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# Kidnapped Cultural Heritage?

*A Cultural Analysis on the Conflict about Cultural Heritage  
Among Cultural and Political Actors*

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## Abstract

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The Sweden Democrats have, like many right-wing populist parties all over Europe, had an increased success. Frequently they have been accused for thriving cultural policies as an excuse to raise nationalistic and anti-immigrational issues. The Sweden Democrat's presence in the cultural heritage sector triggers the question whether and how culture is used for instrumentalizing purposes and disturbs the balance in the field. This thesis assumes instrumentalization of cultural heritage being a given.

This investigation analyses the cultural heritage sector in Skåne, a region in South-Sweden as a political field. The focus is on the cultural actors in the field, which includes museums, cultural heritage associations, sites, networks and the political actors, which in this context are party members of the Sweden Democrats in Skåne. The aim is to analyse how the cultural and political actors use cultural heritage as a political tool and how a conflict between the actors appears and becomes visible in their discourse.

The investigation is based on eight ethnographic interviews and several official documents. Theoretical tools for the analysis are among others; Bourdieu's field theory, Foucault's discourse analysis, Smith's concept of an Authorized Heritage Discourse, Zizek's concept of national identity and Anderson's concept of imagined communities. The results of the thesis show that the overall goals of cultural and political actors are no contradiction, but that the individual components of the goals differ. These disagreements lead to a conflict in the field. The results suggest that all actors see each other as intruders in the field. This leads to a forced renegotiation of all positions, which is a struggle but also an asset. All actors benefit from the conflict, since it gives them more attention. This makes the conflict itself a dominant political tool of cultural heritage.

Keywords: Cultural Heritage; Sweden Democrats; Museums; National Identity; critical Discourse Analysis; Bourdieu; Political Tool

## **Abstract (Swedish)**

Kidnappat kulturarv? En kulturanalys av konflikten om kulturarvet mellan kulturella och politiska aktörer

Elin Fredriksson

Under de senaste åren har det politiska partiet Sverigedemokraterna, i likhet med många högerpopulistiska partier i Europa, fått ökad framgång. Inte sällan har de blivit anklagade för att använda kulturpolitiken som en ursäkt för att driva nationalistiska och invandringsfientliga frågor. Sverigedemokraternas närvaro i kulturarvssektorn har förändrat kulturarvsfältet.

Denna masteruppsats analyserar kulturarvssektorn i Skåne som ett politiskt fält och utgår från en existerande instrumentalisering av kulturarvet. Fokus ligger på de kulturella aktörerna, som omfattas av museer, kulturarvsföreningar, webbplatser, nätverk. De politiska aktörerna utgörs i den här uppsatsens av partimedlemmar från Sverigedemokraterna i Skåne. Uppsatsens syfte är att beskriva och analysera hur de kulturella och politiska aktörerna använder kulturarvet som ett politiskt verktyg och hur en kulturpolitisk konflikt mellan aktörerna uppstår och vilka uttryck den tar.

Undersökningen baserar på åtta etnografiska intervjuer och offentliga dokument. Följande teoretiska verktyg har använts för analysen: Bourdieus fältteori, Foucaults diskursanalys, Smiths Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD), Zizeks koncept nationell identitet och Andersons koncept föreställda gemenskaper. Uppsatsens resultat visar att de kulturella och politiska aktörerna har liknande övergripande mål avseende användningen av kulturarv, men att enskilda delar i målen skiljer sig åt. Resultaten visar att de olika aktörerna ser varandra som inkräktare i fältet. De blir tvungna att definiera sin position i fältet på nytt, vilket leder till konflikter. Men ompositioneringen är också en tillgång för aktörerna: alla drar nytta av konflikten, eftersom den ger dem uppmärksamhet. Detta gör själva konflikten till ett dominerande politiskt verktyget i kulturarvsfältet.

Nyckelord: Kulturarv; Sverigedemokrater; Museum; Nationell identitet; Kritisk diskursanalys; Bourdieu; Politiska verktyg

## **Abstract (German)**

Entführtes Kulturerbe? Eine Kulturanalyse zum Konflikt zwischen Kulturakteuren und politischen Akteuren

Elin Fredriksson

In den letzten zehn Jahren hat die schwedische Partei «Schwedendemokraten», so wie viele rechtspopulistische Parteien in ganz Europa, einen erhöhten Erfolg erzielt. Nicht selten werden sie dafür kritisiert, die Kulturpolitik als Vorwand für nationalistische und fremdenfeindliche Fragen zu nutzen. Das kulturpolitische Interesse der Schwedendemokraten verändert den Bereich des Kulturerbes und wirft die Frage auf, ob und wie Kultur für Instrumentalisierungszwecke verwendet wird. In dieser Untersuchung wird eine bereits existierende Instrumentalisierung des Kulturerbes vorausgesetzt.

Diese Masterarbeit analysiert den Bereich des Kulturerbes in Skåne, einer Region in Südschweden, als politisches Feld. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf den regionalen Kulturakteuren, zu denen Museen, Verbände, Kulturstätten und Netzwerke gehören. Die politischen Akteure im Zusammenhang mit dieser Masterarbeit sind Parteimitglieder der Schwedendemokraten in Skåne. Mit der Studie soll analysiert werden, wie die verschiedenen Akteure das Kulturerbe als politisches Instrument nutzen, wie ein Konflikt zwischen den Akteuren entsteht und wie sich dieser Konflikt sichtbar macht.

Die Untersuchung stützt sich auf acht ethnografische Interviews und eine Vielzahl öffentlicher Dokumente. Folgende theoretische Werkzeuge wurden unter anderem für die Analyse verwendet: Bourdieus Feldtheorie, Foucaults Diskursanalyse, Smiths «Authorized Heritage Discourse» (AHD), Zizeks Konzept der nationalen Identität und Andersons Konzept der vorgestellten Gemeinschaft. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Kulturakteure und politische Akteure ähnliche Ziele bezüglich der Verwendung des Kulturerbes haben, doch die einzelnen Bestandteile der Ziele unterscheiden sich. Die Ergebnisse verdeutlichen auch, dass sich alle Akteure gegenseitig als Eindringlinge im Feld des Kulturerbes sehen. Dies zwingt sie dazu, ihre Position im Feld neu zu definieren, was zu einem Konflikt führt. Doch die Neupositionierung bedeutet für die Akteure auch eine Bereicherung: Alle profitieren vom Konflikt, da sie dadurch an Aufmerksamkeit gewinnen. Damit wird der Konflikt selbst zu einem dominierenden politischen Instrument im Feld des Kulturerbes.

Schlüsselwörter: Kulturerbe; Schwedendemokraten; Museen; Nationale Identität; Kritische Diskursanalyse; Bourdieu; Politische Instrumente

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Lund, 2019-05-31

Elin Fredriksson

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## **List of abbreviations**

SFI = Svenska för Invandrare = Swedish classes for immigrants

SD = Sweden Democrats

AHD = Authorized Heritage Discourse



# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Background

The inspiration for this thesis is based on my personal interest in the mediation of cultural heritage and my employment as a museum pedagogue in the cultural open-air museum Skansen, located in Sweden's capital city of Stockholm. The job of my colleagues and myself was to transmit historical and cultural information while being dressed according to different historical eras and practising traditional activities and handicrafts. During lunches and after-works I started to realise that the Sweden Democrats' (SD) obvious interest in the cultural heritage sector was a hot and provocative topic among my colleagues. As I had grown up outside Sweden, the direct contact with this discussion was new to me. However, I understood my colleagues and also started feeling resentful that we were sharing interests with a party that is classified by the majority as right-populist or even racist. The following Post on the internal Facebook group for all the museum pedagogues of Skansen illustrates the discussion among the Skansen employees: "Have you seen what SD has been doing? I thought it was a joke" (personal communication, August 12, 2018). A reposted list of different activities within music, literature and sports like "the Swedish folk sport 'Varpa'", "Swedish folk dance" and "Poetic tribute to Swedish folk tales and dialects" followed. It was taken from the programme of the SD yearly cultural festival, at Sölvesborg in Blekinge in Southern Sweden, that had taken place on 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> August 2018 (Sverigedemokraterna Sommarfestivalen, 2018). Sölvesborg is somewhat symbolic for SD, since it is the hometown of Jimmie Åkesson, the party leader of SD since 2005. Since 26<sup>th</sup> November 2018 his partner, Louise Erixon, has been the chairwoman of the municipal council in Sölvesborg, leading the first coalition between SD, the Conservatives (Moderaterna) and the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) (Eriksson & Bendjelloul, 2018). The Post on the internal Facebook page for Skansen's museum pedagogues was commented on by many colleagues with angry emojis and statements like: "I hope they don't get attached to Skansen" or "Allow me to puke a little..." (personal communication, August 12, 2018).

It might seem surprising that people working in the cultural heritage sector in Stockholm are provoked by a cultural festival taking place hundreds of kilometres away from them. But there are reasons to believe that the Facebook Post mentioned above is only a fractional outcome of a wider conflict, perhaps beginning in 2010 when SD won seats in the

Swedish parliament and Jimmie Åkesson and Louise Erixon appeared wearing Swedish costumes from Åkesson's home region Blekinge (Bergfeldt, 2010). In the parliamentary handling of the cultural budget in 2010 SD suggested increasing the support to institutions preserving the Swedish cultural heritage and introducing a Swedish cultural canon at the expense of multicultural activities (Gustafsson & Karlsson, 2011).

In the following years up until today SD's focus on the cultural sector has been outstanding compared to other parties and it is today embracing and employing cultural heritage as one of its main standpoints more than other parliamentary parties (Engström, Källén & Ramberg, 2018).

SD define themselves as having conservative, nationalistic values and being "strong opponents to multiculturalism as a political idea and social system"<sup>i</sup> (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011) in their party programme. Since Skansen was started in 1891 with the very idea of preserving Swedish folk culture (Skansen, n.d.) it does not come as a surprise that SD's interests overlap with many of Skansen's activities. However, the museum pedagogues show themselves to be visibly upset about SD promoting traditional folk culture for their festival and imply that SD is monopolizing cultural heritage. The Facebook Post shows how two groups with differing ideologies are trying to claim the same field.

The conflict that is visible on a national level is presumably also visible on a regional level. Hence, my research scope is geographically limited to Skåne, a region in Southern Sweden. SD has a long history here: already in 1991, 19 years before they entered the Swedish parliament, they had one of their first municipal mandates in Höör, Skåne (Ekman & Vergara, 2013). Their strong position in this area is obvious, not only if we are to believe the media that like to portray Skåne as yellow on a map, yellow being the colour of SD (Francke, 2018), but also when looking at the large number of people that voted for them on a national level (Valmyndigheten, 2018).

History shows that culture has, since long, been a tool for the cohesion of people into political entities like the nation state. Clifford Geertz has called this "integrative revolution" and as one of the big projects of nationalism in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century. It aimed at integrating all people that were part of the same national sovereignty into one and the same culture (Geertz, 1963). Cultural practices, like the introduction of a national written language, were an important tool for the process of nationalisation (Anderson, 2006). What is relevant in the Swedish context is the case of Arthur Hazelius, who founded the Nordic museum and Skansen in Stockholm out of nostalgia for the diminishing traditional Swedish folk culture. His national romantic projects can be "embedded in the nation-building project common to many European countries in the

latter half of the nineteenth century” (DeGroff, 2012, p. 231). For this thesis he plays a role, not only as the personal starting point and inspiration for the topic but also as a sort of father figure of today’s heritage discourse that many of my interview partners are part of. Today, as in the past, “cultural heritage cannot be released from political aspects” (Jönsson, Wallete & Wienberg, 2008, 7), as the reactions of Skansen’s museum pedagogues concerning SD’s usage of cultural heritage show. In this thesis I want to investigate how cultural and political actors in Skåne use cultural heritage as a political tool and how the conflict between the actors becomes visible.

## 1.2. Aim and research questions

In this thesis I will investigate cultural heritage as a political field in Skåne in Southern Sweden. The thesis has two aims:

- 1) *The first aim is to analyse how cultural and political actors use cultural heritage as a political tool.*

How the cultural and political actors interpret cultural heritage is part of a discourse in a Foucauldian sense. This means that the actors’ interpretation and the broader discourse on cultural heritage influence and reinforce each other reciprocally. Consequentially, I must investigate how the actors interpret cultural heritage in order to understand how they reproduce and use a certain discourse. The following research questions will guide the first aim: How do the actors define cultural heritage? Why do they consider cultural heritage important? What is their aim of using cultural heritage in their work?

- 2) *The second aim is to find out how the conflict between different actors and their attempts to claim the cultural heritage field are made visible in their discourse.*

In the context of the second aim I will study how different discourses work together in the field of cultural heritage. I suggest that there is an ongoing conflict, in which all actors try to claim the field of cultural heritage. I identify SD as a “new player” in the heritage field that has been establishing itself the last ten years. But this establishment has not happened without a reaction from cultural actors already present in the field. The following research questions will guide

the second aim: What are the sources for the conflict? How is the conflict made visible? What do the actors do to claim the field and maintain their position in it?

### 1.3. Previous research

The field that I have been studying combines cultural heritage studies, political science, studies on nationalism, diversity and xenophobia. This section offers an overview of studies that have been made within these fields, especially focusing on the Swedish context.

Cultural heritage is the subject of research in many different areas and as the specialist in heritage studies Rodney Harrison observes, it does not have its “home” in any particular academic field (2013, 8). Many authors, including Harrison, write about cultural heritage from a rather general perspective. Laurajane Smith (2006), also specialist in heritage studies, provides a theoretical and critical approach to cultural heritage with her introduction to the Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD). Cultural historian and folklorist Anne Eriksen also reflects on cultural heritage in rather general terms and investigates the transformation of artefacts and buildings from being antiquities to heritage sites (2014). Ethnologist and folklorist Valdimar Hafstein investigates the intangible heritage, in particular his most recent work *Making Intangible Heritage: El Condor Pasa and Other Stories from UNESCO* highlights the significance of intangible heritage and shows the kind of cultural transformation that a song can go through (2018).

However, despite the relatively small number of works connecting ethnography or ethnology with political science, both in the Swedish context (Jönsson, 2003) and on an international level (Schatz, 2009), the field of cultural heritage definitely finds “a home” within the political field. Cultural politics in particular is well-researched in connection with cultural heritage, which is also of special interest for ethnographers and ethnologists, since it investigates the role of culture in society. In many cases the political aspect of culture and cultural heritage is covered from a historical perspective: How did culture evolve as a political sector? How did cultural heritage become a political interest? For example, the historian Anders Frenander in *Kultur som kulturpolitikens stora problem*<sup>ii</sup> (Frenander, 2014) provides an overview of the history of culture in the political field.

Apart from the more general works on cultural heritage, many authors connect the topic to its position in society. In this context, the anthology *I industrisamhällets slagskugga: om problematiska kulturarv*<sup>iii</sup> (Jönsson & Svensson, 2005) must be mentioned. It discusses how industrial society is represented in cultural heritage. In the anthology *Kanon och kulturarv:*

*historia och samtid i Danmark och Sverige*<sup>iv</sup> (Jönsson, Wallete & Wienberg, 2008), several authors follow up on the concept of the cultural canon that was introduced into Denmark in 2004. The ethnologist Lars-Eric Jönsson writes about the accessibility to cultural heritage in a Swedish and International context by basing his investigation on the slogan “Kulturarv för alla”<sup>v</sup> which has been widely used by various political and cultural actors within the cultural heritage field in Sweden (Jönsson, 2008). In *Föreställd mångfald*<sup>vi</sup>, Jönsson also describes the rise of the term cultural heritage as a political interest in Sweden in the 1990s and investigates the cultural discourse in the context of diversity and future visions (2017).

Another important research field where cultural heritage finds “a home” is the education sector. For example, the historian Per Eliasson writes in the anthology *Kanon och kulturarv: historia och samtid i Danmark och Sverige*<sup>vii</sup> how the significance of the term cultural heritage has changed in the Swedish school curriculum (2008). Lotta Brantefors, specialist in didactics, shows in her study from 2015 how cultural heritage sometimes contributes to ideas of othering and xenophobia in the Swedish curriculum (2015).

The societal role of cultural heritage becomes densified when connected to the fields of nationalism, nationality, diversity, populism and xenophobia. In many cases these studies overlap with research on the roles of museums or the role of archaeology. For example, the anthropologist Larry J Zimmerman touches on the fact that archaeology in the USA has been receptive for populist movements and discusses how this influences the field (2018). A Swedish example is social scientist Annika Alzén’s and historian Peter Aronsson’s *Demokratiskt kulturarv? Nationella institutioner, universella värden, lokala praktiker*<sup>viii</sup> (2006). One of the authors in this anthology is Tobias Harding, specialist in cultural policy and cultural organization, who investigates in his text *Det breddade kulturarvet och den oromantiska nationalismen*<sup>ix</sup> (2006) how cultural heritage and the ideas on a national community are connected. Harding has published several articles on both cultural politics in general and cultural heritage in connection with national identity, one of the latest being on church heritage and Swedish policies (2018).

