

**“We Think Nothing Like This Can
Happen Here”:
Reception, Perception and Response
to Risk Communication Among
Refugees and Immigrants in Sweden**

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Abstract

Risk communication is recognised as an essential component of crisis preparedness, enabling people at risk to take informed decisions to protect themselves. Research has shown that foreign-born people including refugees and immigrants to a lesser extent than others are reached by the information and are less prepared for crisis, making them particularly vulnerable in crisis situations. Employing a receiver-perspective and using the Swedish risk communication leaflet If Crisis or War Comes as a case study, this research investigates reception, perception and response to risk communication among a group of refugees and immigrants in Sweden. Informed by semi-structured interviews with the refugees and immigrants, the findings show that the leaflet was received and read by most of them, and the information perceived as relevant and important. The increased information did however not lead to the taking of any additional preparedness measures, confirming to the insight that information only is not enough to encourage protective action. Risk perception, reliance and dependency on authorities, unrealistic optimism and lack of storage space were identified as the main hindrances to preparedness, whereas limited Swedish language skills posed a barrier to comprehend the information. It is argued that further analysis of obstacles to preparedness, and ways to overcome the challenges, is needed for increasing the effectiveness of risk communication, to help ensure no one is left behind in preparing for crisis.

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Abbreviations

EU	European Union
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MSB	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
SFI	Swedish for Immigrants
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction

Glossary

Asylum Seeker	“A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments” (IOM, 2011).
Beneficiary of International Protection	“A person who has been granted refugee status or subsidiary protection status” (EU, 2011).
Country of Origin	“The country or countries of nationality or, for stateless persons, of former habitual residence” (EU, 2011).
Emigrant	“A person who leaves his/her own country in order to settle permanently in another” (Lexico).
Immigrant	“A non-national moving into a country for the purpose of settlement” (IOM, 2011).
Migrant	“Usually understood to cover all cases where the decision to migrate was taken freely by the individual concerned for reasons of ‘personal convenience’ and without intervention of an external compelling factor; it therefore applied to persons, and family members, moving to another country or region to better their material or social conditions and improve the prospect for themselves or their family” (IOM, 2011).
Person Eligible for Subsidiary Protection	“A third-country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm” (EU, 2011).
Refugee	“A third-country national who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or a stateless person, who, being outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned above, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it” (UN General Assembly, 1951).

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

The starting point in most discussions on migration is usually numbers (IOM, 2017) and this paper is not an exception. By the end of 2017 there were 258 million migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in the world¹, meaning that there has never before been more people living in a country other than their country of birth (UNDESA, 2017). At the same time as societies are becoming more culturally and linguistically diverse, today's increasingly complex and unpredictable world is facing major environmental and social transformations that create new risks to society (Beck, 1992; Ogie, Castilla Rho, Clarke & Moore, 2018). This duality poses a challenge for governments and emergency agencies who must develop effective ways of communicating risk and crisis information to heterogeneous populations (Ogie et al., 2018), in particular towards immigrants and refugees whom research indicates to a lesser extent than others are reached by the information (Lindell & Perry, 2004). Language barriers, unfamiliarity with new environment, and lack of networks and experience with local hazards are some of the factors making this population group also particularly vulnerable in crisis situations (Fothergill, Maestas & Darlington, 1999; Howard, Agllias, Bevis & Blakemore, 2017; Lindell & Perry, 2004; Ogie et al., 2018; Pauvert, Twigg & Sagramola, 2017; Savoia, Lin & Viswanath, 2013).

It is against this background this thesis seeks to examine the outreach and impact of risk communication on a group of refugees and immigrants in Sweden, using the recently issued "If Crisis or War Comes"² leaflet as a case study. Distributed six times earlier (1943 – 1991), this re-issued version of the leaflet was sent out to Sweden's all 4.8 million households in May 2018 by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB). The purpose of the information is to increase risk awareness and improve citizen crisis preparedness (MSB, 2018a). This because the Swedish government has acknowledged new threats to society including extreme weather, a deteriorated security situation, and cyber- and terrorist attacks, and found that Swedes in general are poorly prepared for a crisis (Regeringsbeslut Ju2017/01534/SSK). In 20 pages, the leaflet informs about societal risks and what to do in the event of a war or crisis, provides information on national warning systems, emergency numbers and home preparedness measures, and emphasizes all citizens' personal responsibility to prepare for a crisis (MSB, 2018a; Regeringsbeslut Ju2017/01534/SSK)².

Despite being fundamental for the improvement of future risk communication (Glik, 2007; Rohrman, 1992; Warg, 2000), there is a general lack of studies evaluating the impact and success of risk communication programs (Fischhoff, 2009), from a receiver-perspective in particular (Sellnow et al., 2014). While MSB has conducted two follow-up surveys (Demoskop, 2018; Enkätfabriken, 2019) examining the impact of the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet, factors influencing reception of and response to the leaflet have not been sufficiently explored. This, in addition to the paucity of studies within risk communication research focusing on immigrant

¹ The term "refugees" is often used for all beneficiaries of international protection, disregarding refugee status. In this paper, however, the term is defined in accordance with the United Nations (UN) (1951) and does not include, for instance, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection. "Immigrants" here refers to those who have obtained residence permits on grounds other than protection needs, for example work, studies or family ties. For more information, see the *Glossary* section in the beginning of this paper.

² A copy of the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet can be found in Appendix 1.

populations (Yong, 2017), creates a knowledge gap which this thesis seeks to contribute to. By investigating how the leaflet was received, perceived and acted upon by refugees and immigrants the thesis sets out to contribute also to the current lack of knowledge on how different population groups in Sweden understand and respond to risk communication (MSB, 2018b), to help ensure no one is left behind in preparing for a crisis. This is crucial considering that foreign-born people make up as much as a fifth of Sweden's population of around 10 million people, coming from 206 different countries, speaking up to 200 various languages (Parkvall, 2015; SCB, 2018a; SCB, 2018b).

1.2 Research Aim and Research Questions

The aim of this thesis is to examine the outreach and impact of the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet on immigrants and refugees in Sweden. More specifically, the study aims at through semi-structured interviews with a group of first-generation immigrants and refugees in the Malmö area, south Sweden, investigate to what extent they have been reached by and read the leaflet, their perception of it, and whether the information has had an impact on the immigrants and refugees' crisis preparedness. This has led to the development of the following three research questions⁴:

1. To what extent has a group of refugees and immigrants in the Malmö area, Sweden, received and read the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet, and what are the factors influencing this?
2. What are the refugees and immigrants' perception of the leaflet and its message?⁵
3. Has the leaflet had an impact on the refugees and immigrants' crisis preparedness? If so, how? If not, why?⁶

1.3 Delimitations

It has been argued that all risks have the potential of escalating beyond control and becoming a crisis (Wilks & Moore, 2004). This study is however limited to only encompass the risks and hazards posing a threat to society as brought up in the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet, including extreme weather, serious accidents, major power cuts and water shortages, terrorist- and cyber-attacks, and military conflict. Furthermore, given the leaflet's target group, the population of Sweden, this study focuses on crisis preparedness at *individual* level. Preparedness at other societal levels is thus not considered.

³ This includes only those registered within the Swedish Population Register ("Folkbokföringsregistret"). The Register does not account for asylum seekers.

⁴ In the development of the research questions, consideration has been taken to relevant criteria for evaluating risk communication (Rohrmann, 1992), examples of effective risk communication as identified in previous research (Gray, Stern & Biocca, 2013) and the results of the two follow-up surveys on the effectiveness of If Crisis or War Comes leaflet (Demoskop, 2018; Enkätfabriken, 2019).

⁵ "Perception" here refers to the refugees and immigrants's general view on the leaflet, and on its message that all individuals in Sweden have a personal responsibility to prepare for a crisis. Perception here includes also emotions caused by the leaflet.

⁶ "Impact" on crisis preparedness is here divided into *psychological* preparedness (e.g. increased risk awareness and knowledge) and *physical* preparedness (e.g. investments in home preparedness).

1.4 A Few Words on Conducting Research on Refugees and Immigrants

Despite the current lack of empirical studies on risk and crisis communication in relation to foreign-born people in Sweden (Falkheimer & Hede, 2008), conducting research on this topic is debateable. On the one hand, focusing on immigrants and refugees exclusively risks creating an “us” and “them” and lead to doubtful conclusions and stereotyping of people with foreign background (ibid). On the other hand, without knowledge on how different people receive, perceive and respond to risk communication authorities might continue to base their communication strategies in accordance to the perception and experience of the majority population, making immigrants and refugees a disadvantaged group in crisis situations (Olofsson, 2007). The researcher has done her utmost to avoid simplifying and drawing conclusions without further problematizing, and it cannot be stressed enough that foreign-born people should not be seen as a homogeneous group. There is however little point in differentiating foreign-born people on the basis of national cultural background. What is of interest is instead different people’s experiences and identification which are processes that have more to do with the situation and context in the host country than in the country of origin, such as a different use of media, another view and relation to risks, crises and authorities (Falkheimer & Hede, 2008). While the informants’ countries of origin are presented in this paper, nationality should not be considered the focus of the study. Presenting this information is done to increase transparency and to provide the reader a better understanding of the study group’s heterogeneity.

1.5 Thesis Outline

Following this introduction chapter, the thesis is divided into five additional chapters:

Chapter 2 provides a conceptual understanding of the concepts of risk communication and crisis preparedness, and the relation between the two. It further presents previous research on risk communication and crisis preparedness in relation to refugee and immigrant populations.

Chapter 3 describes the research approach and the methodological considerations that have guided the research, including also challenges and limitations.

Chapter 4 presents the main findings of the study in relation to the research questions.

Chapter 5 summarises the findings of the study and discusses them in relation to the findings of previous research, along with a discussion on research limitations and suggestions for future studies.

Chapter 6 completes the thesis by answering the research questions and summarising the main findings of the research.

2. Conceptual Framework

This chapter explores previous research on risk communication and crisis preparedness in relation to refugee and immigrant populations. As “risk communication” and “crisis preparedness” are rather general terms without established and coherent definitions, the chapter begins by briefly describing these concepts and the link between the two, to create a common ground of understanding.

2.1 Risk Communication

In order to understand risk communication, it is useful to know something about “risk” itself as well as the basis for “risk perception” (Breakwell, 2000). Starting with the former, as a concept studied within several disciplines there are perhaps as many definitions of risk as there are articles written on the topic. In a pure technical way, risk can be defined as the probability of an event occurring multiplied by the magnitude of potential consequences, assuming that society is indifferent towards a low-consequence/high-probability risk and a high-consequence/low-probability risk (Kasperson et al., 1988). That is however unrealistic as risk is a subjective construct, inherently social and reflects people’s choices, decisions and values (Wester-Herber, 2004; Yates & Stone, 1992). In other words, what one person perceives as a risk might not be considered a risk by someone else. A “concept used to give meaning to the things, forces or circumstances that pose danger to people and to what they value” (Stern & Fineberg, 1996, p. 2015) is thus a more accurate definition of risk in relation to this study.

From the 1960’s and onwards, researchers have studied how people judge risk, i.e. risk perception, and the factors influencing this. Early findings show a discrepancy in perception of risk among experts and the public (Cvetkovich & Earle, 1992). This has been explained by experts assessing risks based on facts and data whereas the public’s assessments are influenced by factors including emotions, irrationality and ignorance (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1982; Irwin, 1995). It is from this discrepancy risk communication as a research topic evolved, with researchers interested in finding optimal ways to use communication as a tool to bridge the gap between experts and the public’s knowledge and perception of risk (Drottz-Sjöberg, 2003; Leiss, 1996; Warg, 2000). Properly applied, risk communication can help people with differentiating perspectives share a common understanding of the level of risk (Beecher et al., 2005). Other goals and objectives of risk communication include, but is not limited to, changing attitudes or behaviours, legitimating decisions, assisting in reconciling conflicts about risk-related controversies, providing behavioural advice during crisis and enhancing public protection through information about individual risk reduction measures (Renn & Levine, 1991; Rowan, 1991).

Initially characterised by one-way communication where risk assessments at very exacting level of detail were communicated from experts to the public, followed by marketing communication strategies used to persuade the audience of the correctness of a certain standpoint, the recommendation today for risk communication is two-way dialogue between the sender and the receiver. This includes emphasis on the social context and consensus building, which stands in contrast to the previous stages of risk communication that put experts in a superior role and led to arrogance of expertise and public opposition (Fischhoff, 1995; Leiss, 1996). According to

Warg (2000), communication initiatives in which the sender is not required to take into consideration the opinions and feelings of the receiver, but where the main concern is to transmit a message to a defined audience, should perhaps not even be classified as risk *communication* but risk *information*. MSB, the sender of the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet, does not distinguish between the two terms. Risk communication, as defined by the state agency, is to be interpreted as:

“A process involving communication about known risks and threats, the consequences that these risks and threats may have on individuals and society, and how individuals, responsible authorities and other actors can prepare themselves for minimizing the consequences of a societal crisis.” (MSB, 2017)

2.2 Crisis Preparedness

In line with the concept of risk, also “crisis” has been defined in various ways and studied within several disciplines. It is often used interchangeably with terms such as “disaster” or “emergency”, further contributing to the confusion of the term. In an attempt to provide a better understanding, Al-Dahash, Thayaparan and Kulatunga (2016) systematically review existing arguments and counterarguments about how crisis, disaster and emergency are defined. Their analysis reveals that although there are differences between the terms they are closely interconnected, interdependent and overlap significantly. It is also in this paper acknowledged that such differences and similarities exist, but this will here not be further elaborated upon as it is outside the scope of the study. By adopting the same term as used in the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet, crisis, the researcher hopes to reduce further confusion.

Crisis is here defined as a disruption that physically affects society as a whole, threatens its basic functions and values, and makes society not function as intended (Krisinformation.se, 2017; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). “Crisis preparedness” is then the knowledge, capabilities and actions taken to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from the impacts of a crisis (UNISDR, 2009). Or as formulated by Coppola (2011), it is to on beforehand knowing what to do in a crisis’ aftermath, how to do it and to have the right tools to do so effectively (p. 251). This involves *physical* as well as *psychological* preparedness, where the former refers to activities such as storing water and food supplies, whereas the latter can be to have knowledge of the risks particular to one’s context (Levac, Toal-Sullivan & O’Sullivan, 2012; Malkina-Pykh & Pykh, 2013).

