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Botswana's Ownership over the Development Cooperation with the European Union: Technical and Vocational Education and Training and the Cooperation of Stakeholders

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1. Introduction

The European Union (EU)'s "international development policy can be seen as a recent addition to academic interest {...}. Despite the scale of the EU's contribution to international aid [...] debate has been slow to pick up" (McCann 2012). Although the EU and its member states "are collectively the world's leading donor" (European Commission 2019) the study of EU development cooperation displays a research area which unlike the common market has yet to catch up regarding its prominence.

In those instances in which the policy field is subject to scientific analysis questions about how the EU executes and implements its foreign development policy commitments within its cooperation in developing countries are largely ignored. The debate is rather spread across a variety of issues in the development nexus surrounding but not addressing the actual level of engagement (on the issue of human rights: Horng (2003), comprehensive trade agreements: Hoffmeister (2015), structural changes due to the Lisbon Reforms and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS): Holland/Doidge (2012), aid effectiveness claims after Lisbon reforms: Carbone (2013), Henriksson (2015) and interest coalition forming in the Council of the EU (Tobin 2013)). Research on the EU's actions in international development can thus be seen as a patchwork which is in need of empirical approaches and research. By addressing *how and to what extent the EU allows for ownership in developing countries and whether or not developing countries take control of their own policy areas aimed at ensuring long-term development progress*, the study aims to provide a perspective from which it is possible to theorise about the EU's development cooperation in relation to a developing country's own policy actions to tackle the increasing need for skills development. Examining the relation between the relevant stakeholder institutions in Botswana and the European Delegation concerning their efforts in implementing the necessary progressive policies offers an empirical approach able to determine how this (policy-specific) cooperation looks, who can be identified as an important actor among the institutions participating and how this participation can be put in relation to the other institutions.

Within this paper – baring this gap within the research of development policy in mind – it is argued that the aspect of technical and vocational education and training (T-VET) provides a set of skills within a society, upon which sustainable development can be built. These training policies can be found in a variety of developing countries – but it remains unclear whether these are proscribed by the donor or politically owned by the aid recipient. Ownership is thus the crucial condition for a country's socio-economic development if sustainable knowledge-based professions are to be successful in leading a society to independence from development assistance.

With the most recent Cotonou Agreement (signed in 2000) nearing its end (2020) it is time to assess and characterise the EU's development policy with respect to the ownership paradigm and use empirical observations to start an academic discussion which has so far been neglected.

To answer the research question and to situate the EU within the donor community this study proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 addresses the underlying background regarding the reasoning for this study. This serves the purpose to better understand not only the necessity for a field study but also shows that the elephant in the room has so far not been adequately addressed. Chapter 3 elaborates deductively how ownership and TVET are related to each other specifically and the development paradigm in a broader sense. Chapter 4 addresses the methods used to examine how and to what extent the EU allows for ownership as a concept to be exercised by the stakeholder community in Gaborone, the capital of Botswana. Moreover stakeholders will be identified and interviews with both Botswana and EU officials will be conducted. This approach will help to uncover possible discrepancies between donor and recipient in the light of the *training for development* approach. Chapter 5 displays the results and offers an analysis of the current situation in Botswana concerning ownership of development initiatives and to what extent the EU is participating or influencing the ownership of national policies which aim at contributing to the domestic development. Chapter 6 puts the results in perspective, thus allowing for further research to be conducted concerning the empirical work of the EU in development. Chapter 7 concludes, offering a summary of the results and stressing the importance of this research for the perception of development and the potential impact of the EU's policy in developing countries.

2. Motivations – Why EU and ownership?

This chapter outlines the background of the study and gives cause to its relevance for the research field. It is divided into two parts: Development Policy in Practice and External Actions of the EU. This chapter will show that although development studies emphasise the importance of acknowledging local characteristics among aid recipient communities and therefore make an indirect claim for why ownership is important they do not take the structural cooperation between the EU and local government institutions into account. The second part takes the perspective of the EU and its actions into account and points to the missing link between development studies and EU related studies, which are mostly inward looking and thus leave the external (non-EU) perspective of cooperation in developing countries unexplored. As such, while one side of the current aid literature neglects the EU as an actor the other neglects the extent of local empowerment through the context specific actions by the EU as an actor. By providing this background the need for this empirical development study

which focuses on local ownership and the EU's role will emerge out of the shortcomings of the two strands.

2.1 Development Policy in Practice

The study of practical development cooperation aims at providing future aid workers and specialists in the field with the knowledge needed to envision, plan and execute relevant aid related projects in order to improve the living conditions of the target group in a chosen geographical, political and cultural setting. National guidelines from national aid and development agencies are utilised to strategically address development related problems. Learning how to possibly improve living conditions and to fight poverty is key when it comes tackling development issues. As such one has to know what one is *fighting* as “poverty looks different in different countries” (SIDA 2015 *author's translation*). Local settings are specific cultural, hierarchical or structural factors that are deeply entrenched in local communities, thus being embraced, developed and preserved by the local people. Not only the complex social structures but also the overall goals themselves display complicated cases, as the German development agency GiZ states: “Within the 2030 Agenda, sustainable development, poverty reduction and climate policy are inextricably linked” (GiZ 2018). Hence, unintended consequences occur regularly in any aid programme, which consequentially influences the identified problem and the necessary measures used to tackle the problem in the developing context at hand.

With the emphasis on the local background it is crucial to work *with* and not *against* these apparent local structures. Therefore any development undertaking needs to entail cooperation between local governments and foreign development agencies/aid organisation within the governing system in the targeted region, village or country. The mapping of local partners is thus necessary in order to successfully cooperate and ensure sustainability. Any foreign intervention lacks insights into local contexts, which have historical and cultural roots. This circumstance needs to be bridged by utilising the knowledge of members of society who are part of the beneficiary group or region. This renders continuous progress possible, i.e. targets are to be maintained even when the development assistance is coming to an end. By adding this level of ownership interventions are able to ensure sustainable outcomes (Makuwira 2018). Crucial here is the contextual analysis in which characteristics of target groups in different regions limit or exclude most blueprint-approaches from succeeding (Ramalingam 2013). In the case of a development intervention ownership can therefore be seen as a key concept which needs to be adhered to if development cooperation is to lead to long-term progress and empowerment for the individual person and the society and social group it belongs to.

2.2 Development Policy of the European Union

Research regarding the EU's development cooperation has for the past decade been influenced by Maurizio Carbone. The focus in his contributions surrounds the special issue of aid effectiveness, which in Sub-Saharan Africa is "significantly constrained by national aid bureaucracies and by the complex aid architecture" (Carbone 2013:2). While coherent strategies are planned in Brussels the structures relevant for aid policy implementation serve as obstacles as these structures promote national and bilateral action. As such he stresses the need for an "[a]lignment of preferences [which] can be achieved not only around norms but also around interest[s]" (ibid.3). Any apparent lack of visible coherence leads to credibility problems in recipient countries and international organisations. Hence aid effectiveness is mostly defined by donor countries as "money disbursed rather than service delivered", which diffuses the "responsibility of failure" (ibid.5). The EU thus seems to utilise the amount of aid spending to develop a "European way of doing development policy (in opposition to the Washington Consensus [1992]¹), which did not necessarily imply the full delegation of policy authority to the supra-national level" (Carbone 2013:6 (see also McMichael 2012:5f.)). What becomes clear in this effectiveness driven research area is that the divide between foreign development action (by the EU and the member states) and local actions executed by locally empowered institutions and societies has not been bridged and EU related research looks for (1) diverging member states' preferences which constrain the EU's cohesiveness and (2) lead donors which at times create "national rather than supranational modes of interaction" or involve "excessive technical and human capacities from lead member states" (Carbone 2013:9). To this end Bodenstein/Kemmerling (2017:579) presume that "EU aid seems relatively politically neutral" and find that EU funded aid projects are "slightly more popular among wealthier people" in the recipient population (ibid.). From this offset it seems promising to look at the EU's actions rather than the coordination of and within the EU.

The circumstance that the EU's "foreign aid policy is [viewed as] one of the EU policy areas in which the EU has relatively weak powers" (Henriksson 2015:438) hampers the coordination in this regard. The extent to which power relations can be observed could thus be indicative for the EU's actions and potential limitations in the cooperation with the local development actors and recipients in Gaborone (Botswana).

¹ In the light of development policy the Washington Consensus refers to a policy package prescribed by Western countries lead by the U.S. to promote and implement a set of free-market economic policies in developing countries. The approach was backed by prominent economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury. The approach can in reference to its emergence in the late 1980's be understood as a policy which aimed to oppose Soviet-led communist approaches on development – especially in terms of production of goods – and expected economic growth.

In sum the strand of literature on EU development policy shows that (1) the EU's actions regarding development policies are situated within already existing aid structures which the EU itself abides thus limiting the EU's room to manoeuvre and the overall aid effectiveness, (2) the EU faces credibility problems linked to the lack of influence over these structures as well as the incomplete delegation of development policy to the supranational level, (3) the EU (like other donor organisations and actors in this realm) needs to balance the evaluation of aid efforts between the service delivered (which is the central part of this study) and money disbursed, as only the comprehensive look on both issues can show how the EU cooperates on the local level with stakeholders regarding development policy.

What becomes clear is that an investigation concerning how the EU is involved in development policy implementation as an actor is missing. EU level policy analysis in this strand of literature – though surrounding the topic – do seemingly not fully penetrate its core and fall short on offering insight into the dynamics on interrelations between the EU and local stakeholder institutions.

As such it follows from the construction of this chapter that the academic debate regarding EU development policy so far fails to a large extent to take the issue of local ownership in development into account. But how can one conceptualise ownership at a local level? The next chapter will address two problems related to this area of the research question; how does the current state of literature allow us to view ownership as a concept and utilise it for development. To address this issue one first has to explore what progress in a society means. Only by setting a clear theoretical point of departure can the concept of ownership be described and understood as a goal of development interventions.

3. The literature so far

This chapter aims to offer a suitable conceptualisation of ownership and here especially sheds light on technical and vocational education and training (TVET) for development as a means both for empowerment on the one hand and for broader macro-economic development on the other. The structure of the chapter follows a deductive approach arguing that progress within a society depends on its ability to convey knowledge, that knowledge creation needs to be anchored within institutions and educational systems which are tasked with distributing knowledge, that the system for the distribution of knowledge has to be *owned by* local people affected rather than being proscribed from the outside, and finally that dimensions of ownership have to be taken into account, protected and examined in order to ensure development success. These aspects concerning TVET for development will situate the research question within a suitable framework and allow for the conceptualisation and examination of the extent to which the EU lets developing countries control and structure their vocational education policies with respect to the training necessary for the successful integration of

the domestic labour market into the global economy. The chapter concludes with a *road map*, which emerges from the literature discussion and provides an operationalisation of the ownership for development paradigm.

The chapter starts with offering a definition of the term *progress* from a historical point of view (section 1). In this first part the argument is that any economy aims at progressing in order to achieve a surplus of goods that can be exported to other national economies. Thus technological progress tied to mass production indicates the level of progress. Technology as a precondition requires knowledge and the distribution thereof (section 2). As a result it is argued that the need for labour market related reforms is a driver behind the knowledge creation, which is necessary for progress (section 3). Consequently, by tapping into the ownership discussion in the next part of this chapter (section 4) TVET is introduced as a means to create social progress. Utilising the concept of ownership TVET is linked to observable empirical criteria of ownership. As such the concept – starting out at an abstract review of the current academic literature regarding ownership – introduces several dimensions of ownership. These dimensions (Sjöstedt 2013/Faust 2010) are examined and combined in order to form observable criteria for ownership (section 5) which are capable of addressing the preconditions of *progress*

3.1 Progress – From Labour-Intensive Farming to Innovation

Development policy specifically, but also – in more general terms – labour market policy as a subfield of the macro-economic development within a country, aims at providing society and its members with the necessary means and tools to obtain a minimum standard of living. This minimum is defined by the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. Rather than being static development follows a logic of progress. To capture the foundation upon which progress and thus development is built it is useful to start out by illustrating Rostow's (1959) idea of modernisation.

“The Preconditions for Take-off [...] point [to t]he widening of the market – both within Europe and overseas [which] brought not only trade, but increased specialization of production” (Rostow 1959:4). The general observation is that economic and social development in (western) societies was accompanied by specialised manufacturing. The knowledge how to refine raw material and – by altering its natural properties – adding value to it leads to higher levels of quality. These products are thus more precious on the market (globally and domestically). On a basic level value chains account for the creation of value. On an abstract level these instances of *adding value* can be seen as “factors [...] outside the market place, [which] have interplayed with the dynamics of market demand, risk-taking, technology and entrepreneurship [...and] determine the specific content of the stages of growth for each society” (ibid.3). Adding value to goods and thus renewing the use or purpose can be

labelled *innovative*. Secondly, and historically seen, these innovations in the agricultural sector led to surplus of labour which moved to the cities to find new occupation, leading to a rise in the urban populace (ibid.5). The creation of occupation will depend on how innovative the respective sector has become and how important its output is for the global (and local) economy. “The leading sectors in the drive to maturity will be determined, then, not merely by the pool of technology but by the nature of resource endowments; and it may be shaped to a degree, as well, by the policies of government” (ibid.8). This phenomenon goes together with the concentration of “capital and technology in sectors other than manufactured consumption goods” (ibid.9). Thus “[a]s societies move to technological maturity, the structure and quality of the working force change. The proportion of the population in agriculture and rural life decreases; and within the urban population the proportion of semi-skilled and white-collar workers increases” (ibid.10). From a theoretical point of view Rostow (1959) outlines the development of society with great care. By focusing on technological and innovative advancement for the development of a local economy any attempt to execute development policy should take the requirements for progress into account. Easterly (2000:53) deduces from this circumstance that employment in developing countries will decline in areas in which the work is carried out by “[l]abour saving technology” – primarily in the agricultural sector. By taking advantage of the available technological means a country’s economy can enter the stage of mass production and export its refined goods, i.e. the country can enter and interact with the global market.

These requirements for growth – next to peace and the absence of violent social unrest – are tied to knowledge, the distribution thereof and the opportunity to engage economically within the society. As such the next section will outline the need for knowledge as a requirement for progress. Because nothing in the globalised world remains unaffected by outside events Rostow’s general assumptions need to be viewed in relation to specific pre-conditions.

3.2 Requirements for progress

Progress does not occur within a vacuum. The outside world impacts today’s development and progress in economic and social terms. By observing the situation in any country one can identify impeding or supportive conditions for progress. Progress requires the absence of violence and social unrest. The state as the structural component offers a legal framework of incentives and regulations to promote and protect the growth of the local economy. But at times the state may be unable to act due to conflicts, war, civil war or the lack of state structures and institutions. In these cases “the state and the public sector have not been able to deliver development to the presumed beneficiaries, [...and] NGOs must then step in and fill the void” (Zaidi 1999:261) bringing back *sensitivity* regarding local problems. The development landscape is therefore fragmented and NGOs are seen as means for

addressing development problems from below, in cases in which the political elite fails to provide policy input from above that adequately addresses structural problems. As such NGOs form the counterpart to government initiatives in the development sector in case the latter is not capable to act. It is thus crucial to take the local perspective on development issues into account when assessing the countries situation. Examining the overall political stability within a country and the surrounding region is thus the first step to determine who to look at in terms of stakeholder mapping. Alternatively, instead of looking for NGO activity the focus shifts in secure and peaceful regions. Here the local elected officials representing the local people within (bureaucratic) government bodies and the attached civil servants are at the centre of analysis.

Next to the absence of violence progress is primarily tied to knowledge. In times of peace innovation, inventions and the distribution thereof – within the rules of the market – create jobs and favour economic development for the individual and the family unit. The creation of value chains as outlined above (Chapter 3.1) depends on specialisation. It is hard to disagree that the creation of bread, in industrialised countries is specialised and presents the utilisation of machinery in the twenty-first century. Thus the means of mass production are much more advanced and cost-effective in the long-run than manufactured bread from local plots of each family unit. If everyone produces a little and does not specialise the prospects for growth are slim. By adding mass production and specialisation within society the variety of products, the art of occupation and the market structures adapt. Having no longer a society in which everyone produces and consumes what he or she can grow and manufacture we enter a society of specialised workers adding value to basic goods, thus creating professions and demand for those goods. As such the labour *moves* quite literally from rural farming towards urban production and the refinery of raw material. On an abstract level these instances of *adding value* can be seen as “factors [...] outside the market place, [that] have interplayed with the dynamics of market demand, risk-taking, technology and entrepreneurship [...] and] determine the specific content of the stages of growth for each society” (Rostow 1959:3). Adding value to something and thus renewing its use or purpose can be labelled *innovative*.

