Humanitarian Security in the Light of Financial Independence

Why funding structures are also a matter of security management in South Sudan

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Abstract

Marketization of the humanitarian system and the financial independence is thought to have an impact on humanitarian organisations' behavior. With an increased insecurity for aid-workers and thus investment in aid-worker security management, research on this matter is pressing. This thesis seeks to examine the characteristics of the relationship between humanitarian organisations' financial (in)dependency, and their use of acceptance as a security strategy. Acceptance is a security strategy preferred by humanitarian organisations. I pose the research question: *How does humanitarian organisations' level of financial independence contribute to their application of acceptance as a security strategy in South Sudan?* The thesis answers this through a qualitative case study of three different layers of humanitarian organisations' (MSF and ICRC; INGOs; L/NNGOs) in South Sudan, guided by acceptance as the analytical framework. The study finds that the level of financial (in)dependence can contribute to all components of the acceptance strategy in various ways. Higher level of financial independence provides flexibility and operational independence, and lower level of financial independence impedes flexibility and increases compliance with donor interests. This has consequences for all components of acceptance in some ways, but particularly for principles and mission and programming.

Keywords: Humanitarian Organisations, Financial Independence, Security Management, Acceptance, South Sudan
Characters: 67064

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1   Introduction

Humanitarian aid has become a 'big business' and with an increasing number of actors as well as money, the competition between aid agencies is increasing and leading to a marketisation of their work (Collinson & Elhawary, 2012, p. 21; Cooley & Ron, 2002; Joachim & Schneiker 2018; Schneiker, 2015, p. 23; Van Brabant, 2010, p. 10). These competitive structures lead them, unintentionally, to comply with donor interests and shape their own interests accordingly (Hopgood, 2008, pp. 105-106). If the organisations do not follow donor policies, they risk loosing funding (Anderson, et al., 2012, p. 51). The degree to which organisations have to enlist in the marketplace thus is determined by their level of financial independence. Financial dependence on donor states creates pressure to align political and humanitarian objectives, thus making it difficult for organisations to live up to the humanitarian principles (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 36). This development has even let to critics asserting that humanitarian organisations are more concerned with their own survival, than the aid reciepents', and therefore develop programmes accordingly (Barnett & Weiss, 2008, pp. 28-29). Financial sustainability of an organisation is crucial for the organisation to survive, and since the organisations depend on the donors' satisfaction to gain funding, it results in emphasis on upwards accountability to donors, rather than downwards to recipients (Anderson, et al., 2012, p. 37). Programming and downwards accountability to donors are closely related to acceptance, a consent-based security management strategy (Mierop, 2016, p. 305; Fast, et al., 2014, pp. 212, 225). The narrative, in the humanitarian field, is that aid-workers are increasingly insecure, thus there is a changing approach to security management (Armstrong, 2013; Egeland, et al., 2011, p. 1). The recent years have seen humanitarian organisations increasingly invest in aid-worker security management thereupon the research of it has become more pressing.

1.1   Purpose and research question

The purpose of this study is to examine the characteristics of the relationship between humanitarian organisations' financial (in)dependency, the independent variable, and their use of acceptance as a security strategy, the dependent variable through a qualitive case study in South Sudan. The aim is to contribute with advanced in-depth knowledge to the research of the potential consequences of financial (in)dependence on humanitarian organisations' behavior, related to security.

How does humanitarian organisations' level of financial independence contribute to their implementation of acceptance as a security strategy in South Sudan?

1.2   Previous research

The humanitarian system is increasingly referred to as a marketplace where organisations depend on selling a product (their projects and programmes) to donors, due to the marketisation. Humanitarian organisations are therefore increasingly adopting business principles in order to improve efficiency. They adopt the language of business, and branding and commercial skills are essential for their survival, and they have become more professionalised with more people from the private sector hired to run their organisations (Anderson, et al., 2012, pp. 35-37; Hopgood, 2008, pp. 105-107; Joachim & Schneiker 2018; Van Brabant, 2010, p. 21). This leads to the organisations' capability being measured in terms of delivery, meaning how many places they operate and how many people they have helped (Schneiker, 2015, p. 23). Mary Anderson et al. (2012) call this the system of delivery and their study provides cumulative evidence from the receivers of aid that the system of delivery has a negative effect on the effectiveness of humanitarian aid organisations. They attribute the lack of downwards accountability to this system. A previous study by Alexander Cooley and James Ron (2002) provided

evidence that marketisation under some circumstances can affect an organisation's behaviour and have dysfunctional outcomes, based on three case studies. Propositions could be contextual and might not be generalisable in the complex environment in which humanitarian organisations are operating in. Thus, there is a need for more qualitative research regarding the consequenses of marketisation, across sectors and regions (Cooley & Ron 2002), which is what this thesis seeks to contribute with.

While the literature on humanitarian action is generous and plentiful, there continues to be severe shortcomings in the literature on humanitarian security (Fast, 2010; Gassmann, 2005). Especially concerning the micro and internal factors regarding humanitarian organisations' security management. This is an essential perspective to the practice of humanitarian organisations since these are factors which the organisations actually have an ability to influence in opposed to external, macro factors which they have no control over. Hence, this is essential to their own agency and impacts the strategies (Fast, 2010). Different literature has expressed the need for understanding the issue of humanitarian security management in relation to the wider contexts such as marketisation, and there is a lack of in depth research on this relationship (Brabant, 2010; Schneiker, 2018; Schneiker, 2015). Therefore, this paper sets out to examine the consequences of marketisation, by investigating how financial (in)dependence can contribute to the internal factors of humanitarian organisations' security management. Acceptance is the preffered strategy of humanitarian organisations, because of its compliance with the humanitarian principles (Schneiker, 2015, p. 41). Therefore this thesis will confine its focus to that. Moreover, it is interconnected to the overall programming of an organisation as well as the organisation's accountability.

1.3   South Sudan as Case

To examine the research question, I use the case of South Sudan. It continues to be one of the most dangerous contexts for humanitarian organisations to operate in, and the number of attacks towards aid-workers continues to escalate (Carter & Haver, 2016, pp. 27-28; Stoddard, et al., 2018). Prior to 2016, kidnappings were

uncommon in South Sudan, but is now on the rise (Humanitarian Outcomes, 2013). The aid-delivery in South Sudan is complex due to high-risk but also because of host government as well as donor government regulations (Hamsik, 2019, p. 7). South Sudan is a geographical researchable limit and it is the world's youngest country, as it was formed 2011 after the civil war in Sudan. Therefore, the timeframe of the study will be from 2011 till now. Choosing the case based on the violence towards aid workers, rather than a case in which western donor governments and organisations are engaged politically, such as Syria or Afghanistan, minimise selection bias. The donor governments in South Sudan have low level of political interests, of support for host government as well as of antipathy towards non-state armed groups (Carter & Haver, 2016, pp. 22-24). Furthermore, there are no designated terrorist groups in South Sudan, which reduces the legal and operational risk for humanitarian organisations (Hamsik, 2019, p. 10). These are elements that otherwise are thought to have an influence in the level of operational independence of the organisations (Carter & Haver, 2016; Egeland, et al., 2011; Hamsik, 2019; Haver, 2016). Hence, the selection of South Sudan has been done with care in order to provide a more convincing result.

