

Power and Policy

A comparative study on the state use of paramilitary forces in
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Ukraine

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Abstract

Combative paramilitary forces are an unconventional but not unusual notion in warfare. The purpose of this study is to explain how the domestic and international power of a state affect its decision to support and align itself with paramilitary forces in war. By comparing the state alignment in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Ukraine, the study sets out to explain the phenomena by utilizing existing theories of comparative politics and foreign policy analysis. After having classified the two states as domestically powerful and internationally weak, it is concluded that paramilitary alignment can be regarded as a strategy induced by the executive authority of government and the small degree of social organization and cohesion of society. Further the study argues that civil members can be regarded as a resource of the state - mobilizable and extractable for military purposes. Lastly the concept of "Bolted Policy" is introduced as a theory of how certain policies can change the domestic power dynamics and hence the strategy of a state.

Key words: Power, policy, paramilitary, war, action

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1 Introduction

“For what, for whom, must I kill and be killed?”. The question put forward by Leo Tolstoy is a notion that has riddled humanity ever since the beginning of civilization in the context of war and warfare. Modern history tells of several cases of the discrepancy between nations conducting war and their citizens willingness to bear arms for their state. Cases where states conducting war choose to align their regular fighting forces with paramilitary groups, existing outside of the official state organization.

During the 1960s the National Liberation Front, or informally known as Viet Cong, became a world known paramilitary force as a symbol of organized insurgency by civilians.

In 2014, after escalation of conflict with separatist forces, the Ukrainian government chose to mobilize, finance and support private militias for fighting the war in the Donbass region of Eastern Ukraine.

The oddity of states aligning themselves with paramilitary forces rather than seeking to recruit and incorporate them into official fighting forces, is clear. However, the reason as to why they choose to do so is not, raising the question of what mechanisms and causes that invoke such a strategy of policy in war.

1.1 Purpose and research question

The purpose of this paper is to examine how bridging theories on domestic and international power can explain state action in conflict. With the arrival of Neorealism to scientific community in the 1970s, earlier notions that states only are to be perceived as equal rational actors on the international scene have been revised. A broader perspective on how domestic and international circumstances mutually affect the decisions and methods which countries act according to, have been put forward – not at least in the context of security and foreign policy. States decision to supply, use and align themselves with paramilitary units in warfare, represents an example of how domestic and international decisions cross-border which intrigues further research.

The research question of this study is:

- *Why do states use paramilitary forces in war?*

1.2 Earlier research

The existing literature discussing the notion of state use of paramilitary forces in war is predominantly focusing on the forces themselves, to explain the attraction of states to use such forces. Kalyvas (2006) points to the local knowledge and connection of paramilitary groups to their immediate surroundings as an asset for the state to combat insurgency and maintain territory. This is based on the different tactics used in unconventional warfare where conflict often is a consequence of rebellion or ethnic divergence.

Furthermore, paramilitary forces can attract state interest as a substitute for the regular armed forces. Increasing the sheer size of fighting forces, enables states to reduce costs as paramilitaries often are self-sufficient and less likely to ensure standardization. Eck (2015) argues that this is a factor of a great attraction, where states perceive paramilitary forces as opportunity to bypass tactical or political obstacles that may hinder conventional warfare.

Lastly, the literature suggests that the use of paramilitary forces functions as method for the state to avoid accountability for violating international regulations, pointing to the separation of paramilitary forces from the official armed forces (Carey et al. 2015). Galbreath and Malyarenko (2016) concurs but suggests that this disturbs the command of the state, as the lack of accountability induces a lack of control meaning that the authority of the state over its warfare becomes impaired.

1.3 Disposition

The study begins by presenting the methodological framework of the comparative research (Chap. 2). Then follows a description of the theory on what constitutes domestic and international power of states and the implications this has (Chap. 3). Following a brief hypothesis of the study (Chap. 4) the subsequent part presents the empirical evidence, describing the different cases and indicators themselves (Chap. 5). Finally, by connecting the theory with empirical evidence, the analysis and discussion sets out to present a result of the paper (Chap. 6) and a concluding answer to its general question (Chap. 7).

2 Methodology

2.1 Comparative method

Conducting research that aims to provide new theory, demands a clear foundation of how the study practically achieves that. Since the aim is to produce an answer to the question *Why do states use paramilitary forces in war?* - and to provide new theoretical insight to the state action in war - the theory will to a great extent direct the study. Thus, the study is a theory-developing cause analysis, based on existing theory which is natural in the strive to develop new insights (Svensson - Teorell 2007, p. 27; 52). The cases - the DRV in 1960 and Ukraine in 2014 - therefore functions as tools to provide empirical evidence that can contribute theoretically to the results of the study. To achieve an elaborate tracing and explanation of the chain of events, and thus the causal mechanism behind use of paramilitary forces, I have purposely chosen to pursue an intensive approach to make the research more detailed (Svensson - Teorell 2007, p. 80). By following this approach, it is possible for me to reduce the number of analytical units in favor of a wide variety of variables such as the polity, the political system, level of corruption, tax allocation etc.

The study is conducted in the method of hypothetic-deductive model. A hypothesis is set forth, and the process of deduction direct the theoretical and empirical evidence throughout the study to prove the hypothesis. Thus, making it suitable for a hypothesis with the purpose of developing theory (Svensson - Teorell 2007, p. 99). For the study this process includes four steps:

1. Presenting a hypothesis on why states choose to use paramilitary forces in war.
2. Theoretically describing the domestic and international factors that are perceived as affecting the policy to use paramilitary forces.
3. Describing the empirical evidence of the two cases, classifying each state and explaining the process in which they have aligned themselves with paramilitary forces.
4. Concluding whether the hypothesis is correct, false or can be revised.

Regarding the issue of ensuring validity of the results produced by the paper, I have done extensive theoretical research to identify measurable indicators of the factors of domestic and international power that I examine. Thus creating a conceptual apparatus of the factors I intend to examine both in theory and in operation (Svensson - Teorell 2007, p. 59). Still, the two cases are separated by 50 years, making a completely equal comparison difficult due to the varying historical conditions and empirical availability. My approach is therefore to treat the cases on their own terms, hence the need for an operationalization with breadth and depth.

