

Understanding Community Resilience: Resilience in the community response to the 14th June 2017 Grenfell Tower fire in London

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Abstract:

Community resilience is a highly relevant topic and the focus of much contemporary research, however it has yet to be distilled down to an exact science. The current thesis applies a theoretical framework for community resilience as an analytical lens when investigating the community response to the Grenfell fire and tragedy of 14th June 2017. Of particular interest is to uncover what community resilience entails, how it may be measured and the role of grass-roots, faith and local community organisations in fostering community resilience in post disaster situations. Examining these issues attempts to shed light on how to create and retain resilient communities, in good times and bad. In undertaking this project, first an extensive review of key terms was conducted through which to decide on a relevant framework. The research embraced interviews and questionnaires with a small sample of community members, and two leaders of a local community-based organisation and faith-based organisation respectively. In addition, the project reviewed a sample of 86 individual witness statements from the Grenfell Public Inquiry to understand the relevance of local actors in the response. Through analysis of the primary and secondary data gathered in this research, this report highlights which elements of community resilience are tangible and through which local organisations contribute immensely. This report also argues for the benefits of engaging with local community organisations in disaster preparedness, planning and response. Motivating the case that due to their trusted position within communities, these organisations hold crucial knowledge relevant in planning to respond and adapt to potential further disasters. They also present an opportunity for partnership to raise further awareness and promote resilience in our communities moving forward.

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1. Background

On 14th June 2017, shortly before 01:00 a fire ignited in a fourth-floor kitchen flat of a 23-story housing block in North Kensington, West London (BBC news, 2018). The fire spread within minutes, rapidly consuming the exterior of the building and engulfing the majority of the upper floors by 3am (BBC news, 2018). The fire did not burn out until 01:14 on Thursday 15th June 2017, 24 hours later. In that period the inferno claimed the lives of 72 people (BBC news, 2018). This is arguably the biggest tragedy to have affected Britain on home soil in recent history and the largest one post war in London (Strelitz & Macey, 2018).

Since 14th June 2017, there have been numerous investigations by police, fire department and forensic architects into the disaster and its causes as well as the official Grenfell Tower Inquiry and an inquiry by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, named Following Grenfell. The official Grenfell Tower Inquiry is ongoing and therefore the topic of this thesis is current.

1.1 Motivating the case study and the role of organisations

Grenfell Tower has highlighted the rather ugly underbelly of the British social system, particularly those of poverty and housing (MacLeod, 2018; Preston, 2019; Shildrick, 2018; Hinsliff, 2017). As the Chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, David Isaac said:

“The Grenfell Tower fire has become a symbol of the inequality that exists in our country.... The first duty of the State is to protect the lives of its citizens and lessons must be learnt to avoid this happening again. From the right to life to the duty to provide adequate housing, there are several areas where the State fell short in its duties to its citizens and these must be properly addressed.” (2017, No Page).

One reporter wrote, “One of the most painful aspects of the tragedy is that it would have been entirely preventable if one of the richest boroughs in the country had listened to its poorest residents” (Armstrong, 28/06/2017).

This is a highly sensitive and politicised topic. The public inquiry has been tasked in phase one to “establish in some detail what happened at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017” and in phase two to focus “attention on the critical circumstances and decisions which enabled such a devastating event to occur” (Moore-Bick, 2018, p. 1). This process will be extensive and take longer than many anticipated. It must scrutinize not only the events leading up to the disaster, but the institutional failures and entrenched inequality within the UK’s (United Kingdom) social system (Isaac, 2017; MacLeod, 2018; Shildrick, 2018).

Many commentaries on the official response contend that it was inadequate and poorly managed (Plastow, 2018a; Foster, 2017; Taylor, 2017; Tomlin, 2018). Although these commentaries do not seek to understate the heroism and selfless bravery of emergency

responders, such as the fire brigade, ambulance and police, they do seek to question a seemingly lacklustre level of preparedness and coordination in the official response capacities (Hinsliff, 2017; Plastow, 2018a; Taylor, 2018).

This report however, seeks to focus on the unofficial response, because amidst the chaos and backlog of institutional unpreparedness and confusion, there were people, Community Based Organisations (CBOs)¹, and grass-roots movements working tirelessly to meet unmet needs, cover uncovered gaps and support their community from within (Armstrong, 2018; Plastow, 2018a, 2018b; Begum, 2018; Plender, 2018; Caffyn, 2018). It is their actions pre and post-disaster² that this report studies, specifically whether they reflect research on the constitutive elements and characteristics of ‘resilient communities’.

The affected Grenfell community has been resolute in their response and ensuing struggles (O’Mahony & Davis, 2018; Kennedy, 2018). From the immediate aftermath to today, the community has not relented in their search for answers and justice (Smith, 2017; Booth, 2019a). Their response has been dignified, united by a common desire to ensure that such an unnecessary tragedy never reoccurs (Grenfell United, n.d.; Booth, 2019b; Baynes, 2019). Amidst this community’s response actors, individuals and organisations, have been strong for their community, showing impressive levels of resilience, solidarity and leadership in circumstances which would have shattered notions of pre-existing resilience indicators (MacLeod, 2018; Sherwood, 2017; Aitken, 2017). Fuelled by grief, anger and devastation as well as compassion and love for their community, with limited government funding, CBOs have been integral for this community’s response and recovery (Armstrong, 2018).

1.2 Purpose and aims

The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding about the processes of creating and retaining resilient communities with a particular focus on how CBOs and grass-root movements may contribute.

To meet this purpose, the thesis comprises three aims. Firstly, it examines the essence of community resilience and social capital at the community level, how they materialise in post-disaster situations and how they are traditionally measured. Secondly, it investigates the role of CBOs in shaping the response to the Grenfell Tower disaster and examines their contribution to their community’s resilience. Thirdly, it explores the advantages of engaging with CBOs and grass-roots movements at a local level to increase social cohesion and resilience to disasters in communities and discusses how the benefits of engaging with these movements can inform the discussion on the development of community resilience.

¹ CBOs – Community-Based Organisations – Considered as organisations that provide social services at a local level, are non-profit and primarily rely on voluntary resource contributions (Chechetto-Salles & Geyer, 2006).

1.3 Research Questions

In order to reach the above stated objectives, the thesis seeks to address the following research questions:

1. How do the notions of community resilience and social capital present themselves in post-disaster situations and how are they measured?
2. What was the influence of CBOs in shaping the response to the Grenfell Tower disaster and are CBOs to be considered as crucial components of this community's resilience?
3. Which advantages may be drawn from engaging with grass-roots movements or CBOs at a local level to increase social cohesion and resilience to disasters in the community and how can these benefits inform the discussion on the development of community resilience?

These questions are at varying stages investigated throughout the report and through a variety of methods. The report structure below sets out at what stage of the report they are considered and how they have been dealt with.


1.4 Report Structure

The first question is handled through an extensive literature review of scientific papers. The review attempts to clarify the key concepts 'community', 'resilience', 'community resilience' and 'social capital' used in the report. It then moves to establish how community resilience and social capital present themselves in post-disaster situations. Additionally, the literature review was conducted to establish or motivate a framework through which to design the case study.

The second question has been handled through the collection of primary and secondary data, which is further accounted for in the methodology section. The evidence from the data collection is presented in the results section and used in combination with the frameworks that were informed by the literature review and used as basis for the discussion and conclusion sections of this report.

Similarly, the third question is primarily addressed in the discussion and conclusion sections of this report. Consequently, it is investigated through a discussion and analysis of the findings presented in the results section and through reports on the Grenfell Tower disaster. Figure 2 outlines the methods and data used as well as the workflow involved in answering the three research questions (RQ) of this study.

Figure 2. Schematic overview of workflow, methods and data input.



2. Literature review

2.1 What do we mean by community?

Community is traditionally understood as “a group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings” (MacQueen et al., 2001, p.1929). Similar definitions can be found in St John (1998), Theodori (2005), Murphy (2007) and Allman (2015). Accordingly, communities are understood as both place-bound and socially constructed, often falling within two categories, “territory-free” and “territory-based”, the former often describing “social groupings or networks” (Theodori, 2005, p. 662).

Theodori suggests social interaction drives community establishment, tying in four key elements of community, identified as; “shared territory, common life, collective actions, and mutual identity” (2005, p. 662). Social interaction is offered as the driver of the four components as it “(a) delineates an area as shared territory, (b) contributes to the wholeness of local life, (c) gives structure and direction to collective actions, and (d) is the source of mutual identity (Theodori, 2005, p. 663). Through this interpretation “community occurs in places and is place oriented, but the place itself, per se, is not the community” (Theodori, 2005, p. 663).

Based on Flora’s (1998) work on ‘Social Capital and Communities of Place’, Murphy (2007) offers further characteristics of community supporting Theodori’s (2005) notion that social interaction drives community. Communities display the following traits, “members interact on a somewhat regular basis/.../this interaction is not mediated by the state/.../and members have some degree of shared preferences or beliefs” (Murphy, 2007, p. 300). Although not explicitly mentioning location as a key determinant, Murphy offers an understanding of community boundaries that requires fluidity as they are likely to “change over time both in response to their own internal dynamics as well as to external influences” (2007, p. 300). Her main point is similar to that of Theodori (2005) and Joerin, Shaw & Krishnamurthy (2014) who all contend that communities, whether place-bound or not, are socially constructed (Murphy, 2007).

Communities in the urban context “are composed of built, natural, social, and economic environments that influence one another in complex ways” (Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Whyche & Pfefferbaum, 2008, p. 128). Urban communities can be considered as more than social constructs, rather an amalgamation of human and non-human characteristics. Understanding communities in an urban context requires an appreciation of the layers of social networks and physical assets that make up this fabric. This task is made easier by prefacing the term community with ‘local’, which helps narrow the scope in an urban setting to “neighbourhoods and other types of socially bounded entities in which people live their day-to-day lives” (Murphy, 2007, p. 297-298). This approach works to avoid imprecision over

community membership by confining it to a locality, but also appreciates non-social influencers of community such as the built environment that form a locality (Allman, 2015; St John, 1998; Joerin, Shaw & Krishnamurthy, 2014; Norris et al., 2008).

For the purpose of this thesis we will understand the affected Grenfell community as a local community where both place orientation and social interaction in built, natural, social, and economic environments are key.

2.2 Resilience

The foundation of this fashionable but ambiguous term is found in the Latin 'resilire', "meaning to rebound or recoil" (The Young Foundation, 2012, p. 11). A buzzword in the disaster management sphere, resilience, unlike its Latin ancestor, suffers from a lack of concrete definition and understanding (Townshend, Awogosa, Kulig & Fan, 2015; The Young Foundation, 2012; Manyena, 2006; Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Klien, Nicholls & Thomalla, 2003; Chelleri, 2012).