1.4 Outline

This paper will continue as follows. First, the theoretical terms assisting the research will be presented: financial independence in terms of ethical dilemmas, and security management focusing on acceptance. Next, the methodological decisions will be discussed. The variables will be operationalised and illustrated with two figures. The acceptance strategy will be operationalised, in order to apply it as the analysis framework later, and the operationalisation of financial independence will divide humanitarian organisations into three layers: Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs); and Local/National Non-Governmental Organisations (L/NNGOs). Then I will conduct the analysis, to examine in what ways an organisation's funding basis contribute to the organisations' use of acceptance strategy in order to conclude on the effect of

financial (in)dependence. The findings will continuously be illustrated with summarising tables. Finally, the findings will be summarised and reflected upon in a concluding discussion.

2 Theory

2.1 Financial Independence as an Ethical Dilemma

Humanitarianism is defined as the independent, neutral and impartial provision of relief to victims of conflict and natural disaster. Humanitarian organisations are defined through their fundamental principles. They differ from organisation to organisation but there are four universal values that recur. Humanity, all human beings' lives matter; independence, being autonomous and not following interests; neutrality, not engaging in controversies or picking sides; impartiality, no discrimination, so everyone is treated the same according to their needs (Shapcott, 2010, pp. 124-130). The complex humanitarian emergencies, such as the ones in South Sudan, leaves humanitarian organisations entangled in civil wars and political emergencies. Therefore, they are faced with ethical dilemmas, in which extremely difficult decisions must be made quickly. An ethical dilemma is, according to Slim (1997, p. 247), defined as a choice between two wrongs. It entails clashing principles and so the choice consists of prioritising certain principles over others.

While all humanitarian organisations swear to the humanitarian principles, and most have committed to them institutionally, it is widely acknowledged that it is a challenge to live up to them. One of the challenges being that financial dependence on donor states creates pressure to align political and humanitarian objectives (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 36). An organisation's financial independency is highly facilitated by unrestricted or less restricted funding and private funding (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 39). The organisations' reliance on donor states creates pressure to align political and humanitarian objectives, thereby challenging the independence of an organisation (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 36). While being privately funded an organisation is allowed to avoid politically motivated donations (Pringle, 2015, p.

88). The research question of this thesis relates to ethical dilemmas in itself. To some, the humanitarian imperative to save lives might be a strong enough argument to compromise independence. The organisation could be able to save more lives by operating in certain areas where there is more potential for funding or by accepting government funding in general. On the other hand, it could compromise impartiality and neutrality which in turn can affect the organisation's reputation. There has always been inevitable bad sides to humanitarian action, the challenge for humanitairan organisations then become one of moral responsibility (Slim, 1997). Therefore, the problem examined in this thesis will be understood in the terms of ethical dilemma, in order to highlight its complexesies as well as to contribute to the debate about humanitarian moral responsibility.

2.2   Security Strategies

Security strategies are "the overarching philosophy, application of approaches, and use of resources that frame organisational security management." (Egeland, et al., 2011, p. xv). Humanitarian organisation use a combination of different strategies in managing the insecure environments in which they operate. The main strategy that organisations mostly base their security management on, is the consent-based *acceptance* strategy, because of its consistency with humanitarian principles (Schneiker, 2015, p. 41; Fast, 2015, p. 317). *Hardened approaches* to security management cover protection and deterrence as well as avoidance (Fast, 2015, p. 317). The strategies are interdependent, and decisions in one area of security management might affect another. Particularly, the hardened approaches to security can inflict acceptance in various ways. The main issue is that they resemble the military and political actors which the humanitarian organisations would like to distinct themselves form in order to promote the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence. Furthermore, they increase the distance between the organisations and the local communities they want to assist, and the risk of alienation (Fast, 2015, p. 319-320; Fast, et al. 2015, p. 220; Humanitarian Outcomes, 2013, p. 7; Schneiker, 2015, p. 42).

In this thesis, security management will be understood in terms of ethical dilemmas, in accordance with previous literature (Fast, 2015; Schneiker, 2015; Slim 1997; Ghosn, 2018), requiring humanitarian organisations and aid-workers to constantly asses the trade-offs, as presentet in this section.

2.2.1 Acceptance

The concept of acceptance as a security strategy stems from the founding of the ICRC, but gained recognition in 2000 and was then revised in 2010 in the the publication of *Operational Security Management in Violent Environments* (GPR8) (Fast, et al., 2013, p. 224). Here it is defined as an approach that: "attempts to reduce or remove threats by increasing the acceptance (the political and social consent) of an agency's presence and its work in a particular context." (Humanitarian Practice Network, 2010, p. 55). Larissa Fast et. al. (2013, p. 225) develops an expanded definition of the concept: "acceptance is founded on effective relationships and cultivating and maintaining consent from beneficiaries, local authorities, belligerents and other stakeholders. This in turn is a means of reducing or removing potential threats in order to access vulnerable populations and undertake programme activities.". The goal of acceptance is to reduce or remove potential threats by increasing the political and social consent from local communities, recipients, authorities, belligerents and other stakeholders. The idea is that by gaining, cultivating and maintaining good relationships and trust from all stakeholders, organisations can operate in safer environments (Ghosn, 2018, p. 484; Fast, 2015, p. 317; Fast & O'Neill, 2010; Schneiker, 2015, p. 38; Humanitarian Practice Network, 2010, p. 55). The strategy depends on how those stakeholders perceive the organisation (Fast & O'Neill, 2010; Schneiker, 2015, p. 38). Fast et al. (2014, p. 214) stresses the need to integrate acceptance as a strategy for both programming and security management.

The analysis framework is developed guided by the key components of acceptance, defined by Larissa Fast et al. (3013), which are as follows: *principles and mission* of the organisations must be manifested in practice; *stakeholder and context analysis* identify and examine actors, the circumstances and the

environment in which the organisation operates; positive *relationships and networks* with local communities through active outreach; good and effective *programming* that meets community needs in a timely manner; ongoing *negotiation* on many levels, from governments, to non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to local indiciduals; and consistent *communication* related to both the implicit and explicit messages an organisation projects and statements others make about it. Followed by two cross-cutting components. S*taffing for acceptance* means thoroughly considering staffing decisions and its consequenses, and it affects all other components. *Image and perception* are fundamental for acceptance and is affected by all other components as well as global dynamics. Gaining and maintaining acceptance consists of a complex relationship between all these components that can affect local perceptions of the organisation (Fast, et al., 2013, pp. 228-234).

3   Method

In the pursuance of answering the explanatory research question, this thesis is looking to examine the relationship between the two factors of a humanitarian organisation: financial independence, being the independent variable, and the application of acceptance as a security strategy of an organisation, being the dependent variable (Halperin & Heath, 2012, pp. 97-98, 127-129). This study is not an attempt to conclude if there always is a causal relationship between the variables. There are many factors affecting an organisation's security management in complex humanitarian emergencies, especially when perceiving it as an ethical dilemma. Based on previous research and the theory presented above, the working hypothesis is that when the level of financial independence change, sometimes, the application of acceptance change (Halperin & Heath, 2012, pp. 129-130). Thereupon, this study seeks to examine the characteristics of that relationship, which reveals an exploratory facet of the research. It is important to note here, that the thesis has a practical, rather than theoretical, focus, as the topic of security management of humanitarian organisations is practical in its nature. Nonetheless, the security strategy of acceptance will guide the analysis.