2.3 Risk Communication and Crisis Preparedness – a Debated Relationship

Whether risk communication is successful or not depends on what the sender has formulated as the aim or goal (Wester-Herber, 2004). Many risk communication initiatives, including the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet, strives not only to increase risk awareness but also to encourage preparedness among the target group (Rohrmann, 1992). In such cases, risk communication can be considered successful if the increased information is linked to an enlarged capability to act upon that knowledge (Kasperson, 1986). Taken a step further, Basolo et al. (2009) state that risk communication towards households is effective only if residents adopt preparedness strategies. The assumption that risk communication leads to protective action is nevertheless

debated (Paton, 2003) and many social-psychological studies have shown that the link between knowledge or attitudes and behaviour is usually weak (Rohrmann, 1992). This makes it unrealistic to expect major changes in people's preparedness level as a result of an information campaign only (Larsson and Enander, 1997). In fact, people might be well informed and aware of risks but still do not take any measures to prevent or mitigate their potentially negative consequences (Marynissen & Ladkind, 2012). There is even a risk that public hazard education programs may *reduce* level of preparedness if individuals transfer responsibility for safety from the self to others (Ballantyne, Paton, Johnston, Kozuch & Daly, 2000).

Breakwell (2000) identifies in his study on risk communication three categories of factors influencing impact: the characteristics of the audience, the source of the message and the message's content. The first is influenced by factors including demographic features, past experience, personality profile and ideological orientation, but also cognitive biases. The second refers to the audience's level of trust in the sender and its perception of the message being true and reliable, which also other research (see for example Aven & Renn, 2010; Glik, 2007; Rogers, Amlôt, Rubin, Wessely & Krieger, 2007; Slovic, 1999) has found is key for a risk message to effectively reach out to an intended audience. Lastly, Breakwell (2000) argues, risk communication must have a content which triggers attention, achieves comprehension and can influence decision-making. This is something studies on framing effects, i.e. the way in which a message is presented (Block & Keller, 1995; Slovic, 1986), have been interested in. An example of this is McClure, White and Sibley's (2009) study on earthquake preparedness in which the researchers discovered that people's intention to prepare for earthquakes was higher if information on preparedness focused on the negative outcomes of not being prepared than on the positive effects of being so, corresponding to the proposition in prospect theory regarding that losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). More specifically, the researchers found that those exposed to a negative outcome frame had a higher judgement of risk and rated preparation as more important than those exposed to a positive outcome frame. Behavioural intentions showed however to be influenced not only by the framing of *outcomes* but also by the framing of preparation *actions* in relation to outcomes, highlighting the need to distinguish between outcome framing and action valence when designing and evaluating the effect of risk messages (McClure et al., 2009).

Grothmann and Reusswig (2006) argue in their study on flood preparedness that communication programs should address not only the negative consequences of a certain risk but also the possibility, effectiveness and costs of precautionary measures, as well as issues of concrete action, to cause people to behave pro-actively. This as uncertainty about what to prepare for, and how to do so, seem to be some of the main reasons for why people do not take preventive measures (Enander, 2010). This is in line with Prior and Eriksen (2012) who state that meaning and incentives to prepare are derived for the individual through contextual relevance and understood validity of advocated actions. Risk communication practices should therefore not rely on passive forms of information such as checklists on preparedness supplies but need to be complemented by an explanation on why such tasks should to be completed (ibid). Or as found by Larsson and Enander (1997), preparedness must be considered meaningful in one's life and in societal commitment to cause individuals to prepare.

To illustrate how individuals process risk information, Conzola and Wogalter (2001) has developed the “Communication Human Information Processing (C-HIP) model, seen in figure 1 below⁷.




Figure 1: Communication - Human Information Processing (C-HIP) model (Conzola & Wogalter, 2001, p. 132).

This model is based on the assumption that for information to lead to a certain behaviour (for example the taking of preparedness measures) it needs to pass through several stages including *source*, *channel*, *attention*, *comprehension*, *attitudes and beliefs*, and *motivation* where each stage can allow for the information to ‘flow through’ to the next stage or to create a bottleneck (Conzola & Wogalter, 2001). For example, a message might catch the receiver’s attention and be comprehended as intended but not lead to changes in attitudes or beliefs, resulting in no motivation to adjust behaviour. This does however not imply that the information should be considered entirely ineffective as it might have had a positive effect on precursor stages, for example having increased awareness of a certain risk. Illustrated as a linear process, the model includes feedback loops showing that later stages may influence decisions at earlier stages. While used here as a pedagogic tool to illustrate the processing of information, it is important to bear in mind that this is a simplified model not considering the influence of, for instance, other sources of information or people’s ability to take action (e.g. financial conditions).

2.4 Risk Communication Towards Refugee and Immigrant Populations

Previous research indicates that immigrants and refugees to a lesser extent than others are reached by risk and crisis information (Lindell and Perry, 2004). This has been explained by factors including limited knowledge of the host country’s dominant language and lack of trust

⁷ The C-HIP model was developed to explain warning effectiveness in the workplace but has been used as a generalised example of the reception, processing and response to risk information (see for example Drottz-Sjöberg, 2003).

in authorities induced by a residue of discrimination or by past experience of having lived in countries with authoritarian governments (ibid; Ogie et al., 2018; Shepherd & Vuuren, 2014). Regarding the latter, also cultural factors may prescribe which information source that is considered to be reliable (Yong, 2017). Consequently, studies have found that immigrants and refugees might prefer to receive risk and crisis information through other channels than what are used in the host context, for instance orally through trusted community leaders as opposed to via printed material (Eisenman et al., 2009; Sjöberg & Enander, 2005; Tierney, Lindell & Perry, 2001).

Research shows also that refugee and immigrant populations tend to be less prepared for crisis than native-born people (Olofsson, 2007). Some of the factors influencing this are financial, time and space constraints that become barriers to gathering and storing emergency supplies (Baker & Cormier, 2014; Burke, Bethel & Britt, 2012; Matthew & Kelly, 2008). This risks creating what Blake, Marlowe and Johnston (2017) call “preparedness for the privileged” and may lead to the prioritisation of immediate returns as opposed to preparing in a long-term perspective (Meyer, 2006). Another obstacle to preparing for crisis is lack of experience of potential hazards in the host area (Yong, 2017). An example of this is seen in a study on risk perception among immigrants in the United States of America (USA), who had survived conflicts and wars in their native lands. When comparing their past experiences with the American context the immigrants drew conclusions such as “America is a safe place; therefore, there is no need to prepare” (Shiu-Thornton, Balabis, Senturia, Tamayo & Oberle, 2007, p. 469).

There is moreover a considerable number of studies exploring the links between culture and risk perception, as the two have long been recognised as intrinsically intertwined (Appleby-Arnold, Brockdorff, Jakovljević & Zdravković, 2018). One example of this is Cornia, Dressel and Pfeil’s (2016) comparative study on risk culture in seven European countries, where the authors identify three main types of cultures: state-oriented, individual-oriented and fatalistic. Based on their findings, Sweden is classified a state-oriented country where citizens have a high trust in the state, take warnings from governmental authorities seriously and rely on state actors in crisis situations. This strong dependency on the state however hampers crisis preparedness at individual level, as individuals transfer responsibility from the self to others (ibid, Terpstra & Gutteling, 2008; Lalwani & Duval, 2001). Other research has found that also a fatalistic risk culture may be an obstacle to preparedness as it involves resigning to risks because one cannot do anything to reduce them (Appleby-Arnold et al., 2018; Sjöberg, 1999). An example of this is seen in Oral, M., Yenel, Oral, E. and Aydin’s (2015) study on earthquake preparedness among earthquake victims in eastern Turkey. Despite having experienced a devastating earthquake the survivors showed to be minimally prepared for new quakes as they believed these events are an act of God and uncontrollable, which makes them useless to prepare for (ibid).

Studies as the aforementioned give support to Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) argument that risk perception goes beyond the individual and should be seen as a social and cultural construct. Consequently, risk perception is not static but subject to change when individuals move from one environment or context to another (Sjöberg and Enander, 2005). This has furthermore implications for risk communication, since collective interpretations often override individual

experiences and makes an individual's response to risk communication shaped also by other people's response (Fessenden-Raden, Fitchen & Heath, 1987).

Taken together, how likely and to what extent recipients respond to risk communication is a complex process influenced by multiple factors (Krimsky & Plough, 1988; Xin, Karamehic-Muratovic & Cluphf, 2015). This implies that a particular risk communication strategy may work in some settings, for certain types of audiences, risks and political circumstances, but not in other contexts (Rohrmann, 1992). It is then perhaps not very surprising that literature suggests that risk communication strategies should be tailored to meet the needs and concerns of the specific target group, since generic risk communication designed for the general population may not be the most effective way to mobilise some social groups to take action (Yong, 2017). Or as stated by Yong, Lemyre, Pinsent and Krewski (2017), risk communication that “do not accommodate to immigrant populations’ unique social, cultural, structural, and contextual factors may increase their risk” (p. 2).

The body of knowledge presented in this chapter serves, in addition to providing a conceptual understanding of risk communication and crisis preparedness, the purpose also of informing the design of this study. More precisely, findings from the here reviewed literature directly influences the interview guide used in the primary data collection. This is further elaborated on in the following *Methodology* chapter.

3. Methodology

This chapter presents the research methodology of the study including research design, data collection and data analysis, ethical considerations and methodological limitations.

3.1 Research Design

As the purpose of this research is to gain deeper knowledge of how a group of refugees and immigrants are reached by, perceive and respond to risk communication, the study made use of a qualitative research method involving in-depth interviews which, in contrast to a quantitative approach, can provide a rich and contextualised understanding of the informants reasoning (Graham, 2005; Polit & Tatano Beck, 2010). Designed as an inductive exploratory case study, the thesis does not seek to test existing theories or assumptions, but to *suggest* hypotheses about the data and the process underlying them (Fotheringham, 2005).

3.2 Data Collection

3.2.1 Secondary Data

Secondary data was collected through a desk-based study in which a literature search on the topics of risk communication, crisis preparedness, and these concepts in relation to refugee and immigrant populations, was conducted⁸. Synonyms to the keywords including, for instance, “crisis communication”⁹, “disaster preparedness” and “emergency preparedness”, and their corresponding translations in Swedish, were also included in the search to discover other relevant literature. Consisting primarily of academic articles, books and other publications, the literature was found using search engines including “Science Direct”, “Google Scholar”, and “LUBsearch” (Lund university library database). As much influential research on risk communication was conducted already in the 1970’s and onwards (Warg, 2000) the search was not limited to a specific time period, for instance literature published during the last decade. Consequently, the material reviewed consists of both older and more recent literature.

Once relevant literature had been identified, the reference sections listed in the reviewed material were used to complement the information. While also other literature could have been included these articles, books and publications were deemed most pertinent for the purpose of the study. In addition, the material entails policy documents from Swedish authorities, including MSB and the government, which were found through searches on their respective websites. Taken together, the material generated from this literature search helped provide a conceptual understanding and served as the theoretical basis when designing the interview guide used in the primary data collection.

3.2.2 Primary Data

Primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews with refugees and immigrants in Malmö area between March and April 2019. Consisting of open-ended questions, this data collection method was chosen as it allows the informants to express their thoughts and opinions, reflect upon complexities and potential contradictions on certain topics, and raise issues not anticipated by the researcher (Bryman, 2011; Valentine, 2005).

⁸ See the above *Conceptual Framework* chapter.

⁹ “Crisis communication” was included in the search as it is intricately interconnected with risk communication, and as risk communication can be seen as one of the initial phases of crisis communication (Coombs, 2010).

In regard to the study area, Malmö was selected because of its heterogeneity, providing the researcher a valuable opportunity to get in contact with a variety of informants from different contexts and cultures. More specifically, Malmö is one of Sweden's most diverse cities, in terms of population origin, where one in every three people is foreign-born. This population group, consisting of more than 100 000 people, represents 186 different nationalities that speaks around 150 various languages (Malmö Stad, 2019; Vamling, 2015). In addition, the researcher resides in Malmö and has contextual knowledge of the city, which was believed to ease the data collection process. The geographic location of Malmö is shown in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2: Map of Sweden and the location of Malmö city (Wisén, Auken and Dahlin, 2005).

As the researcher on beforehand did not know if the informants had read the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet, and since they could not be expected to remember its content, the informants were all provided a copy of the leaflet up to a week before the interview and were asked to read it through. To keep the interviews on track a set of guiding questions was developed by the researcher, influenced by the findings of the two national surveys on the effectiveness of the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet (Demoskop, 2018; Enkätfabriken, 2019) and findings from the literature search. These questions paid particular attention to factors for effective risk communication as identified in previous research including the target group's information needs, perception of relevance of the information, attitude towards the sender, perception of given risks, and attitude towards the proposed measures for dealing with the given risks (Gray, Stern & Biocca, 2013). Rohrmann's (1992) "*Criteria for risk communication effectiveness*" was also reviewed and taken into consideration¹⁰. This resulted in the development of three separate themes of questions corresponding to the initial research questions, as seen in Table 1 below.

¹⁰ Rohrmann's criteria for risk communication effectiveness are found in Appendix 2.

Theme	Question Content
Reception	Comprehension; interpretation of purpose; trust and credibility in sender and message.
Perception	Perception of the leaflet and its message; view on responsibility to prepare; emotions caused by the leaflet ¹¹ .
Impact	Effect on risk awareness and psychological crisis preparedness; effect on physical crisis preparedness; eventual barriers to preparedness.

Table 1: Interview question themes and content.

Questions associated with *Dissemination channel*, although related to the first theme, were deemed more appropriate to ask about separately towards the end of the interview, thus forming a separate theme in the interview guide¹². Once developed, the questions were piloted on four persons to ensure high validity, i.e. that the questions measure what they are intended to, and to avoid response errors such as misinterpretations (Parfitt, 2005). Interviews were then conducted face-to-face with the informants and lasted between 19 to 41 minutes each.

3.3 Sampling

Due to the scope and time limit of the study, a maximum number of interviewees was initially set to 15, to allow time for a thorough analysis of the data generated from the interviews. Informants were recruited using a convenience sampling method¹³ having as the requisites for the interviewees to be first-generation immigrants or refugees, to understand enough Swedish to be able to read the official version of the *If Crisis or War Comes* leaflet issued in Swedish, and to have a Swedish residence permit (the latter in order to avoid interviewing asylum seekers who are considered a particularly vulnerable group)¹⁴. Nearly half of the informants were at the time of the research studying Swedish in a “Swedish for Immigrants” (SFI) class in Malmö and they were contacted by the researcher through a visit to one of their lectures. Among the around 20 students registered at the course, seven were willing to participate in this study. As no other SFI classes in Malmö area, nor any of the organisations working with immigrants and refugees contacted by the researcher, allowed for research or had an interest in participating in the study, a personal contact of the researcher and snowballing technique was used to get in contact with the remaining eight informants. Taken together, the 15 refugees and immigrants interviewed come from 12 different countries, spread over five continents, and they speak more than 10 different first languages. The informants have lived in Sweden from 10 months up to 13 years¹⁵.