In psychology, the work on resilience predominantly focusses on psychological coping strategies (The Young Foundation, 2012; Abramson et al., 2015; Manyena, 2006). In physics, it generally describes the "capacity of a material or system to return to equilibrium after a displacement" and the time taken to do so (Norris et al., 2008, p. 127). Within ecology, the term describes the capacity of an ecological system to stabilise post shock or stress (Holling, 1973; The Young Foundation, 2012; Folke, 2006). A concurrent theme runs throughout these understandings of resilience, i.e. it maintains a close-knit relationship with the capacities of the systems, materials, or people in question. However, the capacity to do *what* is still unclear.

Associating words such as "cope, bounce back, withstand" or "absorb negative impacts" give resilience a reactive connotation, which can be misleading when considering more fluid human systems such as communities (Manyena, 2006, p. 438; Berkes, 2007). Adger (2000), drew the distinction between understanding resilience through the biophysical and human lenses, arguing that whilst adaptive capacities are key to both, unlike human systems ecological systems do not possess the institutions to support resilience (Abramson et al., 2015).

Norris et al. make the point that when "applied to people and their environments 'resilience' is fundamentally a metaphor" (2008, p. 127). When considering resilience in human environments there are two fundamental viewpoints; first, that resilience should be understood as an ability or process, second; it should be seen as adaptation to disturbance and not a return to stability (Norris et al., 2008; Manyena, 2006; Berkes, 2007).

A general consensus within the disaster management sphere prescribes resilience as process oriented and reliant upon adaptive capacities. Yet, there is no agreement on how to measure resilience (Manyena, 2006; The Young Foundation, 2012; Abramson et al., 2015). Some see resilience as a positive spin-off effect from the reduction of vulnerability or poverty (Berkes,

2007; Cutter, Burton & Emrich, 2010; Cutter et al., 2008), while others propose that sole focus on building resilience will reduce vulnerability (Manyena, 2006).

Tierney contributes an encompassing view of resilience which can guide our understanding as follows:

Resilience is a property of physical and social systems that enables them to reduce the probability of disaster-induced loss of functionality, respond appropriately when damage and disruption occur, and recover in a timely manner. Resilience can be further conceptualized as consisting of four dimensions: robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity. It can be further seen as consisting of technical, organizational, social, and economic elements (2003, no page).

This definition highlights elements and characteristics within a social system that can work to make it resilient. It also works well with our understanding of community as it describes processes that work within the constructs of local community.

Establishing how we understand community, and resilience as a process reliant on the adaptive capacities contained within social systems, it is imperative to understand the two terms together, as ‘community resilience’.

2.3 What do we mean by Community Resilience?

Patel, Rogers, Amlôt & Rubin comment “the ability to operationalize the concept of ‘community resilience’ against a disaster is highly sought after by disaster-response professionals, government officials, and academics” (2017, no page). The community level is considered a worthwhile level for investment in resilience. Governments and aid organisations cannot always provide immediate assistance in a disaster, so the community must therefore be empowered to utilise its own capacities, networks and resources to handle a crisis (Patel et al., 2017; Norris et al., 2008; Cox & Perry, 2011; Abramson et al., 2015).

In theory a unified definition of community resilience should exist, with key measurements and indicators that allow for it to be operationalised, applied and assessed, however this is not the case (Cutter et al. 2008). Patel et al. (2017) conducted an extensive review of 80 relevant papers defining ‘community resilience’ and the results indicated there “was no evidence of a common, agreed definition of community resilience” (Patel et al., 2017, no page). Patel et al. did however find “nine core elements of community resilience that were common among the definitions” (2017, no page). Further to this the authors found “19 sub-elements linked to community resilience” (Patel et al., 2017, no page). The nine core elements proposed, with 19 supporting sub-elements can be seen in the table below:

Table 1. Nine core elements of community resilience and 19 sub-elements

Nine Core Elements		
Local Knowledge		
Factual Knowledge Base	Training and Education	Collective Efficacy and Empowerment
Community Networks and Relationships		
Connectedness		Cohesion
Communication		
Risk Communication	Crisis Communication	Effective Communication
Health		
Mental Health	Health Services	Physical Health
Governance and Leadership		
Infrastructure and Services		Public Involvement and Support
Resources		
	Resources	
Economic Investment		
Post-disaster Economic Development		Post-disaster Economic Programming
Preparedness		
	Planning and Mitigation	
Mental Outlook		
Hope		Adaptability

The nine elements and sub-elements proposed by Patel et al. (2017), provide a tangible foundation to examine community resilience by targeting areas in which contributions to community resilience can be made and measured. Their findings correspond to other research on community resilience. Townshend et al. see it as including “engagement of people and places, the presence of community infrastructure, community networks and governance” (2015, p. 916). MacLean, Cuthill & Ross promote six attributes of community resilience as “knowledge, skills and learning; community networks; people-place connections; community infrastructure; a diverse and innovative economy; and engaged governance” (2014, p. 154).

A study on social cohesion and community resilience in Haiti concluded that “social cohesion drives resilience”, highlighting the “importance of considering social cohesion in all programs and policies aimed at improving resilience and disaster risk reduction” (Patel & Gleason, 2018, p. 166). Furthermore, Norris et al. (2008) highlight economic investment, community engagement, organisational support, social cohesion and support and adaptive planning as key to building community resilience. Highlighting social cohesion within this report and in connection with research question 3 is important as studies have shown that increased levels of social cohesion can lead to improved levels of post-disaster resilience (Ludin, Rohaizat & Arbon, 2018; Townshend et al, 2015). Importantly, social cohesion is not the sole influencer of community level resilience, it may be one amongst many drivers. However strong social cohesion does appear to correlate with resilient responses to disasters and should be

considered when examining the means by which resilient communities can be created and retained (Patel & Gleason, 2018; Ludin, Rohaizat & Arbon, 2018; Townshend et al, 2015).

Community resilience and resilience can be understood similarly as adaptive processes (Ganor & Ben-Lavy, 2003; Kofinas, 2003; Quinlan, 2003; Coles & Buckle, 2004; Gunderson & Folke, 2005; Daly, Becker, Parkes, Johnston & Paton, 2009; Cox & Perry, 2011; Castleden, McKee, Murray & Leondardi, 2011). Complexity does arise when handling the concept of resilience in communities as it can sometimes be misrepresented as an outcome or end-state, however resilience as this paper deals with it, refers to resilience as process oriented. As Almedon notes, “it may be misguided to think of building community resilience as a job for outsiders and external experts designed in linear terms of intervention and outcome” (2013, p. 21). Resilience is perhaps better considered as “creating the conditions that are conducive to self-organizing and self-governing in order to emerge more able or prepared to handle crisis in future” (ibid.). Resilience is ultimately a process in which people, institutions, organisations and the relationships between interact to allow for adaptation in and to adversity. Community resilience is not an outcome of a collective of resilient individuals; not everyone within a community is likely to be resilient, however through social connection and relationships, those that are work for those that are not (Brown & Kullig, 1996). It is within networks and relationships that we understand social capital and this concept is explored below.

2.4 What do we mean by Social Capital?

Social capital is fundamental to community resilience and present throughout the nine core elements (Gunderson & Folke, 2005; Patel & Gleason, 2018; Norris et al., 2008; Arbon, Cusak, Gebbie, Steenkamp & Anikeeva, 2013; Patel et al., 2017; Norris & Stevens, 2007). LaLabone (2012, p. 211) provides a thorough definition of social capital as it can be understood in a disaster:

social capital refers to the potential resources in goods, labor, and other forms of assistance, that are embedded in local-level social networks of family and neighbors, and other groups formed through place-based, work-based, and common interest-based bonds of interaction, trust, reciprocity, and support, that people can mobilize individually and collectively to use for community resilience in the face of disasters.

Social capital is often overlooked and under-appreciated as a resource in community level disaster management (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Kwok, Becker, Paton, Hudson-Doyle & Johnston, 2019; Aldrich, 2010; Cox & Perry, 2011; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011). However, some generally accepted forms of social capital exist that can be understood as bonded, bridged and linked (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Norris et al., 2008; Kwok et al., 2019; Mathbor, 2007; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Sadeka, Mohamad, Reza, Manap & Sakar, 2015; Sanyal & Routray, 2016).

Bonded describes the connectedness and relationships of people who are emotionally close, such as family or friends (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015). Within a community, these relationships are often trust-based and can extend out of the family unit to build a sense of community (Norris et al., 2008; Mathbor, 2007; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004).

Bridged describes a process whereby individuals and communities who are less emotionally close, from varying ethnic and geographic backgrounds are brought together. Bridges can take many forms such as place attachment, interest-based activities, involvement in civic organisations. (Mathbor, 2007; Norris et al., 2008; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2007; Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Cox & Perry, 2011). It is in the bringing together of people that community networks and relationships are formed.

Linked social capital involves connecting individual members of communities, through CBOs, religious and civic institutions, to those who are in a decision-making authority, such as local government, local council and other state level authorities (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Mathbor, 2007; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004).

A thread among the three forms of social capital is the presence of trust and collectivism, bringing people together, through bonds, bridges and links, based on varying degrees of association to represent shared interests and values for the betterment of their individual and collective circumstances (LaLabone, 2012; Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Norris et al., 2008; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011; Abramson et al., 2015; Aldrich, 2010; Mathbor, 2007; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004).

Social capital is seen as a driver for community resilience (Abramson et al., 2015; Kwok et al., 2019; Mathbor, 2007; Murphy, 2007; Sanyal & Routray, 2016; Patel & Gleason, 2018). Communities with higher levels of social capital at work, are more likely to be resilient pre and post-disasters (Aldrich, 2010; Sanyal & Routray, 2016; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Murphy, 2007; Mathbor, 2007). Social capital, when operationalised, consists of accessing resources within one's network, formed through bonding, bridging and linking activities, the more trust-based and collectivised one's network is, the greater the likelihood of being well resourced when needed (LaLabone, 2012; Mathbor, 2007; Murphy, 2007).

2.5 How do community resilience and social capital present themselves in post-disaster situations?

Levels of functioning social capital within a community are directly linked to the levels of resilience that communities might display in post-disaster situations (Sanyal & Routray, 2016; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Aldrich, 2010; Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; LaLabone, 2012; Abramson et al., 2015). A community or individual able to access social resources and support, through trusted networks and relationships will be better equipped to cope, adapt and revitalise,

through the response and recovery phases³ (Abramson et al., 2015; LaLabone, 2012; Aldrich, 2010; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011; Dynes, 2006; Murphy, 2007; Kwok et al., 2019).