3.1   Research Design

To answer the research question, I will conduct an exploratory qualitative small-n case study. Qualitative small-n case study has an advantage when it comes to cases with complex causal relations, which apply to humanitarian emergencies, the humanitarian organisations and their security management, as they allow for in-depth knowledge (Bennett & George, 2004). The study will examine the security management, guided by acceptance as the analytical framework, on three different layers of humanitarian organisations, operating in South Sudan: MSF and ICRC;

INGOs; L/NNGOs. They differ on the independent variable, hence their level of financial independence.

This thesis is not an attempt to compare the different organisations as many factors influence what choices they make. Nor is it an attempt to compare their specific relief efforts as they differ a lot. While MSF is single mandate and almost solely medical, many other NGOs are multi mandate organisations, aiming broader with a variety of key missions. The thesis is solely portraying the relationship between financial independence and security management on several layers in order to broaden the understanding of it. As discussed above, the thesis is theory-laden rather than determined, and conducting an exploratory small-n case study allows me to identify new propositions and provide in-depth knowledge about humanitarian organisations' application of acceptance in order to broaden the understanding of the relationship between them (Halperin and Heath 2012, 125). It does compromise the external validity of the research result, but when it comes to security management, context-specific factors are extremely important (Carter & Haver, 2016). Hence, the purpose is not to develop generalised rules. Rather, the aim is that this thesis can develop propositions that can become a fundament for further research in other contexts.

3.2   Gathering Material

The analysis will mainly build on secondary material, two very comprehensive research projects in which case studies of South Sudan were performed, complemented by interviews conducted by myself as well as supplemental case-study reports and articles. The first research project is SAVE (Secure Access in Volatile Environments) and is the first major effort to examine some of the questions regarding aid in conflict zones (Carter and Haver 2016). It is based on three years of field work in four countries, including South Sudan, and used quantitative as well as qualitative methods gathering over 900 interviews with aid workers and a survey of over 4000 affected people. The second project is NGOs and Risk which studies how NGOs perceive, define and manage risks to their staff and operations (Hamsik 2019). It collaborated with 14 major INGOs and in their

case study of South Sudan and Nigeria they interviewed 72 aid officials across 42 aid organisations. The reports are very clear about distinguishing between the countries, when the results differed. And so, the material I will use in this research are only the ones in which South Sudan are among them. Furthermore, they distinguish INGOs, L/NNGOs and the SAVE research also identify MSF and ICRC as the ones standing out because of their success in achieving access.

One limitation to the material gathering of this thesis is the fact that the reputation of a humanitarian organisation is vital to their future funding. Therefore, organisations fear sharing information about security incidents that could reveal organisational weaknesses and faults (Schneiker, 2015, p. 9). Deciding to receive restricted funding from governments is an ethical decision in which they believe to have made the better choice, despite the fact that it compromises their principle of independence. Hence, this constitutes a limitation in the research, as material-collection might be challenged, biased and in some cases unaccessible. As narrative material will be affected by the organisations' need to upkeep a good reputation for their funding opportunities, I will be careful about using material that expresses the organisations' security policy. To overcome this limitation, I collect material that expresses the specific choices concerning security made by the different organisations in South Sudan as well as critically interpreting the meaning behind the material. This, to some degree, limits the potential bias and provide more trustworthy data on which I can conclude on the research question (Halperin & Heath, 2012, pp. 160-161, 176-177).

In order to complement this material with more in-depth knowledge, semi-structured online Skype interviews have been conducted with primary persons in the humanitarian field in South Sudan. The interviewees are informants rather than respondents as the purpose is to contribute more specific and detailed evidence for the issue researched in this thesis. The interviews and the analysis of them will be more positivistic in nature as the purpose of them are to gain factual knowledge (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2018, pp. 22-23.) Important to note, that while positivism seeks to generalise results, this, still, is not the aim of this research.

The interviews have been designed and conducted in accordance with Brinkmann and Kvale's (2018) book on doing semi-structured life-world interview. It suits the research question, and its qualitative purpose, and leaves room for interpreation in order to overcome the limitation of narrative material in relation to

the organisation's reputation. One could argue that it could have been more appropriate to use funnel-shaped techniques to interview the aid-workers, in order to obtain the interviewees spontaneous views, not affected by their need to upkeep good reputation. But, to secure informed consent in relation to the ethical guidelines, the interviewees were given an information sheet with the purpose of the study as well as the research question, and some interviewees were also given a research proposal (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2018, pp. 32-33, 64). Therefore, the opportunity to remain anonymous has been proposed to the interviewees, in the hope of obtaining more spontaneous and honest material, which four out of five chose to.

The selection of the sample for the interviews have been made from the criteria that they have field experience from working with humanitarian organisations in South Sudan. By contacting different organisations, presenting them my research question and purpose, I have been put in contact with field staff they found suitable, and thus gaining access via gatekeepers. It limits the control over selection of subject and my own selection bias, but it additionally makes the research sensitive to the gatekeepers' interests. The semi-structured interviews consist of an interview-guide, with open questions regarding the topic of security management leading it to the interviewee to lead me to specific dimensions. The interview questions were adapted to the interviewee in accordance with their background. This type of interview is followed by a tension. It requires sensitivity to the topic of the interview as well as qualified naïveté, being presupposition-less. Thus, the open questions presented to the interviewees, are based on detailed knowledge of the topic, and I cannot be completely free of expectations when proposing my second questions. These two aspects, in turn, compromises intersubjectivity and the ability to reproduce the interviews. But not having foreknowledge makes it difficult to obtain nuanced descriptions and having preformulated questions would restrict the comprehensive understanding of the topic described by the interviewee (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2018, pp. 16-17).

3.3   Operationalisation

It is important to thoroughly consider the operationalisation of the two variables to ensure the validity of the research (Halperin & Heath, 2012, pp. 130-136, 149, 171). In the following section acceptance as well as financial independence will be operationalised, based on the theory presented above and illustrated by figures.

3.3.1 Acceptance

While many humanitarian orgnaisations emphasise acceptance as their main approach to security management, the perception of the approach varies greatly and it is not well conceptualised. It is due to the term's broad reach and intersectitionality and its concern for creativity and flexibility in the implementation. Therefore it is difficult to define and operationalise which creates a problem of testability (Fast & O'Neill, 2010; Fast, et al., 2013, p. 223-224). The lack of an operational definition, makes measuring and comparing humanitarian organisations' approaches to acceptance more difficult. Nevertheless, Larissa Fast and Michael O'Neill among others have done a great amount of research on acceptance as a security strategy and have developed what they call a comprehensive conseptualisation of acceptance (Fast, et al., 2013; Fast, et al., 2014). Based on this, and the GPR8, I have operationalised the term, as illustrated below. The component of image and perception will be analysed throughout the other components of acceptance, as it is affected by them. Thus, it will not have its own section, but it will be elaborated, when relevant, throughout the other sections.

