapter 6, stated by Chigas et al. (2018: p. 50), the deprivation of economic opportunities for the victims and their sense of inequality are a threat to peace and should therefore be accordingly addressed in a post-agreement society. The current government has not expressed too much concern even in the face of these risky issues.

The security situation in the country has rather stayed the same as before, enabling the breaches in various human rights and limiting the possibility for political participation and freedom of expression. This lack of choice results in maintaining the disempowered in their current status quo, unable to fight for their rights or opt for choices – or as the interviewed human rights defenders, risk their lives in the fight. This makes the country highly unequal in terms of opportunities for its people. The displaced population's agency as their ability of making their own life choices with options, resources as medium to this agency and achievements as the extent of potential as mentioned in Kabeer's (2003) empowering factors, is more limited than the rest of the society's.

According to the research question about how the displaced people were included in the process of peacebuilding, there was no consensus among interviewees whether the displaced population was sufficiently included in the formation of the Agreement. Key informants mainly agreed that the victims were extensively heard and included, but among displaced interviewees this was not so clear. Many different events and platforms for participation were offered, but there was a lack of knowledge on displaced people's part to

participate. Even though victims were present also in the peace talks in Havana, Cuba, some displaced persons interviewed expressed their concerns that these victims were not representing the victims as a whole, but rather representing organizations or the elite of the victims. This ties to World Bank's (2002) framework on empowerment, limiting the access to information in order to make choices about the participation.

The most common challenges for future mentioned by the interviewees and pertaining to the last research question, were the current government and their lack of political will, the continuation of the implementation of the Agreement as such, the start of the functioning of the Comprehensive System and for the FARC to prove themselves as a political party and stick to the Peace Agreement as well as guarantees for the political participation of the victims and restitution of lands. A repeatedly mentioned issue in the interviews was the idea of peace as a *social justice* more than just the absence of guns, referring to social development in general as decent living conditions, access to education and formal employment. These basic rights are the ones that the displaced people long for the most, and as mentioned by one of the key informants, these should be provided by each nation everywhere even without a Peace Agreement.

Binding these results in the literature, it can be noted here that as it is mentioned by Chigas et al. (2018), the first years after a peace agreement can be even more difficult than the actual peace talks. This is what has happened in the Colombian case: meanwhile others do think that there has been progress (in form of de-escalation and the Comprehensive System), these have been non-perceivable in the lives of individual displaced people. The signing of the Agreement brought high expectations amongst Colombians and international community, that have now been hindered by slow progress. Luckily the Peace Agreement is highly visible in Colombian news and there is pressure towards the government to continue the implementation and to address the victims. Chigas et al. (2018) emphasize the importance of the people inside the context as providers of information if there has been real progress in the post-agreement phase. This idea has been leading this study and the analysis of the results.

I would suggest further research on the success of reintegration of the former FARC-members into civilian life in their point of view as well as from the point of view from the displaced population and other civilians. Since the support for the Peace Agreement in Colombia is not unanimous, it would be relevant to analyze whether there has been change of opinions after the implementation started. Currently, the future of the Peace Agreement does not seem as bright as two years ago but giving it more time can change the course towards a more positive one. While the number of victims in Colombia is considerably high, this means



great challenges in the process of guaranteeing the rights to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition.

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**Appendix 1: List of the Interviewees**

<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>City</b>	<b>Date</b>
<b>Interviewee 1</b>	Key Informant	Representative of ONIC	Bogotá	01-02-2019
<b>Interviewee 2</b>	Displaced, since 1985	Human rights defender	Bogotá	20-02-2019
<b>Interviewee 3</b>	Key informant	Political Scientist, different projects with IDPs	Bogotá	22-02-2019
<b>Interviewee 4</b>	Key informant	UNHCR representative	Quibdó	26-02-2019
<b>Interviewee 5</b>	Key informant/Former displaced	Lawyer, Ombudsman	Quibdó	26-02-2019
<b>Interviewee 6</b>	Displaced since 2010	Social Projects for IDPs	Quibdó	27-02-2019
<b>Interviewee 7</b>	Displaced since 2000	Member of Victims' Municipal Board	Quibdó	27-02-2019
<b>Interviewee 8</b>	Displaced since 2011	Indigenous Rights Defender	Quibdó	27-02-2019
<b>Interviewee 9</b>	Key informant	Member of Communitarian Council	Quibdó	28-02-2019
<b>Interviewee 10</b>	Displaced since 2012	Anthropologist	Quibdó	28-02-2019
<b>Interviewee 11</b>	Key Informant	Lawyer, Ombudsman	Quibdó	01-03-2019
<b>Interviewee 12</b>	Key informant	IOM representative	Bogotá	06-03-2019
<b>Interviewee 13</b>	Displaced since 2013	Indigenous leader	Bogotá	09-03-2019
<b>Interviewee 14</b>	Key Informant	Redprodepaz representative	Bogotá	12-03-2019

## **Appendix 2. Interview Guide - IDPs**

### ***Personal Information***

- 1) Where from Colombia are you from?
- 2) How long have you been displaced?