But adding value to basic goods requires knowledge and skills and therefore cannot be interpreted as a natural phenomenon. An unskilled worker without the necessary creativity and *know-how* to alter a raw product can neither progress in terms of holding on to a competitive advantage, which differentiates him from the rest of workers in the sector, nor can he contribute to the knowledge development (innovation) of the society as a whole. As such having the creativity, knowledge and specialisation makes the labour market more divers and indeed specialised for the demand of the people within society. “[I]n the cross-section of countries and the time series data for countries that

are currently rich, there are strong negative relationships between income per capita [...] and agriculture's share of employment and output" (Gollin 2015:17). On a quantitative basis one can thus arguably find a relation between development and shifts towards knowledge intensive occupational situations. The task to allow for and promote specialisation and the distribution of the necessary skills and knowledge is thus a key aspect to create the *right* conditions for development. The next section will therefore address the means to distribute knowledge in order to impact the development progress within a selected social group.

3.3 TVET for progress

The elaboration of the two previous sub-sections has laid the basis for addressing Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) as part of development and labour market (in a narrow) and economic policy (in a broader sense). Training and skills development are not only important to keep up with the modernisation of technology but also assists in the overall creation of employment opportunities. By teaching students the skills needed to engage within a specialised society the abovementioned movement of labour within the labour market can be addressed and utilised. But one is best advised to bear in mind that this movement does not always occur as automatically as this deduction may leave one to suggest. The movement of labour away from farming to more specialised jobs relies on technology to replace manpower because a society is nevertheless relying on foodstuff production – thus dependent on farming. These specialised jobs require various skills and expert knowledge. As such the technological advancement depends on the society to adequately generate, acquire and distribute the necessary practical and theoretical knowledge among its members and empower them to utilise their skills to execute a variety of tasks in economic areas which are key industries for growth and knowledge creation – hence development. Consequently, interventions need to take this line of arguments into account and offer developing countries, and here especially citizens, the possibility to profit from and exploit this technological advancement. But the status quo of this development and the individual progress varies from one society to the next. The local perspective within developing countries is therefore important in order to assess the society's capability to provide institutional support for development through knowledge distribution. Only then can a transition towards specialised occupation be fruitful.

Despite the call for primary education for all children as one of the Millennium Development Goals the issue of TVET as a means for developing countries to catch up economically has received comparatively little attention. The 2015 Sustainable Development Goal 4 – Quality Education mentions as one of its ten targets (4.4) to “substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills,

including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship” (UN 2019) but empirical studies concerning the actual actions undertaken are scarce. The academic debate surrounding technological advancement as a necessary condition for development projects to help countries to progress can be traced back to Chang/Cheema (2002). They argue that the “process of technological development [in developing countries] is fraught with market imperfections” (Chang/Cheema 2002: 393), which “call for an activist technology policy” (ibid). Competition within the international market encourages and demands technological development through “innovation and learning” (ibid: 375) as the use of technology creates higher productivity rates. But innovation for higher productivity rates is in itself not sufficient. Because the competitive market itself does not always react positively to deregulation Chang/Cheema (2002) suggest that positive legislation, regarding the market on the one hand and the technological advancement through education on the other, needs to be used in order to ensure positive results on productivity rates and competitiveness through technological change (ibid.390). The state needs to create a playing field by institutionalising and legally determine structures for development. With this conclusion Chang/Cheema (2002) leave the empirical dimension of development policy making and implementation largely unexplored. Bornschier et al. (2005:513) find that the access to mass education and higher education under the right labour market conditions leads to an “investment friendly environment” and the prospective economic growth which benefits society as a whole and the individual. “Public spending on education [...] contributes to the formation of economically useful human capital” (ibid. 524), which reduces inequality within society and impacts employment opportunities for its graduates. Investment in (especially post-primary) education is thus said to achieve progress.

Development and education seem to be correlated – not only in monetary terms (potential of income). “Today’s students need *twenty-first-century skills*, like critical thinking, problem solving, creativity, and digital literacy. Learners of all ages need to become familiar with new technologies and cope with rapidly changing workplaces” (Brende 2015 (italics added)). Conveying knowledge is thus one of the key tasks within the century to also contribute to economic prosperity in general. Under the right conditions (i.e. within locally empowered and supported economies (Chapter 3.4)) knowledge and labour-market-related skills are seen as the new *silver bullet* against poverty. Skills training entails therefore also the notion of *life skills*, which prepare (future) workers to deal with fast changing environments due to further technological advancement. “A well-functioning post-school vocational education system is a key lever for school leavers to break out of poverty and inequality and sustain a consistent development trajectory” (Badenhorst/Radile 2018:92). In their critical study Badenhorst/Radile claim that the success of TVET rests upon the ability of TVET institutions to “respond to the skill

requirements of employers” (ibid.) and in the aftermath to successfully manage “the transition of young people into suitable jobs” (ibid). Departing from the South African case the authors find that TVET providing colleges have difficulties to decrease the “skill shortages in South Africa” (ibid.93) because the institutions lack “proper career guidance” (ibid.102) and “monitoring by supervisors” (ibid. 104). These *guiding* skills are needed to execute the tasks within the technically advancing labour market. It seems therefore to be appropriate to shift the perspective to the political level and the steering of the policy process.

The concept of learning in order to achieve sustainable development is broadly accepted within a variety of aspects in life – from school to further specialisation at work. The acquisition of new skills is related to new possibilities to improve one’s compatibility vis-à-vis labour market requirements; whether individually or on the aggregated level. But does the concept itself reach universality in its promises for development? The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) noted already in 2006 that the “World Bank and other donors are beginning to make reference to the great need for TVET as a measure for reducing poverty since basic education alone, without linking graduates to the world of work, does not lead to achieving the aim of collaborating industrial and labour sectors” (JICA 2006:87). Relating this JICA finding to Rostow’s model and the previous elaboration above the link between technological development and the transition of labour seems to have set roots in the development debate. In a 2017 project sheet the World Bank called for an increased diversification of the sub-Saharan African market, provided through TVET in order to enact sustainable development. The World Bank (2017:6) assesses that “Regional Skill Centres of Excellence (RSCE) provide the needed capacity” and are “effective in not only serving the short-term need of skills provision but also catalysing national reform” (ibid). These reforms are an empirical result from the theoretical debate, in which a “political orientation of the state towards global competitiveness” (King/Palmer 2007:47) and thus the “demand for training” are incorporated in national policy making in many impoverished transition countries (ibid).

Concerning to what degree new skills and adjusted education systems impact the development of the labour market and thus development in developing countries a study conducted by the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) in March 2018 found that “training and continuing education will be crucial [...] to adept to the new labour market” (BMZ 2018:23). The importance and the utilisation of vocational training approaches for development seem thus widely acknowledged in both the academic and more importantly in the broader donor-led debate. But even more paramount is the relation between TVET as a means for development and *ownership* as a concept in which TVET as a policy is situated with regards to its consequences on empowering local

communities. As mentioned above (section 2.1) creating a bridge between foreign development aid and local contextual preconditions is a key task of development projects and studies. The following section will therefore aim to explain the importance of ownership for the success for TVET policies within development aid.

3.4 Ownership and TVET

As pointed out in the previous section development rests on knowledge. This knowledge is spread within a society through the necessary training provided by institutions in order to prepare the members of the respective society for the globalised labour market in which the need for specialisation and knowledge leads to competition. Thus training, specialisation and labour market integration are part of the development paradigm. But every local community or social group shows specific group dynamics. It is therefore difficult to come to general conclusions about what development measure is successful. Empirical effects are more elusive as “the nature of the impact of Aid [is] limited and uncertain” (Ramalingam 2013: 360). Aid and its effects are from this perspective not measurable in a quantitative/qualitative paradigm indicating causal relations between a certain intervention and its outcomes. Definite answers to development problems within a community are thus hard to come by (ibid.266) and not generalizable. According to Ramalingam (2013) development interventions often fail to generate expected results because they underestimate the impact of “[t]he local context [which] proved to be too complex and resilient for a context modification strategy to work” (ibid.38). The people in their social, economic, and cultural structures determine what development means to them and how best to make use of development assistance. This assistance covers a broad spectrum of development cooperation from ordinary budget support to enable the creation and continuation of government initiated programmes to the utilisation of more non-monetary approaches such as knowledge exchange and deliberate consultation. Thus, any linear evaluation of success can only deliver results, which are at best approximations of (1) causal effects and (2) structural settings. In any such situation it is next to impossible to account for all contextual variables, some of which can best be labelled “*unknown unknowns*”². But by assessing the local situation, i.e. who is capable of acting and delivering on development policies (NGOs in times of extreme crises and state failure or the state, local government and bureaucracy) one can identify the stakeholders on the recipient side. The cooperation between donor and recipient country – for this reason – does not follow blueprint solutions thought of by the donor, but rather depends on channels of communications between

² most famously used by the former US Secretary of Defense of the United States of America Donald Rumsfeld in his speech to NATO allies 2002 in reference to global security threats

recipient and donor, who provides development assistance which empowers the recipient country to receive the type of assistance it needs. The prevailing local characteristics therefore determine to what extent development support is appropriate. To be more precise: Development support aimed at enabling a community to achieve economic development through training and further education has to assess the prevailing situation and provide the assistance needed and requested by the recipient in order to achieve that goal. For instance, the most promising approach to promote the production of goods with means of mass production must also take into account the global market perspective and how these goods can be sold, thus generating the need for labour and income in the first place. The most-eloquent idea may fail to serve as a kick-start if the rules and governing principles of the global market are ignored. On a later stage the institutionalisation of regulated market and revenue generating tax system hints at the finalisation of a system equipped with “enough resources for [...] development and enforcement” (Chang 2005:117). If the developing country *owns* this policy area internally developed mechanisms for revenue creation thus implicate stronger independence from donor countries. This example acts as an illustration of the general concept putting an emphasis on the structural preconditions that can be found in what Chang (2005) labels (East-Asian) *now-developed countries*.

The most notable background factor is *ownership* or the empowerment of local communities to create their own institutional structures capable of driving the development of educational policy, which aims at adapting the labour market through progressive reforms. But the conceptualisation of ownership is less straight forward than one could presume. Ampiah (2012) avoids to give a concise concept of ownership and its measurement options and rather attests ownership “a lack of a coherent definition of the concept and analysis [...] whatever definition might suit [the] agenda at any particular time and in relation to particular issues at hand” (Ampiah 2012:164) qualifies as definition. Despite these conceptualisations being ill-suited for an empirical examination it nonetheless shows how the controversy of the concept *ownership* renders a simplified operationalisation impractical. Without exemption and regardless of the conceptualisation and operationalisation of *ownership* and the amount of assistance by foreign entities the “final decision rests with the recipient government” which at best receives “minimal external guidance” (ibid.166).

To address this *minimal guidance* it is nonetheless crucial to determine what ownership means and what aspects of social structures it covers; i.e. examining characteristics of ownership that lead to a suitable operationalisation of the concept. Instead Ampiah (2012) attests ownership a vague and all-inclusive character applicable in most cases depending on one’s own interpretation and needs. Ampiah (2012), rather offering a description of what ownership consists of, how ownership can be observed or who influences the ownership regarding a specific empirical example, deducts broadly that

“ownership is about authorial control by the government over reform, but it is also about the commitment the state apparatus brings to the development process” (Ampiah 2012:178). Within this interpretation ownership seems to penetrate almost every organisational state structure in the broadest sense. Ampiah (2012) points to the illusiveness of ownership which makes it difficult to conceptualise. Despite this obstacle rather than offering a simple sentence as a definition, which could be taken straight from any dictionary, one can nonetheless identify several crucial dimensions or aspects that come with and are attached to the interpretation of ownership within this study.

The long-term independence from aid through means of suitable education and labour market policies requires the developing country to take the policy formulation and implementation (in the long-run) into its own hands. The resulting policy output focussing on social and economic progress is thus – at least within this conceptualisation – the visible result of executing ownership over one’s own (economic) development policy. Therefore the dimensions of ownership allows for an empirical study of the degree to what extent the EU allows for ownership to take place within its development policies need to be determined. As such ownership as a concept can avoid the illusiveness.

3.5 Dimensions of ownership

Rather than defining what ownership *is* it seems more reasonable to mention what ownership consists of. This perspective on ownership will allow the establishment of ownership as a concept. Within the concept applied in this study *ownership* includes the characteristics of the participants (who) within the development paradigm (section 3.5.1) and the actions performed (what) by the participants (section 3.5.2); further by looking and who acts and what is done it is possible to put these aspects in relation to each other forming a map indicating how ownership in the EU’s development policy looks like (Chapter 4). To address the questions “*who acts*” and “*how does this action form an interaction with affected actors*” the remainder of this section draws from two authors’ interpretation of ownership characteristics (Faust 2010 / Sjöstedt 2013). Their conceptualisation incorporating several dimensions (*bureaucracy, political leadership, dialogue coordination, civil society*), which will be laid out as crucial components of the concept ‘*ownership*’, form the basis of the instruments used to observe the degree to which the EU acknowledges and abides by the demand for ownership within the development literature. These dimensions are, categorically speaking, addressing the general questions *who acts?* and *what is carried out?* By using these dimension of ownership as proxies the question to which extent the EU allows or prevents ownership can be framed and examined. Moreover it allows for potential stakeholder mapping (Chapter 4) and thus lays out how development is

conducted and to what extent certain perspectives are taken into account on the donor and the recipient side.

3.5.1 The participating actors must be stakeholders

By asking *who is important* within the target group for any development project or policy one can identify potential contacts, i.e. persons or institutions, in recipient countries that are needed for the implementation of the project or policy. As a subject actors (and more specifically stakeholders) define the first dimension of ownership. They are sources of information providing the necessary inside-knowledge in order to give feedback on the support and the potential success or failure of the development measure given by the donor community. As Faust (2010:526) defines democratic ownership as a “broad and democratically legitimised consensus among the recipient country’s relevant actors from state and civil society about the content and implementation of development-enhancing policies” it can be argued that stakeholders – effected by the policy intervention – are crucial to include within dialogues in order to listen to their needs and ideas. The stakeholders are not only actors on the recipient side but are equally important on the donor side as their activities (here within the EU) are subject to democratic scrutiny and mismanagement – in the eyes of the electorate concerning tax payer money – can lead to backlash during the next election (notably, however, development policy has shown rather low levels of salience concerning general poverty reduction (Lewis 2006)). But if the actors within the ownership concept are stakeholders either related to recipient or to donors it still remains “difficult to operationalise and measure” ownership (Kim/Jung 2018:352). Faust (2010) emphasises two distinct groups of actors (civil society and the bureaucracy) and in this ignores the donor perspective within his interpretation. He stresses three characteristics among the stakeholder group: (1) the recipient country’s senior bureaucracy needs to be involved and the administrative apparatus needs to be legally codified, (2) civil society groups need to be consulted (at least in the implementation phase), and (3) the political leadership has to be supportive of the foreign development intervention. Sjöstedt (2013) addresses the question *who acts?* by utilising the term *partnership* relying on the question “*Who participates in the dialogue?*” (ibid.148). While Sjöstedt’s (2013) approach to the participants is relatively broad and lacks the needed specificity concerning a categorisation of possible *partners* Faust (2010) prioritises actors whose issues *are at stake*, thus having a vested interest in the matter at hand. Within the paradigm of TVET for development deducted above it is possible to link the ownership question to the actors involved. By linking ownership to the question *who acts?* it is possible to overcome the difficulty to “operationalise and measure ownership” (Kim/Jung 2018:352).

Operationalisation

As part of the operationalisation of the theoretical outline of actors above the question arises – who acts? Next to civil society as the beneficiary of TVET policies one can identify the local bureaucracy which is responsible for generating TVET-related policy output as a means of ownership in the sense of taking control over one's own policy. In the area of TVET for development this task is undertaken by the Ministry of Education and Skills Development (Botswana³) and the Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development. On the other side – participating in the dialogue – the EU Delegation in Botswana is representing the donor dimension within this study. The civil society in this case is represented by providers of Technical and Vocational Education, i.e. TVET institutions but is also represented by the democratically legitimised representative government. Concerning what actions are performed the measurement of this dimension includes the coordination of actions regarding the partners within this triangle consisting of foreign donor, local empowered and legitimised government ministry and local educational institution executing the policy. It is thus obvious that beneficiaries, i.e. students of TVET institutions, are marginalised in this approach. They are, regarding the ownership paradigm, represented by the local government through indirect democratic procedures. On the EU's side the stakeholders are the EU delegations staff dealing specifically with development policy issues in the broader and cooperation regarding TVET policy in the narrow sense. On the side of Botswana's Government the bureaucracy implementing TVET policies within the Ministry of Education and Skills Development, Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development and the Ministry of Finance are institutions which oversee the implementation of TVET policy are key stakeholders. Additionally the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is responsible for the coordination of Botswana's diplomatic actions with foreign entities such as the EU. By concentrating on those actors one can identify to what extent the key stakeholders (in Botswana's executive branch) are empowered and take the creation of TVET policy-making and the necessary follow-up evaluation into their own hands. Furthermore taking command over the creation of TVET with support of the EU Delegation indicates the Ministries' general support and appreciation of the EU's development cooperation and creates a relationship between the EU and Botswana which Sjöstedt (2013) labels *partnership* within the ownership concept.