Figure 1: Operationalization of Acceptance (Fast et al., 2013)

3.3.2 Financial (In)dependence

The operationalisation will remain qualitative and divide the humanitarian organisations into three layers differing on their level of financial independence, higher respective lower level. Their level of financial independence is determined by their type of funding (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 39; Mierop, 2016, pp. 312-315). This decision has been made consciously of the limitations it encompasses in sake of the convenience of the research. Firstly, the type of funding will be defined

through the degree to which the organisation's donors are governmental/public or private. While public funding includes governments as well as governmental institutions (UN institutions, The World Bank and EU institutions), private funding includes individuals as well as private institutions (companies, trusts and foundations, and other non-profit organisations). Secondly, the donations are divided into the degree to which they are restricted/earmarked. When funding is earmarked, the donor has dictated where and how the aid may be used (Barnett & Weiss, 2008, p, 34). Some donations are non-earmarked and therefore with no restrictions, while other donations are country or region earmarked and lastly some are very restricted and earmarked to specific programmes or projects. Based on this, the organisations are divided into three layers.

The first consists of ICRC and MSF as they have a high level of financial independence (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 36). Important to note, they have this financial independence on different bases. ICRC is mainly funded by governmental donors, representing 76% of the funds raised over the past 5 years (ICRC, 2019). In 2017 82,2% of the budget was from governments while only 2,7% came from private donors (ICRC, 2017, p. 520). On the other hand, their donations are not very restricted, and they state that "we will not accept donations that are very tightly earmarked and that would breach the principles of independence and impartiality." (ICRC, 2019). Only 14% of their donations are tightly earmarked, 30% are non- or loosely earmarked, and the remaining 56% are country earmarked (ICRC, 2019, p. 558). MSF is around 96% privately funded, public income represents only 2% of the total funds raised and the remaining 2% is income from other activities such as merchandising, equipment and services provided to other organisations, and financial transactions (Gajardo, et al., 2017, pp. 19-20). When referring to donors throughout this thesis, it will solely refer to public donors. While MSF, and other organisations with private funding, also have to be accountable to those donors, it is a different accountability based on trust (Interview 5).

The second consists of INGOs, thus, of quite different combinations of funding types. It has mixed financial independence – both low level and high level. While a more persistent division of organisations might be preferable for the reliability of the study, the data available does not allow for this. But, due to MSF's and ICRC's remarkable financial independence, despite ICRC's high percentage of governmental donations, they are perceived as differing from the remaining INGOs.

The third contains L/NNGOs. They are most often tightly funded by INGOs and international governmental organisations as the UN, and therefore dependent on them and their funding. L/NNGOs will, in this thesis, be the indicator of a high participation in the marketplace as they have a low level of financial independence. In the humanitarian system they are called partners but from the L/NNGOs' perspective INGOs and the UN are their donors (Hamsik, 2019, p. 17).

| Higher level of financial independence	• **MSF and ICRC** • MSF is 96% privately funded • ICRC is mainly funded by governments in an unrestricted manner
Mixed level of financial independence	• **INGOs** • Mainly restricted and public funding • Portions of unrestricted and private funding
Lower level of financial independence	• **L/NNGOs** • Tightly funded by INGOs and the UN

Figure 2: Operationalisation of Financial Independence and the Layers of Organisations

4   Analysis

In the following sections, the three layers of humanitarian organisations are analysed, guided by the operationalisation of acceptance. In order to conclude on the effect of financial (in)dependence, it will be examined in what ways an organisation's funding basis contribute to the organisations' use of acceptance as strategy. It is important to stress, that the components of acceptance are interconnected, therefore affecting one another and difficult to separate.

4.1   Principles and mission

The principles and mission of the organisations must be manifested in practice and their effect must be considered when applying acceptance actively as a security management approach (Fast, et al., 2013, p. 228). The way in which the different organisations in South Sudan perceive the principles and aim to be principled differs among them. MSF and ICRC stand out as they stay committed to the humanitarian principles and they are flexible (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 40). A nuanced, fluid and dynamic understanding of the principles enables them to translate them operationally into the specific context. They are acting in a principled manner, not because they do not compromise the principles, but because they are aware of, and determine which compromises are the most acceptable (Carter & Haver, 2016, pp. 37-38). This is, according to the study by Carter & Haver, partly facilitated by their financial independence which provides them with flexibility as well as operational independence and neutrality (Carter & Haver, 2016 p. 40, Haver, 2016, p. 6). This is also perceived as a reason for why they achieve better access in South Sudan than INGOs, as armed actors and other stakeholders actually perceive the organisations as neutral, impartial and independent, thus more likely not to attack them (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 36). In South Sudan, the staff from INGOs as well as L/NNGOs have a tendency to understand the principles as moral

absolutes, and dilemmas and difficult decisions are not talked about in terms of principles, though the need for compromises is acknowledged. A project manager from an INGO, I spoke to, said, when asked about dilemmas where certain principles have to be prioritised over another, that only on rare occasions do they have to do so and that they did not feel tied down to prioritise them. These organisations can be more sensitive to addressing difficult choices, as they have to worry about their reputation to donors in order ensure organisational survival. Those organisations then, lack structured ways of thinking about ethical risks (Carter & Haver, 2016, pp. 37-38).

The organisations with best access in South Sudan tend to have a strong culture of 'triage', meaning they assign degrees of urgency to different groups, in order to respond the those most in need, following the principle of impartiality (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 39). Many organisations will state that they focus on the core mission of humanity, and have a 'triage' culture, but often, having to focus on bureaucratic aspects of organisational survival distracts them from this in practice (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 39). During the interviews this was also brought up either by the interviewees themselves or elaborated when I mentioned it to them. An INGO project manager said that they face this dilemma on a daily basis and consider it when developing proposals. "That is a dilemma we also find in our day to day activities, and as we come up with our proposals it is something, we take into account very often. (…) They [the donors] want to reach beneficiaries that they have seen in the media, that they have heard of and that are more marginalised and vulnerable, than what you know of otherwise." (Interview 2). She described that sometimes, the organisation prioritises reaching certain populations, based on donor interest. If certain groups receive media attention, and donors get to know about marginalised groups otherwise under the radar, then the donors want to reach them, and the organisation will see if and how they can respond depending on the security situation in those areas. Another area manager, spoke about donors being understanding in those situations, where they are not able to deliver in certain areas and willing to adjust the arrangement (Interview 1).