An important element to the task of proving the hypothesis and answering the study's question is to describe the chain of events in order to identify the causal mechanism. For the study this means providing empirical evidence and empirical analysis, so that the relationship between state power and paramilitary alignment can be assessed. Depending on the results this can either lead to an ascertainment or an explanation of the causal mechanism, the latter pointing at certain factors constituting the relationship (Svensson - Teorell 2007, p. 63). To accomplish at least an ascertainment of the causal mechanism, I will describe the state of the DRV and Ukraine - domestic and international power indicators - at their time of alignment, and the alignment process itself when they officially invoked the paramilitary forces into their warfare. The analysis shall therefore conclude whether the theory shows a causality between the independent variables of domestic and international factors, and the dependent variable of alignment itself. Are the two countries pursuing the same policy for the same reasons?

2.2 Demarcation and selection of cases

The study is deliberately more limited in the aspect of time than it is in the aspect of space. To ensure the provision of qualitative empirical results, the study limits itself to examine the state of the DRV in 1960 and the state of Ukraine in 2014 - the time of their alignment with paramilitary forces.

The reason why I have chosen the DRV and Ukraine as the cases for this study, is because of the great variation of the independent variables that are suspected to be ineffectual to the dependent variable. The cases differ in time, geography, political rule, extent of conflict and military capacity. However, as postulated by the hypothesis, the cases demonstrate similarities in terms of domestic power centralization, social mobilization and international power - and both are well known cases of state alignment with paramilitary forces in war. If results of a causal relationship can be established apart from the many differences, it will indicate a great applicability of the mechanism discovered (Svensson - Teorell 2007, p. 227).

2.3 Material and information evaluation

The material used in the study is composed by primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include such documents as the constitutions of each state, official statements regarding the establishment of paramilitary troops and legislative documents. The secondary source are a collection of articles, books and reports.

In the case of assessing the domestic and international power of the DRV this includes the use of contemporary CIA documents describing the political and economic development in the DRV. To make the same assessment in Ukraine i have collected information from international organizations researching and mapping such factors as corruption, civic participation and institutional trust.

I have consistently evaluated the collected sources using the four general principles of source criticism - genuineness; proximity; inclination; dependence (Svensson - Teorell 2007, p. 106-107). Since most of the sources originate from governmental archives, independent organizations and peer reviewed journals contemporary with the events that they describe, I do not consider genuineness and proximity to be a factor of risk. However, since the sources, especially in the case of US intelligence on the DRV, are descriptions of adversaries in conflict there is a certain risk of inclination and dependence. I have therefore deliberately sought to cross check these sources with other independent material and avoid news, since these pose a risk of being purposely targeted to present a certain picture of a situation.

2.4 Operationalization

Domestic power of a state is defined as an absolute measurement based on the degree of state centralization and social mobilization which together indicate the location where foreign policy is dictated (Morin - Paquin 2018, p. 134). By operationalizing and measure its components it will be possible to create an absolute classification of the two analyzed states.

The theory of *state centralization* postulate that power is divided between different levels of government within the state. A method to operationalize this is to describe the polity of each state, the division of power as stated in their constitutions and the central veto-players that have the executive power of creating and implementing foreign policy. As economic division is described as a typical expression of power fragmentation, tax allocation can be perceived as an influx of power.

Social mobilization is described as an expression of the degree of cohesion and social organization. Cohesion, although abstract is by Dragolov et al. defined as civic participation and citizens trust to institutions. I will therefore

operationalize the term by presenting indications of election participation and statistics on the civil trust in institutions such as the government and judiciary system (Dragolov et al 2016, p. 7).

A representative operational indicator of social organization is the public provision of, and social access to, welfare. How organized, developed and accessible health care, education etc. is, is an example of how organized the state is socially and therefore functions as an adequate operationalization.

International power of state is a relative measurement defined by the power of other actors. In order to measure the international power of North Vietnam and Ukraine at the time of their aligning with paramilitary forces I will describe the states dependence and relationship with their allies and adversaries.

3 Theory

3.1 Domestic state power

An important premise to the determination of domestic power is the understanding that the power itself is absolute, due to the state being a sole entity and the domestic power an effect of its internal structures and interaction. The theory is concerned with how influence on policy creation is divided between government and society - policy in war is no exception.

3.1.1 State centralization

The phenomena known as state centralization describes the relationship between different levels of government and how their executive and judiciary power differ (Morin - Paquin 2018, p. 134). The degree of centralization can therefore be said to represent the degree of power fragmentation between low (local) and high (state) level of government. Stephens presents a clear definition of this by describing a decentralized state as a state in which public policy, resource distribution and welfare service mainly is provided by local authorities. The contrary - such things being handled by the national government - represents an ideal centralized state (Stephens 1974, p. 52).

Theoretically there are several indicators that have been credited to represent the degree of state centralization. The polity itself is a contributing factor to how power and authority is distributed between different institutions within the state. A federation inherently divides power to a greater extent between different vertical levels of government than a unitary state. Lijpharts research has for example shown that a high causality exists between federal-decentralized states and unitary-centralized states (Lijphart 1999).

A concurring explanation to this institutional approach is Tsebelis perspective on veto-players - actors within a state that have the authority and capacity to produce policy change. The more players - the greater the risk is of a non-cohesive environment and decentralization of power (Tsebelis 1995). Due to this, authoritarian states generally exhibit a high degree of centralization.

Economic factors such as taxation are also presented as expressions of power fragmentation, the argument being that higher state taxation is a sign of economic

power allocation to the state (Rodden 2004). Stephens further argues for a perspective on service distribution as a sign of power allocation (Stephens 1974).

Regarding the domestic power of a state, centralization of power creates a greater capacity for the government to execute desired foreign policy (Morin - Paquin 2018, p. 137). The “state-capacity” to conduct foreign policy is stronger in a centralized state than in a decentralized state due to the lesser fragmentation of power.

3.1.2 Social mobilization

All societies to some extent commit themselves to common interaction. Depending on the extent of this interaction, societies can have little or great capacity to influence the foreign policy of the state. The term social mobilization is defined by two phenomena of social interaction - cohesion and social organization (Morin - Paquin 2018, p. 135).

Cohesion as defined by Dragolov et al “is characterized by resilient social relations, a positive emotional connectedness between its members and the community, and a pronounced focus on the common good.” (Dragolov et al 2016, p. 6). Examples of such cohesive elements is the acceptance of diversity, trust in institutions and civic participation (Ibid, p. 7).