A partnership elevates the developing country from being merely a recipient towards an acknowledged sovereign partner in the development paradigm. This approach also identifies the extent to which these stakeholders form a coordinated group – meaning that interviews with these stakeholders can

³ Case selection follows in Chapter 4.1

uncover links between national ministry and EU in terms of policy advice. One might question whether the advice given already constitutes the surrender of decision making power and thus ownership. This is certainly a crucial and controversial argument not only in research concerning development policy but political science as a discipline. This line of arguments must not be ignored. But within this paper the utilisation of Max Weber's classical definition of power as "any chance to enforce one's will against reluctance within a social relationship, no matter what that opportunity is" (Weber 1972:28) serves as point as departure. Offering the opportunity to – at least formally – ignore advice the argument is that power rests generally with the aid recipient. This view can be upheld only through the fact that the EU's general budget support is – at least formally – tied to the adherence of democratic values (Hornig 2003) not to the implementation of EU dictates. This is not to say that ownership and power are completely detached but pursuing the power relations would lead to questions concerning why the EU's acts the way it does, implying power structures within the development policy. These can be identified but offer limited answers to the question how the EU's allows for ownership. Questioning why we would see certain power relation play out in Botswana emerge foremost from identifying how the cooperation is happening in the first place. How the development cooperation is carried out calls for the closer look at activities of the donor and the recipient. Consequently the next section asks what actions can be observed between these actors.

3.5.2 The activities must be coordinated

What actors do is crucial to determine not only the degree to which *ownership* within a policy field can be defined and observed but is also needed to see whether or not and to what extent the government receives support concerning the policy area in question. Taking the donor perspective: the assistance provided to the recipient cannot be understood within a policy vacuum but co-exists and complements national policy-making and implementation in the for the donor foreign context. As such looking at how the local technical and vocational training policy is implemented needs to take into account policy influence from developing partners. Sjöstedt (2013: 154) rejects the idea that development follows "linear causality [...] through top-down command" which he concludes "hamper[s] innovation" (ibid). He views this presumptive causality as an approach which is too simple to grasp the underlying complexity of the development relation. In the same manner Ramalingam (2013) stresses that blueprint approaches often fail due to their insufficient contextual analysis which assesses the characteristics of different target groups in different regions. In this sense although overlapping means for development may be utilised at times "the way feedback plays out is highly dependent on context and incredibly hard to prepare for and to capitalize on in advance" (Ramalingam 2013:151).

Thus the structure is not only more complex but must also allow for coordination of the interplay between donor and the recipient's bureaucracy. Specifically in the area where budget support is coupled with knowledge exchange there is "room to manoeuvre" (Sjöstedt 2013:151). In this respect the donor through the provision of funds and advice can direct the recipient government to invest into certain policies more than in others without relying on conditionality but indirect means of diplomatic influence. It is therefore crucial for the assessment of ownership to investigate how the channels of communications between donor and recipient are used to exchange views on certain measures aimed at achieving progress. Within his study of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) Sjöstedt (2013:148) focusses amongst others on the promotion of Swedish priorities within its foreign development assistance. It is therefore not unlikely that the EU has measures installed in order to observe the progress made within the developing country in question in order to at least observe if not influence the local policy. One of the most common forms of coordination within even the broader field of foreign policy are dialogues. The constant exchange of information regarding progress and needs within the development interaction between donor and recipient also calls for capacity building measures in order to facilitate (or even institutionalise) the cooperation. While Faust (2010) stresses the circumstance that the recipient country's politicians and bureaucratic elite need to be convinced that the development measure is successful Sjöstedt (2013) translates this instance and rather stresses the need for a plan inside the recipient government's ministries in order to engage in purposefully planned and coordinated discussions.

Operationalisation

The brief theoretical outline above raises the question – what is done? Here the actors as identified in section 3.5.1 are interacting in order to exchange views and ideas in order to achieve progress through (in this case) TVET policy. The participants having priorities concerning how the TVET policy should translate into progress have to coordinate their activities and cooperate in order to be successful. This coordination between the actors is crucial. When engaging with each other having a set of ideas and goals for development, which may set focus on different aspects and thus can vary between the Government of Botswana and the EU, it is plausible to assume that at least the recipient (if in control of its own policy formulation) has a dialogue plan through which it conveys feedback concerning the previous and ongoing supportive measures. Within the exchange about TVET as a means for development the parties have to be convinced that the policy interventions generate the expected results. As any exchange of opinion and knowledge is subject to reciprocity public servants on both sides influence and potentially alter the initial idea throughout the dialogue. But the political leadership of the recipient country has a responsibility vis-à-vis the electorate. Therefore any change

agreed upon on the bureaucracy level needs to be communicated and approved by the elected officials. Only if the political leadership voices its support for the policy measure coordinated between EU and recipient countries bureaucracy the coordination can adhere to the ownership principle above since the recipient government takes command and actively supports the development measure.

Another crucial point concerning the operationalisation is to look for institutionalised structures of the here mentioned communication channels. Only if these consultations are institutionalised ownership can be guaranteed. If the aspect of institutionalisation is missing ad hoc consultations can impede the legitimacy of any policy not only in the realm of TVET but also on a broader economic level. Especially if the public has reasons to suspect that their elected officials' policies are driven by foreign donor interest any development measure is likely to fail. At best these channels of communication between donor and recipient are legally codified within cooperation agreements, which should be accessible for the public.

Following the conceptualisation of who acts and what is as the output of the development cooperation visible within the development strategy the translation of these dimension to empirical phenomena is equally important. Thus it seems from the presented offset plausible to focus on the cooperation between the EU representation and the government institutions in Botswana formally addressing training for development policy formulation (stakeholder mapping as part of the methodological approach for this study will be addressed in Chapter 4.2). In uncovering the coordination between the EU and these government entities in Botswana the research question can be adequately addressed. To what extent do these stakeholders refer to the development of the respective policy measures as '*their idea*'? Is potential impact kept at the level of consultations? Has the government of Botswana measures installed to follow-up on the output of TVET policy reforms independent from EU support and proscriptive policy suggestions?

In sum this chapter offered an extensive deductive effort conceptualising ownership for development. Starting out by offering a historical outline of how progress can be identified the first section referred to the need of innovation in terms of technological advancement which is crucial for development. Within the second section the technical advancement was tied to the need within the progressing society to acquire labour market related skills which accelerates the transition from farming to knowledge-based jobs. The third section formed the link between the state's obligation to employ legislative matters to institutionalise development through education, providing the grounds upon which TVET is built and carried out. The institutionalisation of the provision and distribution of skills related to the labour market requirements is important for the country to progress. As such support

offered by foreign agencies needs to comply with the principles (dimensions) of ownership. Thus foreign development policy needs to contain elements of cooperation with local stakeholders and coordinate those policies with identified local institutions.

Establishing an observable framework is central to the study at hand. It is important to know what to look for regarding the research question and determine where and what kind of answers can be expected. The offered conceptualisation of *ownership* is used as a thread throughout this paper, which provides guidance for the rest of this study in terms of its content and expectations. What is missing is the outline of the methodological approach addressing the practical implications which derive from this chapter. The next chapter will therefore address the methods used to identify the stakeholders' actions and how their interactions are carried out. It further translates the ownership conceptualisation provided in this chapter into questions and guides which are referred to in the gathering of empirical data within the field study approach.

4. Methods

This chapter will introduce the methods used in order to acquire answers to the research question in general and to assess the level of engagement of stakeholders in the TVET-policy formulation, the cooperation between these stakeholders and the level of the EU's involvement in particular. For the sake of the replicability, the validity and the objectivity of this study and notably its reliability, which allows for challenging the results of the study, it is crucial to provide the details on how the research is conducted; meaning what instruments are used in order to assess the ownership of Botswana's stakeholders in relation to the EU's support. This chapter addresses (1) the case selection, (2) the stakeholder mapping, (3) the interview structure with officials from mapped institutions which are involved in the policy making of TVET and the development support, and offers a description of the interview guide (Annex II), which is used to operationalise the ownership concept and provides a thread throughout the interview in order to get qualitative answers concerning the relationship between Botswana and the EU concerning the ownership and influence over TVET related policy making processes.

The problems which come with this method are hard to dismiss. To ask a person working within a Ministry or the EU institution offers limited answers if one wants to assess the institutionalised cooperation among the entities these persons represent. As such despite the attempt to come to general observations about how the EU addresses the ownership question in the aid recipient country Botswana will be limited by the personal perceptions and responses by the interviewee and the

interpretation of the interviewer. Further cultural differences are potential obstacles when it comes to (1) analysing the results and putting them in context to the question asked and to (2) the general thesis made within this study. It must therefore be assessed whether the respondent understands the general issue and the claims made within the study and whether the communication reflects this understanding. This assessment is crucial for the validity of this study and must therefore be approached with great care. The success of this kind of empirical research depends greatly on one's ability to dive into a different culture and understand and critically reflect upon the situation within the interview, the context and conditions under which answers are provided and one's own influence as a researcher on the research process. Another problem which comes with the research design is that although this research tries to uncover the interrelations between the EU as a donor and Botswana as a recipient, therefore generally aims to contribute to a broader understanding of how the EU cooperates within developing contexts the single case study limits the results and knowledge acquired to the case under study. As pointed out above, since context specific details are rarely the same in different context the transfer of the study within a different context is likely to generate different results.

4.1 Case selection – Botswana

The EU with the latest comprehensive *Cotonou* Agreement and the *Joint Africa EU Strategy* cooperates with 79 ACP countries concerning EU development policy. Out of these 79 countries 49 are countries on the African continent (Council of the European Union 2018). The choice for Botswana was made for several reasons.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of Botswana as a Sub-Saharan African country is the fact that it has precious earths and is known for its diamonds. This circumstance, considering the sources of natural raw material are to be depleted in the foreseeable future, pictures the need for Botswana's economy to diversify and incorporate the idea of *value adding* (see Chapter 3.3) within its approach to TVET and the manufacturing industry. Failing to develop these necessary (labour) market adjustments and providing the necessary skill set to progress may reduce the chance of Botswana to participate in the global economy without external assistance and development adjustments dictated by foreign entities. The need to move employment from labour intensive mining, which unlike farming has a natural expiration date, towards knowledge intensive occupations is a political concern in Botswana, which has to be taken seriously. As diamonds and mining are largely (~30%) run by the government the country has not yet succeeded in "diversifying its economy away from diamonds" (Lewin 2011:87).

Secondly, Botswana has had one reported civilian death caused during a dispute between the Government of South Africa and Botswana in 1990. This is the only recorded casualty between 1990 and 2017 (UCDP 2017) making Botswana one of the most secure and peaceful countries capable of providing the necessary conditions for *progress* in this area. Further, Botswana's government "functions in a democratic manner, elections are *free and fair* and the government is responsible to the electorate and transparent in its dealings" (Lewin 2011:85). As such government controlled policy institutions rather than NGO-led policies are observable. A lack of state presence and its ability to act would otherwise shift the ownership focus away from state institutions as legitimate sources for an inquiry.

Moreover, the absence of armed conflict, separatist movements and terror contributes to the legal authority of the state entities. In this respect, Botswana's political leadership "has ensured stability and social and economic progress" (ibid.82) through consultative institutions, which also "created a degree of trust in the government" (ibid). This circumstance gives reason to ask the government officials about the cooperation with the EU and address the ownership concept. As shown above (Chapter 3.2) the absence of conflict is crucial for progress. But also the government ministries are viewed as at least capable of taking ownership over the necessary policy making.

Lastly, Botswana is one of Africa's land-locked countries, which makes it highly dependent on international trade and the necessary infrastructure, which requires cooperation with partner countries concerning coordination and knowledge exchange. Botswana "heavily" invests in infrastructure and human capital development (ibid.85) to limit the "erosion of domestic productivity and competitiveness" (ibid). This investment in human capital is indicative for the education for development approach investigated in this paper as it ties into the argument outlined above that TVET as a means for progress is a symptom of ownership.

Botswana can thus be seen as a typical case for development assistance because it faces like most developing countries difficulties to "create employment for its citizenry" (Mogomotsi/Madigele-Kefilwe 2017:1) and due to its reliance on diamonds, is in need of rethinking its revenue generation in the foreseeable future. Simultaneously, Botswana shows the necessary preconditions for progress as the government is aware of this problem (Lewin 2011). It is therefore important to consider the choice for Botswana as a country in need for TVET policy implementation which tackles the needed changes regarding structural reforms in the employment sectors and reforms in the countries revenue structure. The assessment from the European Commission (2019a) that Botswana is "[o]ne of Africa's success stories [which] has evolved since its independence in 1966 from a least-developed to a middle

income country” may therefore be short-sighted as it is difficult to assess to what extent this upwards trend relies on the export of these precious gems. By looking at the aspects of ownership within the cooperation between the EU and Botswana with respect to the needed shift towards skills development portrays a fitting case for this study. From the EU perspective linking the case of Botswana to the case of TVET for development seems insofar logical as *Education and Administrative Management* is after debt forgiveness the second largest position when it comes to the EU’s sectoral aid disbursement (EU Aid Explorer 2019) which arguably mirrors the EU’s interest in this policy area. Rather than applying a random country selection, which would be fatal in this context, the selection of Botswana as a country and TVET as a thematic sub-field of development assistance are deliberate choices. On a practical note this choice is supported by the fact that the EU, unlike most European countries (which handle their diplomatic relation from the neighbouring South African embassies), has a representation in Gaborone, Botswana which holds the opportunity to speak to both actors in the development cooperation. The next section will – in the light of this case selection – map the stakeholders necessary to be heard in this case study.

4.2 Stakeholder Mapping

Departing from the operationalisation offered in Chapter 3 this section introduces stakeholder mapping as a technique to put the identified stakeholders in relation to each other and thus offers a conceptualisation of links between the actors in TVET policy making. “[A]ny policy project needs for strategic and tactical reasons to get an inventory of institutions involved, identify key players [...] and [...] highlight the relevant institutions’ role and the inter institutional linkages” (Aligica 2006:79). As such stakeholders are “persons or groups whose interest and activities strongly affect and are affected by the issues concerned, who have a stake in a change, who control relevant information and resources and whose support is needed in order to implement the change” (ibid). *Stakeholder Mapping* is therefore the tool to identify “policy ownership” (ibid) in relation to vested interests and influence concerning decision making processes. Stakeholders can be identified and mapped within institutional structures. In democracies “the participation of stakeholders [is...] essential for building legitimacy and policy ownership” (ibid.80).

The mapping itself is driven by the research question and the utilised approach but takes into account different perspectives and thus related objectives of the acting institutions. Any mapping is coupled with a background concept (ibid.82) (in this case) *ownership* and “should capture in its content [...] key actors [and...] their interrelations” (ibid). It allows the uncovering of links or exchanges between actors concerning a certain policy problem within a certain legal framework. Tied into the background

concept mapping as a technique offers guidance concerning local relations and potential power structures. Any institutional map consists of an *action* (what) and *actor* (who) component (ibid.87) which allows for linking potential/expected outcomes to the interactive exchange among social groups. "It is important to note that the approach offers a mapping method not only for stakeholders and institutional structures but also for the process involved" (ibid.88). Mapping is an instrument to address research questions concerned with finding either causal relation between actions and actors (e.g. identifying underlying power relations) or (as applied in this case) address research questions concerned with identifying the channels of interactions addressing how interactions are organised in empirical cases.

The approach can be translated into different contexts and cases making it a tool capable of addressing various countries. It is further tied to a policy project (here TVET within development policy by the EU in Botswana) tying activities and interests to the issue of support, information and resources. The result of the utilisation of stakeholder mapping displays the local situation along the *lines of interest* for this study.

As mentioned above (section 3.5) the participants in the ownership conceptualisation need to be stakeholders engaged in interactive cooperation. The EU's External Action Service ((EEAS) refers to the local delegation as having played a "prominent role in managing EU development assistance to Botswana covering areas such as wildlife conservation, infrastructure development, micro-projects, and mining sector diversification. Botswana has, since Lomé 1 [1976], benefited from preferential trade opportunities" (EEAS 2016). Assessing the influence of the EU Delegation in the development of Botswana's education/labour market policy unveils the first crucial stakeholder in the constellation of actors: the EEAS as diplomatic corps implementing the EU's development policies in the host country. The **EEAS diplomats** posted in Botswana are thus the first stakeholder carrying out the EU's foreign policy. Their work within the realm of TVET policy, whether as advisors or knowledge providers to their counterparts in Botswana has a potential influence on the ownership of Botswana's government with respect to Botswana's ownership of its training for development policy. Assuming that the EEAS diplomats are working on issue specific topics, such as security issues it is important to focus on the staff concerned with development in the broader and (further) education for development in the narrow sense. The EEAS works within the Human Resource Development Sector and had "Policy Support Programmes" (EEAS 2018) which mentions the promotion of "*life-long learning*" as one of its main goals (ibid.) but fails to display how it will assist "Botswana[']s authorities to strengthen efficient management of the education sector[...]" (ibid). Contributing to the development of the education sector as a crucial part for employment is necessary for Botswana to progress, but the extent to which

measures introduced to *help* Botswana's local administrative bodies adhere to the concept of ownership or are rather proscriptive is still unclear, despite the seemingly neutral wording used on the EEAS's webpage.