Corruption and fiduciary risks are major concerns for donors as well as agencies. Aid actors have reported that governemnt authorites and Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-iO) often try to influence the aid (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 54), and resources are being lost due to looting or attacks

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(Hamsik, 2019, p. 21). It is also common practice in South Sudan for organisations pay for access in various ways, thus, indirectly partaking in corrupt practices, in order to safely reach people in need while pleasing those who hold power (Carter & Haver, 2016, pp. 50-51, 54). Therefore, the reporting requirements to ensure accountability to donors are important for organisations to ensure funding. Interesting to note is, that while the UN officials believed they had an increased loss tolerance, both INGOs and L/NNGOs described decreased loss tolerance and greater scrutiny (Hamsik, 2019, p. 21). It has been observed that there is increased monitoring and zero-tolerance policies from donors regarding corruption and fiduciary risks. Combined with the issues of simplistic understanding of the principles, it has led to a culture of silence and lack of discussion regarding this ethical dilemma facing INGOs and L/NGOs on a daily basis. L/NNGOs are perceived as more corrupt than INGOs and consequently exposed to further regulatory scrutiny (Ali, et al., 2018, p. 13; Hamsik, 2019, pp. 22-23). MSF's and ICRC's large amount of private and unrestricted funding provide a freedom and a flexibility to acknowledge, explain and deal with the dilemmas when they have to pay for access and corruption happens (Carter & Haver, 2016, pp. 50-51; Haver, 2016, p. 9.

The financial independence of MSF and ICRC allows them to deal with the principles and ethical dilemmas in a more comprehensive and contextualised way, thus making it easier for them to manifest and demonstrate their principles and mission. Furthermore, the flexibility facilitated by their independent funding structures gives them this institutionalised ability to fulfill the humanitarian principles. INGOs and L/NNGOs lack structured ways of dealing with ethical dilemmas due to their simplistic understanding of the principles as definitional and their need to focus on self-preservation. When the principles are not operationalised into the specific context it makes it difficult for them to demonstrate them. One common example of this is donors influencing the decision-making regarding who receives aid, then compromising the principle of impartiality.

4.1.1 Summarising Figure

Figure 3: Summarising Figure - Principles and Mission

4.2 Stakeholder and context analysis

Through investing in initial analysis and ongoing monitoring, stakeholder and context analysis identify and examine actors, the circumstances and the environment in which the organisation operates. Understanding and navigating the political forces at play is important for operational independence, as it gives organisations the ability to recognise and overcome various pressures – both from actors on the ground but also from donor capitals. Thus, being able to manage the demands of those seeking power, such as donor states. In South Sudan humanitarian

organisations tend to be less aware of how their operational independence is affected by donor governments than by other power-holders (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 39; Haver, 2016, p. 20). Financial independence, through private or less restricted funding, allows MSF and ICRC as well as INGOs with such funding available, to invest extra in conducting in-depth context analysis (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 39).

Both Carter & Haver's and Hamsik's case studies found that upwards accountability through regulations by donors and 'zero-tolerance' policies reduced information sharing in South Sudan, something that is critical for stakeholder and context analysis (Carter & Haver, 2016, pp. 50-51; Hamsik, 2019, pp. 22-23). Hightened regulartory scrutiny creates an environment of fear and suspision as well as confusion about how to safely communicate sensitive information to staff for both INGOs and L/NNGOs (Hamsik, 2019, p. 10). Previous research supports this relationship between the competitive structures of the humanitarian system, and the reduction of information sharing (Schneiker, Risk-Aware or Risk-Averse? Challenges in Implementing Security Risk Management Within Humanitarian NGOs 2018). A case study of South Sudan made by MSF, showed that, during a refugee related emergency, NGOs who relied on UNHCR for funding were hesistant to discuss problems openly. UNHCR was heavily underfunded and consequently the NGOs desperately needed more funding. This reduced information sharing and led to minimitation of problems and a culture of blame and suspicion (Healy and Tiller 2014, 25-26).

Thus, an organisations's context analysis is implicated by donor-dependence which can reduce information sharing, and restricted funding that impede investing the extra time and staff. Managing the pressure from various actors, including donor states, build upon this analysis in the first place.

4.2.1 Summarising Figure

Financial independence	Evidence	Effect on stakeholder and context analysis
Higher level	Private and less restricted funding allows for further investment in in-depth context analysis	Can contribute positively to context analysis
Lower level	Environment of fear and suspicion, caused by donor-dependence, reduces information sharing	Can reduce ability to conduct analysis

Figure 4: Summarising Figure - Stakeholder and Context Analysis

4.3   Relationships and networks

Positive relationships with armed actors or local stakeholders, who hold power and can influence the organisation's security, are very important. Many INGOs rely on force protection for road convoys which prevents the organisation from fully capitalising on their relationships to armed actors (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 61). Several of my interviewees described how UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the peacekeeping mission, provides security for themselves and other humanitarian orgnaisations. Previous studies have proven that relying on governmental funding may undermine an organisation's ability to refuse cooperation with their donors' military (Schneiker, 2015, p. 48). While MSF and ICRC aim to build trust with local communities by actively seeking to be perceived as distinct from the UN, by managing their staff, security and assets separately, many INGOs rely on them and

their services in numerous ways. Relying on the UN presents various challenges affecting their relationships to local stakeholders as well as other elements of acceptance (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 58; Interview 3; Interview 5). Two of my own interviewees from INGOs, described how they depend on UNMISS for security on projects, especially in case of evacuation and during high insecurity they also provide armed escort. Though they both made clear, that they do not work on implementing projects together, they do sit next to UN agencies (Interview 1; Interview 2). Therefore, it could be difficult for the INGOs to make sure the local communities are able to distinguish between the agencies and perceive them as neutral. These issues were not mentioned by the two interviewees from INGO, while an interviewee from MSF did find it important to make sure they were not associated with UNMISS in order to ensure the principle of neutrality (Interview 5).

One of my interviewees described increased local partnerships as a result of donor interests: "in some areas we have had to use local agencies because sometimes some of the funding we get is earmarked by the donor so you will only get it if a certain percentage go to local partners, because most of the donors are now looking to build the capacities of local agencies in South Sudan, so localisation is now becoming a big thing in South Sudan." (Interview 2). The NGOs and Risk case study showed that the relationship between L/NNGOs and INGOs in South Sudan is often affected by biases. Some L/NNGOs expressed beliefs that INGOs want to keep more resources and money for themselves, therefore, denying L/NNGOs financial support. This leads to donor "herding", meaning that donors make a few L/NNGOs "partner of choice" and fuels mistrust within the partnerships. In South Sudan this has led to several incidents where L/NNGOs have undermined INGOs programming; fostered negative perceptions of INGOs' performance to donors; and instigated local communities against INGOs' field staff. It is not the norm that the competitive relationship leads to these incidents, and it is hard to distinguish if it is also a result of personal disputes, but a few of these incidents can have severe complications for the relationships with local communities and the perceptions of the organisations (Hamsik, 2019, p. 19).

L/NNGOs in South Sudan have said that they are unable to manage staff security because of lack of funding to do so. The L/NNGOs are not aware that they have to integrate security into proposal budgets. The proposals lack security lines,

donors do not provide guidance on security support or encourage them to integrate security costs into the proposals, or when doing so they were told that the security costs were too expensive (Ali, et al., 2018, p. 11; Hamsik, 2019, p. 15; Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 49). The false assumptions about local staff having better access, paired with the cost-efficiency focus by donors creates pressure for L/NNGOs prioritising organisational survival over staff security and therefore rarely incorporating security costs into their budgets (Hamsik, 2019, p. 15). An UN official in South Sudan expressed concerns that the L/NNGOs' dependency on the UN funding and the competitive market is keeping them from requiring funding for security. This also plays a role in the fact that national staff are more exposed to security risks as donor pressures and lack of flexible and supportive funding push them into taking on greater risk. In one example from South Sudan, a UN donor pressured a LNGO to move a vehicle which then was ambushed leaving several staff dead (Hamsik, 2019, p. 15). In South Sudan, national staff in all NGOs, receive more acknowledgement for the demanding and risky service they provide. Furthermore, all officials interviewed for the NGOs and Risk study agreed that the impact of safety and security incidents are felt more by national staff of L/NNGOs, and there is a rising number of L/NNGO staff killed. Aid workers expressed that when this is combined with pressure to deliver, it will result in staff getting hurt (Hamsik, 2019, pp. 15-17). When local and national staff are hurt and exposed to higher risk than international staff, it can hurt their relationships and community trust towards all NGOs.