### ***Implementation of the Peace Agreement***

- 1) In the Peace Agreement, it is stated that the victims of the conflict are in the center of the Agreement. Do you think that the victims were sufficiently included in the process of formation of the Agreement? Did you have a chance to express your opinion?
- 2) Do you think that the victims continue to be in the center of the Agreement?
- 3) In the Agreement it is stated that the victims have the right to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition. How have these elements been implemented in the last two years?
- 4) Do you think that the Agreement guarantees the necessary changes for durable peace?
- 5) What kind of support have you received from the Colombian government?
- 6) What kind of support have you received from the NGOs?
- 7) What kind of support would be the most important to receive from the government and NGOs?
- 8) It is stated that the peacebuilding includes the participation of the Colombian society as a whole. Are you aware of the tools you have to participate in the execution and monitoring in the peacebuilding process? (What do you think is your role and what can you do?)
- 9) In concrete, what changes have you experienced in your life situation in the last two years since the start of the implementation of the Agreement?
- 10) What is the most important point to focus from now on in building a lasting peace?
- 11) What are the most important challenges for the future of the implementation?

### ***Displacement***

- 1) What were the motives behind your displacement?
- 2) How did you decide where to locate?
- 3) Have you been able to build a new life in your new home?
- 4) Were you aware of your rights and reclaim them?

### **Appendix 3. Interview Guide - Key Informants**

- 1) In the Peace Agreement, it is stated that the victims of the conflict are in the center of the Agreement. Do you think that the victims were sufficiently included in the process of formation of the Agreement?
- 2) Do you think that the victims continue to be in the center of the Agreement?
- 3) In the Agreement, it is stated that the victims have the right to truth, justice, reparation and non-repetition. How have these elements been implemented in the last two years?
- 4) Do you think that the Agreement guarantees the necessary changes for durable peace?
- 5) Are there regional differences in the implementation of the elements?
- 6) What kind of support the victims are receiving or should receive from the government?
- 7) What changes has the Peace Agreement brought forward in the lives of the displaced people in concrete?
- 8) Are the victims aware of their rights and do they reclaim them?
- 9) Do you consider that the displaced population is aware how to participate in the execution and monitoring of the elements in the Agreement?
- 10) What is the most important element to focus from now on in the peacebuilding?
- 11) Which are the most important challenges for the future of the implementation?

## Appendix 4. Nvivo Nodes: IDPs

Node	Source <sup>8</sup>
Armed groups also have development projects	1
Awareness of rights and tools for implementation	
- yes	2
- no	1
- people don't know about the content of the agreement	1
- minorities are not let to participate	1
→ the tools don't exist	1
Challenges for future of the implementation	
- change of government	2
- guarantee of political participation for victims	2
- implementation of the integral system	1
- implementation of PDET	1
- political participation of FARC	1
- commitment of FARC to disarmament	1
- extension and resources for victims' law	1
- work in the rural territories	1
- more evaluation of organisms of control	1
- there is no future for the agreement	1
Concrete changes in the lives of IDPs	
- cooperation projects	1
- strengthening of social tissue	1
- we have continued with our projects	1
→ with initiatives that gvmt complies with the agreement	1
→ with initiatives that they won't kill us	1
- Victims' unit is the only impact we have seen [Chocó]	1
→ collective reparation initiatives, integral attention to victims, psychosocial help	1
- integral system still in process	1
- no advancements in the elements	3
- no changes	1
- still abandoned by the State, government	1
- situation in my home territory hasn't improved much	1
- the changes are not for us	1
Criticism towards peacebuilding	2
- does not depend on agreements	1
- does not depend on disarmaments	1
- It is about social justice	1
- there will not be peace	1

<sup>8</sup> Sources are the number of interviewees



Current state of the conflict is...	
- a lot of presence and difficulties with the armed groups still [Chocó]	1
- the problems are still there	1
→ displacement	1
→ restricted movement	1
→ forced recruitment of minors	1
→ economic, social and political conditions are the same	1
→ still threats to social leaders and human rights defenders	1
→ → I get threats every time I sit with the gvmt	1
- if gvmt doesn't comply with their own laws, armed groups will continue to exist	1
→ ex-combatants returning to armed groups	1
- gvmt not interested in complying the agreement	2
Inclusion of the IDPs in the formation	
- yes	2
- concrete proposals from the victims	1
- ethnic chapter included because of victims' initiatives	2
- no	3
- it was not the voice of real victims	2
- I never had the chance to express myself	2
Government and institutionality	
- institutions have not strengthened	1
- international monetary aid does not reach the victims	1
- no guarantees for political participation of the victims	2
- lack of resources for PDET	2
- no recognitions of the victims	1
- no recognition of the conflict	1
Main point for victims is the Truth	2
- currently getting further from it	1
- the gvmt not interested in letting the truth to be told	1
- own commission of truth created in Chocó	1
Peace is a social justice	1
- state has to guarantee access to healthcare, education, employment, living conditions	1
- it is about integral social policies for all	1
- they have confused peace with conflict	1
Regional differences	
- agreement stayed in Bogota	1
- yes	1
Rejection by the rest of the society and institutions	2
Reparation	