Firstly, in the response phase bonding and bridging social capital present themselves almost immediately (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011; Aldrich, 2010). Family members, neighbours, or even those present at the time of a disaster are normally the first to respond (Aldrich, 2010; Perrow, 2007; Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011). Bonding social capital can provide emotional support, access to shelter, financial resources, childcare or food and drink (Aldrich & Mayer, 2015; Aldrich, 2010; Sanyal & Routray, 2016). Bridged social capital can provide information and organisational support through faith or community centres offering shelter, childcare and emotional and spiritual support (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Sanyal & Routray, 2016; Vallance & Carlton, 2016). Bridged social capital can provide resources during disaster response and recovery that may not be accessible through bonded social capital (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Mathbor, 2007; Abramson et al., 2015).

Secondly, during the recovery period bonding, bridging and linking forms of social capital are present in various forms similar to the aforementioned but sustained over a longer time (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015). Local businesses and community organisations are well placed to offer services, but equally to provide some sense of normalcy in which community members can take time to process (Wilson, 2013). These forms of social capital help to form collective narratives during the recovery phase (Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011). As Aldrich notes, “survivors have difficult choices to make following a disaster” (2010, p.7). This choice can often concern whether to stay, or to go (Aldrich, 2010, Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011). Collective narratives can alleviate pressure on the individual as they enable community members to “interpret their circumstances and to decide on a course of action” (Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011, p.270). Increased social capital raises the cost of exit and those with strong bonded and bridged capital will be more likely to return to their communities and invest in their improvement and regrowth (Aldrich, 2010; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011). Linked social capital connects a community’s collective ambition for the future through CBOs, to those decision-making bodies with the capacity and authority to make it happen (Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Mathbor, 2007; Aldrich, 2010).

When the community goes beyond requiring immediate access to resources for the purpose of survival, bridged social capital can allow for collective decision making, collective learning and can increase disaster readiness and resilience (Aldrich, 2010; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011). It can endow community members with a sense of ownership of the recovery process, cultivate leaders and build engagement (Mathbor, 2007). An example is found in the

² The response phase denotes decision making in the immediate effects of a disaster and the recovery phase describes the longer process of community reconstruction and restoration to the point where the needs on affected peoples have been met and levels of demand on services have returned to normal (Cabinet Office, 2013).

Christchurch 2011 earthquake recovery where the public was encouraged to send in ideas over the rebuild of public spaces (Wesener, 2015). Linked social capital enables community members to hold officials accountable and advocate for the development and improvement of their communities (Aldrich, 2010, Kwok et al., 2011).

CBOs play a vital role for communities in post-disaster situations as much of the bridged and linked social capital rests on these local organisations (Abramson et al., 2015; Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2011; Murphy, 2007; Dynes, 2002).

2.6 Patterns of organisational involvement in disasters

According to Dynes (2002) there are four types of organisation present in post-disaster situations; established, expanding, extending and emergent. Established organisations are perceived to undertake tasks post-disaster in the same manner as pre-disaster; expanding organisations possess the same functioning as established organisations, but their operational capacities grow to meet demand; extending organisations are those which are established, not in a disaster response capacity, but extend to provide a service in an affected community, and finally; emergent organisations are those that form post-disaster to meet the unattended needs of an affected community (Dynes, 2002; Murphy, 2007). We will explore the cruciality of these types of organisations later on, although it is important to mention them now as they are an integral expression of social capital and bottom up community resilience at work in post-disaster situations (Murphy, 2007, Quarantelli, 1998).

Social capital presents itself in a variety of forms, in various levels of interaction and at varying scales. Accessing social capital at the local community level is indeed crucial to a resilient response and recovery post-disaster. Social capital supports the activation of Patel et al.'s (2017) core and sub-elements of community resilience. Social capital is also crucial when considering the position of CBOs within a disaster affected community as well as their role in contributing to community resilience

3. Methodology

3.1 Primary Data Collection

In writing this thesis, I developed 16 semi-structured questions based around Patel et al.'s (2017) nine core elements of community resilience. These were to be used both in interviews and as part of a questionnaire (see Appendix. 1). Questions were phrased open-endedly such as 'To what extent', 'In what way', 'How well placed', 'How do you define' and 'Would you define'.

The questions were either general with no mention of pre/post disaster, and others were specified with post-disaster. The motivation behind this was to allow respondents to provide contextual knowledge of the roles of CBOs within the local community before the fire, and to provide contextual knowledge of the actions taken by CBOs post-disaster. Therefore, constructing a before, during and after picture.

Most approaches tend to use the Likert-type scale when measuring resilience, with respondents asked to disclose the extent to which they agree with certain pre-set statements. This approach is often used to extract perceived levels of resilience, bench-marking the responses against a set of baseline indicators (Patel & Gleason, 2018; Cutter, Burton & Emrich, 2010; Patel et al., 2017; Sherrieb, Norris & Galea, 2010; Pfefferbaum et al. 2013; Leykin, Lahad, Cohen, Goldberg & Aharonson-Daniel, 2013). This can be problematic as one can appropriate a level of resilience to a community which might be more or less than the community feels it possesses (Jones, 2019). This presented a challenge when structuring the questionnaire, and in order to ascertain their sense of resilience I asked participants how they would define resilience and secondly if they would define the local Grenfell community as resilient in their response to the disaster. Questions concerning CBOs and the nine core elements of community resilience were phrased in a way to allow participants to elaborate and provide their own consideration on the levels of provision of the nine elements rather than purely a yes or no response.

All participants were found through personal connections, through family, or friends of friends and their networks. In one instance a participant was connected to me via another.

Aside from interviews and questionnaires, I had a conversation with an employee of a CBO with follow up notes written and approved. I also made observations when visiting the area to get a feel for the community and in attending the monthly silent march on 14th June 2019 exactly two years on from the disaster.

3.2 Secondary Data Collection

An extensive literature review was conducted to understand how community resilience and social capital present in post-disaster situations. Search terms used during the literature review included but were not limited to; 'definitions of community', 'definitions of resilience', 'definitions of community resilience', 'social capital and disasters', 'social capital and community resilience post-disaster'. These search terms yielded a large number of results, while there was no systematic thinning out, consideration was made to whether the results dealt with the terms mentioned in relation to disasters, their year of publication and that they came from recognised journals. Additional search terms for background information were 'resilient Grenfell community', 'community resilience in Grenfell aftermath' and 'community-based organisations Grenfell response'.

Most literature was found through Google searches and scientific databases such as ResearchGate, SagePub and ScienceDirect. Other sources were found through "snowballing", i.e. by reviewing bibliographies of previously read sources (Greenhalgh & Peacock, 2005, p. 1064). This research provided the theoretical framework for this thesis, the basis of the questionnaire, analysis and discussion of results. Journalistic news articles and the Grenfell Inquiry (2017-Present) provided the basis for the background information in the introduction. One book and three reports written on Grenfell are relied upon in the discussion section to contextualise my results.

I analysed a selection of 86 individual witness statements (IWS) from the Grenfell Inquiry. The sample comprised local residents, former Grenfell Tower residents, bereaved family members and emergency responders. There was a small selection bias when choosing statements to the extent that the statements referred either to the community or to CBOs. The inquiry is not covered by The Freedom of Information Act, however transcripts and evidence considered in the inquiry are published on the inquiry's website. These are made available to the public unless any "contrary order or restriction notice made under section 19 of the Inquiries Act 2005 is in place" (Grenfell Tower Inquiry, 2018).

3.3 Methods of Analysis

As Figure 2. demonstrates there are multiple strands of data input and analysis, this is explained further below. Although as guidance to the analysis and data collection there were three fundamental theoretical inputs; the community resilience framework developed by Patel et al. (2017), the organisational framework developed by Dynes (2002) and a broader literature review-based framework of bonded, bridged and linked social capital. Of central importance was Patel et al.'s framework, guiding the primary data collection and analysis, as well as guiding the review of witness statements. Dynes' (2002) organisational framework was used to consider the organisational types present and to categorise them through their actions as organisations. Thirdly, a literature review-based framework on bonded, bridged and linked social capital was used to identify in the primary and secondary data, examples where these three strands of social capital can be seen to contribute to community resilience. The analysis of both primary and secondary data, in accordance with the

frameworks mentioned is then drawn upon to handle RQ 2 and 3 in the discussion, with Patel et al.'s framework used centrally to structure RQ 2.

3.3.1 Analysis of Primary Data

The nine core elements of community resilience framework was used to present the primary data in the results section. Analysis of the results in the discussion section highlights the performance of CBOs in relation to the nine core elements, where CBOs are relevant and where they could be better supported.

Dynes' (2002) framework on the four types of organisation present in a disaster situation was used to identify the types of organisations mentioned and actions, which might qualify them as established, expanding, extending or emergent.

Types of social capital at work are considered within three categories as either bonded, bridged or linked. However, when analysing the levels of social capital within a community we must acknowledge that there are external influences that can either increase or decrease these levels (Aldrich, 2010; Kwok et al. 2019). In order to understand these influences, it is important to keep in mind the context of the community in question. This is referenced in the introduction and further highlighted in the discussion section.

3.3.2 Analysis of Secondary Data

Dynes' framework (2002) and Patel et al.'s (2017) nine core elements provided the basis for analysing the 86 IWS collected from the Grenfell Inquiry. Whilst analysing this data, the core elements were kept in mind to highlight where CBOs could be considered as supporting Patel et al.'s (2017) nine core elements.

The types of social capital used in the analysis of the primary data were also used when considering the actions of CBOs and public mentioned in the sample of the 86 IWS.

3.4 Research Limitations

Undertaking this research has not been without challenges, both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, whilst an extensive literature review was undertaken, the concepts with which this report works with are both fuzzy and contested with no agreed definition or formats for measurement or analysis. Efforts were made to choose concrete theoretical work to develop or choose a framework. However, with limited word count a thorough cross reference of the frameworks chosen, which had been included initially became too extensive.

The practical challenges experienced mainly materialised when contacting organisations and prospective research participants. I had initially contacted 10 organisations for comment, to conduct an interview or answer a questionnaire and only 2 responded. I was informed that the community was experiencing a considerable amount of research fatigue. This disaster is very recent and highly political and when commencing work on this thesis, there had already

been researchers and large amounts of media contacting the community for input into their work. Moreover, the Grenfell Tower tragedy is a deeply upsetting, emotional and sensitive topic for those involved whether they are the affected community, first responders or those working to serve their community through CBOs, grass-roots movements or religious organisations. Therefore, despite being committed to research this topic, I had to be highly sensitive and respectful when doing so. I did not want to push people to respond and if an organisation or individual said they were unable to help; I wanted to respect their decision and not push further. Many of the organisations involved are also stretched for resources and time whilst working for a community that tries to recover and rebuild after a tragedy. For these reasons, I did not manage to attain as many participants as I had initially wished for. Notwithstanding, those who did engage (two local residents and two leaders of a CBO and faith-based organisation respectively) were central to the perspectives that I sought. To facilitate extracting their experiences and knowledge, I also got to develop and apply two different research tools (interviews and a questionnaire), which has strengthened my ability in conducting research per se.