Social organization on the other hand is more concerned with the concrete social interaction which is organized in a clear pattern to achieve social results. Such organizations can exist on any level in a state and the desired results can as an example involve mobilization, welfare or local governance - the point being that this takes place in a defined organizational structure with clear goals (Firth 1954, p. 10).

Having described the two constituting phenomena of social mobilization it is necessary to define the term itself as it is a process of cohesion and social organization within a society. Deutsch argues that social mobilization is a process in which traditional ruling social, economic and psychological structures are refuted and replaced with new methods of socialization and interaction As the quality of society change, so does its demands on the politics undertaken by government (Deutsch 1961, p. 494; 498).

Social mobilization affects the creation and pursuit of policy similarly to centralization. A state with a high degree of social mobilization, with the purpose of shaping policy - decreases the government authority and autonomy in shaping and conducting foreign policy (Morin - Paquin 2018, p. 135). The presence of influential NGOs, an example of social mobilization with the purpose of shaping foreign policy, can have great influence on the governmental decision-making, hence decreasing the domestic power of the state (Cohen 2004).

3.1.3 Policy network

The third factor as presented by Morin and Paquin as a determinant of the domestic power of a state concerns the connection between social and governmental forces. Subsequently it is bridging state centralization with social mobilization in its description of how developed channels, of communication and interaction, are between government and society (Morin - Paquin 2018, p. 136).

Risse-Kappen presents a classification of an ideal type of policy networks within a centralized and not socially mobilized state: This then determines the influence on policy that can be attributed to state or society:

- In a state with a high degree of state centralization and low degree of social mobilization, the policy network is more likely to be dominated by the state. Policy is primarily created by political actors without the influence of society (Risse-Kappen 1991, p. 486).

Since the type of policy network is an expression of the relationship between state centralization and social mobilization it can be perceived as mapping of who controls the creation of foreign policy and subsequently whether it is dictated by society or state. Thus, a foreign policy created in a network of primarily political actors is an expression of a domestically strong state and foreign policy created in a network of primarily social elite groups is an expression of a domestically weak state.

3.2 International state power

Since the international power of a state only is measurable in relation to other states the theoretical conclusion can be made that this power is relative, hence the state can only be credited with having a certain power-posture in the international structure. As Kenneth Waltz describes it “an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him” (Waltz 1979, p. 192).

3.2.1 Neorealist definition

The neorealist consensus on state power and action can be reduced to three notions of condition, cause and effect of the international system.

The first notion is that of the anarchical order of the world. Neorealist structural approach to international politics argues that the abundance of sovereign authority makes the international system inherently anarchic (Waltz 1979).

The second notion deals with the question of resources of the state, where

Waltz argues that power must be viewed as a distribution of capabilities where states are more powerful, the more capabilities they have. To account the power of a state simply from reviewing the results of power implementation is inevitably disregarding the causes (Waltz 1979, p. 192). Hence this perspective gives a comprehensive indication of power as it involves the degree of capacity as well as the control that a state has.

The third notion presents rationality and utility maximizing as the main motive of state action. Thus, foreign policy is viewed as having the overall purpose of achieving and maintaining state interests. States seek security in balance of power either internally, such as for example developing armed forces, or externally, by creating alliances (Parent - Rosato 2015, p. 54). Waltz describes these methods as having the sole purpose of strengthening the own state or weakening other states, much like the system of market-economy (Waltz 1979, p. 118)

The view on international politics of neorealism is that of a world of self-help. States will prefer to guarantee their security through internal strategies, but due to the availability of resources great powers are more likely to pursue balancing of power through internal means rather than external, and small powers are more likely to concede aligning themselves with others states (Parent - Rosato 2015, p. 54).

3.3 The power duality and state action

An attempt to develop a scientific theory of state action that combines the domestic aspects of comparative political studies and the international aspects of foreign policy analysis is that of Mastanduno et al. (1989). In this model a state can pursue three different strategies, either within its borders or externally, which in turn are dependent on the power of the state.

The first strategy is *mobilization of resources*. By accepting the realist assumption that the international interest of states is survival through the acquisition of power and wealth, Mastanduno et al. suggest that states can enhance economic growth and societal wealth by intervening in the economy. A state can accomplish such a mobilization by reorganization of production e.g. through nationalization and central planning. However, it can also be accomplished through an indirect approach in which the state uses legislation, fiscal policy and promotion of innovation to create societal wealth, which in turn creates economic wealth (Mastanduno et al. 1989, p. 462). The goal of the mobilization is to create “...the resources necessary to sustain military expenditures [...] and otherwise expand the political and economic bases of power” (Ibid, p. 463).

The second strategy deals with the *extraction of resources*. Wealth itself must be converted by the state from the society into power, it cannot constitute power by solely existing. Through taxation, obtainment of resources and expropriation a state can transform wealth into military capacity, economic aid and foreign assistance. Consequently, as Mastanduno et al. points out, the process of extraction is easier to carry out in centralized and authoritarian states, since such states tend to have a more extensive control over means of production (Mastanduno et al. 1989, p. 463). As well as transforming domestic wealth into power, states can pursue external extraction. Transfer of external resources to the state, through e.g. trade agreements can contribute to the state reaching its domestic and international goals, while not having to push internal extraction to the limit. However, this strategy requires the state to have a bigger amount of international power since they must be able to dictate international markets etc. (Ibid, p. 464).

The third strategy presents *validation* by gaining recognition internationally as a method for states to enhance their domestic position. A prominent example of a validation - especially in the case of newly found state after a revolution - is the diplomatic recognition of by the international community (Mastanduno et al. 1989, p. 464).

Mastanduno et. al create a synthesis of which strategies states are expected to utilize depending on their domestic and international power. See fig. 1 for illustration of the synthesis. To avoid confusion, they use the term *hard* for a domestically powerful state, *soft* for a domestically weak state, and *weak/powerful* for international state power (Mastanduno et al. 1989, p. 465-469).

		<u>International Structure</u>	
		Weak	Powerful
<u>Domestic Structure</u>	Soft	Internal Extraction External Validation	External Extraction
	Hard	Internal Mobilization	Internal Mobilization External Extraction

Fig. 1. The strategies and constraints as induce by domestic and international power (Mastanduno et al. 1989, p. 469).