Besides the EEAS in the Delegation the **Commission** – especially the Directorate General (DG) International Development Cooperation (DEVCO) is among the stakeholders in this paper. As the DG is attached to the Delegation rather than independent local facilities the interaction with respective staff members is occurring in the Delegation itself. Covering the global spectrum of Aid DEVCO (and the DG for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO)) does not separately present itself as an actor in Botswana, despite DG DEVCO's authority of policy formulation concerning actions in the host state. As such little details are *prima facie* available concerning their actions concerning the context of this study.

As outlined in chapter 3 the government institutions in Botswana formally addressing training for development policy formulation are key stakeholders. These are Botswana's government ministries. The **Ministry of Education and Skills Development** is setting the legal framework for TVET and shapes the transposition of policy ideas potentially prescribed by or via EU influence or determined on its own. Moreover the **Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development** is concerned with "productivity across sectors and in the work place (work ethics), vocational and skills development" (gov.bw). As the name suggests there may be a presumptive overlap of competences in the tasks concerning the issue of development. The **Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation** as the diplomatic counterpart to the EU delegation may act as a link between the EU and domestic policy interests thus primarily listening and engaging in the foreign exchange with the EU. The **Ministry of Finance and Development Planning** tackles the "Economic Management and National Development Planning Coordination" (ibid.) and provides the link to the EU's budget support. The Ministry of Finance might appear as rather unrelated to development through TVET but (1) it is the recipient part of the provided budget support by the EU and (2) as the European Commission reports:

"The Government is accordingly investing up to 30% of its budget in education and training. High enrolment rates in primary education and an increase of enrolments in secondary and tertiary education have been achieved, but the figures are still not completely satisfactory" (EU Commission 2009:1f.).

The Ministry of Finance and Development Planning is thus the gatekeeper for spending money for aid-related policies attached to the TVET for development approach. Moreover as the EU pledges much of its aid as budget support (European Commission 2019a) the Ministry of Finance, as gatekeeper concerned with the responsible execution of the – by the legislative branch – approved annual budget

plan, is allocating the money to satisfy government priorities. As “fiscal policy is a powerful tool for boosting economic growth [...]” (Siebritz 2017:179) and the legislative input concerning the budget proposal and thus control over funds, which includes foreign aid is limited, the Ministry of Finance is arguably the stakeholder with the most vested interest regarding the EU’s budget support. Moreover the relatively weak powers of the legislature in this regard render the Parliament of Botswana rather inappropriate for a stakeholder analysis in this paper. The context – here specifically the constitution – thus allows for the precise mapping and as a result the exclusion of institutions (parliament) which are not of importance for the study at hand.

Not Included in this map as indicated in the previous chapter are NGOs, as well as students as beneficiaries of TVET policies. The scope of this study, though acknowledging the importance of a tripartite cooperation between the stakeholders on donor side, the recipient’s government side and the beneficiary – the private person enrolled in a further education programme, does not allow an analysis which includes private citizens. This limitation should not curtail the results of this study because the government in Botswana as a democratically elected body, represents the electorate. Individual TVET institutions will not be targeted primarily but only be mentioned if directly referred to by the EU or the government ministries as partner in policy discussions.

4.3 Interviews – What to ask

So far this chapter has addressed the reasoning behind the case selection and the stakeholder mapping with respect to the ownership conceptualisation. This section will address the need for qualitative interviews as a method to determine the characteristics of the relationship between the EU and Botswana and the extent to which ownership is observable.

Although it is established that each specific development context is a unique composition of specific background factors (chapter 2.1) the conclusion of generalizable patterns is a central element of research. The study of the EU’s cooperation with Botswana regarding the ownership concept aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of the EU’s cooperation in developing countries. Therefore the method section must in its construction offer the transparency needed for reproduction of the study. The method in this case are qualitative stakeholder-interviews. McCracken (1988:9) depicts the in-depth (“long”) interview as one of the most-revealing *“instrument[s] of inquiry”* allowing to see the *“mental world of the individual, to glimpse the categories [...] by which he or she sees the world.”* Rather than focussing on a narrow concept in quantitative designs, which can be mathematically proven right (or wrong) or at least offer a degree of correlation, qualitative designs are sacrificing this *precision* to

obtain “the complexity-capturing ability” (ibid. 16). Thus the research relies on the “experience and imagination to find a match for the patterns” (ibid. 19) in the engagement and interactions between the EU as the provider of foreign aid and Botswana as the aid recipient. Any interview that is conducted for the sake of understanding patterns or aspects of interactions between different actors needs to be thoroughly prepared. It is necessary to provide the guidance for the interviewee so that s/he can give the answers which are relevant to the research question and design and in this provide insight and understanding into the broader issue of the topic under investigation (development cooperation concerning the ownership of TVET policy making). To answer the research question this study relies on communication, i.e. the conversation between the researcher and the individual representing any of the above mapped stakeholders. Chapter 2 addressed the lack of empirical research within case studies. Consequently, it seems not advisable to take a constructed set of interview questions already established in other areas of research to inquire about the specificity of ownership regarding Botswana’s TVET policy. This lack of established cues addressing the TVET-ownership-aspect in development policy studies implicates the need for formulating questions which tackle the research question and the operationalisation above. Thirdly, there is a requirement for *openness* as the provided answers are not to be anticipated within the question itself. The character of the inquiry needs to be non-loaded for the sake of the validity of the provided answers and transparent to the degree that the interviewee is able to understand what his/her answer means in the context of the study. As such questions and the communication thereof must provide the open-ended character needed to allow for unpredicted answers but remain on-topic. Here working in another culture offers the advantage that “[v]irtually everything [...] is, to some degree, mysterious. Those who work in their own culture do not have this critical distance from what they study” (ibid. 22). Despite this importance the interview-guide does not exclude or prohibit bivariate (yes/no-) questions which especially in the early stages of the interview can act as an easy introduction into the topic.

To understand *how and to what extent the EU allows for ownership in developing countries* thus exploring how Botswana takes control over the policy issue of TVET the operationalisation sections mentioned in the previous chapter (3.5) need to be incorporated into the interview guideline. Two separate guides (Annex I) are providing related but differently phrased questions concerning the cooperation between the EU and Botswana in order to capture both perspectives and find differences between the aid recipient and the donor. The questions asked in the guide form the skeleton of the inquiry but are not closed in the sense that additional information can be extracted from the verbal exchange between interviewer and interviewee despite the fact that they are not specifically asked for. As McCracken (1988:24) puts it:

“The use of a questionnaire is sometimes regarded as a discretionary matter in qualitative research interview. But, for the purposes of the long qualitative interview, it is indispensable. The demanding objectives of this interview require its use.”

An inquiry about any topic without prior conceptualisation of the questions endangers the validity and replicability of any research.

As can be reasoned from the sections above formulating a question or a set of questions is a key preparation if one is to conduct a goal-orientated inquiry regarding to what extent ownership can be observed. However a direct approach – especially given the research design and the background that the research is conducted from the European (donor) side – must be avoided otherwise the provided answers may not contribute to answering the research question in itself but may imply that the EU does or does not comply with the ownership concept outlined above. This would be problematic because the very purpose of this study is to uncover potential links between the stakeholders identified above (section 4.2). The inquiry thus has to begin with shedding light on the exchange between Botswana and EU officials in a broader sense and narrowing in on the topic of TVET policy ownership. To minimise the problematic effect of suggestive questions, which distort the results extracted from the interviews ownership as a concept or expression will not be used.

Another critical aspect that has to be borne in mind is that the interviewee provides answers to his interpretation of the question. As such it must be reflected upon whether the information extracted from the interview can be interpreted in the way the respondent meant to answer. Within the interview situation it is important to reflect upon the personal influence on answers given such as asking directed questions, which in their formulation limit the range of possible answers from the offset. A respondent at times says what s/he thinks the interviewer wants to hear. This problem of getting the sought information one initially entered the interview situation is amplified in situations in which interviewer and interviewee come from different cultural backgrounds and contexts making the need for careful phrasing of questions and the necessary follow-up crucial.

These follow-up questions are hard to anticipate and are dependent on the ad hoc situation of the interviews themselves. The interview structure has therefore to start with an outline of the purpose, research question, methods (here explaining why the questions are asked and what the expected contribution to the research is) and topic of the study. Rather than closed questions addressing the issue of cooperation the inquiry has to contain rather broad open-ended questions which allow for narrowing down the issue depending on the reply received. The exchange therefore relies on the provided answers to formulate ad hoc follow-up questions as guidelines and blueprints for this kind of

data collection within the presented context and format do not exist. Questions which emerge because of the information extracted from the interviews need to be interpreted and follow-up questions formulated '*ad hoc*'. To offer some guidance for how the interviews contribute to the research and in order to prepare the interview partner a 1.5 page outline of the study (Annex II) was sent to the EEAS, Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development and the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. The *ad hoc* structure in combination with the provided outline of the study allows for snowball sampling which parallel to the identified stakeholders presents the opportunities to generally widen the map of stakeholders (Chapter 4.2) if stakeholders are referred to during the interviews that have not been mapped at that point. The advantage of an open structure allowing for spontaneous follow up vis-à-vis completely closed designs is that an interviewee can point to an individual with specific knowledge concerning the cooperation within the stakeholder organisation, who would otherwise be ignored by the research design. This is especially helpful in research contexts which are outside of the interviewer's/researcher's personal and usual social environment. Another advantage of providing a compact outline of the research is that it reduces the discrepancy between the researcher as a person with a specific research goal in mind and "who [...] the respondent thinks the investigator is" (McCracken 1988:26).

Next to capturing the complexity of the situation at hand and obtaining the answers needed for the research through the inquiry the final questionnaire needs to incorporate so-called icebreakers typically "a set of bibliographical questions" (ibid.38), which allows the respondent to develop a sense of familiarity and leads him to refer to later, content- or research-related question from his own perspective and is thus dis-encouraged to answer these question in a way in which s/he thinks the interviewer wants to hear the responses, further limiting the extent to which questions asked by the researcher seem *loaded*.

The conducted interview should follow a narrative character in which the interviewer and the respondent interact with each other. To avoid tension potentially emerging out of implicit power relations within the interview situation the interviewer has to make sure that he conveys his genuine interest in the work of the interviewee from the stakeholder organisation. By starting out with a work related but for the research itself secondary question inquiring about the interviewee's study background and working background the memory of the respondent is triggered and helps to lay the ground for a narrative interview. This method is used to prevent the interview to evolve into a back and forth between interviewer and interviewee, which could be addressed in a questionnaire rather than a verbatim interview. It also opens up the interview situation and allows the interviewee to inquire about the research and the researcher. It is thus a method to create a trusted or trustworthy

environment. Using this technique also allows the respondent to provide answers related to the issue of ownership in TVET policy making which the research has or could to this point (prior to the interview) not anticipate. Within this opening the respondent is assured that he is the one who can decide what to disclose within the interview. The second question and the first content related question targets the amount of contacts between the stakeholders from EU and Botswana's Ministries. The answer is indicative for this research as it can uncover that there is no contact between the stakeholders which would in itself be a crucial part of the answer to the research question. As the assumption is that there are exchanges between stakeholders from the other side the next question or aspect the interview covers within its narrative character is asking whether the stakeholders coordinate activities with their respective counter parts. As a broad question this allows for a narrative determined by the respondent. From this rather broad outline which is meant to prevent tensions the next set of cues surrounds the content related aspects which are utilised as primary sources for the analysis in this study. By asking "Do you coordinate activities with the staff from Ministry of Education and Skills Development, Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills development, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning" or "Do you coordinate activities with the staff from the EU Delegation" as well as the follow up question "How does this coordination look like" the respondent is encouraged to reflect about the working procedures s/he deals with on a daily basis. The respondent has as such to reflect upon the coordination and more importantly the answer has to be interpreted in a way which situated this qualitative answer i.e. his/her own position in relation to the other side's stakeholder. As such the response provided to this question by the respondents from both sides is crucial to the answer the research question. The next set of cues (questions 4-6) attend more crucially the negative side of the policy making at hand and assess to what extent problems in the development relation are perceived (question 4) and addressed (question 5), while question 6 asks about the imaginary or empirical scenario (depending on the experience of the individual respondent) in which the communication and actions of both sides within diplomatic exchanges diverge. Thus question 6 tackles the cultural divide and opens the narrative up for a perspective on progress and the means to achieve this which could potentially be interpreted differently and undermines the cooperation between the respective stakeholders. The response is as such relevant for the ownership question as a whole. The final question with which the narrative interview is to conclude concerns the issue of state/procedural secrets of methods and working habits. As in most governments there are information which for policy, security, diplomacy or matters of (party) political interest are kept classified. Asking whether or not certain aspects of the cooperation are classified serves several purposes: (1) a negative answer assures that the research adheres to scientific principles of being transparent and allows for replication of the method used; (2) it shows that the researcher is aware of the potential sensitivity of certain aspects of

(development) policy making in which a variety of political actors are engaged; (3) a positive response has great value for this research field as it directly points to the limitations of this method and the limits of what the study of development policy cooperation can uncover. It thus offers future research a perspective and helps to theorise about this area of ownership in political cooperation within developing contexts.

On a technical note an application for a research permit was sent to the Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development as is a requirement in Botswana. A denial of this permit or an overly delayed permission may negatively impact the ability to speak to the recipient country's stakeholders. The interviews themselves follow the interview guide and are recorded and transcribed where this was possible (Ministry of Tertiary Education and Skills Development and GiZ) and notes and quotations were compiled in a memo written during and after the meeting in cases in which recording was either not supported or due to the set up not possible (EU, Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning).

The dependence of this research on the responses and the agreement for interviews among the identified stakeholders is crucial for the result and the general feasibility of the research. The lacking accessibility concerning information on the structure of any government ministry in Botswana with only one telephone number for requests and one insufficiently programmed inquiry form on the homepage (gov.bw) of Botswana's government (rather than a decoupling of ministry issues, which could be targeted individually) put constraints on the research effort. Once further exploration of the government homepage revealed individual phone numbers for the mapped ministries they could be contacted. It took several attempts to establish contact with the ministries and to obtain an e-mail address in order to send the outline of the study. The EU Delegation in Botswana was difficult to reach despite being transparent on the homepage. Establishing contact with either side of the cooperation is a difficult and time consuming task, which was not successful in all cases.

Before analysing the empirical material provided within the conducted interviews it seems wise to offer a brief summary of this chapter. Botswana's rare earths, which served as a guarantee for income and prosperity are limited natural resources. This circumstance demands the movement of labour to knowledge intensive work occupation. Botswana checks the structural preconditions for this transition. The mapping of stakeholders allows specific targeting of individuals concerned with technical and vocational education and training policy and puts them in relation to the EU as a donor, which allows the investigation of the ownership conceptualisation. The interview (guideline in Annex

II) as the tool of choice is used to capture the complexity of relations between the stakeholders, uncover channels of communication and potential implicit power structures. These stakeholders are the European External Action Service, the Commission, and the government of Botswana represented in this study through the Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, the Ministry of Education and Skills Development, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and. The use of guidelines for the questions is necessary to avoid divergence and answers not related to the research question and the operationalisation thereof and the open-ended structure allows to learn more than is – due to the lack of contextual insight – asked for. This chapter offered an extensive specialisation in terms of why the case study approach seems appropriate, what tools are used to investigate the research question and how to conduct the research. The next chapter presents the results of the inquiry and the analysis of the material received. As such the analysis chapter looks into the case of Botswana's ownership of TVET policy making and situates the EU's role within the concept.

5. Results

The interviews were conducted during the study trip to Gaborone from July 23rd to July 30th, 2019. On a practical note: It seems advisable to schedule the meetings either by calling the necessary stakeholders from Botswana, i.e. with a local telephone number or by personally going to the Ministries during the work day and ask to speak with a desk officer dealing with the issue of EU cooperation (in the case of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning or personally ask at the front desk of the ministry whether it is possible to talk to a desk officer and schedule a meeting). This method proved useful as it rendered interviews with all mapped stakeholders possible. One of the first results the interviews have unearthed is that the German development agency *giz* (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) is a crucial actor concerning the development assistance in Botswana. As such the *giz* was added to the list of stakeholders and an interview was scheduled. The *giz* is the primary partner for the implementation of not only German but also the EU's development efforts (interview EU Delegation July 24th, 2019 14:00 -15:00). As a general observation the *Icebreaker question* was less useful than previously assumed. The question only reduced the *distance* between the interviewer and the interviewee in the Ministry of Education and Skills Development making the interview less a questionnaire-like question-response-pattern and more like an actual discussion. As such a different question or ignoring the first question entirely seems to better fit the situation. The rest of this chapter will be organised along the content-related aspects of the interviews to analyse to what extent the EU allows for ownership in its development cooperation as

such the thematic questions rather than the interviewed institution will provide the frame for the rest of the chapter.