Moreover, there are a couple of theses and dissertations focusing on the problematics of cultural heritage, nationalism and identity building in the Swedish context, such as *Folkdans som kulturarv? En studie i svensk folkdans och nationell tradition*<sup>x</sup> (Henriksson, 2011) or *Vems är det svenska kulturarvet? En diskursanalys av Riksantikvarieämbetets kulturarvs- och identitetsproduktion*<sup>xi</sup> (Johansson, 2006).

SD, being part of a general rise of populist parties in Europe, is the topic of many works such as *Sverigedemokraternas svarta bok*<sup>xii</sup> (Axelsson & Borg, 2014) or *Varför vi älskar*

*att hata Sverigedemokraterna*<sup>xiii</sup> (Hellström, 2013). However, SD and cultural heritage is a topic less well covered in academic literature. There are a couple of articles covering the problematic of SD's interest in the archaeology and cultural heritage sector, like archaeologists Anders Gustafsson's and Håkan Karlsson's text *A spectre is haunting Swedish Archaeology – the spectre of politics*, (2011) where they discuss the kind of strategy that cultural heritage institutions should develop in order to defend solidarity and multiculturalism in Sweden. I also found the Master thesis *Vårt svenska kulturarv. En diskursanalys av Sverigedemokraternas syn på kulturarvsbegreppet i relation till den hegemoniska kulturarvsdiskursen*<sup>xiv</sup> written by Elias Hall (2016). As far as I know, no other qualitative study on the topic has been made. Hall also notes the lack of academic literature but mentions that there is a range of news articles outside academia. This does not surprise me, since it is this range of daily news that partly inspired me for the topic of this thesis.

## 1.4. Thesis outline

This thesis consists of a cultural analysis of the cultural heritage sector as a political field. It investigates the conflict between the cultural and political actors within the field. The thesis started with an introduction looking at background, aims, research questions and previous research. The thesis further consists of three main chapters, from chapters two to four, that build on each other.

In Chapter two I describe and analyse how the cultural and political actors interpret cultural heritage. I analyse four different discourses that came up during the interviews. Each sub-chapter presents one of these factors. Based on these findings I then, in Chapter three, analyse how the different discourses clash and lead to a conflict. I have identified four different conflicts, each described in a sub-chapter, that can appear among the actors. Based on these conflicts, in Chapter four I analyse five different scenarios of how the conflicts are visible. Then follows a conclusion of the analysis and a chapter about the applicability of the thesis.

## 1.5. Methods and empirical material

### 1.5.1. Interviews

The main empirical material of this thesis consists of eight ethnographic interviews (seven individual interviews, one interview with two interview partners) that I conducted between 12<sup>th</sup>

February and 19<sup>th</sup> March 2019. I conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews in the format that, for example, Charlotte Davies (2008) or Gubrium, Holstein, Marvasti & McKinney (2012) describe. Conducting a semi-structured interview means that the interview is partly structured, for example occurring within a planned time frame and based on a list of question or themes. But it also has unstructured elements, since the interviewer does not have to stick to the interview guideline but can add or leave out questions depending on the situation. Also, in a semi-structured interview the interview partner is encouraged to expand the responses. In short, “semi-structured interviewing requires attention to the interview context and the relationship between participants beyond simply what is said” (Davies, 2008, p. 106). This sort of attention is the minimum of ethnographic observation that can be done by a researcher. Since the focus of this thesis is on discourse analysis and the interviews of the actors, a classical participant observation in a Malinowskian sense has not been applied. However, ethnographic observation by interpreting the reality and structuring the impressions (Ehn & Löfgren, 1982, p. 108) was employed as a natural activity.

Each interview lasted between 50 minutes and 1.5 hours. For an ethical treatment of the interviews during the conduction, the transcription and the usage of the interviews for analysis, I followed the guidelines of the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet, 2017). Just before the interviews, all interview partners received oral information about the topic of the thesis and clarification that they could withdraw their participation at any time and that they would remain anonymous. An official consent letter was sent to the interview partners by e-mail after the interviews. In addition, the persons I have quoted from the internal Facebook group in Section 1.1. received information about the thesis and have agreed to the same conditions as the other interview partners. Hence all names have been changed. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. The audio files and the transcripts have been saved by the author of this thesis. Due to the loss of one audio file, the quotes of that interview only exist in written form.

This is a list of my interview partners and what they represent, in chronological order according to the day of the interview:

- **Gabriel:** active within a national network concerned with “folk heritage”, lives in Skåne
- **Mikael:** a regional SD-politicians and active in regional cultural politics in Skåne
- **Karl and Sandra:** both working in the management of a regional cultural heritage site.
- **Amalia:** working in the management of a regional museum in Skåne
- **Cornelia:** a regional SD politician and active in regional cultural politics in Skåne

- **Xavier:** working in the management of a regional museum
- **Pernilla:** working in the management cultural heritage association
- **Jan:** working in the management of a regional museum in Skåne

In the beginning I based my choice of interview partners on two different inputs: On the one hand, I chose museums and cultural heritage associations that were listed for receiving operating grants and public funding for the year 2019 in the 2019 operational plan and budget of the cultural committee of Skåne (Region Skåne, 2019). On the other hand, I was inspired by the media coverage before and during the Swedish elections in September 2018, when SD was described as the parliamentary party focusing the most on cultural heritage (Engström, Källén & Ramberg, 2018). Shortly after the elections, the first media Posts started to appear stating that SD's view on culture was already visible on a political level in Sölvesborg, the first municipality with a coalition between SD, the Christian Democrats (Kristdemokraterna) and the Conservatives (Moderaterna) (Lindkvist, 2019). Not only did I identify SD as crucial political actors in the cultural heritage sector, but as a "new player": their presence in the field became obvious when they became a parliamentary party in 2010 (Johnson, 2010) and has been visible since then. In the course of the research, I broadened my field and included a regional cultural heritage site that had received operating grants from the cultural committee before, but now receives it from the regional board and a network that has raised its voice concerning cultural heritage. It is a national network, but the representative I talked to has a connection with the region and I therefore considered his voice important. According to Bourdieu, fields consist of participants with a certain disposition and where there are certain factors that are at stake for all the participants (Broady, 1988, p. 6-7). It is only a field if it is recognized as such by specialists and institutions. Based on this definition, I consider all my interview partners to be part of the cultural heritage field. Interview partners that represent a museum, cultural heritage site, association or network are referred to as cultural actors. Interview partners that represent SD are referred to as political actors.

### 1.5.2. Transcription and translation

Concerning the transcription process, I refer to Whatmore, who declares that it is not possible to talk about raw data as such, because the interview itself, the recording and the transcription all function as an intermediary between the interviewer and the interview partner and that the initial words are transformed along the way (2003, p. 9). This is, of course, important to consider in general, but I want to point it out in particular because I have translated the quotes I have



used for analysis (not the whole interviews) from Swedish into English. Some of the initial meaning might be lost in that process. The assumption that “ethnographies [...] are not transparent and unproblematic records of scientific research but are instead creative and politicized documents in which the researcher as author is fully implicated” (Bucholtz, 2000, p. 1440) is relevant concerning the process of translation, and particularly noteworthy considering the political context of this thesis. If requested, the quotes used in this thesis are available for inspection in their original form. Any other translated quotes from official documents are marked with “translation E.F.” and provided in the original form in a footnote.

### **1.5.3. Analysis**

For the analysis of the data I made use of a grounded theory approach as suggested by Corbin and Strauss (2008) and described by Agar (2008), who proposes to use categories based on the content of the interviews rather than applying outside categories. This means that I started analysing the interviews with help of a couple of analytic tools described by Corbin and Strauss as “waving the red flag”, which means that a researcher looks out for terms like “always” or “never” in order to reveal, for instance, prejudices. Other tools are “looking for words that indicate time” or “thinking in terms of metaphors and similes” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 68-86). The words that I extracted with these tools and identified as relevant constituted my “codes”. As a second step I collected all codes with a similar content from all interviews and made groups that I called “concepts”. As a third step I collected the concepts into categories, which I then used to analyse the interviews again. I ended up with three very broad categories: 1) What defines cultural heritage? 2) What creates a conflict? 3) What are the products of the conflict? These broad categories are also the main chapters of this thesis and they contain several sub-categories.

### **1.5.4. Official documents**

The investigation includes the SD party programme (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011), the SD election manifesto (Sverigedemokraterna, 2018) the operational plan of the cultural committee of Skåne (Region Skåne, 2019), “Knätofsmanifestet”<sup>xv</sup> from the group “Folkmusiker mot främlingsfientlighet”<sup>xvi</sup> (Folkmusiker mot främlingsfientlighet, n.d.).

Some of the official documents I used as data were also part of my interview method. I used quotes from the SD party programme, from the operation plan of the cultural committee

of Skåne and from “Knätöfsmanifestet” and made my interview partners comment on these quotes, without letting them know where they came from (list of quotes in Appendix C). At the end of the interview I revealed the sources. This method not only triggered conversation, it also allowed me to confront my interview partners with different opinions, without having to state my own point of view. This technique also helped me make my interview partners define certain terms such as cultural heritage, culture, or folk culture, which I consider are subject to an empirical rather than a theoretical study.

### **1.5.5 Social media and media coverage**

I treated social media such as Facebook pages of various politicians and associations as data but looked at it rather as a side-track and an input for further understanding of the party's, the museum's or the associations positioning. The same goes for the media coverage of the debate on cultural heritage: Articles on cultural heritage and conflict around it have not been prioritized as data but have served as background and inspiration. Sometimes news articles have led me to a new interview partner, like the call against SD's cultural policies made by people considering themselves active in Swedish folk cultural heritage, which I read about during media research.

### **1.5.6. Limitations**

Of course, “an ethnography can only be partial”, as Agar states (2008, p. 91) and this study is only a small collection of actors in relation to all those involved in Skåne's cultural heritage sector. It is important to note that all the actors play a role on a mainly regional level; thus no museums or organisations that only receive municipal grants are included.

Two interview partners that I interviewed together withdrew their participation in the study after they had received the consent letter. Some networks and politicians I contacted did not answer my e-mails and some museums denied my request by stating that “the Sweden Democrats do not have any influence at all on our activities”. Because of lack of time I could not pursue the contacts with no answer or a negative answer. For all these reasons some relevant voices are not included in this study.

It also has to be noted and taken into account that the quotes from the SD party programme, from the operation plan of the cultural committee of Skåne and from “Knätöfsmanifestet” that I showed to my interview partners during the interview in order to trigger conversation were, of course, shown out of their context. The analysis of my interview

partners' reactions to those quotes is hence limited because they are commenting only on a small part of the party programme, the operational plan and "Knätöfsmanifestet".

## 1.6. Ethical consideration

Agar writes about "informal interviews", which are not based on a list of questions but on a "repertoire of question-asking strategies" and where the ethnographer does not take the formal role of an interrogator (Agar, 2008, p. 140). Given the circumstances that all my interviews took place in a more or less formal environment (like the offices of the interview partners working in museums), it seems absurd to call them informal. Yet I claim they were, since I invited my interview partners to take part in a conversation rather than being a classical interviewer, and I also had a very loose set of questions (examples in Appendix A and B). Thus I focused on avoiding a "vessel of answer" approach, as Gubrium, Holstein, Marvasti & McKinney call it (2012), where the interview partner is only seen as a passive deliverer, and based my interview style on the fact that ethnography pays just as much attention to what people do as to what they say (Whatmore, 2003). This awareness is especially important concerning my second research question, where I want to look at the ways in which the conflict is visible. As already mentioned, I have used ethnographic observation only on a marginal level, but what people do can also become clear through their description of a certain behaviour that might seem trivial to them.

Broady explains Bourdieu's concept of symbolic capital and field theory by describing Bourdieu's position during field work: The Kabyle people, whom Bourdieu researched, participated in and took for granted a sophisticated gift system, without understanding its symbolic value. This is what Bourdieu calls "méconnaissance" – lack of knowledge. Bourdieu, as an outsider to the system, was not entitled to be part of the system itself. This outsider position enabled him to understand the economic characteristic and mythological idea of the system (Broady, 1988). It is the classic situation of a participant observant, where the participation becomes both asset and obstacle. In my case, I was an observer in the sense that I was neither a cultural nor a political actor, which gave me an outside perspective.

Of course, personal and institutional views overlap, and during the interviews many interview partners differentiated between their own and for example their party's view, referring directly to a party programme or operational plan. But interviewing representatives of institutions, especially politicians, comes with certain limitations such as their "institutional filter". "Persons are the products of their cultures, the times they live in, their genders,

experiences, and training”, write Corbin and Strauss (2008, p. 79) and I think in this case they are also products of their respective museum, party or network. This can be related to the concept of discourse in the sense that discourses “both constitute the social world and are constituted by other social practices”<sup>xvii</sup> as Winther Jørgensen and Phillips write, based on Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (2000). This means that the discourse occurring in the interview situation must be considered as a part of a bigger discourse. Or in other words: “It’s important to recognise that the roles within the field precede the people who occupy these roles” (Danaher, Schirato & Webb, 2000, p. 33). The researcher must “wave the red flag” in order to recognize the interview partners’ “biases, assumptions, or beliefs” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 79). Moreover, the politicians I talked to pointed out several times that since they had just started their position in the cultural committee, they could not tell me much about what they had done so far concretely. This goes for all the actors: at the time of the interviews the parliamentary term had only lasted between one to two months, the political situation was new and the scope of financial support still unclear; decisions and suggestions were still about to be developed.

My role as an observer can be seen as an asset, since it made me a more or less neutral actor who is “enabled” to see through the system, giving me access to it, just as Bourdieu got access to the gift system. And that is exactly why I tried to hold on to that role. For example, I did not state my political viewpoint because I did not want to harm the flow of information. Agar discusses whether it is unethical to conceal parts of one’s own background in order to benefit the research (Agar, 2008). The question remains unanswered, but the issue is solved by the fact that I probably revealed more of my background than initially planned. Agar also suggests that objectivity is nearly impossible and not necessarily worthwhile: “Treat yourself to a little self-indulgent arrogance. Some scientists think that objectivity is an accomplished goal” (2008, p. 100). I did not enter and will not leave the field as an objective individual. I confronted my interview partners with “their system” thereby revealing that I was not free from opinions when it comes to cultural politics. The choice of questions, topics and issues I brought up in the interviews showed what I think is relevant. I might have upset some of my interview partners with my assumptions or made them suspicious and sceptical concerning my apparent neutrality. But by giving hints of my own perspective, I invited my interview partners to a conversation and chose to see them as co-producers of the material, as Stengers suggests (1997). That is also why I prefer to call the individuals I have interviewed interview partners instead of informants.

The political field as a research subject within ethnology is often avoided, as Jönsson states (2003). This might have to do with the researcher's fear of being associated with a political party or with the fact that other disciplines, like political studies, address the issues more explicitly, as Jönsson continues. But many ethnologists do investigate political issues, without explicitly calling it political, as Fredrik Nilsson develops the thought (as cited in Jönsson, 2003). Obviously, this thesis expresses the political content openly, and needless to say, my interest in politics is one of the reasons for the choice of this topic. But I do not see this as a reason to make personal political statements; politics forms part of our everyday life and is hence a research subject just as any other area. I want to distance myself from all the political statements in the quotes, and I do not see it as my task to sympathize with any of the actors I describe.

## **1.7. Theoretical framework**

### **1.7.1. Cultural and symbolic capital**

My first aim is to analyse how the cultural and political actors use cultural heritage as a political tool. As already mentioned, I must hence analyse both the actors' interpretation of cultural heritage and the broader discourse, which contains the former.

Donald Broady's (1988) and David Swartz's (1997) understanding of Bourdieu's concept of capital (Bourdieu, 1977) will be useful tools for describing how the actors in my study interpret cultural heritage. According to Bourdieu there are four types of capital: economic, cultural, social and symbolic (Swartz, 1997, p. 74). Symbolic capital is the most visible one, sometimes covering the other types of capitals. Actors within a certain context may not recognize the economic, cultural or social capital and only the mythological idea, symbolic capital, becomes visible. For example, "ignorance" of the material economy is a precondition for the symbolic economy to work (Bourdieu, 1977). Every capital form can become symbolic capital if it is legitimized and recognized by other actors within the field (Swartz, 1997, p. 74).