Towards the end of the data collection, data provided by the informants did not lead to any new emergent themes and tended to be redundant of data already collected, which according to Given (2016) and Grady (1998) are indicators of saturation¹⁶. This does however not imply that

¹¹ In line with Prinz (2006), the researcher here considers emotions part of perception. See also Finucane (2012) for more information on how emotions and feelings impact the processing of and response to risk communication.

¹² The interview guide is found in Appendix 8 (in Swedish) and Appendix 9 (in English).

¹³ A non-probability sampling method using sampling units easily accessible to the researcher (Bryman, 2011).

¹⁴ A further explanation on this is given in section 3.5 *Ethical considerations* below.

¹⁵ A list of the informants is presented in Appendix 3.

¹⁶ For a more thorough discussion on saturation in qualitative research, see Saunders et al. (2017).

saturation was reached as the study group is still rather small, and it is likely that more interviews could have generated other information. Consequently, this research does not intend to provide results that are generalizable to the greater population of refugees and immigrants in Sweden. The results of this type of study can nonetheless illustrate general structures that may be compared with other studies or used as a springboard for future research (Bryman, 2011).

3.4 Data Analysis

The analysis of primary data was done by firstly transcribing the interviews and secondly coding and analysing them using the NVivo software. For the coding process, an inductive open-coding method was used in which the data was broken down, examined and categorised into separate “sub-nodes” (sub-themes) grouped into “nodes” (themes) based on the topics that recurrently appeared in the data. This process was done several times, trying different sets of coding and resulted in what the researcher believes is the ideal way of structuring the data, as it has enough categories and sub-categories to facilitate a thorough analysis¹⁷. The researcher however acknowledges that there are several other ways in which the data could have been organised. Guided by the research questions the nodes were then divided into four main categories, comprising the following sub-themes as presented in Table 2 below.

Coding category	Sub-theme
Reception	Comprehension; interpretation of purpose; dissemination channel; trust and credibility in sender and message.
Perception	Perception of the leaflet and its message; view on personal responsibility to prepare for a crisis; emotions caused by the leaflet.
Impact	Impact on risk awareness and psychological crisis preparedness; impact on physical preparedness.
Barriers to preparedness	Reasons for not taking preparedness measures.

Table 2: Coding categories and sub-themes.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

To ensure this study is done in an ethically correct way the researcher has followed the ethical principles for research suggested by the Swedish Research Council (2002) including *information, consent, confidentiality* and *use*. Before the interview, all immigrants and refugees were informed orally about their roles and the purpose of the study, that they will remain anonymous¹⁸ and cannot be identified by the information provided, and that their participation is voluntary and can be cancelled whenever throughout the study. Informants received information also on that the data provided will be used for research purpose only, that it will be stored in a way so that refugees and immigrants cannot be recognized, and that only the researcher and the thesis supervisor, who observe strict rules of confidentiality, will handle the

¹⁷ For coding examples, see Appendix 10.

¹⁸ After careful consideration and review of previous research on confidentiality in qualitative research involving vulnerable participants (Surmiak, 2018), anonymising the informants was chosen as a protective measure to preserve their privacy as private citizens.

data. This information was printed and given to the informants before the start of the interview. All immigrants and refugees furthermore gave their written consent to participate in the study¹⁹.

As research on refugees and immigrants concerns a particularly vulnerable group which needs specific safeguards in terms of research ethics, the researcher considered also the particular principles adopted by the European Commission Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (*Guidance Note – Research on Refugees, Asylum Seekers & Migrants*). These principles include that the researcher, in addition to what has already been presented, is transparent and objective, treats the participants with care and sensitivity, avoids ethnocentricity by showing respect for ethnicity, religion, language, gender and sexual orientation, and respect the participants' values and right to make their own decisions. The researcher has furthermore education in and professional experience of interviewing asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants.

An additional measure taken by the researcher in relation to research ethics is that asylum seekers, a particularly vulnerable group who has not yet received a decision on their asylum applications or obtained a residence permit, were purposely excluded from the sampling. Only refugees and immigrants, whom all have residence permits in Sweden, were part of the sampling. There are however two exceptions to this, one man and one woman, who initially stated that they are in Sweden for studies respectively work. During their interviews the informants revealed that their study and work permits have been cancelled and as a consequence, they have applied for asylum and have pending asylum applications. These two cases were carefully reviewed by the researcher who decided not to discontinue their interviews as the informants expressed a wish to continue the conversations. Their answers were treated in the same way as the other informants'.

3.6 Methodological Limitations

As most research, the findings of this study have to be seen in the light of some methodological limitations, and limitations of the researcher. Evaluating risk communication is “fraught with challenges” including the need to account for various channels of influence, devise appropriate timing and questions (Thomas, Vanderford & Crouse Quinn, 2008, p. 5), and define the meaning of success (Kasperson & Palmlund, 1989). It should here be noted that this is not an evaluation *per se* but a research study seeking to produce findings about *how* and *why* the recipients received, perceived and responded to the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet in the way they did²⁰. Doing so, the researcher has done her utmost to formulate interview questions that consider various factors of influence, as identified in previous research and evaluations, which can help provide a thorough understanding of the process of receiving and responding to risk communication. There are however several other factors these interview questions could have taken into consideration, but due to the time constraint that has not been possible. The time frame of this study posed a barrier also to adopt a longitudinal research design, where interviews could have been held with informants also before the issuing of the leaflet, to help isolate the impact of the information and shed light on social transformations and causal impact over time (Bryman, 2011). Moreover, given the broad scope of this research it cannot provide an as in-

¹⁹ The full information given to the informants, and a copy of the consent letter, are found in Appendix 4 – 7.

²⁰ For more information on the difference between evaluation and research, see Patton (2014).

depth analysis of a certain factor, for example trust, influencing reception of and response to risk communication as a narrower research scope could. This approach was however chosen due to the current lack of research on the topic, where results generated from the study may serve as a basis for future research.

Despite the researcher's attempt to create a heterogeneous sample profile there are some limitations also in regard to this. The rather low number of informants recruited from the SFI class resulted in the use of snowball sampling, in which recommendations of people to contact were provided through a first contact. Even though consideration was taken to different profiles of immigrants and refugees this may have led to the underrepresentation of some. For instance, all informants are highly educated or have study experience²¹, none is above 41 years old and they all live in the city. Research shows that all these factors have an influence on preparedness, with younger age or living in an urban environment are factors associated with a lower level of individual preparedness, whereas high level of education is a strong predictor for preparedness (Asp & Sjölund, 2014; Baker, 2011; Kohn et al., 2012; Mohammad-Pajooch & Aziz, 2014; Mulilis, Duval & Bovalino, 2006). A more heterogeneous sample profile could possibly have been obtained if the researcher had advertised the study better, or reached out to SFI classes, organisations and associations working with refugees and immigrants even earlier.

As previously mentioned, the study group is small and should not be seen as representative for the greater population of refugees and immigrants in Sweden. This becomes evident when comparing Table 3 below showing the 15 informants' countries of origin, with Table 4 presenting statistics of the 15 main countries of origin among refugees and immigrants in Sweden. Recalling the argument made by Falkheimer and Hede (2008), national cultural background is however not the main point of interest but different peoples' experiences and identification.

²¹ Informants recruited from the SFI class all have study experience (a prerequisite for taking taking this particular class). Informants recruited outside of SFI have studied, or are studying, at university level.

Informant number	Country of Origin
1	Spain
2	Iran
3	Uganda
4	Iran
5	Iraq
6	Iran
7	Palestine
8	Australia
9	Belgium
10	Germany
11	Russia
12	Denmark
13	Australia
14	Iceland
15	United States of America

Table 3: The informants' countries of origin.

Number	Country of origin	Number of immigrants and refugees	Proportion of all immigrants and refugees in Sweden
1	Syria	185 991	9.5 %
2	Finland	147 883	7.6 %
3	Iraq	144 035	7.4 %
4	Poland	92 759	4.8 %
5	Iran	77 386	4.0 %
6	Somalia	68 678	3.4 %
7	Yugoslavia	65 124	3.3 %
8	Bosnia and Hercegovina	59 395	3.0 %
9	Afghanistan	51 979	2.7 %
10	Germany	51 140	2.6 %
11	Turkey	49 948	2.6 %
12	Thailand	42 394	2.2 %
13	Eritrea	42 300	2.2 %
14	Norway	41 747	2.1 %
15	Denmark	40 011	2.0 %
Total		1 160 770	59.4 %

Table 4: The 15 major countries of origin among refugees and immigrants in Sweden (based on data from SCB, 2019).

Lastly, some of the informants' limited Swedish language skills posed a barrier during the interview and made the researcher reformulate some of the interview questions or explain specific words. According to the wish of some informants, interviews were held also in English to ease the conversation and to reduce the risk of misunderstandings. This is however not expected to have caused response errors or affected the results as the researcher made sure the informants had fully understood the questions before answering them. In hindsight, and to further increase the reliability of the data, the researcher could have made it possible for the informants to edit the interview transcripts (Surmiak, 2018).

4. Results and Analysis

In this chapter, the results of the interviews are presented, divided into sections corresponding to the research questions. The first sub-chapter presents findings related to reception of the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet including the refugees and immigrants' comprehension and interpretation of the leaflet and its purpose, their thoughts on the dissemination channel used, and trust and credibility in sender and message. This is followed by a sub-chapter providing findings linked to the informants' perception of the information including general opinion on the leaflet, view on responsibility to prepare for crisis, and emotions caused by the leaflet. The third sub-chapter provides results on the leaflet's impact on the immigrants and refugees' crisis preparedness. The chapter ends with a section on what the informants bring up as obstacles to preparing for crisis.

4.1 Reception

When asked if they received the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet when it was issued in May 2018, all but two of the informants said yes and among them, eleven said they read it²². Nearly a third expressed also that they saved the leaflet but when asked where it is stored many of them replied in terms of:

*“No idea, it might be in the apartment, but I do not know.”*ⁱⁱ (Informant 8)

4.1.1 Comprehension

In terms of comprehension, nearly half of the informants expressed that despite having allocated time to read the leaflet once again before the interview it was still partly difficult to understand, not least because of the unfamiliar vocabulary. A particularly complicated section, as brought up by some informants, was the information on page nine about “Duty to contribute to Sweden’s total defence”. Having read this section several times, one person asked if this means that she should continue her regular work in the event of a crisis or war, or if the information is directed only towards a specific group of people: *“When they say ‘you’, does it mean everyone?”*ⁱⁱⁱ (Informant 2). Others said it was unclear whether the recommendation on storing water and food, and turning on the radio, goes for both war and other crisis situations.

Limited knowledge of the Swedish language was also the major reason for why some of the informants did not read or save the leaflet, with some saying that it easily got mixed up with other mails and was taken for advertisement. In the words of one of them:

“I know a lot [of refugees and immigrants] who do not understand this. It comes in the mailbox and goes straight to the bin.”^{iv} (Informant 5)

Despite not understanding all of the information, several informants found the illustrations together with the rather short sentences and bullet points helpful in increasing comprehension. To further ease the understanding of the leaflet some suggested that it could be issued also in

²² Among the ones who did not receive the leaflet, one person had not yet moved to Sweden, and the other person said she did not receive the leaflet in her mailbox.

other languages, for example English or Arabic, or that some of the more important sections could be translated. None of the informants had noted the information on the first page saying that the leaflet is available in other languages online. When shown this section by the researcher some said it could have been printed in slightly bigger text.

4.1.2 Interpretation of Purpose

When asked about the purpose of the leaflet, most informants said that they interpret it as a sort of guideline to follow in case of a war or crisis:

“What we are supposed to do, how the government is supposed to help people, what we as people should do for ourselves and that kind of facilitation.” (Informant 3)

Only three of the refugees and immigrants referred to the leaflet as a way to on beforehand help people become better prepared, whereas the remaining part thought its main purpose is to create a feeling of safety, to encourage people to help others, and to inform that everyone in Sweden needs to participate in the event of a war. A few informants stated that they do not understand why the leaflet was issued now, especially since it has not been distributed for a very long time. Consequently, they suggested that this could have been better explained in the beginning of the leaflet. Two informants did also express concerns about the issuing of the leaflet and said that although it may strive to make people better prepared for war or crisis, the leaflet risks giving rise to feelings of fear that the government can use to implement *“a stricter policy to immigration or multiculturalism”*^v (Informant 8) or be used by other actors in society *“to create even more panic or to blame it on a group of people they want to blame it on”* (Informant 10).