4 Hypothesis

I claim that the study will show that a domestically hard and internationally weak state is more likely to use paramilitary forces in war. This is based on the hypothesis that such a state combines a high degree of state centralization with a low degree of social mobilization, resulting in great executive authority of government to organize a non-cohesive society. In the context of my cases this means that members of such societies are more inclined to enter war in paramilitary units and the state at war has the authority to support, finance and align such forces as a part of their foreign policy. Mobilization and use of paramilitary forces, I argue, is an example of what Mastanduno et al. call Internal mobilization - a signature strategy of the hard and weak state to mobilize already existing resources in their creation and implementation of policy. I predict that the transformation of civil members of society into paramilitary forces is an example of such a resource being mobilized.

5 Empirical evidence

5.1 The power of the DRV in 1960

5.1.1 A democratic republic of Vietnam?

With the purpose of consolidating the state and political system, a new constitution was drafted and adopted by the first National Assembly of the DRV in 1959. The constitution describes the organs of state within the DRV as practicing “democratic centralism” (DRV Const, art. 4). The National Assembly, being the only legislative authority, assuming the power of parliament - for example enacting laws, electing the heads of state organs and deciding on questions of war and peace (DRV Const, art. 44; 50). However, as the National Assembly only was to be in session twice a year, the continuous responsibility to execute its tasks was delegated to The Standing Committee of the National Assembly, also responsible for mobilization, as stated in article 53 (DRV Const, art. 46; 53).

The constitution of 1959 also explicitly describes the executive power of the president and government. Apart from the role of representing the state, the president is also appointed as supreme commander of the armed forces and national defense. Additionally, it grants the president the right to attend and preside over meetings of the government known as The Council of Ministers (DRV Const, art. 61; 65; 66).

Elaborating on what the implications of centralization are for the concrete society article 78 postulate the division of the state by saying that “The country is divided into provinces, autonomous zones, and municipalities directly under the central authority.” (DRV Const, art. 78). In terms of the true autonomy of these divisions article 91 clearly states that “The administrative committees at all levels are placed under the leadership of the administrative committees at the next higher level, and under the unified leadership of the Council of Ministers.” (DRV Const, art. 91). Hence, the constitution to a great extent concentrate the authority and power to the highest executive organ of the DRV. Summarizing his contemporary breakdown of the constitution Fall suggests that “the DRVN seems to be intent upon developing a certain top-heaviness in state control organs.” (Fall 1959, p. 183).

To understand this top heaviness, as established by the DRV constitution of 1959, it is crucial to explain the influence of power and authority of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to the political system. In 1960, key positions of the government organs of the DRV were staffed by the highest-ranking leaders of the CPV. The executive presidency, the legislative Standing Committee of the National Assembly and the governmental Council of Ministers were all under the leadership of members of the CPV leadership and politburo. As Weiner Normand describes the CPV was a highly centralized organization wherein the decision-making for the DRV ultimately took place in the board-like politburo of the party, thus transcending the power of the National Assembly. Creating what Weiner Normand calls a “parallel administration” (Weiner Normand 1967, p. 71; 73; 74).

5.1.2 Social mobilization and policy network

As of 1960, the DRV was still very much in the process of establishing institutions tending to its political, military and social goals. The National Assembly election of 1960 became not only the first election under the new constitution, but also the first legislative election to be held in the DRV since 1946. Penniman suggests that the absence of elections can be connected to the difficulties of the DRV state to rally rural voters, since they had suffered the most from the land reforms imposed by the central run economy (Penniman 1972, p. 76-77). However, official sources of the DRV proclaimed in the election of 1960 that 99.85% of voters turned out on election day resulting in a 100% majority for the CPV in the National Assembly (Ibid, p. 79). Adding doubt to the legitimacy of these results is the contemporary inability of the CPV to recruit members outside of the urban intelligentsia. Although the party heavily advocated its representation of workers and peasants, the party experienced great difficulties in recruitment of rural areas. (Weiner Normand 1967, p. 72). In 1958 the DRV initiated the first three-year plan for economic development where the total expenditure on society, culture and welfare constituted 12.8 % of the state budget. However, a majority the expenditure was directed to the purpose of lifting agriculture and industry through collectivization, thus neglecting such welfare posts as healthcare and education (CIA 1959, p. 5-6; 19).

In a 1964 special report, the CIA summarize the situation by saying that “Lack of enthusiasm for regime goals and directives appears to be widespread and is probably of greater concern to Hanoi than the prospect of active dissidence” (CIA 1964, p. 5).

5.1.3 International power position

The inherent dichotomy between north-communist and south-capitalist governance was not exclusive to involve the domestic actors of Vietnam. As a part of the cold war, the United States on behalf of South Vietnam, and the Sino-soviet bloc of China and USSR on behalf of the DRV fought to ensure each country's sovereign authority.

For the DRV, the mid and late 1950s marked a turning point to a distinct alignment with the Sino-soviet bloc. The centerpiece was the great foreign economic aid that the DRV received from China and Soviet. Between 1953-59 the financial aid amounted to \$520 million dollar and made up more than 30% of the total yearly state revenues (CIA 1959, p. 10; 19).

The army of the DRV, although under reconstruction, was not self-sufficient enough to develop a modern military force, as was its goal. Dependent on foreign material aid to function, almost all heavier firepower, military vehicles and standardized weapons were of Soviet design, provided by China due to the lack of a domestic arms industry. Its sole strength - the sheer size of the army - was tactically impaired by an insufficiently small navy and air force. (CIA 1963, p. 1; 4-5).

Regarding its proposed adversaries in 1960, the DRV alone could not compare to the United States, which not only dominated as the greatest economy, but also proposed a great political and military force with the imminent presence of nuclear arms. Alignment with the Sino-soviet bloc hence became a necessity not only to satisfy demands of the DRV: s economy, but also to maintain its military capabilities and status quo (Tierney 2018, p. 646).