Moreover, as establishing trust is key in this kind of research, there was a need to be conscious to not have an angle or an agenda, other than to let participants respond as they saw fit. As mentioned earlier, all participating research respondents had been sourced through a personal connection.

It is also worth mentioning that this is a rather ‘heavy’ topic to research, notwithstanding its political and emotionally sensitive nature. I acknowledge that when reading through personal accounts of trauma, loss and tragedy, particularly in light of its needless nature, it is hard to remain dispassionate and to keep the analytical lens clear.

3.5 Ethical considerations

As mentioned, the Grenfell fire was a close personal tragedy to the participants of my inquiry and therefore the topic had to be approached with the upmost sensitivity and care. All direct participants were asked if they consented to their answers being used in this thesis and to form part of a report that would be submitted to and eventually published online at Lund’s Tekniska Högskola. All direct participants were asked to state their relationship to the local Grenfell community, either as an individual or organisation to ensure credibility. In addition, they were asked if they wished to remain anonymous or to review my work before final submission to approve/disapprove sections in which answers had been used. Duly, I have all consent statements in writing and have respected all requests

4. Results

4.1 Primary Data; Interviews, Questionnaire and Approved notes from Conversation with CBO staff member.

This section presents results from the questionnaire and the interviews held with current or previous local residents and community members and those who work for local CBOs and faith-based organisations. The findings are presented in accordance with the nine elements that Patel et al. (2017) found as core to community resilience, preceded by the participants' views concerning the essence of resilience and whether they deem that their own community was resilient in the face of the Grenfell Tower disaster and if so, what had made it so. To enhance readability, the questions from the interviews and questionnaire have been inserted whilst presenting the results. The full interview guide and questionnaire is provided by Appendix 1 and were answered by the following persons:

- **Participant 1** – Zaila Rhodes, Parent and local resident (questionnaire respondent)
- **Participant 2** – Gaby Doherty, local resident (interview participant)
- **Participant 3** – Clare Richards, Chief Executive of the Clement James Centre (interview participant)
- **Participant 4** – Jackie Blanchflower, Church Leader at Latymer Community Church (interview participant)

4.1.1 Resilience

- How do you define resilience?

All four participants described resilience as an ability:

- **Participant 1** – *'ability to withstand adverse experiences/environment.'*
 - **Participant 2** – *'being able to continue, to keep going, to not get beaten down or destroyed by life or whatever's happening around you.'*
 - **Participant 3** – *'an ability to move on, move forward and not be completely defined by one incident...'*
 - **Participant 4** – *'it's the ability of an individual or a community to cope with or recover from some sort of event in their lives...'*, in addition, *'becoming able to...first of all function but then also go on to thrive.'*
- Would you define the local Grenfell community as having been resilient in their response to the disaster?

In assessing the resilience of the local community in their response to the disaster, **Participant 1** responded they had been *'incredibly'* so, but the event had *'taken its toll and continues to affect mental health.'* **Participant 2** stated *'we haven't really had any choice; we've had to live*

through it...' **Participants 3 and 4** both described resilience to have been present but also fluctuating. **Participant 3** considered the community as having been initially '*remarkably resilient*' and the core group of survivors and bereaved as to continuing to be '*astonishingly resilient.*' The wider community had '*peaked and troughed in their resilience*' (**Participant 3**). **Participant 4** noted resilience levels a '*a mixed bag*', and, '*some people have been hugely resilient, but I think others have really struggled*' owing to lower levels or pre-existing resilience caused by '*other life events.*'

Participant 3 highlighted factors that had aided the community's resilience, as an established '*amazing sense of community*', as high levels of existing support within the area and the formation of Grenfell United with '*a focus and purpose*' in response to 14th June 2017.

4.1.2 CBOs and the nine core elements of community resilience

Local Knowledge

- *To what extent are community-based organisations positioned to provide local and contextual knowledge about the community's needs?*

All participants were unanimous that CBOs are ideally positioned to provide local and contextual knowledge about the community's needs.

Participant 1 considered them as '*the best placed*', **Participant 2** referred to CBOs as '*vital*', **Participant 3** referred to the importance of '*local and trusted organisations*' and **Participant 4** described the position of CBOs as '*ideal*' as they often work with '*hard to reach people.*'

In response to Grenfell **Participants 2 and 3** highlighted that a length of service endowed CBOs with the trust of the community and as such were identified as '*a trusted safe place*' (**Participant 3**)

Participants 2 and 4 highlighted that CBOs were considered a trusted place to seek help and advice in place of local authority.

Participant 4 highlighted that different organisations were able to serve different needs and support each other's needs gaps '*for example having Muslim Aid coming in and supporting Al Manaar meant that they could also support the rest of us by providing head scarfs...*'

Participant 3 contributed that awareness of community needs can support the community through pre-existing challenges that '*don't suddenly disappear.*'

- *How well placed have the community-based organisations been to provide training and education to the local community? How accessible are they?*

Participant 2 highlighted the Clement James Centre as somewhere that provides *'a lot of education.'*

Participant 3, noted their organisation provides *'training, employment support...education for all ages...advice and guidance, wellbeing support'* and in addition to the range of services on offer they lever *'in other organisations who are specialists.'*

Participant 4 noted that *'different voluntary organisations will have different roles'* and in their role as a community centre and church have put on programmes such as healthy eating, working with *'the NHS to deliver that into the community.'*

Participant 1 recognised such services as *'very accessible and trusted'* by the community and **Participant 2** noted that *'local people do rely on the resources educationally provided.'*

- *To what extent would you say community-based organisations have been active in creating a shared belief amongst the community that it will recover?*

All participants confirmed that CBOs had contributed to belief amongst the community that it will recover, or be able to face disaster related challenges, although not without difficulty.

In regard to CBOs, **Participant 4** noted that *'whether we believe it or not, we have to.'*

Participant 3 said *'we have to believe that otherwise we're kind of failing in our service to this community really.'*

Participant 1 considered the actions of CBOs as *'Very important. Especially in the very early days.'*

Participant 2 highlighted the impact of the timely intervention that CBOs had, noting that they *'acted very quickly.'* They also noted that it was an area familiar with struggle and *'used to standing up'* and that this had got even stronger.

These responses show the importance of the timely interventions of CBOs in response to Grenfell and the impact this had on their community with regard to fostering strength to face on-coming challenges.

As organisations **Participants 3 and 4** noted in their initial response they were functioning in overdrive, but at some stage needed to take stock and consider how to best serve their community. As **Participant 4** highlights, in this moment *'you're making more of a choice of how you're going to respond.'*

The circumstances in which CBOs were required to work were not easy, there was a lack of transparency from the authorities in terms of response strategy. Moreover, CBOs had to find

a balance between *'doing all your regular stuff plus additional stuff that you'd never dreamt of having to do'* (**Participant 3**).

Community networks and relationships

- *How have the community-based organisations helped to maintain and encourage a sense of connectedness and cohesion amongst the local community post-disaster?*

Participants 1, 3 and 4 responded that CBOs acted to encourage a sense of connectedness and cohesion amongst the local community post-disaster.

Participant 2 highlighted contextual influences that drove connectedness and cohesion as friendships, networks and by living in close proximity.

A factor that shone through from **Participants 1, 3 and 4** was that CBOs that had premises were integral to connectedness and cohesion. **Participant 1** noted CBOs *'provided a place of gathering together free of judgement and authority trust issues. A place to talk and share feelings. A place for positive experiences.'*

Participant 4 mentioned the benefit of CBOs, regardless of ethos was that *'they're still open to everybody...'* so naturally provide a place for people and groups to gather and connect.

Both participants from organisations noted that they had endeavoured to make their buildings press exclusion zones, further embedding them within the trust of their community.

Additionally, connection and cohesion amongst CBOs in the response to Grenfell was deemed integral by **Participant 4**. There was an element of solidarity between organisations experiencing the same stress. Furthermore, connection amongst CBOs allowed them to coordinate donation handling and storage whereby *'each place was like specialising in something'* (**Participant 4**). Their organisation had *'all the food that was non-perishable'*, and another, childcare items for example (**Participant 4**).

Communication

- *To what extent did you observe community organisations acting as an effective source of emergency communication and information to the affected community post-disaster?*

All participants confirmed CBOs had worked to provide emergency communication and information to the affected community, although not without challenge and with limited effectiveness due the situation they were faced with and a lack of information from the authorities.

Participant 1 noted that CBOs *'definitely'* provided information, although *'you did need to know where to ask and who to ask to some extent.'*

Participant 2 mentioned outside *'Latymer Christian Centre'* there was *'a table and it had lots of the information newsletters.'* Furthermore, CBOs and faith centres hosted public meetings and would advertise this information to the public.

Participants 3 confirmed that their organisation had acted to provide emergency information to the public, but the means by which they could was very *'needs must.'*

Participant 4 described the process of providing information to the public *'really hard...'*

Participants 3 and 4 commented that in terms of official communication from the authority to their organisations and to the public as *'probably the greatest failing post Grenfell locally'* (**Participant 3**) and *'a complete nightmare'* (**Participant 4**).

Participant 4 noted that the lack of central coordination in the early hours of the disaster made it hard to establish where had opened as a reception centre and where had not ultimately resulting in a chaotic and distressing situation whereby it was hard to direct members of the public as to where they could look for family members.

Despite this, CBOs endeavoured to provide relevant information to their community and to set up information sharing amongst their organisations.

Participants 3 and 4 described the organic processes by which they sought to address the issues surrounding communication. **Participant 3** conducted a daily morning briefing to provide staff with the most up to date information possible, sending staff to other centres to gather information, to then feedback internally and then externally to the public. **Participant 4** noted that after a WhatsApp group had been created between *'all the key coordinators at all the different centres'*, they were able to know *'what each other was doing.'* The process was described as having *'the mobile number for each coordinator and having a coordinator at each place you could actually get through to as another coordinator'* (**Participant 4**).

The important consideration here is that despite all the turmoil and intensity of trauma being experienced, these organisations worked to provide the community with information in the manner that they were able through networking. It may have not been perfect, but they did what they could in the fraught circumstances.

Health

- *To what extent did community organisations act as providers of care for the communities physical and/or mental health needs post-disaster?*

In the provision of care for the physical and mental health needs to their community post-disaster the results indicated that this was delivered by CBOs with the support of volunteer medical staff and coordination with specialist organisations offering their services.

Participant 1 responded that there was *'lots of physical and mental health help available through volunteers at community organisations.'*

Participant 2 also mentioned that *'there was a lot of help available.'*

Participants 3 and 4 recognised that whilst their teams were first aid trained, the greatest contribution was from volunteer medical staff and ambulance services, for example *'loads of volunteer doctors just arrived at the centre who were offering their support...'* (**Participant 3**).