4.1.3 Dissemination Channel

A slight majority of the informants said it was good to receive this type of societal information by mail, since having the information in the form of a leaflet is helpful in a situation where computers or mobile phones may be out of use. Others explained that this led also to a greater interest in reading the information, as opposed to receiving an e-mail or SMS which feels less official. As furthermore mentioned by one of them:

“Receiving it in the mail was a good idea. It became a dialogue about it in media, and society started to talk about why it was issued. It went viral, kind of.”^{vi} (Informant 13)

Concerns about receiving the information via mail were however expressed, with one informant saying the following:

“There are people who do not get post. I have a friend who told me that he has his post with the “kommun”²³ [...] There are also people renting a room

²³ "Municipality" in Swedish.

somewhere and who are not allowed to put their names on the address.”
(Informant 3)

Others were concerned about the environmental impact of issuing leaflets, and several said it would have been better if the information was shared through public lectures or meetings where people get together and can ask questions and discuss preparedness. In that way people with limited knowledge of the Swedish language, or those who are illiterate, could better take part of the information. In the words of one informant:

“Talking to people impacts them differently [...] The more we come together the more views we get [...] We might not be working in the government, but we have our views, we can benefit.” (Informant 3)

Other suggestions on how to better reach out to people were TV-campaigns and social media. Some informants underlined also the importance of using many different channels, and more frequent and accessible information:

“One needs to send it many times, not just sending it today and then wait ten years to the next time.”^{vii} (Informant 7)

“The last page with important telephone numbers, why not just send it as a single paper or a fridge magnet? [...] After no dialogue in, I do not know, thirty years or so, they send out a book. A whole book?!”^{viii} (Informant 13)

“When receiving it one thought about it but after two months one forgets.”^{ix}
(Informant 6)

4.1.4 Trust and Credibility

Regarding the sender of the leaflet, not more than two informants were aware of who issued the information. After having been informed by the researcher about this, and asked if they trust in information from Swedish authorities and find the information within the leaflet credible, nearly everyone said yes. For one informant, the information in the leaflet is considered credible because *“the things make sense, therefore I trust this information”* (Informant 1) whereas another informant stated that *“I am not sure if I have to trust it or not [...] it is just giving advices I guess”* (Informant 9). Some compared Sweden with their countries of origin and argued in terms of *“I came here because I have trust in Swedish democracy and news, and everything we did not have in Iran”* (Informant 6). Others found the information trustworthy since there in Sweden is *“a good way of producing information that is sent out to the public”* (Informant 8). Previous good experiences of other Swedish authorities was another factor contributing to the level of trust also in MSB. In the words of one of the informants:

“I am pretty confident in the capabilities of most Swedish institutions. As a foreigner I have had to deal with Skatteverket²⁴ and other governmental authorities and even though its painfully slow it gets done in an orderly fashion.” (Informant 14)

One informant (11) did however reflect upon misleading information, recalling recent international “fake news”, and said that one must use common sense when judging someone’s or something’s trust and credibility. In the words of another informant:

“Now when you ask me, I start thinking if there is some kind of political motive behind it? But it feels like Sweden is such a strict bureaucracy that you hopefully could not get out a leaflet like this if it was a political agenda to get people more worried than they need to be.” (Informant 10)

4.2 Perception

4.2.1 Leaflet

When asked about their general perception of the leaflet, most informants referred to it as relevant and important: *“I think people need this information”^x* (Informant 4), because *“some of us come from other countries and we think nothing like this can happen here”* (Informant 3). One informant recalled the 2018 forest fires in Sweden, which came as a surprise to him, and emphasized the importance of issuing information as the leaflet, not least since:

“In Palestine, there was not much difference between summer, winter, spring and everything as here in Sweden. I can have four seasons in a day here. The weather here, I do not understand the weather here.”^{xi} (Informant 7)

Some of the refugees and immigrants were however sceptical to the leaflet as *“it overstates the threat level that everyone is facing”* (Informant 14), in particular regarding the risk of war as opposed to *“a wildfire or a flood which presumably is a more realistic threat to more people”* (Informant 15). As further explained by one of them:

“It seems to be focusing on war, definitely, but I think the other hazards are more relevant to inform people about. I feel it kind of brushes over those things, and there is nothing about ‘never giving up to an electrical thing’²⁵ or something.” (Informant 14)

Consequently, some of the informants suggested that there could have been two leaflets issued, one on the topic of war and one about other crises. One informant (13) moreover said that there are many other societal risks that would have been more important to inform the population about, for example serious diseases to get vaccinated against.

²⁴ The Swedish Tax Agency.

²⁵ The informant here refers to a statement in the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet saying that “If Sweden is attacked by another country, we will never give up” (MSB, 2018, p. 12).

4.2.2 Responsibility to Prepare

In regard to the leaflet's message that every individual in Sweden has a personal responsibility to prepare for crisis, almost all informants said this is important and logical, since "*when you are prepared you can help other people who need help*"^{xii} (Informant 4). One person described the message as a good reminder, a "*wake up!*"^{xiii} (Informant 5), whereas two other informants referred to it as "*pretty Swedish to put out [...] It is kind of paternal making sure everyone is on the same page*" (Informant 14). Some of them reflected also upon how far this responsibility goes:

"In terms of being prepared and stacking up on food and water and so, I think it is my responsibility to look after myself as good as I can so that society has a better capacity to look after people who cannot look after themselves as much. In the sense of helping Sweden in a war, as an immigrant, that is a completely different thing." (Informant 10)

"[It is like] you owe the country, and I am not quite sure about that." (Informant 11)

"In the end we are not trained to react to an attack or similar." (Informant 1)

4.2.3 Emotions

As nearly no immigrants or refugees on beforehand knew of the issuing of the leaflet, it came as a surprise and caused uneasiness or even worry to half of them. This in particular since many of the informants have had the perception of Sweden being a safe country:

"We moved here because in my home country there are crises and problems. When I saw this [the leaflet] I was shocked. What?!"^{xiv} (Informant 4)

"It feels very official to receive this information on how to act in a crisis, that the authorities think it is a greater risk for crisis and that it was time to send out official information about this. It makes you think 'Oh, what is happening now?'"^{xv} (Informant 12)

A section within the leaflet that contributed to these emotions was the information on page 12 saying "If Sweden is attacked by another country, we will never give up" (MSB, 2018a). Some wondered why this information had been put in a red box, making people really paying attention to it, since it "*makes people panic for no apparent reason*" (Informant 10). The illustrations within the leaflet was another contributing factor, with one woman saying that they remind her of war in her home country. Others described how they received and read the leaflet with excitement as they found it interesting to see what societal information the Swedish government thinks is important to send out to the population, and to learn more about the Swedish system. Two informants however said that their initial reaction when reading the information was to

laugh, as they found the leaflet “*slightly ridiculous and over the top*” (Informant 10). As explained by one of them:

“It is like watching a movie where there are too many special effects and too much going on. Then you become like ‘Oh, it is just a movie’ whereas if less dramatic you might relate better to it.” (Informant 9)

4.3 Impact

4.3.1 Risk Awareness and Psychological Crisis Preparedness

Regarding the impact of the leaflet on crisis preparedness, nearly all informants explained how the information has made them reflect upon societal risks and what to do in a crisis situation, and provided them new knowledge on how society may function in the event of a crisis. A couple of them had even discussed the leaflet with relatives. Some informants explained that this increased knowledge “*chills you down a bit*” (Informant 11) and is useful since in a crisis “*maybe one feels a little lonely*” (Informant 12). Another informant expressed the following:

“Before [reading the leaflet] I had no information on what I should do if something happens in Sweden. I would just be crying.”^{xvi} (Informant 2)

One informant (8) explained that having read the leaflet, she considers deciding on a place to meet up with friends in case something happens. Another person said:

“Obviously I am not going to think about the leaflet if a crisis is happening, but I think it is good to have read it through.” (Informant 9)

The leaflet was considered useful also for several of the refugees and immigrants who said that they due to previous experiences of wars, natural hazards and longer periods of power cuts already have knowledge of some of the information, or perceive themselves as rather prepared:

“I would not say [it has made me] better prepared but it has alerted me. It has given me an ‘aha, this can happen also here’.” (Informant 3)

“I do not know if it is the information itself I get the most out of, but it is the thing about thinking it through which makes me more prepared.”^{xvii} (Informant 12)

Of specific importance to many informants was the section on how to act in the event of a terrorist attack, not least because of recent attacks: “*We had a terrorist attack in New Zealand two days ago and that reminded me of that I have this leaflet [...] and it helps me.*”^{xviii} (Informant 6). Other particularly useful information was where to seek for information in a crisis or war:

“I did not know that SVT²⁶ was responsible for providing information. If information is given out, it is super-easy to receive it by listening to P1²⁷ or SVT.”^{xix} (Informant 8)

The information about bomb shelters was also considered important, although several of the informants were surprised by the lack of information on the location of the shelters:

“It does not say anything about where they [the bomb shelters] are located. It only says that they exist and that one should find them. [...] There should be an app so that one could search for them, or a website.”^{xx} (Informant 2)

Another appreciated section was the information about different emergency signals, with one informant expressing the following:

“I did not learn about the emergency signals until a year after I moved here. I thought it was a protest the first time the signal went off [...] I did the exact opposite of what you are supposed to do. You are supposed to lock the door, close the windows and listen to the radio but I just went straight out on the patio trying to listen in. I would have been an easy target.” (Informant 14)

This illustrates also what several others brought up as an issue, namely that the information should have been distributed even earlier, for example upon arrival in Sweden or when registering at “Skatteverket”. As mentioned by one of them:

“I do not know why I was not given this information from Malmö city when I moved here. They only gave me tickets to the theatre and a bicycle map, but nothing like this.”^{xxi} (Informant 13)

4.3.2 Physical Crisis Preparedness

Despite having increased the refugees and immigrants’ risk awareness and provided them new knowledge on crisis preparedness, the leaflet did not cause any of them to take additional measures to improve their physical preparedness, such as the suggestions on storing water and food or purchasing a radio. One informant (4) did however say that she considers doing so. When asked about the reason for not taking the suggested preparedness measures, the informants provided several different answers summarised in the sub-chapter below.

4.4 Barriers to Preparedness

4.4.1 Risk Perception

The greatest obstacle to preparing for a crisis or war, as expressed by all but two of the informants, is that these events are not perceived as likely to occur in Sweden. In the words of three of them:

²⁶ The Swedish Public Service Television.

²⁷ P1 is one of Sweden’s national radio stations.

“Why would I have a bucket of water in my basement when I do not really see the need for it?” (Informant 9)

“It is good to know that things can happen in a crisis, but it is hard for me to relate this to my everyday life. It is like preparing for a zombie apocalypse, to have cans of food and such at home. In more disordered countries it is perhaps more important to be prepared, but here I do not feel the need for it.”^{xxii} (Informant 12)

“If I hear an alarm signal, first then I will buy [the supplies].” (Informant 2)

The feeling of safety in Sweden was one of the factors contributing to the informants' risk perception. One person described how he and his family used to store extra food and water in his home country. When asked why he is not doing so in Sweden he laughed and said *“we feel safe here”*^{xxiii} (Informant 6). As mentioned by another informant:

“It is kind of ironic because I like to take hiking trips and I put a lot of thought into having a lot of extra food but in terms of preparedness for emergencies, no. I do not know, I have not really been personally affected by emergencies and I have this perception of Lund and Sweden in general being safe.” (Informant 15)

It should here be noted that when discussing risk, most informants initially focused on the risk of war as they perceived the leaflet to be *“mostly about war”* (Informant 14). Similar answers were however received when asked specifically about the other risks mentioned in the leaflet:

“Of course, climatic events are increasing but this is more in the southern regions, so I am not too concerned. Cyber-attacks I think may happen. They mention [in the leaflet] what the impacts can be, but it is still hard to imagine it.” (Informant 9)

A few informants reflected also upon the likelihood of them being personally affected by risks and hazards:

“I do not live in the middle of the forest prone to forest fires, or in a house on the beach prone to flooding, so I do not feel personally at risk for any of these events.” (Informant 15)

The reasoning of another informant indicates that risk perception is affected also by media, or in this case by the *lack* of media attention:

“On TV there is nothing, and on radio they play music and dance and sing all the time. Apart from that it is quiet. Why should I save [food and water]?”^{xxiv} (Informant 5)

For two of the informants, the presumably limited negative consequences of the hazards and risks mentioned in the leaflet is one of the factors for not preparing. One of them described how his home country at times suffers from flooding but that “*here [in Sweden] it is only like three drops of rain*”^{xxv} (Informant 13). The other informant said:

“I am sure it would not be too much chaos in Sweden [...] If something would happen here, I think it would be small scale.” (Informant 9)

4.4.2 Unrealistic Optimism

Another reason for not preparing for a crisis or war, as stated by a third of the informants, is the perception of oneself as “*young, fit, not dependent on medication or have someone dependent on me*” (Informant 10). Some of these informants referred to themselves as people who can help others in need. Two of them explained that they already have a spirit stove and extra medicines at home and see no need to further prepare themselves, such as storing water or purchasing a radio. Two others said that the reason for not stacking up on food or water is that they live close to a supermarket to which they can run and collect food from in the event of a crisis. Other informants discussed the influence of past experience on preparedness and said that having experienced, for instance, longer periods of power cuts they feel capable of handling such situations if they are to occur also in Sweden. In the words of one of them:

“I am coming from a place where everything can happen. When I was little, they turned off the electricity like once a month [...] It calms me down that I have been in this kind of situation before.” (Informant 11)

4.4.3 Lack of Storage Space

A further reason for not investing in emergency supplies, as mentioned by a third of the refugees and immigrants, is lack of storage space and having to think about expiring dates on food, making sure “*that it is eatable*” (Informant 1). As explained by one informant:

“I live in a two-room apartment. There is no space in the kitchen for food and water and everything. I am not going to do anything now. Maybe in five or ten years.”^{xxvi} (Informant 7)

As asked by another informant:

“How can you store water in an apartment? Where? There is no space.” (Informant 3)

Providing more concrete examples on preparedness measures could help overcome this obstacle, as suggested by one informant:

“Of course, it is good to have some extra food but how do I go about it? Do I do it every time I go grocery shopping? Do I set aside one day a month to check my emergency supply kit? [...] Where do I keep it? I think that if there

are more concrete suggestions maybe I will be more likely to take some concrete actions.” (Informant 15)

Another informant said that lack of storage space, in combination with moving frequently, posed a barrier to storing the supplies:

“Maybe I think about this differently if I am in a place where I have space and know I am going to live for a few years.” (Informant 10)

4.4.4 Reliance on Authorities

Furthermore, some informants expressed that they rely on state authorities to handle an eventual crisis situation. Therefore, they see few reasons to prepare themselves for a crisis or war. In the words of two of them:

“Power and water and heating, it always works and if it should not work, they will fix it super-fast because we are in Sweden.”^{xxvii} (Informant 12)

“They teach us that ‘you should just sit down, we fix everything’.”^{xxviii} (Informant 5)

The general reliance in Sweden on authorities was discussed also by other informants. As stated by one of them:

“The greater part of the population relies so much on the social democracy, and in a Swede’s life you do not need to make many decisions from day one. [...] They are going to stand there with their mouths open, ‘what do I do now?’, instead of getting all the buckets in the house and fill the buckets while the water is still running.” (Informant 13)

Most informants did however say that they do not expect the authorities to help them immediately in a crisis situation:

“I know that last year there were only seven ambulances in Malmö, that it not so much.” (Informant 1)

“I think the Swedes have a plan B for fifty years ahead but if something happens now then [they become like] ‘Oh, what should we do?’”^{xxix} (Informant 5)

Others reflected upon how people in their home countries generally do not turn to authorities or listen to the radio in the event of a crisis, but help each other out. These informants were critical to the lack of contact between people in Sweden, as it affects the handling of a crisis situation negatively:

“I do for example not know who my neighbour is, and we live on the same floor. I think it is a problem. You need to know your neighbour in case you need to do something, or if something happens.” xxx (Informant 7)

4.4.5 Information Only is Not Enough

Lastly, some informants expressed that information only is not enough to increase preparedness at individual level. These informants said that the information needs to be complemented by other measures, for example drills or exercises:

“The government might think a brochure is enough because you are already educated and very smart, but I think it is a good thing to teach students and kids at school to experience this in real life.” (Informant 11)

“If you get involved and learn by doing it is easier [...] By only reading this, it is difficult.” (Informant 1)

Some went a step further and questioned the issuing of the leaflet as an effective way to improve preparedness:

“I honestly do not see a leaflet changing the perspective of a whole nation.” (Informant 14)

“Even now, if people are aware of it, does that mean that they are going to stock up on food, or not? If not, then you have a whole worried population that is not really better prepared than if they were not super worried about it.” (Informant 10)

5. Discussion

This chapter summarises the main findings of the study in relation to the research questions, followed by a discussion on their implications. Limitations of the results are further presented along with suggestions for future research.