Undoubtedly, cultural capital is a key term in the context of cultural heritage. Hence, I must not only understand how my interview partners interpret cultural heritage but also how they interpret culture. According to Raymond Williams there are roughly three ways of using the word culture: cultivation, both agricultural and in the sense of "cultivating the soul", aesthetics, in connection with the arts, and anthropology in the sense of lifestyle, traditions and norms (1993). As the ethnologist Magnus Öhlander interprets it, all three usages can be

connected to a ranking or hierarchy, for example the development stage of a society (2005, p. 29). Opposed to this is the perspective of cultural relativism, which indicates that different cultures cannot be compared with each other but must be defined within their own context (2005, p. 14). This term is not to be confused with “ethnopluralism”, which according to political scientist Anders Hellström (2013, p. 81) is the idea that cultures, often connected to nations, cannot and should not be mixed with each other and that culture is impermeable. The term does not necessarily indicate a hierarchical structure, but every group’s unique national characteristic is underlined. Taguieff even calls this sort of ideology cultural racism (1990). Many right-wing populist groups share the ideology of ethnopluralism (Rydgren, 2010, p. 19), while they are strict opponents of cultural relativism (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011, p. 19-20).

When Bourdieu refers to culture, he does not mean the rather broad sense of anthropological culture. He means the sort of culture that is colloquially named high culture: a dominating culture connected to institutions of power and legitimized by educational institutions. The possession of this kind of culture as cultural capital ensures access to power (Broady, 1988, p. 3). Depending on how an actor interprets culture, the meaning of ownership concerning cultural capital will differ. Moreover, it is crucial to take into consideration that all my interview partners represent an institution. Hence, the cultural capital that they refer to is, according to Bourdieu, institutionalized cultural capital, meaning that it has been embedded in, for example, educational institutions or museums. The institutionalized cultural capital stands in opposition to an embodied cultural capital that is visible in individuals’ knowledge and experiences (Broady, 1988, p. 5).

In this context it is important to consider the differences between referring to culture as something that is changing or something that is static (Öhlander, 2005, p. 15-16). While understanding culture as a physical, static entity comes close to biological categories like race (Appadurai, 1997), the view on culture as a process includes contradictions. The closer a culture is to us in time and space, the more visible these contradictions are. Cultures that seem far away geographically and/ or temporally seem more coherent to us. (Öhlander, 2005, p. 16-17).

### **1.7.2. Power and Discourse**

For the analysis of discourses, I implemented a Foucauldian critical discourse analysis as described by Foucault (1978) and interpreted by Danaher, Schirato & Webb (2000). In general, I would like to adopt the definition of discourse that Danaher, Schirato & Webb imply, inspired by Foucault:

Discourses can be understood as language in action: they are windows, if you like, which allow us to make sense of, and ‘see’ things. These discursive windows or explanations shape our understanding of ourselves, and our capacity to distinguish the valuable from the valueless, the true from the false, and the right from the wrong. (2000, p. 31)

In other words, we shape our reality through discourses, and it is not possible to make references to a reality outside language (Frenander, 2014, p. 20). But in turn we are influenced by discourses: From a poststructuralist perspective, discourses “both constitute the social world and are constituted by other social practices”<sup>xviii</sup> (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, p. 67).

One of Foucault’s main points is that discourse and power are intertwined in a complex way. He claims that power is not exercised from above by a state or institution but is developed within society (Foucault, 1978, p. 93). Nonetheless, institutions play a crucial role in the production and dispersion of discourses: “[...] there is no one authoritative discourse, institution or group in a state, but instead a number of competing discourses and groups which produce different versions of events” (Danaher, Schirato & Webb, 2000, p. 77). Playing a part in the (re)production of discourses gives an institution power, for example when influencing how categories are formed. Foucault exemplifies this with the human body that from birth is measured and categorised by different institutions like the hospital, the family and schools (Foucault, 1978, p. 98). In the case of my study, the museums, the networks, the associations and the parties have the power to add meaning to the term cultural heritage. But categories are not stable; they are part of a transformation process and the kind of meaning, we attach to them changes in parallel with trends and popular culture. People are able to resist power when they recognise it. If we understand that categories are not fixed but subject to change, we are free to believe in the categories we want to. This resistance to power can also appear in a different way: if categories are produced by what is normal and healthy, the opposite is automatically also produced: categories of the deviant and pervert (Danaher, Schirato and Webb, 2000, p. 79). This shows how discourses have the power to produce contradictory categories. As Foucault describes it, discourses can be instrument, effect and hindrance of power. Moreover, the silencing of a discourse can also be a source of power, because it creates an idea of prohibition. This can in turn lead to a “reverse discourse”. Foucault explains this by stating that while the appearance of discourses around homosexuality in the 19<sup>th</sup> century enabled more social controls, it also allowed homosexuality to speak up for itself and to request legitimacy; to create a “reverse discourse” (Foucault, 1978, p. 100).

It is important also to note that Foucault talks about power *relations*, meaning that power refers to a relationship between partners (Danaher, Schirato & Webb, 2000, xiv).

### 1.7.3. Specific discourses

While Bourdieu's concept of capital and Foucault's discourse analysis serve as tools to determine how and what kind of discourses appear within the heritage sector, the following concepts will be a basis for analysing some of the specific discourses.

Laurajane Smith points out that we do not preserve heritage because it is important; it becomes important because we preserve it (Smith, 2006, p. 3). In the realm of this thought she identifies an "Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD)" as a prevailing, institutionalized Western discourse that normalizes certain narratives. The AHD places aesthetics at the centre, describing cultural heritage as being automatically precious and valuable, something worth taking care of in order to maintain a common sense of identity. This identity is, in its simplest form, the national identity, which, as Smith explains, has its origins in nineteenth-century nationalism, where the heritage discourse appeared. The narrative of national identity excludes other forms of identities, like sub-national, cultural and social experiences, and focuses mostly on elite social classes. The AHD simplifies the narrative about the past as having only a single perspective and being something that only legitimate experts, like archaeologists, historians and the like are entitled to investigate and define. Smith's AHD is a fruitful complement to the Foucault-inspired perspective. She recognizes Foucault's discourse analysis as important in the heritage context, but she puts her focus on the material consequences that social relations have. At the same time, it is also precisely materiality that she considers problematic within the AHD, because it "helps to reduce the social, cultural or historical conflicts about the meaning, value or nature of heritage" (Smith, 2006, p. 31).

Two terms that are useful in this context are official and unofficial heritage. According to Harrison, official heritage refers to heritage that is recognised by the state, while unofficial heritage has "significance to individuals or communities" but is "not recognized by the state as heritage through legislative protections" (2013, p. 14-15). This is connected to Harrison's distinction between the canonical model and the continuous model of heritage. The canonical model existed mainly in Western societies before 1980 and just like the AHD "tended to recognise only the remarkable" (2013, p. 18). The inclusion of the trivial in the heritage sector, which Harrison calls a "continuous model" because it connects the past's and the present's everyday life, led to a conflict between the "models of heritage that emphasised the remarkable



and those that emphasised the everyday. He claims that this made official heritage go from canonical to representative approaches, meaning that both “high” and “popular” culture were addressed (2013, p. 18-20).

The discourse about heritage being connected to nationhood as described by Smith can be based on a more general discourse about national identity. Žižek describes national identification as the shared feeling of enjoyment a community has towards a certain “thing”:

National identification is by definition sustained by a relationship toward the Nation qua Thing. This Nation-Thing is determined by a series of contradictory properties. It appears to us as ‘our thing’ (perhaps we could say *cosa nostra*), as something accessible only to us, as something ‘they,’ the others, cannot grasp; nonetheless it is something constantly menaced by ‘them.’ (Žižek, 1993, p. 595)

The members of a community agree to be the only ones having access to this “thing”, the only explanation being that it is “our way of life” (Žižek, 1993, p. 595). Moreover, the “thing” is inaccessible to outsiders and at the same time threatened by them. In Anderson’s terms, a nation is not only a community but also an imagined community, meaning that we share values and beliefs with many people whom we do not know in person but still see as fellow members of the same community (2006, p. 5-6). Harding explains the differentiation between nations that base their idea of national community on “cultural nationalism” or on “civil nationalism”. Nations with “cultural nationalism” have built their national community on the idea of a national culture for which the state must be created. Nations with “civil nationalism” have built their national community on an idea of an already existing state and a given population (Harding, 2006, p. 72-73). Connecting the ideas of nationhood and national identity to heritage shows how culture has been and still is used as a tool for the creation and maintenance of a nation (Löfgren, 1993, p. 22 ff).

#### **1.7.4. Dynamics in the field**

My second aim which addresses the conflict between the different actors in the cultural heritage field and their attempts to claim the field, is analysed through Bourdieu’s field theory (Bourdieu, 1993). I again make use of Broady’s (1988) and Swartz’s (1997) interpretation of Bourdieu.

“Fields may be thought of as structured spaces that are organized around specific types of capital or combinations of capital” (Swartz, 1997, p. 117). The components of a field are participants with a certain disposition, investments that must be made when entering the field,

contributions to the field, economic and symbolic profits and certain factors that are at stake for all the participants. But a field in Bourdieu's sense is only a field if it is recognized as such by specialists and institutions. The existence of the field is maintained by its participants who hold the "doxa", the implied beliefs of the field, unexpressed. Only when new "heterodox" participants enter the field and challenge the dominance of the old "orthodox" participants, are they forced to voice the doxa and make it a discourse. Broady, who exemplifies Bourdieu's concept in the literary field, claims that the different opinions of new and old participants are their weapons in the fight for the field. The "heterodox" participants stand out by wanting to go back to "primordial" and "original" sources (Broady, 1988, p. 6-7). Hellström describes how SD's entry into the political field in Sweden has led to a renegotiation of national identity. The debate around SD is also a fight for who has the right to own the symbols for a national community. Being against SD is a good way to make a statement and position oneself, according to Hellström (2013). His ideas exemplify what the conflict in the field can look like and how the different actors fight about owning a certain discourse. Bourdieu's field concept and Hellström's ideas as a complement will be useful tools for analysing how the actors juggle with the different sorts of discourses in the field and how this creates a conflict.

## 2. Discourses of cultural heritage

I dare to assert that most people have an image of what cultural heritage is and looks like. The image might be vague and based on what tourist catalogues or museum brochures communicate. The definition of cultural heritage is tricky, which becomes clear when looking at previous research and official documents, where willingness to provide a concrete and solid definition is lacking. Smith's statement that "There is, really, no such thing as heritage" (2006, p. 11) is probably the most encompassing description of cultural heritage. Of course, this makes it challenging to write about cultural heritage without drifting away into extremely abstract and blurry fields. It is possible to make use of official lists like the one UNESCO produced in 2002, naming rather specific categories like "festive events" or "traditional medicine" (UNESCO as cited in Harrison, 2013, p. 5-6) or the UNESCO World Heritage list (UNESCO, n.d.). But this would not be a very objective starting point, since the categorisation of cultural heritage is biased. According to Harrison it is a modernist instrument for dealing with the past and a Westernized perspective on heritage (Harrison, 2013). Smith even points out that cultural heritage becomes important *because of* categorisation, which is the very source of an Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD) (2006). There is an interplay between public opinion and the categorisation of cultural heritage: The public influences institutions in the way the categorisation is made, but at the same time categorisation influences the public perception of cultural heritage. Harrison mentions how the decision of what is official heritage influences people in what they believe is their unofficial heritage (Harrison, 2013). Jönsson and Svensson write that institutions do not have an exclusive right to cultural heritage (2005), meaning that a discourse about cultural heritage is also created "out there" in the public. In this chapter I analyse institutional discourses. However, discourses have many actors and are part of a complex machinery. Because of the above-mentioned interplay between the categorisation of and public opinion about cultural heritage, I claim that the analysis will also to some extent reflect public opinion about the topic.

Below follows a description of cultural heritage in the government bill on cultural heritage:

Cultural heritage can be understood as traces and expressions from the past that are given value and used in the present. In cultural politics, it is crucial to start from such an open understanding of cultural heritage. The delimitation of what is to be counted as cultural heritage, which is required in practical activities, must, as far as possible, be made in civil society and by the professionals in the cultural heritage area.<sup>xix</sup> (Prop. 2016/17:116, translation E.F.)

The denial to provide a list of what cultural heritage is and to leave the categorisation to the civil society and the professionals is of course connected to the Museum Law, which in the government bill says that “The museum principals must ensure that a museum has a decisive influence over its content”<sup>xx</sup> (Prop. 2016/17:116, translation E.F.). This means that politicians should have no say about the content of a museum’s exhibition. This description shows the politicians’ awareness that defining and categorising cultural heritage can be a tool for exclusion. It must be taken into consideration that this official description of cultural heritage in the government bill is part of a bigger discourse on cultural heritage. The political actors are part of the machinery that has produced this description, but also reproducers and contributors. The cultural actors, since they are public museums, are obviously influenced by the official view on cultural heritage, concerning their activities.

Nevertheless, I would like to claim that most actors in this study do not deny either the categorisation or the usage of cultural heritage as a tool. The focus on usage was strong in all interviews and many interview partners referred to cultural heritage with the terms “tool” (Interview with Sandra, 2019), “instrumentalization” (Interview with Amalia, 2019) or “key” (Interview with Cornelia, 2019). The following quote shows how the usage of cultural heritage was given importance:

**Amalia:** I think that we use cultural heritage rather than preserve it, I would say. If we just lock things up in an archive, they are not useful to anyone. It may be preserved very well because we can have exactly the same humidity and temperature all the time so that it can be stored there for 1000 years, but it makes no use whatsoever and no one sees it and uses it. So the important thing about the cultural heritage is that you use it in different ways, and you can do that in a lot of different ways. (Interview with Amalia, 2019, emphasis by the author (E.F.))

As I will show in this chapter, all actors used cultural heritage as a tool in different ways, just as Amalia pointed out. Based on my first aim (*The first aim is to find out how cultural and political actors use cultural heritage for political communication, activity and power*) I will describe and analyse the kind of discourses the actors reproduced in connection with cultural heritage and to what extent these discourses transform cultural heritage into a tool. I will showcase and analyse four different themes that appeared in the interviews when negotiating the importance of cultural heritage.

## 2.1. A social discourse

Cultural heritage was referred to by many actors as something social: “[...] having it [cultural heritage] as an instrument, so to say, and especially for building bridges between people and different groups, I think that is really important” (Interview with Cornelia, 2019). Amalia called their museum “a community actor” in the sense of helping the community to become better. She mentioned “special groups where we are required to do a little more” like schools for children with special needs, elderly people that are lonely, SFI groups.<sup>xxi</sup> “And it is about reaching out to everyone but also increasing well-being, when you look at culture and health [...] you see that people feel better with culture and cultural experiences” (Interview with Amalia, 2019). Jan went in a similar direction when he described cultural heritage as something that “strengthens you and enriches you as a person” and that “if one lives in a society that takes advantage of its cultural heritage, it becomes a better society than if it did not care about its cultural heritage” (Interview with Jan, 2019).

In their election manifesto from 2018, SD describes the idea of “culture piloting” that should “strengthen cultural cohesion [...] with the task of collecting, marketing and integrating the local cultural heritage into the welfare activities and establishing Sweden centres in the country’s most vulnerable areas”<sup>xxii</sup> (Sverigedemokraterna, 2018). This is something which Cornelia also mentioned that she had proposed in her municipality; it could be “used as a tool to create meeting points and give people a common fixed point [...]” (Interview with Cornelia, 2019). Reaching out, building bridges, creating meeting points – cultural heritage becomes a tool for the inclusion of different groups and increased access to culture. It seems as if the social aspect as a goal is pursued by all actors. That is no coincidence: accessibility to cultural heritage, in its very broad meaning including work against xenophobia, increased physical accessibility and a social broadening of the audience, has been in focus in Swedish cultural politics for several decades (Jönsson, 2008).

However, the actors have different roles within this social context. Putting it in Bourdieuan terms (Broady 1988): the cultural actors are in charge of the dispersion of cultural capital and the politicians are potential distributors of economic capital. SD’s social discourse has been observed and interpreted before: Mulinari and Neergaard call this sort of discourse, where SD describes helping immigrants, “an ethnopluralist caring discourse” (2014, p. 209). This goes back to Hellström’s explanation that ethnopluralism sees culture as hermetic in the sense that different cultures cannot be mixed (Hellström, 2013). SD combines the social discourse and the ethnopluralist discourse: In helping immigrants adapt to Swedish traditions

and customs, they are helped to integrate into society, hence SD sees it as their task to dispense Swedish culture in what they call “vulnerable areas”, which in a common sense understanding can be read as the outskirts of cities with a dense immigrant population. This sort of action does not seem astonishing, and other parties, like The Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) point out the importance of integration in cultural policies (SVT, 2018). But there are voices arguing that SD’s social discourse is a wolf in sheep’s clothing; Mulinari and Neergaard develop their term from “ethnopluralist caring *discourse*” to “ethnopluralist caring *racism*”. The two authors claim that this sort of discourse is a strategy that SD uses to respond to critics that accuse them of being racists: By claiming that they just want to help, SD want to make their finger-pointing at immigrants’ non-integration appear to be innocent (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014). It can also be argued that SD’s social discourse is a hidden nationalistic discourse, giving them the opportunity in fact to pursue another political interest: regulating immigration by focusing on a strengthening of Swedish culture. Zizek’s “thing” (1993) might be applied as an inclusion for people, but it becomes an exclusion of culture, because there is little or no space for immigrants to indulge in their own traditions.