The financial independence of MSF and ICRC enables them to stay distinct from UNMISS. Hence, remain their neutrality which can have a positive effect on relationships to armed actors as well as local communities as it helps build trust. Concurrent, INGOs tend to depend on UNMISS for security, which can hurt their perceived neutrality, thus their local relationships. Partnerships between INGOs and L/NNGOs, encouraged by donors, are sometimes characterised by competition and mistrust. Ultimately, this can affect INGOs relationships to local communities. Lastly, L/NNGOs accept unfavourable payment methods, which they cope with in a manner that can hurt their local networks and relationships.

4.3.1 Summarising Figure

Figure 5: Summarising Figure - Relationships and Networks

4.4 Programming

Quality programming that meets community needs in a timely manner is cirtical for the community's perception of the organisation. Healy and Tiller (Healy & Tiller, 2014, pp. 4, 17) have found that in South Sudan, among other places, the UN funding systems, especially, are inflexible, bureaucratic and required long time. They conclude that this is unsuitable for emergency response as it requires flexible and unearmarked funding in order for emergency response to be effective and meet changing needs. There was reported slow response times to new needs in South

Sudan, which is due to both to the insecure context, but also funding that is not flexible or sufficiently fast (Carter & Haver, 2016, pp. 66-67). L/NNGOs are often prescribed budgets from INGOs or the UN, leaving little room for discussions or adressing poorly costed programmes. These ambitious programmes and restricted funding hinders adaption (Ali, et al., 2018, p. 11; Hamsik, 2019, p. 18;). Therfore, making it hard to meet community needs when they change or when the conditions for delivery of aid change. This acts as a great barrier to building trust with the affected communities (Carter & Haver, 2016, pp. 66-67).

While restricted funding and donor regulations impede flexibility, the flexibility produced by less restricted funding has a positive effect on programme quality, something that was both visible in the reports as well as in several interviews (Haver, 2016; Carter & Haver, 2016). Timelines and meeting changing community needs in a timely matter is essential in ensuring programme quality and building trust with local stakeholders. The flexibility provided by financial independence enables an organisation to respond quickly to new needs, and organisations with pre-positioned supplies and funds also improved their timelines in South Sudan. When interviewing project managers from MSF, the importance of flexibility was mentioned repeatedly and also how private or unrestricted funding facilitates it (Interview 4; Interview 5). INGOs also benefit from less restricted or private funding where and when they have it. In South Sudan organisations expressed that this kind of funding allowed them to undertake higher-risk programming, both security and fiduciary wise, due to less stringent monitoring or reporting requirements. Furhtermore, it allows organisations to invest in security measures, otherwise difficult to invest in, and taking longer to implement programmes (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 39). Two interviewees from an INGO also described how they manage unrestricted funding in order to cope with donors pulling out or reducing funding (Interview 1; Interview 2). In South Sudan, the UNHCR announced a while ago that organisations should expect a 40% cut in funding. This could lead to some organisations closing projects completely. But, because of the unrestricted funding from other donors available to this INGO, they were able to restructure finances and continue their programme in the area. He did also describe how they sometimes do have to close down projects completely or get L/NNGOs to run it, and then return at a later time, when funding has been raised (Interview 2). There is a positive trend in South Sudan, where donors are recognising the risks organisations face in

those environments, leading to dialogue and increased flexibility. By making awards less restricted in terms of the programmes "place of performance", allows organisations to adapt to the changing context (Hamsik, 2019, p. 21).

Restricted funding from donor governments can affect the organisations programming choices, as they are more likely to be bound or influenced by donor interests on specific areas or groups in South Sudan (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 39). A project manager I interviewed said: "of course, if the funding is restricted, you find that you are tied down in the sectors that you can respond to, and the areas that you can work in" (Interview 2). So, when donors are specific in regards of the sectors they wish to support and in which areas, then the organisation will have to prioritise this. Thus, it compromises making programming choices that reflect the community needs. Many aid-recipients in South Sudan have reported that the aid they receive is not the aid that is most needed. This is reflected in the absence of cash assistance which could help meeting community needs. It could also address challenges of recipients' security and safety when collecting aid as it is less bulky and more discrete. But, because of the fact that it is perceived more prone to fiduciary risk it is being underutilised. There is a higher standard in place for cash assistance, due to zero-tolerance policies from donors. Senior managers in the SAVE research believed that the negative impact, such as loosing funding, of delivering cash is worse than it is for in-kind assistance (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 65, 67).

The NGOs & Risk report, supported by Ali et al. (2018, pp. 11-14), concludes that the competitive funding structures leads some organisations to take on projects that they simply do not have the capability to and that are unfavourable in terms of requirements and budgets (Hamsik, 2019, p. 14). Thus, L/NNGOs in South Sudan often accept unfavourable program budgets, requirements and payment conditions in order to survive organisationally. In the study, only one L/NNGO officials described a situation where he would not accept an award, and no officials described situations in which they would ask for longer timelines or additional budget (Hamsik, 2019, p. 17). There have also been examples of donors applying pressure, to make L/NNGOs implement projects, before funding was contributed. Result-based payment methods creates delays which can make the organisation incapable of delivering aid or force it to rely on funds from other donors or projects. This impedes cash flow management and pressures the organisation to deliver more than

they might have resources to, and thereby compromises the programme quality (Hamsik, 2019, pp. 20-21).

Despite the strict monitoring requirements from donors, as discussed above, it has been noted that administrative functions ensuring upwards accountability are rarely being funded by donors, even when donors encourage partnerships with L/NNGOs (Hamsik, 2019, p. 12). Organisations compromise in order to win funding, by focusing on upwards accountability, by developing mechanisms to account for the money spent and aid delivered, at times, at the expense of programme quality and operational factors (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 50). The NGOs and Risk research also verified this, and L/NNGOs officials have expressed that the fear of losing funding refrains them from introducing this issue to their donors. If the funding was more flexible and reliable, it would reduce the burdens of upwards accountability, as reporting requirements and oversight would be reduced (Hamsik, 2019, pp. 12-13). Ali et al. (2018, p. 17) on contrary, found that L/NNGOs often prioritise programming activities over administrative costs. This can in turn increase fiduciary risk, and consquently the L/NNGOs reputation and ability to obtain funding later. Ultimately, this can result in shutting down projects, hence hurting their programming (Hamsik, 2019, pp. 12-13).