5.2 The power of Ukraine in 2014

5.2.1 Between revolution and reaction

The constitution of Ukraine emphasizes the Ukrainian state as being unitary with a sole legislative parliament, a president as the head of state and a cabinet of ministers as the highest executive organ (UKR Const, art. 2; 75; 102; 113). The president of Ukraine has extensive powers and areas of responsibilities as expressed in the 31 paragraphs of article 106. For example, making the president Commander-in-Chief over the armed forces and other military formations, giving presidential authority to decide on mobilization and martial law in the event of an aggression (UKR Const, art. 106, §17; 106, §20). However, Futey argues that the constitution grants the president authority that the judiciary branch should possess, pointing at the presidential power to create and dismantle ministries, and

the authority to appoint cabinet ministers without the consent of parliament (Futey 1996, p. 31). The power of the presidency therefore exceeds that of the Cabinet of Ministers, while not explicitly being stated in the constitution.

Although the Ukrainian constitution ensures local governance through the self-management of for example socio-economic development in the oblasts (regions), districts, cities, city districts, settlements and villages, it ambiguously describes the vision as being a middle road between decentralization and centralization, but that every level of governance is subordinate to state-governmental law (UKR Const, art. 132; 140; 143). Hence making it necessary to elaborate with a description of the reality of the territorial division of power in Ukraine as of 2014.

With the escalation of conflict in Donbass, Ukraine-Russian trade was cut off, thereby resulting in Ukraine losing its biggest trade partner. The financial effects of this were devastating to the Ukrainian economy. In 2014 Ukraine GDP decreased with 6.5%, inflation soared, and the unemployment rate increased by 77% (The World Bank 2019a; 2019b; 2019c). In regards to allocation of tax revenue and government spending the situation inflicted on social security, forcing the government to cut pensions and paternal benefits (ILO 2016, p. 38). Meanwhile, government spending on defense almost doubled, as did the post of debt service to pay off for IMF loans (WIIW 2015, p. 25). Pressured to implement fiscal austerity to cope with the impending recession, Ukraine public policy in 2014 redirected its focus to state expenditure for it to cope with the root of its financial predicament - the war in Donbass.

5.2.2 Social mobilization and policy network

The case of general distrust and commitment to the common society of Ukraine was a well-known issue at the time of the war in Donetsk. As of 2014, Ukraine was plagued by the presence of widespread corruption. The presidency of Viktor Janukovytyj not only fueled nepotism through the appointment of allies to key government positions, but also created a dependence of state institutions to oligarch patrons to secure public funding and election campaigns. Consequently, judiciary courts did not ensure a fair practice of law and Transparency International ranked Ukraine as the most corrupt country of Europe in 2014 (Transparency 2014; Transparency 2015).

A consistent failure of politicians and government organs to meet the expectations of the civil society, heavily affected the general trust to institutions in Ukraine. The president, government and police force, as an example, were overwhelmingly perceived with distrust in a survey performed in 2012 by the European Social Survey (KIIS 2012). More than 50% of the population did not support neither the president, government nor parliament, but the judiciary courts still received the greatest criticism, being disapproved of by 59.8% of the population in early 2013 (BTI 2014, p. 6).

The civil contempt and indifference to Ukrainian social institutions, is also visible in the general lack of participation in civil society organizations (CSO). Only 2.2% of the population participated in any form of CSO such as NGOs and charity organization, which at the time of the Euromaidan were trusted by a mere 13% of the population (Bartlett - Popovski 2013, p. 16; EEAS 2019, p. 1).

Regarding the local governance of Ukraine, as explicitly stated in the constitution through the division of different territorial levels of government, civilian influence on the creation of decision of policy has been minor. When asked about their perception of the biggest obstruction for them to assert their influence on local governance, 36% of the respondents answered that their efforts would be useless (Aasland - Lyska 2015, p. 164).

5.2.3 International power position

Ukraine's turn to alignment with the EU in early 2014, culminated with the parliamentary signing and ratification of the Association Agreement. Covering the political and economic relationship with the EU, the agreement constitutes a framework for free trade with the European market through the elimination of tariffs on Ukrainian imports (Emerson - Movchan 2016, p. 1-8). This market integration is described as having been essential for overcoming the economic recession in Ukraine sparked by the events of 2013 and 2014, as well as step towards the introduction of European values of democracy, sovereignty and transparency (Petrov 2018, p. 3).

At the time of Russia's annexation of Crimea and the uprising of pro-Russian rebels in Donbass, the armed forces of Ukraine were in a deplorable condition. Insufficient funding, neglected training, poor equipment and demoralization in ground troops, amounted to a military force unable to face the threat that had arisen. As an example, 70% of Ukrainian troops stationed in Crimea swore allegiance to Russia following the annexation (Carnegie 2018).

The predicament of the armed forces at the time of conflict eruption, led the new government of President Poroshenko to deepen Ukraine's collaboration with NATO. After meeting with the heads of the member states, NATO expressed its support to Ukraine territorial sovereignty, and established a trust fund to strengthen Ukrainian defense through support of logistics, command and control. This included practical coordination of humanitarian actions, and the provision of military advisors to train the armed forces (NATO 2015). In the collaboration and support from NATO, Ukraine found a powerful ally to assist both the buildup of forces and the concrete defense of the Ukraine state.

From the very beginning of the conflict, Russia positioned itself as an adversary to Kiev, deploying 48.500 troops at the Ukrainian border in April of 2014 (RAND 2017, p. 65-66). The contribution of information and material from Russia were crucial for the sustainment of the pro-Russian insurgency conducted in Donbass in early 2014. Being provided with training, personnel and arms, resulted in advantageous position for separatists to maintain seized territory, and Russia to keep its covert presence in Ukraine (Grove - Strobel 2014).

5.3 Use of paramilitary forces

5.3.1 The National Liberation Front

The formal creation of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in late 1960 meant a shift in the DRV's strategy and policy towards South Vietnam. Although North Vietnamese insurgency in the south had occurred since the mid-1950s, its activities had been haphazardly conducted without any central organization or planning. Thus, the new organization and public face of insurgency in South Vietnam brought about a more aggressive foreign policy of the DRV. (Fishel 1965, p. 11).