## **2.2. Warming the heart and widening the views**

One of the most important factors when my interview partners talked about cultural heritage was knowledge. However, their references to knowledge were very broad, stretching from extremely abstract and emotional, like “the little warmth to the heart” (Interview with Cornelia, 2019) to extremely concrete, like “How warm was it in this farmyard in the year 1815?” (Interview with Jan, 2019). I have found two major groups that I very broadly call 1) Awareness and 2) Facts, which I will elaborate in this section. As already mentioned, Bourdieu refers to a dominating “high culture” connected to institutions of power when he writes about cultural capital (Broady, 1988). Nevertheless, I would like to claim that, for the actors in my study, knowledge based both on awareness and on facts was seen as the cultural capital of cultural heritage, since both legitimize its importance. Owning either of them provides access to a cultural understanding.

### 1) Awareness

Cultural heritage evokes feelings: a romantic connection, belonging, pride and most importantly nostalgia. “Nostalgia is today the universal catchword for looking back”, defines Lowenthal

(1985, p. 4). While nostalgia in the 17<sup>th</sup> century was seen as a physical illness when feeling homesick, it is today much less concrete. As a state of mind, nostalgia can be seen as the product of a “rebellion against the present” and a “mistrust of the future” (Lowenthal, 1985, p. 11). It is hence not surprising that the interview partners, such as Cornelia, who were members of SD, a party that likes to accentuate its national romantic and conservative views (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011), explained their nostalgic feelings as rather abstract and very natural:

**Cornelia:** [...] it would be sad if we tore down all the old churches, if we removed all the Midsummer poles and refused to celebrate Christmas, if we just removed it all, it would feel terribly empty, it would be like cutting off your right arm, it is what we are so accustomed to, for purely nostalgic reasons, of course it should remain as long as we want it and as long as it has a value for us and means something, and gives this little warmth to the heart because it is well known. (Interview with Cornelia, 2019, emphasis E.F.)

Cornelia’s metaphors “cutting off your right arm” and the “little warmth to the heart” make it clear that she sees cultural heritage as being very close to herself, close to embodied. But she also embeds the feeling in a community around her, since it is what “we are so accustomed to” and has a “value for us”. Mikael, another SD politician, had a similar narrative and exemplified it by explaining that he did not feel any emotional connections, when, during his theology studies, he was introduced to African wood carvings and figures; “but if I see a beautifully carved Jesus on a cross, I know exactly what that means” (Interview with Mikael, 2019). The feeling that he gets when looking at “for example, churches” Mikael described with the words “happiness, harmony and pride”. What Cornelia and Mikael describe here is basically what Zizek calls “the thing”: the inexplicable, shared feeling of enjoyment of a community (Zizek, 1993). The knowledge about “the thing” must be based on knowledge about “community”, which leads to Anderson’s concept of the imagined community (Anderson, 2006). Cornelia’s vocabulary of “us” and “we” and Mikael’s reference to Christianity show that they assume a community with whose members they share their feelings. Also, when looking at the SD party programme, the assumption of such an imagined community is visible: “Taking care of cultural heritage means showing respect for past generations and remembering what they have achieved”<sup>xxiii</sup> (Sverigedemokraterna 2011, p. 19). The community that is described here exists not only across space but also across time. Looking at the kinds of feelings the cultural heritage is supposed to evoke, they are all positive: warmth, happiness, harmony, pride. Smith’s ideas that an Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD) focuses on everything that is aesthetically

pleasing (2006) goes well together with this sort of narrative, although the aesthetics here might be on a rather abstract level.

## 2) Facts

In opposition to this concept is the narrative of cultural heritage being related to knowledge based on facts. In this sort of narrative, facts seem to justify the value of cultural heritage, as the following two quotes, from Jan, the director of a regional museum and Sandra, the executive director of a regional cultural heritage site, exemplify:

**Jan:** It [cultural heritage] is not only something that is created, it is also something that exists, I think. [...] You can think about the use of history, how history is used to strengthen a thesis [...] but history is not just something we use, it's also something that has happened, some people lose the empirical perspective, and that also goes for cultural heritage. [...] What is it that has actually happened? In our museum- [...] one interesting aspect is to see how it was to live- How cold was it [...] How long did people sleep, how early did they get up, how was daily life? (Interview with Jan, 2019, emphasis E.F.)

**Sandra:** It is very important that we work with the mediation of knowledge: [...] you can never get away from the fact that we had migration during a time when [name of museum] had extremely much exchange of people and other things [...] you can't get away from the facts. (Interview with Sandra, 2019)

In both quotes the use of history is juxtaposed with historical facts. Both Jan and Sandra referred to facts in a very neutral and objective way: the facts are a protection from misuse. The facts are reliable and true, they prevent the cultural heritage site or museum from being used for any other goals and put all the focus on the cultural heritage itself. Of course, one actor can use more than one discourse and have more than one perspective. It is possible to see cultural heritage as facts and a tool for use at the same time. Jan pointed out in the interview that his focus on the empirical aspect of history does not prevent him from seeing how history and cultural heritage can be used as tools for certain narratives.

However, the focus on facts as having a sort of absolute value indicates an AHD. According to Smith, an AHD gives privilege to the experts and their values over those of the non-experts (2006). The two quotes above both come from actors working either in a museum or at a cultural heritage site, which means that the knowledge that they represent is institutionalized in a Bordieuan sense and hence "accepted" by the public (Broady, 1988). The quotes indicate that the value of cultural heritage relies on professional knowledge, which they possess via their institution.



Cultural capital can become symbolic capital if it is legitimized and recognized by other actors within the field (Swartz, 1997). The cultural capital that the actors are in charge of in different ways (either by dispersing it directly or by influencing it with economic capital) and in different forms (awareness or facts) can be transformed into symbolic capital if it is mediated to others. Hence cultural heritage can become an instrument to teach us something. Knowledge as awareness teaches us on a moral and philosophical level. It gives us a general understanding for our position in time and space and how we can go on from here. This becomes visible for example in this quote by the SD politician Cornelia:

**Cornelia:** Then of course, it is also important to preserve everything, for example, the buildings, the cultural environments, because they give us memories of what has been and they can give us guidance for the future, so we do not lose everything from the past. I think we should learn a bit from the old and not just speed away [...] if nothing else, just for purely nostalgic reasons that can have a value so to speak. (Interview with Cornelia, 2019)

Facts also teach us where we are in time and space, but more concretely, for example by making us learn from the past or position ourselves on a timeline: “I think it is useful to often say [...] ‘when you are going to relate to this place, you cannot think of Sweden and Denmark because Sweden and Denmark did not exist at that time, [...] because people should widen their views, try to think a little differently” (Interview with Sandra, 2019). This provides a perspective that is based on facts that we learn from cultural heritage. A frequent narrative was also how past techniques can teach us in the present and for the future, as Pernilla, working for a cultural heritage association, pointed out. She mentioned how much we can learn from other generations, especially when it comes to maintaining a sustainable lifestyle (Interview with Pernilla, 2019).

### 2.3. Welcome to our cultural heritage

The knowledge connected to cultural heritage, be it awareness or facts, can be used for a simple division: Those who have the knowledge, and those who do not.

**Cornelia:** [...] how can we create something from the cultural heritage we have and maybe use it in schools, in elderly homes and last but not least go out with it to the areas where people live in social exclusion who have recently arrived in Sweden, invite them, show them, ‘this is our Swedish cultural heritage, welcome. (Interview with Cornelia, emphasis E.F.)

In this quote Cornelia used a narrative containing “us” and “them”. Mikael said that “we have a responsibility” towards those who come here, to teach them about cultural heritage. The narrative that “we” have a certain knowledge that “they” must learn is easy to spot in the interviews with SD and in their programme and election manifesto (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011, Sverigedemokraterna, 2018). If we want to define who “we” and “they” are, we are led directly towards the inevitable discussion about national identity:

**Cornelia:** I think it is because it is so important, recognizing, feeling that you know that things are, that – like feeling it is natural, feeling that it is something you share with others, you know that it is – this is something that is important for Sweden. Why do we have that damn Midsummer pole? Well, we don’t know, but more or less, we have all danced around it, but if you have never seen it before, it is difficult to enter the community around the Midsummer pole, you first have to crack the code, so in that sense I think it is super important. (Interview with Cornelia, 2019, emphasis E.F.)

As the quote above shows, Swedishness, for SD, is “just there”. When Zizek describes “the thing” as a feeling that a community shares, he develops the concept to “the nation qua thing” which is specific for a community that identifies as a nation (Zizek, 1993). Anderson’s “imagined community” (Anderson, 2006) can be delimited to the nation in reference to this quote. This demarcation is important for SD and shows that they are making use of an AHD that, according to Smith, has a focus on national community:

**Mikael:** [...]and then I think it is important that it is OK to be Swedish [...] that churches are Christian buildings, but Christianity has melted in so much to the original, you can see immediately if a church is Danish or Scanian [...] English churches have their specific style [...] I would like it to be OK just to be Swedish [...]. (Interview with Mikael, 2019)

Karl, working for a regional cultural heritage site, argued that SD politicians showed more interest in the cultural heritage site he works for when it was referred to as “Swedish” and less interest when they realised that it was promoted as “international” (Interview with Karl, 2019). The cultural heritage site that Karl and Sandra work for and their perspectives show an interesting contrast to SD’s discourse focusing on nationality. In the interview with them, a narrative about internationalism in connection with the cultural heritage they represent was dominant. Karl pointed out the international aspect of the cultural heritage site he works for, both today and in its own history: “We are a very special kind of cultural heritage because we do not only belong to a Swed- we are a Swedish cultural heritage, we are partly a Danish cultural

heritage, we are a Nordic cultural heritage, but we are mostly a European cultural heritage [...]” (Interview with Karl, 2019).

## 2.4. Heritage and change

Time plays a role because cultural heritage challenges us to define where the past ends and the present starts. Answers to the question how much time must pass until something becomes cultural heritage went from “I think it takes a lot of time” (Cornelia) to “it doesn’t have to take a lot of time at all” (Interview with Karl, 2019). At first sight this does not seem to tell us anything, but it indicates that the actors’ relation to time has an influence on how they see cultural heritage. I would like to compare these two quotes, which come from two different interviews but can almost be read as a dialogue:

**Cornelia:** [...] it is something that develops all the time, so cultural heritage can never disappear, but if we treat parts of it carelessly it can change at a faster pace than people feel comfortable with. And that is where I think we get a risk for rootlessness, where it also becomes harder to accept new impulses, I think. (Interview with Cornelia, 2019, emphasis E.F.)

**Amalia:** Yes, well, the world is changing all the time and you must accept that, it is not really a goal in itself to preserve a cultural landscape as it has been the last 100 years, because we know that 1000 years ago it also looked different, so what makes exactly the time 100 years ago the time we want to preserve for the future? You can never put your foot down and say ‘the year 1832, that is the year we are going to preserve, what everything is going to look like in that year’ but you always have to think that it changes. (Interview with Amalia, emphasis E.F.)

Both Cornelia and Amalia talked about development, change and acceptance. But while Cornelia sees change as problematic, Amalia has a rather pragmatic point of view. This can be interpreted with help of Öhlander (2005), who states that culture can be seen either as a verb or a noun, as changing or static. He also claims that the further away culture is in time or space, the more coherent it appears to be (2005). I would like to add that the further away culture is in time, the easier it is to classify it as cultural heritage. And the other way round: the closer culture is in time, the more difficult it is to see phenomena as cultural heritage, especially if an actor has a nostalgic view of the past, because “Nostalgia is blamed for alienating people from the present” (Lowenthal, 1985, p. 13). SD’s narrative about cultural heritage shows a nostalgic undertone and how they connect cultural heritage with a past that is

clearly separable from the present. In their party programme it is argued that: “Taking care of cultural heritage means showing respect for past generations and to remember what they have achieved”<sup>xxiv</sup> (Sverigedemokraterna 2011, p. 19, translation E.F.). Even if Cornelia stated that development is part of cultural heritage, she already showed in other quotes that she romanticizes the past. In the following quote she made clear that in her opinion there must be a lot of time in between the present and a phenomenon that can be called cultural heritage:

**Cornelia:** A lot of people mix up culture and cultural heritage and really think that something that recently came to Sweden a year ago, that it is cultural heritage now. Well, I prefer to think it is things that have existed here for a long period of time, that it is cultural heritage. Then, of course, it changes [...] but I don’t want to think that ‘oh now this appeared in Sweden a year ago and now this is our cultural heritage’ because it’s not, it needs time to grow and become something that everybody recognizes and knows that this is typically our Swedish culture, then it has become cultural heritage. (Interview with Cornelia, 2019)

Cornelia underlined that phenomena do not easily become cultural heritage. They must first be recognized and accepted as typically Swedish by a majority. What plays a part here is also an Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD) (Smith, 2006) and the canonical model (Harrison, 2013). This is also perceivable when Mikael stated that cultural heritage is:

what resists time, but also what I call canon. I think that there is a cultural canon, many cultural expressions, and they come all the time from all different directions, some we assimilate and they are cool and hip for a while, but then we need to throw them out to the peripheries again, we get tired of it. But then there are some that we keep in the mainstream, which means that there is a sort of cultural canon. (Interview with Mikael, 2019)

In this quote an AHD is visible because it contains “the idea that ‘heritage’ is innately valuable and because “‘heritage’ is seen to represent all that is good and important about the past, which has contributed to the development of the cultural character of the present” (Smith, 2006, 29). It could also be seen as being part of a canonical model that recognizes “only the remarkable – the greatest, oldest, biggest and best” (Harrison, 2013, p. 18).

According to Mikael, this cultural canon is something that “just happens”. But as already discussed, culture was used as a tool for the forming of nations in the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Löfgren, 1993, p. 22 ff); hence the concept of cultural heritage is more artificial than what this quote would seem to show. Smith claims that heritage is not being preserved because it is important, but vice versa: “However, heritage is heritage *because* it is subjected to the management and preservation/ conservation process, not because it simply ‘is’” (Smith, 2006, p. 3). The SD

election manifesto suggests introducing “a Swedish cultural canon, in order to guarantee the same points of reference around Swedish culture”<sup>xxv</sup> (Sverigedemokraterna, 2018, p. 5, translation E.F.), which also reminds an AHD.

### 3. Creating a conflict

In its widest sense, Swedish culture could be defined as the sum of everything ever thought, written, said, created or made by people belonging to the Swedish nation.<sup>xxvi</sup> (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011)

Swedish folk culture is a changing tradition that includes amateurs, professionals, preservers and innovators.<sup>xxvii</sup> (Knätofsmanifestet, n.d.)

These were two of the quotes I showed to some of my interview partners during the interviews, the first from the SD party programme, the second from the manifesto from *Folk Musicians against Xenophobia*, which was a reaction to SD's view on cultural politics. Jan, director of a regional museum, commented on the two quotes as follows: "The essence of both quotes is that it contains everything. This thing we want to define, it contains just about anything" (Interview with Jan, 2019). It is quite provocative to compare quotes from two opposing groups and claim that they basically say the same thing. But what if it makes sense?

Taking the discourses and interpretations from Chapter 2 into consideration, it is hard to spot huge differences in what the importance of cultural heritage means for different actors. They all see a social aspect in cultural heritage, they all confirm that it can be instrumentalized in one way or other, they all connect it to some kind of knowledge that can teach us something about ourselves and our surroundings and they agree that it is an ever-changing phenomenon that we have to keep developing. The analysis of the interviews does not show any major difference in the way different actors interpret cultural heritage itself. After all, it is not a coincidence that almost all of them mentioned Midsummer and Christmas at some point in the interview. However, what the interviews can show is that there are underlying ideologies that differ among the actors, that cultural heritage has become a vessel for these ideologies. I have presented the discourses in Chapter 2 and in this chapter I will analyse how these discourses can clash and become a conflict.

#### 3.1. The empty field

"No party has a special interest in our cultural heritage site", says Karl (Interview with Karl, 2019) and this might be one of main reasons why a conflict about cultural heritage is even possible: cultural heritage is not a priority in politics and among voters. I would like to compare the discourse about cultural heritage in politics and among voters to the silenced discourse that,

according to Foucault, makes it possible for reverse discourses to appear as counterreactions. If a discourse is forbidden, opposite discourses take the opportunity to be heard. Although I do not claim that the discourse about cultural heritage has been *silenced*, I do think it is *silent*, and that has about the same effect: it allows a reverse discourse and makes it even stronger. Since cultural heritage is an “empty field”, as I would like to call it, this clears the way for those actors who want to focus on it. Jan described it as follows: “I think it [folk culture] is an area that has not been researched enough, and that is what creates this situation [...]” (Interview with Jan, 2019) and Xavier pointed out that “the Sweden Democrats have a clear vision of cultural heritage, while other parties lack a picture of how they want to see culture” (Interview with Xavier, 2019).