5.1 Summary of Findings

5.1.1 Reception

In regard to the study's first research question, *“To what extent has a group of refugees and immigrants in the Malmö area, Sweden, received and read the ‘If Crisis or War Comes’ leaflet, and what are the factors influencing this?”* the results have shown that nearly all immigrants and refugees received the leaflet when it was issued in May 2018, and that more than two thirds of them read the information. At a first glance, this indicates that the leaflet was effective in reaching out to the study group. The finding aligns with the results of MSB's first follow-up survey on the leaflet (Demoskop, 2018) showing that the information was received by 91 percent of the Swedes²⁸. It is similar also to the results of MSB's second follow-up survey (Enkätfbriken, 2019) in which 84 percent of the foreign-born Swedes said that they have received the leaflet. Solely looking at numbers do however say very little about the actual reception of the leaflet. As the results of this study have revealed, there are differences among the immigrants and refugees regarding to what extent they have read the leaflet and how they have interpreted its purpose, ultimately affecting also their responses to it. This can primarily be traced back to the immigrants and refugees varying Swedish language skills. Consequently, preferences were expressed for receiving the information in other languages or through other dissemination channels better adapted to their language skills, for example TV-campaigns or public meetings. Shorter and more frequent information including flyers or fridge magnets were other suggestions on how to improve understanding of the message. This is in line with the results of previous research on risk and crisis communication among immigrant populations showing that limited knowledge of the host country's dominant language, and type of dissemination channel, are some of the barriers to access and process risk information (see for example Eisenman et al., 2009; Lindell & Perry, 2004; Sjöberg & Enander, 2005; Tierney et al., 2001).

In contrast to the findings of other studies (e.g. Ogie et al., 2018; Yong, 2017) did the immigrants and refugees in this research express a high level of trust in the sender, MSB. This discrepancy could possibly be explained by that many of the earlier studies have been conducted in countries very different from Sweden, where refugee and immigrant populations may experience a higher level of discrimination (Shepherd & Vuuren, 2014). Or as mentioned by several of the informants in this study, Sweden is perceived as a fair country where positive experiences of other state authorities have contributed to the level of trust also in MSB. The latter finds support in Renn and Levine's (1991) study on trust and credibility in risk communication, in which they state that *“the overall climate towards institutions in general has a definite impact on the trust that people have in specific institutions”* (p. 202). The lack of background information on *why* the leaflet was issued did however cause some informants to

²⁸ This includes native-born as well as foreign-born Swedes.

question its credibility, and to speculate on whether the government is hiding information from the public or using the leaflet as a political tool. Recalling the importance of trust in risk communication, and that trust is easily vanished but difficult to regain (Slovic, 1999), concerns as these should be paid careful attention to as they may not only have an impact on the perception of the current leaflet, but also on future risk communication initiated by the sender.

5.1.2 Perception

When it comes to the second research question, “*What are the refugees and immigrants’ perception of the leaflet and its message?*” the results have shown that most immigrants and refugees found the information relevant and important. They did also agree with the leaflet’s message that every individual in Sweden has a personal responsibility to prepare for a crisis. Interestingly, and against the general proposition that people who perceive themselves as personally responsible for protecting from a hazard are more likely to do so (Lindell & Perry, 2004), only two of the refugees and immigrants had taken preparedness measures, and this before the issuing of the leaflet. As further discussed in the below 5.1.2 *Impact* section, this lack of action can be derived from their view on the responsibility also of state authorities.

Moreover, the findings have revealed great differences within the study group in regard to emotions caused by the leaflet. While some immigrants and refugees found the information interesting, even entertaining, others said it caused worry, not only due to its content, dramatic illustrations and framing of message but because it came as a surprise. Corresponding to the findings of previous research (Shiu-Thornton et al., 2007), some of the informants compared the situation in the host country, Sweden, with the situation in the country of origin. These informants said that they had not thought that hazards as brought up in the leaflet could occur in Sweden. What is interesting about this finding is that such a comparison was expressed only by the refugees, and not by any of the immigrants. A possible explanation to this, as indicated by some of the refugees’ reasoning, is that they have had the expectation and perception of Sweden as a safe haven, whereas none of the immigrants had migrated for safety reasons. This finding can however not be compared and analysed with reference to the reviewed literature as this tend to group refugees and immigrants (in their legal definitions) together and discuss them as “migrant populations”²⁹, or even lump race and ethnicity with immigrant status³⁰ (Yong, 2017).

5.1.3 Impact

The last research question, “*Has the leaflet had an impact on the refugees and immigrants’ crisis preparedness? If so, how? If not, why?*” cannot be answered with a straight “yes” or “no” but needs to be examined from different perspectives. On the one hand, the findings of the study have shown that the leaflet provided most informants with new knowledge on societal risks and started a process of reflecting upon risk and crisis, indicating improved *psychological* crisis preparedness (Levac et al., 2012; Malkina-Pykh & Pykh, 2013). On the other hand, the leaflet

²⁹ This is however not unique for risk communication research but a problem also in other literature (see Bradby, Humphris, Newall & Phillimore, 2015).

³⁰ As emphasized by Yong (2017), while immigrants and refugees are often ethnic or racial minorities, these categories are not synonymous: “The experience of being new in a country is unique to being an immigrant and is experienced by most, if not all, immigrants regardless of racial or ethnocultural identity.”

did not cause any of the refugees and immigrants to take action, such as the suggestions on storing water and food and purchasing a radio, indicating no improvements in *physical* crisis preparedness. The main reason for not taking such measures, as the results of this research have shown, is the immigrants and refugees' perception of the risks and hazards mentioned in the leaflet. More specific, these hazards are neither not perceived as likely to occur in Sweden, nor as leading to severe consequences. Applying Conzola and Wogalter's C-HIP model for information processing, this finding indicates that even though the leaflet was successful in catching the immigrants and refugees' *attention*, and to a large extent being *comprehended* as intended, it did not manage to influence or change *attitudes and beliefs* causing a *motivation to adjust behaviour*, i.e. to take the suggested preparedness measures.

The C-HIP model can be used also in the analysis of the immigrants and refugees' processing of a specific risk brought up in the leaflet, namely terrorist attacks. Despite the relatively low actual risk of terrorist attacks occurring in Sweden, several of the informants saw these events as both threatening and likely to happen. Recent terrorist attacks and a heavy media coverage are believed to have influenced their perception of the risk, given that people tend to form beliefs about the likelihood of hazards by looking at the most recent data (Meyer, 2006) and with media being a powerful influence on people's risk perception (Slovic, 1986; Wester-Herber, 2004). Even though the informants were of the *belief* that attacks might happen, none of them mentioned the taking of precaution measures, for example avoiding crowded public areas. Applying the explanatory steps in the C-HIP model, this indicates a lack of *motivation to adjust behaviour*. It gives support also to the argument that response and compliance to risk communication is influenced by much more than merely risk perception (Xin et al., 2015).

Another factor hampering the informants' incentives to prepare was their view on their own capability to deal with an eventual crisis situation. Interestingly, many of the immigrants and refugees perceived themselves as *less* vulnerable to crisis than native-born people, which goes against literature suggesting the opposite (see for example Pauvert et al., 2017). Past experience of military conflicts, natural hazards and longer periods of power-cuts made these informants feel confident to handle such events if they were to happen also in Sweden. As a consequence, some immigrants and refugees indicated that they thus are in less need of taking the preparedness measures as suggested in the leaflet. These measures were considered more important for people of less good health and by older age, illustrating optimistic bias, namely the tendency for people to view hazards as more likely to impact others than themselves (Meyer, 2006). Another study group, including people of older age or with disabilities, is likely to have generated a different result in regard to this, again underlining that the results of the study should not be seen as representative for the greater population of refugees and immigrants in Sweden.

Consistent with the findings of previous research (Terpstra & Gutteling, 2008) reliance on authorities was shown to be a further barrier to preparedness, hampering the motivation to prepare for crisis at individual level. As explained by Cornia et al. (2009), excessive trust in public authorities, as in Sweden where the population in general strongly rely on state intervention and sees the state as responsible for crisis management and prevention, can be counterproductive and inhibit citizens to take protective measures. This expectation of the state

to intervene did not exist in many of the informants' countries of origin but has developed in Sweden, supporting the notion that changing environment or context may lead to changes in behaviour in relation to risk. This also since risk perception and behaviour are social and cultural constructs influenced by other people's response (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Sjöberg & Enander, 2005).

Unexpectedly, and in contrast to the findings of previous research (Baker & Cormier, 2014; Burke et al., 2010), none of the informants brought up financial resources as a barrier to investing in better home preparedness. This may have to do with an already relatively good economic status, or with the suggested home preparedness supplies not being considered particularly expensive, which was not further explored in the study. Instead, lack of storage space was considered an obstacle to storing emergency supplies, partly because of limited living space but as a result also of moving frequently. This is something also other studies have found to be a barrier to preparing for a crisis (see for example Eisenman et al., 2009; Matthew & Kelly, 2008). Suggestions were made by the informants on how to overcome this obstacle, including that more concrete actions on how to practically collect and store the supplies are needed. This is in line with the recommendations in literature (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2016; Prior & Eriksen 2012) suggesting that examples of action and a careful explanation of why such tasks need to be completed are means to help people behave pro-actively.

5.2 Implications and Recommendations

Taken together, what have the findings of this study suggested, and what are their implications for future risk communication? The findings have shown that the *If Crisis or War Comes* leaflet was effective in reaching out to the refugees and immigrants, but that their comprehension of it varies and could be improved. The results have furthermore revealed that the information was successful in triggering the informants' attention, which is one of the factors influencing impact (Breakwell, 2000; Conzola & Wogalter, 2001), but that it did not lead to the taking of any additional preparedness measures. Based on the results of this research, one of the main challenges MSB is facing when developing future risk communication campaigns is to bridge the discrepancy between the receiver's risk perception and the risks communicated. Framing effects and the benefits and drawbacks associated with the use of positive versus negative outcome and action frames, as found by McClure et al. (2009), is here an area for further analysis. Simply influencing risk perception may however be insufficient to cause people to behave proactively (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2004) considering the public's reliance on authorities in crisis response. In line with Lalwani and Duval (2000), this study proposes that telling people in a straightforward way that it is their personal responsibility to take action is not very effective in encouraging the attribution of responsibility to self. Identifying ways for how to effectively communicate the personal responsibility to prepare for crisis, and the social settings and environments that allow for and motivate people to do so (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2004), is thus another challenge to MSB.

Recalling that risk communication designed for the general population might not be the most effective way of reaching out to and mobilise some groups in society to take action (Yong, 2017), it could be proposed that information specifically targeting foreign-born people should be developed. This is something Olofsson (2007) discusses in her study on crisis

communication in Sweden, in which she suggests the use of a “to each and every one as required” strategy as opposed to the current “equal for all” approach. However, the notion that there is no uniform public in risk communication (Wester-Herber, 2004) is applicable also to this population group, making an overall communication strategy for immigrants and refugees highly debatable. Developing such a strategy is moreover likely to be met with several practical challenges, not to mention ethical concerns. Simply put, authorities cannot determine based on someone’s country of origin what information should be sent how and in what language to whom. This leads also to a discussion on fairness; where to draw the line on who should be given information adapted to his or her specific needs and who should not?

With this in mind, it is here not advocated that national risk communication initiatives as the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet should be replaced by strategies designed for specific population groups including immigrants or refugees. Instead, the findings of this study give support to the suggestion that other dissemination channels such as TV-campaigns or public information meetings may be used as complementary measures to reach out to a broader audience and increase comprehension of the information. The latter may also provide the sender a valuable opportunity to take part of the public’s reflections on the information and to further increase trust, which is a cornerstone in risk communication (Aven & Renn, 2010; Breakwell, 2000; Glik, 2007; Rogers et al., 2007; Slovic, 1999). These suggested measures do however not necessarily lead to a more active and constructive role of the public, as it is still presented a set of predefined preparedness measures to take, doing little more than respecting the public’s ability to prevent solutions, not to create them (Fischhoff, 1995). Inviting the public to the creation, or selection, of such measures could perhaps lead to a greater acceptance of and willingness to prepare for crisis, as has been indicated by informants in this study³¹.

At a minimum, risk communication, implying a two-way dialogue and partnership between the sender and the receiver (Fischhoff, 1995; Warg, 2000), should allow for the public to provide feedback. Whether this has satisfyingly been met in the case of the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet can be discussed, with none of the immigrants and refugees saying that they have thought of contacting MSB to provide feedback or ask questions. The leaflet does not even provide the public any contact details for doing so, apart from a few short notices saying “You can find more information at dinsakerhet.se” and “Dinsakerhet.se – detailed information about the content of this leaflet” (MSB, 2018a). Recalling the distinction between risk *communication* and risk *information* (Warg, 2000), initiatives as the leaflet should perhaps then be framed by MSB as the latter rather than the former.

Based on the findings of this research it is further argued that communicators of risk must make sure the public is given thorough and transparent information on the factors underlying the issuing of information. If not, and as shown here, this can lead to trust issues. Making sure the audience is aware of *why* certain measures need to be taken is of utmost importance considering that understood meaning of preparing for crisis, and contextual relevance and validity of

³¹ MSB’s Secretary-General, Dan Eliasson, has said that MSB in the creation of the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet conducted several focus group discussions with people in Sweden (Sveriges Radio, 2018). It is however unclear to the researcher what topics the discussions covered and to what extent refugees and immigrants were part of the focus groups.

advocated actions, are some of the deciding factors to why people prepare (Eriksen & Prior, 2012; Larsson & Enander, 1997).

The expected impact of a leaflet on people's crisis preparedness should however not be overestimated. Confirming to the insight that an information campaign only is not enough to encourage protective action (Larsson & Enander, 1997), the findings of this research indicate that other measures might also be needed. Drills and exercises are two complementary strategies suggested by the informants, which may help support the participation of citizens in crisis management activities. Ultimately, this combination may facilitate the fostering of a culture of preparedness and help overcome the public's current perception of the in the leaflet mentioned hazards and risks as "we think nothing like this can happen here".