In terms of mental health care provision CBOs were considered ideally positioned to coordinate with trusted specialist organisations to support both their staff and the community they serve. CBOs were highlighted as more approachable than the local National Health Service (NHS). Their position enabled them to signpost community members to the services they needed.

Participant 3 mentioned their organisation *'levered in things like Winston's Wish, Child Bereavement UK, Samaritans...to offer that specialist support alongside our staff team...'*

Participant 4 also mentioned their position as a church connected them with the Billy Graham Association's disaster response chaplains which *'did a massive amount of really pastoral support'* of which they *'could have complete confidence in...'*

Additionally, both **Participants 3 and 4** mentioned as organisations that they had sought internal staff training early on in the response to better equip them in dealing with traumatised people.

There are a number of key factors present here, firstly that CBOs had the space in which to provide assistance. Secondly that as familiar organisations those volunteering services would know to go to these centres. Thirdly that networks maintained within these CBOs resourced them with trusted support, both for training and care purposes.

Governance & Leadership

- *To what extent have community-based organisations empowered and engaged the local community in the response and recovery periods after Grenfell?*

CBOs were considered to have empowered and engaged the local community in the response and recovery periods, with an amount of grass-roots engagement.

Participant 1 described CBOs as *'hugely'*, contributing to empowerment through providing *'a place to gather and talk and share ideas.'*

Participant 2 also responded that CBOs had *'definitely'* engaged and empowered the local community as well as highlighting that *'local people have started up local organisations in response...'*

Participants 3 and 4 highlighted their ability to host as empowering and engaging the local community. **Participant 3** noted they had offered *'a free space to come together'* for emerging groups and by *'being there if they've wanted advice on stuff'* without imposing their opinion.

Participant 4 described their role as *'encouraging people to engage, whilst also respecting that you know some people, they just can't at that time.'*

As an organisation they were able to host meetings between the official response authorities, the Residents Association and the community.

Within the community, **Participant 2** shared that *'people were already quite empowered'* and that *'they've become more empowered'*, highlighting the Silent Walk as a symbol of community engagement and empowerment. **Participant 2** notes the Silent Walk as *'a really powerful sign of solidarity...'*

- *To what extent have community-based organisations provided guidance and leadership in the response to the Grenfell disaster?*

Participants 1, 3 and 4 reported that to some degree CBOs had provided guidance and leadership. There was a difference in response between **Participants 3 and 4** as to how their organisations did so.

Participant 1 highlighted that *'The faith centres provided a much-needed place of practical and emotional support from day one.'*

Participant 4 noted with regard to emotional and spiritual care *'faith group organisations are really well positioned because that's what we do anyway.'* In the response to Grenfell, faith organisations were considered key in offering emotional and spiritual guidance through the grieving process.

Participant 3 shared that as an organisation their efforts concentrated on being available, providing guidance and structural support as and where requested, along the lines of *'if you let us know and we can, then we will.'*

- *In what way could community-based organisations be considered as key facilitators for the local community in advocating for their recovery?*

CBOs were confirmed by all participants as key facilitators for the local community in advocating for their recovery after 14th June 2017. A strong response by **Participant 2** supported this as *'Yeah, definitely. Without a doubt.'*

Participants 1 and 4 highlighted community trust in CBOs over those in authority as an important factor in the response. The strain of broken trust towards authority after 14th June 2017 meant many in the community were not comfortable approaching official channels for help. As a result of earned trust, CBOs *'could speak for those people as well as provide help and guidance from official organisations that otherwise wouldn't have reached those people'* (**Participant 1**).

Participants 3 and 4 commented that they were in a position to see *'patterns of barriers that people are facing'* (**Participant 3**) and see what needs aren't *'being picked up elsewhere'* (**Participant 4**) and could then pass this forward to the respective authorities.

Furthermore, **Participant 3** noted that they were also able to facilitate meetings between authority leaders and local people, whilst stepping back and acknowledging *'it would be much better if you actually spoke to the people this is affecting'*, in doing so, enabling the community to air their concerns whilst holding people in authority to account.

Resources

- *To what extent did you see community organisations provide access to resources to the local community in their time of need?*

All participants reported that local CBOs had provided the local community with access to resources in their time of need. The types of resources supplied ranged through physical, technical, human, financial, legal and so on. As **Participant 1** noted, CBOs *'provided everything.'*

Participant 2 shared that some organisations already maintained *'give and take'* schemes which meant they were somewhat resourced initially.

After 14th June 2017, the local area was flooded with voluntary donations. However, as **Participants 2, 3 and 4** noted, this was potentially more of a hindrance outside of the immediate response.

Both **Participants 3 and 4** stressed the contribution of the business community through donations in kind and resource provision as integral. **Participant 4** commented *'for the first week we didn't need money, we'd just ring up anyone and they'd send us huge great industrial fans, they would send us food, water, whatever...it was just incredible.'*

Importantly, CBOs were also able to provide space as a resource, not just as a shelter, but as a place through which external organisations could set up a provide services to the community such as assistance with *'application forms for funding'* (**Participant 3**).

One element highlighted as particularly challenging was in providing financial assistance. **Participant 4** commented *'you need the secondhand stuff and everything for the first few hours, but then actually you need money.'* Described as the hardest process, *'was getting the money to people and then processing that money because, obviously you've got to be accountable...'* (**Participant 4**). The results indicated that whilst structures were put in place after a short time *'it was those first few days where the need was greatest where you were all having to make up your systems on the hoof'* (**Participant 4**).

Economic investment

- *To what extent could you consider community-based organisations as having encouraged economic development prior to the disaster and/or encouraging economic regrowth post disaster for the benefit of the local community?*

When asked to what extent they considered community-based organisations as having encouraged economic development prior to the disaster and/or encouraging economic regrowth post disaster for the benefit of the local community, the responses were not so direct rather presenting the financial context of the area.

Participants 1 and 2 acknowledged that local CBOs supported their community's economic development through back to work schemes and working on youth employment and opportunities.

Participant 3 spoke in relation to economic investment, that on paper the authority was *'supportive of the voluntary sector and investing in the area and acknowledging that there was this, you know, disparity between wealth and poverty.'* However, housing was very much considered a commodity, noting that *'there was definitely a push, a sort of creep over the years that I've been here towards...kind of managed decline'* (**Participant 3**).

Participant 4 highlighted that they would encourage staff and community members to *'play an active part in community life so that they can influence what's going on.'* Although the dynamic between the community and the authority was presented as *'power and powerlessness'*, that people in the area *'had not had power for generations'* and there is an assumption by those in charge that *'they know what everyone else needs and don't actually listen and respond...'* (**Participant 4**).

This is arguably not an area in which CBOs are considered particularly relevant, predominantly because it is not their responsibility. CBOs invest in their communities through their effort, time and resources and it is the responsibility of local and national authorities to consider economic investment in communities. These results indicate however, that this had

potentially been lacking in the local Grenfell Community and surrounding estates. Moreover, that the process of engaging with the local authority was characterised by a feeling of helplessness against an air of official ambivalence.

Preparedness

- *In what ways do you consider local community organisations as being prepared to respond to a crisis, or as increasing their level of preparedness to respond to potential future emergencies since the Grenfell disaster?*

CBOs were considered prepared to respond to a crisis, or as increasing their level of preparedness to respond to potential future crises since 14th June 2017 to a degree.

Participant 1 commented that CBOs *‘were way more prepared than official channels who froze. And are still frozen.’* **Participant 2** thought that *‘people were always prepared to respond to a crisis’* on a smaller scale, but that *‘now, they’re even more prepared and ready.’*

Participant 4 commented, *‘I can’t speak for all agencies/organisations, but out of those that I know that responded, obviously I think we all responded because that is in our nature. Because we are here for the community, we are part of the community...’* That at a base level *‘you haven’t got a choice really’* (**Participant 4**).

While CBOs and the community were not prepared to respond to a crisis on this scale there was an instinctive willingness to respond in whatever fashion they could, driven by their *‘normal human compassion’* (**Participant 4**). **Participant 4** contributed *‘I’m really glad we felt we could do what we did, and it did make a difference.’* Both **Participants 3 and 4** shared that they had a genuine belief that an official would approach them with a plan, yet they were left *‘waiting for someone to tell you what to do’* (**Participant 4**).

There were elements of organisational learning present in the CBOs response to Grenfell. **Participant 4** drew upon the importance of visibility in a disaster. Their staff would not necessarily be in uniform or be identifiable to those who did not know them, so they procured *‘lanyards for everyone’* and they did so *‘quite early on’* (**Participant 4**).

Since Grenfell there has been a lot of thought gone into preparedness thinking at national level, of which organisational experiences of the 14th of June and aftermath had fed into. However, according to **Participant 3**, this *‘doesn’t seem to have fed back down again’*.

Mental outlook

- *To what extent have you witnessed community-based organisations contributing to a sense of hope about the future post-Grenfell?*

CBOs had contributed to a sense of hope amongst the community for the future according to two, the other 2 participants spoke more thematically of hope within the community.

Participant 1 shared that CBOs *'definitely provided a sense of hope.'*

Participant 3 considered it a crucial organisational role, *'when it comes to resilience I think the key role we can play and are playing is in getting people to set goals and think about going forward.'* Whilst also providing space to talk about past experiences.

Participants 2 and 4 acknowledged that hope was quite difficult for many as there is a huge loss amongst the community, and likely will be for quite some time, as the process of moving forward was not about forgetting. **Participant 4** noted:

I think there's a whole discussion to be had on what does hope look like in a disaster? What is hope? What are we really saying we're hopeful about? I don't know. My phrase for hope is, well the sun rose again. There's still another day, we are still here...

Furthermore, levels of hope were considered time dependent. Initially when everyone is together there is a sense of hope however, as time moves on and the community is faced with institutional battles and the trauma remains for a long time, hope fades to a degree.

Participant 2 expressed hope amongst the community as; *'we've got a kind of, we've been in it together, we've survived this.'*

Participants 2 and 4 highlighted the Grenfell Silent Walk/March as an important sign of hope amongst the community, allowing space and time for people to gather and communally grieve, whilst also showing unity and purpose, reinforcing a several layered hope and search for justice, bound by *'this should never happen again'*, *'that there should be justice for those that died'* and the survivors need to be *'all housed well in places they can feel safe and comfortable and provided for'* (**Participant 2**).

- *To what extent have community-based organisations helped the local community adapt to changes and uncertainty about the future that occurred post-Grenfell?*

CBOs were considered to have assisted their community in dealing with uncertainty and change post 14th June 2017.

Participant 1 responded that *'they have been a permanent and reliable source of help and positivity throughout.'*

Two important contributions from **Participants 3 and 4** showed how as organisations they were able to assist in dealing with uncertainty and change.