- disacknowledgment of what is reparation	1
- I don't need a mediocre reparation	1
- indemnity is not reparation	1
- reparation is restauration of rights	1
- they can't repair me what I've lost	1
Revictimization	1
Rights of the victims	
- no decent living conditions	1
- no recognition of rights	1
- no recognition of conflict	1
- rights are vulnerated	2
- rights to reparation and non-repetition will not fulfill	1
→ because none of the previous victims' law has been fulfilled	1
- rights will not be fulfilled. Why lie about it?	1
- Victims' Unit is deceiving the victims	1
Some day they will have to solve our problem	1
Support from the state	
- minor monetary aid for alimentation	2
- some get support, some don't	1
- they have paid me for my services for the state	2
- protection unit ineffective	1
- no support or aid from gvmt	3
- no indemnity	4
- was offered an indemnity, didn't take it	1
- lot of support from NGOs	2
→ but it's state's responsibility	1
Support that would be important	
- decent living conditions	3
- access to education	2
- access to healthcare	1
- guaranteeing the indemnity in equal conditions for all	1
- guaranteeing the tools for re-establishment of territorial rights	1
- guaranteeing the return to territory	1
- permanent psychosocial help	1
- land restitution	2
- that the armed groups leave the territory	1
Victims still in the centre of the agreement	
- yes	1
- no	2
- previous gvmt and FARC were interested in having victims in the centre of the agreement	1

## Appendix 5. Nvivo Nodes: Key Informants

Node	Sources
Alternative Agreements by the civil society	1
Armed groups brought development in rural regions	1
IDPs are aware of their rights	
- Yes, the majority	6
- Many are politically active	1
- If not, there are ORGs and platforms to help	1
- I do not know	1
- Places where information does not reach	2
- Places where difficult to participate openly in politics	2
- Majority of IDPs do not belong to any org.	1
Challenges for future of the implementation	
- apply the elements in rural territories	2
- current government	3
→ lack of political will	4
→ lack of institutional response	1
- FARC to prove themselves as a political party and social organization	1
- guarantees from the State	1
- impulsar mas el estatuto de JEP	1
- negotiate with ELN	1
- prevent the killings of social leaders	1
- reincorporation of FARC into civilian life	1
- restitution of lands	1
- security measures extended to the whole population	1
- that the civil society understands the importance of the agreement	1
- that the integral system starts to work	2
- to comply with the elements in the agreement	4
- to reach a Colombia in peace	1
- territory [Chocó] in different conditions	1
Concrete changes in the lives of the IDPs	
- de-escalation of the conflict	2
- many advancements	1
- the integral system was created	3
- very little has been implemented	1
- no advancements at all	3
- no advancements in changing political structure	1
- no reparation at all	2
- nothing has arrived in the communities	1
- still waiting for changes/advancements	2
- total disacknowledgment of the agreement	1
- minor percentage has received indemnity	3
→ government does not have the resources	1

Country is centralized in Bogotá	3
Criminalisation of social protests and little participation of the civil society	1
Currently the conflict is...	
- continuing human rights breaches	2
→ forced displacement	4
→ restriction of movement	1
→ selected killings	2
→→ both government and armed groups	1
- country in war still	3
- difficult to fight the guerrillas	1
- no presence of the state	3
- same as before	2
- worsening in indigenous territories	1
Inclusion of IDPs in the formation of the agreement	
- Yes	5
- No	2
- They were centered	1
Interests of the State	
- denial of the conflict	1
- government implicated in the conflict	1
- megaprojects in geostrategic places	1
- no interest in telling the truth	1
- the continuation of war is beneficial to some	2
Regional differences in the implementation	
- yes	5
- each region has their complexities	1
→ lack of infrastructure, social services, motivation of the government entities	1
Rejection of IDPs by the rest of the society	1
Resilient relationship between the government and civil society	
- no credibility in public forces	1
- no trust in institutions	1
→ rights vulnerated so many times	1
Revictimization of the victims	4
- accusing of being collaborators	2
Rights of the victims	
- good living conditions barely 30%	1
- on behalf of international cooperation	1
- on behalf of victims' initiatives	1
- partial implementation	1
- return to territory far from reality	3
→ no State guarantees for safe return	2
- victims are working for the system, not the other way around	1
Two Colombias	

- rural and urban	1
→ many in the urban territories do not know conflict in rural zones	1
- one part of the society wants change, the other part does not	1
- sectors where there is no agreement	1
State Support for IDPs	
- administrative support	1
- hope	1
- minor support	1
- Victims' Unit	1
The Peace process doesn't work	1
Victims are more resistant	2
- they know that if they go, they won't return	1
Victims still in the centre of the Agreement	
- yes	2
→ but also left behind	1
- no	3
- victims are disappointed	1
- victims are not motivated anymore	1
- victims are more victimized everyday	1
- victims not represented in the congress	1
- victims without recognition	1