5.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

In addition to the methodological limitations already described in *Chapter 3*, there are some limitations also in regard to the findings of this research. Given the qualitative research approach and the limited number of informants it is not possible to draw any general conclusions based on the results. More empirical evaluation research is therefore needed to create a solid body of findings that have general implications. Generalisability was however not the purpose of this study which has sought to contribute with a deeper understanding of the informants' reasoning, providing material that future research or communicators of risk can make use of. One such finding deserving more study and special attention is obstacles to preparedness, and the factors influencing this. The study has identified several barriers to preparedness, including risk perception, reliance on authorities, lack of storage space and unrealistic optimism, but not specifically aimed at suggesting solutions. More research on how to overcome these barriers is needed for risk communication to better enable protective action.

Since this study, to the researcher's knowledge, is the first qualitative research exploring reception, perception and impact of the If Crisis or War Comes leaflet, a further limitation is that there is no control group to compare the findings of the study with. Consequently, more research is needed on how other groups in society, for example native-born Swedes, elderly and students amongst others, receive, perceive and respond to the information. Such comparative research is crucial in order to draw any further conclusions based on the results of this study. This especially since characteristics including past experience, age, gender and socio-economic status, to mention a few, could have a greater influence on reception, perception and response to risk communication than being foreign-born (Olofsson, 2007).

Future research could furthermore explore what eventual effects Sweden's currently stricter immigration policy (SFS 2016:752; SFS 2019:481) has on reception of and response to risk communication among refugees and immigrants. This new policy implies that the previous standard of permanent residence permits is replaced by temporary permits. As found in other research, temporary permits may reduce the incentive to integrate into the society of the host country (Blomqvist, Skogman Thoursie & Tyrefors, 2018), in turn affecting perhaps also compliance to risk communication.

Lastly, it is important to bear in mind that any risk communication program takes place in a complex social context influenced also by other information (Rohrman, 1992). The If Crisis or War Comes leaflet was issued in a time of societal change and events receiving much medial focus including terrorist attacks and global demonstrations against climate change, to mention a few. This may have impacted and skewed the informants' perception of the risks discussed in the leaflet, ultimately affecting also their responses to the information. Given media's influence on risk perception, it is possible that if other events had dominated media's attention this study could have generated slightly different results.

6. Conclusion

This thesis set out to explore reception, perception and response to the Swedish risk communication leaflet *If Crisis or War Comes* among a group of refugees and immigrants in Sweden. This to help ensure that refugees and immigrants, a population group less prepared for crisis and to a lesser extent than native-born people reached by risk communication, are not left behind in preparing for crisis. More specifically, the study aimed at investigating to what extent the refugees and immigrants have been reached by and read the *If Crisis or War Comes* leaflet, and the factors influencing this, their perception of the information, and whether it has had an impact on the refugees and immigrants' crisis preparedness. To achieve this aim, the study undertook a receiver-perspective in which semi-structured interviews were held with 15 refugees and immigrants in the Malmö area, south Sweden.

Based on the findings of the study it can be concluded that the leaflet was successful in reaching out to the refugees and immigrants. Language barriers posed however a challenge to comprehend the information, ultimately affecting also interpretation of the leaflet's purpose. Consequently, the refugees and immigrants expressed preferences for receiving the information in other languages than Swedish or through other dissemination channels, meetings for instance, allowing for a two-way dialogue between the sender and the public.

It was further acknowledged that due to the lack of prior information, the leaflet came as a surprise to most refugees and immigrants, and it caused mixed feelings. Even though nearly all of them perceived the information as important, and agreed with the message that every individual in Sweden has a personal responsibility to prepare for crisis, few of them were of the belief that Sweden can be severely affected, or affected at all, by the risks discussed therein. Consequently, the information did not cause the refugees and immigrants to take further preparedness measures. Unrealistic optimism, lack of storage space and reliance on state authorities were other factors hampering protective behaviour, indicating that information only is not enough to encourage preparedness at individual level. Further identification and analysis of barriers to preparedness, and ways to overcome these challenges, is thus needed for increasing the effectiveness of risk communication.

While not leading to improved physical preparedness, the findings of the study revealed that the leaflet helped increase the refugees and immigrants' risk awareness and contributed to a greater feeling of being prepared. This indicates improved psychological crisis preparedness, which the value of should not be underestimated in crisis management. To draw any further conclusions based on the findings of the study more empirical research is needed, focusing on both native-born Swedes and sub-groups of the greater population of refugees and immigrants in Sweden.

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Appendix 1: The "Om krisen eller kriget kommer" Leaflet



VIKTIG INFORMATION TILL SVERIGES INVÅNARE



OM **KRISEN** ELLER **KRIGET** KOMMER



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This brochure is available for download in several different languages on dinsakerhet.se.

Frågor och svar om broschyren finns på dinsakerhet.se.



MSB är en statlig myndighet som arbetar för att samhället ska bli bättre på att förebygga och hantera olyckor och kriser. Vid en allvarlig olycka eller kris ger vi stöd till dem som är ansvariga.

Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap
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www.msb.se



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Till Sveriges invånare

Den här broschyren skickas till alla hushåll i Sverige på uppdrag av regeringen. Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB) ansvarar för innehållet. Broschyren ska hjälpa oss att bli bättre förberedda på allt från allvarliga olyckor, extremt väder och it-attacker till militära konflikter.

Många människor kan känna oro inför en osäker omvärld. Även om Sverige är tryggare än många andra länder, finns det hot mot vår säkerhet och självständighet. Fred, frihet och demokrati är värden som vi måste skydda och stärka varje dag.

Myndigheter, landsting och regioner, kommuner, företag och organisationer ansvarar för att samhället ska fungera. Men ansvaret för vårt lands säkerhet och trygghet är gemensamt för alla som bor här. En av våra viktigaste tillgångar när något hotar oss är vår vilja att hjälpa varandra.

Om du är förberedd bidrar du till att hela landet bättre kommer att klara en svår påfrestning.

SPARA BROSCHYREN!

3

Vad skulle du göra om din vardag vändes upp och ner?

En kris kan göra att samhället inte fungerar som vi är vana vid. Ett förändrat klimat kan göra att översvämningar och skogsbränder blir vanligare. Händelser i omvärlden kan ge brist på vissa livsmedel. Störningar i viktiga it-system kan påverka elförsörjningen. Efter bara en kort tid kan vardagen bli besvärlig:

- Värmen försvinner.
- Det blir svårt att laga och förvara mat.
- Mat och andra varor kan ta slut i affärerna.
- Det kommer inget vatten i kranen eller toaletten.
- Det går inte att tanka.
- Betalkort och bankomater fungerar inte.
- Mobilnät och internet fungerar inte.
- Kollektivtrafik och andra transporter står stilla.
- Det blir svårt att få tag i läkemedel och medicinsk utrustning.

Tänk igenom hur du och personer i din närhet kan klara en situation när samhällets normala service och tjänster inte fungerar som vanligt.



Din krisberedskap

Din kommun ansvarar för att bland annat äldreomsorg, vattenförsörjning, räddningstjänst och skola fungerar även vid en samhällskris. Du som privatperson har också ett ansvar. Med rätt förberedelser kan du klara en besvärlig situation bättre, oavsett vad som orsakat den.

Vid en samhällskris kommer hjälpen att först gå till dem som bäst behöver den. De flesta måste vara beredda på att kunna klara sig själva en tid. Ju bättre förberedd du är desto större möjlighet har du också att hjälpa andra som inte har samma förutsättningar.

Viktigast är att ha vatten, mat och värme och att kunna ta del av information från myndigheter och medier. Du behöver också kunna komma i kontakt med anhöriga. På sidorna 10 och 11 finns deklarerad matvaror och saker som kan vara bra att ha hemma.

Fundera på vilka risker som kan påverka dig i ditt närområde. Bor du i ett område som är känsligt för skred eller översvämning? Finns det någon farlig industri eller något annat i din närhet som kan vara bra att känna till?



5

Var vaksam mot falsk information

Stater och organisationer använder redan idag vilseledande information för att försöka påverka våra värderingar och hur vi agerar. Syftet kan vara att minska vår motståndskraft och försvarsvilja.

Det bästa skyddet mot falsk information och fientlig propaganda är att vara källkritisk:

- Är det fakta eller åsikter?
- Vad är syftet med informationen?
- Vem är avsändaren?
- Är källan trovärdig?
- Finns informationen någon annanstans?
- Är informationen ny eller gammal och varför finns den just nu?

- Sök information – du kan motverka propaganda och falsk information bäst genom att vara påläst.
- Tro inte på rykten – använd flera trovärdiga källor för att se om informationen stämmer.
- Sprid inte rykten – verkar informationen inte trovärdig, sprid den inte vidare.

6

Vid terrorattentat

Terrorattentat kan riktas mot enskilda personer eller grupper, mot allmänheten eller mot samhällsviktiga funktioner som elförsörjning eller transportsystem. Även om ett terrorattentat kan utföras på olika sätt och på olika platser så finns det några råd som kan gälla i de flesta situationer:

- Sätt dig själv i säkerhet och undvik folksamlingar.
- Larma polisen via 112 och meddela om du ser något viktigt.
- Varna dem som befinner sig i fara och ljädem som behöver.
- Sätt mobilen på ljudlöst och ring inte till någon som kan befina sig i riskområdet. Mobilsignalen kan röja en person som gömmer sig.
- Ring inte med mobilen om du inte måste. Blir nätet överbelastat kan det bli svårt för livsviktiga samtal att komma fram.
- Följ polisens, räddningstjänstens och myndigheternas uppmaningar.
- Dela inte obekräftad information på nätet eller på något annat sätt.



7

Sveriges försvar

Sveriges samlade försvar ska skydda och försvara landet, vår frihet och rätten att leva som vi själva väljer. Vi har alla en uppgift om Sverige hotas.

Totalförsvar

Totalförsvar är all verksamhet som behövs för att förbereda Sverige för krig. Totalförsvaret består av militärt försvar och civilt försvar.

Militärt försvar

Det militära försvaret består av Försvarsmakten inklusive Hemvärnet samt ett antal andra myndigheter som har till huvuduppgift att stödja det militära försvaret. Försvarsmakten försvarar vårt territorium och våra gränser.

Civilt försvar

Civilt försvar handlar om hela samhällets motståndskraft vid krigsfara och krig. Civilt försvar är det arbete som görs av statliga myndigheter, kommuner, landsting och regioner, privata företag och frivilligorganisationer. Arbetet syftar till att skydda civilbefolkningen och att exempelvis sjukvård och transporter fungerar vid krigsfara och krig. Vid krigsfara och krig ska det civila försvaret också kunna stödja Försvarsmakten.



Totalförsvarsplikt

I Sverige gäller totalförsvarsplikt. Det innebär att alla som bor här och är mellan 16 och 70 år kan kallas in för att hjälpa till på olika sätt vid krigsfara och krig. Alla har en skyldighet att bidra och alla behövs.

Det finns tre typer av totalförsvarsplikt:

- **Värnplikt** i Försvarsmakten.
- **Civilplikt** inom verksamheter som regeringen beslutar om.
- **Allmän tjänsteplikt** som innebär att man tjänstgör inom verksamheter som måste fungera även vid krigsfara och krig. Det betyder att du fortsätter på ditt vanliga jobb, arbetar inom en frivilligorganisation eller får i uppgift av Arbetsförmedlingen att utföra arbete som är särskilt viktigt för totalförsvaret.

Totalförsvarspliktiga kan bli krigsplacerade. Är du krigsplacerad har du fått en krigsplaceringsorder eller annat besked av din arbetsgivare om detta.

I många år har förberedelserna för krigsfara och krig varit mycket begränsade i Sverige. I stället har myndigheter och kommuner satsat på att stärka beredskapen för fredstida kriser som översvämningar och it-attacker. Men i takt med en förändrad omvärld har regeringen beslutat att stärka totalförsvaret. Därför ska planeringen för Sveriges civila försvar återupptas. Det kommer att ta tid att utveckla alla delar igen. Samtidigt är beredskapen för fredstida kriser en viktig grund för vår motståndskraft vid krig.

8



9

Tips för din hemberedskap

Förutsättningar och behov ser olika ut, exempelvis om du bor på landsbygd eller i tätort, i hus eller lägenhet. Här får du allmänna tips för din hemberedskap. Använd det som passar just dig och dina nära. Gå gärna ihop om vissa saker och låna av varandra.

Mat

Det är viktigt att ha extra mat hemma som ger tillräckligt med energi. Använd hållbar mat som kan tillagas snabbt, kräver liten mängd vatten eller som kan ätas utan tillagning.

- potatis, kål, morötter, ägg
- bröd med lång hållbarhet, till exempel tortilla, hårt bröd, kex, skorpar
- mjukost, messmör och andra pålägg på tub
- havredryck, sojadryck, tormjölkspulver
- matolja, hårdost
- snabbpasta, ris, gryn, potatismospulver
- färdigkokta linser, bönor, grönsaker, hummus på burk
- krossade tomater att till exempel koka pasta i
- konserver med köttfärsås, makrill, sardiner, ravioli, laxbullar, kokt kött, soppor
- fruktkräm, sylt, marmelad
- färdig blåbärs- och nyponsoppa, juice eller annan dryck som håller i rumstemperatur
- kaffe, te, choklad, energibars, honung, mandlar, nötter, nötsmör, frön.

Vatten

Rent dricksvatten är livsnödvändigt. Räkna med minst tre liter per vuxen och dygn. Om du är osäker på kvaliteten behöver du kunna koka vattnet.

Om toaletten inte fungerar kan du ta kraftiga plastpåsar eller plastsäckar och placera i toalettstolen. En god handhygien är viktig för att undvika smittor.

- flaskor
- hinkar med lock
- PET-flaskor att frysa vatten i (fyll inte ända upp, då spricker flaskan)
- mineralvatten
- dunkar, gärna med tappkran, att hämta vatten i. Du kan också ha ett par rena dunkar fyllda med vatten i reserv. De ska stå mörkt och svalt.

Lär dig mer om hemberedskap på dinsakerhet.se

Värme

Om elen försvinner under en kall årstid kommer bostaden snabbt att bli utkyld. Samlas i ett rum, häng filtar för fönstren, täck golvet med mattor och bygg en koja under ett bord för att hålla värmen. Tänk på brandfaran. Släck alla ljus och alternativa värmare innan ni somnar. Vädra regelbundet för att få in syre.

- ullplagg
- varma och oömma ytterkläder
- mössor, vantar, halsdukar
- filtar
- liggunderlag
- sovsäckar
- stearinljus
- värmeljus
- tändstickor eller braständare
- alternativ värmekälla, till exempel gasolvärmare, fotogendrivna element.