Firstly, **Participant 3** noted that their efforts to deal with uncertainty came through information sharing, *'providing information when we have it' and 'doing it in a kind of factual way...sharing information and providing advice and guidance and support but trying not to stamp too much of an opinion.'*

Secondly, **Participant 4** noted *'I think the best thing you can do is the fact that we're still here...people can still come in, whatever, there's the same faces...'* Consistency and continuity of service was considered an integral part of the response of CBOs in the Grenfell aftermath.

4.1.3 Further contributions or comments on the role of CBOs in the response and recovery periods, towards resilience post the Grenfell Tower fire

Participant 1 highlighted a major issue as *'the attitude of the authorities in wanting to do things their way and pushing back at volunteer and community organisations and devaluing them.'*

Participant 1 also contributed that the official channels *'continue to be surprised that their way or working has not reached the community.'* The response to Grenfell has also led to a lack of trust in authority; *'Before Grenfell I trusted in authority. Witnessing their response in the aftermath truly astounded me'* (**Participant 1**).

Participant 3 shared that funding channels needed to consider the roles of CBOs before, during and after a disaster. The day to day challenges faced amongst communities did not disappear in a disaster, if anything they are heightened and whilst CBOs work to meet both immediate and existing demands *'it does put a strain on organisations'* (**Participant 3**).

Participant 4 raised three points for the future. Firstly, it was helpful when they were approached by the NHS and asked what mental health training needs there might be. Secondly, sharing between community leaders and getting *'peer group support is really, really invaluable'* (**Participant 4**). Thirdly, emergency finance systems for CBOs would be a fundamental asset to appropriate funds without being caught up in paperwork.

4.1.4 Approved notes in conversation with staff member of CBO working closely with the Grenfell response and recovery:

- Community organisations have been very important to the response and in helping resilience, but it should not be up to them. The government should be doing more.
- It's very difficult to be non-political, as it is such a political issue. Social cleansing is a very real sentiment felt amongst survivors.
- Community organisations have been meeting the unmet needs in that area long before the fire, and there is a long-standing history of unmet needs in the area.
- People are angry, it is a resilient community, but very hard to gain the trust of the community.

- The process of recovery will take a long time.
- The ultimate takeaway is the government should have done more, the community organisations have done the best they can to fill the gaps, but ultimately it should not have been up to them to do it.

4.2 Secondary data

This section presents the results from an analysis of 86 **Individual Witness Statements (IWS)** from the Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry.

Table 2. Number of direct references to organisations in 86 IWS

References to Organisations in 86 IWS	
References to Organisations:	Number of Appearances:
Faith Centres, e.g. Churches & Mosques	36
CBOs, e.g. Youth Clubs, Social Clubs, Community Centres, Local Charities	82
Grass-roots movements/organisations, e.g. emergent Not-For-Profits & Campaign Groups	9
Local Businesses, e.g. Pubs, Bars, Shops	3
Nationwide and National Charities	3
	Total: 134

Table 3. Key Organisations Referenced in 86 IWS

Key Organisations Referenced in 86 IWS	
Organisation:	Type:
The Harrow Club	Youth Club/Community Centre/Local Charity
Rugby Portobello Trust	Local Charity
The Clement James Centre	Local Charity/Community Centre
Latymer Community Church (formerly, Latymer Christian Centre)	Church/Faith Centre/Community Centre
St. Clement Church	Church/Faith Centre
St. James Church	Church/Faith Centre
Al Manaar Mosque	Mosque/Faith Centre/Community Centre
The Westway Trust*	Local Charity

*It is important to note that the Westway Trust became the official relief hub for six weeks after the 14th June 2017 (Westway Trust, n.d.).

Emergent Grass-Roots Organisations:

- Grenfell United
- Relative Justice
- Beyond Grenfell
- Humanity for Grenfell

4.2.1 Organisational Types

The analysis of the IWS through Dynes' (2002) framework on established, expanding, extending or emergent, showed that all CBOs and faith centres mentioned can be categorised as extending organisations, the grass roots movements referred to as emergent and the nationwide charities as established.

4.2.2 CBOs, faith centres and Patel et al's. (2017) nine core elements

A review of the 86 individual witness statements through Patel et al's. (2017) nine core elements found that CBOs and faith centres were referenced as having made contributions to community resilience through the nine core elements presented in the following table.

Table 4. CBO contribution to nine core elements and 19 sub-elements of community resilience in 86 IWS.

Nine core elements and 19 sub-elements	Total number of references
Local Knowledge	8
Factual Knowledge Base	
Training and Education	2
Collective Efficacy and Empowerment	6
Community Networks and Relationships	20*
Connectedness	
Cohesion	
Communication	22
Risk Communication	
Crisis Communication	22
Effective Communication	
Health	6
Mental Health	1
Physical Health	5
Health Services	
Governance and Leadership	7
Infrastructure and services	3
Public involvement and support	4
Resources	82
Resources	82
Economic Investment	0
Post-disaster Economic Programming	
Post-disaster Economic Development	
Preparedness	0
Planning and Mitigation	
Mental Outlook	0
Hope	
Adaptability	

*During the analysis references to connectedness and cohesion were considered the same, so the total is provided and not separated into either category.

There were no direct references to economic investment, preparedness or mental outlook. These categories are less straightforward to ascertain the levels of in terms of CBO

contribution through the IWS. However, mental outlook as hope and adaptability thematically presented themselves whilst not being explicitly referred to. The contribution of CBOs to long term economic investment was not mentioned as it is not relevant to the first stage of the inquiry as it is predominantly focussed on the events of the 14th of June 2017 and the ensuing aftermath. The contribution of CBOs to preparedness is also not explicitly mentioned in the IWS.

4.2.3 Sense of Community

In reviewing the IWS, it was important to consider the perceived sense of community amongst the witnesses both prior to the 14th of June 2017 and after. The results are shown here:

Table 5. References to Sense of Community in 86 IWS.

	Pre 14th June 2017	Post 14th June 2017
Positive	27	17
Negative	0	5

For examples of statements used to conduct this analysis, please see Appendix 2.

4.2.4 Social Capital Analysis

The number of references in the 86 witness statements to the presence of bonded, bridged and linked social capital in providing access to resources on the 14th June 2017 and in the aftermath are shown in the following table. Examples can be found in Appendix 3.

Table 6. References to type of social capital present in the 86 individual witness statements.

Type of Social Capital	Number of references
Bonded	24
Bridged	48
Linked	10

4.2.5 Other Key themes

In addition to highlighting the organisational types present, the roles of CBOs, the sense of community and activation of social capital that could be uncovered in the IWS. There are some other important themes amongst the 86 IWS that are worth mentioning:

- The local community is incredibly diverse and there were defined communities existing within the broader local community context.
- There was a lack of visibility and accountable presence from official and responsible organisations.
- Communication and information to the public was poor, a lot of information sharing was done organically, at an individual and volunteer level.

Examples of statements highlighting these themes are provided in Appendix 4.

5. Discussion

This section handles the second and third research questions individually. The first part discusses the role of CBOs in shaping the response to 14th June 2017 and their contributions to resilience. The second part explores the advantages of engagement with CBOs and grass-roots movements to increase social cohesion and resilience to disasters at a community level and how this further develops community resilience.

5.1 Examining the role of CBOs in shaping the response to the Grenfell Tower disaster. Are they the crucial components to this community's resilience?

Considering resilience as an ability or process, and an adaptation to disturbance rather than a return to stability, we can understand this community at large to have been resilient in their response to 14th June 2017 (Norris et al., 2008; Manyena, 2006; Berkes, 2007). The community having faced a major traumatic event, is working to adapt to the changes that a terrible disaster has caused. Community resilience projects to disasters are often focused, as aforementioned, in areas whereby governments and aid agencies are not positioned to provide immediate assistance (Patel et al. 2017; Norris et al., 2008; Cox & Perry, 2011; Abramson et al., 2015). What makes this case particularly interesting is that this disaster occurred in an inner London borough, where the assumption is that the local authorities would be prepared to respond and offer effective assistance immediately. However, beyond the professional response from the emergency services, the local authority, as the evidence suggests were inadequately prepared to handle such a crisis. Instead, the community, CBOs and faith organisations worked instinctively to fill this gap.

The narrative of community resilience in the response to, and aftermath of Grenfell highlights a number of characterising factors. This is a community with multiple, diverse and strong identities, with a strong pre-existing sense of community. The strong pre-existing sense of community has not been destroyed by the disaster, but has, as witnessed through the formation of emergent groups such as Grenfell United, Justice4Grenfell and the monthly silent march, adapted. There is a common purpose held within these grass-roots movements, backed by the community and the wider public, which is to seek justice for the victims of 14th June 2017, to ensure survivors are appropriately cared for and to ensure that such an event never happens again. Creating this collective narrative, in the face of trauma, adversity and powerlessness seemingly drives their response.

The narrative equally demonstrated functioning social capital in response to the disaster. Evidence of bonded, bridged and linked social capital permeates through the results and confirms much of the existing literature on social capital in disasters. Among the 86 IWS, there are multiple cases demonstrating the community as first responders, accessing resources

through individual and collective networks, and of community members supporting each other, whether emotionally close or not, through their shared experience.

Arguably labelling the CBOs as *the* crucial component to this community's resilience is therefore too narrow, rather they must be considered as a crucial component of the community that worked to facilitate its resilience in the face of immense pressure and lacklustre official support.

The role of CBOs in shaping the response to Grenfell should be considered integral and not overlooked or understated. The benefits of future engagement with such organisations will be expanded on in the next section, however the actions of CBOs within the Grenfell case will be discussed here.

Studying the role of CBOs in the response to Grenfell through Patel et al.'s (2017) nine core elements, and 19 sub-elements has limitations. Elements within this framework exist that are arguably not the core offering of CBOs before, during and after a disaster. This framework was derived out of a literature review of community resilience definitions, grounded in theory and less so, reality. However, when applying this framework to a case study and engaging with the specifics of the Grenfell disaster that CBOs and faith organisations worked within, a number of tangible, constituent elements of community resilience surface, supported through the actions of CBOs. Equally, there are constituent elements of community resilience, that whilst not the core offering of a CBO, as in the case of Grenfell, they worked to uphold as best possible.

5.1.1 Economic Investment

Sub-divided by Patel et al. (2017) as post-disaster economic development and post-disaster economic programming is, in the context of Grenfell, not a core offering of CBOs. Whilst CBOs are involved in improving the financial circumstances of their community through various finance and debt management education programmes, economic investment in the area, particularly in relation to disaster financing is placed elsewhere and is the responsibility of local and national authorities.