Throughout this research, it became very evident that the funding basis of an organisation influences its programming choices in South Sudan. The type of funding can have an impact on programme quality as it can enable as well as restrict flexibility. Something that was evident in all five interviews as well as several reports consulted (Ali, et al., 2018; Carter & Haver, 2016; Hamsik, 2019; Healy & Tiller, 2014; Poole & Primrose, 2010).

4.4.1 Summarising Figure

Figure 6: Summarising Figure - Programming

4.5 Negotiation

Negotiation with local stakeholders as well as armed groups is vital to building relationships and ensuring safe access. Donors can influence an organisation's willingness to reach out to non-state armed groups (NSAGs) who are politically sensitive. There is a clear link between the views of donor governments towards NSAGs and the degree to which an organisation feels comfortable negotiating with the specific groups (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 56; Jackson, 2014, p. 2). In South

Sudan, the staff were much more likely to discuss engagement with groups such as Sudan People's Liberation Movement – in Opposition (SPLA-iO) than armed actors under political or military attack by western governments (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 56). The interviews for the SAVE report showed that there was a difference in how staff from INGOs and L/NNGOs spoke about their organisation's approach to negotiation and how staff from MSF and ICRC did. Staff from INGOs and NGOs spoke with more uncertainty about whether contact with NSAGs is permitted and they do not invest in as much in guidance and training on negotiation despite the largest INGOs having recourses available to do so. The reasons for this seem to be the attitudes of donor governments, their political positioning towards certain NSAGs as well as the general sensitivity and secrecy around the topic. The organisations, with high portion of earmarked funding, felt more pressure from donors (Carter & Haver, 2016, pp. 55-57). Nonetheless, the donor governments' low level of antipathy towards non-state armed groups in South Sudan, the fact that there are no designated terrorist groups and donor governments do not support any side of the conflict, lead to aid-workers in South Sudan being relatively more open about negotiations (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 61). MSF and ICRC have made organisational investments in engagement with armed actors, and the interviewees from the SAVE research states that this is partly facilitated by their unrestricted funding. It gives them a greater flexibility and time to understand the context and build relationships with armed actors, which has shown to be essential for secure access in South Sudan. Their staff spoke knowledgeable about their organisation's approach to negotiation, which is to have conscientious but regular and direct engagement with armed actors (Carter & Haver, 2016, pp. 39, 55-57, 63).

The degree to which funding is restricted can influence an organisation's bargain tools available in negotiations with local communities, due to the reduced flexibility. In one of the interviews the project manager of an INGO in a refugee related programme described how meeting community needs is a negotiation tool in itself, but also how restricted funding prevents them from using it in certain situations and how unrestricted funding enables them to. This is in accordance with the above analysis of programming. They often encounter the issue of the host community (the local population hosting the refugee camp) being unsatisfied with the amount of aid they get, compared to the amount of aid the refugees get. This was mentioned several times throughout the interview as a tension that is difficult

to handle, and that can have severe consequences for the staff's security and ability to continue operating, as the host community have been attacking in order to get more aid. "Balancing that is not very easy and it has led to a few security incidents (…)." (Interview 2). According to her, 99% of the funding the INGO gets in that area, is earmarked for the refugees. Therefore, it is difficult to balance the needs of the host community who also wants in, when they see the organisations receiving goods in the airport, and not getting any of it despite also being in difficult economic situations (Interview 2). Important to note, this is an issue that all interviewees mentioned, but independent funding allows more flexibility to deal with it.

Because of sensitivity to donor interests, financial dependence can influence which actors an organisation decides to enter negotiations with, and unrestricted funding can influence the tools available for the negotiation.

4.5.1 Summarising Figure

Figure 7: Summarising Figure - Negotiaion

4.6 Communication

Consistent communication by skilled staff is important for how and organisation is perceived. In South Sudan the issue of communication and community feedback was considered a dilemma in which reaching a large amount of people in a wide area compromises the downwards accountability and community participation. This is connected to engaging communities in the programming and addressing the most relevant needs. Since this results in rudimentary aid-delivery, it compromises the quality of aid and the extent to which community needs are met (Carter & Haver, p. 65; Steets, et al., 2016, p. 30). Community feedback mechanisms can strengthen the downwards accountability to affected populations, but the systems in South Sudan tend to be more concerned with upwards accountability to donors (Steets, et al., 2016, pp. 25-26). In South Sudan the percentage of population that has been consulted about the aid received is very low at 7% (Steets, et al., 2016, pp. 31-32). One central issue is the fact that organisations tend to focus on community leaders and gatekeepers rather than the broad community. It can be extremely challenging for humanitarian organisations to know when local representatives are actually speaking on behalf of the broader community and in their best interest. When talking to community members, it was difficult for SAVE reaserachers to get views that differed from persons used as community representation (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 64). This could potentially also be a sign that the community representatives were actually acting the people's best interest. Regardless, it shows how important a deep understanding of the local context and power dynamics are. As portrayed above, less restricted funding allows for more investments in these analyses, and thus lead to better community feedback mechanisms based on a deeper understanding of the community in which the organisation is operating and the power dynamics. This would result in better monitoring and ensuring that they communicate with the right people, and not power-holders who do not have the people's best interest (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 64).

4.6.1 Summarising Figure

Figure 8: Summarising Figure - Communication

4.7 Staffing

The decisions regarding staffing, who gets hired and fired, pay scales, and the salaries relative recourses available for the local communites, can all affect the organisation's perception and thereby acceptance. When L/NNGOs are more concerned with institutional survival in a competitive environment, they accept awards that have unfavourable budgets, requirements and payment conditions. L/NNGOs frequently experience late award payments, especially among UN funders, which incite staff turnover within the L/NNGO as salaries are often suspended in order to cope with the delayed payments (Hamsik, 2019, pp. 15-16, 21). As a result, in order to cope with cash-flow shortages, L/NNGOs suspend staff salary, limiting the movement of staff to and from the field, rationing fuel for generators and vehicles and incurring debt with local vendors. These are all

elements that affect the organisation's relationships with local stakeholders and can hurt their network (Hamsik, 2019, p. 21). As staff will seek to more reliable employers as the UN or INGOs where they have better working conditions, it increases staff turnover and impedes capacity building. Staff turnover has a negative impact on acceptance, as it can affect community trust, relationsships, the effectiveness of the programmes as well as constrict stakeholder and context analysis. In turn, this compromises prorgramme quality, as loosing competent staff, in which one have invested capacity building, can weaken the programming and administrative functions payments (Ali, et al., 2018, p. 14; Hamsik, 2019, p. 15-16; Humanitarian Practice Network, 2010, p. 30). Thus, uncompetitive pay, few benefits and increased risk-taking, portrays a picture of L/NNGOs in which it is difficult for them to make advised staffing-decisions. It limits their control over who stays and who leaves, as it may be more of a question of finding willing staff, rather than the right staff (Hamsik, 2019, p. 15-16, 21).

The SAVE research supports this, as it found that private or less restricted funding allows MSF and ICRC as well as INGOs to hire the right staff and fire the wrong ones, despite the fact that it can take longer and delay the implementation of the programme (Carter & Haver, 2016, p. 39). The staff from INGOs consulted for this study did express high level of consideration when hiring local staff. It is a long process, and they are looking into their experience as well as identity. They also consider which areas the staff members are placed in, based on their identity and security levels. Furthermore, they are investing a lot in capacity-building when necessary (Interview 1; Interview 2).