Övrigt

- spritkök och bränsle
- ficklampa, pannlampa
- batterier

Kommunikation

Vid en allvarlig händelse behöver du kunna ta emot viktig information från myndigheterna, framför allt via Sveriges Radio P4. Du behöver också kunna följa mediernas rapportering, ha kontakt med anhöriga och vänner och i akuta fall kunna nå räddningstjänst, sjukvård eller polis.

- radio som drivs med batteri, solceller eller vev
- bilradio
- papperslista med viktiga telefonnummer
- extrabatteri/power bank till bland annat mobiltelefon
- laddare till mobiltelefonen att använda i bilen.
- kontanter i mindre valörer
- husapotek och extra mediciner
- våtservetter
- handsprit
- blöjor och mensskydd
- utskrifter på papper av exempelvis försäkringsbrev, bankuppgifter, registreringsbevis
- drivmedel i tanken.

10

11



Om Sverige angrips krävs motståndskraft

Vi måste kunna stå emot olika slags angrepp mot vårt land. Redan i dag sker attacker mot viktiga it-system och försök att påverka oss med falsk information. Vi kan också påverkas av konflikter i närområdet. Möjliga angrepp kan vara:

- Cyberattacker som slår ut viktiga it-system.
- Sabotage av infrastruktur (till exempel vägar, broar, flygplatser, järnvägar, elledningar och kärnkraftverk).
- Terrorattentat som drabbar många människor eller viktiga verksamheter.
- Försök att påverka Sveriges beslutsfattare eller invånare.
- Avskurna transporter som ger brist på livsmedel och andra varor.
- Militära angrepp, exempelvis flyganfall, robotattacker eller andra krigshandlingar.

Om Sverige blir angripet av ett annat land kommer vi aldrig att ge upp. Alla uppgifter om att motståndet ska upphöra är falska.

12

Höjd beredskap

För att stärka Sveriges möjligheter att försvara sig kan regeringen besluta om höjd beredskap. De fredstida lagarna gäller, men vid höjd beredskap kan även andra lagar användas. Staten kan exempelvis ta över privat egendom som är särskilt viktig för totalförsvaret.

Vid höjd beredskap ska hela samhället kraftsamla för att möta en angripare och för att se till att det viktigaste fungerar. Vid höjd beredskap kan du bli inkallad för att hjälpa till på olika sätt.

Information om höjd beredskap får du genom radio och TV. Sveriges Radio P4 är beredskapskanal.

Totalförsvaret

Totalförsvaret



13

Viktigt meddelande till allmänheten

Signal 7 sekunder – uppehåll 14 sekunder



Faran över

Oavbruten signal 30 sekunder



Varningsystem

Viktigt meddelande till allmänheten

Varnings- och informationssystemet VMA (viktigt meddelande till allmänheten) används vid krisituationer – till exempel vid utsläpp av farliga ämnen, bränder med explosionsrisk, skogsbränder och andra naturkatastrofer.

Viktigt meddelande till allmänheten sänds fram för allt i Sveriges Radios kanaler, Sveriges Televisions kanaler och på SVT Text. VMA kan också skickas som SMS till mobiltelefoner inom ett visst område.

Varningsystem



14

Utomhusvarning

Vid sällsynta tillfällen används utomhusvarning ("Hesa Fredrik"). Anläggningar för utomhusvarning finns på flera större orter samt runt Sveriges kärnkraftverk.

Om du hör signalen: gå inomhus, stäng fönster, dörrar och ventilation och lyssna på Sveriges Radio P4 som har i uppdrag att ge samhällsinformation.

Systemet för utomhusvarning testas kloden 15.00 den första helgfria måndagen i mars, juni, september och december.



Varningsystem

15

Beredskapslarm

Signal 30 sekunder – uppehåll 15 sekunder



Flyglarm

Signal med korta stötar under 1 minut



Faran över

Oavbruten signal 30 sekunder



Beredskapslarm och flyglarm

Beredskapslarm är ett sätt för regeringen att meddela att det råder omedelbar krigsfara, eller att landet är i krig.

Om du hör signalen ska du omedelbart gå inomhus och lyssna på Sveriges Radio P4. Förbered dig på att kunna lämna bostaden med det allra viktigaste, varma kläder, något att äta och dricka samt id-handlingar. Är du krigsplacerad ska du omedelbart bege dig till den plats du har fått besked om.

Flyglarm betyder att du omedelbart ska uppsöka skydd, exempelvis skyddsrum eller en källare i den byggnad där du befinner dig.

Nya sätt att varna befolkningen kan bli aktuella.

Håll dig uppdaterad på dinsakerhet.se

Varningsystem

16

Skyddsrum och andra skyddande utrymmen

Skyddsrum ska ge skydd åt befolkningen i krig. Alla skyddsrum och byggnader med skyddsrum är märkta med skylt. Du tillhör inget särskilt skyddsrum utan använder det som finns närmast.



Ta reda på var ditt närmaste skyddsrum finns där du bor och där du befinner dig dagtid. Vid flyglarm ska du omedelbart bege dig till ett skyddsrum eller i nödfall till annat skyddande utrymme som källare, tunnel eller tunnelbanestation.



Varningsystem

17

VIKTIGA TELEFONNUMMER OCH WEBBPLATSER

112

Vid en nödsituation som kräver omedelbar hjälp av ambulans, brandkår eller polis.

113 13

För att lämna eller få information vid allvarliga olyckor eller krissituationer.

114 14

Alla polisärenden som inte handlar om pågående brott eller händelser.

1177

Sjukvårdsrådgivning.

Dinsäkerhet.se

Fördjupad information om innehållet i den här broschyren.

Krisinformation.se

Samlad information från Sveriges myndigheter vid kriser.

Appendix 2: Criteria for Risk Communication Effectiveness (Rohrmann, 1992)

Evaluation Aspects	Information Source		
<i>Substantial criteria</i>			
Content evaluation			
– Substantive correctness		E	
– Completeness of the information	A	E	
– Comprehensibility of the message		E	R
– Congruence between message and info need/request			R
– Belief/trust in the information			R
– Attention-calling ability		E	R
– Ethical considerations		E	
Process evaluation			
– Difficulties/failures in running the program	A		
– Inclusion of relevant actors/societal groups	A	E	
– Feedback possibilities		E	R
– Facilitation of communication		E	R
– Constructive interaction between involved parties		E	R
– Relevant target groups reached		E	R
Outcome evaluation			
– Degree of information dissemination		E	R
– Reception of the information provided			R
– Increased/improved knowledge			R
– Advanced problem awareness and involvement			R
– Consistency/homogeneity of responses to messages			R
– Acceptance of message			R
– Confidence of the information source			R
– Change of beliefs/attitudes			R
– Improved risk-controlling behaviour			R
– Amount of participatory activities		E	R
– Number of responses to RC agency	A		
– Reduction of accidents/illness/mortality rates	A	E	
– Conflict resolution	A		R
<i>Organisational criteria</i>			
– Financial efficiency (material costs personnel)	A		
– Time requirements	A		
– Training needs for the personnel involved	A	E	
– Difficulty of implementing the program	A		
– Flexibility and adaptability /content, procedure)	E		

Note:

‘A’ stands for RC agency (or author of the RC program),

‘E’ for risk expert or RC expert (independent researchers),

‘R’ for information receiver or participant of the RC program.

Appendix 3: List of Informants

No.	Gender	Age	Country of Origin	Time in Sweden	Reason for Migrating
1	Woman	25	Spain	1,5 years	Studies
2	Woman	30	Iran	10 months	Work
3	Man	41	Uganda	8 years	Asylum
4	Woman	32	Iran	1,5 years	Studies/Asylum
5	Man	41	Iraq	13 years	Asylum
6	Man	40	Iran	1,5 years	Work/Asylum
7	Man	32	Palestine	5 years	Asylum
8	Woman	35	Australia	5,5 years	Work
9	Woman	22	Belgium	4,5 years	Studies
10	Woman	27	Germany	3,5 years	Studies
11	Woman	29	Russia	9 years	Partner in Sweden
12	Woman	24	Denmark	4 years	Studies
13	Man	36	Australia	3 years	Partner in Sweden
14	Man	26	Iceland	1,5 years	Studies
15	Man	25	USA	1,5 years	Studies

Appendix 4: Information to Informants (in Swedish)

Hej,

Jag vill börja med att tacka dig för att du tagit dig tid att möta mig för denna intervju. Mitt namn är Linn Hollanti och jag studerar masterprogrammet "Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation" vid Lunds universitet. Intervjun jag kommer att hålla med dig kommer att ge mig data till min masteruppsats på temat riskkommunikation och krisberedskap. Det övergripande syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka hur en grupp utlandsfödda i Malmöområdet tagit del av, uppfattat och agerat på riskinformationsbroschyren "Om krisen eller kriget kommer".

Innan vi börjar vårt samtal vill jag informera dig om ett par saker gällande intervjun. Det här är en semi-strukturerad intervju vilket innebär att jag kommer att ställa några huvudfrågor till dig och beroende på ditt svar kan jag även komma att ställa några följdfrågor för att bättre förstå dig. Det finns inga rätt eller fel svar, jag är bara intresserad av att ta del av dina tankar och åsikter. Den information du lämnar kommer endast att användas i forskningssyfte, och den här uppsatsen kommer senare att publiceras på Lunds universitets databas LUP-SP. Om du vill kan du få ett fysiskt exemplar av den här studien när den är färdig.

Ditt namn och andra indikatorer som skulle kunna göra det möjligt att identifiera dig kommer inte att ingå i den här uppsatsen. Dina personuppgifter kommer att hållas konfidentiella. Du kommer med andra ord att vara anonym i den här studien. Du kan när som helst välja att avbryta intervjun, och ditt deltagande i studien.

Jag vill avslutningsvis fråga om din tillåtelse att få spela in den här intervjun. Inspelningen är endast till för mitt eget personliga bruk så att jag kan lyssna på intervjun efteråt när jag analyserar data. Säg till om du någon gång under intervjun vill säga något utan att det spelas in, då pausar jag inspelningen. Har du några frågor innan vi börjar?

Vid ytterligare frågor om studien eller ditt deltagande är du välkommen att kontakta mig på:

Linn.hollanti.5840@student.lu.se

Vänliga hälsningar,
Linn Hollanti

Appendix 5: Information to Informants (in English)

Hello,

I would like to start by thanking you for taking the time meeting me for this interview. My name is Linn Hollanti and I am currently studying at the “Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation” master’s programme at Lund University, Sweden. The interview I am about to conduct with you will provide me data for my master’s thesis on the topic of risk communication and crisis preparedness. The overall purpose of this thesis is to explore how a group of foreign-born people in the Malmö area, Sweden, receive, perceive and respond to the “If Crisis or War Comes” risk communication leaflet.

Before we start our conversation I would like to inform you about a couple of things regarding the interview. This is a semi-structured interview which means that I will be asking you some primary questions, and depending on your answer I might ask also some follow-up questions to better understand you. There are no right or wrong answers, I am only interested in taking part of your thoughts and opinions. The information you provide me will only be used for research purpose, and this thesis will later on be published at the Lund University’s database LUP-SP. If you like, you can be provided a physical copy of this study once it is finished.

Your name and other indicators that could make it possible to identify you will not be part of this thesis. Also, your personal data will be kept confidentially. In other words, you will remain anonymous throughout this study. You may choose to discontinue this interview, and your participation in this study, whenever you want.

Finally, and before we start, I would like to ask you for your permission to record this interview. The recording is only for my personal use as I can then listen to the interview when analysing the data. If you at some point would like to say something without being recorded, let me know and I will pause the recording. Do you have any questions before we start?

If you have any further questions regarding this study or your participation you may contact me at:

Linn.hollanti.5840@student.lu.se

Kind regards,
Linn Hollanti

Appendix 6: Consent Form (in Swedish)

Tack för att du läst informationen om denna studie och intervju på temat riskkommunikation och krisberedskap. Studien genomförs inom ramen för min masteruppsats vid programmet “Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation” vid Lunds universitet. Genom att signera det här formuläret ger du ditt samtycke till att delta i studien. Läs först noggrant igenom punkterna nedanför.

- Jag bekräftar att jag har läst och förstått informationsbladet till denna studie och att jag har haft möjlighet att ställa frågor. Jag vet även vem jag ska vända mig till om jag har ytterligare frågor om studien eller mitt deltagande.
- Jag förstår att mitt deltagande i studien är frivilligt och att jag när som helst kan välja att avbryta mitt deltagande utan att uppge någon anledning. Om det är någon särskild fråga jag inte vill svara på behöver jag inte göra det.
- Jag förstår att de uppgifter jag lämnar kommer att förvaras konfidentiellt. Jag förstår att mitt namn inte kommer att kunna kopplas till forskningsmaterialet, och det kommer inte heller att kunna identifieras i uppsatsen som är resultatet av denna forskning.
- Jag godkänner att den här intervjun spelas in. Jag förstår att inspelningen från intervjun enbart kommer att användas i analysyfte och att utdrag från intervjun, genom vilka jag inte kommer att kunna identifieras, kan komma att användas i uppsatsen och andra rapporter eller akademiska artiklar som utvecklas som ett resultat av den här forskningen. Jag förstår att inspelningen inte kommer att användas på något annat sätt utan mitt skriftliga godkännande, och att ingen annan förutom forskaren eller uppsatshandledaren kommer att ha tillgång till inspelningen.
- Jag ger mitt samtycke till att delta i den här studien och intervjun.

Deltagarens namn

Datum

Signatur

Signeras och dateras elektroniskt av deltagaren vid telefonintervju, annars av deltagaren i samband med intervju ansikte-mot-ansikte. Det signerade och daterade samtyckesformuläret kommer att förvaras av forskaren. Deltagaren ges en kopia av det signerade och daterade formuläret, samt en kopia av informationsbladet till studien.

Appendix 7: Consent Form (in English)

Thank you for reading the information sheet about this study and interview on the topic of risk communication and crisis preparedness. This study is part of my master's thesis within the "Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Adaptation" master's program at Lund University, Sweden. By signing this form you give your consent to participate in this study. Please read the statements below carefully.

- I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet and that I have had the opportunity to ask questions. I also know who to turn to if I have any further questions about this study or interview.
- I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.
- I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research material and will not be identified or identifiable in the thesis that results from the research.
- I agree for this interview to be recorded. I understand that the audio recording made of this interview will be used only for analysis and that extracts from the interview, from which I would not be personally identified, may be used in the thesis and other reports or journal articles developed as a result of the research. I understand that no other use will be made of the recording without my written permission, and that no one apart from the researcher and the thesis supervisor will be allowed access to the original recording.
- I agree to take part in this study and interview.