5.1 Quantity of Exchange

One of the early questions asked was how often the interviewee has contact with the stakeholders of the EU and – in the case of the EU – the government ministries of Botswana. The respondent from the Foreign Ministry answered: Anytime “when things need to be discussed” and “when there is an event organised by a member state [...] We have been at the EU [delegation] 3 times this year” (interview 25.07.2019 09:00-10:00). With this answer the Foreign Ministry – at least formally – does not point to unusual forms of the cooperation the exchange through the official diplomatic channels seems as frequent as one would expect for a country in which the foreign policy is not mainly based on the donor-recipient relation. The Acting Director of Skills Development and Vocational Training in the Ministry of Tertiary Education and Skills Development referred to meetings with the GiZ to take place “twice a month but also with the EU” (interview 26.07.2019 15:00-16:30). In this the Ministry of Tertiary Education and Skills Development’s Department for Tertiary Training and Technical Education indicated a more frequent exchange with the EU: “We really interact a lot [...] we actually have meetings almost every month.” (ibid.). To this extent it seems that the EU prioritises the Ministries, which are responsible for the content specific execution and oversight over the training policy rather than using channels usually used for diplomacy. The respondent from the Ministry of Finance and Development Cooperation answered “on a daily basis” (interview 24.07.2019 9:00-10:00). This can be indicative for a way to circumvent the usual channels of foreign policy cooperation and that the EU in its development cooperation directly approaches the Ministry dealing with, in this case the financing part of the European Development Fund (EDF11). Even the deputy director of Skills Development and Vocational Training in the Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development reports that meetings occur on average twice a month “with the GiZ but also with the EU” (interview 24.07.2019 7:30-8:00). The EU’s answer “daily” (interview 24.07.2019 14:00-15:00) does not differentiate between ministries but shows that the amount of interaction between the government of Botswana and the EU is considerable – especially seeing that the Ministry of Finance as the “authorising Ministry” (interview 24.07.2019 9:00-10:00) is Botswana’s gatekeeper when it comes to the agreements falling under the European Development Fund (EDF11).

The EU by regularly discussing the finance part of the cooperation seems to utilise these channels of communication to direct the government to invest into certain policies more than in others relying on indirect diplomatic influence. As such Botswana’s full autonomy over – at least of the financing part –

of the domestic development policy making can be questioned. With this as formulated earlier (Chapter 3.5.2) the EU has measures installed (frequent scheduled meetings) to observe and influence local policy making other than using communication channels at the Ministry of International Affairs and Development Cooperation. This does however not apply for the GiZ as an implementing agency of the EU's Development Policy as the programme assistant for T-VET at the GiZ acknowledged that the Ministry of Finance only permits the cooperation programmes but after that process it is "not our implementation partner" (Interview 25.07.2019 14:00-15:00). The frequent meetings with the EU and all of the stakeholder Ministries in combination with the dissenting statement of the Ministry of International Affairs and Development Cooperation, which in the usual set-up would seem as the most-likely stakeholder to facilitate foreign policy and thus development cooperation, seems surprising and paints a picture of the EU's development cooperation which does not go along with general expectations. Frequently used institutionalised channels are in place despite being between the EU and the finance ministry rather than the foreign ministry which constitutes an equally important actor in Botswana's democratic system. Exchanges with ministries tasked with the T-VET policy making process and the labour market development is – in relation to the foreign ministry noticeably frequent (Interview 24.07.2019 07:30-08:00).

5.2 Coordination between the EU/giz and the Ministries

The second part concerning the cooperation between the EU (Delegation and giz) and the Ministries goes beyond the numerical part and asks whether activities are coordinated and how this coordination looks in practice. As such the question (2 and 3 in Annex I) aims to offer answers concerning the institutionalisation of communication channels on the one hand and on the other allows for shedding light on the practical part of the coordination allowing for narrowing down the issues to the level of ownership in especially asking questions 4;5;6 of the interview guideline. Further, by asking "how the coordination looks like?" the respondent offers insight into practical aspects of the EU's development cooperation which so far have been scarcely addressed (see Chapter 2). Noticeable for this question is that every answer only displays the cooperation from the respondent's point of view. As such the Ministry of International Cooperation and Development has – due to its policy field – a different relationship with the EU than the Ministry of Education and Skills Development or Finance and Development Planning.

The first result which can be observed is that all government stakeholders (and the GiZ) replied positively meaning that, in one form or another, they coordinate activities. The Director for Europe and the Americas at the Foreign Ministry responded that they "are invited to events" hosted by the EU

delegation and that they “work within the ACP agreement and the Cotonou Agreement which is coming to an end (2020) so that we have to have an[other] agreement.” The last remaining issue concerning the successor of the Cotonou Agreement is the “issue of migration” (interview 25.07.2019 09:00-10:00). On the other hand the Director stressed that there is a “need for consistency” between the EU and the Member States and that the scheduling of a political dialogue is hampered by the Europeans as the “love their summer holidays” (ibid).

The coordination between the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning focusses on another aspect of the cooperation and is thus not as diplomatic with a narrow focus on the economics. Besides the fact that the Ministry of Finance is cooperating in the programming of three EDF11 programmes and “signed two financing agreements” (interview 24.07.2019 9:00-10:00) the coordination is expressed within joint committee’s in which the EU the Ministry of Finance and the issuing ministry (for T-VET the Ministry of Tertiary Education or the Ministry of Labour Productivity) discuss funding and implementing the TVET policy programme. Here any programming depends on the EU’s support and more importantly the EU’s approval. This points to strict rules under which the EU cooperates making the adherence to the written agreement mandatory for its budget support. This is not unusual in a relationship between donor and recipient but limits the Finance Ministry’s room to manoeuvre considerably as there is “no programming without [the EU’s] permission” (ibid).

The answers from the thematically involved (in T-VET policy making) ministries (the deputy director of Skills Development and Vocational Training at the Ministry Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development and the director of Tertiary Training and Technical Education in the Ministry of Education and Skills Development) revealed that there is a level of coordination in which the Ministry of Employment actively approaches the EU Delegation asking “why don’t we organise a workshop on this topic” (interview 24.07.2019 7:30-8:00) and moreover that the EU in “whatever they do the assistance and even in T-VET we are the ones who work together on what we want for our country and we are, we set the target together [...] So they are really supporting us in that we ... and they don’t decide things for us. They let us decide what we want for Botswana [...]” (interview 26.07.2019 15:00-15:30). On the matter of T-VET policy making, which is mainly carried out in these two issue-specific ministries, it appears as if the local government bodies make use of the EU’s expertise and support and as such deliberately and carefully choose whether and how to make use of the advice given by the European Union’s development staff.

Rather than pointing to the assistance to the issue-Ministries the interview with the EU delegation stressed the cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. This comes not as a

surprise as the main part of the EU's development aid comes as budget support (interview 24.07.2019 14:00-15:00). Seeing the involvement of the EU in the daily policy process of the issue ministries the EU further pointed to the problem that the "split of T-VET in several ministries" (ibid) makes the coordination difficult. Focussing on the Ministry of Finance in their exchanges also underlines the priority of the EU to hold the government accountable with respect to the EU's budget support. The GiZ supports the local policy making with its projects "Strengthening Employment Relevant TVET in Botswana II". Having just one project and a small team the GiZ organises "meetings with them [the issue ministries] and [...] have e-mail contact [...] try[ing] to convince them to give us [the GiZ] as much of their time as possible" (interview 25.07.2019 14:00-15:00). When taking the statements from Botswana's government officials into account it seems as if the EU is at least in an advisory position and not completely detached from the T-VET policy per se.

Summing up how the practical cooperation can be viewed it can be observed that the EU is invited by the Ministries to acquire expertise and advise, while the GiZ as the implementing partner struggles to get the attention it needs in order to provide the technical assistance for the EU's development support. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation is not as one can assume the primary go-to ministry as the provided budget support involves the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning to a much larger extent, reducing the foreign ministries role to day-to-day diplomacy. Finally, among the issue-ministries the Ministry of Education and Skills Development clearly use the expertise if needed to the extent that it fits their needs in the policy making process rather than accepting ideas from the EU without prior internal consultations.

5.3 Pointing out problems and acting against the EU's advice

After the clarification of specifics concerning the day-to-day exchange between the government of Botswana and the EU the next part offers (in relation to the operationalisation effort) an indication of the EU's concerns in the donor-recipient-relationship with Botswana. Questions 4, 5 and 6 of the guideline allow for an analysis of the EU's possible influence over the policy making process in Botswana as well as an analysis of Botswana's ability to defend its ground, resisting the specifics EU advice on its government policy which deviates from Botswana's own ideas.

The response of the Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development was surprisingly direct. Despite the fact that the EU's and GiZ's technical assistants conduct "tracer studies" but leave the evaluating to the Ministry the Acting Deputy Director of Skills Development and Vocational Training described the cooperation as sometimes being "dictated by the partner" (interview

24.07.2019 7:30-8:00) but that the ministry can voice opposition which would lead to negotiations. This, in combination with the affirmation of the question whether the ministry would act against the advice if internal deliberation would come to different results (ibid), paints a conflicted image of the cooperation. A superficial answer may be found in the fact that the government of Botswana has “a lot of needs in T-VET” (ibid) but some irritation remains. The EU on the other hand sees the advice it gives as fitting in the “agreed process” (interview 24.07.2019 14:00-15:00) stressing that they mainly “shar[e] views”, “mobilis[e] experts” and “advise”. A central concern seems to be the fragmentation of the T-VET policy making within several government bodies. In addition the official from the Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development was unable to think of an incident in which a rejection of EU advice was a move to be considered at least not “for now, [as] all assistance currently are beneficial” (interview 24.07.2019 07:30-08:00). From this point of view the cooperation appears to be highly asymmetrical, which puts the statement from the representative of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning that the EU tries to “pick [the national programmes] and align them to fit their priorities [because the EU] has a vision for the country” (ibid.) into an almost neo-colonialist context.

But it is ill-advised to generalise this issue as the Ministry also described a previous case (question 6 deliberately not following advice) in which a technical assistant was not agreeing on the implementation of a programme, which “was thought to be headed by the EU” but in which Botswana wanted to take control over the policy process all the way and “ultimately succeeded” (interview 24.07.2019 9:00-10:00). The Ministry of Finance displayed itself as the final decision maker and at worst the “Minister [of Finance] calls the Foreign Ministry to stop the idea from the EU”. In this the Ministry of Finance acts as the authority having the final say in the cooperation process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in its diplomatic task referred to the fact that once an internal, “national position” (interview 25.07.2019 9:00-10:00) is formed they “communicate it back and forth until an agreement is reached” (ibid). The Ministry’s major concern is that internal EU negotiations may lead to new regulatory grounds on which the development policy is based, which thus prolongs the negotiation process making it more complicated for the foreign ministry to quickly react to the new framework under which the EU conducts its development policy. In the end the cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the EU operates always in “a spirit of give and take” (ibid). In this the divide between the diplomatic channels, the financing aspect of the cooperation and the issue specific ministry position becomes visible. Again these statements point to a misalignment between the EU which in its development cooperation directly approaches issue-ministries rather than taking the diplomatic route through the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. Within the discussion the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation pointed to the issue-Ministries to which the EU would “offer[] expertise [...]” (ibid) concerning the T-VET policy without pointing to any form of technical advice it receives itself during these exchanges.

One representative in such an issue-Ministry is the Director of the Department of Tertiary Training and Technical Education at the Ministry of Education and Skills Development, who – when asked whether the EU gives advice and whether or not to act upon this advice – responded that “they are giving advice to find [...] the T-VET policy for the country [and that they sent a technical assistant] who looked at all the institutions [...] and the rationalisation of programmes for the entire country”, which help to save labour costs (“human resources”) and “expensive [...] equipment on T-VET” (interview 25.07.2019 15:00-16:00). The general observation within the exchange with the Director of Tertiary Training is that the EU despite pointing out problematic policies seems to offer solutions or at least ideas, which the Ministry of Education and Skills Development welcomes. In especially the issue of cost-effectiveness the Director welcomes the advice as it makes it easier to justify nationally the ministry’s spending if cuts proposed by the EU lead to more efficient policy output. As such the cooperation has to differentiate between the financing aspect and the diplomatic channels in which the relation is neutral or tilted in favour of the EU’s position (at least having a say as to how to invest the budget support provided by the EU and the issue-specific ministries which seem to interpret the advice of the EU less as a binding decision and more as suggestive advice).

On the diplomatic side the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation addresses the advice by especially France and Germany who offer assistance if asked for but makes clear that both sides are “always very clear with each other [and w]ill not hide it [aversion to the offered advice] from each other” (interview 25.07.2019 9:00-10:00). It appears through these discussion that the EU (and GiZ) seemingly prefer direct contact with the issue-Ministries thus do not approach the issue within the usual diplomatic channels used through general foreign policy.

Concerning the European side and whether its development staff points to policy aspects it considers problematic to implement or problematic concerning results achieved and whether there are instances in which the government of Botswana acted deliberately against the advice given by the EU/giz the junior advisor in giz’s T-VET programme expressed that “there is a bit of leeway that you have talking to the partners; what is, what is most-pressing at the moment. [...] So in the end I would say that [uhm] the partners are the [...] driving force” (interview 25.07.2019 14:00-15:00). Despite being considered the driver of their own needs-based development the representative at the GiZ could not remember

a “case in which [the government of Botswana] deliberately blocked what we wanted” (ibid). The EU delegation’s development staff although admitting that there are “smaller things” which came to a surprise in the implementation of previously agreed policy measures but that these minor deviations are “normal [as the] government has to make its own decisions. They are in charge of their own policy” (interview 24.07.2019 14:00-15:00). Contradictory the EU evaluates the situation as the lack of a singular T-VET policy per se in which they “identify problems” but stresses that their task is merely to advise not to enforce the development of any policy in a certain direction. Also the relationship is described as equal without big surprises. In this the EU – at least expressively within the interview – respects the importance of Botswana’s own capacity to address T-VET policy issues.

5.4 Information withheld

The final part of the analysis evolves around the final question in the guideline and whether or not the cooperation contains classified aspects which for political reasons prevent the interviewee from providing information concerning the cooperation process. This final question is necessary to account for the completeness of the study: (1) if the respondent affirms this question then the study uncovered that there are indeed more channels or means of exchange and thus influence on the policy making process which potentially interact with the ownership concept. These for department policy reasons can, however, not be shared and establish a dark veil limiting the reach of this research. (2) If the respondent does not point to such restrictions the research can be considered to be conclusive – at least within its set limitations. It acts as a question to determine what research in the realm of practical EU development implementation in relation to the applied ownership concept can and cannot uncover.

The GiZ is not aware of such information other than personal information referring to the data of individuals which is not at the centre of the question. The Acting Deputy Director of Skills Development and Vocational Training at the Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development responded: “No, not that I am aware of” (interview 24.07.2019 07:30-08:00) and the Ministry of Finance stressed that: “Everything is full transparency.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation confirmed that within the system “we have little [few] secrets”. But if it falls under the “planning stage and is not publicised it falls under the [illegible] of both parties” (interview 25.07.2019 09:00-10:00). Here one can assume that there are efforts to let the public and thus the researcher know as much as there can be said about existing lines of cooperation, however aspects of the development policy which are not yet finalised and in the aftermath published can for reasons of scrutiny not be shared. With this the research at least from the perspective taken and with respect to

its operationalisation can be considered valid at least for the framework under which it is developed. The Ministry of Education and Skills Development refers to “one document” which is as “a working document” not yet confirmed by “the permanent secretaries” which could potentially make it subject to changes (interview 26.07.2019 15:00-16:00).

In sum although the analysis is not considered conclusive as the brief interviews of 30min with each stakeholder cannot explain the entire picture of the interaction. The daily exchange with the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning indicates at least a possible leverage over the national policy formulation, which despite being generally welcomed can be interpreted as an intervention in national issues. The potential impact in this case would definitely exceed the level of consultation. Clearly channels of communication between each individual ministry and the EU exist but the room to manoeuvre concerning the financial planning of the Ministry of Finance is limited. These limitations also remain true for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation which despite having diplomatic channels seems to depend on the EU’s efforts. The issue-Ministries seem to make use of the EU’s expertise as a means of improving their policy making and thus seemingly enjoy much more freedom within the relationship.

It is important to remember that negotiations may shift the power in favour of the finance ministry if concessions are made because as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation admits: It is a situation of give-and-take. Only the EU representation although correctly pointing to an agreed process may misinterpret their own effect on extent to which Botswana feels in charge of its decisions. This does not necessarily mean that there is a projection of power the EU willingly uses to enforce its vision, nor does it mean that Botswana itself is not empowered. It may in this case be interpreted as merely the context-specific interpretation of the relationship in which specific aspects are viewed differently without either side complaining on a substantive level or even feeling helpless. As the Ministry of Education and Skills Development put it the EU gives suggestive support which may or may not be deemed useful for the development of the T-VET policy making. The general opinion in the discussions was that the development assistance despite minor humps is to an overly large extent a positive cooperation in which advice is welcomed although in some cases the EU appears to restrain especially the government’s fiscal decision autonomy.