Based on a ten-point plan, the purpose and goals of the NLF as an organized paramilitary insurgency was to overthrow the South Vietnamese government, unify Vietnam, implement land reforms and end US presence in Indochina (Anderson 2002, p. 34-35). Although state radio in Hanoi announced the formation of the NLF as an independent uprising of civilians in the south, the connection with the DRV and its leadership were clear (Radio Hanoi 1961). As van der Kroef points out:

“The original ten-point NLF program of 1960, it should be said, had already borne a remarkable similarity both in letter and spirit to the report of Le Duan, long-time first secretary and chief theoretician of the Lao Dong Party (that is, the Communist Party) of North Vietnam, to that party's all-important Third Congress in September 1960.” (van der Kroef 1967, p. 5).

The organization of the NLF, stemming from a central committee down to local committees, also reflected the affiliation with DRV. As of 1961, the planning of military operations by the NLF, was sanctioned from North Vietnamese army officials in the communist party (Pentagon 1967a p. 40). A similar development was visible in the lowest levels of the NLF organization, where the number of members doubled three times resulting in a member count of 300.000 in late 1962. Every member belonged to several functional and administrative sections of the NLF, all under the supervision of the communist party. Further, NLF members were often trained and indoctrinated in North Vietnam before being deployed to the south (p. (Pentagon 1967b, p. 70; Pentagon 1967a p. 40) Describing the purpose of such a system, Paret's analysis points out that “the essential thing is that no one escapes from this enrollment and that the territorial hierarchy is crossed by another one, which supervises the first and is in turn supervised by it, both being overseen by [...] the Communist Party” (Paret 1964, p. 12-13).

5.3.2 Paramilitary battalions in Ukraine

Responding to the uprising rebellion and escalating violence in eastern Ukraine, acting president Turtjynov utilized the power bestowed in him by the constitution and issued a decree for mobilization on the 14th of April 2014 (Presidential Decree 2014:405; UKR Const, art. 106. §17).

To organize the newly founded voluntary battalions into the defense of eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs became responsible to ensure accountability and funding of the 37 paramilitary battalions. However, as Malyarenko and Galbreath emphasizes, only 9 out of the 37 paramilitary battalions were actually composed by volunteers, the remaining 28 were drafted troops, recruited through compulsory military service (Malyarenko - Galbreath 2016, p. 120). This implies that the chain of command within the Ukrainian state suffered from a fragmentation in joint organization, which is confirmed through the internal disputes on responsibility that occurred between the two responsible ministries (Butusov 2014).

Even though the Ukrainian government played an active role in the upkeep of paramilitary battalions in combat, supplying them with tanks and heavy artillery, they were not the sole contributor. (Malyarenko & Galbreath 2016, p. 123). Apart from contributions from the state budget and military dependence of the official armed forces of Ukraine for artillery cover, no standardization existed on how paramilitary battalions were to be internally organized or funded (Mironova - Segatskova 2017),

An intelligence report from 2015 summarizes the varying forms of organization within the battalions by saying that: “While basic salaries and military hardware are provided by the state, equipment and extra pay are often financed through crowdfunding or donations by individuals (family members, local companies or oligarchs)” (FOI 2015).

Ukraine’s embracement of paramilitary battalions paints the picture of an ambiguous relationship. While having been successful in combat operations, such as the battles of Mariupol and receiving public acclaim and support, the paramilitary battalions of Ukraine still exists in a limbo between government supervision and self-constructed autonomy. (Dzerkalo Tyzhnia 2014). Aligned and dependent with each other but lacking a principal-agent structure of command.

6 Analysis and discussion

Here follows an analysis and discussion of the empirical evidence in relation to the theory of state power and state action. Firstly, a power classification is made of the DRV and Ukraine, based on the empirical indicators of domestic and international power. Secondly, the chain of events in the process of alignment with paramilitary troops is analyzed to assess if it accounts for a certain strategy as presented by the theory. Thirdly, I will discuss possible theoretical contributions that the study presents.

6.1 Classification of cases

6.1.1 Domestic power

Centralization

Stephens definition of what characterizes centralization is a state in which public policy, resource distribution and welfare service mainly is provided by the national government (Stephens 1974, p. 10). In the case of the DRV's constitution, the term "democratic centralism" is explicitly used, whereas Ukraine's presents its vision of balance between centralization and decentralization (DRV Const, art 132; 140; 143). However, analysis of the empirical evidence makes the notions of "democratic" and "balance" refutable in favor of a distinct centralization of power.

For the DRV the constitution of 1959 as well as the influence of the CPV on North Vietnamese legislation and executive governance points toward a case of unitarian authoritarianism. Granting extensive executive authority to the government and presidency is in itself not sufficient enough for a centralized classification, but as the empirical evidence shows, the general omnipresence of the communist party indicates a total control over the formation policy from the politburo (Weiner Normand 1967, p. 71; 73; 74). This assessment is further confirmed when describing the relevant deciding actors of each state and their influence as veto-players. The reflection of Tsebelis is that a smaller concentration of players result in a more homogenous decision-making, thus centralizing the power, especially in the case of an authoritarian government such as a one controlled by one party, such as the DRV was in 1960 (Tsebelis 1995).

Similarly, Ukraine's constitution expresses a vision that contradicts the reality of its empirical indications of power centralization. Not only is the constitution granting the presidency alone with extensive executive authority, but it stresses the subordination of local governance to state interests (UKR Const, art 113; 132; 140; 143). Furthermore, as the events of 2014 has shown, the economic influx is very much allocated to state interests as welfare was reduced during a recession, in favor to fund the war in Donbass. The reality of Ukraine in 2014 presents a state which as Rodden and Stephens argues, allocates resources, and thus power to the state, making it further centralized (Rodden 2004; Stephens 1974).

Social mobilization and policy network

To empirically identify the degree of social mobilization as a process of replaced traditions and institutions increasing the cohesion and organization of a society, this study has focused on civic participation and societal trust in institutions as indicators (Deutsch 1961, p. 498).

It should however be said that it is hard to assess the true degree of cohesion within the North Vietnamese society of 1960, but the contrasting reality of an extremely high election participation with the long-lasting issues of rallying voters and rural support for state projects, makes it possible to argue that the real degree of cohesion was smaller. This empirical evidence along with the demographic concentration of the intelligentsia in the state leadership cannot be said to represent a positive connectedness between members of society or a focus on the common good as cohesion is defined by Dragolov (2016, p. 6).