Name of participant

Date

Signature

To be signed and dated electronically for telephone interviews or in the presence of the participant for face to face interviews. The signed and dated consent form will be kept by the researcher. The participant will receive a copy of the signed and dated participant consent form, and the information sheet.

Appendix 8: Interview Guide (in Swedish)

Nr.	Fråga	Följdfråga	Syfte
Bakgrundsfrågor			
i	Namn? Ålder? Födelse/uppväxtland? Tid i Sverige? Tillståndsgrund (studier, arbete, anhörig, asyl)? Bor i stad/landsbygd?		Få en bättre förståelse av informanten samt några av de faktorer som kan påverka uppfattning av och respons till broschyren.
Mottagande			
1	Har du fått den här broschyren tidigare, innan ditt deltagande i den här studien? Hur?	Läste du den då? Varför/varför inte? Har du sparat den? Varför/varför inte?	Undersöka genomslag av broschyren och påverkansfaktorer.
2	Vad tror du är syftet med broschyren?		Undersöka hur informanten uppfattar broschyrens syfte.
3	Hur är det för dig att förstå broschyren?	Lätt/svårt? Kan du ge något exempel?	Undersöka informantens förståelse av broschyren.
4	Vet du vem avsändaren till broschyren är?		Undersöka informantens kännedom av och tillit till avsändaren och broschyren.
5	Litar du på information från MSB/svenska myndigheter?	Varför/varför inte?	
Perception			
6	Vad kände du när du mottog och läste broschyren? Varför?	Till exempel orolig, trygg...?	Undersöka vilka känslor broschyren ger upphov till.
7	Vilka är dina tankar och åsikter om broschyren?	Är den relevant/irrelevant? Varför/varför inte? Är det något särskilt du gillar eller ogillar med broschyren?	Undersöka informantens perception av broschyren.
8	Vad tänker du om de risker och händelser som tas upp i broschyren, till exempel cyberattacker, terroristattentat, naturolyckor, krig, strömavbrott etcetera, i relation till Sverige?	Är du orolig att någon av dessa händelser kan inträffa i Sverige? Vilken? Varför/varför inte?	Undersöka perception av risker som tas upp i broschyren.
9	Vad är dina tankar och åsikter gällande att förbereda dig för de här händelserna?	Är det viktigt/oviktigt för dig? Varför/varför inte?	Undersöka syn på krisberedskap på individnivå.

		Har du någon tidigare erfarenhet av kris, eller någon av här riskerna? I sådant fall, vilken? Tror du att det påverkar hur du tänker kring att förbereda dig?	Undersöka effekt av tidigare erfarenhet på beredskap.
10	Den här broschyren informerar bland annat om att alla i Sverige har ett eget ansvar att förbereda sig för kris och krig. Vad tänker du om det budskapet?	Tror du att svenska myndigheter skulle kunna hjälpa dig i en krissituation? Varför/varför inte?	Undersöka syn på eget ansvar att förbereda för kris. Undersöka tillit till och beroende av myndigheter i krissituationer.
Inverkan på krisberedskap			
11	Efter att ha läst den här broschyren, har du vidtagit några åtgärder gällande krisberedskap? Varför/Varför inte? (Har du till exempel pratat med andra om innehållet? Har du besökt hemsidan dinsakerhet.se för att få mer information? Har du förbättrat din hemberedskap?)	Skulle du kunna tänka dig att vidta någon av åtgärderna som tas upp i broschyren? Vilka? Varför/varför inte? Vad hindrar dig från att göra det?	Undersöka om/vilka åtgärder informanten vidtagit, samt eventuella hinder till beredskap.
12	Efter att ha läst den här broschyren, tror du att den gjort dig bättre förberedd på att hantera en krissituation? Varför/varför inte?	Kan du ge något exempel? Är det någon information gällande krisberedskap som du saknar i broschyren?	Undersöka broschyrens effekt på informantens krisberedskap samt förbättringsmöjligheter.
Distributionssätt			
13	Hur vill du helst få den här typen av information? Varför?	Till exempel i form av en broschyr som denna, SMS, e-mail, muntligt...?	Undersöka informantens föredragna distributionssätt och påverkansfaktorer.
Avslutning			
14	Är det något du vill tillägga på det här ämnet innan vi avslutar vårt samtal?		Inbjudan till avslutande kommentarer.

Appendix 9: Interview Guide (in English)

No.	Primary Question	Secondary Question	Purpose
Background questions			
i	Name? Age? Country of origin/grew up in? Time in Sweden? Ground for residence permit (studies, work, family ties, asylum)? Residing in the city/countryside?		Get a better understanding of the informant and some of the factors that may affect perception of and response to the leaflet.
Reception			
1	Have you received this leaflet earlier, before your participation in this study? How?	Did you read it then? Why/why not? Have you kept it? Why/why not?	Explore the outreach of the leaflet and factors influencing this.
2	What do you think is the purpose of the leaflet?		Explore interpretation of purpose of the leaflet.
3	How is it for you to understand the leaflet?	Easy/difficult? Can you give an example?	Explore the informant's comprehension of the leaflet.
4	Do you know who the sender of the leaflet is?		Explore the informant's knowledge of and trust in the sender and the information.
5	Do you trust in information from MSB/Swedish authorities?	Why/why not?	
Perception			
6	What did you feel when you received and read the leaflet? Why?	For example, worried? Safe?	Explore what feelings the leaflet gave raise to.
7	What are your thoughts and opinions on the leaflet?	Is it relevant/irrelevant? Why/why not? Is there something in particular that you like or dislike with the leaflet?	Explore the informant's perception of the leaflet.
8	What do you think of the risks and hazards mentioned in the leaflet, for example cyber-attacks, terrorist attacks, natural hazards, war and power cuts, in relation to Sweden?	Are you worried that any of these events may occur in Sweden? Which? Why/why not?	Explore risk perception of the hazards mentioned in the leaflet.

- | | | | |
|----|---|--|---|
| 9 | What are your thoughts and opinions on preparing for these hazards? | Is it important/not important for you? Why/why not?

Do you have any previous experience of a crisis, or any of these hazards? If so, which? Do you think this affects how you think about preparing for a crisis? | Explore view on individual preparedness.

Explore the effect of previous experience on preparedness. |
| 10 | Among other things, this leaflet informs about that all individuals in Sweden have a personal responsibility to prepare for a crisis. What do you think about this message? | Do you think Swedish authorities can help you in the event of a crisis situation? Why/why not? | Explore the informant's view on responsibility to prepare for a crisis. Explore reliance on authorities in crisis situations. |

Impact on Crisis Preparedness

- | | | | |
|----|--|---|--|
| 11 | Having read this leaflet, have you taken any measures in relation to crisis preparedness? Why/why not?

(For example, have you talked to others about the content? Have you visited the website dinsakerhet.se to receive more information on this topic? Have you improved your home preparedness?) | Would you consider taking any of the measures mentioned within the leaflet? Which? Why/why not?

What hinders you from doing so? | Explore if/what measures the informant has taken, and eventual barriers to preparedness. |
| 12 | Having read this leaflet, do you think it has made you better prepared to handle a crisis situation? Why/why not? | Can you give an example?

Is there any other information in relation to crisis preparedness that you think is missing in the leaflet? | Explore the leaflet's impact on crisis preparedness, and areas for improvement. |

Dissemination Channel

- | | | | |
|----|---|--|---|
| 13 | How do you prefer to receive this type of information? Why? | For example, in the form of leaflet like this, SMS, e-mail, orally...? | Explore the informant's preferred dissemination channel and factors influencing this. |
|----|---|--|---|

End

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| 14 | Is there something you would like to add on this topic before we finish our talk? | | Invitation for closing remarks. |
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Appendix 10: Coding Examples

Node	Sub-node	Sub-node	Example
Reception	Comprehension	Language	“I know a lot [of immigrants] who do not understand this.” (Informant 5)
		Formulations	“When they say ‘you’, does it mean everyone?” (Informant 2)
	Interpretation of Purpose		“What we are supposed to do, how the government is supposed to help people, what we as people should do for ourselves and that kind of facilitation.” (Informant 3)
	Dissemination Channel	Type	“Receiving it in the mail was a good idea. It became a dialogue about it in media, and society started to talk about why it was issued. It went viral, kind of.” (Informant 13)
		Frequency	“One needs to send it many times, not just sending it today and then wait ten years to the next time.” (Informant 7)
	Trust and Credibility	Sender	“Now when you ask me I start thinking if there is some kind of political motive behind it, but it feels like Sweden is such a strict bureaucracy that you hopefully could not get out a leaflet like this if it was a political agenda to get people more worried than they need to be.” (Informant 10)
	Leaflet	“The things make sense, therefore I trust this information.” (Informant 1)	
Perception	Leaflet in General		“I think people need this information.” (Informant 4)
			“It overstates the threat level that everyone is facing.” (Informant 14)
	Message on Responsibility to Prepare for a Crisis		“[It is like] you owe the country, and I am not quite sure about that.” (Informant 11)
	Emotions Caused by the Leaflet		“We moved here because in my home country there is a much crisis and problems. When I saw this [the leaflet], I was shocked. What?! (Informant 4)
Impact on Preparedness	Risk Awareness and Psychological		“I would not say [it has made me] better prepared but it has alerted me. It has

	Crisis Preparedness		given me an ‘aha, this can happen also here’.” (Informant 3) “I do not know if it is the information itself I get the most out of, but it is the thing about thinking it through which makes me more prepared.” (Informant 12)
	Physical Preparedness		(No measures taken)
Barriers to Preparedness	Risk Perception	Likelihood	“Of course, climatic events are increasing but this is more in the southern regions, so I am not too concerned.” (Informant 9)
		Consequences	“Here it is only like three drops of rain.” (Informant 13)
		Sweden as a Safe Place	“I have this perception of Lund and Sweden in general being safe.” (Informant 15)
		Lack of Media Coverage	“On TV there is nothing, and on radio they play music and dance and sing all the time. Apart from that it is quiet. Why should I save [food and water]?” (Informant 5)
	Unrealistic Optimism		“I am young, fit, not dependent on medication or have someone dependent on me.” (Informant 10)
	Lack of Storage Space		“How can you store water in an apartment? Where?” (Informant 3)
	Reliance on Authorities		“Power and water and heating, it always works and if it should not work they will fix it super-fast because we are in Sweden.” (Informant 12)
	Information Only is Not Enough		“I honestly do not see a leaflet changing the perspective of a whole nation.” (Informant 14)

Endnotes: Statements Translated from Swedish

- i "Om krisen eller kriget kommer"
- ii "Ingen aning, den kan vara i lägenheten men jag vet inte."
- iii "När de säger 'du', betyder det alla?"
- iv "Jag känner många [flyktingar och immigranter] som inte förstår det här. Den kommer i brevlådan och går direkt till papperskorgen".
- v "En hårdare policy mot invandring eller multikulturalism."
- vi "Att få den på posten var en bra idé. Det blev en dialog runt den i media och samhället började prata om varför den kom ut. Den gick 'viral', typ."
- vii "Man måste skicka den många gånger, inte bara skicka den idag och sen vänta tio år till nästa gång".
- viii "Den sista sidan med viktiga telefonnummer, varför inte bara skicka ut den som en lapp eller en kylskåpsmagnet? [...] Efter ingen dialog på, jag vet inte, trettio år eller något, så skickar de ut en bok. En hel bok!?"
- ix "När man fick den tänkte man på den men efter två månader glömmer man."
- x "Jag tror att människor behöver den här informationen".
- xi "I Palestina fanns det inte så stor skillnad på sommar, vinter, vår och allt som det är här i Sverige. Jag kan jag ha fyra årstider i en dag här. Vädret här, jag förstår inte vädret här."
- xii "När man är förberedd kan man hjälpa andra människor som behöver hjälp".
- xiii "Vakna!"
- xiv "Vi flyttade hit för att i mitt hemland är det mycket kris och problem. När jag såg den här [broschyren] blev jag chockad. Va?!"
- xv "Det känns väldigt officiellt att få den här informationen om hur man ska agera i kris, att myndigheterna tänker att det är större risk för kris och att det var dags att skicka ut officiell information om det här. Det gör att man tänker 'oj, vad händer nu?'."
- xvi "Innan [jag läste broschyren] hade jag ingen information om vad jag ska göra om något händer i Sverige. Jag skulle bara gråta".
- xvii "Jag vet inte om det är informationen i sig jag får ut mest av, men det är det där med att tänka igenom det som gör mig mer förberedd."
- xviii "Vi hade en terroristattack i Nya Zeeland för två dagar sen och det påminde mig om att jag har den här broschyren [...] och den hjälper mig".
- xix "Jag visste inte att SVT hade ansvar för att gå ut med information. Om information ges ut är det jättelätt att ta del av den genom att lyssna på P1 eller SVT."
- xx "Det står inget om var de [skyddsrummen] ligger, det står bara att de finns och att man ska hitta dem. [...] Det borde finnas en app så att man kan söka efter dem, eller en hemsida."

xxi “Jag vet inte varför jag inte fick den här informationen av Malmö stad när jag flyttade hit. De gav mig bara biljetter till teatern och en cykelkarta men inget sådant här.”

xxii Det är bra att veta att saker kan hända i en kris men det är svårt för mig att koppla det till min vardag i Lund. Det är som att förbereda för en zombiapocalyps, att ha burkar med mat och sånt hemma. I länder där det är mer oroligheter är det kanske mer viktigt att vara förberedd, men här känner jag inte samma nödvändighet för det.”

xxiii ”Vi känner oss trygga här”

xxiv “På TV är det ingenting, och på radio spelar de musik och dansar och sjunger hela tiden. Annars är det bara tyst. Varför ska jag spara [mat och vatten]?”

xxv ”Här är det bara typ tre droppar regn.”

xxvi ”Jag bor i en tvåa. Det finns inte plats i köket för vatten och mat och allt. Jag tänker inte göra något nu. Kanske om fem eller tio år.”

xxvii “Ström och vatten och värme, det fungerar alltid och om det inte skulle fungera kommer de att fixa det supersnabbt för att vi är i Sverige.”

xxviii ”De lär oss att ’du ska bara sitta ned, vi fixar allt’.”

xxix Jag tror att svenskarna har en plan B för femtio år framåt men om något händer nu [så säger de] ‘Oh, vad ska vi göra?’”

xxx “Jag vet till exempel inte vem min granne är och vi bor på samma våning. Jag tror det är ett problem. Du måste känns din granne om du behöver göra något, eller om något händer.”