But the emptiness in the field is a deceptive appearance. The cultural actors are the orthodox participants who keep the content of the field unpronounced, as long as there is no need for its explicit pronunciation. Also, they have transformed the cultural capital into symbolic capital by recognising the value of it. Thus they are armed to maintain the status quo in the field. In this case a generally accepted knowledge that is to be connected to cultural heritage has been present in the field.

**Jan:** Skansen created an image of folk culture, I think that is a consensus that- what we think is like old Swedish traditions... [...] that they should be old Swedish traditions. And then we relate to this picture somehow, but as far as I know we devote ourselves very little to finding out how it really was. (Interview with Jan, 2019)

According to this quote, Skansen was the initiator of a generally accepted knowledge in Sweden, which has been accepted as fact based by the orthodox participants in the field, without really carrying out any deep investigation into it. A Foucauldian discourse about a certain truth is implemented, which Skansen has contributed to. This is possibly true, considering the fact that the opening of Skansen was the first time in history an “open-air ethnographic museum as a permanent public exhibition of translocated pieces of pre-modern folk architecture with their equipment and surroundings emerged fully implemented” (Bukowiecki, 2018, p. 13). This would also mean that many museums, and hence the majority of the cultural actors in my study, have followed this discourse and are just as much re-producers of and contributors to the discourse and generally accepted truth.

This generally accepted truth is threatened by SD, the heterodox participants, who enter the field, because the orthodox participants do not classify SD’s knowledge as fact based, but as an awareness that simply relies on symbolism and nostalgia. This means that the orthodox

participants now must break the silence and renegotiate their position in the field. In Bourdieu's field theory, actors that are present in the field use their different opinions as weapons against each other (Broady, 1988). In the field of cultural heritage it seems as if facts are weapons as well. This becomes visible in the interview with Gabriel, who is active within a network of folk musicians: "What we perceive as a threat is that they [SD] somehow try to kidnap symbols of Swedish culture and make them some sort of ideological bats and use them for a populist agenda" (Interview with Gabriel, 2019). The picture of Jimmie Åkesson and his partner Louise Erixon wearing Swedish costumes during the opening of the parliament in 2010 has become a sort of symbol for this "kidnapping" and a discourse that the media like to reproduce repeatedly. An analysis of the picture in this thesis would be redundant. However, what is crucial to analyse is how my interview partners refer to it.



Fig.1. A photo retrieved from P4 Dalarna showing Jimmie Åkesson and his partner Louise Erixon dressed in Swedish traditional costumes at the opening of the parliament in 2010.

Gabriel states that the picture shows "how he [Jimmie Åkesson] has no idea about how to wear it [Swedish costumes]" since "he wears it the wrong way" (Interview with Gabriel, 2019). What this quote shows is that Gabriel thinks that he possesses a knowledge that the SD couple do not have. Xavier shared this point of view, not in reference to the picture, but on a general level, by stating that he thinks that especially on a regional level, many politicians are "leisure-time politicians", and hence do not have that knowledgeable concerning cultural issues (Interview with Xavier, 2019). Both Gabriel and Xavier used their fact-based knowledge as a weapon in order to justify their own use of folk culture and devalue SD's use of it.



When I introduced the picture to Jan, we started talking about how museums showing folk culture automatically have to become political, because the costume that the SD couple wear is so clearly connected to their interests:

**E.F.:** From my point of view, the picture shows that it is impossible not to be political as a museum.

**Jan:** Yes, I think so too. [...] But at the same time, it is a traditional Swedish costume, isn't it? [...] Of course it is difficult to say that it doesn't become political and that is a big problem from my point of view. Does it become a political statement to have Swedish costumes? You could wonder whether people actually wore them in the past. I think that would be the most interesting question.

**E.F.:** Do you think Jimmie Åkesson reflected on that?

**Jan:** No, but he wears it in order to refer to some sort of ideal Swedishness that Skansen created during the 1880s. (Interview with Jan, 2019, emphasis E.F.)

The accentuation on what it *is* rather than what it *symbolizes* represents the “Facts” as opposed to “Awareness”. Jan would like to see the facts as a protection against unfavourable interpretations; at the same time, he sees how SD uses an idealized version of these facts.

“Awareness and understanding [...] should in this context not be confused with factual knowledge” (Harding, 2006). Harding refers to the “Forum för levande historia”<sup>xxviii</sup> in Stockholm that, as its official purpose, claimed to strengthen the awareness and understanding of people by informing them about the Holocaust. As Harding interprets their message, they did not want to transfer raw facts but to influence people deeply. But based on the examples I have made in this section, I would like to claim that the difference between awareness and facts is minimal. SD refers to “awareness” and a “natural feeling” when talking about cultural heritage, while cultural actors rather use “facts” and “archive material”. But both use it as truth and thereby justify the importance of cultural heritage. While they appear to tell the same truth, they do not agree that their truth is the same (Danaher, Schirato & Webb, 2000). A conflict appears because all the actors see themselves as the orthodox participants in the field and the others as heterodox intruders. This leads to all the actors feeling threatened in *their* field and in *their* truth. A conflict also appears because “facts” and “awareness” are not true or false, they are opinions, used as weapons. The truth that they refer to is true, because they have created a discourse around it. It does not matter whether Jimmie Åkesson knows how to wear suspenders or not or whether he cares about it at all. It is important for the cultural actors to point out that he is wrong.

### 3.2. Negotiating Swedishness

The different truths that are used in the conflict as opinions cannot be used only as weapons, but also as tools contributing to a discourse around national community. The conflict over what cultural heritage is supposed to transfer is also a conflict over what a national community means and what kind of truth it is based on. While Cornelia talked about Swedish traditions as a natural feeling that “is something you share with others” and that is “important for Sweden” (Interview with Cornelia, 2019), Amalia highlighted that “we just have to dig in the archive” to show that Midsummer traditions have changed over the past 100 years. The different truths, connected to awareness on the one hand and archival knowledge on the other, do not only define the cultural heritage, but also the national community, and this creates a conflict. While Gabriel sees SD as kidnappers of Swedish symbols that they use for populist purposes, SD sees their definition of Swedishness as being kidnapped by other actors: Mikael stated that “there are many letters to the editor in tabloids where different cultural figures have a quite negative attitude towards Swedishness and the Swedish cultural heritage” and that there is a general depreciation of cultural heritage. Cornelia mentioned that many people “don’t see that there is actually a value in the fact that we have Swedish culture and Swedish cultural heritage” and gets upset when traditions are doubted, as for example in an exhibition that she mentioned:

**Cornelia:** [...]it went wrong [...] the fact that it was even funded by tax money made me upset. It was meant to provoke and that succeeded. So, they had made this exhibition [...] they wanted to question all the Swedish cultural heritage and it was about that all these spices, saffron and everything... “oh, we don’t have any Swedish culture, because these spices, they come from all these places” What? Well, of course it is Swedish culture, it has come here and we have started using it! (Interview with Cornelia, 2019, emphasis E.F.)

What Cornelia referred to is that many originally imported spices are used in Swedish traditional bakery and meals, like saffron, which is used in the traditional Swedish “Lussebulle”<sup>xxix</sup>. The fact that an exhibition questions the Swedishness of these pastries, because they contain imported spices upset her.

The clash between the cultural and the political actors in my study does not appear because the former deny the transmission of national values. I have already pointed out that culture has in the past played a role in forming a national community, and this basically is not different today, since some of the activities of the museums I include in my study revolve around regional and national history.

But again, facts are not facts, they are constructed truths and hence opinions that can be used in a certain context. For example, a museum can choose to write that a country has been conquered, defeated or invaded, as Amalia pointed out. Of course, this has a direct influence on the national feeling of a visitor. The difference between the actors in my study is that they have different opinions about what a national community means and transmit different truths about it. SD tells the truth about a national community connected to symbols, romanticism and nostalgia. A national community is seen as something rather static and difficult to change. The cultural actors, on the other hand, referred to a historical understanding when talking about national community and point out changes and the complexities of forming a nation on a social, cultural and economic level. I want to point out that these are the dominating discourses – stories that are told again and again. Of course, SD members might be aware of the historical complexity of a nation and cultural actors probably also refer to symbolism in certain contexts. But it is important to note that specific discourses outweigh in the interviews. It is when these discourses are used against each other that a conflict is created.

### 3.3. Cultural capital for whom?

As already mentioned, cultural capital is transformed into symbolic capital when its value is recognized by other agents in the field. Besides the communication with other actors within the field, one way to transform cultural into symbolic capital is to convince potential new agents; an audience. In that sense all actors have the same point of departure. What differs, as already discussed, is what kind of truth the actors want to transfer. SD focuses on the mediation of a national awareness, which I want to underline by looking at one of Cornelia's quotes that I have already introduced earlier, where she talked about why Midsummer is celebrated:

**Cornelia:** Why do we have that damn Midsummer pole? Well, we do not know, but more or less we know, we have all danced round it, but if you have never seen it before it is difficult to enter the community around the Midsummer pole, you first have to crack the code, so in that sense I think it is super important. (Interview with Cornelia, 2019, emphasis E.F.)

Cornelia mentioned several times the social codes, our moral and our norms that can be transferred via cultural heritage. "Cracking the code" is quite an abstract action and nothing that anyone can be taught in one day. Cornelia's and SD's goal with cultural heritage is to transmit awareness or Zizek's "thing" that "we" Swedes already have but foreigners need to learn. This narrative is also visible in the SD party programme (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011) as well as in

their manifesto (Sverigedemokraterna, 2018). Mikael explained: “I hope that we on a regional level- [...] help in different ways, for example by stimulating different traditions and so on-how can Skåne help by pursuing different traditions and so on-“ (Interview with Mikael, 2019) The “culture piloting” described in Section 2.1. can also be seen as a planned activity to transmit Swedishness, as the named “Sweden Centres” hint (Sverigedemokraterna 2018, p. 5). Also, Mikael basically described that he wants to transmit the “nation qua thing” (Zizek, 1993): he wants everybody that comes here to feel the same happiness and harmony that he feels when looking at, for example, churches in Skåne (Interview with Mikael, 2019).

SD’s ideas remind us of what Clifford Geertz calls “integrative revolution”, meaning the integration of all people that are subject to the nation’s sovereignty into one and the same all-encompassing culture (Geertz, 1963). It seems as if cultural heritage, in its very broad meaning, can simply be taught, thereby facilitating integration. At first glance, that does not sound too bad. Cultural heritage as a tool for integration sounds positive and the claim in SD’s party programme (2011) that cultural heritage acts as a cohesive putty and that every society needs common traditions and customs in order to hold together in the long run (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011) sounds like a fair approach. It also connects to the idea that there is little difference between facts and awareness, which means that solid chunks of knowledge, such as cultural heritage in the form of a custom like Midsummer that can easily be imitated, can be used to create an awareness of a national community. This is not different from what museums like Skansen have done since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century in order to create a national feeling in the sense of a cultural nationalism where the culture is a given, but the state around it must be created (Harding, 2006). If cultural heritage as integration works, is SD’s approach a source of conflict?

**Jan:** It might be true that it works as a cohesive putty, yes, but is it right to use it in that way? It is like a false cultural heritage (...). The image of Swedishness of Hazelius (...) yes, it might work, it meant that we had a conflict-free 20th century without revolution (...) maybe it works, but it wasn’t true (...). (Interview with Jan, 2019)

What Jan referred to in this quote, with a reference to Skansen and its founder Arthur Hazelius, is that a narrative about a cohesive national community that has been used to strengthen the idea of a nationality is not a solution but part of the conflict. It can be argued that cultural actors have created a creature that mirrors the morals of its environment: By contributing to an already existing discourse on national community, they have paved the way for SD, who now follow the path and re-narrate the discourse in their own context.

According to Harding, a “civil nationalism” makes it easy for immigrants to integrate, because there is a strong focus on a common culture that can be learnt and adapted to, while a “cultural nationalism” presupposes that culture is inherited (Harding, 2006). SD’s statements do show signs of a “civil nationalism”, since they pointed out that foreigners can learn “our” cultural heritage (for example the interview with Cornelia and Mikael, 2019). And that is exactly what makes it exclusive. Appadurai states that treating culture as a static entity comes close to a biological categorisation of race (1997). Something similar happens in this case: Using factual knowledge for awareness-building is one side of the coin, but the other side is treating awareness as a closed entity as a sort of facts. By looking at social and cultural codes as something that they can be learnt, it becomes much easier to define a “we” and a “them”. “We” are the Swedes who already have the necessary knowledge to be part of this community. “They” are those who might learn it and possibly become part of the community. Zizek’s “thing” becomes a tool for separation and hence a tool for exclusion. SD’s social discourse about wanting to “help” immigrants in their integration process is paired with a clear division between “us” and “them”, leading to an “ethnopluralist caring racism” (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014).

### **3.4. Contradictive heritage**

I have already discussed in Section 2.4. how different perceptions of time influence how cultural heritage is interpreted. Not only past times have left traces on cultural artefacts and expressions; recent and present times also do so right now. Concerning today’s influence on cultural heritage I have identified the most discussed factor in the interviews, which I call “external factors”. In some cases, this collides with the word “immigration”, but that word was not extensively used by any interview partner.

External factors are, of course, not in any way a new phenomenon. All the interview partners showed great awareness of the fact that new impulses, among others coming from immigration, have changed what is considered as the cultural heritage during all periods of time. Mikael, for example, mentioned several times that Christianity was originally imported, but today influences many of the phenomena we call cultural heritage. Karl and Sandra underlined several times how their cultural heritage site was extremely international in the past. Gabriel stated that the reason why the Polska is the most common dance form in Swedish folk culture today is a result of King Gustav Vasa importing Polish court musicians in the 16<sup>th</sup> century because that music was popular among the nobility at that time.

However, there are different perspectives on how new impulses today should be dealt with. While some representatives of the cultural heritage associations pointed out the importance of including new impulses and external factors, because this gives us new perspectives and lets cultural heritage develop (for example Interview with Pernilla, 2019), SD pointed out the risks connected with that kind of treatment:

**Cornelia:** [...] go out with it to the areas where people live in social exclusion who have recently arrived in Sweden, invite them, show them, ‘this is our Swedish cultural heritage, welcome. Instead of what is often done today, give a lot of grants to ethnic association and there they should sit and speak their native language, and cook their meals and they do it only with their compatriots. Well, where does the contact point come? [...] in that case it is not weird that we develop excluded societies and polarisation and suspicion and you never talk to each other, you don’t meet. (Interview with Cornelia, emphasis E.F.)

Cornelia stated that she wants to assimilate new influences into the existing culture. As I have stated before, the further away culture seems to be both in time and space, the more coherent it appears (Öhlander, 2005). Hence, the closer culture is to us, the more contradictive it appears. That external factors have influenced cultural heritage in the past seems more coherent and logical, but that external factors are influencing cultural heritage today is not acceptable in the same way. A conflict appears when actors have different strategies of dealing with the contradictions.

Cornelia, for example, cannot accept the contradictions and wants to assimilate the new influences into the existing Swedish culture, so that it remains coherent. She wants the “nation qua thing”, which is the natural feeling that the members of a national community share (Zizek, 1993), to stay the way it is. If this sort of assimilation does not happen, external factors become a threat to that “nation qua thing”, because they risk repressing it. Cornelia argued in accordance with the statements of her party’s programme, which says that “Cultural impulses that, without adapting to Swedish conditions, are forced into Swedish society from rulers or groups that do not consider themselves Swedish, are not seen as part of Swedish culture, but rather as a form of cultural imperialism”<sup>xxxx</sup> (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011, p. 19). Assimilation is a big topic for SD; Mikael also argued that it is dangerous if “we” have to adapt to cultures coming from the outside; rather, “they” have to assimilate to “us”. Mikael also calls multiculturalism “imposed” and an “engineering creation” and Cornelia thinks that multiculturalism is being “rammed down the throats” of the population. According to Harrison, heritage is often described in the context of threat or risk, either on a material level by the

diminishment of objects and sites or as a threat to a community that sees the cultural heritage as their own (2013). Terdiman refers to this as a late modernity's memory crisis (1993). This sort of crisis can again be connected to Žižek's "thing" which, as described before, is often seen as exposed to threats from external influences. SD's actions that are based on such a memory crisis can lead to a conflict, since the cultural actors do not seem to suffer from that sort of crisis and focus on including external factors to the cultural heritage.