The same can be argued in the case of Ukraine in 2014, where civic participation and trust in institutions suffered from the widespread corruption in the judiciary and political organs established to tend to Ukrainian civil society. Creating an indifference to social institutions, it has affected the interest to participate in civil organizations providing welfare, aid and support to the distressed. Thus, the organization of Ukrainian society can be regarded as low since there is no apparent support or interest to organize for a common cause (Firth 1954, p. 10).

To conclude the analysis of domestic power, policy and social mobilization in the DRV and Ukraine, the empirical evidence points towards the ideal type that Risse-Kappen defines as states where creation and implementation of policy as dominated by the state (Risse-Kappen 1991, p. 486). The two states high degree of centralization and low degree of social mobilization makes it possible to classify the states as hard in relation to their own society, or domestically powerful. In the DRV it's a question of authoritarian control over policy creation through the influence of the CPV as a veto-player granted by the constitution, and in Ukraine it's a question of a nonfunctioning social society built on mistrust and corruption. Policy is in both cases a matter of the state and not the people.

6.1.2 International power

Analyzing the relative power of the DRV and Ukraine in relation to their allies and adversaries makes for a fair comparison of two similar cases. In both cases the empirical evidence presents a picture of two states dependent on their greater allies - North Vietnamese dependence on the Sino-soviet economic support and military material to balance the dichotomy of the cold war - and Ukrainian dependence on trade with the EU and organizational support from NATO. Accepting the realist idea that small powers are more prone to seek help abroad, these strategies of alignment with greater powers is arguably an example of such a strategy, confirming the theory of Parent and Rosato (2015, p .54).

Further elaborating on Waltz view on power as a distribution of capabilities to achieve maximized utility of the state interests shows that “self-help” from internal means alone has not been possible (Waltz 1979, p. 118; 192). As both states pursued a clear alignment with greater powers to enable their continued war effort, it is possible to conclude that the DRV and Ukraine, based on their inferior power to the United States and Russia, are to be perceived as internationally weak states - dependent on their allies to claim international power.

6.2 Paramilitary forces – a strategy of what?

Classifying the DRV and Ukraine as domestically hard and internationally weak positions the states as being more likely to pursue internal mobilization as a strategy of state action (fig. 2).

		<u>International Structure</u>	
		Weak	Powerful
<u>Domestic Structure</u>	Soft	Internal Extraction External Validation	External Extraction
	Hard	Internal Mobilization <u>The DRV - 1960</u> <u>Ukraine - 2014</u>	Internal Mobilization External Extraction

Fig. 2. Strategy of the DRV and Ukraine as postulated by Mastanduno et al. (1989).

6.2.1 Understanding the strategy

The notion of internal mobilization, as described by Mastanduno et. al. is the approach of state intervention in the domestic economy to transform a resource into wealth to promote a certain state interest. This can either be carried out through the direct presence of the state as a central planner and enforcer of economic reform, or it can be implemented indirectly through planned legislation and promotion of certain values (Mastanduno et al. 1989, p. 462-463). I argue that both the DRV's alignment with the NLF in 1960 and Ukraine's alignment with paramilitary battalions in 2014, are examples of internal mobilization, but that the DRV pursued a direct approach whereas Ukraine pursued an indirect approach.

The formation of the NLF as an allied paramilitary force to the DRV was not a process outside of governmental control or direction. As shown by the empirical evidence the NLF was not granted autonomy in the planning of military operations, nor was it autonomous from North Vietnamese training and political indoctrination. This process of recruitment organized its members in clear political subordination to the hierarchy of the politburo of the DRV. The influence of the North Vietnamese government to the NLFs set out goal of unifying Vietnam, its military organization with North Vietnamese training and the surveillance of the military chain of command by the CPV, indicates a direct approach by the DRV to transform humans from a the resource of being civilians into soldiers, making them an asset of wealth in a parallel army (Paret 1964, p. 12-13; Mastanduno et al. 1989, p. 462).

Ukraine's alignment with paramilitary battalions is similar to the case of the DRV in regard to the state officially embracing volunteer paramilitary forces. Firstly, the presidential decision to mobilize "other forms" of military granted by the constitution functions as a judiciary enabling arming of paramilitary soldiers. Secondly, military conscription to the battalions indicate an approach of the Ukrainian state to support the fighting forces without having to assimilate paramilitary forces into the regular army. Lastly, the autonomous positions of the paramilitary forces as being self-sufficient in providing funding and the battalions being independent organizations from the Ukrainian state. I argue that these factors point toward a more indirect internal mobilization of civilians into paramilitary soldiers (UKR Const, art. 106, §17; 106, §20; Malyarenko - Galbreath 2016, p. 120; FOI 2015).

6.2.2 Understanding the mechanism

As the theory postulates, the degree of power centralization is a question of the executive and judiciary power of the state. A greater concentration of power because of polity, veto-players and resource allocation inducing power to the state, results in greater state capacity to pursue and implement a certain policy. Meanwhile a low degree of social mobilization also contributes further to the state

capacity to create and pursue policy since a lesser amount of cohesion and organization within a society means a reduced influence of civilians on the formation of state policy (Morin - Paquin 2018, p. 135; 137 - Dragolov 2016, p. 6).

In this context, state alignment with paramilitary forces can be regarded as a result of two coinciding forces within the state. The first stemming from the ability of the state to pursue - due to its capacity to form policies on its own terms - the unconventional strategy of arming and supporting already existing civilian paramilitaries. The second stemming from the society not trusting and willing to fight for state institutions such as the army, making paramilitary forces more appealing due to their alternative organization and greater autonomy (Morin - Paquin 2018, p. 137; Deutsch 1961, p. 494)

It can be argued that this dichotomy exists within domestically hard and internationally weak states such as the DRV and Ukraine. In the DRV the empirical evidence showed that the policy of alignment was a direct product of the politburo strategy to organize insurgency in South Vietnam, while the massive inflow of members to the NLF indicate a widespread willingness to join such as force. The same process took place in Ukraine, where constitutional approval and conscription enabled alignment with civilians that generally entrusted paramilitary troops more than state institutions. This could be a sign of the state capacity being used to rally paramilitary members as a resource in the state's conducting of war and civil members being more willing to join paramilitary forces, fighting along the state in an autonomous organization (Pentagon 1967b; van der Kroef 1967, p. 5; BTI 2014, p.6; Malyarenko - Galbreath 2016, p. 120)

It is possible to argue that domestically hard and internationally powerful states would not pursue such a strategy since such states generally achieve their international power through already developed official armed forces, which was not the case for the DRV and Ukraine, which at their respective time of alignment suffered from an underdeveloped military (Carnegie 2018; CIA 1963, p. 1; Waltz 1979, p. 192).