5.1.2 Health

Seen as both physical and mental health care, CBOs in the context of Grenfell, whilst not required to be responsible for, facilitated. Indicated in the results, CBOs were able to provide access to these services. In relation to physical health, the core offering of CBOs was of space, whereby voluntary medical staff and emergency responders were able to operate. With regard to mental health, whilst some CBO's mentioned in the results and in Doherty (2018) were trained to offer these services, others either acquired training in response to Grenfell or levered in trusted organisations to provide appropriate levels of care.

5.1.3 Communication

Another element whereby the responsibility to provide effective, crisis and risk communication in a disaster is not the responsibility of a CBO. Rather it is the responsibility of the official response team and local authorities. However, as the results indicate this is an arena in which CBOs and faith organisations worked to fill a needs gap in testing circumstances. As acknowledged by the respondents and in the IWS, it was organic, ad hoc and imperfect, however the importance lies in the fact that they did what they could in recognition that it was needed.

5.1.4 Governance and Leadership

Considered by Patel et al. (2017) to consist of infrastructure and services and public involvement and support this is another element which might not be considered relevant in the traditional sense to the offering of CBOs in the context of Grenfell. These notions are prescribed to a local authority, particularly infrastructure and services. However, in the context of Grenfell, CBOs can be seen as part of the local community infrastructure providing invaluable service. As a part of their community, CBOs worked to involve and engage the public in the response and recovery process, whilst they may not have done so directly, their offering, evidenced by the results, is more of facilitation and provision. Linked social capital is embedded in their actions, hosting meetings between officials and the public, providing space for groups to organise and gather whilst offering support as required are all examples in the case of Grenfell whereby CBOs played an integral role, again whilst not being a core responsibility. Furthermore, the faith-based organisations can be considered to have been vital in providing emotional and spiritual guidance and leadership. This might fall outside of traditional measures of governance and leadership, albeit a crucial offering in a time of tragedy.

The relevant factors of resilience that CBOs contributed in the Grenfell context could be considered as local knowledge, community networks and relationships, resources, preparedness and mental outlook. This should not overshadow their efforts in the aforementioned elements, but rather shine a light on what CBOs in the context of Grenfell were incredibly well positioned to do to support resilience.

5.1.5 Local Knowledge

Whilst not explicitly referred to in the 86 IWS more than 8 times, this is an element in which CBOs were considered highly relevant in the Grenfell context. The primary results indicated that CBOs are best positioned to provide knowledge of community needs and support collective efficacy and empowerment.

Firstly, community embedded CBOs are aware of existing and ongoing needs, which do not disappear in crisis. Secondly, the length of service to their community had endowed them with community trust, thereby identifying them as a safe space. This is corroborated in the

secondary data by the number of mentions CBOs and faith-based organisations received in the 86 IWS as places that survivors and members of the local community sought help. Thirdly, as CBOs work within cultural diversity, some will be more relevant to particular identities within a community than others, in addition to working with hard-to-reach people. CBOs in the context of Grenfell had a better understanding of their community than official or external organisations.

Services to collective efficacy and empowerment in the context of the response to Grenfell were equally important. The consistency and continuity of support offered by CBOs to a community experiencing traumatic loss reassured a belief that they were supported from within. Recovery might be a long process but there is confidence that the community will be supported through the process.

5.1.6 Community Networks and Relationships

Their ability as open organisations to provide safe spaces, where people could connect and support one another through a traumatic time is an invaluable service. Furthermore, their ability to network with other organisations, not only provided solidarity, but also enabled them to tailor a response organically, to take responsibility for storing goods and to organise collectively to provide support to their community.

5.1.7 Resources

Whilst flooded with donations, both wanted and unwanted, supported by the business community through financial donations and required goods, CBOs were able to resource their community as best they could. Additionally, CBOs levered in trusted external organisations and voluntary services to provide technical resources. Mentioned on 82 occasions in the 86 IWS, CBOs were considered by the community to have been somewhere they could go to be resourced. Although as mentioned in the results, financial resourcing had been a challenging process, whilst donations in kind were required to a degree, business contributions accurately filled this gap. Beyond the immediate aftermath, financial resourcing is what the community most needed.

5.1.8 Preparedness

As organisations that interact with people in crisis, although on a smaller scale, CBOs had a mentality that dictated that they would respond in whichever way they could. Their actions made an important difference. Clearly it is not the remit of local CBOs to have been prepared to respond to a crisis on a major scale: this responsibility lies with the local authority and official response channels. CBOs as organisations that serve their community were already positioned to offer immediate care and support, if not to respond to a disaster. Their timely interventions were not only crucial, but an outward visible symbol to their community that they would continue to be ready to support them.

5.1.9 Mental Outlook

Whilst hope in such an event often peaks and troughs, CBOs, whether directly or indirectly worked to encourage hope and importantly appropriate it at the right level. Their contribution to adaptability can be witnessed in their continuity of service and engaged support for their community.

5.2 Exploring the advantages of engaging with grass-roots movements or CBOs at a local level to increase social cohesion and resilience to disasters in the community.

There are numerous advantages of engaging with grass-roots movements or CBOs at a local level that can increase social cohesion and resilience to disasters in the community. The official inquiry into Grenfell is a crucial part of due process, however as the Bishop of Kensington noted on the social legacy of Grenfell, “if all we do is think about fire safety and building regulations, we will have missed a vital opportunity” (Tomlin, 2019, p.3). There are important lessons to be learned, both in how create and retain community, but also in disaster response and community resilience as to how we value and engage with local level actors in building resilience and response capacities to disasters (Tomlin, 2019; Plastow, 2018a). The actions of local organisations in the response to Grenfell have in subsequent reports, and in this thesis, attempted to highlight the advantages of engagement with local actors and CBOs (Plastow, 2018a; Tomlin, 2019). As noted by Plastow, the “Grenfell Tower response has demonstrated the critical importance of local actors.” (2018a, p.33).

In addition to the constituent elements of community resilience that CBOs, faith-based organisations and to a degree, grass-roots movements were seen as integral in supporting during the Grenfell response, there are other finer points that arise in the results worth considering.

CBOs and faith-based organisations often exist within larger networks and structures, and whilst on the surface their capacities as single entities may be considered small, the broader networks of local actors are often not truly appreciated. Accounts in the results and in Grenfell Hope (Doherty, 2018) show how many of the local actors involved were supported in their service provision by the larger networks within which they exist. This is particularly true of faith-based organisations. Charitable organisations are also well equipped in their networks to draw in trusted support. Combining this with the well-established point that these organisations hold the trust of the community enables a layered trust structure; the community trusts CBOs, and the CBOs trust their partnered organisations. The ability to act upon strong, established trust-based relationships improves community cohesion and resilience to disasters through strengthening bonded and bridged social capital between the community and local actors.

Local organisations that work within communities are often reflective of the genetic makeup of that place. This is a point raised by Plastow (2018a), the benefits of which, as shown in the Grenfell experience is that these organisations can work to deliver culturally appropriate and

sensitive support. Engaging with local organisations from a disaster response and resilience perspective would allow for a greater awareness of needs, service provision and avoid inappropriate support in the event of a disaster.

As local organisations tend to be staffed by those living locally, as the primary and secondary data indicate, they are able to respond rapidly to deliver services to their community in crisis. Therefore, engaging with such organisations prior to a disaster and equipping them, if needed, with necessary emergency supplies, training and resources will quicken the initial response.

An integral theme, often reoccurring within this thesis, and among the other reports by Tomlin (2019), Plastow (2018a) and Plender (2018) is the importance of being local to a community, particularly with regard to local knowledge, community networks and relationships, resourcing, preparedness and mental outlook. The fact that CBOs, faith-based organisations and grass-roots movements are grounded and rooted in their communities presents a vital opportunity for local engagement in developing resilience to disasters. These organisations are aware of the contextual needs of their communities, seeing patterns of vulnerabilities, distilling the information and advocating on it. Investment and partnership in such organisations mean contextual knowledge of existing vulnerabilities which may become acute in a disaster is readily available.

In addition, many faith-based organisations and CBOs are considered accessible by their communities. As Tomlin notes “time and again, the places local people went to find help was in the places where they already had established relationships...places that had been around for a long time and would be there long after the other offers of help had disappeared.” (2019, p.10). This is something which must be acknowledged moving forward. Communities in crisis will seek support from those whom they are already supported by and community resilience efforts need to factor this by engaging with local actors, to support them appropriately. Furthermore, the accessibility of these organisations to their community provides a great advantage in increasing preparedness through disaster related training. There is an opportunity, as Plender (2018) mentions to use their position within communities to roll out emergency training. The methods by which to do so, based on best practice and trust, can either be offered to staff to then roll out, or to partner with CBOs to roll out through workshops. However, this must be needs based and relevant. A continual complaint in the example of Grenfell before, during and after the disaster was the presupposition of needs by the authorities, rather than listening to those on the ground; it was experienced as “paternalistic and patronising” (Tomlin, 2019, p.5).

Ultimately when building resilience at the local level to disasters, knowledge is key (Chong, Kamarudin & Wahid, 2018). Exemplified in natural disasters, communities that are well-informed of their vulnerabilities and work to mitigate against them, can reduce their own losses (Chong, Kamarudin & Wahid, 2018). However, this knowledge needs to be equally reflected at a local and national official response level, particularly in urban disasters. As noted, the community and residents of Grenfell were aware of their existing vulnerabilities and reported them, yet their voices were not heard, and tragedy ensued. With local

organisations aware of existing vulnerabilities, there is an opportunity for knowledge sharing, both bottom up and top down. However, this process is made redundant if channels for local voices are not open nor concerns appropriately addressed.

In seeking to develop partnership between CBOs, faith groups, external agencies and authorities, there is a level of suspicion. In the broader context this often boils down to amateurs versus experts, in the sense that local organisations do not possess the expertise of the more professional and established agencies in building resilience to disasters and developing response capacities and their involvement while well intended may not be aligned to the experts (Tomlin, 2019; Plastow, 2018a). However, this is a rather unnecessary suspicion, as exemplified in the Grenfell case. While not experts in disaster response and resilience per se, local organisations are indeed experts in their community and have the relationships with community members that external agencies are seeking to assist. Therefore, developing a support-based relationship is advantageous to both parties, local organisations can be supported appropriately in building community resilience in the communities they know so well and be guided by agencies that know the technical detail of resilience to disasters. In return, external agencies are equipped with a grounded understanding of the vulnerabilities which communities face and can tailor their service appropriately.

Visibility and flexibility are two benefits highlighted by Plender (2018), in Doherty (2018) as well as the primary data and 86 IWS that also contribute to the benefits of engagement with CBOs and faith groups. In addition to locality, visibility was a key attribute of CBOs and faith groups in the response to Grenfell. The ability of those in crisis to not only identify the local organisations present but equally those that were working for them, contributed to community cohesion and morale, to know they were supported, and supported locally. This was a particular highlight of the response of faith groups whereby uniform and identification could establish signposting for those of a particular faith. Furthermore, flexibility is another key attribute of CBOs and faith groups, often able to work in structures which are less rigid than formal response agencies, meaning they have agility in a crisis.