## 4. Signs of a conflict

(...) one can easily conclude that a more profound political (and economic) support to disciplines and activities that handle the past and the cultural heritage solely exists in situations where political forces strive for control over the interpretations of the past for various political agendas. (...) In short, this means that times of prosperity for archaeology are synonymous with times of unpleasant, xenophobic and/or nationalistic, societal and political conditions. (Gustafsson & Karlsson, 2011, p. 14-15).

This quote refers to SD's heightened interest in archaeology. If it is true that this increased interest and success in cultural heritage is a sign of xenophobia and nationalism in society, it is relevant to detect these signs. In the previous chapters I have analysed the discourses the actors of my study used when describing cultural heritage and how a conflict can appear due to colliding discourses. In this chapter I will now investigate how the discourses and actions of my interview partners show signs of a conflict.

### 4.1. A non-existing conflict?

According to media coverage, SD's cultural policies have had concrete consequences for cultural actors in, for example, the municipality of Sölvesborg, where SD is part of the ruling coalition, in the sense that money for cultural activities has been cut in various ways (Lindkvist, 2019). No actor in my study talked about this kind of scenario other than hypothetically. In fact, all cultural actors stated that they do not think that SD has any influence on their activities at all and had difficulty in describing an actual conflict. The main reason is that SD does not have any political or financial influence, since it is not one of the ruling coalitions, on either a national or a regional level. Xavier notes:

**Xavier:** Since SD doesn't have any influence on the state level, no impact is visible there either. And even if we are local and regional, the regional money comes from the state. But since we have a Social Democratic government, there is no SD influence from that direction (Interview with Xavier, 2019).

“That direction”, which Xavier referred to is the official direction based on taxes and the legislative regulations. Nationally and regionally, SD does not have the power to make any changes in cultural politics by cutting money or introducing new laws. So, if we leave it here, there is no conflict, end of story.



At the same time, Xavier started the interview by stating that he knew the kind of conflict I wanted to talk to him about, and other interview partners pointed out that they considered it important to participate in my study in order to position themselves. Obviously, I have conducted eight interviews talking about this conflict – so even if the conflict might not be visible in less money or limiting laws, all the actors had something to say about it, which I think is an important proof of an existing conflict. Many other factors indicate an ongoing conflict: the fear of becoming limited in one's activity and the need to participate in an interview in order to position oneself or in a project on how to prevent xenophobia within one's organisation.

Karl was the only cultural actor from my study who denied seeing a conflict and made it clear that he did not really understand why I wanted to talk to him about SD. My assumptions that the cultural heritage site that Karl represents is of interest for SD was mainly based on a couple of articles showing how a local politician from Skåne had focused on the site and initiated a parliamentary seminar concerning the site on a national level. Karl's overall reaction to my assumptions was: "I think you exaggerate their [SD's] significance a little bit, to be honest" (Interview with Karl, 2019). He stated that the parliamentary seminar that the SD-politician had initiated, focusing on the cultural heritage site, was based on his personal interest as an individual rather than a general interest on SD's part. At this point I once again want to emphasise the relevance of Foucauldian discourses. Earlier I cited Danaher, Schirato & Webb who, based on Foucault's critical discourse analysis, write: "It's important to recognise that the roles within the field precede the people who occupy these roles" (2000, p. 33). A politician who says something of general interest in public is always connected to his party's ideology and can hardly be separated from a discourse about the party. According to Foucault, "truth" is not just out there, but it is being produced and reproduced. He calls this "a game of truth", which can be described as: "while public institutions authorise their activities by claiming to be speaking the truth, these truth claims are dependent on institutional and discursive practices" (Danaher, Schirato & Webb, 2000). This means that something that is accepted as "true" can in fact be a produced and reproduced discourse. The truth that is produced about SD, as about any political party, has several producers, one of which is the media. But SD themselves are also producers of their own truth. One of the main focuses of SD is immigration policy. A dominant discourse about them is that their interest in cultural heritage is a strategy in order to lead a discourse about what it is to be Swedish and what is not. Maybe the personal opinion of this individual politician had driven him to initiate a parliamentary seminar on this particular cultural heritage site. But for potential voters, sympathizers and rivals that is secondary, because

his actions are not private, they are part of a discourse with which he is reproducing a truth about SD.

## 4.2. The Elephant in the room

The already existing discourse about SD can be harmful for cultural actors if they do not want to relate to the nationalistic ideology. They see a risk in getting attention for the wrong purpose. Some actors mentioned how, for example, the picture on Jimmie Åkesson and his partner Louise Erixon in traditional Swedish costumes is bad promotion for the cultural heritage sector. Jan mentioned that “there is an elephant in the room somehow that does not have any direct influence at all, but very much indirect influence” and “the influence that the Sweden Democrats have, that is that they are something you need to be vigilant about, so that you don’t favour them- you have to position yourself in relation to them” (Interview with Jan, 2019). A very concrete action in sense of positioning in relation to SD is, according to Jan, the celebration of Sweden’s national day in the regional museum where he is the director. Jan told me about an occasion when the celebration at the museum was in its planning phase and he had asked the responsible person in the municipality why they actually had to do this:

**Jan:** He answered that it - the celebration of the national day... had an important function; if the museum and the municipality won’t do it, somebody else will [...] not as an explicit policy, this was a talk between me and the person from the municipality. Yes, then somebody else will do it, and then we will have no control, it can get out of hand, it can become a nationalistic manifestation that becomes a political manifestation. (Interview with Jan, 2019)

It was not said that the risk of SD taking over the celebration was the only reason for organising it in the museum on the municipal level. But it clearly shows that SD, without doing anything concrete and only by being the elephant in the room, has the power to influence a whole institution.

## 4.3. Conflict as a tool

The discourse about SD misusing cultural heritage in order to focus on their real interest, which is immigration policy, does not only have to limit cultural actors; it can also be an asset. Bourdieu’s field is partly defined by the fact that all actors are interested in the symbolic gain of being recognised. In Section 3.1. I described how a conflict appears by SD entering the field,

thereby forcing the orthodox participants, the cultural actors, to overcome their silence because they have to renegotiate their position.

My assumption is that the orthodox participants, in this case the cultural actors, at first raise their voices reluctantly, unwilling to believe that an intruder is disturbing the status quo, but they soon realise that the noise they are forced to make due to their renegotiation in the field gives them more recognition and attention than they had before. SD's discourse that enters the field of cultural heritage provokes a reverse discourse, as Foucault calls it. The cultural actors recognise an opportunity to make their voice heard in opposition to SD. The following dialogue between Amalia and me, and the quote by Karl show how cultural actors perceive the lack of interest in cultural heritage in general and how they consequently think that this could benefit their respective cultural institutions:

**E.F.:** Have you felt any direct threat from SD or have they shown any interest in your museum?

**Amalia:** No, not at all. It would be funny if they tried.

**E.F.:** Why do you think that?

**Amalia:** Well, in that case we would get a bit more debate and attention for the museums. It can also be an opportunity to debate things. And we could get other political parties to have a broader view on culture and cultural heritage.

**Karl:** Generally, the bigger problem for us is that there is too little interest in our cultural heritage site. The problem is not that too many people are interested in it and want to have a debate about what our cultural heritage site actually is [...] in some way I could say that it would even be better if SD were more interested in our cultural heritage site; then we are ready to have a discussion, in case they get it wrong [...] attention for our cultural heritage site is always positive for us.

Both Amalia and Karl seemed to suspect that their interest in cultural heritage differs from SD's. But Amalia sees an opportunity in SD's potential approach and for Karl the chance that SD could "get it wrong" would provide the possibility to set the record straight. SD's interest is better than nothing. This might not be the sign of a full-grown conflict. But it is a sign of a conflict rumbling under the surface that makes itself visible through potential recognition and attention for the participants.

Jan noted how much influence SD has just because many actors try to limit its influence (Interview with Jan, 2019). A comparison between the cultural heritage sector and the Swedish elections in September 2018 appeared during the interview: the whole formation of the parliament revolved round trying to give SD as little influence as possible. SD could not have wished for more influence by being the one wheel in the machinery that slowed down the whole process. As a side effect it received a lot of attention and screen time in the media.

Transferring this to the cultural heritage sector, we see that the rumbling conflict is also beneficial for SD. According to Mikael the debate around Swedish culture has changed due to SD's entry into the field:

**Mikael:** I think the cultural debate has been between left-oriented debaters and SD, but now I think that right-oriented debaters have taken over SD [...] it is possible that right-oriented debaters have started to take some space and now people dare to talk more about Swedish culture I think, in a different way, because now SD has talked about it for so long, now we have become that big, so now others dare, especially left-oriented debaters dare to talk about it, without being judged by their own group. (Interview with Mikael, 2019)

According to Mikael, the discourse about Swedish culture has been displaced thanks to SD going from being shameful to being normalised. What he literally described here is their renegotiation as actors in the field. He himself as an SD member sees SD as the orthodox participant in the field that has been disturbed by other actors like “left-oriented debaters” and “right-oriented debaters”. But through renegotiation, SD has now benefited from the conflict in the sense that they have been able to normalize a discourse they are part of. Additionally, the conflict gives them the opportunity to point out that others misunderstand them. It is no secret that SD has been given an outsider position in the political environment and that they like to point this out (Hellström, 2013), by stating, for example, that many people do not understand what they really mean. The conflict about cultural heritage gives them the opportunity to add to this discourse. The following discussion with Mikael and Cornelia is an example:

During the interviews with Mikael and Cornelia, both of them independently mentioned how Mona Sahlin, a former party leader of the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterna), had publicly said that Sweden only has silly traditions like dancing round the Midsummer pole. Cornelia pointed out how she thinks that this sort of statement provokes people who hold Midsummer dear, and Mikael thought that it shows the depreciation of Swedish culture. At another point in the interview I showed both Mikael and Cornelia a quote from “Knätofsmanifestet” of *Folk Musicians against Xenophobia* (n.d.). This stated that Swedish folk culture can be summarized as “national romantic Midsummer culture”. Here is Cornelia's reaction:

**Cornelia:** Unfortunately, that is often the case when a debate around culture and cultural heritage is lifted [...] it becomes sarcastic somehow: “Yeah, yeah, you Sweden Democrats - red cottages and everybody should eat meat balls, are you happy then?” What? Please don't make this such a small question, because it is so much bigger. (Interview with Cornelia, 2019)

While on the one hand Cornelia can be upset about the depreciation of national romantic symbols, she also thinks that SD cannot be reduced to a party that only cares about national romantic symbols. What I want to suggest with this example is that the conflict about cultural heritage gives SD the opportunity to once again point out how alone they are with their opinions in the Swedish political landscape and that nobody understands them. In this case, they are the only ones explaining what cultural heritage *actually* is. So what is it?

Most actors could not really answer that question. And that has to do with the fact that the conflict abandoned cultural heritage long ago. Or as Jan put it:

**Jan:** I think Sweden has a very instrumental view on culture and that is very much so in the question about the Sweden Democrats... for them [SD] cultural heritage has only one function... to define Swedishness, [...] and for some of Sweden's museums, the only function of cultural heritage is to fight the Sweden Democrats. (Interview with Jan, 2019)

SD complained about those who do not care about Midsummer, and many cultural actors liked to underline how SD simplifies the history. But in fact, they do not disagree a lot when it comes to describing what cultural heritage looks like, what it smells like or what kind of feelings it provokes. Even a museum employee can get “a little warmth in their heart” when they see a Midsummer pole and SD understands very well that “Lussebullar” would not exist today without globalisation and the import of saffron. But that is not what this conflict is about. The conflict is about using the weapons and about getting attention. Cultural heritage is only a vessel that can be filled with many different ideologies and opinions. The national flag can provoke happiness, emotions of inclusion or exclusion, pride or hate, depending on which context it appears in (Ehn, Frykman & Löfgren, 1993), and the same goes for cultural heritage. The actors are aware of this, and by being part of the conflict they can fill their vessel with their ideology. Trying to elude the instrumentalization per se is almost impossible. Because leaving the vessel empty means risking that somebody else will fill it. In other words, if cultural actors that do not agree with SD's ideology do not attach any value to the cultural heritage they represent and argue with “raw facts”, they leave it unattended and run the risk that SD will occupy it with their ideology.

Actors cannot decide whether or not they want to use cultural heritage as an instrument, they can only decide which kind of politics they want to represent and support (Shanks & Tilley, 1987a, 1987b). Or as Jan formulated it: “If you want to have the power, you need a conflict” (Interview with Jan, 2019). Therefore, it is important for every actor in the field to be part of the conflict, because the conflict itself is the most precious political tool they can get.

#### 4.4. Preventive measures

My interview partner Pernilla, working for a cultural heritage association in Skåne, shared with me a document describing a project on cultural heritage and tolerance that her association has been running since many years. The document shows a picture of an elderly, European-looking man and woman dressed in Western clothing, another woman dressed in a traditional Swedish costume, two women wearing a hijab, and a little boy, probably the son of one of the women, waving a Swedish flag. All the six people sit in front of what can be perceived as a typical Swedish red, wooden cottage. As it is placed on a document about cultural heritage and tolerance, everything in this picture is symbolic and has a very clear statement: Swedish traditions and new influences do not exclude each other. Such a project with such a picture would not be organised, if there was not the fear and the knowledge that there are groups that interfere with this perspective. The preventive measures are a sign for a conflict that has already silently started.

The cultural actors know that they are dealing with issues that are interesting for right-oriented groups like SD, and that creates the need for preventive measures. The association Pernilla represents is the alliance of a couple of small associations in Skåne: “Of course, we do not know whether there are any SD sympathizers among those who are active in the smaller associations; in fact, I can be pretty sure there are” (Interview with Pernilla, 2019). This knowledge makes it important for her to be clear about what they stand for and to send out clear messages.

Another preventive measure that was mentioned was the Museum Law (Prop. 2016/17:116), which according to Amalia, was based on the overall development of European politics. It must be seen as a preventive measure and a sign of the fear of a conflict:

**Amalia:** We can see what is happening in Poland and Hungary, that museum directors have been fired because they show exhibitions that are not in line with the opinion of the ruling party about cultural heritage and history. That is the development we see in Europe in different places, that is also what is behind the Museum Law that was introduced a year, almost two years ago maybe, with an arm’s length between politics and museums [...]. But laws can easily be changed, so that is no guarantee that it will always remain like that. (Interview with Amalia, 2019)

My interview partners representing SD, Mikael and Cornelia, pointed out exactly the same risk:

**Mikael:** [...] there are certainly countries today, many countries today that have done this... when the state in fact decides what... this is good culture, this is bad culture. We can't have it like that, that is dangerous, and that everybody should have the possibility to participate is very, very, very, very important, I think. (Interview with Mikael, 2019)

**Cornelia:** We can't go and tell them exactly what they [the museums, E.F.] should do, then you have - then culture is not free anymore [...]. They need their grant in any case, we can't remove their grant just because they make an exhibition that I don't like (*laughs*). (Interview with Mikael, 2019)

SD agrees with many of the cultural actors that the state should not be involved in the content of museums, because then “we would start approaching dictatorship” and “culture needs to remain free and unbound” (Interview with Cornelia, 2019). But what differs in SD's discourse is that they do not fear an approaching conflict, they think it is already here. The argument that the state cannot be the one to decide what cultural heritage is, is used in their party programme to make clear how a line has to be drawn between what is and what is not cultural heritage: “Cultural impulses that, without adapting to Swedish conditions, are forced into Swedish society from rulers or groups that do not consider themselves Swedish are not seen as part of Swedish culture, but rather as a form of cultural imperialism”<sup>xxxix</sup> (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011, p. 19). This means that only cultural expressions that are voluntarily accepted by the population can be included as cultural heritage. With a pinch of salt, Mikael put it this way: “I don't feel that the state has forced taco Friday<sup>xxxix</sup> on me [...] these are material influences that we have taken and transformed in our cultural heritage.”

However, the fact that SD has the need to mention this in their party programme is not only a preventive measure but a sign that they believe a conflict has already started. Also, the party leader Jimmie Åkesson made this clear in an interview on a TV-show, *Skavlan*<sup>xxxix</sup>, where he confirmed his party colleague Mattias Karlsson's<sup>xxxix</sup> statement that a “cultural war” is already taking place in Sweden (Sartori, 2018). Mikael and Cornelia seemed to follow the discourse of their party leader, pointing out that external influences are being “rammed down our throats” (Interview with Cornelia, 2019) and that multiculturalism is an “engineering creation” (Interview with Mikael, 2019).