6. Discussion – Putting things into perspective

One can easily argue that the elaborations of the previous chapter, despite allowing inside into the cooperation between the EU and Botswana, fail to penetrate the core of the ‘so-what’-question meaning

that it remains so far comparably vague how the observations gathered through the stakeholder discussions and analysed above help to tie into the ownership concept of the early chapters as such this chapter will offer the space for a brief debate in which the gathered empirical material will be linked to the theoretical construct.

Above (Chapter 3.5) I introduced ownership as consisting of key aspects, which:

- At its most elevated form can be seen as partnership among equals.
- Rejects notions of top-down commands.
- Allows for measures installed to observe and report on progress achieved.
- Inherits an institutionalised process.
- Is displayed in planned and coordinated discussions.
- Involves levels of bureaucracy and political leadership.

By displaying the results of the stakeholder interviews it becomes possible to link these results to this theoretical concept.

Although it is hard to argue that the relationship is equal by any terms. Except the Ministry of Employment Labour Productivity and Skills Development (which due to its perceived needs experiences the relationship as tilted) all ministries in this study would engage in discussions and negotiations, “communicate [dissent] back and forth until an agreement is reached (interview 25.07.2019 09:00-10:00) or would not “just take [...] advice from [the EU] because [they] understand the country better” (interview 26.07.2019 15:00-16:00). Even despite leverage on the financial part “different [financing] ideas” are discussed (interview 24.07.2019 09:00-10:00). It is therefore fair to assume that the relationship is respectful but that the EU has leverage over certain aspects of the T-VET policy making this is not only tied to financial aspects but also arises due to the level of imbalance when it comes to expertise the EU provides. On the T-VET policy making the EU certainly encounters a capable bureaucracy, which can decide on its own and utilises the EU’s experience independently when it sees fit and sets their own “targets” and key indicators” (interview 26.07.2019 15:00-16:00). Internal policy reviews are supplemented by studies from technical assistants (interview 24.07.2019 7:30-09:00) to jointly monitor progress according to the agreed indicators within the written cooperation agreements meaning the Ministry of Employment Labour Productivity and Skills Development is involved in its bureaucracy and has monitoring measures are installed. The fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation mentioned the delay of the political dialogue due to scheduling issues, the Finance Ministry referred to daily meetings and phone calls and the monthly joint meetings indicated by the issue-Ministries undoubtedly proves that the planned and coordinated discussions empower the government of Botswana in the formulation of a national position and enable them to communicate their ideas for the cooperation within these meetings. The

Ministry of International Cooperation and Development has Dialogue Plans with the EU but since the “Cotonou Agreement which is coming to an end (2020) [they] need to have an[other] agreement” (interview 25.07.2019 09:00-10:00), which is dependent on negotiations which are expected to take place as a relationship among equals. Besides this development aspect of the cooperation the Ministry of International Cooperation and Development stresses the “excellent [diplomatic] relationship with a “very, very low [...] rejection rate” (ibid).

As the directors of affected departments (Ministry of Education and Skills Development) or the Permanent Secretaries (interview 26.07.2019 15:00-16:00) would engage and potentially “call the foreign ministry to stop the idea from the EU” (interview 24.07. 9:00-10:00) it is plausible to assume that not only the bureaucratic leadership is involved in the process but also that in events the EU’s ideas are perceived as counterproductive vis-à-vis national priorities the government of Botswana is empowered and capable to steer the cooperation towards its own ideas.

It can thus be confirmed that the EU – at least in this aspect – acknowledges and works with the structures and despite experiencing frustration at times does not try smoothen the process by addressing a more preferable institutional set-up for the T-VET policy making. Among the issue-ministries the Ministry of Education and Skills Development clearly uses the expertise if needed to the extent that it fits its needs in the policy making process rather than accepting ideas from the EU without prior internal consultations.

The Ministry of Finance displayed itself as the final decision maker and at worst the “Minister [of Finance] calls the Foreign Ministry to stop the idea from the EU”. In this the Ministry of Finance acts as the authority having the final say in the cooperation process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in its diplomatic task referred to the fact that once an internal, “national position” (interview 25.07.2019 9:00-10:00) is formed they “communicate it back and forth until an agreement is reached” (ibid). The EU thus does allow ownership of the local development policy in Botswana but has a tight grip on the financial part of the national T-VET for progress initiatives and thus the relationship despite involving levels of bureaucratic leadership is tilted in favour of the EU. This is not to say that the independence from this financial support is out of reach as the issue-specific expertise is offered on demand rather than proscribed and considering that a functioning tax-system is in place (as observed during the study trip) Botswana can be seen to reach full independence and complete ownership over these financial aspects of policy making to complement their already high level of ownership over the policy aspects of its T-VET policies in due time.

7. Conclusion

This study has addressed the EU's development cooperation and how and to what extent the EU allows for ownership in its development cooperation. This empirical field of the EU's development actions has yet to set roots in the academic realm and thus the paper can only be seen as a first attempt to enter the area of empirical case studies regarding the EU's practical development cooperation and the aspect of local ownership as addressed by development scholars (e.g. Makuwira 2018). By conceptualising ownership and establishing a link to a progressive society this essay determined ownership over the T-VET policy making process as a crucial precondition for the prospective development of a country in socio-economic terms. By relying on expert interviews and conducting an empirical field study interacting with crucial stakeholders the study utilised empirical qualitative data to evaluate the level of ownership over the T-VET policy making in Botswana and to what extent autonomous decision making can be observed – especially by the stakeholder ministries in Botswana. The results show a picture, which needs to be viewed from the angle of finance and foreign exchange on the one hand and issue specific policy making on the other. Whereas the EU (and within the implementation process the GiZ) uses its channels to interact with all ministries the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning expressed that it – despite having the opportunity at times to decide upon financing ideas – finds that there is a vision behind the EU's actions and stresses its oversight over the spending which includes the EU's budget support. Concerning diplomatic channels the relation also seems tilted in favour of the EU's position. The issue-specific ministries conversely seem to interpret the advice of the EU less as a binding decision and more as suggestive advice which is also the interpretation of the EU representation. It is thus far from easy to come up with a conclusion which straight forward answers the research question adequately. Many factors remain so far hidden from this specific empirical research field. As such one has to take the results as they are and need to contest them through further country studies which may at some point allow for the generation of theoretical frameworks which more adequately point to aspects in the relation between the EU and aid recipient countries when it comes to the question of ownership.

19,927 words

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Annex I – Interview guide:

EU:

0 – Icebreaker

Can you briefly tell me about yourself, where did you study? How long have you been working in this institution? Did you have a different job before you had this position?

1. – Quantity of Exchange

How often do you or your colleagues here in the department meet or have contact (personal/phone/mail/e-mail) with the

- a) Ministry of Education and Skills Development (the BQA)
- b) Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development
- c) Ministry of Finance and Development Planning

2. – Coordination

Do you coordinate activities with the staff from

- a) Ministry of Education and Skills Development (the BQA)
- b) Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development
- c) Ministry of Finance and Development Planning

3. How does this coordination look like?

4. Do you point to aspects concerning the TVET policy which you consider problematic in Botswana's implementation?
5. Do you point to aspects concerning the TVET policy which you consider problematic concerning possible results achieved.
6. Do you know of instances in which the government of Botswana deliberately acted against what you discussed previously. Not as in defying orders but rather in an unexpected way concerning an issue you were exchanging opinions/knowledge upon?
7. Is there any part of the cooperation that you cannot disclose for political or legal reasons or reasons concerning classified material such as internal documents or EAS rules or guidelines?

Botswana:

0 – Icebreaker

Can you briefly tell me about yourself, where did you study? How long have you been working in this institution? Did you have a different job before you had this position?

1. – Quantity of Exchange

How often do you or your colleagues here in the department meet or have contact (personal/phone/mail/e-mail) with the EU delegation?

2. – Coordination

Do you coordinate activities with the staff from the EU Delegation?

3. How does this coordination look like?

4. Does the EU in exchanges point to ideas or policy aspects concerning TVET which the EU assumes to be problematic to implement or to be insufficient means to tackle the problem at hand?

5. Do you get advice from the EU concerning TVET policy?

a. If so do you ask for it

b. If so do you evaluate the advice and decide deliberately to act accordingly or deliberately to act differently?

6. Can you imagine a scenario in which you would deliberately not follow any advice from the EU – if given throughout exchanges – because it does not sound like a good idea

6.a) if so would you communicate this to the EU representation?

7. Is there any part of the cooperation that you cannot disclose for political or legal reasons or reasons concerning classified material such as internal documents or EAS rules or guidelines?

Annex II – study outline



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Department of Political Science

Subject: European Affairs (Master of Science (M.Sc.))

Thesis Supervisor: Maria Strömvik (Ph.D.)

Topic: Development Policy of the EU

Title: The European Union's Development Cooperation in Botswana: Technical and Vocational Education and Training and the European Union's Support

Abstract:

The European Union (EU)'s development policy receives less attention than market or economic policy. Despite the fact that the EU is the world's biggest donor little attention has been paid to the EU's development policy output in developing countries. Within the field of development studies research over the past decade identified the potential of post-primary, technical and vocational education and training (TVET) to combat poverty and support economic development and growth. By departing from the assumptions that knowledge leads to progress and that the distribution of knowledge must take the local perspective into account this study argues that within the TVET for development paradigm the development cooperation must include the notion of ownership. The study identifies several dimensions of ownership and investigates to what degree these dimensions are supported by the EU and local government institutions. By mapping the relevant actors in government, EU and civil society this study attempts to investigate the extent to which the EU support foreign countries through its development policies and how the EU conducts its foreign development policies.

Keywords:

EU's development policy, European Union's development cooperation, Education and Training for development, TVET, development cooperation in Botswana

Outline:

The study departs from the EU's development policy in academia and finds that the focus has been less on the local cooperation between the EU and the donor country but rather addressed issues like human rights and trade agreements. Within the domain of development assistance the research has focussed on effectiveness. The development research has identified education, and especially post-primary education as potentially suitable for long-term progress and economic development. Moreover, the ownership literature stresses that cooperation not only needs to take the local, governing structures within the targeted society into account, but also relies on active cooperation between donor community and the society in the recipient country. The latter by taking command over the crucial policy areas – education and economic regulation the donor offering support for local policy interventions regarding the issue. Taking both sides into account this study addresses the research question, *how and to what extent does the EU allow for ownership in developing countries? Do we see developing countries taking control of their own policy areas aimed at ensuring long-term development progress?*

Departing from the historical conceptualisation of progress the study deduces that knowledge leads to technical advancement, technical advancement requires expert knowledge, the distribution of knowledge is dependent on government structures that allow society to progress and acquire the needed skills, that these structures and the resulting policy output has to be *owned* by the local society (and their accountable public officials and representatives), which lead to the conceptualisation of ownership along the dimensions stakeholder participation (civil society, local government, donor (EU)). In offering answers to this research question, this study contributes to the sparse literature concerning the EU's development policy in Sub-Saharan Africa and shows within one of the first empirical field studies how the EU conducts its foreign development policies and cooperates with developing countries.

Master Thesis

VT 2019

The European Union's Development Cooperation in Botswana: Technical and vocational Education and Training and the European Union's Support

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Table of Contents:

- 1. Introduction**
- 2. Motivations – Why EU and ownership?**

3. The literature so far
4. Methods
5. Results and Analysis
6. Discussion – Putting things into perspective
7. Conclusions

Stakeholders:

EEAS, Commission (DEVCO) staff,

Botswana’s Ministry of Education and Skills Development, Botswana’s Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development, Botswana’s Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, Botswana’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

Annex III: Interview Transcripts and Meeting Minutes

	A	B	C	D	E	F
1	Interviews in Gaborone (Botswana) study visit July 22-26					
2		22nd	23rd	24th	25th	26th
3	06:00					
4	07:00			Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development (Memo only)		
5	08:00					
6	09:00			Min of Finance r2-21 (Memo only)	Min of Foreign Affairs (Memo only)	
7	10:00					
8	11:00					
9	12:00					
10	13:00					
11	14:00			EU Ambassador and development policy staff (Memo only)	GIZ (voice recorded)	
12	15:00					
13	16:00					
14	17:00					
15	18:00					
16	19:00					Director of Training Ministry for Education and Skills Development Department of Research (voice recorded)
17	20:00					
18						

Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development 24.07.2019 07:30-8:00

Observation: it appears to exist a considerable pressure on how the (“workshops”) cooperation should look like, however as GiZ was referred to in this matter it remains unclear to what extent the EU and German Development Policy targets are congruent.

0 – Icebreaker

Can you briefly tell me about yourself, where did you study? How long have you been working in this institution? Did you have a different job before you had this position?

Acting Deputy Director of Skills Development and Vocational Training. The Department was established in Nov 2016.

Note: Ice Breaker did not work sufficiently to make the situation comfortable. The longer the interview lasted the more comfortable the discussion got but overall the atmosphere displayed a noticeable “distance” between the interviewer and the interviewee.

1. – Quantity of Exchange

How often do you or your colleagues here in the department meet or have contact (personal/phone/mail/e-mail) with the EU delegation?

The cooperation with the GiZ was stressed. Cooperation projects like GiZ’s “Strengthening Employment Relevant TVETII” (SER TVET II) was indicated. Here the GiZ offers Technical Assistance and meetings are arranged ~ twice a month “with the GiZ and also with the EU.”

2. – Coordination

Do you coordinate activities with the staff from the EU Delegation?

Yes the Ministry approaches the EU delegation. “Why don’t we organize a workshop on this topic.”

3. How does this coordination look like?

Both, the Ministry of Education and Skills Development and the EU representation are present at meetings facilitated by the EU’s technical assistants

4. Does the EU in exchanges point to ideas or policy aspects concerning TVET which the EU assumes to be problematic to implement or to be insufficient means to tackle the problem at hand?

Yes, cooperation is sometimes “dictated by the partner” but the exchange includes a back and forth between the partners in which the Ministry (of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development) can voice opposition to ideas.

5. Do you get advice from the EU concerning TVET policy?
a. If so do you ask for it

(EU’s) Technical advisors assist in conducting “tracer studies”. But evaluating is outside the scope of the EU’s work.

b. If so do you evaluate the advice and decide deliberately to act accordingly or deliberately to act differently?

“Yes” we would. But in T-VET “we have a lot of needs in T-VET” so no.

6. Can you imagine a scenario in which you would deliberately not follow any advice from the EU – if given throughout exchanges – because it does not sound like a good idea

Possibly, but “no for now, all assistance currently are beneficial”.

6.a) if so would you communicate this to the EU representation?

/

7. Is there any part of the cooperation that you cannot disclose for political or legal reasons or reasons concerning classified material such as internal documents or EAS rules or guidelines?

“No, not that I am aware of.”

“[...] even though they are assisting you [...] they know what they get out of it facilitating their own interest.”

“These things come along with it [...] it is mainly restrictive. Money is only meant for what it has been agreed” despite possible other needs.

Ministry of Finance and Development Planning

24.07.2019 09:00-10:00

0 – Icebreaker

Can you briefly tell me about yourself, where did you study? How long have you been working in this institution? Did you have a different job before you had this position?

Dep. Development and Budget – Development Cooperation Unit – Multilateral Projects and Bilateral Agreements since November 2017 under the Development Cooperation Unit before that “I worked in the office of the President [...] coordinating [the] USAID programme, bilateral and UN Aid”. From 2005 Treasury.

1. – Quantity of Exchange

How often do you or your colleagues here in the department meet or have contact (personal/phone/mail/e-mail) with the EU delegation?

On a “daily basis”.

2. – Coordination

Do you coordinate activities with the staff from the EU Delegation?

Yes programming for EDF11 contains 3 programmes which “we coordinate together [...] finalizing the third programme” – a T-VET support programme. We “signed two financing agreements.” The joint committees EU, Finance Ministry and issue Ministry are responsible for funding and implementing the TVET Policy Programme. The Ministry of Finance is the “authorising office”.

3. How does this coordination look like?

Once the programme started the technical assistant (GIZ), “us and the EU [and experts]. We “share the report with the EU for comments. In cases where the EU contracts the Ministry [of Finance] comments on draft agreements”. But there is no programming “without [the EU’s] permission”.

4. Does the EU in exchanges point to ideas or policy aspects concerning TVET which the EU assumes to be problematic to implement or to be insufficient means to tackle the problem at hand?

“They [the EU] try to pick [our national programmes] and align them to fit their priorities. ... The EU has a vision for the country.”

5. Do you get advice from the EU concerning TVET policy?
 - a. If so do you ask for it

Yes, they contact the EU and amongst others the Education expert (EU) on the matter

- b. If so do you evaluate the advice and decide deliberately to act accordingly or deliberately to act differently?

Yes if there are “different ideas” they discuss different financing ideas.

6. Can you imagine a scenario in which you would deliberately not follow any advice from the EU – if given throughout exchanges – because it does not sound like a good idea

“In one of the Programmes that was an issue”. A technical assistant was not agreeing the “implementation was thought to be headed by the EU” but Botswana wanted to take control and “ultimately succeeded”.