Engaging with grass-roots movements also presents fertile ground to build community resilience to disasters. As noted by Tomlin (2019, p.12), there is a “desperate need for community.” In combination with CBOs and faith groups, grass-roots movements are a way in which the community can connect and remain connected. They are an avenue through which community members of diverse backgrounds can come together under a common purpose, to gather, to share and to contribute. Engaging and supporting such movements, which often arise from an awareness of unmet needs ultimately supports relationship building and connection within a community. Connection and cohesion, as constituent sub-elements of community resilience, work to combat isolation. When building resilience towards disasters, the more communities are encouraged to connect, the greater the levels of social capital that will form, which could be activated to resource those suffering if disasters occur.

6. Conclusions

Community resilience exists as a concept with multiple interpretations as evidenced through the literature review. In this thesis, community has been interpreted in connection with locality where both place orientation and social interaction in built, natural, social, and economic environments are key. Resilience has been considered as a process reliant on the adaptive capacities contained within social systems, including the institutions and organisations that support the societal fabric. Several researchers have attempted to operationalise the concept of community resilience, whereof Patel et al. (2017) suggest it comprises of nine core elements. These elements were used as a basis to investigate how resilience manifested in the community response to the Grenfell Tower disaster and to examine the roles of local organisations in supporting community resilience.

The actions and commitment to the community of organisations local to Grenfell Tower following the 14th June 2017 fire are notable and enduring and provide insight to the discussion on creating and retaining resilient communities. CBO's, faith-based organisations and grass-roots movements played an invaluable role in the response effort. Either by filling a needs gap left by the official response or extending their services beyond their usual remit due to the adverse circumstances. Community resilience was strengthened from the combined efforts of these organisations, who, by inception exist for the benefit of their community, embedded within them, visibly present, flexible and relevant to the people they serve.

Engaging with local organisations that interact at a grass-roots level allows for a better understanding of specific and thematic community needs. Moreover, these organisations maintain the trust of their community and are more likely to be accessed than external organisations present in a disaster particularly when civic trust is low.

Local organisations can facilitate and foster networks and relationships across varying scales which can drive bridged and linked social capital. These relationships can be activated in crises to resource the community, either through bridged relationships formed amongst the community in engaging with local and grass-roots organisations or through the linked relationships between organisations and authority, to resource the community appropriately in response or to advocate in recovery.

As this report contends, amongst the constituent elements of community resilience, CBOs, faith-based organisations and grass-roots movements can be considered crucial in terms of local knowledge, community networks and relationships, resources, preparedness and mental outlook. The advantages of engaging with such organisations are reflected in the case study, but moreover are reflective of the need to support such organisations in strengthening community resilience. Communities are complex and multi-layered human systems and developing community resilience remains challenging. However, in acknowledging the need

for community, for increased social cohesion and connection to build social capital we must invest in the human institutions that support these processes, fostering a greater level of resilience.

The fundamental purpose of this thesis was to contribute to our understanding of the processes of creating and retaining resilient communities with a particular focus on how CBOs and grass-root movements may contribute, and it has achieved this by addressing the stated aims and research questions. The framework developed by Patel et al. (2017) and employed in this thesis has proved relevant and useful to understanding the creation and retention of resilient communities. The motivation was not to test this framework against the Grenfell case and to suggest alterations, but rather highlight how support and commitment to the constituent elements can improve resilience across communities, and to consider, where relevant the benefits of engaging with local organisations amongst these elements. As a framework it has showed the worthiness of its application in the context of community resilience, by providing a basis for understanding and depicting how communities may act in support of, or to the detriment of, their own resilience. Importantly, creating a categorised breakdown of conditions through which communities can seek to foster resilience, which is a paramount step in guiding the resilience process.

6.1 Further Recommendations

This report has explored the contribution of local actors to resilience and briefly what organisational support was deemed important in crisis. Developing further knowledge on how best to support and partner with these organisations in a disaster resilience scope would be an interesting task.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Interview and Questionnaire guide.

Name (and/or organisation if relevant):

Relationship or interest to the Grenfell Tower fire:

Do you consent to the answers you provide to be used as part of Edward Persson's Master's thesis to be submitted to Lund University (Sweden) May 2019 (now September 2019), and eventual publication on the University's website?:

Please let me know if you would you prefer to remain anonymous or to review and approve the section in which your answers are used before final submission to the University on 15/05/19, (now 03/09/19) or are happy to approve without review or anonymising.

Starting questions:

1a) How do you define resilience?

1b) Would you define the local Grenfell community as having been resilient in their response to the disaster?

Community Based Organisations are considered as organisations that provide social services at the local level, are non-profit and primarily reliant on voluntary resource contributions.

Local Knowledge:

2a) To what extent are community-based organisations positioned to provide local and contextual knowledge about the community's needs?

2b) How well placed have the community-based organisations been to provide training and education to the local community? How accessible are they?

2c) To what extent would you say community-based organisations have been active in creating a shared belief amongst the community that it will recover?

Community networks and relationships:

3a) How have the community-based organisations helped to maintain and encourage a sense of connectedness and cohesion amongst the local community post-disaster?

Communication:

4a) To what extent did you observe community organisations acting as an effective source of emergency communication and information to the affected community post-disaster?

Health:

5a) To what extent did community organisations act as providers of care for the communities physical and/or mental health needs post-disaster? (This could be considered as first aid in the response or, counselling in the recovery period).

Governance & Leadership:

6a) To what extent have community-based organisations empowered and engaged the local community in the response and recovery periods after Grenfell?

6b) To what extent have community-based organisations provided guidance and leadership in the response to the Grenfell disaster?

6c) In what way could community-based organisations be considered as key facilitators for the local community in advocating for their recovery?

Resources:

7a) To what extent did you see community organisations provide access to resources to the local community in their time of need? (This could be considered as supplies such as food and water, or technical resources such as access to shelter, financial resources or human and social resources such as legal advice.)

Economic investment:

8a) To what extent could you consider community-based organisations as having encouraged economic development prior to the disaster and/or encouraging economic regrowth post disaster for the benefit of the local community?

Preparedness:

9a) In what ways do you consider local community organisations as being prepared to respond to a crisis, or as increasing their level of preparedness to respond to potential future emergencies since the Grenfell disaster?

Mental outlook:

10a) To what extent have you witnessed community-based organisations contributing to a sense of hope about the future post-Grenfell?

10b) To what extent have community-based organisations helped the local community adapt to changes and uncertainty about the future that occurred post-Grenfell?

If you have further contributions or comments to make on the role of community-based organisations in the response and recovery periods towards resilience post the Grenfell tower fire please add them here:

Appendix 2. Examples of Positive and Negative References to Sense of Community in 86 IWS			
Name:	Date:	Witness Type:	Selected Statement:
Example of Positive Statement prior to 14th June 2017			
Gimja Tekie	21/05/18	Former Grenfell Tower Resident	<i>I believe that it is essential to convey to the Inquiry that the Grenfell Tower was not just a block of flats, with people living in isolation from each other, which is often the case with private flats. Everyone who lived at Grenfell Tower will confirm that it was like living within a small community or village. In many cases it felt more like a big family.</i>
Example of Positive Statement prior to 14th June 2017			
Elias Aitequakrim	17/08/18	Local Resident	<i>The community is strong. People who don't speak, don't get along, they squashed their beef because of this. "Life's too short", they said to each other. That was a good thing to see.</i>
Example of Negative Statement post 14th June 2017			
Hicham Cherbika	06/04/18	Local Resident	<i>We lost our home and our community in the fire. Everything changed.</i>
Ibtisam Alfawaz	20/04/18	Local Resident	<i>I loved living in Hurstway Walk. I loved the community we had.... We will never be able to get a community like that again.</i>
Appendix 3. Examples of Statements showing Bonded, Bridged and Linked Social Capital in 86 IWS			
Name:	Date:	Witness Type:	Selected Statement:
Bonded Social Capital			
Dorirenda Encarnacion Suarez-Chans	15/06/2018	Former Grenfell Tower Resident	<i>I recall that we stayed some four nights with my son's girlfriend over in South London</i>
Bridged Social Capital			
Hicham Cherbika	06/04/18	Local Resident	<i>I went to the mosque and prayed, and then I stayed there to rest.... A lot of people were coming to the mosque</i>
Linked Social Capital			
Clarrie Mendy	18/09/18	Relative of Deceased Victims	<i>Under the umbrella of Relative Justice – Humanity for Grenfell and Beyond Grenfell there are other support networks. Beyond Grenfell is a support network I am organising to help those affected by the tragedy. It will be run by an ex-UN ambassador in providing support by world class trauma specialists and in-house legal teams to deal with all matters including housing, providing counselling for post- traumatic stress and giving those affected psychological and psychiatric care, retreats, community events and remembrance services etc</i>

Appendix 4. Examples of Other Key Themes highlighted in 86 IWS

Name:	Date:	Witness Type:	Selected Statement:
Diversity			
Joanne Minton	21/05/18	Local Resident	<i>One aspect of the community that I love is that it is culturally mixed. I come from a mixed English-Trinidadian family and have always enjoyed being exposed to different cultures.</i>
Amina Yabajadda	28/06/18	Local Resident	<i>Prior to the fire, there was a strong, very closely-tied community. There were a lot of Moroccan people living in Grenfell Tower and in the walkways, some originally coming from the same town in Morocco. We are all more like family and I call most of the wives my sisters. Residents I didn't know to socialise with, I would know to say hello to</i>
Lack of Visible Authority			
Marcia Levi	15/05/18	Local Resident	<i>I feel that no one was there from the council when we needed them most. These homes are theirs. I wish that someone from RBKC or the TMO could have been there just to give us a pat on the shoulder and say it's going to be ok — either on the night of the fire or in the days after. This is when we needed them the most, when we were naked and desolate. We were abandoned until the Queen appeared; it was at that point that the Council took notice. Their attitude towards us changed and they have started to listen, though, I am not convinced that they are listening entirely.</i>
Lack of Communication & Existence of Organic Information Channels			
Turufat Yilma Girma	06/06/18	Former Grenfell Tower Resident	<i>In the hours immediately following the fire, it was just a chaotic situation. No one knew what was going on, but the Westway Centre and the Ruby Portobello Trust became an informal information exchange amongst the residents, themselves, and the volunteers. I do not recall any signs in the first few hours or days giving us guidance, nor do I recall seeing any staff from the Royal Borough or Kensington and Chelsea ("RBKC") or the TMO</i>