The ethnologist Walter Leimgruber has called discourses on immigration “phantom pain”: whenever something does not seem to work in society, immigration is used as the explanation. But in fact, states Leimgruber, immigration is not really the source of the problem; the discourse is a “phantom pain” that shows that something else in society is not right. What Leimgruber wants to point out is that, despite its phantom-like appearance, this sort of pain in society has to be taken into consideration and must be taken seriously, just like phantom pains

in the body (2014). SD's discourse about a cultural war might be understood as such a phantom pain: it might not indicate an actual war between cultures, but it indicates that there is a conflict between different perceptions of cultures. Once more, this leads to Bourdieu's field theory. Cultural and political actors see themselves as the orthodox participants and each other as intruders in their field and all of them feel the need to renegotiate their position. What looks like preventive measures are in fact renegotiations in the field that have been triggered by the presence of the apparent intruder in the field.

#### **4.5. Is money power?**

Bourdieu's field, among many other things, is defined by the fact that there are economic gains that all actors are interested in (Broady, 1988). All the actors in my study belong to the field of cultural heritage and share an interest in economic gain, but the kind of interest differs a lot. While the political actors are in charge of deciding about and distributing money, the cultural actors are the ones receiving and using it. The economic capital of the cultural actors is thus partly dependent on the political actors, while the economic capital of the political actors is based on tax money. Nevertheless, as Foucault points out, power is always based on a relationship (Danaher, Schirato & Webb, 2000, xiv). Hence, the actors are in a partnership with each other that consists of dependencies and leads to power dynamics. The narratives of the interviews confirmed this:

**Cornelia:** It is tax money we manage after all. People work hard and pay 30% of their salary in taxes and then there is a politician that distributes this money to different cultural actors, but who says that it always matches what people want? (Interview with Cornelia, 2019)

**Mikael:** The problem we have is that the regional board has reduced the allocations by 17 million [...] Malmö Opera gets 52 million [...] when we go to Malmö Opera, 80% is paid by other tax payers that cannot go there and I don't say that it's right or wrong, but we need to discuss it. (Interview with Mikael, 2019)

The political actors focused on the limitation of the economic capital available and their responsibility to the taxpayers. The cutback in the cultural sector that both Mikael and Cornelia mentioned has been a highly discussed topic since the elections in 2018 (for example Zillén, 2019). The cultural actors were worried about this limitation as well. But they also mentioned a limitation that is not connected with less money but with the way the power relations between them and the political actors become visible. Amalia, working in a regional museum, mentioned



that the content of the exhibitions is governed politically in the sense that state money comes with conditions. For example, the Swedish Arts Council (Kulturrådet), an administrative authority under the Ministry of Culture, which distributes and follows up governmental grants, can make announcements about allocating money for projects highlighting accessibility issues. “Then we see that the Swedish Arts Council thinks it is important, so if we want money to develop projects, we must work in precisely this area” (Interview with Amalia, 2019). However, Amalia mentioned that the requirements from the state or the region are usually vaguely formulated, leaving some space for interpretation. Nevertheless, even if the government bill on cultural heritage says that “The law contains a specific regulation concerning the independent position of the museums in relation to the political decision-making level”<sup>xxxv</sup> (Prop. 2016/17:116, translation E.F.), the state has influence on and indirect power over exhibitions. This again means that the decision about where money is to be invested and where it is to be cut is based on certain interests and values. The economic capital has been transformed into symbolic capital, and it is the symbolic capital that has the power to make the cultural actors dependent on the political actors.

In the best of worlds this power will not be misused in the sense that a political party or a coalition in a ruling position formulates narrow conditions that are mainly of political interest. If that would be the case it would become difficult for museums to produce a politically independent content and to meet the aim of public museums to address a broad audience and contribute to the development of society, as the government bill on cultural heritage says (Prop. 2016/17:116). There are no signs whatsoever that this sort of power is or can be misused on a regional level in Sweden right now. Even if SD has many voters and sympathisers in Skåne, their influence in the cultural political sector of the region is very limited. On a regional level, there are SD members and two SD deputy members on the cultural committee in Skåne. On the regional board of Skåne there are three SD members and three SD deputy members. The dependency that the cultural actors in my studies feel is general and not primarily connected to SD. Nevertheless, SD was mentioned in the discourse on money:

**Amalia:** If they [SD] were to get a lot of influence on the available funds [...] one should be a little vigilant and I think that the other political parties are vigilant in the current situation concerning the kind of requirements that are set. Of course, if those requirements were to become unreasonable, we would not be able to accept the money, and then we would have big problems. (Interview with Amalia, 2019)

The hypothetical situation where SD would have more power to distribute tax money is a risk, Amalia argued. This consciousness reflects the underlying conflict. Some interview partners

claimed that they would categorically refuse money coming from SD, because they cannot stand behind SD's ideology. This becomes particularly visible in the call against SD's cultural policies that my interview partner Gabriel is involved in. Many people who in some way or other are connected to traditional folk culture, either professionally or as a hobby, have signed the call. The aim of all these people is to distance themselves from SD and other extreme nationalistic groups, as they call them. The text of the call says:

Should the Sweden Democrats come into office in Sweden and gain influence over our culture and education politics, they would most likely, in accordance with their cultural policy... "a broad, Swedish and accessible cultural life" that gives priority to "the core of Swedish culture" [...], pour money over our Swedish folk culture. It is usually said that "money does not smell", but that is not true. This money would smell. It would smell of racial and cultural contempt, of exclusion and oppression. This smell would soon spread into our national costumes, our archives and our old buildings, creating an odour that it would take generations to air out (anonymized source, translation E.F., emphasis E.F.)

What this quote makes clear with the metaphor of the "smell of racial and cultural contempt, of exclusion and oppression" is that the money has become something else than just money. It is not the money they say no to but to SD's ideology and symbolic capital, which the actors behind the call connect with racism and oppression.

The interviews with the two SD politicians in my study revealed how SD would use the potential power over and the potential influence on money distribution in the cultural sector. When I asked Cornelia if she thinks that there are activities which in her opinion are not promoting cultural heritage, this was her answer:

**Cornelia:** (...) if someone were to come with, for example, a request that they want money for an ethnic organisation that will make shows and only promote their own language and their own culture and their own dishes, then I would not think that this is something that we should give money to, because that is not cultural heritage  
**E.F.:** Because it's not Swedish?  
**Cornelia:** Exactly, it is another group's cultural heritage and they can of course have it, but we should promote Swedish cultural heritage, promote it so that we can agree upon it. So I would have said no to such a request. (Interview with Cornelia, 2019)

The distinction that Cornelia made is not between what is and what is not cultural heritage, but what is Swedish and what is not Swedish. Thereby she classifies cultural heritage as being based on national categories, which in this case would lead to an exclusion. Even if this is only a

hypothetical situation, it shows how money has as much symbolic as financial power. The political denial in this case would not only limit an organisation financially but also culturally.

When I asked Gabriel whether SD has ever offered them money, he denied. But the fact that the situation is hypothetical does not make it less relevant. The participants' statement about a situation that has not happened shows that the denial of money is a statement rather than an action. By saying no to the money and no to SD's ideology, the actors proclaim their idea of freedom and independence.

But several problems arise from this reasoning. First, it is unclear to what extent it would be possible for a public institution to refuse public money, as that would go against democratic regulations. The government, the Swedish Arts Council, Region Skåne – they all govern on a democratic basis and distribute tax money coming from the Swedish people. Saying no to public money would mean saying no to democratic decisions and hence going against what the democratic majority might see as relevant in the cultural heritage sector. Second, the idea of freedom and independence that is claimed by the call remains only as long as SD does not really offer them money. If the situation were to occur, where SD was in charge of the distribution of taxpayer's money, and cultural actors actually said no to it, this might not lead to more freedom. True, taking the money would either be connected to unreasonable conditions or to a labelling that museums do not want to get. But a refusal would force them to become completely self-sufficient. Depending on paying visitors and private funds is also connected to conditions and might be just as limiting. The cultural actors are trapped in an economic-political wheel. So, the question is perhaps whether culture and cultural heritage can ever be free at all. The same question can be directed to SD. I showed the following quote to all of my interview partners:

Culture should be a dynamic, challenging and unbound power with freedom of expression as a basis. Everyone should have the opportunity to participate in cultural life. Creativity, diversity and artistic quality should characterize society's development.<sup>xxxvi</sup> (Region Skåne, 2019, p. 4, translation E.F.)

Cornelia commented on this as follows:

**Cornelia:** I agree with that, it is pretty basic. [...] what quality is is different for different people [...] but you can't judge something in order to say 'this mustn't exist, because I think it doesn't have enough quality', that becomes dangerous, then we would come close to a dictatorship, so no, it should be free, unbound [...]. (Interview with Cornelia, 2019)

SD's party programme also says in the chapter "The Sweden Democrats and the State" that cultural heritage should be financed by the public, and in the chapter "The Sweden Democrats and Culture" that "Foreign phenomena can become part of the Swedish culture if they happen naturally, voluntarily, organically and gradually"<sup>xxxvii</sup> (Sverigedemokraterna, 2011, p. 19). How do Cornelia's statement and the quote from SD's party programme fit in with Cornelia's earlier quote: "the ethnic organisation only promoting their own language, culture and dishes?" The claim that money would be denied certain groups contradicts their idea that culture should be free if freedom is given by public money. Assuming that a clear separation between Swedish and non-Swedish cultural heritage is possible, it is questionable whether a natural and organic inclusion of non-Swedish culture is possible if ruling parties were not to include them in the public distribution of tax money. Words can say one thing, and money can say something else: A message of freedom is given, but it is limited with a nationalistic argument.

## 5. Conclusion

In the aftermath of the Swedish elections in 2018 and the nomination of the new Minister of Culture at the beginning of 2019, the Conservative writer Alice Teodorescu writes the following:

The role of culture must never be reduced to a tool for fulfilling another purpose, no matter how good this second purpose is. Culture must be allowed to be an end in itself. Moreover, the practitioners of culture must never be put in a situation where, in order to receive financial support, they are expected to adapt to the ideological whims of power. In this respect, it does not matter whether it is SD or MP<sup>xxxviii</sup> that rules.<sup>xxxix</sup> (Teodorescu, 2019, translation E.F.)

This quote gives the impression that the politicians are the “bad guys” and the cultural practitioners the victims. But this conflict is not about good or bad, and “cultural heritage is not innocent or by definition good” (Jönsson, 2005). What Teodorescu indicates is that the conflict about cultural heritage is based on the question whether actors within the field do or do not, should or should not use cultural heritage as an instrument. From my point of view that is an unrealistic and inadequate question. Rather the conflict on cultural heritage is about a general instrumentalization of culture, that is inevitable, but problematic, nonetheless. This does not mean that actors should stop aiming at an independent cultural heritage. But it does mean that if, without any judgement, we can accept that the instrumentalization of cultural heritage is a dominant factor, we can turn to a more insightful question that will help both cultural and political actors to deal with cultural heritage. So rather than asking *if*, we should ask *how* political and cultural actors use cultural heritage as a tool.

This was my first research aim. In that context I wanted to answer the following questions: How do the actors define cultural heritage? Why do they consider cultural heritage important? What is their aim of using cultural heritage in their work? What makes answering these questions so complex is the fact that the definitions and aims of cultural heritage do not seem to differ much between the actors. The feeling that Midsummer is important, and transfers very special feelings is not unique for SD, probably most Swedes feel the same. As I have pointed out, the actors do not differ much in what they think cultural heritage *is* but in what they think it *means*. The overall goals that both political and cultural actors want to reach with cultural heritage were described in Chapter two and can be summarised as follows:

- 1) Using cultural heritage for social meeting points
- 2) Transferring a certain truth through cultural heritage
- 3) Transferring a message about nationality through cultural heritage
- 4) Using cultural heritage for the development of culture in general
- 5) Facilitating our own positioning in time and space through cultural heritage

What differs between the actors are the individual components of these goals. All actors appear to tell the same truth, in a Foucauldian sense, but do not agree that their truth contains the same information. SD is often accused of hiding a nationalist discourse with a social discourse. It is what Mulinari and Neergaard refer to as the ethnopluralist caring discourse or even ethnopluralist caring racism (2014). Concerning the transference of truth, I have stated that while SD focuses rather on a truth based on awareness, the cultural actors focus rather on factual knowledge. If this is applied to the stereotypical example of the Midsummer celebrations, both the cultural actors and the political actors in the study seem to agree on their value as cultural heritage. But while the cultural actors focus rather on a historical understanding of Midsummer, SD underlines the nostalgic feeling connected to it. This is connected to the transference of a narrative about nationality, since here too SD tends to define nationality with a natural feeling that is comparable to Žižek's "nation qua thing" (1993). Their discourse on nationality shows elements of an Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD) (Smith, 2006) and of a canonical model (Harrison, 2013). But as I have shown in this thesis, rather than SD inventing a new national discourse in connection with cultural heritage, it is following and contributing to an old discourse. Past times have shown that cultural heritage has on many occasions been a tool for the formation of a national identity, and museums have always played a crucial role in this process. To some extent this might still be the case today. But what makes the AHD and canonical approach of SD provocative is that they use it not only as a tool for the formation of a national identity but also as a tool for the exclusion of certain groups from this formation. By using a discourse on nationalism, SD can make a division between those who possess awareness of cultural heritage and those who do not. Hence, cultural heritage becomes a tool for the distinction between "us" and "them" and leads to excluding activities.

All the actors refer to cultural heritage through a positioning in time and connect it to how culture has developed and changed in the past and still does today. But the relation to time and development differs among the actors. I explained this with Öhlander's concept of contradictions in culture (2005). While SD's discourse shows little acceptance for recent

change, they seem to accept external influences that lie in the past. This confirms their romanticised image of cultural heritage.

My second research aim was to find out how the conflict between different actors and how their attempts to claim the cultural heritage field are made visible in their discourse. With this aim I wanted to answer the following questions: What are the sources of the conflict? How is the conflict made visible? What do the actors do to claim the field and maintain their position in it?

The main source for a (potential) conflict between the actors is the discord in formulating the individual components of the goal of cultural heritage. This conflict is disturbing, especially for the cultural actors, who fear that SD might “kidnap” cultural heritage and label it with their ideologies. The cultural actors have several strategies in order to avoid being connected with SD, like a clear positioning of the own ideologies by officially refusing SD’s potential financial support or through preventive measures. I have applied Bourdieu’s field theory (Broady, 1988) and Foucault’s concept on the silenced discourse (Foucault, 1978, p. 100) in order to show how these strategies become visible. The cultural heritage discourse is not *silenced*, but *silent*, which enables new actors, in this case SD, to enter the field. The orthodox participants, in this case the cultural actors, must overcome their silence when the heterodox participants, SD, enter the field. The repositioning of the orthodox participants becomes visible through their strategies, which again are a sign for an existing conflict.

However, the conflict is also an asset for all actors involved, because repositioning in the field gives them the opportunity to attract attention for their cause. The way the actors talk about how the conflict gives or might give them recognition is another sign that makes the conflict visible. I have argued that the conflict is not about cultural heritage but about the ideologies that it contains. According to Bourdieu, opinions are used as weapons in the field. In the conflict about cultural heritage, the cultural actors claim they use “facts” and the political actors claim they use “awareness” as their weapons in the field. However, there is little difference between facts and awareness in this context, and everything becomes opinions that the actors use to justify their usage of cultural heritage. Inspired by Foucault I call it truths, and cultural heritage becomes a vessel for these different truths. This means that the conflict itself is the most dominant factor when defining cultural heritage as a tool.

Throughout the thesis cultural actors and SD appear as oppositional forces. Indeed, the results than can be drawn from my data show that most cultural actors share similar discourses, while the SD members share other discourses. But this conclusion can only be drawn if they are reflected within the idea of discourses and should not be valued on an individual level. My

interview partners represent museums, associations, networks and parties and of course the individual human beings can be part of multiple discourses at the same time. In this context, the complex political apparatus that makes cultural actors political representatives would be a meaningful investigation for further research. For example, an investigation could be made of the way not only SD, but also other parties use cultural heritage as a political tool for other narratives. Another focus that could be made in further research is the regionality: in the interview with Mikael the importance of the regional culture in connection to his interest in cultural heritage came up. As mentioned before SD is particularly strong in Skåne and hence further investigation on how regional patriotism is related to SDs interest in culture could lead to new understandings of the cultural heritage sector. Thematically I have not focused on issues of regionality, but my research scope has nonetheless been on the region Skåne and cultural and political actors on the regional level. The situation probably looks very different on a municipal level, both regarding SD's influence and regarding the position of the cultural actors, since there are municipalities where SD is part of the ruling coalition and might have more immediate influence. Going even deeper into a micro-level could lead to significant insight.