- 6.a) if so would you communicate this to the EU representation?

Yes. The EDF is a six year programme. At the programming stage funding and implementation are discussed once agreed there is no rejection. Disagreement is communicated through the bureaucratic line of authority at worst the “Minister [of Finance] calls the Foreign Ministry [Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation] to stop the idea from the EU” as a final decision maker.

7. Is there any part of the cooperation that you cannot disclose for political or legal reasons or reasons concerning classified material such as internal documents or EAS rules or guidelines?

“Everything is full transparency.”

At the programming stage information is ONLY shared with stakeholders. Imagine “if we had to change and the public already knew and we change them.”

“We wait to be a knowledge based economy [and] export leader.”

Capacity building is priority. Declining donor support and drastic cuts in EU aid is visible. Botswana could be sustainable “after a time” but youth employment is high and therefore EU’s support vital. TVET Support is mainly “government funded and second largest government programme”.

Delegation of the European Union to Botswana and South African Developing Countries (SADC)
24.07.2019 14:00-16:00

The icebreaker question was skipped due to the set-up being a group discussion with the Head of Cooperation (FB) and a Cooperation Officer (CC). Further due to this fact and the direct approach coming straight to the point of the content of the interview minutes rather than voice recording and transcribing the minutes seemed the more suitable approach.

1. – Quantity of Exchange

How often do you or your colleagues here in the department meet or have contact (personal/phone/mail/e-mail) with the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, the Ministry of Employment Labour Productivity and Skills Development and the Ministry of Tertiary Education and Skills Development, and the GIZ?

Daily, but the go-to-Ministry is the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning because of the contribution of Development Aid to Botswana as budget support.

2. – Coordination

Do you coordinate activities with the Ministries of Finance and Development Planning, Employment Labour Productivity and Skills Development and Tertiary Education and Skills Development? And

3. How does this Coordination look like?

Yes, but the “split of T-VET in several ministries” makes the coordination difficult. The main part of the EU’s development aid comes as budget support and thus entails the Ministry of finance. The fragmentation comes with difficulties and a general skills mismatch is observable. The EU’s development assistance is aligned to Botswana’s national development plan (NDP11) where Botswana set the priorities. The national programming document is not an EU document.

But in general “we question the participation of local [non-political] stakeholders”.

The EU is invited by the local ministries which convey the meetings.

With the help of the GIZ the EU provides technical assistance upon request.

Since most of the development aid is provided through budget support the EU “pay[s] if they achieve some of the goals [agreed upon].” The support can be seen as an incentive “to meet the target”.

“We try to facilitate dialogue between the private sector in Botswana [...] we have to take other stakeholder into account.”

4. Do you point to aspects concerning the T-VET policy which you consider to be problematic in Botswana’s implementation?

Since there is no T-VET policy per se the EU advises “through [...] policy dialogue [and] technical assistance, [...] mobilizing experts, [...]and] sharing views. [...] We advise.” We observe a “lack of institutional involvement of private sectors.”

T-VET spreads over from secondary to tertiary education curricula. Yes “we identify the problems.” There is a TVET advisory body or “taskforce” consisting of the Ministry of Finance as lead ministry,

the three Ministries ((Basic) Education and Skills Development, Ministry of Tertiary Education, Research, Science and Technology and Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development), and the parastatals the Botswana Qualification Authority and the Human Resource Development Council.

5. Do you point to aspects concerning the T-VET policy which you consider problematic concerning possible results achieved?

No. It is an “agreed process” because the payments depend on results achieved. Agreement is reached before the cooperation agreement is signed and the development assistance starts.

6. Do you know of instances in which the government of Botswana deliberately acted against what you discussed previously. Not as in defying orders but rather in an unexpected way concerning an issue you were exchanging opinions/knowledge upon?

It came as a surprise when the Ministry of Education was split. There are “smaller things but not” major issues.

“We facilitate the cooperation between developing partners in T-VET [...e.g. the] World Bank the ones that are here now.”

We tried to make “multiple pathways [studies, apprenticeship, (on-job) training] more fluent and interchangeable. [but] we cannot impose, we advise.”

“That is normal [...] the government has to make its own decision. They are in charge of their own policy.”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

25.07.2019 09:00-10:00

- 0 – Icebreaker

Can you briefly tell me about yourself, where did you study? How long have you been working in this institution? Did you have a different job before you had this position?

Director for Europe and Americas.

1. – Quantity of Exchange

How often do you or your colleagues here in the department meet or have contact (personal/phone/mail/e-mail) with the EU delegation?

Anytime “when things need to be discussed. [...] We had a [...] working lunch [with the EU ambassador]. Often “even when there is an event organized by a Member State” we are invited. “We keep open channels of communication [...]and] have been at the EU [delegation] [pause] 3 times this year.

2. – Coordination

Do you coordinate activities with the staff from the EU Delegation?

Yes. "We are invited to events" the delegation prepares and the EU Delegation "took the opportunity to meet us at the Victoria Falls Conference (Africa Wildlife Economy Summit (June 23rd-25th))."

"We work within the ACP agreement and the Cotonou Agreement which is coming to an end (2020) so that we have to have an[other] agreement." The last remaining issue concerning the successor of the Cotonou Agreement is the "issue of migration".

"There is a need for consistency" between the EU and the Member States. "We have to schedule a political dialogue but the Europeans love their summer holidays."

3. How does this coordination look like?

- Sending official communications to "invite you over"
- The political dialogue is hold back by scheduling
- They try to coordinate events and the rejection rate is "very, very low"

"We have an excellent relationship. We have each other's numbers" "it is always good to have the atmosphere [...] exchange views."

4. Does the EU in exchanges point to ideas or policy aspects concerning TVET which the EU assumes to be problematic to implement or to be insufficient means to tackle the problem at hand?

"There is a lot of policy coordination going on [...] on a weekly basis." "Some of the policy issues especially TVET you would see the Member States being part in the TVET [...] offering expertise."

5. Do you get advice from the EU concerning TVET policy?
a. If so do you ask for it

Yes

b. If so do you evaluate the advice and decide deliberately to act accordingly or deliberately to act differently?

"We are partners. [...] The French and the Germans are very much involved [...] We are always very clear with each other. We are very clear [...] this is our policy" "Yes, they (the EU) give advice to the Ministry of Tertiary education and Skills Development." "We will not hide it [aversion] from each other." "This year we agreed on the communication of the T-VET cooperation with the Germans. It is a mutually agreed arrangement". Also the SME support is welcomed.

6. Can you imagine a scenario in which you would deliberately not follow any advice from the EU – if given throughout exchanges – because it does not sound like a good idea

Yes.

"The only difficulty we come across is when you have the agreement and the member states and 6 weeks later you have new regulations" (previously not in place which were agreed internally in the EU and now interfere with previously negotiated arrangements).

6.a) if so would you communicate this to the EU representation?

Internal processes. "Once we formed consent [...] a national position [...] we [communicate it] back to the EU. We communicate it back and forth until an agreement is reached. Even when "it is always a spirit of give and take." "The EU understands the [need for the] death penalty." "Even when the death penalty is a due process in the courts as to how to apply it. "

7. Is there any part of the cooperation that you cannot disclose for political or legal reasons or reasons concerning classified material such as internal documents or EAS rules or guidelines?

Yes it is in the system. "But to be honest with you we have little [few] secrets". But if it falls under the "planning stage and is not publicized it falls under the [illegible] of both parties"

"I think we have been democracies [...] finding common ground on working in a transparent manor."

"All is nice and good."

Interview Transcript GiZ – Interview T.W. T-VET Programme Assistant 25.07.2019 14:00-15:00

MB: So [...] the first question will be a bit [uhm] a bit more personal. Can you tell a bit about yourself, your personal [uhm], how did you come to be, where did you study what did you do and how did you end up here?

TW: Yeah, ok, my name is [uh] TW. [Uhm] I finished studying my Masters in Development Studies [uhm] in 2018 at LSE and after that I did an internship in Nigeria for Giz. And after finishing that internship which was also in private sector development T-VET I started here as a junior advisor in March. And this is my role here I am a junior advisor in the T-VET Project.

MB: [Uhm,] thank you. The next question concern the quantity of exchange, you guys have with [uhm] certain ministries. So for example with contact I mean both personal and via phone, e-mail, letters, so all the contacts. So how often do you have these contacts with the Ministry of Education and Skills Development here in Botswana?

TW: [Uhm], we implement the project together with the Ministry of [uhm] Employment, Skills Development and Labour Productivity and also the Ministry of Tertiary Education, [uhm] Research, Science and that's the long-form; MOTE in short and the first one is MELPSD – Employment, Labour Productivity, Skills Development. And with them we are almost in daily contact because we, we cannot implement the project without them [uhm] I'll just try to answer the question briefly because otherwise I would have to explain the entire project. I don't know how, where you are [-] the project, the contact and what we are doing. But just to answer the questions there is almost daily contact, there is a steering committee, there is a management committee, so the steering committee meets four times a year and the management committee meets whenever necessary. Steering Committee is at the level of the perm [...] permanent secretary of the ministries whereas the management team is department level. And from our side [uhm] the [inaudible] head of the programme which is Sabina Gebauer – she will be present at both the management meeting and the steering committee and at

the steering committee we will also have people from the [German] Embassy the person responsible for economic development and cooperation from the Embassy and [...] otherwise daily contact, workshops, Email, phone, letters not so much because it is just around the corner.

MB: How about the Ministry of Finance here in Gaborone?

TW: The Ministry of Finance and Economic Development is [uh] is our [...] is not our implementation partner so they are our partner for setting up the project basically. They, they gave us the permission to work here in the country but they are not our implementation partner because they don't work in T-VET. They are more about the formal set-up, whereas the other two Ministries I mentioned are our implementation partners.

MB. So once you are done with the Ministry of Finance – that's it. In the beginning [...]. Yeah

TW: We have to, we have to send them a letter that we're start here and they have to send us a letter that we can actually work here and that's mostly, that's mostly it.

MB: OK. [Uhm] the next question would be: Do you coordinate your activities with the staff from said Ministries [uhm] the Education and Skills Development, and Employment and Finance ok than...only once.

TW: Finance not [...] exactly and with the other two ministries as I said we have the steering committee, we have the management team and then we also have working groups [uhm, well] our technical staff would be involved and also technical staff from the ministries. So we have working working groups on monitoring the evaluation, monitoring groups [...] oh sorry [...] working groups on monitoring and evaluation. One working group on curriculum development and then also one on improvement of cooperation private sector – between the T-VET institutions and the private sector. [Uhm] yeah.

MB: OK, can you be a bit more specific on how this coordination looks like. How do you en..engage. what does that on a day-to-day [inaudible] basically how do you how does the cooperation transform into the normal scheduled day-to-day work?

TW: Hmm... So... We have made the experience that e-mail is always a bit difficult because the colleagues seem to receive either a lot of emails or sometimes the e-mails accounts don't work. So the best way if you want some ad hoc information or [...] like [inaudible] meeting the best way is to to call them. As I said we have a very specific structure that we have the steering committee on which the main direction of the programmes is being decided on. Obviously the Federal Ministry of of Economic Development in Germany and Cooperation – they gave us a mandate for for certain projects to implement and this is not to be changed. So the steering committee is more about the high level decisions on implementation of the project. And then you have the management team [uhm] that is I would say one level below that so it is more about [uhm] it is not about the direction of the projects it is then about what are we doing it's about affirming what has been decided on lower levels and they will then affirm if that's ok or not – if something needs to be changed operational plans of the different working groups. And then you have the working groups in which [...] It is not like we are working in [...] it's not like we have a big project team because they obviously have their own work to do and the GiZ project is "TVET2 – Strengthening Employment Relevant TVET

in Botswana 2". That project is only one part of the [...] of what they are doing. So we have meetings with them and we have e-mail contact but it is not like we are working as a big project team and only have this one project. [Uhm] so in terms of coordination its then on the phone, having meetings, [uhm] and try to convince them to give us as much of their time as possible ... if it makes sense. Yeah.

MB: Ähm, during these exchanges that you mentioned [ähm] do you point to aspects concerning this T-VET [ähm] policy that you consider to be possibly problematic in Botswana's implementation process.

TW: Uhm I mean this is already a very very specific question. Uhm, the general feeling that I and also Sabina [Gebauer] have is that that the TVET sector here at least it exists there are a lot of policies a lot of rules, regulations [uhm] it's then more about implementation on the ground so we are involved in the TVET policy [uhm] group where the new T-VET policy is being developed and of course our role is advising on that policy like when we think [uhm] when we think that a certain issue could be problematic, and by problematic I mean that from our point of view the private sector is not being included enough in the design of the curricula for example, than we would obviously raise that point [uhm] but whether it will be included in the policy is obviously the partner's decision. Uh Ja.

MB: But you point it out in these discussions?

TW: Yeah if it is the right format [uh] to point it out if it's in our mandate of the project than we would do that. If we would be asked for advice we would also do that.

MB: Do you also point to [uhm...] aspects concerning these policies that you consider problematic concerning the results achieved because you are as part of [...] or loosely tied to the German Government therefore also responsible in some sort for [uh] the German Taxpayer money in the end, which is funding these [uh] projects to a large extent. Do you point to these aspects as a matter of results achieved (point of view).

TW: Yeah definitely, the basic idea is in the beginning to [uhm] to sit together and agree on the design of the project and [...] I don't know how familiar you are with how a development project is basically being commissioned and started. So of course you you there is at first we have consultations between the government, between the governments of the two countries: Germany and the other country. And there in negotiations we basically agree on what the project is going to be about and then you have an appraisal mission in which staff from Giz if BMZ wants Giz to implement the project and the staff from Giz will come here, have a look, talk to the partners, ask the partners what they need, what they want because we are not implementing projects the partners don't need. That will not happen. [Uhm] So you have these discussions and in the end [uhm] GiZ will design [uhm] the project as they think fits best to the situation and then BMZ will either approve that or not. And normally they approve. And then the project will be implemented but always [...] it's not like you come with a lockframe and then you say this is going to be implemented over the three years. There is, there is a bit of leeway that you have talking to the partners; what is, what is most-pressing at the moment. Then you also you report every year to the BMZ concerning the progress of the project and in those reports you can also raise points where you think the project has to be redesigned because things have changed. So in the end I would say that [uhm] the partners are the the driving force in the design of the projects of course in line with [uhm] the strategies of the BMZ.

MB: Now switching the [...] the perspective a bit. Since specifically my study is about the European Union as a whole in its development cooperation, how do you engage with the EU Delegation here in Gaborone?

TW: Hmm, [Uhm,] we have, I don't know if the EU talked to you about that but [uhm] there is supposed to be a co-financing agreement between Giz and the European Union on TVET. So we are currently implementing [uhm] a project on behalf of the BMZ but the EU will also give us some money [uhm] to to implement [uhm] so what they are doing is they are giving ten million to the government of Botswana, ten million Euro as budget support for T-VET and there'll be [...] the task for GiZ will be to give technical assistance to the government of Botswana so that they can make use of this budget support. So in addition to the project we currently have we will deliver this technical assistance to the budget support. In that respect we, we are currently talking to the EU about the design of this additional project and how it is aligned to our current project. [Uhm] so ja there is a lot of contact.

MB: Would you say that there is more [uhm] contact with the German representation here than with the European Union one?

TW: [Uhm,] I can see where you are going with that question. I think it very much depends normally. [Uhm] so if you have a co-financing agreement where both the BMZ and the EU gives GiZ money to implement a project then you talk to both of them. If you have a bilateral programme where only the BMZ [uhm] commissions you to do something [...] of course you talk more to the BMZ. So I think it depends on the kind of project that you are implementing. But also when you implement a bilateral programme you will of course talk to the EU delegation about what they are doing here and if things can be aligned. Yeah.

MB: Uhm, now I want to play a bit of a game of thought. Uhm, do you know of any or can you imagine any instances where the government of Botswana acted deliberately against things that you have discussed with them previously? Not necessarily as defying orders or something like that just in an unexpected way that was concerning an issue where you were thinking you are on [uh] different levels during the discussions?

TW: You mean [uh] a different level. You mean you understood things differently.

MB: Yes, exactly.

TW: Puh. Uh. Not, not really. I would have to [...] I would have to think a lot about that. Generally, implementation is going fairly well. I think you always have to keep in mind, also as an implement[er] of development projects [uhm], also in our case where the budget is not very large [uhm] that what we are doing is only one part of what the partner institutions, in this case the ministry is doing. They have, they have their daily work – so sometimes you would not be the top priority [and] on their agenda and sometimes you will be depending on how things play out. So [...] but there was no case in which they deliberately blocked [uhm] blocked what we wanted to do. No.

MB: Ja, ok. Thank you so far and one last question for you. [uhm] Since we are dealing [uhm] especially with government and with money that comes into and these things [uhm] is there any part of this cooperation that you can [...] with either the European side or the side of Botswana, that you

cannot disclose for legal reasons or reasons concerning classified material? Such as internal documents that are circulated within...

TW: ...that I couldn't share with you

MB: Yes.