6.3 War and policy

6.3.1 Revising the theory of state action

Whereas the strategies of Mastanduno et al. (1989) themselves are thoroughly elaborated and exemplified, the concept of resources themselves are just described as material to enable the state's pursuit of foreign policy. A described process of turning a resource into wealth and wealth into power - for example state intervention in the economy to promote production, which then can enable

military expenditure to increase military power (Mastanduno et al. 1989 p. 460; 462).

I argue, based on the empirical evidence, that this model should expand its perspective to include civil members as a resource to be strategically mobilized and extracted into power. Seeing as both states of the DRV and Ukraine have been active in the process of recruiting and supporting paramilitary forces, implies a view of civilian members as a potential asset in war. Furthermore, the use of the forces alongside regular armed forces in combat implies a perception of the forces as an instrument of military power. Internal mobilization of resources is an organization of a resource into an asset. Arming and funding civilians in paramilitary groups makes them into an asset for the state to be used as a part of their war effort. Likewise does the possible use of such forces by the state turn them into a source of power, meaning that the asset becomes extracted. This observation concurs with Waltz view on power as a distribution of capabilities, where the use of paramilitary forces in war can be perceived as such a distributed capability (Waltz 1979, p. 192).

6.3.2 A flux of power and policy?

Alignment itself, I argue is a process of decentralization. As paramilitary forces gain funds, organizational support and material from the state, it becomes a process of reallocation of resources from the state to social organizations. Such distributions to the society are according to Rodden a sign of decentralization (Rodden 2004). This was visible in Ukraine, where the state funded the paramilitary battalions which in turn attracted further funding from private individuals, oligarchs etc., indicating a general reallocation of resources to the battalions (FOI 2015).

Simultaneously as paramilitary forces establish themselves, they become entrusted institutions in the society. The fact that the NLF was able to recruit 300.000 members in their first two years, and that paramilitary battalions in Ukraine received more support by the civil society than the government, points to a change in trust and participation within the society (Pentagon 1967b, p. 70; Dzerkalo Tyzhnia 2014). The introduction of such entrusted organizations is according to Cohen an example of a shift towards a greater social mobilization where organizations gain influence on decision making (Cohen 2004).

International power is relative, but domestic power is an absolute entity making it more dynamic as it relies on domestic factors. If decentralization of power and an increase in social mobilization takes place due to a policy of alignment it would mean, for states that are domestically powerful, that the policy causes a shift in domestic power from hard towards soft. When applied to the model of Mastanduno et al. (1989) on how states are expected to act depending on their domestic and international power, states would be more likely to pursue internal extraction and external validation, due to flux of power from the state to paramilitary forces (see fig. 3). The states become more dependent and affected

by the paramilitary forces as these gain influence over the creation of policy in the continuing war.




Fig. 3. How decision induce upkeep through a shift in power (Author of the study).

That the DRV and Ukraine extended their use of paramilitary forces, indicates a perception of these forces as an asset of power, or an internally extractable resource in war. Both the DRV and Ukraine were openly embracing the use of paramilitary forces, communicating their appreciation and support of the unconventional warfare, which is a sign of the type of validation that a softer state seeks to rally support for its action. War induces fragility, and so the state seeks recognition (Mastanduno et al. 1989, p. 463; 464; Dzerkalo Tyzhnia 2014; Radio Hanoi 1961).

Therefore, I argue that the policy of alignment with paramilitary forces can induce a process in which the policy distorts the domestic power distribution and creates a bolted effect in which the state policy of alignment becomes continuous and difficult to abandon. The decision of alignment could therefore be an example of a policy embarked upon in a hard state, but the continuous upkeep of alignment could be an effect of the decision itself as the state transitions into a softer state. I have decided to call this phenomenon “Bolted Policy” - a policy that changes the dynamics of state to the extent that the policy becomes consolidated and changes the pursued state action strategy. The state use of paramilitary forces is a question of a decision and upkeep that could be the results of a power shift within a hard state.

7 Conclusion

The purpose of this study has been to provide an understanding of why states align themselves with paramilitary forces, by analyzing and elaborating theories on domestic and international power. Through an empirical analysis of the cases of the DRV in 1960 and Ukraine in 2014 the study could conclude that paramilitary alignment can be regarded as a state strategy induced by the factors constituting the domestic and international power of the state.

Describing the degree of centralization, cohesion and international alignment has made it possible to classify the DRV and Ukraine as domestically powerful and internationally weak states. The expected state strategy of internal mobilization, as induced by the conclusions of the classification, was then applied to the decision and process of alignment with the NLF in the DRV and paramilitary battalions in Ukraine. General mistrust and low cohesion coinciding with the high degree of state centralization, made it possible to explain the alignment as a strategy of turning civil members into a military asset. Exemplified by the executive authority of the states to recruit and mobilize and the general trust and willingness of civil members to join paramilitary forces indicate a causal mechanism between the “Hard-Weak”-state and the use of paramilitary forces in war

Additionally, the study has been able to elaborate the theory of state action and contribute to its further development. Firstly, by applying the theoretical concept of mobilization and extraction of resources on the process of mobilization and use of paramilitary forces in the DRV and Ukraine, I argue that civil members should be perceived as a resource.

Secondly by describing the decentralizing and socially mobilizing effect of a state arming and supporting autonomous civilian military forces, I argue that the upkeep of alignment can be regarded as an effect of the power shift that such a strategy induces. Supporting this conclusion is the fact that both the DRV and Ukraine have pursued strategies of internal extraction through continued use of paramilitary forces and external validation through the official communication and cooperation with the forces. Meanwhile it has been evident that the paramilitary forces have gained influence and autonomy and thereby reduced the state’s power of policy creation, thus weakening the domestic power of the state.

The prospects are good for future research on the phenomenon of paramilitary warfare and state action. One aspect that this study has not focused on is how the internal organization of paramilitary forces affect the process of alignment. Does hierarchical order, political affiliation or methods of combat in groups of armed civilians affect state willingness to support and use such groups in war?

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