However, I do think that the cases described in my study are to a certain extent representative of a broader context, concerning not only the cultural heritage sector but also the political landscape in general. The measures taken in the cultural sector to limit SD's influence seem rather to give them more influence than less. This mirrors the Swedish government formation in 2018/2019, when the whole process focused on restricting SD's power, but instead gave them the power to slow down all decision-making. In the title of this thesis I imply the question: Is cultural heritage kidnapped? Preferably, I would like to answer this question with a no and together with Teodorescu hope for an independent and free culture, but that would not be a realistic answer, since all my arguments have shown that cultural heritage is trapped in a political, economic and societal machine, and various actors are trying to occupy it with their truths. However, this need not be a pessimistic outlook, since the awareness of how cultural heritage is a tool within a conflict might lead to a more reflective view.



## 6. Applicability

Hopefully this thesis can be a tool for cultural actors working in museums, cultural heritage sites, associations and networks; for politicians that are interested in cultural heritage and for politicians who aim at focusing more on cultural heritage. For the political actors the thesis can serve as a support for decision-making concerning the distribution of funds to cultural actors. For cultural actors the thesis can serve as a support when making use of the funds and when maintaining a debate on cultural heritage.

This thesis has shown that avoiding an instrumentalization of cultural heritage is probably impossible and also not the most effective strategy to promote cultural heritage. I have identified the conflict on cultural heritage as a dominant tool and I have no doubt that all actors understand the differences between the various “weapons”, in the field. I do not want to encourage the actors working with cultural heritage in different ways to maintain the conflict and to remain opposing forces. But I do hope that a reflection on the own weapons, the contemplation of the own political role and an enhanced understanding for others’ perspectives can transform the conflict to a fruitful debate. Without wanting to politicize cultural heritage, I would like to suggest that the cultural heritage field can benefit from an active acknowledgement of its political role. But also, for political actors, the reflection on what impact their values have on the cultural sector can be applicable for further decision-making.

SDs interest in cultural heritage both shows the risks and benefits of the cultural involvement of a political party. A broader engagement across the political landscape might lead to more balance in the field and more interest in the public. Therefore, I hope that my thesis can serve as an invitation for other political parties to become more involved in the cultural heritage field and contribute to a general debate on the cultural-political map. In the best of worlds my thesis can be a support for self-reflection and broadened understanding and contribute to the political debate on cultural heritage.

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Mikael (2019, February). Personal interview (E. Fredriksson, Interviewer)  
Pernilla (2019, March). Personal interview (E. Fredriksson, Interviewer)  
Sandra (2019, February). Personal interview (E. Fredriksson, Interviewer)  
Xavier (2019, March). Personal interview (E. Fredriksson, Interviewer)

### b) Internet Ethnography

Personal communication (2018, 12 August). Post and comments on the internal Facebook group of Skansen's museum pedagogues.

### c) List of Figures

Fig. 1: Picture on Jimmie Åkesson and Louise Erixon in Swedish traditional costumes, retrieved 25 May 2019 from

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## Appendix A

### Example of an interview guide for political actor

#### **Vad betyder kultur för dig?**

#### **Vad är kulturarv?**

- 1) Vad är kulturarv (enligt SD, enligt dig)?
  - a. Materiellt?
  - b. Immateriellt?
- 2) Med hjälp av vilka faktorer bestämmer SD vad som anses vara kulturarv och vad som inte anses vara kulturarv?
  - a. Orienterar ni er efter institutionella definitioner som t.ex. riksantikvarieämbetet/ institutet för språk och folkminnen
  - b. Vilken roll spelar historiska faktorer/ händelser? Och i så fall vilka historiska händelser?
- 3) Vem anser ni/ du bestämmer eller borde bestämma vilka platser/ aktiviteter som är kulturarv?
  - a. Institutioner?
  - b. Politiker?
  - c. Befolkningen?

#### **Varför är kulturarv viktigt?**

- 1) Varför är kulturarv en fokus för SD?
  - a. Vad anser SD är bra/ uppbyggliga kulturarv? Varför?
  - b. Vad anser SD är platser/aktiviteter som inte borde vara kulturarv? Kulturarv som inte är uppbyggliga? Varför?
  - c. Vad anser SD vara platser som borde bli kulturarv som inte är det i nuläget? Varför?
  - d. Lista med kulturarvsaktörer Skåne – är du införstådd med det?
  - e. Vilka konkreta kulturarvsplatser vill SD fokusera på? Varför?
- 2) Vad har kulturarv för funktion i samhället?
- 3) Är kulturarv ett mål i sig eller är det ett syfte för ett eller flera andra mål?
- 4) Vilka teman/ frågor inom kulturarvsdebatten är speciellt viktiga för SD? Varför?
- 5) Vilket immateriellt kulturarv vill SD fokusera på? Varför?

#### **Vad betyder kulturarv politiskt?**

- 1) Vad betyder kulturarv för SD som parti? För bilden av SD?
- 2) På vilket sätt är kulturarvsfrågor viktiga för SDs politiska mål?
- 3) Vad betyder kulturarv för SDs intressen inom svensk politik?
- 4) Vad betyder kulturarv för Sverige som land?
  - a. För Skåne som region?
- 5) Vad betyder det för Sverige att ha kulturarv på unescos internationella lista?
  - a. Sverige har inget immateriellt kulturarv på unescos internationella lista. Vad tror du om det? Vilket immateriella kulturarv borde finnas på den listan?

- b. Vad tror du om tanken att benämningen av kulturarv betyder att inordna det i en värdehierarki?
- 6) Hur ser SD på museer och andra aktörer i kulturarvsfältet som inte är eniga med er om kulturarvens roll och funktion?
  - a. Hur ser ni på museer idag?
  - b. Goda exempel på museer? Som de borde vara.
  - c. Exempel på museer som håller på att spåra ur, som inte gör det de borde göra?
  - d. SD vill på sikt avveckla stödet till alla statens världskulturmuseer (etnografiska, medelhavsmuseet etc.) (*"Så vill SD radera kulturen"* Aftonbladet. 2016-09-09. Sida: 4-5) – varför är det inte viktigt? Varför är det mindre viktigt än t.ex. ...?

### Hur hanterar SD kulturarv?

- 7) På vilket sätt kan SD stödja kulturarv?
  - a. Finansiellt?
  - b. Medialt – genom debatter, diskurser i media?
  - c. Politiskt – lagstiftning?
- 8) Hur skiljer sig den nationella och den regionala hanteringen i kulturarvsfrågan?
- 9) Det finns kulturarvsverksamheter och verksamheter inom folkkultur som säger att SD vill monopolisera folkkultur. Vad säger du om det?
- 10) Hur ser du din funktion som ledamot i kulturnämnden Skåne? Vad är dina uppgifter?
  - a. Hur kan du konkret påverka kulturarvsdebatten?
- 11) Hur mycket spelar enstaka uppfattningar, som t.ex. vad du anser vara kulturarv, en roll när det kommer till kulturarvsfrågor inom SD?
- 12) Hur tror du att kulturarvsdebatten kommer att utveckla sig i Sverige? Inom SD?

## Appendix B

### Example of an interview guide for cultural actor

#### Kulturarv

- 1) Vad har regionmuseet Kristianstad med kulturarv o göra? Är ni kulturarv?
- 2) Är kulturarv viktigt? Varför?
- 3) Varför är ni som verksamhet viktiga?
- 4) Det första man tänker på i samband med kulturarv är ju tanken av att bevara. Hur viktigt är bevarandet för regionmuseet?
- 5) Hur hänger att bevara och att utveckla ihop?
- 6) Hur gör ni för att få ihop dessa två?
- 7) Hur vill ni förmedla historia i regionmuseet? Regional? Nationell? Internationellt?
- 8) Vem är publiken som kommer hit?
- 9) Kulturarv: Mål eller medel?

#### Politik

- 1) Hur politiskt är ett museum?
- 2) Ni får pengar från regionen Skåne – märker man av skillnader nu efter valet?

- 3) Region Skåne är ju alliansstyrd, Kristianstad är alliansstyrd – det tyder ju på att SD har relativt begränsat inflytande – eller?
- 4) Det är ju ingen hemlighet att SD har många väljare i Skåne och att de överlag visar stort intresse för kulturarv och kulturpolitik. Märks det? Vad tänker ni på museet kring det?
- 5) Har det uppstått diskussioner bland ledamöter i styrelsen från olika partier?
- 6) Känner ni något politiskt hot/ ångest/ oro – nerskärning på pengar? Att museets ska visas i en bestämd debatt?
- 7) På vilket sätt skulle SD kunna få inflytande?
- 8) Är det viktigt att ni distanserar er från SD eller inte?
- 9) Skulle uppmärksamhet från SD vara en välkommande publicity?
- 10) Är politik/ SD ett tema på arbetsplatsen?
- 11) Oro över att spela SD i händerna?

## Appendix C

### Quotes for Interviews

- 1) ”Konst och kultur är grundbultar i ett demokratiskt samhälle, viktiga för att värna och stärka yttrandefriheten.” (Region Skåne: Kulturnämndens verksamhetsplan och budget 2019)
- 2) ”Att värna om kulturarvet är också att visa respekt mot tidigare generationer, att minnas vad de har åstadkommit.” (Sverigedemokraternas principprogram)
- 3) ”Svensk folkkultur och mångfald kan inte bli varandras motpoler i kulturdebatten.” (Knätofsmantestet, Folkmusiker mot främlingsfientlighet)
- 4) ”I sin allra vidaste mening skulle den svenska kulturen kunna definieras som summan av allt som någonsin tänkts, skrivits, sagts, skapats eller gjorts av personer som tillhör den svenska nationen.” (Sverigedemokraternas principprogram)
- 5) ”Den allmänna synen på svensk folkkultur är och har länge varit förlegad och kan sammanfattas till en museal och nationalromantisk midsommarkultur.” (Folkmusiker mot främlingsfientlighet, Knätofsmantestet)
- 6) ”Kulturen ska vara en dynamisk, utmanande och obunden kraft med yttrandefriheten som grund. Alla ska ha möjlighet att delta i kulturlivet. Kreativitet, mångfald och konstnärlig kvalitet ska prägla samhällets utveckling.” (nationella kulturpolitiska målen i Region Skåne: Kulturnämndens verksamhetsplan och budget 2019)
- 7) ”Svensk kulturdebatt är inte jämställd. I kulturpolitiken ska ett debattklimat skapas där politiker, utövare och publik deltar på lika villkor.” (Folkmusiker mot främlingsfientlighet, Knätofsmantestet)
- 8) ”Svensk folkkultur är en föränderlig tradition som rymmer likväl amatörer som proffs, bevarare som förnyare.” (Folkmusiker mot främlingsfientlighet, Knätofsmantestet)
- 9) ”Kulturarvet fungerar som ett sammanhållande kitt. Varje samhälle behöver gemensamma normer och värderingar, kollektiva minnen, gemensamma myter, gemensamma högtider och traditioner, gemensamma seder och bruk för att i förlängningen kunna hålla samman.” (Sverigedemokraternas principprogram)

## Footnotes

- <sup>i</sup> Original quote: Sverigedemokraternas syn på kulturen och dess betydelse för samhällets och nationens fortlevnad medför naturligtvis att vi blir starka motståndare till mångkulturalismen som politisk idé och samhällssystem.
- <sup>ii</sup> Translation E.F.: Culture as the great problem of cultural politics
- <sup>iii</sup> Translation E.F.: In the industrial society's blow shadow: about problematic cultural heritage
- <sup>iv</sup> Translation E.F.: Canon and cultural heritage: history and contemporary in Denmark and Sweden
- <sup>v</sup> Translation E.F.: Cultural heritage for everyone
- <sup>vi</sup> Translation E.F.: Imagined diversity
- <sup>vii</sup> Translation E.F.: Canon and cultural heritage: history and contemporary in Denmark and Sweden
- <sup>viii</sup> Translation E.F.: Democratic cultural heritage? National institutions, universal values, local practices
- <sup>ix</sup> Translation E.F.: The broadened cultural heritage and the unromantic nationalism
- <sup>x</sup> Translation E.F.: Folk dance as cultural heritage? A study on Swedish folk dance and national tradition
- <sup>xi</sup> Translation E.F.: Whose Swedish cultural heritage? A discourse analysis of the National Heritage Board's cultural-heritage- and identity-production
- <sup>xii</sup> Translation E.F.: the black book of the Sweden Democrats
- <sup>xiii</sup> Translation E.F.: Why we love to hate the Sweden Democrats
- <sup>xiv</sup> Translation E.F.: Our Swedish cultural heritage. A discourse analysis of the Sweden Democrats' view on the cultural heritage term in relation to the hegemonic cultural heritage discourse
- <sup>xv</sup> "Knätofs" = the tassel at the knee of Swedish folk costumes
- <sup>xvi</sup> Translation E.F.: folk musicians against xenophobia
- <sup>xvii</sup> Translation E.F.: både konstituerar den sociala världen och konstitueras av andra sociala praktiker
- <sup>xviii</sup> Translation E.F.: både konstituerar den sociala världen och konstitueras av andra sociala praktiker
- <sup>xix</sup> Original quote: "Kulturarv kan förstås som spår och uttryck från det förflutna som tillskrivs värde och används i samtiden. I kulturpolitiken är det avgörande att utgå från en sådan öppen förståelse av kulturarv. De avgränsningar av vad som ska räknas till kulturarvet som krävs i praktisk verksamhet, måste så långt det är möjligt få göras i det civila samhället och av de professionella inom kulturarvsområdet."
- <sup>xx</sup> Original quote: "Museihuvudmännen ska säkerställa att ett museum har ett bestämmande inflytande över verksamhetens innehåll."
- <sup>xxi</sup> SFI = Svenska för Invandrare = Swedish classes for immigrants
- <sup>xxii</sup> Original quote: Stärka den kulturella sammanhållningen genom lokala kulturlotsar med uppgift att samla in, marknadsföra och integrera det lokala kulturarvet i välfärdens verksamheter och etablera Sverigecenter i landets mest utsatta områden.
- <sup>xxiii</sup> Original quote: "Att värna om kulturarvet är också att visa respekt mot tidigare generationer, att minnas vad de har åstadkommit."
- <sup>xxiv</sup> Original quote: Att värna om kulturarvet är också att visa respekt mot tidigare generationer, att minnas vad de har åstadkommit.
- <sup>xxv</sup> Original quote: Inrätta en svensk kulturkanon, för att garantera samma referenspunkter kring svensk kultur.
- <sup>xxvi</sup> Original quote: I sin allra vidaste mening skulle den svenska kulturen kunna definieras som summan av allt som någonsin tänkts, skrivits, sagts, skapats eller gjorts av personer som tillhör den svenska nationen.
- <sup>xxvii</sup> Original quote: Svensk folkkultur är en föränderlig tradition som rymmer likväl amatörer som proffs, bevarare som förnyare.
- <sup>xxviii</sup> Translation E.F.: Forum for living history
- <sup>xxix</sup> A traditional bun eaten in Sweden at Christmas time
- <sup>xxx</sup> Original quote: Kulturimpulser som utan att anpassas till svenska förhållanden inympas i det svenska samhället av maktavare eller grupper som inte själva ser sig som svenska betraktar vi dock inte som en del av den svenska kulturen utan snarare som en form av kulturimperialism.
- <sup>xxxi</sup> Original quote: "Kulturimpulser som utan att anpassas till svenska förhållanden inympas i det svenska samhället av maktavare eller grupper som inte själva ser sig som svenska betraktar vi dock inte som en del av den svenska kulturen utan snarare som en form av kulturimperialism."
- <sup>xxxii</sup> In Sweden and other Scandinavian countries, it is very common to eat Tacos on Fridays and has received the colloquial reference "Taco-Fredag" – "Taco-Friday" (Thellenberg, 2011)
- <sup>xxxiii</sup> Norwegian TV host of the Scandinavian Talk Show "Skavlan"
- <sup>xxxiv</sup> Karlsson is an SD politician, a member of the Swedish parliament and previously leader of SD in the parliament.
- <sup>xxxv</sup> Original quote: "Lagen innehåller en särskild bestämmelse om museernas självständiga ställning i förhållande till den politiska beslutsnivån."

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<sup>xxxvi</sup> Original quote: "Kulturen ska vara en dynamisk, utmanande och obunden kraft med yttrandefriheten som grund. Alla ska ha möjlighet att delta i kulturlivet. Kreativitet, mångfald och konstnärlig kvalitet ska präglade samhällets utveckling."

<sup>xxxvii</sup> Utländska företeelser kan mycket väl bli en del av den svenska kulturen om det sker naturligt, frivilligt, organiskt och successivt .

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Miljöpartiet = Sweden's Green party

<sup>xxxix</sup> Original quote: "Men kulturens roll får aldrig reduceras till ett redskap för uppfyllnad av ett annat syfte, oavsett hur gott detta andra syfte är. Kulturen måste tillåtas vara ett självändamål. Dessutom får kulturens utövare aldrig försättas i en situation där de, för att få ekonomiskt stöd, förväntas anpassa sig efter maktens ideologiska nyckel. Om makten bärs av SD eller MP spelar i det avseendet i praktiken mindre roll."