TW: Uhm... of course I can't talk about personal data [uhm] who is doing what [uhm] no but [uh] a few, a few search for the project online [uhm] or if you just go to the GiZ-website and have a look what we are doing in Botswana then you will find most of what I just told you online so it is not classified information. Of course when I talk about our work with a partner we don't share that [uhm] we don't share that online like how it is going. So [uhm] but it is not, it's not per se classified material because it is also my impression and my opinion and maybe a person at the ministry perceives it completely differently. Ja.

MB: Ok thank you that's it.

Interview Transcript: Ministry for Education and Skills Development – Interview Director of Training M.M. 26.07.2019 15:00

MB: It will take about half an hour could be less depending on your (inaudible). So (ähm) first of all can you briefly tell me about you – yourself. How did you basically end up here what is your (ähm) how long have you been working in this institution, what is your [...] how did you come to be to this position. Just briefly.

MM: OK I am M. M. I am the director Department of Tertiary Training and Technical Education. I trained as a – a teacher. Mathematics teacher. I was teaching mathematics and statistics at high school level. And then I remained teaching until I reached the level of Head of Department at Mathematics at high school [inaudible] college. They called it a college but it was still a high school, it is offering at high school level. Then in 2008 I applied for a position in the Ministry for assistant director manpower planning. So I was appointed in this position of assistant director manpower planning then that means I left teaching. I joined the ministry headquarters. So then I rose through the ranks and you find that now when I came here it has nothing to do with mathematics or the studies that I was teaching but I apply the the meds [methods] because mainly it was administration. So I was appointed to the position of [uh uh] manager human resources and administration and I was subsequently, in 2016, appointed to the position of the Director. But in 2016 I was appointed the director position but it was in the region, when it was still the Ministry of Basic Education.

MB: uh-oh ok.

MM: Ministry of Education and Skills Development. Before the Ministries split. Then in October 2016 the Ministry of Education and Skills Development which used to be responsible for education in the country from early childhood all the way up to higher education [...] because they were all in one ministry. So government felt that it was a bit mandate of the ministry was huge so the ministry was split in three, three ministries [inaudible]. Well Ministry of Basic Education was constituted and then there is the Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development, which Basic

Education took up until high school. And then Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development was responsible for vocational education.

MB: uh-hu.

MM: That is up to the Brigades and Certificate Level of vocational education - the skills this is why it is Skills Development and then there is our Ministry, Ministry of Tertiary Education, Research Science and Technology which is responsible for higher education and then there is in for T-VET the Ministry took over the technical education that is the diploma level training so they are mandated to to be responsible for that. And then I was now following this split of the Ministry transferred to Headquarters from the region in November 2016 and then I was given this Department. It is compositioned of two former departments. When it was the Ministry of Education and Skills Development before this Ministry was split it was the Department of Voca... Technical and Vocational Education and Training – D-TVET. And then there was also the Department of Training and Development.

MB: ok

MM: And then we had to now cut off Tertiary Training and Development which is the [inaudible] Training went to Ministry of Basic Education.

MB: Ja.

MM: And then the Brigades went to the Ministry of Employment and therefore that means [inaudible] remained on the Tertiary Training and Development and then the technical education remained on the former D-TVET. Then there was no need for having two directors. So I had to merge the remaining that is the Tertiary Training bit and then the Technical Education bit. And then imagine those two. That is why the department is called Tertiary Education and Technical Education. But it used to be two different departments. So then now there are in one department following the split of the the Ministry and that's how I ended up in this position and therefore I have to be responsible for both Tertiary Training and the Technical Education – on the, on the, on the other side. So I started as a high school mathematics teacher.

MB: Quite, quite the impressive way to go [chuckles]. Uhm, yes so uhm the next question I would like to ask you is a bit more about uhm tied to also my research in term of the European Union and the presence they have [uh] here. Could you just on an estimate tell me how often you or your colleagues have meet- or have contacts with the staff of the EU delegation here in in Gaborone. Just on a – an estimate. Can be personal or via phone when you have something to exchange or e-mail just just in any terms of...

MM: We really interact a lot via both, especially e-mail and meetings. Uhm we actually meetings almost every month but the meetings are convened under the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. So the support of the European Union that is where it is coordinated. So the Three Ministries are now our ministry, the Ministry of Basic Education and Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development we all go to Finance together with the European Union staff.

MB: Uhm, ok.

MM: Where we meet on a monthly basis together. And whatever they do the assistance and even in T-VET we are the ones who work together on what we want for our country and we are, we set the target together. So we meet on monthly basis with them. So they are really supporting us in that we ... and they don't decide things for us. They let us decide what we want for Botswana what are the initiatives and what are the targets and what are the key indicators. We decide the indicators of course with the assistance and they will keep on asking questions.

MB: Uhm besides these regular meetings do you schedule or coordinate uhm events inbe- or any kind of campaign events where you promote your – the aspect of Training for Development together with the European Union's staff?

MM: Yes. We do [phone ringing] ... sorry let me take this call

Interview was suspended until the call was over then it resumed

MM: So, you said if we ever have activities that they support, yes?

MB: Yeah.

MM: We, we, we... You realise that the European Union works with us to develop the policy called "Education and Training Sector Strategy Plan" which was heavily funded and supported by the European Union – is called the ETSSP: Educational Training Sector Strategic Plan for the country and you need – there were a lot of technical assistants who came here through the European Union, when the findings on the the[...] they looked at the the the survey and T-VET was negative – negatively perceived. Especially by young people in this country. They are not coming forth to take on programmes in T-VET. It was perceived as for those who did not make it, who did not succeed academically.

MB: Hmm.

MM: And then through the support of the European Union [ah] the revealed what we can do to improve the perception of how people view T-VET and how the image of T-VET in general in a country. So we have a [...] other bodies that non-governmental. There is one body called "Young Africa Botswana" and "Make TVET Cool".

MB: I heard the slogan

MM: So it is through the European Union who also supported us. So we have agreed with them with that group where the [inaudible] is to publicise T-VET and the European Union is also in the – where there are working together with young people to publicise T-VET, to try to say to young people in this country that there is a lot of unemployment and our population is – close to 60% are the youth, young people of this country and a lot of unemployment is found on young people. And therefore T-VET has been seen as the way to either to give these young people some jobs or decent jobs, remember that if they had done T-VET – it is not like they have gone to university to (inaudible) degree in humanities or whatever degree – when they have completed they all look up to government for employment but with our T-VET programmes such as hair dressing or furniture

design or furniture or textiles they may not necessarily [inaudible] the completed programme they can set up their own saloon and don't look for a job from somebody. And even employ other people. That's now why we have to really encourage a lot of young people to go for T-VET programmes. So we have been really campaigning for that with our – I have been keeping the statistics of the enrolments from 2016, 17,18,19 they show a significant level of [increase] on the number of people pursuing the T-VET programmes because we are on a daily basis showing them the difference between a university degree and a T-VET programme. That far you can acquire university degree but you still be looking for a job an then with a T-VET it can be plumbing or welding or pipe fitting. You are able to get a job immediately without having asked for that. But we see some positive...

MB: You see results?

MM: results or an increment in the numbers because we want to ultimately turn because currently the bulk of the high school leavers goes to the universities and then very few go to T-VET. Now we want to tilt the scale so that T-VET gets ... uh ... larger enrolment of students but it is through the support of the European Union where indeed through the ETSSP [Educational Training Sector Strategic Plan] the image of T-VET is now, we also, even in our department, we are working around the clock through advertising our programmes with our public relations office and you see all the media like the facebook and internet where the young people go using the television where we really publicise and show them the importance of T-VET.

MB: Nice. Hm coming back to the cooperation with the European Union can you briefly comment on how this coordination looks like in in in detail on a daily, workday basis how does it, how do you cooperate on the issue of T-VET support? Or promoting...

MM: Yes, I think uhm... it is coordinated so that it is actually – the reason why it went to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development is for quality control and quality purposes so that [uhm] indeed if we see we want to do this initiative or we want to do this project the Ministry of Finance wants evidence before they can really come in and support you we have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that this is what we will be, will be doing even this [uhm] where we are publicising T-VET it can be funded through the European Union but we have to justify to the Ministry of Finance that ...

MB: Ah, ok

MM: that we if European Union has the budget because they release the budget in tranches and these are the projects, and these are the initiatives that we want to do. One of the the the initiatives is publicised in T-VET and we indicated clearly what we want to do and I think they deliberately, they should show that the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development is responsible because it is the whole Ministry is responsible for government's budget and they release money when they are really satisfied that it is indeed it is worth releasing money for this for this project. Otherwise if it is maybe left with any ministry to implement we may just use the money even on projects which are not necessary because even in Botswana's government it is it has to continue budgeting and funding its ministries. We don't have to really look to the European Union as if the European Union is taking over. It has to, the government should also show commitment and the commitment is shown through the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Yes.

MB: Yeah, thank you so so far. Uhm once more about the European Union. Since you have regular contacts with the European Union uhm... Does the European Union in exchanges point to ideas or aspects concerning the the T-VET policy making which the EU assumes to be problematic to implement or insufficient to tackle the problems at hand?

MM: Yes.

MB: Or give feedback-loops in these terms.

MM: Yes, yes like currently following the ETSSP that I talked about before one of the the findings was that there was no T-VET policy for the whole country and [uh] Unesco has really recommended that each country has a T-VET policy and Botswana was one of those countries that didn't have that T-VET policy and [uh] the European Union has currently – as we speak – they sent a technical assistant, who has been sent here and we did develop it before ... the T-VET policy and it has not yet really final... being finalised. And the technical a-assistant they do we have sent in to them to look at it and they are giving us advice to find to the T-VET policy for for the country so they they they they do assist in that regard and they have also – following the ETSSP there was also another [...] technical assistant who was sent here who looked at all the institutions, rationalisation of institutions and rationalisation of programmes for the entire country. So we do have that report whereby it was good that there was a lot of duplication same programmes offered by institutions that are close to each other and we find that if we maintain that it becomes costly because you'll buy equipment for this institution for auto-mechanics programmes and then an institution close to it is also offering the same programmes you have to buy equipment for these. And then we had to rationalise that – wait do we really have to offer auto-mechanics less, transfer all the auto-mechanics programmes to this one and then this one needs to be construction programmes. And then when we buy equipment you buy only for one institution not for two. So it is through that advice from the European Union through their report on the so-called rationalisation of programmes and institutions which the technical assistant sent by European Union advise us on those policies that you need to rationalise because it has been assisting us in terms of resources both in terms of human resource, in terms of equipment because the equipment on T-VET is expensive, so we will not keep on buying equipment for [uh] all these institutions. Now all we have implemented that, we have rationalised [uh] a lot of programmes. We have for technical institutions, technical colleges in our Ministry now we have Gaborone Technical College, Botswana College of Engineering and Technology – they are all in Gaborone – there is Oodi College of Applied Arts and Technologies close by Gaborone. And there is only one in Francistown in the north, Francistown College Technical and Vocational Education and Training. So what we have done we have rationalised programmes which were at Gaborone Technical College and [inaudible] so we rationalised those. So that we only have the same programmes offered at Gaborone Technical College and Botswana College of Engineering. So we did rationalise those and then with the [uh] again for Francistown you may find duplication. Programmes at Gaborone Technical College you find them at Francistown. Programmes at Botswana College of Engineering and Technology you find them at Francistown for the simple reason that it has to cater for the population in the north. That's is where we are allowed duplication because it is very far – close to 500km from here. Otherwise if we keep all the programmes on this side then those who are in the north of the country would have to travel down south and which is not necessary so it is though that report through that advice from the European Union that we should rationalise and

ensure that [inaudible] assist the government in terms of funding, in terms of staff deployments, equipment purchasing for equipment, we don't have to duplicate unnecessarily.

MB: Concerning this this advice that you get from the European Union do you [uhm] ask for it specifically or does the European Union offer you this advice beforehand? Or do you observe the problem and then ask for advice at the the European Union Delegation or at the GiZ?

MM: Yes so we did ask for it and they have to look at our programmes and our institutions and then that's when the European Union sent technical assistance who now produces that report and we realise that it is indeed report that is indeed [uh, uh] a report that is assisting us. Apart from the European Union there is the GiZ the German...

MB: Yeah

MM: Programme. They are also assisting. We know that these are not one and the same thing...

MB: No I know. I talked to them yesterday so...

MM: Yes and they are also very supportive in terms of T-VET because with their programme they call it SERTVET – strengthening employment relevant T-VET where there we have rationalised programmes that are needed in the country and also that are when the graduated complete on them they can get employment really so I think these are the supports that we do get.

MB: And now I want to play a little game of min – game of thought just to...uhm... Can you imagine a scenario in which you would deliberately not follow the advice given by the European Union here? [uh-hmm-mm here] in these exchanges because you personally think that would be a fitting idea to solve the problem that you – that you are facing. Just ... would you say that this is something you or do you have an anecdote where this has happened?

MM: Well I don't have one ready but uhm as the advice is for example uhm if it is a matter of curriculum development where the programme is being developed and then they are also assisting us in whatever that curriculum is – let's say hospitality and tourism. We will not just take maybe advice from the technical assistant from the European Union we would look at it – because we understand the culture and the country better than the person from the European Union and they have and that is where we differ in and this is what really the country needs and even in terms of who can assist in terms of developing of that programme because we understand the context of that country better than somebody who is not coming from, from, from the country that is why we at times we can listen but then we say no but this is the route that we take like I recently when I came in as an example as a director there was it was not the European Union it was a UNESCO programme they called it Better Education for Africa Rise's [BEAR II]. And then they were supporting five countries in South Africa to improve their T-VET – Botswana was one of them Namibia, Malawi, Zambia and DRC Congo. So three programmes were developed at diploma level hospitality, management – travel management, and culinarians, where they cook. But I looked – after the programme has been implemented – when I took over as the director after 2016 about 2016 – I looked at the documentation and assessment and then I did not agree with it because [uhm] it was developed such as the grades [uhm] split into A+ and some who would get A+ would be either 90 to and beyond 95% and beyond and then there is A and then there is A- then B+, B, B-, C+,C,C- then I

said I don't need to do splits because this is the people if you train them on culinarians when they have acquired the skill and they leave the institution, they go and let's say be chefs in the hotel. So in the hotel they are not interested in whether you have A+, A or A- so why that. So I I deliberately said no I don't agree because those ones I can use that if I select these students for further for further studies or for that training but here they are these students who are training to get into the industry and therefore who ever developed them into that I think it [...], I am not in agreement with it so I have requested that they have to re-look at it and we come with something that can work for us because otherwise you find in the examination which student can get 95% in an examination so that we can give them an A+? It is a bit challenging and difficult so at that times I find it to be just because the project manager then was some [inaudible] from Europe and that's what he proposed. I said no it will not work really work I don't know why should I have all those.

MB: It sounds to me like a very German way of grading.

MM: Ja because he was called D. I didn't really check which country he was coming from but to me I realised that I don't need that for for for that type of grading. It is not that when someone would bring something we would just accept it.

MB: And this dis-, disagreeing, how do you communicate this back to your partner then?

MM: Uhm... we because we [inaudible] workshops they because they organise workshops then it is through the workshops that we say no that will not really work for us in our country and then we don't see the reason why we should do that – go that route because what is key here is we want to see if the student has the skill, if they are skilled and they can work as the chef as chefs why then do we need to have those splitting grades, which is not necessary. Yes.

MB: Who is all in in these workshops, who is present there in these workshops.

MM: It was him D. who is the project manager for that a task by UNESCO and then lecturers from these institutions and the principle technical education officers at headquarters responsible for those subject areas and the lecturers in those subject areas from those institutions.

MB: Ok we are almost done. One final question. Hmm, because I know I I previously worked in the German Foreign Ministry so I am quite aware of hm Government regulations is there any part of the cooperation that you have with the European Union that you for legal or political reasons can't [ähm] disclose because it is classified material or internal documents of these sorts that you cannot – for legal reasons – share with uhm with me here.

MM: Uhm. There is one document, I think for now I can't share with you now because the permanent secretaries uhm they have to also endorse and agree it is on the indicators the performance indicators what we want to be done for the first tranche to be released by the European Union and by December this year. So because it is still a working document although we have agreed with it on our level now the next level is our – the accounting officers, the permanent secretaries in the ministries so they are I think they are going for a meeting at Finance next week. Because they haven't yet confirmed it will not be advisable to share it because the permanent secretaries may change some of the – some of the things that we have in that particular document and then we finally have it and then later then there are either amendments or some some changes

because the permanent secretaries are are accounting officers for the ministries so although we work at our level but the final final say over that is it it is made by the permanent secretaries. That's why the Ministry of Finance has finished with us. Now they are calling the meeting for the permanent secretaries for the three ministries for I think it is some time next week for the three Ministries to go and validate and finalise the the thing. So it will be too early to to to share the the document, yeah.

MB: mhm well hmm thank you so much for your time this was actually it [chuckles] these were all the questions that I have and hm hm yeah. It has been very very nice, very informative. I think it was one of the most informative meetings I've had this week.

MM: Yeah