4.7.1 Summarising Figure

| Financial independence	Evidence	Effect on staffing
Higher level	Private or less restricted funding allows high level of consideration, taking the time needed, and assessing both identity as well as experience	Allows organisations to thoroughly consider staffing decisions and its consequences
Lower level	Competitive environments lead L/NNGOs to accept unfavorable budgets and conditions. This results in staff turnover and 'brain-drain'.	Can incite staff turnover

Figure 9: Summarising Figure - Staffing

5 Concluding Discussion

The analysis portrays many ways in which financial (in)dependence can contribute to the application of acceptance. It varies across the components of acceptance as well as layers of organisations, and so does the evidence for it. Principles and mission together with programming were components where financial (in)dependence had many contributions and the amount of evidence was most convincing. The flexibility that comes with financial independence enables organisations to manifest and demonstrate their principles and mission, meet the needs of the local communities in a timely matter, and adapt when the needs and the conditions for delivery change. This leaves issues for organisations who depend on public and restricted funding. Their flexibility is confined, and they have to struggle with donor interests impeding their ability to meet community needs in a principled manner. The analysis also portrayed how donor interests can influence programming decisions, such as what aid is provided to where and with whom to engage, thus lead to compromise of principles. Noticeably negotiations with NSAGs. Moreover, these are all elements that can hurt their reputation. Relationships and networks was found to be highly affected by other components, thus difficult to isolate even if the analysis did so. Especially regarding the staffing of L/NNGOs in South Sudan, as their low level of financial independence, leaves them under a severe pressure for organisational survival, the working conditions are poor which in turn fuels staff turnover. Furthermore, low level of financial independence increases the focus on upwards accountability in South Sudan, which can impede communication, programming and context and stakeholder analysis. It was evident throughout the analysis, that the components of acceptance are very interrelated and an effect in one component can have severe effects in others.

By analysing different layers of humanitarian organisations' application of acceptance as a security strategy, this thesis has demonstrated various characteristics of how an organisation is funded can contribute to acceptance as a security strategy in South Sudan. Higher level of financial independence provides

flexibility and operational independence, and lower level of financial independence can impede flexibility and can increase compliance with donor interests. This has consequences for all components of acceptance in some ways, but particularly for principles and mission and programming. Moreover, financial (in)dependence can cause knock-on effects on other components. Hence this thesis concludes that the way a humanitarian organisation is funded can under some circumstances affect the ways in which an organisation's security management.

While the analysis did show how the level of financial independence can contribute to acceptance, there are several areas related to the problem, that the analysis could not treat. First, the results are not only a matter of financial independence. The issues discussed in this thesis are extremely complex, thus many explanations co-exist and have not been touched here. Second, it was evident throughout the analysis, that the components of acceptance are very interrelated and an effect in one component can have severe effects in others. The framework of analysis chosen here, was not the most appropriate in showing this interdependence. Third, is important to stress that this thesis has focused on evidence where financial independence could have an effect on acceptance, thus, leaving out evidence where it did not. Because of the research design of the study, the complexities of the acceptance strategy, and research limits it has not been possible to study and conclude on this. This research then, cannot conclude on the degree of the effect. Hence, the degree to which financial independence contributes to the application of acceptance as a security strategy.

Nevertheless, the purpose of the study was not to test a hypothesis regarding the relationship between the two variables, or to investigate the relationship as correlated. Instead it was to examine the characteristics of the relationship between humanitarian organisations' financial (in)dependence, the independent variable, and their use of acceptance as a security strategy, the dependent variable. The evidence presented in this study does make it clear in what ways the financial independence of humanitarian organisations can, under some circumstances, contribute to how an organisation apply acceptance as a security strategy. Thus, contributing with in-depth knowledge to the propositions regarding the effect of financial (in)dependence on organisational behavior related to security management.

The contextual in-depth knowledge provided by this case study of South Sudan supports the earlier propositions about the marketisation of humanitarian system affecting the behavior of humanitarian organisations. But it cannot contribute with a generalised rule about this. The results here are purely contextual. During my research it did become evident that South Sudan is not the only case where financial independence can influence the application of acceptance. Moreover, security seems to not be the only sector in which financial independence can influence an organisations' behaviour. Thus, this thesis leaves a gap for further studies to fill out in order to further advance to the knowledge about the consequences of marketisation.

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Appendix 1: List of Interviewees

Interview 1: Area manager in South Sudan, INGO

Interview 2: Project manager in South Sudan, INGO

Interview 3: Senior staff with experience from South Sudan, INGO

Interview 4: Senior staff with experience from South Sudan, MSF

Interview 5: Jens Pedersen, Senior Humanitarian Policy Advisor with experience from South Sudan MSF

Appendix 2: Interview Guide

The purpose of this study is to understand the relationship between the humanitarian funding systems and the humanitarian organizations' security management in South Sudan, focusing on the acceptance strategy. The study emanates from the idea of the humanitarian system as a marketplace in which organizations "sell" their projects and programmes to donors, requiring them to be accountable towards their donors.

The intent of the interviews is to gain information about security management of humanitarian organizations in South Sudan, in order to supplement the secondary material in this study. The guide below is not a checklist, but an attempt to provide a broad overview, but each interview will focus on different areas to different degrees.

The guide is developed based on security management related terms, especially the operationalization of the acceptance strategy.

1. **Background**
- Can you tell me about your background in the humanitarian field? Can you shortly present your organization's presence in South Sudan? What is your role within the organization?
2. **Security model and procedures**
- What is your organization's overall security management model?
- What are your organization's security practices and procedures in the field?
3. **Overall understanding of acceptance**
- Are you familiar with acceptance as a security strategy?
- How do you conceive the acceptance strategy? Which activities do you engage in to enhance acceptance?
4. **Principles and mission**

- What role do humanitarian principles (**independence**, neutrality, impartiality) play in your organization's security management and decision-making?

- How do you discuss the ethical dilemmas and compromises you meet? Do you talk about the ethical risks?

- How does your organization deal with the dilemma of reaching the most vulnerable people in hard-to-reach areas, that might require more resources, over executing programmes in reachable areas, where you might reach more people?

5. **Stakeholder and context analysis**

- How does your org. conduct stakeholder and context analysis? Who conducts them? On a regular and continual basis?

- Are resources available?

6. **Programming**

- How do you measure programme quality?

- Does your type of funding enable or hinder aspects of programming?

7. **Relationships and networks**

- How do you reach out to and engage with affected communities?

- How do you find that the type funding affects your ability to build relationships and trust with key actors?

- If partnering with L/NNGOs, how are they selected and how are their security considered?

8. **Communication**

- How do you monitor community perceptions? How do you demonstrate responsiveness to the feedback?

9. **Negotiations**

- How does your organization engage outreach or negotiations with local actors?

- Does your source of funding influence this?

10. **Staffing**

- What is considered when hiring staff? When hiring national staff is it based on skills and identity? Are the national staff's' social network and ability to negotiate considered? How does the organization invest in national staff to ensure a high level of quality?